41[1]MOSKOS CLASSIC - From Institution to Occupation

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Armed Forces & Society

DOI: 10.1177/0095327X77004001031977; 4; 41Armed Forces & Society

Charles C. Moskos, JROrganization

From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military

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From Institution to OccupationTRENDS IN MILITARY ORGANIZATION

CHARLES C. MOSKOS, Jr.

Northwestern University

Te military can be understood as a social organization whichmaintains levels of autonomy while refracting broader societal trends.

It is from this perspective that we apply a developmental analysis to the

emergent structure of the armed forces.

Developmental analysis entails historical reconstruction, trend

specification, and, most especially, a model of a future state of affairstoward which actual events are heading.I Developmental analysis,that is, emphasizes the &dquo;from here to there&dquo; sequence of present andhypothetical events. Stated in a slightly different way, a developmentalconstruct is a &dquo;pure type&dquo; placed at some future point by which we mayascertain and order the emergent reality of contemporary social

phenomena. Models derived from developmental analysis bridge theempirical world of today with the social forms of the future. Put plainly,what is the likely shape of the military in the foreseeable future?

AUTHORS NOTE: ~Mp~o~/royM f~ C/.~..4r~ ~~orc/! /mn


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Initially, two models-institution versus occupation-will bepresented to describe alternative conceptions of military social organi-

zation. These models are evaluated as to which best fits current em-pirical indicators. The basic hypothesis is that theAmerican military is

moving from an institutional format to one more and more resemblingthat of an occupation. Second, there will be specification of some

expected organizational outcomes in the military system resulting fromthe shift to an occupational model.

INSTITUTION OR OCCUPATION

Terms like institution or occupation have obvious limitations in both

popular and scholarly discussion.2 Nevertheless, they contain coreconnotations which serve to distinguish each from the other. For

present purposes these distinctions can be described as follows.

An institution is legitimated in terms of values and norms, i.e., a

purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumedhigher good. Members of an institution are often viewed as followinga calling; they generally regard themselves as being different or apartfrom the broader society and are so regarded by others. To the degreeones institutional membership is congruent with notions of self-sacrifice and dedication, it will usually enjoy esteem from the largercommunity.Although renumeration may not be comparable to whatone might expect in the economy of the marketplace, this is often

compensated for by an array of social benefits associated with aninstitutional format as well as psychic income. When grievances arefelt, members of an institution do not organize themselves into interest

groups. Rather, if redress is sought it takes the form of &dquo;one-on-one&dquo;recourse to superiors, with its implications of trust in the paternalism ofthe institution to take care of its own.

Military service traditionally has had many institutional features.

One thinksof the

extendedtours

abroad,the fixed terms of

enlistment,liability for 24-hour service availability, frequent movements of selfand family, subjection to military discipline and law, and inability to

resign, strike, or negotiate over working conditions.All this is aboveand beyond the dangers inherent in military maneuvers and actualcombat operations. It is also significant that a paternalistic renumer-ation system has evolved in the military corresponding to the institu-tional model: compensation received in noncash form (e.g., food,


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housing, uniforms), subsidized consumer facilities on the base, pay-ments to service members partly determined by family status, and a

large proportionof

compensationreceived as deferred

payin the form

of retirement benefits.

The military variant of professionalism historically has been con-sistent with the institutional model.3 The traditional milieu of the

service academies has been likened to that of a seminary.4 Certainly themultitiered military educational system for career officers-as typifiedby the command schools and the war colleges-is as much institutionalreinforcement as it is narrow professional training. Moreover, unlike

civilian professionals for whom compensation is heavily determined byindividual expertise and can even be in the form of fee for service, the

compensation received by the military professional is a function of

rank, seniority, and need-not strictly speaking, professional expertise.(The exception to this occurs, interestingly enough, when the militaryorganization takes into account-via the mechanism of off-scale

compensation-certain professionals whose skills are intrinsicallynonmilitary, the notable example being physicians.) To compound

matters, there are societal forces eroding the institutional features ofthe professions within and outside the military.5An occupation is legitimated in terms of the marketplace, i.e.,

prevailing monetary rewards for equivalent competencies. In a modernindustrial society employees usually enjoy some voice in the determin-ation of appropriate salary and work conditions. Such rights arecounterbalanced by responsibilities to meet contractual obligations.The occupational model implies priority of self-interest rather than thatof the employing organization.Acommon form of interest articulationin industrial-and increasingly governmental-occupations is thetrade union.

Traditionally, the military has sought to avoid the organizationaloutcomes of the occupational model. This in the face of repeated recom-mendations of governmental commissions that the armed services

adopt a salary system which would incorporate all basic pay, allow-ances, and tax benefits into one cash payment, and which would

eliminate compensation differences between married and singlepersonnel, thus conforming to the equal-pay-for-equal-work principleof civilian occupations. Such a salary system would set up an employer-employee relationship quite at variance with military traditions.

