A Study on the Establishment of an International Nuclear Fuel Cycle System · PDF file · 2014-06-24A Study on the Establishment of an International Nuclear Fuel Cycle System for

A Study on the Establishment of an International

Nuclear Fuel Cycle System for Asia

Report

Translated from the original report written in Japanese

March, 2013

Nuclear Nonproliferation Study Committee

Graduate School of Engineering, University of Tokyo

(Blank Page)

Members of Nuclear Nonproliferation Study Committee (Graduate School of Engineering, University of Tokyo)

Leader: Satoru Tanaka (Graduate School of Engineering, University of Tokyo)

Sub-leader: Yusuke Kuno (Graduate School of Engineering, University of Tokyo)

Takeo Adachi (Graduate School of Engineering, University of Tokyo), Mitsunori Akiba (Graduate School of

Engineering, University of Tokyo), Jor-Shan Choi (University of California, Berkeley), Tetsuo Fukazawa (Hitachi–GE

Nuclear Energy), Ltd. Akira Goto (Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.), Manabu Hamasaki (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,

Ltd), Yasuhisa Hieda (Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd.), Shizuo Hoshiba, Japan Agency for Marine–Earth Science and

Technology),Sukeyuki Ichimasa (National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense), Tomonori Iwamoto

(Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd), Yoshinori Izumi (Graduate School of Engineering, University of Tokyo), Tomohiko Kita

(Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc), Toshihiro Kobayashi (Japan Atomic Power Company), Naoki Miyamoto

(Nuclear Material Control Center), Hirofumi Nakashima (Japan Atomic Power Company), Shinya Nishikawa

(Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc), Nobuhiko Saito (Tokyo Electric Power Company), Michitaka Sanso (Toshiba

Corporation), Naotaka Shimizu (Hitachi–GE Nuclear Energy Ltd./Japan Electrical Manufacturers' Association),

Nobuo Shinohara (Japan Atomic Energy Agency), Katsuyuki Suzuki (Global Nuclear Fuel–Japan), Ryuta Takashima

(Graduate School of Engineering, University of Tokyo), Hiroshi Tamai (Japan Atomic Energy Agency), Motoyasu

Yamazaki (Meisei University), Tomoyuki Tanabe (Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry), Makiko

Tazaki (Graduate School of Engineering, University of Tokyo (alphabetical order)

Working Group Members (Report Writing Staff)

Yusuke Kuno, Mitsunori Akiba, Makiko Tazaki, Takeo Adachi, Ryuta Takashima, Yoshinori Izumi, Jor-Shan Choi

Part of this study is the result of "A Study on Building and Sustainable Operation of an International Nuclear Fuel Cycle System"

conducted under the Fundamental Nuclear Research and Development Initiative of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,

Science and Technology. This study was conducted with financial support from the Fundamental Nuclear Research and

Development Initiative described above and the International Foundation for Safe and Secure Energy Technologies (IFSSET). Since

this study was conducted by the abovementioned study committee purely from an academic viewpoint, the content of this

academic study report does not represent the organization to which the abovementioned study committee belongs.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Background and purpose ............................................................................................................. 1

1.2 Significance of multilateral/international framework ................................................................ 4

1.3 System design specifications ...................................................................................................... 4

1.4 Basic concept for research on multilateral nuclear approach framework .................................. 5

2. Problems with past and current proposals related to multilateral/international approaches ............... 7

2.1 Historical review of international framework ............................................................................ 7

2.2 Recent proposals,

....................................................................................................................... 9

2.3 Issues with the past and current proposals ............................................................................... 14

3. Requirements for establishing multilateral/international nuclear approach (MNA) ..................... 14

4. Proposal for multinational/international nuclear approach (MNA) framework (Regional

Framework) .................................................................................................................................. 22

4.1 Proposed MNA framework ....................................................................................................... 22

4.2 Basic agreement (agreement concerning consortium model and framework treaty) proposal 28

5. MNA framework constituent proposal ........................................................................................... 50

5.1 Potential MNA framework member states proposal ................................................................ 50

5.2 Concrete proposal for the nuclear fuel cycle service states ...................................................... 50

6. Detailed study and evaluation of the proposed framework ............................................................ 52

6.1 Further study and evaluation from legal and regulatory perspectives ...................................... 52

1) Safeguards............................................................................................................................... 52

2) Nuclear safety ......................................................................................................................... 56

3) Nuclear security ...................................................................................................................... 64

4) Compensation/liability for nuclear damages .......................................................................... 70

5) Export controls........................................................................................................................ 80

6) Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements ............................................................................... 85

6.2 Further study and evaluation from transport (Geopolitics) and economic perspectives .......... 94

1) Transport (Geopolitics) ........................................................................................................... 94

2) Economic efficiency: comparison with country-based management ................................... 119

3) Demand–supply balance within framework ......................................................................... 134

6.3 Further study and evaluation of nonproliferation ................................................................... 136

1) Study on regional safeguards systems .................................................................................. 136

2) Evaluation of nonproliferation in multilateral management ................................................. 139

6.4 Participation incentives for candidate countries ..................................................................... 147

6.5 Research on role of industry in international nuclear fuel cycle ............................................ 149

6.6 Forum for discussion on establishment of international nuclear fuel cycle framework ......... 156

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7. Summary ...................................................................................................................................... 160

7.1 Background and purpose of study .......................................................................................... 160

7.2 Final framework proposal ....................................................................................................... 161

7.3 Overview of nuclear fuel cycle framework treaties and agreements ..................................... 174

7.4 Evaluation of feasibility of nuclear fuel cycle framework ..................................................... 178

7.5 Sustainability of stable nuclear fuel cycle framework ........................................................... 193

7.6 Comprehensive evaluation of proposed MNA: discussion on feasibility and sustainability

Sides ........................................................................................................................................ 198

7.7 Future work ............................................................................................................................ 203

8. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 207

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background and purpose

The accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company

at the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake was a critical phenomenon that brought changes to

the global trend of the expansion of the peaceful uses of nuclear power until that time. In Japan, it

may influence the continuation of the peaceful use of nuclear power. On the other hand, it is

undeniable that nuclear power remains one of the most important countermeasures against the

global economic/energy consumption growth and greenhouse gases issues. Although the temporally

termination of nuclear power use may be unavoidable, in the long run, we predict with high

probability that the needs for nuclear power in the world should grow again to accommodate the

increasing energy consumption in line with the rapid economic growth, especially in e.g., Asia,

unless its replacement technology is identified. “A Study on the Establishment of an International

Nuclear Fuel Cycle System for Asia” was carried out based on the premise that, introduction of

nuclear power to the Asian region should be facilitated in the future, especially after sufficient

nuclear safety measures are taken with regard to the nuclear power generation

If the needs for use of nuclear power increases from the viewpoint of global warming caused

by fossil fuel and securing energy as a result of enhanced living standards, the demands for not only

the generation of power but also uranium refining, conversion, enrichment, re-conversion, and fuel

production should increase. In addition, the concerns for the proliferation of so-called “Sensitive

Nuclear Technologies (SNTs)”, namely, enriched uranium fuel production technology (frontend)

and spent fuel (SF) reprocessing technology (backend), and fissile materials should also increase. At

the same time, with an increase in the amount of SF, the SF should be stored in many states. In

other words, there should be a growing concern from the nuclear non-proliferation perspective that

plutonium (Pu) may be globally dispersed in the form of SF. Furthermore, issues with regards to

nuclear security and SF safeguards (all combined and called 3S) should also increase.

Conventionally, international society had been responded to the concerns over nuclear

non-proliferation including nuclear security by strengthening schematic measures centered around

the safeguards under the NPT, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, etc.

However, with an increase in the number of states using nuclear power including SNTs, the nuclear

non-proliferation measures through the systems targeting the overall international society have

limitations. Thus, additional tight measures have been taken by setting conditions on the supply side

such as nuclear technology, equipment, and nuclear fuel (supply side approach: export control

regulation, control on technology transfer based on bilateral agreement, etc.). We should pay

attention to the possibility of the initiative in the supply of nuclear fuel, which is the basis for

supply-side approaches, shifting from the Western countries consisting mainly of Europe and the

United States to the former Eastern countries. There is also concern about a possible weakening of the

nuclear nonproliferation regime established mainly by Western countries including bilateral

agreements with the United States due to increases in uranium fuel (enriched uranium) in the former

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East European countries (central Asia) produced in Kazakhstan, Russia and other countries (possibly

Mongolia in future).

On the other hand, the measures for enhancement of nuclear non-proliferation on the supply

side that mainly consist of the nuclear power technology advanced countries may interfere with the

right of peaceful uses of nuclear power that is guaranteed by Article 4 of the NPT. Thus, there is a

need to develop nuclear non-proliferation measures with high non-proliferation capacity based on a

new concept which is completely different from the conventional ones. In addition, as to the nuclear

security for handling SNTs and nuclear materials as well as safety management of nuclear facility

operations, the conventional state-by-state efforts have limitations from the viewpoint of

effectiveness, efficiency, and economic reasonability.

Under the circumstances, one of the effective ideas is a demand side approach: execution of a

nuclear fuel cycle among multiple countries. (The structure of measures that international society

has been taking so far is presented in the figure below.)

According to this approach, the nuclear fuel cycle services, especially centered on the SNTs,

are multinationally executed and controlled, and therefore unnecessary proliferation of the SNTs

can be prevented, and safe and appropriate control of nuclear technologies and nuclear materials is

obtainable. This can effectively and efficiently assure risk control and risk reduction with regard to

3S. At the same time, due to sharing of a nuclear fuel cycle, etc., this approach is executable without

interference with fostering of the right of peaceful uses of nuclear power in emerging and other

核不拡散に係る国際的な組み

地域枠組みなど新しい多国間不拡散レジーム

デマンドサイドアプローチ（受領国側のインセンテイブを減らす方策）

IAEA包括的保障措置協定(NPT第3条に基づく義務)日・IAEA:1977.12締結

IAEA追加議定書日・IAEA:1999.12締結

包括的核実験禁止条約(CTBT) 未発効日本:1997.7批准

カットオフ条約(FMCT) 条約交渉開始模索中

核兵器不拡散条約(NPT)1970.3発効日本:1976.6批准

部分的核実験禁止条約(PTBT)1963.10発効日本:1964.6批准改正核物質防護条約

2005.7 改正条約案文採択非核地帯条約トルテラルコ条約等

核テロ防止条約2005.4採択2007.7発効

限定された国家間の核不拡散レジーム

条約・制度による核不拡散・核セキュリティ強化の実現

ザンガー委員会原子力専用品 197４.８設立

原子力供給国グループ(NSG)：NPT枠外ロンドン・ガイドライン原子力専用品・技術及び汎用品・技術ﾊﾟｰﾄ1:1978.1設立ﾊﾟｰﾄ2:1992.6設立

サプライサイドアプローチ（供給国側による条件設定による核不拡散）

2国間協定による核不拡散の強化対策

燃料供給保証など多国間管理（MNA）

その他の国際合意・協力

PSI、GTRI、GNEP、

国連決議1540、G8サミットなど

Nonproliferation-related International Efforts

Realizing nonproliferation and enhanced security through treaties and systems

Treaty on the Non-proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Brought into effect in March 1970,

ratified by Japan in June 1976

IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

(obligation under Article 3 of NPT)

Concluded between Japan and IAEA in

December 1977

IAEA Additional Protocol

Concluded between Japan and

IAEA in December 1999

Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)

Brought into effect in October 1963, ratified

by Japan in June 1964

Amendment to the Convention on the

Physical Protection of Nuclear

Material

Amendment adopted in July 2005

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear

Terrorism Adopted in April 2005, brought

into effect in July 2007

Nuclear-free zone treaties

(e.g. Treaty of Tlatelolco)

Supply-side approaches (nonproliferation

measures through conditions set by supply-side

countries)

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

(CTBT)

Not yet in effect, ratified by Japan in July 1997 Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT): Efforts to start negotiations underway

Nonproliferation

regime between

limited countries

New multilateral

nonproliferation regimes such as regional

frameworks

Demand-side approaches (measures to reduce incentives for recipient countries)

Nuclear Suppliers Group

(NSG): Exempt from NPT

London Guidelines

Nuclear-related equipment, materials and

technology

and dual-use equipment, materials and technology

Part 1: Established in January 1978

Part 2: Established in June 1992

Zangger Committee Nuclear-related equipment and

materials: Established in August 1974

Nonproliferation

measures

strengthened by

bilateral agreements

Multilateral nuclear

approaches (MNA) such as fuel supply guarantee

Other international agreements and

cooperation PSI, GTRI, GNEP,

United Nations Resolution 1540, G8 Summit, etc.

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countries. Furthermore, this approach should promote regional confidence-building among the

states in the field of nuclear power development.

Turning our attention to the situation in Japan, we can see that if there is no significant

progress in the use of plutonium (Pu), long-term storage of spent fuel and the storage of plutonium

(as mixed oxide fuel [MOX]) are among Japan's options. It is reasonable to assume that for the

storage of plutonium, whether in the form of MOX or not, the reaction of the international community

would be very negative even if peace in future is stressed. If, however, such storage is carried out not

by a single country but by a group of countries, then a different situation should result.

If Japanese reprocessing stops due to the international concerns on plutonium accumulation, or

causes significant delay, needs on restitution of SF to individual reactor sites and SF’s long storage

would increase. Thereby, it appears that the needs of not only domestic but also international SF

storage become more significant.

Although many discussion and studies have already been made concerning the multilateral

nuclear approach (MNA) , most of them focus on the frontend of nuclear fuel cycle and guarantee

the supply of nuclear fuel (enriched uranium fuel) to the nuclear power generating states. These

approaches may be effective for preventing proliferation of uranium enrichment technology, which

addresses one of the above concerns. However, they are not addressing the issues such as

proliferation of plutonium as a result of accumulation of “spent fuel” and handling of reprocessing

technology with regards to backend. Furthermore, there is a need to examine the international

framework for fuel supply and handling of SF for a normal time, because these approaches

(guaranteeing the supply of nuclear fuel) focus on the termination of supply only at the time of

emergency.

Prior to the present study, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Study Committee conducted a study on

an international nuclear fuel cycle scheme from the viewpoint of nonproliferation.1 That study,

however, did not deal with solutions to specific issues to be addressed in order to make the scheme a

reality such as the feasibility and stability of a framework for an international nuclear fuel cycle and

the identification of conditions for contribution from industry.

This study investigated the specific measures to achieve the sustainable multilateral

international nuclear fuel cycle including stable enriched uranium supply system, SF handing

system, usage of plutonium, establishment of regional safeguards system for the international

nuclear fuel cycle, requirements for the organization that carries out international nuclear fuel cycle,

and role of industry in the international nuclear fuel cycle system. It also examined the issues of the

systems and the countermeasures to achieve the international nuclear fuel cycle. Furthermore, the

study aimed to propose a feasible international nuclear fuel cycle scheme centered on Asia and

present it to the international society.

1 http://www.n.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp/gcoe/jpn/research/nonproliferation/docs/asia_fuel_cycle_kuno.pdf

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1.2 Significance of multilateral/international framework

As nuclear non-proliferation measures while expanding peaceful use including uranium

enrichment and reprocessing, the international society had been taking actions such as application

of systematic measures such as “safeguards” and limiting holding of SNTs by supply states groups

agreement or bilateral agreement. On the other hand, because the situation of nuclear proliferation

has been getting more serious, the international society is requiring tighter measures including the

“nuclear proliferation resistance” and environment surrounding peaceful uses of nuclear energy is

increasingly getting severe. It is also not desirable to pay higher prices for taking the measures of

the nuclear proliferation resistance, etc.

On the other hand, the characteristics of the needs for enrichment, reprocessing, and

international storage are that the needs can be covered as long as there is a limited number of

facilities in the world. Thus, the idea of “multilateral management of nuclear fuel cycle”, which

facilitates the implementation of fuel cycle not just by one state but by multiple states based on the

stand point of fulfilling both peaceful uses and nuclear non-proliferation, has been discussed. It

should contribute to enhancement of transparency and trust-building in the region.

