A PRAGMATIC CASE AGAINST PRAGMATIC THEOLOGICAL REALISM

A PRAGMATIC CASE AGAINST PRAGMATICTHEOLOGICAL REALISM

BY WANG-YEN LEE

St. Edmund’s College, Cambridge

Pragmatic theological realism (PTR) urges us to take up the realist aim of theology or the goal of truthalthough we have good reason to think that the goal can neither be attained nor approximated. Reschercontends that pursuing an unreachable goal can be rational on pragmatic grounds so long as pursuing theunreachable goal yields indirect benefits. I have blocked this attempt at providing a pragmaticjustification for the realist aim of PTR on precisely the same pragmatic grounds: since there is a competingalternative to PTR and the alternative can provide whatever indirect benefits PTR can offer while beingless risky than it is, prudential reasoning favours the alternative to PTR. This undermines the pragmaticcase for the realist aim of theology since the instrumentalist alternative does not aim at the truth.

INTRODUCTION

The cognitive status of the claims of religion is a perennial issue in theology and thephilosophy of religion. If theological statements and theories are not merely useful fictionsdevoid of cognitive content, can they – and to what extend can they – claim to be reliablerepresentations of reality? If the cognitive dimension of religion underlies its emotive,evaluative and pragmatic aspects, truth must be a focus in religion and theology. Thisfocus on truth leads to an important question: is there any justification for the belief thattheology is a truth-orientated inquiry? Theologians and philosophers arguing for someforms of theological realism often draw analogies from and model their defences uponscientific realism. One prominent example isWentzel vanHuyssteen (1989, 155), who aversthat ‘scientific realism, in the form of a qualified critical realism, has tremendous resourcesfor supporting the reliability and validity of theological assertions’. In this paper I shallfocus on van Huyssteen’s proposal of a pragmatic form of theological realism modelledupon Nicholas Rescher’s pragmatic scientific realism, and argue that it is unworkable. ButI shall first trace the backgrounds that led to his pragmatic realist turn.

THE REALIST CLAIM OF THEOLOGY AND ITS DISCONTENTS

Scientific realism can be defined as consisting of three theses: (1) semantic thesis –theoretical statements of science should be taken at face-value in its reality depiction; (2)teleological thesis – scientific theories aim at ‘true descriptions of the world’; and (3)epistemic thesis – this aim or goal is legitimate (Goldman 1986, 157–60). ConvergentScientific Realism (CSR) is the view that theories of mature sciences progress towardsincreasing verisimilitude or truth-likeness in terms of their referential and reality-depicting

r The author 2009. Journal compilation r Trustees for Roman Catholic Purposes Registered 2009. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

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capacity (Psillos 1999, xix; Boyd 1991, 195), and CSR is usually meant when one mentionsscientific realism. An upshot of this view is that, if scientific theories approximate the truthor reality in its referential capacity, theoretical or unobservable terms postulated inscientific theories should be seen as ‘putatively referring expressions’ (Boyd 1991, 195).

Theologians addressing the issue of realism in science and religion seem to favour theterm ‘critical realism’, for they think that ‘realism’ implies naıve realism, which takes theworld exactly as we experience it. They contend that realism should be qualified as ‘critical’since ‘knowledge of the real world can only be acquired through critical reflection uponexperience’ (van Kooten Niekerk 1998, 51; van Huyssteen 1999, 214). But since scientificrealists do not take realism as implying naıve realism, the qualifier ‘critical’ is notnecessary. What theologians mean by ‘critical realism’ is what scientific realists mean byrealism.

But modelling theological realism on scientific realism has its problems. Whilstattention has too often been focussed on identifying the parallels in the use of models andmetaphors in science and religion, the crucial question of the legitimacy of extending thenotion of realism from science to religion has often been overlooked. When arguing for arealist outlook on religion/theology, these authors often emphasise that although scientifictheories should be construed realistically, in most cases they can only capture some aspectsof reality. This characteristic makes scientific theories function like models, analogies, andmetaphors. They highlight the analogical and metaphorical nature of religious languageand the prevalence of models in theology, and argue that religion/theology shouldtherefore also be seen from a critical realist perspective (e.g. Peacocke 1984, 40–50; vanHuyssteen 1999, 218; McGrath 1998, 141–205; McGrath 2002).

Although models and metaphors are used both in science and religion, it does notfollow without further arguments that a parallel to the realism in the former can be foundin the latter. While models and metaphors are features of scientific theories, they are notthe features that provide grounds for our belief in scientific realism, or the ‘credentials’ thatsecure its claim to realism. As pointed out by William Abraham (2003, 274), ‘the crucialfeatures securing the [sic] scientific realism,’ viz. predictive power, technological control,and carefully constructed experiments, ‘are not at all available to theology’. In fact, acentral focus of the defence of or evidence for scientific realism lies in ‘the instrumentalreliability of scientific methodology’ (Boyd 1991, 207), as indicated by the predictive andtechnological success of science (pp 205, 208). In other words, the realist claim of sciencerests on the success of scientific theories in producing ‘substantially correct predictions’and ‘efficacious interventions in the natural order’ (Laudan 1981, 1118). Theologicaltheories clearly cannot claim such a notion of success.