Nevertheless, even in the conventional military system there has beensome accommodation to occupational imperatives. Special supple-




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ments and proficiency pay have long been found necessary to recruitand retain highly skilled enlisted personnel.

The distinction between institution and

occupationcan be over-

drawn. Reality, moreover, is complicated in that the armed forceshave had and will continue to have elements of both the institutional

and occupational types.6 There are also important differences betweenthe various services, the most obvious being faster-paced technologicaldevelopment in the air force and navy compared to the army andmarine corps. But the heuristic value of the typology is deemed valid.It allows for a conceptual grasp of the basic hypothesis that the over-

arching trend within the contemporary military is the erosion of theinstitutional format and the ascendancy of the occupational model.

Although antecedents predated the appearance of the all-volunteerforce in early 1973, the end of the draft served as the major thrust tomove the military toward the occupational model. In contrast to theall-volunteer force, the selective service system was premised on thenotion of the citizens obligation-with concomitant low salaries forlower enlisted personnel-and the ideal of a broadly representativeenlisted force (though this ideal was not always realized in practice).The occupational model clearly underpinned the philosophic rationaleof the 1970 report of the Presidents Commission on anAll-Volunteer

Force (&dquo;Gates Commission Report&dquo;).7 Instead of a military systemanchored in the normative values of an institution, captured in wordslike &dquo;duty,&dquo; &dquo;honor,&dquo; &dquo;country,&dquo; the Gates Commission explicitlyargued that primary reliance in recruiting an armed force should beon

monetary inducements guided by marketplace standards.Actually, the move toward making military remuneration competi-tive with the civilian sector preceded the advent of the all-volunteerforce. Since 1967, military pay has been formally linked to the civilservice and thus, indirectly, to the civilian labor market. From 1964 to

1974, average earnings in the private economy rose 52% while regularmilitary compensation-basic pay, allowances, tax advantages-rose76% for representative grade levels, such as lieutenant colonels and

master sergeants.8 Even more dramatic, recruit pay from 1964 to 1976increased 193% in constant dollars compared to 10% for the averageunskilled laborer.9

It is important to stress that although the army was the only serviceto rely directly on large numbers of draftees for its manpower needs,all the services were berieficiaries of the selective service system. It is

estimated that close to half of all voluntary accession into the military




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in the peacetime years between the wars in Korea and Vietnam weredraft-motivated. The draft was also the major impetus for recruitmentinto the ROTC and the

reserve/guardunits.

Termination of the draft and the rise in military pay have been two ofthe most visible changes in the contemporary military system, but otherindicators of the trend away from the institutional format can also

be noted: (1) proposals to eliminate or reduce a host of military benefits,e.g., subsidies for commissaries, health care for dependents, and majorrestructuring of the retirement system; (2) the increasing class andracial unrepresentativeness of the ground combat arms; (3) the separa-

tion of work and residence locales accompanying the growing numbersof single enlisted men living off base; (4) the burgeoning resistance of

many military wives, at officer and noncom levels, to participatingin customary social functions; (5) the high rate of attrition and desertion

among enlisted personnel in the post-Vietnam military; and (6) the

increasing tendency of active-duty personnel to bring grievances into

litigation. The sum of these and related developments is to confirmthe ascendancy of the occupational model in the emergent military.

- CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCUPATIONAL MODEL

Ashift in the rationale of the military toward the occupationalmodel implies organizational consequences in the structure and,perhaps, the function of the armed forces. This discussion should not

be construedas

advocacy of such organizational consequencesor

evenof their inevitability. But it does suggest that certain outcomes canbe anticipated if the military becomes even more like an occupation.Two changes, in particular, are presently apparent in military social

organization: the growing likelihood of unionization and the increasingreliance on contract civilians to perform military tasks.Althoughseemingly unrelated, both such organizational changes derive from theascendant occupational model.

Trade Unionism

The possibility that trade unionism might link with the armed forcesof the United States was barely more than a remote thought justa few years ago. Today, there are signs that such an eventuality could




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come to pass. The growing militancy of previously quiescent publicemployees at municipal, state, and federal levels may be a percursor ofsimilar

activitywithin the

military system.10 ManyWestern

Europeancountries, including several members of NATO, have long-standingmilitary trade unions.&dquo;It has been the advent of the all-volunteerforce which has made unionization of theAmerican armed forces

a strong possibility. Reliance on monetary incentives to recruit militarymembers is quite consistent with the notion of trade unionism.

