4.2 - Kanev, Krassimir - Bulgaria. the Romantic Period of the Opposition Continues (en)

7/30/2019 4.2 - Kanev, Krassimir - Bulgaria. the Romantic Period of the Opposition Continues (en)

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Bulgaria: the Romantic Period of the Opposition Continues

Bulgaria: the Romantic Period of the Opposition Continues

by Krassimir Kanev

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 3+4 / 1990, pages: 307-317, on www.ceeol.com.
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BULGARIA: THE ROMANTIC PERIOD OFTHE OPPOSITION CONTINUES

Krassimir Kanev

The established stereotypes of interpretation of the political process areabout to lose validity after facing what happened in Eastern Europe duringthe last for years. Applied to this development, they give bizarre results. Forthe old Marxist, dogmaticEastern Europe is obviously "moving to the right",if not suffering "counter-revolution". But how, in that case, could recentevents mobilize such a mass of people, including those of underprivilegedsocial strata? From the same dogmatic position, the rejection of "centralplanning" and introduction of "market economy" would mean rejection of"socialism" and "classless society". But how could one explain the fact that itwas that type of "socialism" and that type of "classless society" whichatt racted, as a rule, the privileged strata it had created?

It would be a leap into the dark to try other interpretative approaches.Today it is perhaps most wise, in describing the East-European situation, touse the conceptualizations of the political forces in their day-to-day struggle.After all, many of the theoretical schemes of social science arose from similareveryday conceptualizations. My basic approach here, in telling the story ofwhat happened in one of the East-European countries, Bulgaria, will makeuse of such results. And it is not only caution: I believe that political science,perhaps more than any other branch of knowledge, is situationallyconditioned in its principles, no less than in its interpretative approaches.The Bulgarian situation

Bulgariawas the only country in which, after a development very similar tothat of the other East-European countries, the Communist party retainedpower through free elections. Why did it happen, and how was it possibleagainst the background of what some political scientists would call the"unquestionable principle" of impossibility for a totalitarian Communistparty to win free elections?Some of the preconditions of this result lie outside the concretedevelopment in free political competition since November 1989. They are inthe Bulgarian history after World War 11, i.e., under the Communist regime.First of all, during this period and under the rule of the Communist Party,especially in the early period, Bulgaria realized certain economic growth andthe people achieved a higher level of social welfare, as in the case of any otherEast-European country. But in Bulgaria certain factors amplified thePraxis International 10: 3/4October 1990 & January 1991 0260-8448$2.00


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Praxis International 307influence of the Communist Party. The Communist ideology came from theSoviet Union and was transplanted in the ground of Greek Orthodoxy withRussophilism, rooted deeply in the mass psychology. Bulgaria gained itsnational independence from the Ottoman empire in 1878, following a warbetween Russia and Turkey. The National Revival produced the myth of"Grand Father Ivan", the liberator, a myth fostered also by the CommunistParty. Throughout pre-Communist modern Bulgarian history, an egalitarianmentalitywas stimulated by the predominantly agrarian economy, withmorethan 75% of the population living in a village, cultivating small pieces of land.The egalitarian feeling was effectively kept up during the period ofindustrialization, regardless of the fact that the rural population decreased to35% in 1985.With the Communist-dominated government of the Fatherland Front,(1944-1947) people associated the country's getting out of the awkwardsituation of collaboration with Nazi Germany during World War 11. Thusduring those 45 years of Communist rule the CP did not take steps towardsacrificing the national sovereignty - a situation different from that ofHungary, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Poland. Moreover, for many people thisparty's rule was a guarantee of sovereignty in spite of (or maybe because of)treading the steps of the Soviet foreign policy. To the south Bulgaria borderson two NATO countries - Greece and Turkey. The regime's attack on therights of the large Turkish minority after 1956 created problems with Turkey.After a violent campaign, during which the names of hundreds of thousandsof Turks were changed by force (in the winter of 1984/85), relations betweenTurkey and Bulgaria were strained further. The official propaganda createdthe false anticipation of immediate danger, coming from Turkey, simultaneously pointing at USSR and the Western Pact as warrantors of thenational sovereignty. Thus the Communist Party has capitalized on thepopular moods caused by its own actions. Because of the conflicts around theso-called "Macedonian question", Yugoslavia failed to produce in Bulgariathe favourable image of a "socialist dissident" which it had in the other EastEuropean countries. On the contrary, fostering of anti-Yugoslavian moodson "anti-Macedonian" ground had as a direct consequence the strengtheningof the offical ideology. As a result, Bulgaria didn't live through anything likeGDR's 1953, Hungary's 1956 or Czechoslovakia's 1968.