IN SEARCH OF A VIABLE MODEL OF REALISM:

FROM CONVERGENTISM TO PRAGMATISM

Unlike many theologians who model upon scientific realism in their defence of theologicalrealism, van Huyssteen shows awareness of this crucial disanalogy: theology cannot claimthe instrumental reliability or empirical success underlying the mainstream defence ofscientific realism. But, as I shall argue, what he proposes in response to this disanalogyis multiply problematic. He believes that any form of convergent theological realism(theological theories progress towards increasing verisimilitude) is indefensible, but thinksthat this should not lead to the abandonment of the realist claim of theology because it is

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still possible to defend a form of theological realism without the idea of gradual progress tothe truth in convergentism (van Huyssteen 1989, 150, 159). In place of CSR, he appeals toErnan McMullin’s scientific realism as a model of non-convergent realism for theologicalrealism on the one hand (van Huyssteen 1989, 150–5), and to Rescher’s pragmaticscientific realism (PSR) on the other. PSR does not lay its realist claim on the notions of‘progress’ and ‘success’ (van Huyssteen 1999, 216). As such, this form of scientific realismis not ‘a justified position’, but a ‘methodological presupposition of our praxis of inquiry’(van Huyssteen 1996, 259; 1998, 39), which can only be defended on pragmatic grounds.

Nevertheless, appealing to these two forms of scientific realism in an attempt toconstruct a non-convergent form of theological realism is incoherent since they areincompatible: McMullin’s is in fact a form of CSR and, given PSR’s rejection ofconvergentism, CSR is incompatible with PSR. Van Huyssteen (1989, 150–1) obviouslyand wrongly assumes that McMullin’s scientific realism is not a version of CSR. The cruxof the matter lies in van Huyssteen’s problematic and incoherent view of convergence andapproximate truth, thinking that in both scientific and theological realism one can have thelatter without the former. Thus, he seems to think that McMullin’s version of scientificrealism affirms approximate truth without convergentism. As I shall argue below, onecannot reject convergentism without also rejecting approximate truth at the same time.However, even if we granted van Huyssteen’s acceptance of approximate truth andrejection of convergentism and granted, counterfactually, that McMullin’s is a version ofscientific realism that affirms science’s ability to attain approximate truth withoutconvergentism, this would still make his appeal to PSR incoherent because PSR deniesscience’s ability to achieve approximate truth.

To further complicate the problem, van Huyssteen’s claim that theology can attainapproximate truth is incompatible with his view of theory change in theology. Hisapplication of Thomas Kuhn’s idea of radical conceptual revolutions in science totheology indicates that he not only thinks that we have no good reason to think thattheology progresses towards increasing verisimilitude, but also believes that we have goodreason to think that theology does not and will not progress towards increasingverisimilitude (van Huyssteen 1989, 63). This Kuhnian model of theological theorychange leads to his denial of a cumulative growth of knowledge (p63). Paradigm shifts insystematic theology often lead to ‘divergent systematic-theological traditions’ and‘fundamental . . . transformation of certain formerly standard axioms and procedures’(p64). Moreover, he asserts that ‘[w]hat Kuhn called the . . . incommensurability ofparadigms is . . . particularly noticeable in systematic theology’ (p65). In parallel withRescher’s (1987) depiction of the ‘constant radical changes in science’ (p15) that lead to‘outright abandonment and replacement’ (p28) of old concepts, van Huyssteen (1989, 67)maintains that ‘radical breakthroughs’ in theology ‘always imply the rejection andreplacement of a framework or essential parts of it’.

Elsewhere however, van Huyssteen (1988, 177) inconsistently claims that approximatetruth is possible for a theological theory because it is possible to argue for explanatoryprogress in the theory. He defines explanatory progress as a ‘better theory or hypothesis’that can solve experiential problems and reduce conceptual problems arising fromreligious experience (p177). There are two problems here. Firstly, the claim thatexplanatory progress in a theological theory gives us grounds to claim its approximatetruth is inconsistent with his Kuhnian view of revolutionary theory change in theology andhis view that any form of theological convergentism is indefensible. If there is explanatoryprogress and approximate truth in theology, can he consistently think that any form of

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theological convergentism is indefensible? It seems not. Suppose a theologian proposesTheory B and contends that it shows explanatory progress in relation to Theory A. Sincevan Huyssteen thinks that explanatory progress in a theological theory provides us withgrounds to think that it approximates the truth (to a higher degree), Theory B has greaterverisimilitude than Theory A, which implies that the change from A to B is a process ofconvergence. If it is not convergence, what else can it be? It cannot be divergence, or else itwill rule out approximate truth. Can it be a process of change that is neither convergentnor divergent? But if the process of change is neither convergent nor divergent, the changefromA to B cannot lead to approximate truth unless A and B already have the same degreeof approximate truth. But if so where does the idea of explanatory progress arise?Furthermore, even if a theory is already approximately true, a process of change that isneither convergent nor divergent but is nonetheless revolutionary will not leave itsapproximate truth intact.

Perhaps what van Huyssteen meant to say is that we should infer that a theory isapproximately true if it has explanatory power, in the sense of solving experientialproblems and reducing conceptual problems. But this simply begs the question that thisproblem-solving ability is an indicator of the truth, and leads to the second problem: theappeal to explanatory power or progress renders no support to the idea of approximatetruth in theology. In ordinary life and science, we have many counter-examples against thissuggestion. Many successful explanations are neither true nor approximately true, whichinclude, for example,

virtually all those geological theories prior to the 1960s which denied any lateral motion to thecontinents[,] . . . the chemical theories of the 1920s which assumed that the atomic nucleus wasstructurally homogeneous[, and] . . . those chemical and physical theories of the late 19th centurywhich explicitly assumed that matter was neither created nor destroyed . . . (Laudan 1981, 1128).

Van Huyssteen appeals to the principle of inference to the best explanation and avers thatthis principle allows us to infer that a theological theory that has explanatory progress isapproximately true. Put differently, we should infer from the ‘explanatory progress’ of atheory to its truth (van Huyssteen 1988, 177). But Bas van Fraassen (1980, 20) challengesthe idea that we should infer from the explanatory progress or success of a theory to itstruth, arguing that there is a rival hypothesis for the inference: we could infer from theexplanatory progress or success of a theory to its empirical adequacy:

In this way I can certainly account for the many instances in which a scientist appears to argue forthe acceptance of a theory or hypothesis, on the basis of its explanatory success . . . For remember: Iequate the acceptance of a scientific theory with the belief that it is empirically adequate (vanFraassen 1980, 20).