If we can propose a solution that is internationally acceptable, the multilateral (international)

administration of nuclear fuel cycle should economically and efficiently attain both fostering of

peaceful uses of nuclear power and nuclear non-proliferation.

Recently, first, as to the frontend (= processes from raw material through mining, uranium

enrichment, and fuel production to nuclear power generation), arguments about international

frameworks such as “assuring nuclear fuel supply” have been advanced. Being led by IAEA,

specific proposals around these arguments are being materialized. However, in reality, the issues for

responding to the backend including spent fuel handling (storage and reprocessing) have been

getting more serious. Therefore, the multilateral management concept, which includes the backend,

is expected to be one solution. We believe that by establishing an appropriate multilateral

management concept, the SNTs should be well managed both at frontend and backend and equal

and efficient fuel cycle (effective use of nuclear fuel) can be achieved.

Furthermore, for the nuclear fuel cycle – plutonium utilization polity, which must be retreated

on one-state basis due to nuclear non-proliferation concerns and economic aspect, the multilateral

framework should advance the discussion for the future based on the viewpoint of regional energy

security strategy and HLW environmental burden reduction.

The multilateral management concept is also expected to provide solution to the uniqueness of

Japan (i.e. the only nonnuclear weapon state which has nuclear fuel cycle).

1.3 System design specifications

Design specifications (summary) for the system that this study aims to realize are as follows:

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Develop a proposed multilateral nuclear approach (MNA) that is effective in nuclear

nonproliferation (nuclear security) through multilateral cooperation to cope with the growing

concern about the proliferation of sensitive technologies resulting from the continuing global

spread of nuclear power plants (including possibilities of obstructive and destructive activities

of terrorists)

Deal with a comprehensive fuel cycle from "front end" to "back end"

Develop a proposed international nuclear fuel cycle model that is feasible and sustainable from

the viewpoint of not only nuclear nonproliferation but also fuel cycle service, host country (site

country) selection, access to technologies, the degree of multilateral involvement, rationality of

economic efficiency, transportation, safety, nuclear damage liability, political acceptability,

public acceptability, geopolitics and regulation

Develop fuel cycle models (proposal) for regions mainly in Asian countries including emerging

nuclear power countries, attaching importance to incentives for the participating countries and

the nuclear power industry

1.4 Basic concept for research on multilateral nuclear approach framework

The proposed International Nuclear Fuel Cycle System (Framework) must meet nuclear

nonproliferation, sustainability and feasibility requirements.

The fuel cycle service system within the multilateral nuclear approach (MNA) framework

(including regional safeguard measures) must be capable of preventing the proliferation of

sensitive nuclear technologies and nuclear materials (it must be as effective as or more effective

than the current global nuclear nonproliferation measures). From the viewpoint of the need to

ensure equality of peaceful use rights and achieve nuclear nonproliferation goals, the MNA

proposal adopts a concept similar to the concept of the objective criteria approach of the 2011

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines (related to sensitive nuclear technologies). This means

that basically the proposed approach allows criteria-meeting member countries to introduce

enrichment and reprocessing. Strict control is exercised over the quality of regional safeguard

measures and the control of sensitive nuclear technologies. Furthermore, in view of the possibility

of member countries' withdrawing from the framework, the requirements for the participation in

the framework must include conditions such as the right to demand the return of nuclear materials

when withdrawing from the framework, the termination of the use and operation of the facilities

(related to sensitive nuclear technologies) newly constructed on the basis of the participation in the

framework and the prohibition of transfer to a third-party country.

In addition to the proliferation-preventing function, the fuel cycle service system within the

proposed MNA framework must have functions for maintaining and strengthening safety and

nuclear security in order for the fuel cycle service system to manage nuclear technologies and

nuclear materials safely and adequately, that is, to effectively and efficiently achieve risk

management and risk reduction goals associated with the 3S's (safety, security and safeguards).

The proposed MNA framework must present rational solutions for both nuclear fuel supply

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(front-end) and spent fuel (SF) handling services (back-end) aspects.

For nuclear fuel supply (front-end), the proposed framework must not only ensure supply but

also provide supply services to meet the needs within the framework.

For spent fuel handling, from the viewpoints of (1) nonproliferation, (2) processing and disposal

and (3) environmental load reduction, combined use must be made of three approaches, namely,

(1) international storage, (2) reprocessing (including the environmental load reduction described

later) and (3) direct disposal.

Spent fuel-generating countries are responsible for both direct disposal of spent fuel and the

disposal of high level waste generated from the reprocessing service.

MNA member countries should devise and implement solutions (developing technologies and

establishing service systems) for environmental load reduction in order to reduce the

environmental burden due to high level waste for which each country is to be responsible. This

can be expected to provide solutions for the disposal of spent fuel final waste within the

framework. (With respect to this viewpoint, the main approach in this study is to pursue final

waste radioactivity reduction by spent fuel reprocessing, but direct disposal should be retained

as an option available within the framework.)

Plutonium recovered by reprocessing should be used for the moment in the form of MOX as

MOX fuel for light water reactors to the extent possible and, in the future when it has become

economically justifiable, should be used as fuel for fast reactors. For regional energy security in

future, therefore, stockpiling is regarded as an option (international storage within the MNA

framework).

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2. Problems with past and current proposals related to multilateral/international approaches

2.1 Historical review of international framework 2

“Uranium enrichment” and “spent fuel (SF) reprocessing technology”, together with the heavy

water production technology, are called “Sensitive Nuclear Technologies (SNT)”. From the

perspective of preventing proliferation of SNT, the concept of “international control” had been

proposed for long time. The old one is the international control of nuclear materials, which was

developed under the Truman Administration in 1946 (i.e. pooling all nuclear materials, etc. in an

international organization and lend them to wishing states). This plan was later put on the table of

the UN Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) in the form of “Baruch Plan” by UN Representative

B. Baruch. The Plan, however, did not take off successfully because it was contradicting with the

US’s free enterprise system of that time as it was promoting international ownership of the US

technology. It also reached deadlock in the negotiation between US and Soviet Union. However, the

Plan triggered the “Age of International Collaboration for Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy” on the

“Atoms for Peace” speech by US President Eisenhower in 1953 at the UN. In this initiative, the

uranium bank (reserve) with an intension of international management of fissile materials was

proposed. After these debates, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in

1957. Provision of nuclear materials, etc. became one of the missions of the IAEA. However, the

uranium bank plan was eventually abandoned because a) uranium supply was not as limited as was

initially envisioned, and b) competition of commercial nuclear energy technology/supply of nuclear

materials in the major supplying states based on the above speech was intensified.

In the post-war Europe, European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was established

to promote nuclear energy development. The most important requirement of the Convention was “to

guarantee nuclear materials supply” by the member states. At the same time, the Convention had

safeguards systems to ensure that the nuclear materials within EURATOM were to be used only for

peaceful uses.

International debate with regards to exporting nuclear technology and material/equipment is

another international framework concerning the supply. In 1971, Zangger Committee was

established. The member states shall apply the IAEA’s safeguards to the exported “nuclear materials”

when exporting them to the non-NPT member states without nuclear weapons as well as when

transshipping them from these nonnuclear weapons states. The Committee also created a list of

equipment as subjects of the regulation. Meanwhile, after the first nuclear test by India, the Nuclear

Suppliers Group (NSG) was established in 1974 for a similar purpose. The NSG controls exports

based on the so-called “NSG Guidelines”, the guidelines designed for the states which export

nuclear energy related equipment, material and technologies (it is a “gentleman’s agreement”

without any legal binding power).

In 1975, the IAEA began the exploration of the first Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Center

2 http://www.jaea.go.jp/04/np/activity/2008-07-10/2008-07-10-9.pdf

8

(RFCC) and assessed the advantages of applying backend to the RFCC. The RFCC report examined

and presented basic research from international and regional approach regarding the backend of fuel

cycle in various geographical sites. From 1977 to 1980, the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Evaluation (INFCE) was conducted, and the effectiveness of nuclear fuel cycle was thoroughly

evaluated by 8 working groups (WGs). Through this activity, many WGs picked up “fuel cycle

center” and described it as a systematic arrangement to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation.

Furthermore, for the SF issues, they considered the fuel cycle as a solution that includes legal

framework and multinational arrangement. Based on the results of the INFCE, the IAEA supported

the experts group to examine the concept of international plutonium storage (IPS), established the

Committee for Assurance of Supply (CAS) in 1980 and continued the deliberation until 1987. The

experts’ examination concluded that the multilateral approach was technically and economically

feasible but there were still issues in terms of difficulty in prerequisites for participation and transfer

of rights towards nuclear non-proliferation.

At GLOBAL 93, an international conference, the “International

Monitored Retrievable Storage System (IMRSS)” was proposed by Dr. Häfele from Germany.

IMRSS proposes that spent nuclear fuel and plutonium shall be stored in retrievable condition under

the monitoring by an international entity. It chose the IAEA as a desirable entity to lead the

initiative. Although it was considered as a temporally measure to buy some time until the

conclusion of whether SF would be directly disposed or plutonium would be retrieved, there was no

developed thereafter. Dr. Atsuyuki Suzuki of the University of Tokyo made a proposal for SF

storage in the East Asia region, and Dr. Choi of CISAC/Stanford University made a proposal for the

regional treaty including regional SF storage. Their proposals show significance of the systems in

which the host states offer interim storage of SF for a limited time (40 to 50 years), even though the

handling of SF from other states is not easy.

In 1994, the US and Russia agreed that the US would purchase 500 tons of highly-enriched

uranium (HEU) from Russia, convert it to low-enriched uranium (LEU) and make peaceful uses of

it. Furthermore, both states agreed that each state would declare 50 tons of excess plutonium to be

used for defense purposes, dismantle and retrieve 34 tons of it from nuclear weapons, and convert

them to power generating fuel as MOX. For the purpose of nuclear non-proliferation, the US also

began the “Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program (FRRSNFA)” in

1996 to accept the US-origin spent HEU and LEU fuels from foreign research reactors by May

2009. Furthermore, under the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) Program, some 2

tons of HEU and some 2.5 tons of LEU SF, which were previously supplied by Soviet Union/Russia

to foreign reactors, were shipped to the Mayak reprocessing complex near Chelyabinsk. The US and

the Russian Federation cooperated in several repatriation projects for Russian-origin HEU fuels.

Based on the recognition that SF and high level waste (HLW) are the common critical issues

which could be factors to hinder nuclear energy promotion in the East Asia region, the Pacific

Nuclear Council (PNC) began deliberation to promote understanding and cooperation for the

management of SF and HLW among the PNC members and investigate possibilities of the

International Interim Storage Scheme (IISS) in 1997. The IISS is managed at national, regional, or

9

international levels and is to augment (not to replace) the national system. The IISS operates during

the contract period from the time when SF and HLW are deposited to the storage facility in the host

state till the time when “they are returned to the originating state”. The host state would be

responsible for safety and safeguards of the storage facility and receive financial liability from the

contact member state, which is the owner of the SF and HLW.

In reality, the interim storage of SF, a part of reprocessing contract, had been offered by

reprocessing operators such as the BNFL and the AREVA. With this system, the state which makes

a reprocessing contract can store SF as long as it is stored in the reprocessing facility; however the

separated plutonium and HLW at the time of reprocessing would be returned to the state. On the

other hand, the concepts of the IMRSS, the RSSFEA, regional treaty and the IISS demand the host

state to store or dispose of other state’s SF. However, this is not easy in reality.

2.2 Recent proposals 3, 4

The concerns about nuclear proliferation by states and the acquisition of nuclear weapons by

terrorists had grown after nuclear test by India/Pakistan in 1998 and terrorist attack on September

11, 2001. The nuclear weapons black market network issues by Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea (DPRK, hereafter referred to as North Korea), Libya, Iran and A.Q. Khan are driving the

international society to make efforts through various trials and proposals in preventing proliferation

of the SNT related to fuel cycle such as isotope separation and reprocessing.

The proposals made by Director General of the IAEA, M. ElBaradei, in October 2003

presented that (1) reprocessing and enrichment operations must be restricted under the multinational

control, (2) nuclear energy system shall have nuclear non-proliferation resistance, and (3)

multinational approaches shall be considered for the management and disposal of SF and

radioactive wastes. However, it was anticipated that his idea of multilateral system of SNT and

radioactive substances would take long time to overcome issues. Former US President G.W. Bush

strongly demanded in his speech at the National Defense University in February 2004 that exporting

SNT should be limited to the states which were already using them in full scale and respecting the

Additional Protocol. However, this proposal may lead to international cartel and may split the

member states into the states with SNT and without SNT. The “Nuclear Fuel Leasing” proposal by

V. Rice, et al. and “Nuclear Fuel Service Assurance Initiative” proposal by E. Moniz, et al. expect

the improvement of nuclear non-proliferation though institutionalization. However, the proposals

still contain a concern over supply assurance to the user states as well as a concern over the

dichotomization of the member states, similar to the other proposals.

Later, a group of experts for multinational nuclear (fuel cycle) approaches (MNA) was

formed (ElBaradei Commission). The group was assigned to (1) identify and provide an analysis

3 http://www.jaea.go.jp/04/np/activity/2008-07-10/2008-07-10-9.pdf and NAS–RAS joint committee report: Internationalization of

the nuclear fuel cycle: goals, strategies, and challenges, September 30, 2008. 4 Kuno and Choi: "Concepts for internationalization of nuclear fuel cycle and regional management: Why internalization of nuclear

fuel cycle?," Genshiryoku Eye (Nuclear Viewpoints), 59–62, No. 5, 2009.

10

of issues and options relevant to multilateral approaches to the frontend and backend of the nuclear

fuel cycle, (2) provide an overview of policy, legal, security, economic, institutional and

technological incentives and disincentives for cooperation in multinational arrangements, and (3)

provide a brief review of the historical and current experiences and analysis relating to

multinational fuel cycle arrangements. In the report, MNA was assessed based on two primary

factors, namely, assurance of supply and services, and assurance of nuclear non-proliferation.

Furthermore, 3 potential MNA options were presented.

1) To strengthen existing market mechanism case by case with an assistance from governments

through long-term and transparent arrangement;

2) To establish an international supply assurance such as fuel bank in collaboration with the IAEA

as an organization to assure fuel supply; and

3) To promote voluntary transformation of existing facilities of member states to MNA (including

regional MNA by collaborative ownership and collaborative administration)

The study results by the expert group at the IAEA are summarized in INFCIRC/640, which

gave an impact on the successive examination of multinational approach framework.

After this report, a number of proposals related to supply assurance and multilateral

approaches had been put forward. Followings are some of these proposals/approaches:

1) In order to achieve “Reliable Fuel Supply (RFS) Initiative”, announced by former Secretary

of the US Department of Energy (DOE), Bodman in September 2005, the US is in the process

of down-blending about 17.4 tons of HEU to about 290 tons of LEU (4.9%) within 3 years

and storing them. The RFS Initiative was later renamed to the American Assured Fuel Supply

(AFS) and it became available in 2012.

2) During the discussion of fuel supply assurance at the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

(GNEP), the US, in collaboration with the partner states, declared that it would aim at

establishing a fuel service mechanism including fuel supply at frontend and SF disposal at

backend to achieve international nuclear non-proliferation. In the Nonproliferation Impact

Assessment (NPIA) (draft) presented by DOE in January 2009, the importance of maintaining

advanced reprocessing capacity including minor actinide recycling was insisted. It also

emphasized the significance of US’s participation in the overall fuel services including

backend service in order to suppress incentives for the emerging states to individually

develop enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Later, as was influenced by political

regime change, the GNEP terminated its domestic activities (i.e. cancellation of prompt

construction of commercial reprocessing facility and fast reactor) and decided that they would

maintain international collaboration framework as International Framework for Nuclear

Energy Cooperation (IFNEC) only for the international activities from 2010. The fuel supply

working group at IFNEC expressed their willingness to support collaborative actions among

member states and organizations towards establishment of international fuel supply

framework. They would also provide trustworthy and worth the cost fuel services/supply to

the global market and provide options relating to the development of nuclear energy usage in

11

accordance with reduction of nuclear proliferation risks. In the speech of the new director, he

expressed their willingness to achieve so-called “from cradle to grave”.