In 1975, the National Maritime Union (NMU), a union affiliatedwith theAFL-CIO, reported that it was considering organizing sailors

in the U.S. Navy. For some time, the independentAssociation ofCivilian Technicians (ACT) has been a union for civilians who work

full-time for the reserve and National Guard (almost all of whom arealso members of the units employing them). Of the various possibilitiesfor military trade unionism, the most substantial initiatives, by far,are those of theAmerican Federation of Government Employees(AFGE), affiliated with theAFL-CIO. In its 1976 annual convention,theAFGE amended its constitution to extend membership eligibilityto military personnel serving on active duty. The majority of theAFGEs 325,000 members are civilian employees working on militaryinstallations. In mid-1977, theAFGE was conducting a referendum todecide whether the union should proceed toward a full-fledged driveto organize military personnel.l2

Such groups as theAFGE, NMU, andACT are staunchly patriotic,conservative in their approach to social change, and professed bread-

and-butter unions. There is no connection between these unions andthe radical, self-styled servicemens unions that appeared in the late

years of the Vietnam war. But there is a potentially disquieting impli-cation if these established unions succeed in organizing the military: the

politicization of the armed forces arising from the usually close workingrelationship between theAFL-CIO and the Democratic Party atnational and local levels

Military unions face a number of legal obstacles. Current defense

department directives allow service members to join unions, but forbidcommanders from negotiating with them.Additionally, legislation hasbeen introduced in recent congressional sessions to prohibit union-ization of the armed forces. Even if Congress passed a law prohibitingmilitary unions and the president signed the law, its constitutionalitycertainly would be tested in the courts. Military commanders alreadyare permitted to negotiate with unionized civilian employees on military




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installations, and, since 1975, they have also been delegated explicitauthority to sign local labor agreements with civilian personnel.

Even

though militaryunions are anathema to the service associa-

tions, almost all senior officers, and many civilians, there is a wide-

spread view among all ranks of military personnel that the institutional

qualities of military life are being undermined. Much of this dissatisfac-tion focuses on the perceived erosion of military benefits and the jobinsecurities resulting from periodic reductions in force. Not so wellunderstood is that the institutional features of the military system mayhave been traded off for the relatively good salaries enjoyed by military

personnel inthe all-volunteer force. The

potentialfor unionization is

great precisely because military social organization has moved in thedirection of the occupational model, while much of its membershipharkens to the social supports of the older institutional format. It

is also possible that a unionized military would not be accorded thefavor that it presently enjoys from the public (which is prone to viewthe military as the embodiment of a calling).4 Indeed, society mightview a military union in more crass terms than would be anticipated

because of a reaction against public employee unions in general.

Civilian Technicians

Trends toward military unionization are organizational develop-ments that could be incorporated, albeit with some strain, into thestructure of the armed forces, but another consequence of the ascendant

occupational model departs entirely from formal military organization.This is the use of civilians to perform tasks which, by any conventionalmeasure, would be seen as military in content. The private armies of theCentral IntelligenceAgency long have been an object of concern withinthe regular military command. But what is anomalous in the emergingorder is that, rather than assigning its own military personnel, theU.S. government increasingly gives contracts directly to civilian firms-with salary levels much higher than comparable military rates-to

performdifficult

militarytasks. In other words, the very structure of

the military system no longer encompasses the full range of militaryfunctions.

One finds it difficult to overstate the extent to which the operationalside of the military system now relies on civilian technicians. The

large warships of the U.S. Navy are combat ineffective without thetechnical skills of contract civilians, the so-called &dquo;tech reps,&dquo; who




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serve permanently aboard these ships. Major army ordnance centers,

including those in combat theaters, require contract civilians to

perform necessary maintenance and assembly. Missile warning systemsin Greenland are, in effect, civilian-manned military installations

operated by firms responsible to the U.S.Air Force. In SoutheastAsiaand SaudiArabia, the U.S. Government gave contracts to privatecompanies, such asAirAmerica and Vinnel Corporation, to recruitcivilians who performed military activities. In Isfahan, Iran, the Bell

Helicopter and Grumman companies established a quasi-military basestaffed by formerAmerican military personnel who trained Iranian

pilots.15 During the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975, charteredcivilian aircraft were used to rescueAmerican nationals under virtual

combat conditions. TheAmerican monitoring force in the Sinai wascontracted out to private industry, with the government retaining onlypolicy control.

External political considerations obviously impinge on decisions touse civilian contracts for certain military tasks. It may be that the

employment of civilian technicians overseas does not symbolize anational commitment to the same extent as would the deployment ofuniformed personnel.Apparently, in certain roles requiring high levelsof technical sophistication, civilians are simply more cost effectivethan military personnel. Nevertheless, if task efficiency is the issue,a more nagging implication is that military personnel cannot or willnot perform long-term arduous duty with the efficacy of contractcivilians. If this were to become the norm, beliefs conducive to organ-

izational integrity and societal respect-the whole notion of militarylegitimacy-become untenable. The trend toward the employment ofcontract civilians to perform military tasks could be the culminationof occupational ascendancy in the military purpose.