In short, van Huyssteen’s Kuhnian view of theological theory change indicates hisrejection of convergentism, which renders his belief in the approximate truth of theologicaltheory incoherent. At any rate, he has no basis to claim approximate truth for theologicaltheories by appealing to their explanatory power and success.

In fact, van Huyssteen’s problem with this has its root in his problematic view ofscientific realism. He clearly looks for a version of scientifc realism that can provide ananalogue to theological realism, and realises that CSR as advocated by philosophers suchas Newton-Smith and Richard Boyd cannot be a good candidate because of CSR’semphasis on the empirical success that theology lacks (van Huyssteen 1999, 216). In orderto provide a space for theological realism to manoeuvre, he argues that ‘progress as such

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need not at all be defined in the sense of a gradual growth toward truth’, and that ‘[e]ven ifthe history of at least some of the natural sciences shows progressive approximation totruth in the physical world, the realist position could never depend on ‘achiving truth’ assuch’. (One wonders how progress can be understood without the idea of growth towardsthe truth, given van Huyssteen’s view that explanatory progress indicates approximatetruth.) What he tries to argue is that, even if CSR is possible, it is not the only viable formof scientific realism. In fact, he thinks that McMullin’s scientific realism is a better version,and most importantly, it can be applied to theology (van Huyssteen 1989, 150–1).However, he mistakenly assumes that McMullin’s scientific realism does not appeal toconvergence and gradual growth towards the truth. In fact, McMullin (1984, 266) refers tothe central idea of his scientific realism as ‘convergences of structural explanation’. Inadducing evidence from the history of science for this idea McMullin appeals to thegradual and steady growth towards the truth and even to cumulative knowledge:

There was a lively debate about the mechanisms of mountain building and the like, but gradually amore secure knowledge of the past aeons built up . . . The long-vanished species of the Devonian aretheoretical entities about which we have come to know more and more in a relatively steady way . . .But the very considerable theory changes that have occured since Hutton’s day do not alter the factthat the growth in our knowledge of the sorts of life forms that inhabitated the earth aeons ago hasbeen pretty cumulative (McMullin 1984, 266–7).

This indicates that McMullin’s is a version of CSR, despite its differences from the CSR of‘Maxwell, Salmon, Newton-Smith, Boyd, Putnam and others’. At any rate, he does notreject their versions of CSR. He simply claims that his version can provide the best case forscientific realism (p266). Whatever improvement he thinks he has made to other versionsof CSR, it is certainly not an abandonment of convergentism or the idea of gradual growthtowards the truth, as suggested by van Huyssteen.

All these undermine the applicability of McMullin’s scientific realism to theology, givenvan Huyssteen’s rejection of convergentism and growth towards the truth in theology.Moreover, a central characteristic of McMullin’s scientific realism lies in the idea that thefertility of a theory, which ‘is usually associated with the ability to make novel predictions’(p270), provides the grounds for the theory’s realist claim. Empirical success, includingpredictive power and technological control, is clearly unavailable to theology. Therefore,van Huyssteen seems to be left with only one option, viz. Rescher’s PSR. Can PSR providea model of realism that will work for theology?

The purpose of this paper is to argue that, independent of whether or not PSR is adefensible form of scientific realism, this pragmatic form of realism is incapable ofsupporting the realist claim of religion or theology. But before arguing to this effect it isinstructive to take a brief look at why PSR seems so promising (at least to van Huyssteen)as a potential model of realism that works for theology.

PRAGMATIC SCIENTIFIC REALISM

PSR is attractive to van Huyssteen because of its preservation of the realist aim of science,which it takes to be the sine qua non of scientific realism, despite its rejection ofconvergentism, and with it the idea of progressive approximation to the truth. Given vanHuyssteen’s acknowledgement that theology has no claim to convergent realism, it is notdifficult to see why a form of scientific realism that is independent of convergentism lookspromising to him.


The image of science Rescher depicts in (1987, Chapter 2, 3) is that of ‘constant radicalchanges’ (p15), which often bring about a ‘wholesale revision of ‘established facts’’ (p23).He clearly denies the cumulative progress of scientific knowledge when he says thatscientific change is a matter of replacement rather than supplementation, and that thedeclarations of science are subject to ‘revision and even to outright abandonment andreplacement’ (p28). In view of this, science’s aim of getting at the truth is unreachable: ‘thereal truth’ lies not with present nor future science, nor the future convergence of science(pp19, 25). This implies that science cannot even achieve gradual approximation to thetruth (pp23–5). Such a view of science is very close to that of instrumentalism orantirealism. But Rescher stops short of becoming an instrumentalist by refusing to give upthe realist aim/goal of science – science is an inquiry that aims at the truth.

However, if, as maintained by Rescher (1987, 23), both ‘historical experience’ andconsiderations of general principle’ indicate that science can neither attain norapproximate the truth in its current and even future developments, there seems to be nolegitimate reason why the truth or approximation to the truth should be taken as one of thegoals of the scientific enterprise. For, as Newton-Smith (1981, 14) puts it so aptly, ‘how canit be rational to pursue that which we have evidence for thinking can never be reached? Is itrational to try and get to the moon by flapping one’s arms if one has evidence that it willnot work?’ But Rescher disagrees with Newton-Smith and contends that holding the realistaim of science can still be rational on pragmatic grounds:

The view that it is rational to pursue a goal only if we are in a position to achieve its attainment orapproximation is a mistaken one. The goal can be perfectly valid, and entirely rational if theindirect benefits of its adoption and pursuit are sufficient – if in striving after it we realize relevantadvantages to a substantial degree. An unattainable ideal can be enormously productive (Rescher1987, 29).