There was no widespread "dissident" activity during the 1960's and 1970's.The conditions for its reproduction were lacking. During the period ofindustrialization large masses of the population went in a very short timefrom villages to towns. The "transplantation" of all those masses with theirrural mentality into the towns struck a blow to the anemic urban culture andthe marginal strata through which it was living. Thus the fertile soil of dissentin the countries of "really existing socialism" was absent in Bulgaria. Becauseof the lack of moral barrier to intellectuals' collaboration with theCommunist Party, they were systematically bought - writers, artists,scientists enjoyed privileges through which their contestations wereblocked. There was practically no ideological or any other barrier to prominent intellectuals, as well as any other "honored" persons, entering the

cessviaCEEOL NL Germany


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308 Praxis InternationalCommunist Party. Its membership increased to an extent unseen in the otherEast-European countries. Before the elections in June 1990 one millionmembers of the Communist Party made up 1/6 of the total electorate,including people of various and often incommensurable habits of mind.

In addition to this picture, it is worth mentioning the traditional isolation ofBulgaria from the World - greater than that of the other East-Europeancountries. This isolation was strengthened under the Communist regime. Atthe end, it became one of the decisive factors of the election victory of theCommunist Party. Throughout Eastern Europe the transformation period ispassing under the slogan "Life like in the West", meaning political pluralismand the dynamic type of market economy, susceptible to modernization.However, the isolation and the long impregnation of ideological stereotypescreated a possibility for transformation of those ideas, in the minds ofcountry's most isolated part of the population, into "restoration ofcapitalism", i.e., of sandals, wooden ploughs and the mud on the streets "as itwas before 1944." The Communist Party was supported in June 1990 byexactly those people - residents of small towns and villages, of lowereducational level, i.e., those who could not be aware of the place ofBulgariain the world.The evolution of an opposition

There were manifestations of organized oppositional activity in Bulgariathroughout the period of the Communist rule. During the 1960s and 1970shere and there members of oppositional groups were discovered andsentenced. They practiced various forms of contestations of the regime.There were such groups also among the Turkish population, especially afterthe campaign of 1984/85. But though these groups managed to survive for ashort period of time, their activities did not reach the public, and upon beinguncovered they were immediately broken up and their members sentenced.Bulgaria was isolated from the World more than any other East-Europeancountry, and the international public could not even know about many ofthose repressions.

During 1988-89, however, we witnessed a different situation - some new"independent" associations were established, which, in spite of the fact thatthey made their activities public, the Bulgarian authorities were forced totolerate, though reluctantly and after numerous attempts at disruption.Thus, what in many East-European countries (including the USSR)appeared already in the 1970s came to the force in Bulgaria only in the late1980s. There were two main reasons that it became possible. The first onewas external - it was the new course of "glasnost" and "perestroika" in theUSSR, which the Bulgarian Communist Party declared that it would followas well. Moreover, the leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party madedeclarations (especially at the CC Plenum of July 1987) that it would even gofurther on that road. The second one was internal: it was the shaken trust ofthe people in the leadership of the country, as a result of the economic crisis.