3) World Nuclear Association (WNA) proposed a three-level assurance mechanism: 1) basic

supply assurance provided by the existing market, 2) collective guarantees by enrichment

operators supported by relevant governmental and the IAEA commitments, and 3)

government stocks of enriched uranium product. According to them, it is necessary to

promote international fuel cycle center idea when nuclear energy usage is expanded in the

future.

4) Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel (RANF) (nuclear fuel supply assurance concept by 6 states):

Similar to the above, this proposal contains a three-level mechanism: 1) supply through

market, 2) system in which enrichment operators would substitute for each other based on the

collaboration with the IAEA, and 3) virtual or physical low-enriched uranium banks by a state

or the IAEA.

5) Japanese proposal: The states willing to participate shall voluntarily register at/notify the

IAEA their capacities (current stockpiles and supply capacity), and the member states shall

notify the IAEA their service provision capacity in accordance with the availability of service

utilization capability by three levels (Level 1: provision of service on the domestic

commercial basis – no exporting at commercial scale, Level 2: international provision on the

commercial basis, Level 3: storage that can be exported for a short time). The IAEA would

make an agreement of standby-arrangement with member states and manage the system. If

fuel supply actually gets confused in a state, IAEA should play a role as a mediator. This

proposal is to improve market transparency, prevent supply termination, and augment the

RANF proposal.

6) UK Enrichment Bond proposal: Enrichment tasks shall be carried out by domestic

enrichment operators. The supplying state, consuming state and the IAEA should make a

treaty in advance. The IAEA shall approve commitment of the consuming state for nuclear

non-proliferation. If assurance is activated by bonding, the supplying state would not be

prevented from supplying enrichment services to consuming state. This proposal is to

enhance credibility of supply assurance mechanism and augment the RANF proposal. The

Bond proposal was later renamed to the Nuclear Fuel Assurance (NAF) proposal and was

approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in March, 2011.

7) The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) proposal: This is a storage system for LEU stockpile

possessed and controlled by the IAEA, and it is the anchor proposal for the actual realization.

For the activity of the NTI, US pledged $50 million, Norway $5 million, the United Arab

Emirates $10 million, EU $32 million, and Kuwait offered $10 million. The total pledge had

reached $107 million. Furthermore, in April 2009, Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev

announced that the country was ready to receive the IAEA nuclear fuel bank and officially

announced its willingness to be a host state in January 2010 (INFCIRC/782). In May 2009,

12

the IAEA presented a proposal for deliberation at the Board of Governors to be held in June

2009. The proposal included consuming state’s requirement in relation to the IAEA nuclear

fuel bank, supply process, contents of model agreement (e.g. supply price of LEU, safeguards,

nuclear material protection, nuclear liability), etc. Later, at a regular Board of Governors on

December 3, 2010, the establishment of “nuclear fuel bank” which should internationally

manage and supply LEU to be used as fuel for nuclear energy generation was agreed. If the

IAEA receives a request from a state which cannot purchase LEU due to exceptional

circumstances impacting availability and/or transfer and is unable to secure LEU from the

commercial market, State-to-State arrangements, or by any other such means, the IAEA

should supply LEU to the state at the market price under the guidance of the Director General

of IAEA. Through this agreement, the first system in which LEU would be controlled by an

international organization began. The IAEA owns the bank based on the contributions from

the member states. The Board of Directors should later deliberate the location of the bank.

Kazakhstan is already declaring its candidacy for a host state. The resolution was proposed

collaboratively by over 10 states including the US, Japan and Russia and was adapted with 28

states voting for favor. The developing countries which were planning to have nuclear

energy later had been insisting that the bank would lead to the monopoly of nuclear

technology by developed countries and “right for peaceful use of nuclear energy” stipulated

by the NPT would be threatened. To address this issue, the resolution clearly stated that it

would not “ask for abandoning” nuclear technology development by each state and obtained

understanding from the developing countries.

8) International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC): The IUEC was established in Angarsk,

Russia, with investment by Russia and Kazakhstan. The IUEC is not only to assure supply but

to provide uranium enrichment services. Thus, this proposal is more realistic than the others.

The proposal states that the uranium enrichment technology should be black-boxed, namely,

the investing states should not be informed, and the technology should be under the control of

the IAEA. Other than Russia and Kazakhstan, Armenia and Ukraine are now members of the

IUEC, while Uzbekistan is expressing their intention of participation. It should have the LEU

reserve of 2 1000MW-level cores. In May 2009, for the deliberation at the IAEA Board of

Governors to be held in June, Russia submitted the proposal including the summary of

agreement for LEU storage between the IAEA and Russia and summary of agreement for the

LEU supply between the IAEA and the consuming states. In November 2009, being led by

Russia, the nuclear advanced states submitted a resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors of

November. The resolution was to seek approval of two agreement plans: 1) agreement plan

between the IAEA and Russia to establish the LEU reserve under Russian IUEC, and 2) a

model agreement plan between the IAEA and the LEU recipient states concerning the LEU

supply from the reserve. The resolution was approved by a majority. In March 2010, the

IAEA’s Director General, Amano, and Director General of Rosatom Nuclear Energy State

Corporation, Kiriyenko, signed on the agreement for the establishment of the LEU reserve

under Russian IUEC, and the LEU storage was established in December, 2010.

9) Multinational Enrichment Sanctuary Project (MESP) (proposed by Germany): This proposal

13

is for the IAEA to manage enrichment plant and exportation on an extra-territorial basis in a

host state. The SNT should be black-boxed.

10) The Science Academies of the US and Russia presented analysis and proposals for nuclear

fuel assurance as a measure to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons under the title of

“Internationalization of Nuclear Fuel Cycle – Goals, Strategies, and Challenges”. In its

report2, the options and technological issues for the future international nuclear fuel cycle are

presented. The report also contains the analysis of the incentives for the states that opt for

accepting fuel supply assurance and developing enrichment or reprocessing facilities and do

not opt for it. Furthermore, they examined new technologies for reprocessing/recycling and

new reactors and made various proposals to the governments of US and Russia and other

nuclear supplier states to stop proliferation of SNT and contribute to reduction in the risk of

nuclear weapons proliferation. The report analyzed and summarized critical issues and

presented several standards for assessing the options.

Figure 2.1 shows the flow of nuclear nonproliferation measures focusing mainly on

multilateral management and supply guarantee. As shown, the debates are becoming more and more

active in recent years, and the needs for internationalization of fuel cycle, which was not very

realistic until now, are gradually becoming reality. As described above, as of December 2011, the

IAEA nuclear fuel bank, LEU reserve in Angarsk, Russia, and the UK’s NFA proposal were

approved by the IAEA Board of Governors, and the US’s AFS became available in 2012.

この図は以前と同じ

Russia took back SF from FSRs, now Eastern European Countries

Soviet took back SF from Soviet-built nuclear reactor

in Finland

RRRFR: US supports Russia to take back SF

from Russian origin research Rx (1999-)

FRRSNFA: US takes back SF from US origin

Rx (1996 -)

Global Threat Reduction Initiative

(GTRI) (2005 -)

1946 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Baruch

Plan

Uranium

bank

EURATO

M IAEA

RFCC INFCE

Zanger

Committee

NSG

INFCIRC/153

Int’l Pu storage

Committee

Assurance of

Supply (CAS)

IMRSS

RSSFEA

Regional

Compact

PNC/

IISS

INFCIRC/540

AP

IAEA Expert

Group,

INFCIRC/ 640

ElBaradel

NAS/RAS

Study on

Int’l NFC

WNA, RANF

SA-RANF

(Japan)

ME-SP

(Germany)

IUEC

(Angarsk)

RFS (AFS)

17.4t HEU Enrichment bond

(NFA, UK)

INFCIRC/66

G.W. Bush

GNEP

RFCC: Regional Fuel Cycle Centre

NSG: Nuclear suppliers Group

INFCE: International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation

RSSFEA: Region Storage of SF in East Asia

Regional Compact: Regional compact including SF storage

PNC/IISS: Pacific Nuclear Council/ International Interim Storage

Scheme

WNA: World Nuclear Association

RFS: Reliable Fuel Supply Initiative

IUEC: International Uranium Enrichment Center

Takeback SF from

Power Rx

Takeback SF from

Research Rx

Multinational

approaches of NFC

Limiting enrichment

and reprocessing

Fuel supply

assurance

Regional spent fuel

storage

Regional fuel cycle

center

International control

of SNTs and

materials

Export control

International

safeguards

Figure 2.1 Changes in proposals and initiatives for international and regional

management of nuclear fuel (cycle) associated with nuclear nonproliferation

14

2.3 Issues with the past and current proposals

From 2009 to 2011, most of the multilateral approaches had never been implemented in any

forms until the nuclear fuel bank and the LEU storage were approved by the IAEA Board of

Governors. It was probably because the nuclear proliferation was not recognized as a sufficiently

serious issue and there was not so strong economic motivation.

However, as was explained above, the situation has been changing in the last few years.

Despite the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident as well as the actual global concern over

nuclear non-proliferation, the expansion on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the world is

unavoidable in the long run. In that sense, the role of supply assurance of nuclear fuel bank, etc. was

reviewed, and the establishment of the IAEA nuclear fuel bank was approved by the IAEA Board of

Governors.

Another reason why many proposals on multilateral approaches have not been implemented

so far was because the proposals did not specify states to be involved. For example, the

INFCIRC/640 report did not specify the name of the states but only evaluated and examined the

nuclear non-proliferation and supply assurance from a comprehensive perspectives.

The purpose of this study is to identify and propose a multilateral approach that is feasible and

sustainable with respect to both front-end and back-end aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. Thus,

although the study examines and evaluates the framework based on the INFCIRC/640, it is

important to evaluate and examine the adequate supply assurance based on a model specific to

states or region, which was not taken into consideration in the INFCIRC/640, in terms of the

nuclear energy situation, specific uranium material supply, uranium enrichment, spent fuel

reprocessing services or (interim) storage of each state and region. It is considered, therefore, that

besides proposing a specific model, the study should consider and evaluate many requirements such

as treaties, agreements (proposals) and regulations, nuclear nonproliferation, economic efficiency,

access to technologies, geopolitics and transportation.

3. Requirements for establishing multilateral/international nuclear approach (MNA)

There had been many proposals with regards to nuclear fuel cycle multilateral nuclear fuel

cycle framework. Particularly, the INFCIRC/640 (Pellaud Report) adequately evaluates the

advantages and disadvantages of various elements from frontend to backend for each option (type)

of the framework. The key points of the report are as follows:

Three options are assumed as a framework of a MNA.

Type I Assurances of services not involving ownership of facilities

i) Suppliers provide additional assurance of supply

ii) International consortium of governments

15

iii) IAEA-related arrangement

Type II Conversion of existing national facilities to multinational ones

Type III Construction of new facilities

Next, the INFCIRC/640 evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of each item of nuclear

fuel cycle technology (i.e. uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, spent fuel disposal, spent

fuel storage) based on the following evaluation elements.

Label A Nuclear non-proliferation value of MNA

Label B Assurance of supply value of MNA

Label C Selection of siting and a host state

Label D Access to technology

Label E Multilateral involvement

Label F Special safeguards provisions

Label G Non-nuclear inducements

As a result of analysis, the INFCIRC/640 states that the objective of maintaining fuel supply

and service assurance while strengthening nuclear non-proliferation can be achieved by introducing

Type I to III in a phased manner.

Our study evaluated and reviewed the adequate options for MNA and their requirements

based on the above options and evaluation results as well as other various elements. As a result, we

believe that the appropriate options of MNA would be as follows:

Type A: The ownership of existing or new facilities is not transferred to MNA. Participation

(activities) does not involve providing fuel cycle services (uranium fuel supply service, spent

fuel/MOX storage service, spent fuel reprocessing service); instead, participants receive such

services from MNA (participation as owners of existing power reactors). It is necessary to agree

to cooperate in achieving higher levels of nuclear nonproliferation (safeguards), nuclear

security and safety (3S's).

Type B: The ownership of existing or new facilities is not transferred to MNA. Participation

(activities) involves providing fuel cycle service. It is necessary to agree to cooperate in

achieving higher levels of nuclear nonproliferation (safeguards), nuclear security and safety

(3S's).

Type C: The ownership of existing or new facilities is transferred to MNA. Participation

(activities) involves providing fuel cycle services. It is necessary to agree to cooperate in

achieving higher levels of nuclear nonproliferation (safeguards), nuclear security and safety

(3S's) (more effective in achieving higher levels of the 3S's than Type A and Type B

approaches).

Requirements for each option have been identified for the twelve categories (labels):

16

Label A Nuclear non-proliferation

If a state meets certain criteria (e.g. regional safeguards under MNA, nuclear security, export

control), it is considered that the state can adequately maintain nuclear non-proliferation. Thus,

the possession of SNTs (i.e. uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing), which is one of

the measures for nuclear non-proliferation, would not necessarily be controlled (criteria-based

approach).

Label B Fuel cycle service

Appropriate state becomes a host state (or site state) and provides fuel cycle service.

The state should provide uranium fuel supply service to those states without enrichment

facilities (i.e. partner state).

As establishment/membership requirements with regards to SF storage under the MNA

framework, the member states (host, site, and recipient states) must determine long-term SF

processing measures within a specific period (until it is expected that MOX fuel can compete

with U fuel in terms of cost: e.g. 50 years). If they cannot make a decision, the received SF

(international storage) should be returned to the generating states.

Excess separated plutonium as a result of reprocessing is considered not favorable for the

nuclear non-proliferation. However, from now on, they should be considered as stockpiles for

the future regional energy security.

In the future, the states should be responsible for disposal of HLW. In order to secure the

disposal space and to reduce environmental burden (e.g. natural level within 300 to 500 years),

solutions shall be discussed and implemented among the member states of the Framework

within a certain period of the multinational storage.

Label C Selection of a host state (site state)

The state that meets all requirements shall be a host state (or site state).

Label D Access to technology

The access to SNTs shall be strictly controlled under the MNA Framework.

The following prerequisites are summarized in Table 3.1 for each option, together with all

other prerequisite.

Label E Multilateral involvement

Label F Economics

Label G Transport

Label H Safety

Label I Liability

Label J Political and public acceptance

Label K Geopolitics

Label L Legal aspect

17

Table 3.1 Formation of MNA based on INFCIRC/640 (Pellaud Report)5, etc (Fuel cycle service (uranium fuel supply service, SF/MOX storage service, SF reprocessing service)) (Requirement for framework establishment)

Options for MNA

Label A: Requirements for nuclear non-proliferation

Restriction to the states having sensitive nuclear technologies (SNT)/right of peaceful use of nuclear energy NPT, Safeguards Agreement (CSA,AP)

Nuclear

facility owner

Notes Safeguards implementer (s) (Comprehensive

Safeguards Agreement, CSA)

Complementary

access implementer(s)

(Additional Protocol

( AP))

Material accounting Inspector(s)

Conventional country-based management Operator Member state operator IAEA IAEA

Type A:

The ownership of existing or new facilities

is not transferred to MNA. Participation

(activities) does not involve providing fuel

cycle services, but participants receive such

services from MNA. It is necessary to agree

to cooperate in achieving higher levels of

nuclear nonproliferation (safeguards),

nuclear security and safety (3S's).

Member state

operator

Framework in which fuel cycle services are available to non-SNT-holder countries if they meet certain

conditions (e.g. regional safeguards, nuclear security, export control)

Member state operator and

MNA member states

IAEA＋MNA member

states

IAEA＋MNA

member states

Regional safeguards: RSAC (CSA+AP)

State operator material accounting, material accounting data are checked by

MNA member states, and joint inspection by IAEA/MNA member states

Type B:


is not transferred to MNA. Participation

(activities) involves providing fuel cycle

service. It is necessary to agree to

cooperate in achieving higher levels of


nuclear security and safety (3S's).