In his 1987, Rescher attempts to provide a pragmatic case for the realist aim of science byarguing that holding the realist aim leads to indirect benefits that give one advantage overinstrumentalism. In my 2005 (13–29), I argue against Rescher’s pragmatic case bydeveloping the so-called ‘prudential argument against PSR’. My purpose in this paper,however, is not to deal with PSR. What I wish to establish here is that, independent ofwhether or not PSR is defensible, the attempt to provide an analogous pragmaticjustification of the realist aim of theology can be refuted by an analogous prudentialargument.

A PRAGMATIC CASE FOR THE REALIST AIM OF THEOLOGY?

Theology is an inquiry in which we attempt to account for religious experience by formulatingtheological theories (van Huyssteen 1989, 144). From a realist perspective, theology aims attrue theological theories. Pragmatic theological realism (PTR) contends that although therealist aim of theology is unreachable and cannot be justified by comparing the representationwith the represented, it can be defended on pragmatic grounds.

It should be noted that van Huyssteen merely appeals to PSR as a form of realismapplicable to theology and has not addressed the issue of the philosophical defensibility ofboth PSR and its theological analogue, viz. PTR. In other words, he has neither made acase nor provided any argument for PTR. Moreover, unlike Rescher in the scientificcounterpart, he has not even developed the key tenets of PTR in any detail, not to mention

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clarifying and analysing the concepts involved. Therefore, as I develop the prudentialargument against PTR, I will have to fill in these lacunae for him.

As argued above, theology can claim neither current approximation to the truth norprogressive growth towards the truth. This implies that theology has no epistemic orevidential grounds for the realist aim and that the realist goal is unreachable. Therationality of holding the realist aim of theology depends on whether a pragmatic case canbe made for it, which depends on whether holding the unreachable realist goal can providesubstantial advantages or indirect benefits. In order to examine whether ‘striving after’PTR’s realist aim provides substantial advantages or indirect benefits, we have to ask whatthese advantages or benefits are. There are two important points to bear in mind before weinquire into this question, and Rescher’s strategy in his pragmatic argument for the realistaim of PSR provides important clues for the appropriate approach to be adopted for thepragmatic justification of the realist aim of PTR.

Firstly, it is essential to distinguish between the pragmatic justification for a choice orcourse of action and the pragmatic endorsement of a belief. Rescher’s pragmaticjustification for the realist aim of science belongs to the former. The pragmatic justificationfor the realist aim considers the pragmatic benefits or advantages brought about by acourse of action or decision, and has nothing to do with the pragmatic validation of beliefdiscussed in Rescher’s (2000). The same should be said of the pragmatic justification forthe realist aim of theology. In other words, the pragmatic justification for the realist aim oftheology is not the pragmatic justification for the belief that theology aims at the truth.Rather, it is the justification for the choice or action of taking up the realist aim oftheology. As such, it is not susceptible to the objection that the pragmatic validation of abelief is not truth-linked, which Rescher (2000, 93) happily agrees. Although holding therealist aim of theology involves the belief that theology aims at the truth (unless one is aradical sceptic), it does not render the pragmatic justification for the realist aim of theologysusceptible to the objection that the pragmatic validation of a belief is not truth-linkedbecause what seeks justification is the choice or action of taking up the realist aim, not thebelief that theology aims at the truth.

Secondly, apart from the question of what the indirect benefits are, it is essential toconsider what kind of benefits is acceptable. Is the pragmatic case for the realist aim oftheology established if holding the realist aim brings just about any benefits to anindividual or a community? All the benefits Rescher suggests for the realist aim of sciencehave a common feature: they are the benefits that are only of interest to the effectiveimplementation of the functions of science, i.e. purported benefits that help scienceperform its task effectively. I think Rescher’s delimitation (if there is any consciousdelimitation at all) is very wise, for it will provide a stronger case for the pragmaticjustification for the realist aim. A pragmatic case for the realist aim that appeals to thebenefits vis-a-vis science’s effective implementation of its functions is stronger than onethat appeals to other (non-cognitive) benefits such as the glory, power, and wealth ofindividual scientists, since only the former deals with the question that is of interest to thephilosophy of science, viz. what course of action can best help science fulfil its functions?

Therefore, I shall develop an analogue of Rescher’s delimitation and focus myconsiderations of the benefits on those that are of interest only to theology. As such, thetype of acceptable indirect benefits considered here are only those that are of interest to theeffective implementation of the tasks or functions of theology. This delimitation isespecially appropriate since the philosophical discussion of the issue of theological realismis concerned about the nature of theological inquiry, and the question of the effective


implementation of its functions is directly relevant to this concern. Thus, the non-cognitiveindirect benefits of the realist aim for people who hold that aim (e.g. that it brings aboutbetter chance for securing the reward of eternal bliss, social cohesion, psychological well-being and etc.) are outside the purview of the present discussion.

THE PRUDENTIAL ARGUMENT AGAINST PTR

Corresponding to my prudential argument against PSR (Lee 2005, 13–29), I shall developan analogous prudential argument against PTR to undermine the pragmatic case for therealist aim of theology. The argument compares PTR with theological constructiveempiricism (TCE), an analogue of constructive empiricism (CE). It is instructive to take aquick overview of CE before considering my proposal of TCE and its comparison withPTR.

PTR Compared with TCECE is a form of non-eliminative instrumentalism that takes the language of scienceliterally, i.e. scientific theories are not construed as metaphors (van Fraassen 1980, 11). Assuch, CE accepts the semantic thesis of scientific realism. However, it rejects theteleological and epistemic theses, and thus implies that science should not be seen aspursuing the goal of truth, because it maintains that one should only accept a scientifictheory construed literally without believing it. Believing a scientific theory entails belief inits truth, which includes both its observable and unobservable aspects, whilst accepting thetheory only involves the belief that it is empirically adequate, which means that what itsays about ‘the observable things and events in this world is true’ (pp11–2). Its attitude tothe existence of theoretical entities is that of agnosticism rather than denial.