CONCLUSION

The hypothesis of the ascendant occupational model in the armedforces alerts one to, and makes sense out of, current organizationaltrends in the social structure of the military. If there is concern withcurrent developments-the possibility of trade unionism, excessivereliance on contract civilians, service morale, and the like-then

attention ought to be focused on the root cause and not just on theovert symptoms. To describe observable trends in military organization




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is not to mean they are inevitable. 16 But developmental analysis revealsthe impetus and probable outcomes of present trends in the emergentmilitary.

NOTES

1. Heinz Eulau, "H. D. Lasswells Developmental Analysis," Western Political

Quarterly 2 (1958): 229-242.2. Robert Dubin, ed., Handbook of Work, Organization, and Society (Chicago:

Rand McNally, 1976).3. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free

Press, 1960).4. John P. Lovell, "The ServiceAcademies in Transition," in Lawrence J. Korb,

ed., The System ofEducating Military Officers in the U.S. (Pittsburgh, Pa.: InternationalStudiesAssociation, 1976), pp. 35-50.

5. ElliottA. Krause, The Sociology of Occupations (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971),pp. 84-108.

6.Although the conceptual referent differs from the hypothesis of the ascendant

occupational model presented here, there are certain parallels to be found in Jacquesvan Doorn, "The Decline of the MassArmy in the West,"Armed Forces and Society 1

(1975): 147-158.

7. The Report of the Presidents Commission on anAll-Volunteer Force (Washing-ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970).

8. Steven L. Canby and RobertA. Butler, "The Military Manpower Question," inWilliam Schneider, Jr., and Francis P. Hoeber, eds.,Arms, Men, and Military Budgets(New York: Crane, Russak, 1976), pp. 186-187.

9. Tulay Demirles, "Adjusted Consumer Price Index for Military Personnel and a

Comparison of Real Civilian and Military Earnings, 1964-1973," Technical Memoran-dum, TM-1200 (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, 1974), p. 9.

10.An overview of the precedents and potentialities for military unionization isEzra S. Krendel and Bernard Samhoff, Unionizing theArmed Forces (Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977).

11. On Western Europe, see the "Special Symposium on Trade Unionism in the

Military,"Armed Forces and Society 2 (1976): 477-522; also Gwyn Harries-Jenkins,"Trade Unions in theArmed Forces," paper presented at the Conference of the British

Inter-University Seminar onArmed Forces and Society,April 1976.

12. "Organizing the Military," The Government Standard [the official organ oftheAmerican Federation of Government Employees] (May 1977): 11-14.

13. In June 1977, Congress was considering repeal of the HatchAct which since 1939has banned federal employees from participating in political activities. One consequenceof repeal of the HatchAct would be removal of restrictions on the use of governmentemployee union funds for political purposes. Washington Post (June 9, 1977): 1.

14. David R. Segal, "Civil-Military Relations in the Mass Public,"Armed Forcesand Society 1 (1975): 215-230; David R. Segal and John D. Blair, "Public Confidence in




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the U.S. Military,"Armed Forces and Society 3 (1976): 3-12; John D. Blair and JeraldG. Bachman, "The Public View of the Military," in Nancy L. Goldman and David R.

Segal, eds., The Social Psychology ofMilitary Service (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976),pp. 215-236.

15. U.S. Congress. Senate. Staff Report to the Subcommittee on ForeignAssistanceof the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Military Sales to Iran, 94th Congress,2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976).

16. To phrase discussion of the emergent military solely in terms of factors internalto the military organization is to beg the larger question. Ultimately, the organizationaldirection of the armed forces is connected with more general values of citizen partici-pation and obligation. Even though there is renewed talk of reinstituting conscriptionin the wake of recruitment inadequacies of the all-volunteer force, this possibility is

viewed as unlikely in the current political climate. More salient, a return to the draftmight well result in troop morale and discipline problems exceeding what the militarysystem could accommodate.

Perhaps the time is opportune to consider a voluntary national service programinwhich military service is one of several optionswhich would be a prerequisite for futurefederal employment. Such a program would be philosophically defensible by linkingfuture employment by the taxpayer to prior commitment to national service. It wouldmeet pressing national needs in both the civilian and military spheres and make publicservice an essential part of growing up inAmerica. Most important, it would clarify the

militarys role by reinvigorating the ethic of national service.

CHARLES C. MOSKOS, Jr., is Professor of Sociology, Northwestern University. Heis the author of TheAmerican Enlisted Man and numerous articles onAmerican militaryaffairs, and the editor of Public Opinion and the Military Establishment. His currentresearch is on the Greek-American community.

1977 Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. All rights reserved. Notat Kings College London - ISS on June 2, 2008http://afs.sagepub.comDownloaded from

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41[1]MOSKOS CLASSIC - From Institution to Occupation