At different moments during 1988 and 1989 there appeared several


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Praxis International 309"independent" citizens' associations, the most important of which were theIndependent Society for Protection ofHuman Rights, the independent tradeunion "Support", "Ecoglasnost", the Club for Protection of Glasnost andPerestroika, and the Committee for Defence of Religious Rights, Freedomof Conscience and Spiritual Values. None of these, nor any of several otherminor associations, delcared themselves oppositional until November 10,1989, or even several w e e ~ s after that date, though they included this ideaimplicitly already in their appearance. Their main historical merit is that theysurvived, making their position public (predominantly on Western broadcasting media) on the key issues of the Bulgarian political history, e.g., thatof the rights of the ethnic Turks in this country. With their survival all of thesegroups demonstrated that "something like that is possible also in Bulgaria" ,i.e., "something" which could exist not only independently, but contrary tothe opinions of the bosses from the Communist Party. All the facts ofrepressive measures - firing from jobs, trials of some dissidents, and forcedexpatriations, especially of several members of the Independent Society forProtection of Human Rights, were made public.Many things happened for the first time "from inside": facts ofviolations ofhuman rights were reported; a campaign against some serious ecologicalcrimes was undertaken; the ethnic Turks were supported in their publicactions of protest on the eve of the Paris Conference in May 1989. OnNovember 3 "Ecoglasnost" organized a march in the center of Sofia topresent a petition to the National Assembly, demanding a public discussionon two river-diverting projects. The signatures under this petition werecollected in the streets during the Meeting on the Protection of theEnvironment, held in Sofia in the second halfofOctober 1989. "Ecoglasnost"was the most successful group challenging the regime and making it go so faras to use force against its peaceful action in one of the central parks in Sofia,thus causing an international scandal.

The "palace coup" staged during the plenum of the central committee ofthe Bulgarian Communist Party, held on November 10, 1989 in Sofia, as aresult of which the then General Secretary of the party, T. Zhivkov, wasremoved, promised a new political perspective. But it was not followed bymass public actions. Almost a month later the idea that we had got rid of abad tsar and now we had a good tsar who would look after our interestsdominated the public consciousness. The ruling Bulgarian Communist Partywas preparing to govern the country in a manner very much similar to that ofGorbachev - through dosed from above reforms in all spheres of social life,constantly demonstrating a wish for "renewal".

The first rally, organized on November 18 by the "independent" groups,went so far as to present "demands of the citizens" to the new leadership, thelegitimacy of its power not being contested. With its first act the risingopposition expressed support, though conditional, for the new leadership.This was its first mistake - for a month or more there was a consensus inBulgaria about the legitimacy, because of its possibility for renewal, of thenew leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party. But this was a mistake,due to weakness - the "independent" groups neither considered themselves,


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310 Praxis Internationalnor felt, ready to take on the role of a political opposition and to claim statepower. They were disunited, acting in isolation from one another andwithout any ties with the population outside the capital, Sofia.Only in the beginning of December did the idea of uniting the efforts of thevarious "independent" associations and political parties take concrete shape.On December 7, 1989 representatives of the most significant among themcreated the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). The idea came from ZheliuZhelev, one of the leaders of the Club for Protection of Glasnost andPerestroika, a person whose dissident activities started back in the 1960's. Hebecame the chairman of the Coordinating Committee of the new coalition.Immediately after it was established, UDF organized, on 10 December, arally in Sofia on the eve of the forthcoming Plenum of the Central Committeeof the Bulgarian Communist Party. This was in fact the first public action ofthe already formed political opposition, though it formally claimed that itwanted changes within the ruling Communist Party. Its central slogan calledfor renouncement of article 1 of the Bulgarian Consti tution, whichguaranteed the Communist Party's monopoly on power. Other demandsincluded: abolition of organizations of the Communist Party in workplaces;freedom for political prisoners; removal of some high party and state officialsfrom their posts; abolition of the privileges of the top party and statenomenclatura; abolition of the secret police; depoliticization of army andpolice; giving back the names of all those who suffered the forced namechanges during the campaigns in the past; decentralization of economicactivity; bringing to trial all those who were considered responsible for thepolicy of state terrorism against minorities and dissidents.The Communist Party in its turn tried to respond promptly and effectivelyto all demands or at least to behave as ifit were responding. Moreover, it wastrying to anticipate some of them. As in the other East-European countries itdeclared its acceptance of social-democratic ideological and organizationalprinciples. But for many rank-and-file members this was not serious - just inorder "to deceive the enemy". Double morality worked as usual.