CE’s stance that allows acceptance of scientific theories also means that the postulationof theoretical entities for the purpose of prediction and explanation is not prohibited (vanFraassen 1980, 33–4). Van Fraassen contends that scientists can make use of the heuristicfunctions of theoretical entities without believing them. He avers that while a scientist is‘totally immersed in the scientific world-picture’ (p80), a world where one finds theoreticalentities like electron, such immersion does not involve belief and commitment to theontological implications of the world-picture (p81). ‘For to say that someone is immersedin theory, ‘living’ in the theory’s world, is not to describe his epistemic commitment’ (p82).Some may question the possibility of being immersed in the scientific world-picturewithout belief or epistemic commitment. But there are examples in ordinary life when onegets totally immersed in an imaginative world in order to perform the relevant taskeffectively but can do so without any epistemic commitment. An actress has to getimmersed in her role and imagines that she is the person she is playing. But the ability toperform this task effectively requires no epistemic commitment – she does not have tobelieve that she is the person she is playing. Likewise, Peter Lipton suggests to me in aprivate conversation that one who plays computer games need no epistemic commitmentto his role – he need not believe that he is the boxer or pilot – to perform his ‘task’effectively though he certainly gets immersed in that imaginative world.

Let’s suppose TCE is a theological analogue of CE. It agrees with PTR in its denial ofany form of theological convergentism. However, PTR and TCE differ in their epistemicattitudes to unobservable entities postulated by theological theories and their views on therealist aim of theology. Whereas PTR contends that we should believe that ‘what we are

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provisionally conceptualizing in theology really exists’ (van Huyssteen 1989, 155), and thatwe should hold the realist aim of theology even though theological theories cannot and willnot attain nor approximate the goal of truth, TCE maintains that theology should aim atempirical adequacy, and that in some cases we can accept the theoretical entities oftheology for the purpose of explanation without believing in their existence.

Readers who have been persuaded by my argument above that a rejection ofconvergentism entails a simultaneous rejection of approximate truth may find that PTR’sclaim that what we are provisionally conceptualising in theology really exists seems to beinconsistent with its rejection of convergentism in theology. If theological theories cannotapproximate the truth, can one still believe the existence of what is postulated in atheological theory? Fraser Watts (1998, 161–5) appeals to Ian Hacking’s scientific realismand suggests that one can still do so if she adopts realism about entities rather than realismabout theories. The fact that theological theories cannot approximate the truth leads onlyto antirealism about theories, but one can still be a realist about entities.

However, theology’s inability to achieve verisimilitude within the PTR framework doesnot allow van Huyssteen to hold entity realism. Any form of entity realism (e.g. Hacking’sexperimental realism) relies on the theory-independence of unobservable entities. But asDavid Resnik (1994) points out in his critique of Hacking’s experimental realism, suchindependence is not possible since an experimental realist can only justify her belief in theexistence of the unobservable entities if she has reason to think that the theoriespostulating these entities are approximately true. Realism about entities that is committedto antirealism about theories is unreasonable in that any antirealist about theories has nojustified belief in the entity postulated by a theory (Resnik 1994, 1180). Setting aside theobjection to Hacking’s realism about entities, it should be noted that realism about entitiescannot be applied to theology. Hacking’s realism about entities or experimental realismrelies on the experimental manipulability of an entity postulated by a theory, and this isunavailable to theology. If an entity postulated by a theory (e.g. God) has no experimentalmanipulability, there is no reason to think that it exists at all, since according to Hackingthe reason for our belief in the existence of an unobservable entity postulated by a theorythat is neither true nor approximately true is its experimental manipulability. In short,PTR’s claim that what we are provisionally conceptualising in theology really exists isindeed incompatible with its rejection of convergentism and indefensible in virtue of itslack of experimental manipulability, and should thus be rejected.

An Overview of the Prudential Argument against PTRThe principle of prudential choice, which is a form of pragmatic reasoning, contends that,when facing some options underdetermined by epistemic or evidential considerations, themost rational action is to opt for the choice that implies maximal gain and minimal loss.My prudential argument against PTR is developed according to this principle ofprudential choice:

(P1) PTR has no advantage over TCE vis-a-vis the indirect benefits (they are on a par interms of potential gains)(P2) PTR is riskier than TCE(C) prudential reasoning favours TCE over PTR

The advantage of this strategy lies in the fact that it defeats PTR’s pragmaticjustification for the realist aim on its own terms – on pragmatic considerations. In thefollowing sections I shall first show that holding a realist aim does not give one advantage


over holding the aim of empirical adequacy because the indirect benefits that can be gainedby holding the realist aim can also be gained by holding the aim of empirical adequacy.This renders PTR and TCE on a par vis-a-vis their abilities to bring about the indirectbenefits. But I shall go on to argue that PTR is riskier than TCE, and this provides us withpragmatic grounds to favour TCE over PTR.

PTR has no Advantage over TCEWhat are the indirect benefits of holding the unreachable realist aim of theology? Since vanHuyssteen does not develop PTR in any detail, I will have to fill in the lacuna on thisquestion by drawing parallels from PSR.

It should be stressed that only indirect benefits can provide a pragmatic justification forPTR’s realist aim. The benefits are ‘indirect’ vis-a-vis the goal of truth because they aregained even when the goal of truth is not attained. The benefits that are obtained byholding a certain goal are ‘direct’ if they are obtained only when the goal is achieved orapproximated, and they are ‘indirect’ if they can be obtained whether or not the goal isachieved or approximated. For example, if my goal is to get a PhD after three years ofpostgraduate studies, being awarded a PhD after three years is the direct benefit, whilegaining the first-hand experience of PhD studies is an indirect benefit because this benefitcan be obtained whether or not I achieve the goal of gaining a PhD after three years ofstudies. The qualifier ‘indirect’ is essential given PTR’s rejection of theology’s attainmentof and approximation to the goal of truth. If a benefit can only be obtained on theassumption of theology’s attaining a certain degree of verisimilitude, then it is actually adirect benefit. But a direct benefit is not obtainable given its dependence on the attainmentor approximation of the goal and PTR’s rejection of theology’s attainment of the truth andverisimilitude.