Member state

operator

Framework in which the fuel cycle service is available to non-SNT-holder countries if they meet certain

conditions (e.g. regional safeguards, nuclear security, export control) (criteria-based approach)

Host country, EH (country providing fuel cycle service)

Partner country, EP (country receiving fuel cycle service)

Many conventional proposals aim to limit the ownership of NSTs such as enrichment and reprocessing

technologies by fuel supply service.

Data check by domestic

entity and MNA member

states

IAEA＋MNA member

states

IAEA＋MNA member

states


State operator material accounting, material accounting data are checked by

MNA member states, and joint inspection by IAEA/MNA member states.

Type C:


is transferred to MNA. Participation

(activities) involves providing fuel cycle

services. It is necessary to agree to

cooperate in achieving higher levels of


nuclear security and safety (3S's) (more

effective in achieving higher levels of the

3S's than Type A and Type B approaches).

Member state

operator

Fuel cycle service facilities whose ownership has been transferred to MNA are established in countries

that meet certain conditions (e.g. regional safeguards, nuclear security, export control) (criteria-based

approach). It is necessary to meet certain conditions in order to become a host country (site country).

MNA consortium IAEA＋MNA member

states

IAEA＋MNA member

states


MNA member state’s material accounting and joint inspection IAEA/MNA

member states.

5 IAEA, INFCIRC/640 (Pellaud Report), February 2005

18

Table 3.1（(continuation-1) Formation of MNA based on INFCIRC/640 (Pellaud Report), etc (Fuel cycle service (uranium fuel supply service, SF/MOX storage service, SF reprocessing service)) (Requirement for framework establishment)

Options for MNA

Label A: Requirements for nuclear non-proliferation

Nuclear security

Export control

(Not included in a nuclear non-proliferation evaluation element of INFCIRC./640)

Limited access to SNTs

(Included in nuclear

non-proliferation evaluation

element of INFCIRC./640)

Requirement for withdrawal

Conventional

state-basis

management

To be carried out by MNA state consortium (e.g.

military, police)

To be a member of NSG and conduct export control. －

Type A To be carried out by licensees in member countries

in accordance with the regulations in each country.

Performance in meeting international nuclear

security guidelines is to be evaluated through

AMMAO's advisory review. Review results are

nonbinding recommendations.

To be a member of NSG and conduct export control based on the following criteria.

(i) To be a Party to the NPT and is in full compliance with its obligations under the

Treaty. The safeguards here indicate the regional safeguards;

(ii) To have not been identified in a report by the IAEA Secretariat which is under

consideration by the IAEA Board of Governors, as being in breach of its obligations to

comply with its safeguards agreement, nor continues to be the subject of Board of

Governors decisions calling upon it to take additional steps to comply with its

safeguards obligations or to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear

program, nor has been reported by the IAEA Secretariat as a State where the IAEA is

currently unable to implement its safeguards agreement.

(iii) To respect for the NSG Guideline6;

(iv) To has concluded an inter-governmental agreement with the supplier including

assurances regarding non-explosive use, effective safeguards in perpetuity, and

retransfer;

(v) To have made a commitment to the supplier to apply mutually agreed standards of

physical protection based on current international guidelines; and

(vi) To have committed to IAEA safety standards and adheres to accepted international

safety conventions.

(c) Transfer should be allowed only when the recipient has brought into force a

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and an Additional Protocol based on the model

Additional Protocol, or pending this, is implementing appropriate safeguards agreements in

cooperation with the IAEA, including a regional accounting and control arrangement for

nuclear materials, as approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.

The subjective criteria of NSG guideline should not be considered.

Access to NSTs should be

limited to the states which

already have the NSTs.

SNTs should be managed by

black box, etc.

(1) After withdrawal, the state must return

to the safeguards before its participation

in the framework (IAEA safeguards).

(2) The use and operation of the facilities

that are newly built due to participation

in the framework must be terminated.

Confirmation and verification of

termination must be entrusted to IAEA.

(3) Of the nuclear material produced by the

new facilities built due to participation

in the framework, enriched uranium

must be returned via the MNA to the

state that asked for enrichment service.

Even if possessed by the state

concerned (withdrawing state),

plutonium (MOX) must be transferred

to and stored at the MNA (international

MOX storage facility) as international

stockpile of the region. This should

support future energy source of the

region (corresponding service cost

should be paid to the withdrawing

state).

(4) It must be prohibited to transfer or sell,

to any state out of the framework, any

nuclear material produced by the new

facilities built due to participation in the

framework

Type B To be carried out by licensees in member countries

in accordance with the regulations in each country.





Type C To be carried out by licensees in MNA in

accordance with the regulations in site countries.





6 NSG Guidelines, INFCIRC/254/Rev.11/Part 1, 12 November 2012

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2012/infcirc254r11p1.pdf

19


Options for MNA Label B: Fuel Cycle Service

Enhancement of nuclear

non-proliferation, intending to limit

SNTs holding.

Incentives for nuclear fuel cycle service

Uranium fuel supply service Spent fuel/MOX storage service Spent fuel reprocessing service

Conventional

country-based

management

Type A There is no intention of limiting the

possession of sensitive nuclear

technologies.

There is no uranium fuel supply service for

other member countries. Mainly, member

countries participate in MNA as power

reactor owners receiving services.

There is no spent fuel storage service for other

member countries.

Spent fuel reprocessing service to the other states it not provided.

Type B The effect of limiting the possession of

sensitive nuclear technologies can be

expected to a certain degree, but the

aim is not necessarily to limit

possession and thereby promote

nuclear nonproliferation.

Host countries provide uranium fuel supply

service to meet the needs of countries that

do not have enrichment facilities (partner

countries).

Excessive market intervention is avoided.

Host countries or site countries (MNA) provide spent

fuel storage service to partner countries (assurance of

spent fuel storage service availability).

It is a prerequisite for establishment/membership that

a decision is made on long-term spent fuel disposal

measures within a certain period (a period of time

within which MOX fuel is expected to become as

competitive in terms of cost as uranium fuel; for

example, 100 years). If this decision cannot be made,

the spent fuel in storage (international storage) is

returned to the generating country.

Recovered Plutonium (Pu) from reprocessing is partially used in the form of MOX

as LWR-MOX fuel, but it is mainly stored as future resources＊）（＊Basically until

the time when MOX fuel can be expected to be equivalent to U fuel）. The

so-called “excess separated plutonium” as a result of reprocessing is considered not

favorable for nuclear non-proliferation. However, through MOX international

storage under MNA control (enhancement of nuclear non-proliferation such as

regional safeguards and strong nuclear security measures), MOX production shall

be considered as the “stockpile for regional energy security” for the future.

The MOX can be used for LWRMOX as well as fast reactor when the economic

feasibility becomes high enough.

In the future, the states should be responsible for disposal of HLW. In order to

secure the disposal space and to reduce environmental burden (e.g. natural level

within 300 to 500 years), solutions shall be discussed and implemented among the

member states of the Framework within a certain period of the time.

Avoid excessive intervention to the market.

Type C The effect of limiting the possession of

sensitive nuclear technologies can be

expected, but the aim is not necessarily

to limit possession and thereby promote

nuclear nonproliferation.

MNA provides uranium fuel supply service

to meet the needs of countries that do not

have enrichment facilities (partner

countries).

Excessive market intervention is avoided.

20

Table 3.1（(continuation-3) Formation of MNA based on INFCIRC/640 (Pellaud Report) , etc (Fuel cycle service (uranium fuel supply service, SF/MOX storage service, SF reprocessing service)) (Requirement for framework establishment)

Options for MNA

Label C: Selection of a host state (site

state)

Label D: Access to technology Label E: Multilateral involvement Label F: Economics

Label G: Transportation

Conventional

state-basis

management

― － ― Depends on the member state.

Type A

Even if a state has an enrichment

facility, a SF storage facility, or

processing (reprocessing) facility, it does

not become a host state.

Access should be permitted

only by technology holders

No participation for supply

Ownership of facility: Technology holder (each state)

Management: Technology holder (each state)

Operation: Technology holder (each state)

Research, development, design and construction of

facility: Technology holder (each state)

Type B

It should be politically and

geographically stable.



Participation only for supply

Construction and ownership of facility: Technology

holder (host state)

Management: Technology holder (host state)

Operation: Technology holder (host state)

Research, development, design (mainly SF processing

technology) : MNA

As the net result of the economy of scale and the

increase in transportation cost, MNA improves

economic efficiency.

It should aim at high security

transportation.

International transport standards

should be satisfied.

It should cooperate in

transportation.

Type C

Special management: Legal framework

to restrict national jurisdiction regarding

location of the MNA fuel cycle facility

(“Special region” situation). It should be

politically stable.



Ownership of facility: MNA

Management: Technology holder (state) under

commission from MNA

Operation: Technology holder (state) under commission

from MNA

Research, development, design and construction of

facility (mainly SF processing technology): MNA

As the net result of the economy of scale and the

increase in transportation cost, MNA improves

economic efficiency.

It should aim at high security

transportation.

International transport standards

should be satisfied.

It should cooperate in

transportation.

21


Options for MNA

Label H: Safety

Label I: Liability

Label J: Political and public

acceptance

Label K: Geopolitics

Label L: Legal aspects

Conventional state-basis

management

To be carried out by MNA state consortium.

Liability by each state.

Type A To be carried out by licensees in member countries in

accordance with the regulations in each country.

Performance in meeting international safety guidelines is to be

evaluated through AMMAO's peer review. Review results are


Liability by each state. It should follow the NPT Article IV:

1. Nothing shall be interpreted as affecting the

inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to use of

nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without

discrimination.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate the

fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and

scientific and technological information for the

peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”

It requires coordination with bilateral treaty and regional

nuclear free zone treaty.

Type B To be carried out by licensees in member countries in

accordance with the regulations in each country.




Liability by each state. A highly acceptable level of

significance needs to be

indicated.

Political stability of MNA member

countries is a general requirement.

Transportation routes are to be

selected from the geopolitical

viewpoint.

Type C To be carried out by licensees in MNA in accordance with the

regulations in site countries.




Certain level liability by

member states.

Political stability of site countries

is a general requirement.

Transportation routes are to be

selected from the geopolitical

viewpoint.

22

4. Proposal for multinational/international nuclear approach (MNA) framework

(Regional Framework)

4.1 Proposed MNA framework

1) The intended timeframe is the near-future and the applicable scope is Asia (i.e. Central Asia

including uranium producing states, North-East Asia including nuclear advanced states,

South-East Asia including nuclear emerging states).

2) The forms of cooperation (activities) are determined for each element of nuclear fuel cycle.

They are categorized as Type A (only cooperation for 3S, receiving services), Type B (MNA

without right to transfer), and Type C (MNA keeps ownership). Based on the type, the

member states are called partner states, host states, and site states, respectively.

3) As an organization that represents the MNA Framework, the MNA operating body (i.e.

Asian Multilateral nuclear fuel cycle MAnagement Organization (AMMAO)) should be

established in collaboration with IAEA.

4) The MNA Framework Convention should be signed and ratified by the member states and

come into effect. Furthermore, agreements required for smooth implementation of the

Convention should be concluded by AMMAO, member states, IAEA (and technology-holding

operators (states), if necessary). AMMAO concludes facility management and operation

agreements with host states or site states. International consortium (cooperative industrial

consortium) operates facilities in the host states and MNA facilities in the site states.

5) AMMAO should strictly control Sensitive Nuclear Technologies (SNTs) by establishing

agreements concerning SNTs management with technology-holding operators (states). Above

2) to 5) are summarized in the following figure.

23

6) As shown in the following figure, the nuclear fuel cycle elements, including uranium

enrichment and Spent Fuel (SF) reprocessing, should be covered by the proposed MNA

Framework (In the figure, the proposed types as described in above 2) are included).

7) All member states are required to commit to nuclear non-proliferation. Meanwhile, in

accordance with Article 4 of the NPT, it is guaranteed that the right of peaceful uses of

nuclear power should not be

interfered with. Furthermore,

through the Export Control

Agreement with the member

states, the member states

must comply with the

objective criteria in the 2012

NSG Guideline (INFCIRC

254 Rev11, Part 1, 6-7).

As described on the right, the

objective requirements (Sixth

paragraph (a); refer below)

concerning transferring

enriched/ reprocessed items

should be the basic

prerequisite for MNA

Export control- NSG Guideline (MNA participation requirements) (INFCIRC/254/Rev.11/Part 1)

The following objective requirements concerning transfer of enriched/re-processed items (Sixth paragraph (a)) shall be the basic requirements for participating in MNA.

• To participate in NPT and comply with NPT’s obligations;

• To have no serious violation of safeguard agreements in the IAEA reports, no additional measures have been demanded concerning compliance with safeguards obligation and establishment of trust for the peaceful use of nuclear power by the IAEA Executive Board, not being pointed out by the IAEA Secretariat that it is impossible to carry out the safeguards agreement;

•To comply with the NSG Guideline and submit reports on the implementation of export control in accordance with UNSCR1540 to the UN Security Council;

•To have concluded agreements with supply states on non-explosive use, permanent safeguards, and re-transfer guaranty.

•To make commitment to apply mutually agreed nuclear material protection measures based on the international guidelines to the supply states.

•To make commitment to the IAEA Safety Standards and to have come to effect international treaties in the nuclear safety field.

24

participation.

8) Non-proliferation regime should be maintained within the MNA Framework; i) by

concluding the Regional Safeguard Agreement with IAEA and member states, the regional

safeguard system should be established (material accounting/management safeguards), ii)

within the Framework, AMMAO and member states should conclude an agreement for

nuclear non-proliferation (e.g. to meet the tight requirements for non-proliferation, equivalent

to bilateral agreement with the USA). Outside of the Framework, AMMAO and non-member

states should conclude a comprehensive nuclear agreement. (Through these agreements, the

bindings through bilateral agreements with the non-member states should be relaxed (to be

comprehensively handled), and the services within the Framework should be provided

smoothly.) Below is the conceptual framework.

9) The agreements on nuclear safety and security should be concluded between AMMAO and

the member states. These agreements include establishment of guidelines/standards and peer

review system (depending on the level, it can be an advisory review, a peer review or a more

effective peer review (for verification)). (Through these actions, nuclear safety and security of

the facilities within the Framework (including nuclear fuel cycle facilities and nuclear power

plants) should be secured at the international level.)

10) Ownership of nuclear materials should remain with the requesting side (requesting states),

regardless of the Type. In other words, the ownership of nuclear materials should not be

transferred when services such as enrichment and reprocessing are requested.

11) Spent Fuel (SF) should be handled by both recycling (re-processing) services and direct

disposal. International storage services for a specific period of time (e.g. 100 years) should

also be available. In principle, the states that generate SF are responsible for direct disposal or

25

handling of the high level waste generated from reprocessing service in their own states.

Furthermore, in order to assist the final disposal of radioactive wastes in each state, AMMAO

should try to develop technologies to mitigate radioactive toxicity of high level waste (to a

medium level).

12) The fuel supply and SF handling services including transport within the MNA Framework

shall be economically advantageous, or at least not disadvantages, to the member states, as

compared to carrying them out alone.

13) Basically, the requesting side shall be responsible for the outward and inward

transportation of nuclear materials. Through the Transport Agreement (e.g. simplification of

procedure such as export permission, mutual support to ensure security in each territorial sea

for transport) with AMMAO, the member states should agree to collaborate for transportation

in relation to nuclear fuel cycle supply and service.

14) Nuclear compensation/liability shall be determined for each Type. In principle, the nuclear

liability shall follow the laws of the partner states, host states and site states as well as nuclear

liability international conventions that they participate in. The liability for the damages within

the MNA Framework shall be established as follows: for Types A/B, the liability shall be

covered by each state, and for Type C, nuclear liability agreement shall be concluded between

AMMAO and the member states, as need arises.