After the first actions of the newly formed political opposition, eventswentvehemently in the direction of progressively challenging the monopoly ofpower of the Communist Party. They were stimulated by the analogousprocesses in the other East-European countries. The revolution in Romaniawas especially influential. One of the programs of the Bulgarian TV wastransmitting directly (with translation) the broadcasts of the Romanian TV.This meant witnessing the revolution in its crucible. The spectacle wasstimulating. This external influence was perhaps the final weight on the scalesof political reason. The opposition made a mistake which was avoidable. Itgave way too early and too thoughtlessly to the anti-communist euphoriaamong some of its sympathizers. In some of their public appearances theoppositionalleaders were even consciously provoking this anti-communism.But this tactic in a country with such a strong and oversized Communist partycould only give the opposite results. It brought about the uniting andcountermobilization of the Communist Party. As a result, it remained theonly one in Eastern Europe which did not suffer serious splits and did not lose


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Praxis International 311many members. At its congress in February 1990 it adopted a new program(for "democratic socialism") and new organizational principles (excludingdemocratic centralism). A month later it changed its name into "BulgarianSocialist Party" (BSP), declaring its wish for a total renewal, but soon afterthat the renewal of its cadres was stopped from above in anticipation of theforthcoming elections.

The newly born opposition suffered its first serious blow in the first days ofJanuary 1990, when a nationalistic euphoria spread all over the country. Thiswas a reaction to the Communist government's decision of December 29,1989 to restore the Moslem names of the Turks and the Bulgarian speakingMoslems (so called "pomaks"). Part of Bulgaria, in the regions with mixedpopulation, was flooded by a wave of protest, including (and inspired by)those who were personally enaged in the assimilation campaign in the past.Formally, these were ill-feelings against a decision of the Communist Partybut actually theywere successfully channelled against the oppositional UDF,presenting this decision as inspired by it. Rallies, organized by the local partyand state nomenclatura in some towns, loaded the oppositionalleaders withreproaches of being "traitors"; UDF attacked them openly. In its turn, theleadership of the Communist Party in its subsequent acts managed to makethe decision of December 29 partially invalid. The old nomenclatura peoplein those regions with mixed population retained their positions, a t leastpolitically. Thus in the forthcoming constellation of political forces theCommunist Party was getting an image as the nationalistic force. The resultsof the elections finally confirmed that. And this was a circumstance thatadditionally legitimized its power. Nationalism is a simple idea, pervadingeasily among the population. And in the ideological vacuum, created afterthe collapse of the Communist ideology in East-European countries, itturned out to be an effective surrogate. But while in the other East-Europeancountries nationalism stood in opposition to the ruling communist regimes, inBulgaria it was symbolized by the Communist Party itself.

The nationalistic outbursts also had another unfavourable result for UDF.They implied that "the Bulgarian people are against the Turks". Unfortunately, some of the leaders of UDF proved to be susceptible to thissuggestion and demonstrated an inclination toward unprincipled calculationsof political possibilities. They were afraid of losing the Bulgarian majoritywhile attracting the Turkish minority. As a result, they kept clear of themovement of the Turks and Bulgarian-speaking Moslems which appeared inthe first weeks of January 1990 and was later registered as Movement forRights and Freedoms (MRF). The Communist leaders were smarter. Theydecided to make friends with the leaders of this movement behind closeddoors and were successful in inciting them against UDF, simultaneouslyblocking their activities on the eve of passing through the National Assemblyof an anti-democratic Bill of the Names of Bulgarian Citizens, creating acomplicated court procedure for those Turks or Bulgarian-speakingMoslemswho wanted back their Moslem names. The final decision was left to the localcourts, i.e., those institutions and people who were involved in the namechanging campaigns in the past. Thus much of what was promised on