As to the specific indirect benefits, perhaps we can draw some parallels from Rescher’sPSR. Rescher (1987, Chap 4; cf. 2000, 105) contends that holding the realist aim of sciencegives one advantage over instrumentalism on these five counts. Firstly, since ‘depiction ofnature’, which means the description of the physical world in its phenomenal and extra-phenomenal domains or getting at ‘the truth about the world’s way’ (Rescher 1987, 33),has traditionally been viewed as the ‘quintessentially cognitive aspiration’ of science,holding the realist aim gives one advantage over instrumentalism because only a realistintent can do the job of science viewed traditionally. Secondly, holding the realist aim ismore (perhaps psychologically) conducive to the exertion of the instrumental power ofscience in prediction and control. Thirdly, only a realist aim can give a fair trial to scientifictheorising about observation-transcending reality by allowing explanation of observablephenomena in terms of unobservables. While the realist may be wrong in her extra-phenomenal explanation of a certain observable phenomenon, this is still better thaninstrumentalism, which urges us to ‘forego any attempt to explain the phenomena in non-phenomenal terms’ without giving it a fair trial (p44), because the realist at least has achance to provide a true explanation, however slim the chance might be. Fourthly,thinking that all forms of instrumentalism prohibit the postulation of ‘real entities orprocesses’ as the extra-phenomenal causes, Rescher (1987, 50) avers that it deprives scienceof the ability to provide a naturalistic explanation of the unobservable phenomena,because ‘[w]hen the range of our acceptable claims is confined to the phenomenal sphere,we are deprived of the mechanisms through which alone we can construct a picture ofourselves as one item of physical reality among others . . .’ Finally, Ontological parsimonyor economy seems to be the only advantage that instrumentalism can offer. But since

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instrumentalism purchases ontological economy, whose virtue and value are questionable,at the expense of explanatory economy, the insistence on ontological economy is actually adisadvantage (p53).

In summary, Rescher suggests that holding the realist aim within the PSR frameworkwill bring about the benefits of (1) enabling us to describe the physical world, whichincludes both its phenomenal and extra-phenomenal aspects; (2) providing a moreconducive environment for the instrumental power of science (i.e. prediction and control);(3) giving a ‘fair trial’ to theorising about observation-transcending reality by allowingexplanation of the phenomenal in terms of the extra-phenomenal; (4) enabling us todevelop a naturalistic explanation of phenomena; and (5) maximal gain and minimal lossin the trade-off between ontological economy and explanatory economy.

Setting aside the problems of Rescher’s suggestions that I highlight in my 2005 (16–25),(4) can be immediately ruled out for my task in hand since a naturalistic explanation ofphenomena is incompatible with a realist outlook of theology. (1) should also be excludedbecause the benefit of obtaining the description about the physical world in its phenomenaland extra-phenomenal domains is not an ‘indirect’ benefit that will be gained whether ornot the goal is realised/approximated. Rather, whether or not this benefit is gained isdirectly related to whether the goal is realised or approximated, for if the goal is notrealised or approximated, the information about the physical world it provides will havebeen false. Therefore, this cannot be accepted as an indirect benefit for the pragmaticjustification of the realist aim of science, and it follows that a theological analogue shouldnot be sought. (2) seems to be out of place because prediction and control have no closeparallels in theology. But perhaps there is a loose parallel in a theology that is associatedwith a functional view of religion, which sees the crucial function of religious traditions as‘providing a guiding vision which shapes our way of life’ (Drees 1996, 279). Though this isfar from paralleling prediction and control, the idea of a theological theory exerting acertain degree of impact on individuals and communities in the functional view of religionhas a loose analogy with the idea of a scientific theory exerting control over nature inscience. Of course, a crucial disanalogy lies in the fact that there is a close responsivenessbetween nature and the scientific theory that allows one to exert control over nature, whilesuch a close responsiveness does not exist between the theological theory that exerts acertain degree of impact on individuals or a community and these people. Recognising thisdisanalogy, the PTRist may nonetheless still argue that holding a realist aim is moreconducive to the implementation of the functions or tasks of a theology that is associatedwith a functional view of religion. Finally, (3) and (5) have close parallels in theology.

Therefore, the PTRist may suggest that holding the realist aim in theology may providethe indirect benefits of (1) giving a ‘fair trial’ to observation-transcending reality byallowing explanation of the phenomenal in terms of the extra-phenomenal; (2) providing amore conducive ‘environment’ (in a metaphorical sense) for the implementation of thefunctions of a theology associated with a functional view of religion; and (3) maximal gainand minimal loss in the trade-off between ontological economy and explanatory economy.Next, I shall take issue with each of these purported indirect benefits of holding the realistaim of theology.

Fair Trial to Theorising about Observation-Transcending RealityA PTRist may contend that only a realist aim can give a fair-trial to theorising aboutobservation-transcending reality by allowing explanation of observable phenomena interms of unobservables. Take the example of the origin of the universe. The orderliness of


the universe is the observable phenomenon. Theists infer from the orderliness of the worldto the existence of a divine creator as the cause of this orderliness, while naturalists explainthis orderliness in entirely naturalistic terms. A PTR theist postulates God and attributesthe orderliness of the universe to God in her theological theory. The PTRist may accuse thenaturalist of not giving a fair-trial to observation-transcending reality, and may evenborrow Rescher’s critique: ‘[a] general epistemic policy which would make it impossible, asa matter of principle, for us to discover something which may (for all we know) responsiblybe supposed actually to be the case is clearly irrational’ (Rescher 1987, 45).