15) The member states, particularly the site states, shall establish domestic laws and

regulations based on the principle that international rules and bilateral agreements

(AMMAO/third state) shall be in precedence to the domestic laws and regulations.

16) When selecting host states for Type B and site states for Type C, geopolitical issues

should be taken into consideration. The transportation routes should also be selected based on

the geopolitical consideration.

17) AMMAO assures uranium supply to the member states by concluding an agreement

concerning additional supply assurance with international organizations.

18) To maintain the balance of uranium fuel demand-supply and the deal at market price

within the MNA Framework, the uranium fuel should also be procured from outside of the

Framework. Namely, in addition to the supply assurance as described in above 17), each state

is allowed to procure uranium fuel.

19) If member states wish to withdraw from the MNA Framework, they must follow the

withdrawal regulations. Differences among the proposed collaboration forms, Type A, B and C

a) Type A (3S collaboration, activities that do not provide services)

Maintain the current ownership of the facilities and laws and regulations

Safeguards: Regional safeguards - the basis is material accounting by state X

(commissioned operator) and MNA. The accounting should be inspected and verified by

MNA and IAEA.

Nuclear safety: The basis is the safety laws and regulations of state X. AMMAO should

carry out peer review to check the implementation status of the international guidelines

(within the agreeable range based on agreement). The results are not enforceable

(recommendation level).

26

Nuclear security: The basis is the nuclear security laws and regulations of state X.

AMMAO should carry out advisory review to check the implementation status of

international nuclear security guidelines (within the agreeable range based on agreement).

The results are not enforceable (recommendation level). (The ones that are not mentioned above are status quo.) Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement and export/import control: If there are states that

carry out Type B or Type C activities within the MNA Framework, the following bilateral

nuclear cooperation agreement and export/import control as described in the following b)

and c) shall also be applicable to the states that only carry out Type A activities.

Type A states should participate in the Framework mainly for their nuclear power plants.

In this case, they can also receive nuclear fuel cycle services (i.e. fuel supply, handling of

SF).

b) Type B (MNA without ownership transfer)

Organizations* that are located within the territory of state X and under the management

of government X. (Operation can be commissioned to a consortium. The investors can be

state X or foreign states.) * The state’s law and regulations are applied to the organization.

Safeguards: Regional safeguards- The basis is material accounting by state X

(commissioned operator) and MNA. The accounting should be inspected and verified by

MNA and IAEA. Nuclear safety: The basis is the safety laws and regulations of state X. AMMAO should

carry out peer review to check the implementation status of international guidelines

(within the agreeable range based on agreement). The results are not enforceable

(recommendation level). Nuclear security: The basis is the nuclear security laws and regulations of state X.

AMMAO should carry out advisory review to check the implementation status of

international nuclear security guidelines (within the agreeable range based on agreement).

The results are not enforceable (recommendation level). Nuclear liability: The host states shall accept major liability. Complementary liability

(insurance) should be provided by MNA (e.g. Additional liability (insurance) in

proportion to the received service).

Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement: The bilateral agreement between the states

should be status quo. However, by making an agreement for higher nuclear

non-proliferation requirements (e.g. requirements for bilateral agreement with the USA)

among the MNA member states (and with AMMAO), the existing bilateral agreements

shall be relaxed (to obtain exceptional status by reaching comprehensive agreement

including nuclear materials transfer and transport within the MNA Framework).

Export/import control: To be governed by international export control (e.g. NSG). The

export/import standards shall be harmonized among the member states as much as

possible. It should be agreed within the MNA Framework that the international storage of

SF shall not be treated as nuclear waste. The final waste should be basically returned to

the states that originate the waste when reprocessing.

c) Type C (MNA keeps the ownership)

Facilities that are located in the territory of state X and are owned by MNA (Operation

should be commissioned to a consortium. The investors are multiple states.) Safeguard: Regional safeguard- The basis is material accounting by MNA (commissioned

operator) and MNA. The accounting should be inspected and verified by MNA

(AMMAO) and IAEA.

27

Nuclear safety: International safety standards should be implemented. AMMAO should

check their implementation status with more effective peer review for verification. Nuclear security: International nuclear security guidelines must be followed. AMMAO

should check their implementation status with more effective peer review (equivalent or

wider range of nuclear material protection peer review for the MNA nuclear power plant

based on the Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with MNA). Nuclear liability: The MNA member states should participate in the international treaties

concerning nuclear liability (e.g. CSC). AMMAO should conclude the nuclear liability

agreement with the member states and establish liability for the damages within the MNA

Framework. An example is a system in which contribution from the member states or

consortium should be pooled (contribution from each power companies is pooled). The

amount of contribution shall be determined based on the services offered to the MNA

facilities.

• Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement: MNA should be treated as one state. MNA

(AMMAO) and MNA non-member state (e.g. the USA) should conclude a bilateral

nuclear cooperation agreement and reach a comprehensive pre-consensus based on the

agreement. By making an agreement for higher nuclear non-proliferation requirements

(e.g. requirements for bilateral agreement with the USA) among the MNA member states

(and with AMMAO), the existing bilateral agreements shall be relaxed (to obtain

exceptional status by reaching comprehensive agreement including nuclear materials

transfer and transport within the MNA Framework).

• Export/import control: To accommodate the international concept of export/import

control such as NSG, MNA should be considered as one state. By agreeing strict

export/import control among the member states, transfer of nuclear material should not be

considered as international transfer. Approaches for mixture of multiple types

In reality, several Types should co-exist within the Framework when nuclear fuel cycle

services are provided and managed by multiple nations. The following are approaches to the

co-existing of Type A/B and Type A/C.

Type A/B

When a Type B state with nuclear fuel cycle service facilities (enrichment, reprocessing)

provides services to a state with only Type A facilities (such as a light water reactor), i) the

Type A state can receive nuclear fuel cycle services due to membership in the framework,

ii) a Type A state should cover the framework treaty and related agreements. The Type B

state should, iii) carry out nuclear fuel service business within the MNA framework,

including smooth transportation of nuclear materials, iv) enter framework treaty and

related agreements to cover the contents indicated in (2) above. When handling Type A

and B within a single state, it should be treated as Type B.

Types A/C In Type C state (as site state), MNA having nuclear fuel cycle service facilities (enrichment,

reprocessing) provides services to a state with only Type A facilities (such as a light water

reactor), i) the Type A state can receive nuclear fuel cycle services due to membership in

the framework, ii) a Type A state should cover the framework treaty and related agreements.

MNA in the Type C state, should, iii) carries out nuclear fuel service business within the

MNA framework, including smooth transportation of nuclear materials, iv) enter

framework treaty and related agreements to cover the contents indicated above. When

28

handling Type A and C within a single state, it should be treated as Type C.

4.2 Basic agreement (agreement concerning consortium model and framework treaty)

proposal

The Framework proposal presented in Section 4.1 is compiled as “Basic Agreement

(Consortium Model and Framework Treaty).” Following are the principles of compilation and

the draft Agreement (proposal).

1) Applicable scope

In Article 20 of the MNA Framework Agreement (Applicable scope), the scope of the

Framework is written as “Asia region, territorial lands and waters of member states.” The

Asian region includes Central Asia including uranium producing states, East Asia including

nuclear advanced states, South-East Asia including nuclear emerging states.

2) Cooperation forms

The cooperation (activities) forms (options) within the Framework are defined in Article

1 of the MNA Framework Treaty (Contents of Cooperation and Scope of Activities). They are

categorized as follows in accordance with the elements (i.e. activity and facility type) of

nuclear fuel cycle: Type A (only 3S collaboration for the MNA Framework, receiving

services), Type B (MNA without transferring right), and Type C (MNA maintains

ownership).

3) Development of an operating organization which will be the core of establishing the MNA

Framework

As an organization that represents the MNA Framework, a MNA operating body will be

established in collaboration with IAEA. This organization is written in the preamble of the

Framework Treaty (Definition) as “Asian Multilateral Nuclear Fuel Cycle Framework

Management Organization, (AMMAO)” and the organizational structure and tasks of

AMMAO (the Executive Board of AMMAO, secretariat) are written in Article 15

(Organizations and roles).” The relationships of AMMAO, member states, IAEA and SNT

owning states (owners) are shown in Figure 4.1. The figure also includes the agreements that

are needed for establishing the MNA Framework.

4) Treaty and Agreements for the MNA Framework

The MNA Framework Treaty that is needed to issue necessary agreements to establish

the Framework will be signed and ratified by the member states and come into effect (in the

postscript of the Framework Treaty). The agreements that are needed for the smooth

implementation of the Treaty shall also be selected and concluded by AMMAO, member

states, IAEA, SNTs owners (owning states) and third states outside of the MNA Framework

(nuclear equipment supply states) as necessary (in Figure 4.1 and in the Framework Treaty

Appendix I, the relevant agreements A-1 to A-11 are described). Especially for the activities

of Types B and C, AMMAO will conclude the Facility Management/Operation Agreement

(A-6) with host or site states. Furthermore, the facilities in the host states or facilities owned

by MNA will be operated by international consortium (cooperative industrial consortium)

based on contracts.

5) Rights and obligations of the member states

The member states must commit to the nuclear non-proliferation (Framework Treaty,

Article 3: Commitment to Non-proliferation). Meanwhile, in accordance with Article 4 of the

29

NPT, it will be guaranteed that the right of peaceful uses of nuclear power will not be

interfered (Framework Treaty, Preamble (Definition): Rights and obligations of the Member

States). Furthermore, by concluding the Export Control Agreement (A-2) with the member

states, AMMAO requires the member states to comply with the objective criteria in the 2011

NSG Guidelines (INFCIRC 254 Rev11, Part 1, 6-7) (Framework Treaty, Article 6:

Export/Import Control). Furthermore, for Type C, to accommodate the international concept

of export control such as NSG, AMMAO member state will be considered as one state, and

transfer of nuclear material within the Framework will not be considered as international

transfer.

6) Safeguards and export/import control (Bilateral nuclear collaboration agreement)

In response to safeguards, export control and the bilateral nuclear agreement, the

nuclear non-proliferation regime will be established within the Framework. In order to

achieve it, i) regional safeguards system (i.e. accounting/management, safeguards) will be

established based on the regional safeguards agreement by AMMAO, IAEA and the member

states, ii) agreement concerning nuclear non-proliferation (included in the Export Control

Agreement) will be concluded between AMMAO and a member state based on the Export

Control Agreement, and iii) as a representative of MNA, AMMAO will conclude a

comprehensive nuclear agreement with the third states (i.e. nuclear fuel supply states) outside

of the Framework. As a result, smooth transfer of nuclear materials and provision of nuclear

fuel cycle service within the Framework can be expected.

Table 4.1 shows the safeguard system in the MNA facilities in comparison with the

conventional safeguards by individual state. The system includes the group/organizations that

are responsible for accounting, data check, and safeguards implementation. For details, please

refer to Article 4 of the Framework Treaty (Safeguards).

Figure 4.1 Asia Multi-national Framework and structure of AMMAO

Support for establishment

ContractContract

A-11 Comprehensive Nuclear Co-op Agreement

• A-2 Export Control Agreement *1, *2, *3

• A-3 Safety/ Security/ Agreement on Liability *1, *2 , *3

• A-4 Transport Agreement *1, *2 , *3

• A-5 Agreement on Transferring Facility Ownership to MNA*2

• A-6 MNA Facility Control/Operation Agreement *2

• A-7 Nuclear Fuel Supply Agreement*1,*2,*3

• A-8 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Service Agreement*1,*2 ,*3

Contract

Contract

Type A Type CType B

A-5, A-6Agreement

Partner State*3Host State*1

Consortium

Member State

Site State*2

A-10 供給保証及び追加的保証S

Assurance

A-1 Regional SafeguardsA

greement*1, *2 , *3

A-9 Agreement on Control of SNTs

Inspections/ Peer Reviews

Regional Safeguards, Nuclear Security, Safety

International Organization IAEA SNT Holder (State)

IAEA

Multilateral Treaty on Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Supply/ Services in Asia (MNA Framework

Treaty)

Agreement on Additional

MNA

3rd State

International Consortium

Asian Multilateral Framework Management Organization (AMMAO)

30

Table 4.1 Proposal for Safeguard System in the MNA Facilities

Accounting Checking data Implementing safeguards

Conventional

safeguards by

individual state

Operator in the

state

SSAC of the state IAEA

Reg

ional safeg

uard

s

MNA/ Type

A

Operator in the

partner state

Partner state and MNA

Regional Safeguards

Department

IAEA and MNA

Regional Safeguards

Department

MNA/Type B Operator in the

host state

Host state and MNA

Regional Safeguards

Department

IAEA and MNA

Regional Safeguards

Department

MNA/Type C International

business

consortium

commissioned by

MNA

MNA Regional

Safeguards Department

IAEA and MNA

Regional Safeguards

Department

Figure 4.2 Responses to bilateral nuclear collaboration agreements (Type A+B)

31

Figure 4.3 Responses to bilateral nuclear collaboration agreements (Type A+C)

As for the responses to bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements for Types A and B, as

shown in Figure 4.2, non-proliferation demand, which is equivalent to bilateral agreements,

will be included in the Export Control Agreement. For Type C, as shown in Figure 4.3,

AMMAO will conclude a comprehensive nuclear agreement with the third states (i.e. nuclear

equipment supply states) which are outside of the Framework. Through these arrangements,

the existing bilateral restriction with the states outside of the Framework will be relaxed, and

the services will be smoothly provided within the Framework.

7) Strengthening safety and nuclear security

Agreements concerning nuclear safety and security as well as nuclear liability will be

examined based on compliance with international standards and establishment of

guidelines/standards and through peer review systems (i.e. depending on the level,

non-binding advisory review, non-binding peer review, and binding peer review) for each

Type. This will result in the application of nuclear safety and security to the facilities in the

Framework at the international level (nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as power plants).

Concerning nuclear safety (Article 7 of the Framework Treaty)

For Types A and B

• Application of laws and regulations concerning nuclear safety of each state

• Implementation of international guidelines (e.g. participation in the four Nuclear

Safety Treaties and IAEA Guidelines) as well as implementation of peer review

to check the implementation status (within the possible range based on

agreement) and provision of recommendations by the MNA Safety Department

of the Monitoring Center.

For Type C

• Application of and compliance with the international safety standards

• Peer review to check the implementation status of safety standards by the MNA

Safety Department of the Monitoring Center.

32

Concerning nuclear security (Article 5 of Framework Treaty)

For Type A and Type B

• Application of laws and regulations concerning nuclear security by each state

• Implementation of international nuclear security guidelines as well as

implementation of advisory review (within the possible range based on

agreement) and provision of recommendations by the MNA Nuclear Security

Department of the Monitoring Center.

For Type C

• Peer review to check the implementation of nuclear security guidelines by the

MNA Nuclear Security Department of the Monitoring Center.

8) Management of SNTs

There are many types of activities within the MNA Framework. Among them,

management and prevention of proliferation of SNTs and sensitive nuclear information of

Type C facilities (MNA owned facilities) are particularly important. AMMAO will strictly

control SNTs by concluding an agreement concerning SNTs management with technology

holders (states). Specifically, it is defined in Article 9 of the MNA Framework Treaty (Access

to SNTs, Security of SNTs and Information) as follows:

For Type C,

• SNTs shall only be accessible by the technology holders (states) to prevent their

proliferation. This will also be applicable when enrichment/reprocessing facilities

are newly installed by the states other than the above state.

• Security procedure and classification of SNTs are described in Annex III.

9) Ownership of nuclear materials

European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) has the ownership of nuclear materials.

However, in case of AMMAO, there are many issues with ownership such as final disposal.