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312 Praxis InternationalDecember 29 was invalidated. But it was clear, at least for the Communistleaders, that they would not win the support of MRF. At that, they did notneed it - it would undermine the image of the BCP as a main nationalisticforce. That's why their strategy was to isolate the movement, blocking anycoalition with UDF. And they were successful. A few months later theMovement for Rights and Freedoms was registered to take part in theelections as a distinct political organization.By the secondhalfofJanuary 1990 the government was at last persuaded tostart round-table talks with the opposition. The Round Table was supposedto be an expression of a new national consensus, being the supreme authorityabove the National Assembly. There were many disputes as to whether it wasactually the case - partly because the Communist Party sometimes passed itsdecisions behind the back of the Round Table, and partly because it wassuccessful in manipulating the opposition to accept its views at the RoundTable. Whatever the case, the National Round Table was a step toward theassertion of UDF as a nationwide alternative to the CP. Through TVbroadcast its position reached the last village. There were many achievements of the Round Table talks, ofwhich the most important was the ban ofpolitical organizations at workplaces. This was achieved through overcominggreat difficulties after extensive debates which blocked to a certain extent thefurther escalation of democratic demands. The obstacle was, of course, theCommunist Party - it had to withdraw its basic organizations from allenterprises and institutions, thus breaking the crucial link in the accretion ofthe Communist Party and the state. The re-registration of its membership attheir places of residence created a further risk of losing members.Free elections were fixed for June 10 and 17 under a mixed fifty-fiftymajoritarian-proportional system. But what was regarded as a partialpolitical victory for the opposition was that elections would be for a shortterm Constituent Assembly. This promised a double advantage: on the onehand, it guaranteed second elections soon after the first ones, while in themeantime the opposition could establish its own structures all over thecountry; on the other hand, the Constituent Assembly meant what theopposition wanted - total break with the past - with a new social and politicalorder framed by the new Constitution.Ideological and political positions in the election campaign

Forty political organizations - political parties, movements, associationswere registered for participation in the elections. Communist dominatedcourts registered every group, hoping to draw aside votes from UDF. But inthe first days it became clear that only four of them had some chance - theBulgarian Socialist Party (BSP as the Communist Partywas renamed in April1990), the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), the Movement for Rightsand Freedoms (MRF) and the Bulgarian People's Agrarian League (BPALa puppet party without a program of its own which had governed togetherwith the CP during the last 45 years). Two of them dominated the politicalarena - BSP and UDF.


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Praxis International 313An attempt at estimating the orientations of the main political forces inBulgaria in terms of "left" and "right" would bring nothing but a mess. "Left"

and "right" are inseparably mixed in their platforms and political images.Both political giants - BSP and UDF - declared in their platforms that they

stand for rapid transition to a socially oriented market economy with welfareguarantees for the "socially weak" strata. The consensus reached at that basecut the ground for principled reasoning on the general economic perspective,making it impossible to judge who stands on the "left" and who on the "right"on this particular issues. But the public images of the two suggested that itwas UDF that inspired the introduction of the market economy since itrejected communism and was supported by the West, i.e., by "the capitalistworld" .

The BSP declared itself a new "left-wing" party immediately af ter thepalace coup ofNovember 10. But both its platform and its public actions weredominated by strong conservative tendencies. First of all, it was the party oflaw and order. Stressing the values of private life and respect for ranks andtraditions, it practically blocked the public activity of masses. This was alsothe party of "competent people", technocracy being its model of socialorganization and "professional politics" a preferred style of the politicalshow. But the strongest pro-conservative affiliations were manifestedthrough its nationalism. No matter how many times it declared that itwouldn't repeat the "errors" of the past, it was (and continues to be) the mainnationalistic, anti-minority force. It proved to be so also at the elections,where its candidates were most successful among Bulgarians in the regionswith mixed population. The nationalistic organizations outside BSP gotalmost nothing. But to shake the stick against minorities in Bulgaria means todeclare yourself against the injured and insulted in this country, against thepeople who were gradually being pushed down to the bottom of societythroughout the Communist rule. And finally, whoever wants to see in theBSP a "left" party should explain how could it happen that such a "left" partycollected the preferences of the most privileged in both social position andwealth: the top party and state officials, the senior officers in the army andpolice, the privileged pensioners.

On the other hand, though UDF chose as a symbol the "conservative" bluecolor (its pro-Western and anticommunist orientation could not involve a"left" self-determination), in its concrete policy it has almost always been onthe left. Its attack on privileges, its demands for trials of those who enrichedthemselves during the Communist regime, were in accord with the demandsof all underprivileged. The union stood for broadening of the public sphere,and for democratization of the processes of decision-making vs. the politicsbehind closed doors. In the decisive moments it definitely took the side ofunderprivileged minorities in their struggle for human rights. It was alsofollowed by the social outcasts, les canailles, i.e., those who in everyrevolution were the barometer of any real democratic social change.The BPAL left the coalition with BSP even before the start of the electioncampaign and declared its "independence". It decided to play the role of apolitical center, balancing between the CP and UDF. Its political platform


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314 Praxis Internationalwas undetermined, as was its position on many central issues of the country'spolicy after November 10. This position was self-defeating. In the eyes ofBSP supporters the Agrarian League was a traitor, while in the eyes of UDFit was part of the established social order.