TCE, however, is not susceptible to this charge, for it allows the postulation of anunobservable theoretical entity to explain the orderliness of the universe. Therefore,holding PTR’s realist aim does not give us advantage over TCE, since TCE also gives a fairtrial to observation-transcending reality by allowing the explanation of observablephenomena in terms of unobservables. The intelligent design theory (ID) may be a case inpoint. ID theorists postulate an unobservable theoretical entity called intelligent designerto account for the origin of the universe and the appearance or indication of designobserved in the biological world. This intelligent designer could be God or an intelligentalien from another planet or even a demon. According to TCE, ID theory can be acceptedfor the purpose of explanation as long as one does not believe its truth. However, this doesnot mean that TCE will necessarily be favourable to ID, not to mention endorsing it, forvan Fraassen (1980, 24) avers that it is not always necessary to explain the observablephenomena in terms of the unobservables unless doing so can (1) lead to gains inpredictions and (2) account for wider empirical regularities (pp33, 34). Therefore, IDtheory may still lose out to naturalistic theories on this basis. But it is at least open to it,and is willing to give it, in Rescher’s terms, a fair trial. Given van Fraassen’s two caveats,there is no need to worry that TCE will lead to the acceptance of many theological theoriesin place of naturalistic theories.

One might question the propriety of accepting these two caveats of van Fraassen’s andargue that they seem to stem from an empiricist bias that focuses on empirical gains. In thispaper I shall remain neutral about whether this emphasis on empirical gains per se isjustified, but the empiricist focus is entirely appropriate within the context of the debateof scientific realism because disputants on both sides take the focus on empiricalgains equally seriously. Even a scientific realist will frown upon a PTRist’s attempt topostulate an unobservable entity to explain observable phenomena when such apostulation does not bring about empirical gains. While one might complain that suchan empiricist emphasis puts theology at a disadvantage, this is the price that theologianssuch as van Huyssteen have to pay for modelling their defence of theological realism onscientific realism.

A PTRist might argue that TCE’s focus on the truth about the observables makes itimpossible to discover the truth about God if it turns out that God really exists. TCE asksus to focus on empirical adequacy whilst being agnostic about whether a theory isdescriptively true, which implies a kind of openness to the possibility that the theory mightbe descriptively true. But a PTRist may charge that, notwithstanding this openness, thefocus on empirical adequacy makes us inattentive to when the theory is descriptively true.But can PTR do better? According to PTR’s rejection of convergentism, it is highlyimprobable that theology ever attains or approximates the truth. Those who believe in thisare also inattentive to when the theory is descriptively true. In short, PTR’s realist aim doesnot give us an advantage over TCE vis-a-vis a fair trial to theorising about observing-transcending reality.

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Conduciveness to a Theology Associated with a Functional View of ReligionWhereas Andrew Moore (2003, 56) thinks that the functional view of religion is anargument against theological realism, the PTRist may argue that holding a realist aim ismore conducive to the implementation of the functions or tasks of a theology that isassociated with a functional view of religion. According to the functional view, religionserves to provide action-guiding visions, motivational power and pedagogical force in theethical, familial and social aspects of human life. While such a view does not necessarilyentail a denial of the ontological aspects of religious claims, the chief focus is theirfunctional efficacy.

PTRists may suggest that holding a realist aim of theology is more conducive to theeffective implementation of these functions in a religious community. Given thattheologising is a crucial element in the formation of the action-guiding visions andteaching in a religious community, holding the realist aim may provide the theologianswithin the community with the indispensable motivational power for their theologicalendeavours, thereby contributing to the better implementation of the functions of religion.By holding the realist aim, the theologians will think that their theological activity is in thebusiness of truth, and this will provide a much more powerful motivational force than thebelief that they are engaging with ‘useful fictions’. (Note that what seeks justification here isthe action or choice of holding the realist aim rather than the belief in the realist aim.)

This is a benefit of holding the realist aim that is subjectivistic, individual-, cultural-,community, and time-relative. (Note that this is a subjective benefit vis-a-vis the betterimplementation of the functions of theology and should not be confused with subjectivenon-cognitive benefits that are not related to the effective implementation of the tasks oftheology, e.g. fame and power of the theologians.) It is not a matter of principle, and thuscannot be determined by conceptual analysis or even empirical studies. Even if anempirical study were to suggest that holding the realist aim was more conducive to thework of a community of theologians, it would be doubtful if this result could begeneralised to other communities, time, locations and cultures.

However, some may not be satisfied with the above response and may argue that unlessthe working theologians believe that they are in the business of truth, they are unlikely tofind sufficient motivational power to sustain them through. In other words, if one holds therealist aim of theology, she will or will be more likely to believe that theology is in thebusiness of truth and such a belief can provide the indispensable motivational power.Believing that theology is ‘in the business of truth’ can be interpreted as believing thattheology is an inquiry that aims at the truth or as believing that theology deals with (atleast approximate) truths in its current state. But holding the realist aim within the PTRframework cannot provide the motivational power. PTR’s claim that the realist aim oftheology is unreachable in virtue of its rejection of convergentism will offset the potentialmotivational power of the belief that theology aims at the truth. Moreover, PTR’srejection of convergentism and its Kuhnian view of theological theory change do not allowone to believe that theology deals with (at least approximate) truths in its current state.