Therefore, it was decided that the ownership of nuclear material shall belong to the service

requesting side (requesting states) regardless of the Type. In other words, there will be no

transfer of nuclear material ownership when a state requests enrichment or reprocessing

service. In the Preamble of the MNA Framework Treaty, it is defined as follows:

• Ownership of nuclear materials: For all activities of Type A, B and C facilities,

the ownership of nuclear materials will belong to the service requesting side

(requesting state). In other words, there will be no transfer of ownership of

nuclear materials when a state requests enrichment or reprocessing service.

10) Countermeasures for Spent Fuel (SF)

SF will be handled by both recycling (reprocessing) services and direct disposal.

International storage service for a specific period of time (e.g. 100 years) will also be

available. In principle, the states that generate SF are responsible for direct disposal or

handling high level waste generated from recycling service in their own states. Furthermore,

in order to assist the final disposal of radioactive wastes in each state, AMMAO will try to

develop technologies to mitigate radioactive toxicity of high level waste (to medium level). In

Article 8 of the MNA Framework Treaty (Assurance of Fuel Cycle Services) Clause 3 and 4,

it is described as follows:

Article 8(3): SF will be handled by both recycling (reprocessing) services and direct

disposal. International storage service for a specific period of time (e.g., 100 years) will also

33

be available. In principle, the states that generate SF are responsible for direct disposal or

handling high level waste generated from reprocessing service in their own states.

Furthermore, in order to assist the final disposal of radioactive wastes in each state, it will be

agreed to discuss within the MNA Framework the possibility of international disposal site

and mitigation of radioactive toxicity of high level waste (to medium level).

Article 8(4): The SF international storage period within the Framework will be a

specific period (e.g. 100 years) agreed by the member states. Based on the collaboration

from the member states, AMMAO will try to develop reprocessing technologies to mitigate

radioactive toxicity of high level waste (to medium level), construct facilities for the

technologies and establish systems to provide the service within the period in order to assist

the final disposal of radioactive wastes in each state. The method and degree of cooperation

will be discussed at AMMAO. (If concrete system is not established within the specified

timeframe, the SF or high level waste will be basically returned to the state that generates

them.)

11) Consideration for economic performance

The fuel supply and SF handling services including transport within the MNA

Framework shall be economically advantageous, or at least not disadvantages, to the member

states, as compared to carrying it out alone. In the Preamble of the Framework Treaty

(Purpose), it is written as “to establish the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Service Multinational

Collaborative Framework (MNA Framework) that takes into account economic performance.”

The economic performance including transport was also examined in details.

12) Transport of nuclear materials

Basically, the requesting side shall be responsible for the onward and inward transport

of nuclear materials according to the international rules. Through the Transport Agreement

(application of international standards, simplification of procedure such as export permission,

mutual support to ensure security in each territorial sea for transportation) with AMMAO, the

member states which are included in or involved with the transport routes will agree to

collaborate for transport in relation to nuclear fuel cycle supply and service.

In Article 14 of the MNA Framework Treaty (Transport), it is defined as follows:

(1) The member states must follow the international standards concerning transport.

(2) The member states must collaborate for transport of nuclear fuel and SF based on the

MNA Framework.

13) Nuclear liability

Nuclear liability shall be determined for each Type. In principle, each state shall follow

its own nuclear laws as well as nuclear liability international conventions that it participates in.

Especially for Type C, nuclear liability systems (i.e. complementary liability insurance, funds

pooling through investments by operators) shall be developed to establish liability for any

damages within the MNA Framework, as need arises. In Article 12 of the MNA Framework

(Liability), it is defined as follows:

(1) Type A: The damage must be compensated by the states concerned. It is desirable that the

member states which own facilities join an appropriate international agreement

concerning liability.

(2) Type B: The major damage must be compensated by the host states. Complementary

liability (insurance) (e.g. additional damage liability (insurance) in proportion to the

service received) will be provided by AMMAO.

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(3) Type C: The site states shall join an international agreement concerning nuclear liability

(e.g. CSC). A system will be established in which member states or commissioned

consortium will contribute to the pooled funds regarding the liability amount before the

said treaty is executed. The amount of funds shall be provided in proportion to the amount

of investment to AMMAO facilities.

The complementary liability by AMMAO is described in Annex IV. For details, AMMAO

will conclude the Safety, Nuclear Security and Liability Agreement (A-3) with the

member states.

14) Corporate status/Legal regulations

In order for AMMAO to obtain international and domestic corporate status, Article 2 of

the MNA Framework Treaty (Corporate status/Legal regulations) was newly established.

Following are the contents:

(1) The MNA Framework has corporate status under international law (including capacity

to conclude treaty or agreement with states or international organizations and conclude

contract with international corporations).

(2) The MNA Framework has corporate status and has legal capacity for the following

items within the region of the member states.

(a) To conclude contracts

(b) To obtain, own and dispose of properties.

(c) To obtain permission

(d) To file an action.

As for the domestic corporate status, AMMAO or its local entity needs to acquire the

corporate status in accordance with the legal framework of each member state. For example,

Japanese government stipulates corporate statutory principle as determined by Article 33 of

the Civil Code, which must be followed. The requirements to establish a corporation are

different based on the types of corporations. The key is the degree to which the government

supervises the corporations. Usually, for international organization such as AMMAO or its

local entity, permission principle (establishment is at discretion of competent government) or

approval principle (establishment is based on the approval by competent government after

legal requirements are met) is applicable.

For the legal regulations, the following regulation was added to Article 2 of the MNA

Framework Treaty, (Corporate status/Legal regulations), Clause 3.

(3) In principle, international laws, international rules and agreements such as bilateral

agreements (AMMAO and third states) (Annex I) take precedence to domestic law.

Based on this principle, the member states, especially the site states, will establish

domestic law.

15) Selection of host states and site states

When selecting host states for Type B and site states for Type C, geopolitical issues

should be taken into consideration. The transport routes should also be selected not only

based on economic but also geopolitical consideration. It is described in Article 10 of the

MNA Framework Treaty (Selection of host states/site states), Clause 2 and 3, as follows:

Article 10 (2): Type B: In principle, the member states are allowed to own facilities to

handle uranium enrichment and SF (SF storage, SF direct disposal) as host states. To be

selected as a host state, the political and geopolitical status of the state must be stable

(including non-conflict status).

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Article 10 (3): Type C: In principle, the member states are allowed to build facilities to

handle uranium enrichment and SF (SF storage, reprocessing, MOX fuel production, fast

reactor, MOX storage) as site states of multi-nationally managed facilities. To be selected as

a site state, the political and geopolitical status of the state must be stable (including

non-conflict status). Furthermore, special management, namely, the Agreement to transfer

ownership of MNA facilities including legal framework that limits state’s jurisdiction

concerning AMMAO facility site (A-5), will be concluded between AMMAO and the site

state.

16) Assurance and additional assurance of fuel cycle service

The host states (or consortium) and AMMAO (or the site state’s consortium) will assure

enriched uranium supply and SF handling service based on a contract. In order to maintain the

supply/demand balance of uranium fuel among the states, if a good balance is not maintained,

the uranium fuel will be supplied from outside of the Framework. In Article 8 of the MNA

Framework Treaty (Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Services), Clause 1 and 2, it is described

as follows:

Article 8(1): Type B: The host state shall guarantee enriched uranium supply and SF

handling service (i.e. SF fuel storage, SF direct disposal) to the partner state based on a

contract. This is not the case if obtaining the enriched uranium fuel from outside of the

Framework is more advantageous in terms of supply balance and price within the

Framework. For details, AMMAO will conclude the Nuclear Fuel Supply Agreement (A-7)

or Nuclear Fuel Cycle Service Agreement (A-8) with the host and partner states.

Article 8(2): Type C: AMMAO shall guarantee the enriched uranium supply and SF

handling services (i.e. SF storage, reprocessing, MOX fuel production, fast reactor, MOX

storage) to the partner states based on a contract. This is not the case if obtaining the

enriched uranium fuel from outside of the Framework is more advantages in terms of

supply balance and price within the Framework. The site states shall follow the necessary

procedure and collaborate for the enriched uranium supply and SF handling (i.e. SF storage,

reprocessing, MOX fuel production, fasts reactor, MOX storage) services which will be

provided from the AMMAO facilities to the partner states based on a contract. For details,

AMMAO will conclude the Nuclear Fuel Supply Agreement (A-7) or Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Service Agreement (A-8) with the partner states.

Furthermore, by concluding the Additional Assurance Agreement (A-10) with

international organizations, AMMAO will assure uranium fuel supply to the member states. In

Article 8 of the MNA Framework Treaty, Clause 6, it is described as follows:

Article 8(6): If possible, AMMAO will provide additional assurance concerning uranium

fuel supply to the member states by concluding the Additional Assurance Agreement (A-10)

with international organizations.

17) Conditions for withdrawal

If a member state wishes to withdraw from the MNA Framework, they must follow the

withdrawal conditions. They are regulated in Article 23 of the MNA Framework Treaty as

follows:

If a member state is going to withdraw from the MNA Framework, it must meet the

following conditions:

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(1) After withdrawal, the state must return to the safeguards (i.e. IAEA Safeguards) before

it participated in the Framework.

(2) The use and operation of the facilities (related to SNTs) which are newly built based

on participation in the Framework must be terminated. Confirmation and validation of

termination will be entrusted to the IAEA.

(3) Among the nuclear material that are produced by the new facilities built based on

participation in the Framework, enriched uranium must be returned to the enrichment

service requesting state through AMMAO. Plutonium (MOX) must be transferred to

and stored at the MNA (international MOX storage facility) as international stockpile

of the region, even if it is possessed by the withdrawing state. This will contribute to

the region as future energy source (the withdrawing state will receive corresponding

service cost).

(4) It will be prohibited to transfer or sell any nuclear material that are produced by the

new facilities built after participating in the Framework to any states out of the

Framework.

Table 4.2 Treaty on Asian Multilateral Framework of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Supply and Service

(MNA Framework Treaty)

Name of treaty Treaty on Asian Multilateral Framework of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Supply and Service, MNA Framework Treaty

Preamble Background Purposes Contents of cooperation Requirements for participation Definition (Label A, B, C)

Aiming at strengthening non-proliferation and improving economic efficiency, while paying attention to the changes of global uranium supply systems, nuclear power development trend in the emerging countries in Asia and impact of the accidents in Fukushima, Japan. The purposes are to establish multinational framework of nuclear fuel cycle supply and service (MNA Framework) that takes into account equality, transparency and economic efficiency and to improve nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear security and safety maintenance in order to contribute to promoting efficient nuclear power use and political stability in Asia. Multinational cooperation shall be implemented by Type A, B or C or combination of several Types, as described in Article 1. The Agreements that are required for collaboration are presented in Annex I. The participating states must implement or plan nuclear power generation and nuclear fuel cycle and fulfill requirements stated in Article 3 (Commitment to nonproliferation), Article 4 (Safeguards), Article 5 (Nuclear security), Article 6 (Export/import control), Article 7 (Safety), Article 12 (Liability), and Article 13 (Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement) as well as Article 23, conditions that are required at the time of withdrawal. (1) Participating state: All the states that meet the requirements in Article 3 to 7, Article 12, 13 and 23 and

37

Rights and obligations of the participating states (Label A, B)

signed and ratified the Agreement. They can also be called as concluding states. (2) Operating body of the MNA Framework: Asian Multilateral Nuclear Fuel Cycle Framework Management Organization (AMMAO). The organizational structure and tasks of AMMAO are described in Article 15. (3) Monitoring centers: Departments for regional safeguards, nuclear security and safety will be established within AMMAO. They will carry out probate (inspection), verification, peer review, advisory peer review, etc. The organization and tasks are described in Annex II. (4) Host states: The member states that own SF storage and SNTs such as existing or new facilities for uranium enrichment and provide services including enriched uranium supply and SF handling (SF storage) to the partner states through AMMAO. (5) Site states: The member states that have transferred the ownership of existing or new facilities for uranium enrichment, SF storage, reprocessing, MOX fuel production, and MOX storage to AMMAO. (6) Partner states: The member states that own nuclear reactors (light reactor and MOX light reactor) (or plan to own a nuclear reactor in the future) and receive services including enriched uranium supply or SF handling (SF storage) from the facilities in the host states or receive (or plan to receive) services including enriched uranium supply or SF handling (i.e. storage, reprocessing, MOX fuel production, fast reactor, MOX storage) from the facilities owned by AMMAO in the site states. (7) Regional safeguards: The regional safeguards include material accounting, comprehensive safeguards and verification by additional protocols by operators and the Regional Safeguards Department of the Monitoring Center of the MNA Framework. (8) Consortium: Group of corporations that carry out businesses under the environment of Type A, B and C (For Type C, it is expected to be the international cooperative industrial consortium). Rights: For Type A, which is stated in Article 1, the member states in principle have the rights to own uranium enrichment facilities and SF reprocessing facilities to be used within the states (For the ownership rights, please refer to Article 1). For Type B and C, which are stated in Article 1, the partner states are allowed to receive enriched uranium supply (i.e. refining, conversion, enrichment, re-conversion, fuel production) and SF processing services (i.e. storage, direct disposal, reprocessing, MOX fuel product, fast reactor, MOX storage). Obligation: The member states must meet the requirements that are stated in Article 3 (Commitment to nonproliferation), Article 4 (Safeguards), Article 5 (Nuclear security), (Export/import control), Article 7

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(Safety), Article 12 (Liability), and Article 13 (Bilateral nuclear collaboration agreement) as well as Article 23, conditions that are required at the time of withdrawal.

Article 1 Contents of cooperation and scope of activities (Label B, C)

(1) Type A: The states will collaborate under the Framework without providing fuel cycle service (i.e. uranium fuel supply, SF handling (SF storage, reprocessing)). The states must implement Safeguards (Article 4), Nuclear security (Article 5), strengthen Export/import control (Article 6) and Safety (Article 7), and comply with Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement (Article 13). (2) Type B: The states will collaborate under the Framework where ownership of existing or new facilities will not be transferred to MNA Management Organization. The host states will supply uranium fuel through existing or new facilities (i.e. refining, conversion, uranium enrichment (in some cases, Type C), re-conversion, and fuel production) and provide SF handling services (SF storage (in some cases, Type C)/SF direct disposal (if each state carries it out for its own, Type A)). The states will implement Nuclear Fuel Supply Agreement (A-2), Nuclear Fuel Service Agreement (A-6), Safeguards (Article 4) and Nuclear security (Article 5), strengthen Export/import control (Article 6) and Safety (Article 7), and comply with Liability (Article 12) and the Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (Article 13). (3) Type C: The states will transfer ownership of existing or new facilities to MNA Management Organization (Agreement to Transfer Ownership of Facilities to MNA (A-5)). The states will supply uranium fuel supply (i.e. refining, conversion, uranium enrichment, re-conversion, fuel production) and provide services to handle SF (i.e. SF storage, reprocessing, MOX fuel production, fast rector, MOX storage) (Nuclear Fuel Supply Agreement (A-2), Nuclear Fuel Service Agreement (A-6)). The states will implement Safeguards (Article 4) and Nuclear security (Article 5), strengthen Export/import Control (Article 6) and Safety (Article 7), and comply with Liability (Article 12) and Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement (Article 13). (4) Regional safeguards, nuclear security and the Monitoring center which has safety department, that are required in order to implement the above collaboration (1), (2), and (3), will be established and their management will be facilitated. The cooperative industrial consortium will be established and its operation will be facilitated. In order to achieve these, AMMAO will conclude the Facility Management/Operation Agreement (A-6) with the host states and site states.

Article 2 Corporate status/ legal regulations

(1) The MNA Framework shall have corporate status under international law (including capacity to conclude treaty or agreement with states or international organizations and conclude contract with international

39

corporations). (2) The MNA Framework shall have corporate status and

has legal capacity for the following items within the region of the member states. (a) To conclude contracts (b) To obtain, own and dispose of properties. (c) To obtain permission (d) To file an action.

(3) In principle, the international laws, international rules and bilateral agreements (including Annex I) take precedence to domestic laws. Based on this principle, the member status will establish domestic laws.