The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) was formed in the firstdays of January 1990. In a short period of t ime it succeeded in establishingitself as the organization ofthe Turks and Bulgarian speaking Moslems. Theyneeded it first of all because it was their political organization - their selfconfidence, injured for years, turned into a feeling of selfless devotion. Itsprogram included guaranteeing the basic rights of all minority groups - rightsconnected with name, language, religion. It included also a demand foreducation in one's mother tongue. With such minimal demands theMovement didn't need to do more than just survive and participate in theelections. And indeed, during the whole period of its existence, its policy hasconsisted in proving its raison d'etre in response to the attacks of severalnationalist organizations. The latter attacked it for being based on "ethnicityand religion" (the Bulgarian Law for the Political Parties included a ban onsuch organizations as a concession to nationalism). Partly because ofpersonal ambitions, partly because of the intrigues of the ruling CP, theleaders of MRFwere made to oppose publicly both CP and UDF. As a result,the Movement was isolated; it fell into a kind of political ghetto. And thoughit gained 23 seats in the Grand National Assembly, the broken links with thebig political forces are a potential threat to the rights of minorities.Political prospectsAlready before the elections and immediately after 17 June, the BSP offereda coalition government, regardless of the fact that it gained the majority inthe parliament. The opposition categorically refused. It was a simple politicalcalculation and the two main political forces could make it easily - though itwon the elections, the CP was on the defensive. The greater part of itselectorate was made up of those who voted for the preservation of the statusquo. Changes, however, were inevitable, and the CP was ready to makethem. However, the changes would attack many of those who gave theirsupport to them.The main reason that it is difficult for a Communist government inBulgaria to introduce market reforms is that it would not have the support ofits own electorate, since most of them voted for its former but not for itsfuture politics. Of course it could stop making reforms but this would be asuicide too, because of the impending economic collapse, and because of thefact that it would lose those who voted for it because they believed it wouldcarry on reforms. And though they are not many, they are enough to assurethe victory of the opposition. Thus, both ways bring it to a failure.In all countries in the world there is some gap between the ideologicalimage and the real policy of the political forces. But nowhere was this gapas big as in the societies of "really existing socialism". We could say that thiswas the precondition of their existence. But the real problem is that this type


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Praxis International 315of society reproduces the impossibility of recognizing this gap. They aresocieties of a total Unilbersichtlichkeit. In the transformation period,however, the change of the political structures reflects on the reproduction ofthis unobservability. And it becomes difficult to govern under thisprecondition. This is the CP dilemma: it either makes reforms and itssupporters realize that they have voted for something other than they wished,or it doesn't, in which case the economic collapse occurs and as a result itscollapse as a ruling party is inevitable.With the presence of UDF representatives in a coalition government thecosts of the market economy could be easily put on them. The West wouldlook more favourably on such a government, which brings economicadvantages. BSP would boldy carry on market reforms, UDF wouldn't takeexception, and the agitators/communists on the spot would divide responsibility, ascribing their positive effect to the CP ("It took care of the peoplefrom the very start, didn't it?") and the negative aspects to the opposition("After all, they brought this mess with the free market"). A coalitiongovernment would help keep the unity of the CP - the propagandastereotypes for the voters would have even stronger effect on the partymembers. Such a government would dull the criticism of former crimes andpresent responsibilities. In its turn, this could stimulate strengthening of theopposition outside UDF to the taste of the CP - without losing its electorate,its policy would split the adversary's. And last but not least, ifUDF remainsin opposition the CP has good reasons to be afraid of a strong trade unionmovement on its way to introduction of the market economy.