Setting aside these problems, even if we concede that holding the realist aim can providethe motivational power, TCE can also provide the same motivational power, because vanFraassen’s notion of immersion could be applied to TCE. Immersion in the theological andreligious world within the TCE framework is a mental state that is so close to belief that it isable to provide the psychological effect that belief can offer. Theologians who are immersedin the worlds of their theories can gain the psychological power equivalent to that of believingin the truth of these theories though they do not in fact believe it. Some may think that such


blurring of the distinction between immersion and belief is a sleight of hand that sneaksbelief back into TCE. While the psychological states of belief and immersion are difficult todistinguish, this does not at all imply that a clear conceptual distinction cannot be madebetween belief and immersion, and a conceptual distinction is all it takes to differentiatebetween them.

Between Ontological Economy and Explanatory EconomyPTR has an advantage over naturalism because naturalism pursues ontological economyat the expense of explanatory economy while PTR strikes a balance between ontologicaleconomy and explanatory economy by allowing the postulation of unobservabletheoretical entities for explanation. However, PTR has no advantage over TCE becausethe latter does not proscribe the postulation of unobservable theoretical entities forexplanation.

With this I have made a case for the claim that PTR has no advantage over TCE vis-a-vis indirect benefits.

PTR is Riskier than TCEIn order to show why PTR is riskier than TCE, I shall develop an argument that closelyparallels my corresponding argument in the case of science – that PSR is riskier than CE(Lee 2005, 28–9). Alan Musgrave (1985, 199) contends that both the realist and theconstructive empiricist face the same risk vis-a-vis the sceptical challenge. Both the realist’sbelief in the truth of a scientific theory and the constructive empiricist’s belief in theempirical adequacy of a scientific theory can turn out to be wrong. The same could be saidof theology – theological realists and theological constructive empiricists face the samerisk. However, the realist faces two additional risks. If a theory that postulates God toexplain the orderliness of the universe – the God theory – turns out to be false, the realistwill have believed in falsehood, whilst the constructive empiricist cannot be said to believein falsehood because she only accepts the God theory without believing in it. Furthermore,if the God theory turns out to be false, the realist will have made a false assertion about theexistence of God, while the constructive empiricist cannot be said to make a false assertionbecause she does not assert that God exists. Therefore, a realist incurs the risks of believingin falsehood and making false assertions.

But what if the God theory turns out to be true? The constructive empiricist will havefailed to believe in the truth and failed to make a true assertion. Therefore, the realistcontends that her own risk is offset by the constructive empiricist’s risk – ‘I risk believing infalsehood and making false assertions but you risk not believing in the truth and notmaking true assertions. So we break even’.

But PTR can still be shown to be riskier than TCE in another sense in virtue of itsrejection of convergentism and its adoption of the Kuhnian view of theological theorychange. According to PTR, the probability of a theory’s being true is very low.

p¼ the probability that a theological theory is true1�p¼ the probability that a theological theory is falsepo1�p

Since the PTRist suffers loss when the theory is false (believing in falsehood and makinga false assertion), and the TCEist suffers loss when the theory is true (failure to believe inthe truth and make a true assertion),

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p¼ the probability of the TCEist’s suffering loss1�p¼ the probability of the PTRist’s suffering losssince po1�pthe probability of the PTRist’s suffering loss4the probability of the TCEist’s sufferingloss

In this sense, PTR is still riskier than TCE.In other words, PTR and TCE face the same risk in relation to the sceptical challenge,

since the PTRist’s belief in a theological theory’s truth and the TCEist’s belief in itsempirical adequacy can be wrong. But the PTRist has two further risks of believing infalsehood and making a false assertion if the theory turns out to be false. The TCEist canavoid these two risks in virtue of its agnostic attitude to the truth of the theory and theexistence of the theoretical entity it postulates. However, the TCEist faces two risks thatcan be avoided by the PTRist: if the theory is true, the TCEist will have failed to believe inthe truth and to make a true assertion. Nonetheless, PTR is still riskier than TCE in thissense: since the probability of a theory’s being false is higher than its being true given itsinability to approximate the truth, the probability of a PTRist’s suffering loss will behigher than a TCEist’s suffering loss because the PTRist suffers loss when the theory isfalse and the TCEist suffers loss when the theory is true.

With this I have made a case for the prudential argument against PTR.

CONCLUSION

PTR urges us to take up the realist aim or the goal of truth although we have good reasonto think that the goal can neither be attained nor approximated. While Newton-Smiththinks that pursuing what we know we cannot achieve is clearly irrational, Rescherdisagrees and contends that pursuing an unreachable goal can be rational on pragmaticgrounds so long as pursuing the unreachable goal yields indirect benefits. I have blockedthis attempt at providing pragmatic justifications for the realist aim of PTR on preciselythe same pragmatic grounds: since there is a competing alternative to PTR and thealternative can provide whatever indirect benefits PTR can offer while being less risky thanit is, prudential reasoning favours the alternative to PTR. This undermines the pragmaticcase for the realist aim of theology since the instrumentalist alternative does not aim at thetruth. In short, I have presented a pragmatic argument against a pragmatic form oftheological realism.

My conclusion that pragmatic considerations favour TCE over PTR should not betaken to imply that I accept TCE. While the merits of TCE compared with those of PTRon some of the premises of van Huyssteen’s have been discussed here, its intrinsic meritsand its merits in relation to other rivals have not been dealt with here. In fact, I realise thatto some TCE per se is perhaps a rather unsatisfactory view of theology. Although it allowsthe postulation of unobservable entities for the purpose of explanation in principle, inpractice it will still yield many grounds to naturalistic explanations given van Fraassen’stwo caveats. But since it is less unsatisfactory than PTR (and thus the lesser of two ‘evils’ tobe chosen by prudential spirit) and my purpose here is not to propose a satisfactoryphilosophical view of theology, but to argue against PTR on pragmatic grounds, I believemy appeal to TCE despite its perceived unsatisfactoriness is appropriate to the task inhand.


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A PRAGMATIC CASE AGAINST PRAGMATIC THEOLOGICAL REALISM