Article 3 Commitment to nonproliferation (Label A)

(1) Member states are prohibited to collaborate with the states without nuclear weapons to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive device. .

(2) Cooperative industrial consortium is prohibited to produce weapons grade uranium.

Article 4 Safeguards (Label A)

Appropriate safeguard procedure will be carried out by the MNA Regional Safeguards Department of the Monitoring Center, based on the Regional Safeguards Agreement (A-1). Type A: (1) Material accounting by the operator in each state (2) Checking of the material accounting data by each state

and the MNA Regional Safeguards Department of the Monitoring Center

(3) Validation by IAEA and the MNA Regional Safeguards Department of the Monitoring Center (Comprehensive Safeguards and Additional Agreements).

Type B: (4) Material accounting by the entrusted operator in each

state (5) Checking of the material accounting data by each state

and the MNA Regional Safeguards Department of the Monitoring Center


Type C: (7) Material accounting by the operator entrusted by

AMMAO (8) Checking of the material accounting data by the MNA

Regional Safeguards Department of the Monitoring Center


Common procedure for Type A, B and C: (10) International procedure for exporting (Article 5) For details, AMMAO will conclude the Regional

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Safeguards Agreement (A-1) with the member states and IAEA.

Article 5 Nuclear security (Label A)

Type A and Type B: (1) Application of laws and regulations concerning nuclear

security by each state. (2) International nuclear security guidelines will be

implemented. The MNA Nuclear Security Department of the Monitoring Center will carry out advisory review (within the agreeable range based on agreement) and provide recommendations.

Type C: (3) International nuclear security guidelines will be

implemented. The MNA Nuclear Security Department of the Monitoring Center will carry out peer review (verification).

For details, AMMAO will conclude the Safety/Nuclear Security/Liability Agreement (A-3) with the member states.

Article 6 Export/import Control (Label A)

(1) To be NSG member (compliance with the NSG regulations)

(2) To comply with the objective criteria in the NSG Guidelines (INFCIRC 254/Part1 Rev.11 6, 7, June 2011)

Furthermore, for Type C, (3) AMMAO member states will be treated as one state in

terms of international export control of NSG etc. Thus, transfer of nuclear materials within the Framework will not be considered as international transfer.

For details, AMMAO will conclude Export Control Agreement (A-2) with the member states.

Article 7 Safety (Label H)

Type A and Type B: (1) Safety laws and regulations of each state will be

applicable. (2) AMMAO will carry out peer review to check the

implementation status of international guidelines (i.e. participation in four Nuclear Power Safety Conventions and IAEA Guidelines) (within the agreeable range based on agreement) and provide recommendations by the Safety Department of the Monitoring Center.

Type C: (3) International safety standards will be applicable and

respected. (4) Safety Department of the Monitoring Center will carry

out peer review (verification) to check the implementation status of safety standards.

For details, AMMAO will conclude Safety/Nuclear Security/Liability Agreement (A-3) with the member states.

Article 8 Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Services

(1) For type B, The host state shall guarantee enriched uranium supply and SP handling service (SF fuel storage, SF direct disposal) to the partner state based

41

(Label B) on a contract. This is not the case if obtaining the enriched uranium fuel from outside of the Framework is more advantageous in terms of supply balance and price within the Framework. For details, AMMAO will conclude the Nuclear Fuel Supply Agreement (A-7) or Nuclear Fuel Cycle Service Agreement (A-8) with the host and partner states.

(2) For type C, AMMAO shall guarantee the enriched uranium supply and SF handling services (i.e. SF storage, reprocessing, MOX fuel production, fast reactor, MOX storage) to the partner states based on a contract. This is not the case if obtaining the enriched uranium fuel from outside of the Framework is more advantageous in terms of supply balance and price within the Framework. The site states shall follow the necessary procedure and collaborate for the enriched uranium supply and SF handling (i.e. SF storage, reprocessing, MOX fuel production, fast reactor, MOX storage) services which will be provided from AMMAO facilities to the partner states based on a contract. For details, AMMAO will conclude the Nuclear Fuel Supply Agreement (A-7) or Nuclear Fuel Cycle Service Agreement (A-8) with the partner states.

(3) Spent Fuel (SF) will be handled by both recycling (re-processing) services and direct disposal. International storage service for a specific period of time (e.g. 100 years) will also be available. In principle, the states that generate SF are responsible for direct disposal or handling high level waste generated from reprocessing service in their own states. Furthermore, within the MNA Framework, it will be agreed to discuss the possibility of international disposal site in AMMAO and mitigation of radioactive toxicity of high level waste (to medium level).

(4) International storage service within the Framework will be provided for a specific period of time (e.g. 100 years) that is agreed among the member states. In order to assist the final disposal of radioactive wastes in each state, AMMAO will try to develop reprocessing technologies to mitigate radioactive toxicity of high level waste (to medium level), construct facilities and establish service systems. The collaboration method and degree of collaboration will be discussed at AMMAO. (If concrete system is not established by the specified period, the SF will be basically returned to the state that generates them.)

(5) As for the use of MOX which is stored as the future energy resources, the generating states keep the ownership in principle. However, the use will be discussed and decided within the AMMAO Framework. The following options will be examined: a) to return the MOX as light reactor MOX to the generating state (owning state) within the Framework

42

if the state wishes (application of high level safeguards and nuclear security), b) to return the MOX as fast reactor MOX to the generating state (owning state) within the Framework if the state wishes (application of high level safeguards and nuclear security), and c) to sell the MOX to the states with nuclear weapons (including outside of the Framework).

(6) If possible, AMMAO will provide assurance and additional assurance concerning uranium fuel supply to the member states by concluding the Additional Assurance Agreement (A-10) with international organizations.

Article 9 Access to SNTs, security of SNTs and information (Label D)

Type C: SNTs shall only be accessible by the technology holders (states) to prevent the proliferation of SNTs. This will also be applicable when enrichment /reprocessing facilities are introduced from the states outside of the Framework. Security procedure and classification of SNTs are described in Annex III. For details, AMMAO will conclude the SNTs Management Agreement (A-9) with the technology holders (states).

Article 10

Selection of host states and site states (Label C)

(1) Type A: In principle, all member states are allowed to own uranium enrichment facilities and SF handling (SF storage and reprocessing) facilities for their own use.

(2) Type B: In principle, the member states are allowed to own uranium enrichment facilities and SF handling facilities (SF storage, SF direct disposal) as host states. To be selected as a host state, the political and geopolitical status of the state must be stable (including non-conflict status).

(3) Type C: In principle, the member states are allowed to build facilities to handle uranium enrichment and SF (i.e. SF storage, SF reprocessing, MOX fuel production, fast reactor, MOX storage) as site states of multi-nationally managed facilities. To be selected as a site state, the political and geopolitical status of the state must be stable (including non-conflict status). Furthermore, special management, namely, the Agreement to Transfer Ownership of MNA Facilities (A-5), including legal framework that limits state’s jurisdiction concerning AMMAO facility site, will be concluded between AMMAO and a site state.

(4) The member states, especially the host states and site states need to collaboratively make efforts to obtain agreement from the public.

Article 11

Degree of involvement with MNA (Label E)

(1) Type A: The facilities’ ownership, management, operation, research, development, design, construction, etc. shall belong to the technology holders (states).

(2) Type B: The facilities’ ownership, management and operation shall belong to the technology holders (states). Reprocessing, MOX storage facilities’ management and operation, as well as future SF handling technology research, development, design and

43

construction shall belong to AMMAO. (3) Type C: The facilities’ ownership shall belong to

AMMAO. The management shall belong to technology holders or cooperative industrial consortium which is entrusted by AMMAO. The operation will belong to technology holders or cooperative industrial consortium which is entrusted by AMMAO. The research, development, design and construction (mainly SF handling technology) shall belong to AMMAO.

Article 12

Liability (Label I)

(1) Type A: The damage must be compensated by the states concerned. It is desirable that the member states which own facilities join an appropriate international agreement concerning liability.

(2) Type B: The major damage must be compensated by the states concerned. Complementary liability (insurance) (e.g. additional damage liability (insurance) in proportion to the service received) will be provided by AMMAO.

(3) Type C: The site states shall join an international agreement concerning nuclear liability (e.g. CSC). A system will be established in which member states or commissioned consortium will contribute to the pooled funds concerning the liability amount before the said treaty is executed. The amount of funds shall be determined in proportion to the amount of investment to AMMAO facilities.

The complementary liability by AMMAO is described in Annex IV. For details, AMMAO will conclude the Safety, Nuclear Security and Liability Agreement (A-3) with the member states.

Article 13

Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement (Label A)

(1) The current bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements between the member states are applicable to all activities.

(2) Type B: AMMAO and the host states will assure strict safegaurds requirements that are required in the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with nuclear materials and equipment supply states (included in Export/import Control Agreement). Through this, the previous bilateral restriction will be relaxed (the states will receive exceptional comprehensive agreement for the activities such as nuclear materials transfer and transportation within the Framework).

(3) Type C: The MNA Framework will be handled as one state. AMMAO will conclude the Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (A-11) with the nuclear materials and equipment supply states that are outside of the MNA Framework and obtain comprehensive pre-agreement based on the Agreement. Furthermore, AMMAO and the member states will assure strict safeguards requirements that are required in the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements (included in Export Control Agreement).

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Article 14

Transport (Label G)

(1) The member states must satisfy the international standards concerning transport.

(2) The member states must collaborate in transport of nuclear fuel and SF based on the MNA Framework.

To achieve this, AMMAO will conclude the Transport Agreement (A-10) with the member states.

Article 15

Organizations and tasks

AMMAO Executive Board, Secretariat (1) Establishment (2) Configuration of organizations, items to decide, decision-making methods (3) Methods of selecting the chairman and the Secretary-General (4) Decision of regulations of the Executive Board and Secretariat procedures (5) Duties, etc. of the Executive Board and Secretariat (6) Issuance of directives based on the decisions

Article 16

Prohibited cooperation items

Prohibition on cooperation items other than those stipulated in Agreements (1) (a) Except for the cooperation described in Article 1 of

this Agreement, the member states must not execute any participation, fostering, and support in any way. (b) Duties of cooperative industrial consortiums

(2) (a) Prohibition on participation in, fostering, and support any new development program with regard to uranium enrichment and SF reprocessing technologies out of the MNA framework. (b) Prohibition on use of deliverables by the concerned states which concluded the Agreement.

Without consent of AMNAO, the member states must not transfer nuclear material and export enrichment, reprocessing, and other facilities to any state out of the Framework.

Article 17

Patent/industrial property rights

How to handle patent and industrial property rights are described in Annex V.

Article 18

Resolution of dispute

(1) Problems shall be solved by the Executive Board. (2) If the conflict is not solved, the concerned states shall

solve the issues. (3) Arbitration by the Arbitration Committee (4) Composition of the Arbitration Committee and

assignment of members (5) Decision making process at the Arbitration Committee (6) No rights to appeal

Article 19

Signatory to Agreements with other states, other organizations

The member states may, on a joint basis, conclude contracts for cooperation with Asian or other states or international organizations provided that these contracts are not concerned in transfer of the SNTs and nuclear material.

Article 20

Applicable scope Asia region, territorial lands and waters of member states. The Asian region includes Central Asia including uranium producing states, East Asia including nuclear advanced states, South-East Asia including nuclear emerging states.

Article 21

Ratification and deposit

This Treaty shall be ratified. The document of ratification must be deposited to the Government of XXX. The Treaty

45

must come into effect on the date when the ○○th document of ratification is deposited to XXX. The Government of XXX shall give notice of deposit of each document of ratification and the date of enforcement of this Treaty to the other signatory states.

Article 22

Revision of the Treaty

Any member state or Executive Board can propose revision of the Treaty at any time.

Article 23

Withdrawal When a member state of the MNA Framework wishes to withdraw from the Framework, it must meet the following condition. (1) After withdrawal, the state must return to the

safeguards (i.e. IAEA Safeguards) before it participated in the Framework.

(2) The use and operation of the facilities (related to SNT) which are newly based on participation in the Framework must be terminated. Confirmation and validation of termination will be entrusted to the IAEA.

(3) Among the nuclear material that are produced by the new facilities built based on participation in the Framework, enriched uranium must be returned to the enrichment service requesting state through AMMAO. Plutonium (MOX) must be transferred to and stored at the MNA (international MOX storage facility) as international stockpile of the region, even if it is possessed by the withdrawing state. This will contribute to the region as future energy source (the withdrawing state will receive corresponding service cost).

(4) It will be prohibited to transfer or sell any nuclear material that are produced by the new facilities built after participating in the Framework to any states out of the Framework.

Article 24

Cancellation of membership and trial

In any of the following cases, based on the decision by the Executive Board, membership may be invalidated. Furthermore, if necessary, the state involved or AMMAO can file a case at the International Court of Justice. (1) Having acted against the member state requirements. (2) Having acted against the member state obligations. (3) Having carried out any activity other than cooperation

that the member states can give. Article 25

Termination of the Treaty

This Treaty can be cancelled by unanimous consent of the member states at any time. In this case, as a result, in order to coordinate the rights and obligations, the protocol must be concluded among the member states. In the protocol, provisions with regards to settlement of assets and debt resulting from their cooperation shall be included.

Article 26

Necessary measures, etc.

Necessary measures, etc. In case of Articles 3, 4, 9, 23, 24 and 25: In case of withdrawal of any member state from this Treaty pursuant to Article 23, cancellation of member state right from this Treaty based on Article 24, or cancellation of this Treaty pursuant to Article 25, then with regards to Articles 3 and 4 that are related to assurance and

46

safeguards as well as Article 9 that is related to measures to protect confidential information, documents and devices, appropriate provisions must be established to continue these provisions, to assure the right of claim for return, to prohibit transfer to the third states, etc. Until the said provisions are established, Articles 3, 4 and 9 and any amendment made or any procedure applied thereto at the time of attainment thereof, must be effectively sustained.

Postscript

In witness of the above, the signers with legitimate authority conclude this Treaty. The X of Treaty were made in ××, ○○, ## and ** languages, on MM DD, YYYY, at YYY. Each document is equally original. On behalf of A: On behalf of B: On behalf of C: On behalf of D:

Annexes I : Related Agreements (A-1 to A-11) II: Organizational structure and tasks of the MNA Monitoring Center III: Security procedures and classification of confidential matters IV: Liability V: Patents and industrial property rights

Name of Agreement Signer Major contents Notes Export Control Agreement (A-2)

Member states (partner states, host states, site states), AMMAO

<Purpose, Definition> Incorporation of nuclear non-proliferation requirements that are equivalent of international rules, NSG Guidelines (2012), and US Atomic Energy Act and their compliance and prior agreement

For Type A and B, the Agreement includes, for example, nuclear non-proliferation requirements

* for the

Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act. For Type C, on behalf of the member states (they are treated as one state), AMMAO will conclude a comprehensive nuclear cooperation agreement with third states. This way, the nuclear transfer within the Framework will not

Table 4.3 Summary of other Agreements (A-2 to A-10)

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be considered as international transfer.

Safety/Nuclear security/Liability Agreement (A-3)

Member states (partner states, host states, site states), AMMAO

<Purpose, Definition> Safety, nuclear security: To comply with international standards and guidelines, development of and compliance with common standards, verification of compliance status, implementation of peer review, etc. Liability: To comply with the law of each state and international treaties concerning liability that the state participates in. Nuclear liability systems (liability insurance, funds pooling) will be established within the MNA

Safety, nuclear security: The regulations will be separated for Type A, B and Type C Liability: The regulations will be determined for each Type.