UDF's remaining in opposition would not change essentially its organization. This would stimulate preservation of its unity. As for the future policy,it is quite possible to move to the left - this would be the outcome of takingadvantage of its being in opposition in a transformation period. Introductionof a market economy, with its further attacks on the living standard of theunderprivileged, would help bring to the fore the elements of egalitarianpopulism which already exist in its present platform. Outside of thegovernment, with a large parliamentary group and good political chances,the opposition would begin the second romantic period of its development.

But still, the two political giants - BSP and UDF - make the situation ofthecountry unusual and artificial. The transition to market economy demandsestablishment of a (normal for that type of economy) political spectrum withclear-out frontiers of "left" and "right". And in the case of Bulgaria thisinevitably leads to dissolution of the two blocks.The main determinant of the political development in this country at

present is the organizational status of BSP. If it splits, UDF would split aswell. The opposite is, of course, also true - a split in UDF would stimulate thesplit in the CP, but this perspective is less realistic. Each organizationmember ofUDF is afraid (and not without ground) that its going out of UDFwould turn it into a walking political corpse. Public opinion polls show thatthe supporters of the opposition tend to vote rather for UDF as a block thanfor the sum of the constitutive organizations, taken separately. Starting thepolitical life anewwould mean running a risk. On the other hand, the election


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316 Praxis Internationalsystem in Bulgaria does not encourage the partIcIpation of smallerorganizations. What are, against this background, the possibilities of thepolitical development in Bulgaria?The less probable outcome is connected with eventual dissolution of BSPinto several parts, neither of which would have any significant politicalprestige. This would bring about a rapid decomposition of UDF. Theformation of political forces would start anew. In such circumstances it wouldbe quite probable that the future left would consist of parts of the dissolvedBSP and decomposed UDF (especially the ecological movements and partsof the Social Democratic Party). The center would be formed entirely bytoday's UDF organizations while the right would include oppositionalorganizatiot:ls which are now outside UDF plus parts of the former CP,predominantly nationalists.

More probable is the split of BSP into two equally strong wings "conservative" and "reformist". During the referendum for changing thename of the CP, the greater part of it voted for change, but this happenedafter the top leaders said "yes" - in this party the respect for authority anddiscipline are decisive factors. The prestige of both wings, however, wouldstart falling rapidly, because one of the causes for the success of the CP is itsorganizational coherence. In the election campaign its activists counted notso much on the force of ideas, as on the personal connection with (anddependence on) their electorate. For many people in Bulgaria the CP is thebackbone of power and order. Its splitting would demand a basicreorientation and actual identification of their own interest with a certainpolitical force. How many of them would join a party of left ideology,dominated by (or at least heir to the organization of) the most privilegedpeople in Bulgaria?Such a split would provoke a split also in the UDF. Two or three of thebiggest organizations would go out of the union but the main core wouldremain. It would however move to the right - the reformist wing of BSP aswell as the UDF's left would take away a significant political space.

It is also quite probable that the CP will split into one big and several otherinsignificant wings. The reformist stream in this party is weak and few of therank-and-file members take it seriously. After all, the wish to retain thepower position has always been stronger among them than the wish to followcertain ideological perspective. And the organizational unity of the party hasproved to be the main contributor to its success at the elections. This wouldmake the processes of democratization in Bulgaria difficult. UDF wouldkeep its unity as well and the confrontation in the country would continue. Itmay well be that, under this development, a new right, beyond the two mainpolitical forces, would consolidate on the basis of a wish for order andauthority.

The two latter political prospects hamper very much the formation of a realleft in Bulgaria. Because both of them (though in a different degrees) back upthe gap between organizational unity and ideological perspective within theCP.Generally speaking, it is very difficult, not only in Bulgaria but in any other


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Praxis International 317East-European country, to raise the banner of "socialism" or "left" politics.You are always in the risky situation of consolidation under this banner ofdifferent ranks of the nomenclatura, which lost its former politicalidentification. Instead of being the ship of salvation in present-day EasternEurope, "socialism" has turned into a life-belt of the "nomenclatura". That'swhy formation and consolidation of a real left in this region is not on theagenda in the nearest future.

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4.2 - Kanev, Krassimir - Bulgaria. the Romantic Period of the Opposition Continues (en)