Transport Agreement (A-4)

Member states (States that are involved with transport routes), AMMAO

<Purpose, Definition> Compliance with international standards and guidelines concerning transportation, cooperation for transportation (simplify transportation approval procedure, mutual support for transportation security in the territorial waters of each state), responsibility for transportation

Responsibility lies with the side that asks for transportation

Agreement to Transfer Ownership of Facilities to MNA (A-5)

Member states (site states), AMMAO

<Purpose, Definition> Conditions to invest in the management and operation entity of facilities, arrangements for tax codes, requirements for approving transfer of ownership and construction of a facility, requirements concerning safety and

Type C Including building a new facility in a site state

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nuclear security MNA Facilities Management/Operation Agreement (A-6)

Member states (site states), AMMAO

<Purpose, Definition> Role of cooperative industrial consortium, facilitation of its establishment and operation, requirements for approval, requirements for safeguards, requirements for safety and nuclear security

Type C

Nuclear Fuel Supply Agreement (A-7)

Member states (host states, site states), AMMAO

<Purpose, Definition> Enriched uranium supply assurance based on a contract

Type B, C Possible to obtain from outside of the Framework

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Service Supply Agreement (A-8)

Member states (host states, site states), AMMAO

<Purpose, Definition> Assurance of SF handling services based on a contact (SF storage/SF direct disposal)

Type B, C

Agreements concerning Management of SNTs (A-9)

SNTs possessing states (holders), AMMAO

<Purpose, Definition> Protection of the target materials/facilities and SNTs/sensitive nuclear information

To prevent SNTs proliferation by limiting the access to only technology holders (states)

Agreement concerning Additional Assurance (A-10)

International organizations, AMMAO

<Purpose, Definition> Cooperation concerning uranium fuel supply assurance

International organizations such as IAEA

*Non-proliferation requirements: To comply with the NSG Guideline

(INFCIRC/254/Rev.11/Part 1), Paragraph 6a; to make internal export control rules strict.

Examples of the export control rules are as follows (summary of the requirements in Section

123 of the US Atomic Energy Act):

1. A guaranty that safeguards will be maintained permanently with respect to all nuclear

materials and equipment as set forth in the agreement for cooperation;

2. NSG Guideline requirements;

3. A guaranty that no nuclear materials and device or SNTs will be used for any nuclear

explosive device, or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device,

or for any other military purpose;

4. The United States shall have the right to require the return of any nuclear material and

device that are the target of cooperation if the non-nuclear-weapon state carries out a

nuclear test or terminates or abrogates the IAEA safeguards agreement;

5. A guaranty that any nuclear material and confidential documents that are the target of

cooperation will not be transferred to unauthorized persons or third states without the

consent of the United States;

6. A guaranty that adequate physical security will be maintained with respect to any

nuclear material that is the target of cooperation;

7. A guaranty that no nuclear material that is the target of cooperation will be reprocessed,

enriched, or altered in form or content without prior approval of the United States;

49

8. A guaranty that no plutonium, no uranium 233, and no enriched uranium that are the

target of the cooperation will be stored in any facility that has not been approved in

advance by the United States; and

9. A guaranty that any special nuclear material, production facility or utilization of

facility produced or constructed by or through the use of any SNTs that are the target

of the cooperation will be subject to all the requirements specified in the above.

50

5. MNA framework constituent proposal

5.1 Potential MNA framework member states proposal

Japan, South Korea, China (including Taiwan), Russia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and

emerging nuclear power states in South East Asia (e.g. Viet Nam, Thailand, Malaysia,

Indonesia)

Reasons for selecting Asia and the above states:

It is expected that nuclear energy use will grow in Asia;

The needs to solve issues of enriched uranium fuel supply and SF in Asia are high;

A new plan to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation is needed in Asia in accordance

with the changes of supply/demand situation including fuel supply (increase in the

supply from former East Europe states) in Asia;

Nuclear power promotion and resource states in North East Asia and Central Asia as

well as nuclear power emerging states in South East Asia are the main targets;

North Korea is excluded for the time being for political reasons. India and Pakistan

are excluded because they are non NPT-members and they do not meet the

requirements for the MNA Framework (i.e. duty of non-proliferation on NPT)

(because IAEA safeguards are the basis); and

Arab states in West Asia are excluded for the same reasons as North Korea (i.e.

political instability).

The USA, Canada and Australia will be treated as the states that “are involved from out

of the MNA Framework” to supply fuel and nuclear non-proliferation leading states (see

discussion in Chapter 7.7-Future Work).

5.2 Concrete proposal for the nuclear fuel cycle service states

The information of front end and back end of each relevant state is presented in Annex,

Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 (at the end of this document). Based on this information, following are the

proposal for the nuclear fuel cycle service candidate states.

(1) Front end participating candidate states:

(a) Uranium mining and refining: Kazakhstan, Russia, China (future potential state:

Mongolia)

(b) Conversion: Russia, China

(c) Uranium enrichment: Russia (Kazakhstan*), Japan, China (

* Facilities are within

Russia)

(d) Re-conversion, fuel production: Kazakhstan, Russia, Japan, South Korea, China

(2) Back end participating candidate states:

① SF storage: Russia, Kazakhstan (tentatively)

② SF re-processing: Russia, Japan, China (future potential states: South Korea,

Kazakhstan)

③ MOX storage: Russia, Japan, China (future potential states: South Korea,

Kazakhstan)

51

④ SF disposal: Participating states

(Nuclear reactor participating candidate states: Nuclear power advanced states, Viet Nam,

Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia)

Furthermore, for each element and facility, the potential MNA participating states and

options for the facilities and activities – compatibility (Type A, B, C) are summarized in Table

5.1, segregated by near future and distant future.

Table 5.1

52

6. Detailed study and evaluation of the proposed framework

6.1 Further study and evaluation from legal and regulatory perspectives

1) Safeguards

Article 3 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) stipulates

the IAEA safeguard acceptance obligation of non-nuclear-weapon states. The

non-nuclear-weapon states must conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA and receive

safeguards for their nuclear activities.

In the following section, the types and overview of IAEA safeguards agreements and

regional safeguards such as European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) composed of 27

states in Europe and safeguard systems between Argentina and Brazil are explained. Based on

them, the safeguards system of the MNA facilities is proposed and evaluated.

1)-1 Types of safeguards and the contents

IAEA safeguards agreements include INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreement

(Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement), INFCIRC/66 safeguards agreement, and voluntary

agreements. There is also Additional Protocol (AP) to strengthen safeguards, INFCIRC/540,

to be signed additionally by the states that have already concluded any of these agreements.

Furthermore, there is a regional safeguards agreement that can be concluded by IAEA,

international organization composed of multiple states, and the member states. The currently

existing regional safeguards agreements include INFCIRC/193 signed by IAEA, Euratom and

the Euratom member states, and INFCIRC/435 (Four Parties’ Agreement) signed by IAEA,

Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC),

Brazil and Argentina.

Euratom’s tasks include promotion of research and development of peaceful use of

nuclear power, stable supply of nuclear fuel within the Euratom framework, and supervision

to ensure that the use of civil nuclear materials is not diverted to purposes other than those for

which they are intended (Euratom Treaty, Chapter 7). This way, Euratom forcibly implements

the safeguards within EU. The characteristics of the Euratom safeguards are as follows:

The purpose of safeguards is to make sure that the use of nuclear materials is not diverted

to purposes other than those for which they are intended;

The non-reported nuclear materials and non-reported nuclear activities are out of scope

(they will be separately determined by European Commission);

All civil facilities excluding device and materials for the purposes of national defence in

France and United Kingdom are subject to inspection;

Euratom recruits inspectors and implements inspection in the member states;

Inspectors have access to all places and data to the extent necessary in order to apply

safeguards by presenting the public documents issued by Euratom; and EC regulations are established for the amplification of Euratom safeguards.

Furthermore, Euratom keeps the ownership of nuclear materials, and facilities possess

only the right to use nuclear materials. There is also a penalty of “nuclear material

withdrawal.”

INFCIRC/193 basically incorporates the contents of INFCIRC/153. However, in order for

the Euratom member states to collaboratively conclude safeguards agreements and for

53

Euratom to apply safeguards to the member states, the following adjustments are made7:

In the conventional IAEA safeguards treaties with individual states, IAEA verifies the

results of nuclear material accounting system of each state. However, the Euratom Treaty

applies the method of verifying the results of the Euratom safeguards system in the

member states In order to utilize the Euratom safeguards system, the Euratom member states are treated

as a region for the IAEA safeguards application, and the transfer of nuclear materials

within the member states are not considered as international transfer

IAEA carries out inspection together with the Euratom inspectors, and the inspection is

based on the observation of the Euratom inspection activities to the extent possible. If

necessary, IAEA carries out inspection separately

Euratom develops the inspection plan in collaboration with IAEA. Regardless of the

availability of simultaneous inspection of IAEA, all Euratom’s inspection results will be

reported to IAEA In order to facilitate the application of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and attached

protocol, Liaison Committee is established comprised of the representatives of Euratom

and IAEA

According to the summary8 of the 2011 Euratom safeguards implementation, Euratom

carried out the total of 1,299 inspections at reprocessing facilities, uranium enrichment

facilities, nuclear fuel production facilities, nuclear power plants and storage facilities,

research laboratory, etc. Furthermore, in order to improve efficiency of inspection within the

region, Euratom signed the New Partnership Approach (NPA) with IAEA in 1992 and agreed

to avoid duplication of inspection activities based on the “one job, one person” principle,

supplemented by new quality control measures. Elements of the NPA include use of

commonly shared inspection instruments and analytical capabilities, sharing of information,

cooperation in research and development and in the training of inspectors, and increasing

common use of technologies to replace the physical presence of inspectors by appropriate

equipment.

ABACC is an organization that was established based on the “Argentine-Brazil

Agreement for Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy” (bilateral agreement). The Agreement was

signed and came into effect as the final action of trust relationship development process of

over 12 years since the “Argentine-Brazil Agreement for the Development and Application of

Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy” which was signed in April 1980 by Argentine and Brazil that

shared the common border and had nuclear weapon development plans handled by the

military governments. ABACC basically promises peaceful use of nuclear materials and

facilities and carries out the Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear

Materials (SCCC) to verify that nuclear materials used in all nuclear activities in both

countries are not diverted to purposes prohibited by the agreement. The Four Parties’

Agreement is basically the same as INFCIRC/153(corrected). However, they differ in that

ABACC applies safeguards and avoids unnecessary duplication with IAEA safeguards

activities as well as ABACC excludes atomic submarine from application of safeguards.

7Atomic Energy Commission Home Page, http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/hakusho/wp1973/sb130201.htm (Date of access: Februrary 6, 2013), others 8 European Commission Directorate-General for Energy, “Summary Report on the Implementation of Euratom Safeguards in

2011”, July 2012, Ref. Ares(2012)1315222 - 08/11/2012

http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/hakusho/wp1973/sb130201.htm

54

1)-2 Legal framework of safeguards for the MNA facilities and its evaluation

In this document, the following forms of safeguards centered on regional safeguards are

proposed for the MNA facilities of type A-C. Regional safeguards are incorporated because,

as is apparent from the examples of Euratom and ABACC, regional safeguards measures

contribute to enhancing nuclear non-proliferation in the region and enhancing trust among

member states.

Table 6.1 summarizes the proposal for the safeguards systems for the MNA facilities of

type A-C. In the Table, Euratom and ABACC, which are already applying the regional

safeguards, and Japan are included for comparison.

Common safeguards for all types of MNA facilities：

Regional safeguards system among the MNA member states will be introduced, and the

system is stipulated in the Regional Safeguards Agreement.

Safeguards Agreement is concluded by the MNA member states, AMMAO and IAEA.

The MNA Regional Safeguards Department will play a role of executing the Regional

System of Accounting for and Control (RSAC) and regional safeguards.

Safeguards for the Type A and Type B MNA facilities:

The MNA Regional Safeguards Department will review the material accounting data

collected by the facility operators, as the RSAC executing agency in collaboration with

the regulatory institutions of the partner state or host state.

The inspection by the MNA Regional Safeguards Department and IAEA may be

accompanied by inspectors from the regulatory institutions of the partner state or host

state. Or both data review and inspection may be entrusted to the MNA Regional

Safeguards Department.

Safeguards for the Type C MNA facilities:

The Type C MNA facilities will be operated by the international cooperative industrial

consortium based on the contract with local entity of AMMAO (site state entity). The

accounting will also be carried out by the international cooperative industrial consortium.

The MNA Regional Safeguards Department will check the accounting data etc. as the

executing agency of RSAC, and it inspects the facility alone or together with IAEA.

Because the MNA facilities are in the territory of the site state and the laws of the site

state are applicable, the site state’s government may review the accounting data collected

by the international cooperative industrial consortium or inspection by the MNA Regional

Safeguards Department.

55

Table 6.1 Proposal for the Safeguards Systems in the MNA Facilities, etc.

Purpose of safeguards CSA AP Regional

safeguards

Governing regulations (domestic laws,

agreements, others)

Material accounting

(=facility operator) Accounting data review Inspector(s)

Japan To prevent the use of nuclear

materials, etc. for nuclear weapons ○ ○ × Nuclear Power Plant Regulations Law

Safeguards Agreement between Japan and

IAEA9

Japanese operator Japanese governmental regulatory

institution

IAEA

Accompanied by Japanese

inspectors

Reg

ional safeg

uard

s

EU states

To prevent the use of nuclear

materials, etc. for purposes other

than those for which they are

intended

○ ○ ○

Domestic law in EU states

Euratom Treaty, Section 7 and below

(Euratom Commission Regulation on the

application of safeguards (302/2005))

Safeguards agreement between the

non-nuclear weapon states among the

Euratom member states, Euratom and

IAEA10

Safeguards agreement by France, Euratom

and IAEA11

Safeguards agreement by UK, Euratom and

IAEA12

Operator in each state

Euratom carries it out as the

executing agency of the regional

accounting management system13

(Regulatory institution of each state

may participate in it.)

Safeguards department of

Euratom and IAEA (Inspectors

from each state may accompany

the inspection by Euratom.)

Argentine

Brazil

To prevent the use of nuclear

materials, etc., for nuclear weapons △14

△ ○

Domestic laws of Argentine and Brazil

“Argentine-Brazil Agreement for the

development and application of peaceful use

of nuclear energy”

Argentine/Brazil /ABACC/IAEA Safeguards

Agreement (INFCIRC/435, Four parties’

Agreement)

Operator in each state Regulatory institution of each state

and ABACC

ABACC and IAEA (Inspectors

of ABACC are composed of

inspectors of both states, Thus,

the states inspect each other’s

facilities.)

MN

A

Type

A Same as above ○ ○ ○

Law of partner states

MNA Regional Safeguards Agreement

MNA member states (including partner, host

and site states)/ AMMAO/IAEA Safeguards

Agreement

Operator in partner state

Regulatory institution of partner

state and MNA Regional Safeguards

Department

MNA Regional Safeguards

Department and IAEA

(Inspectors from the regulatory

institution of partner state may

accompany the inspection by

MNA)

Type

B Same as above ○ ○ ○

Law of host states



and site states) /AMMAO/IAEA Safeguards

Agreement

Operator in host state

Regulatory institution of host state

and MNA Regional Safeguards

Department


Department and IAEA


institution of host state may


MNA)

Type

C Same as above ○ ○ ○

Law of site states



and site states) /AMMAO/IAEA Safeguards

Agreement

Operator (international

cooperative industrial

consortium) commissioned by

the local entity of AMMAO in

the site state.

Regulatory institution of site state

and MNA Regional Safeguards

Department


Department and IAEA


institution of site state may


MNA)

CSA: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

AP: Additional protocol

9INFCIRC/255 and INFCIRC/255 Add.1 10INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193 Add.8 11INFCIRC/290 and INFCIRC/290 Add.1 12INFCIRC/263 and INFCIRC/263 Add.1 13Regional System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material (RSAC) 14Although Argentine and Brazil have not concluded the CSC with IAEA individually, they have concluded the Safeguards Agreement with ABACC and IAEA (four parties’ agreement) that covers the contents of CSC. Argentine and Brazil have not ratified the AP. There is a room for

discussion whether the four parties’ agreement covers the contents of AP or not.

56

Below is the evaluation of the safeguards framework of the MNA facilities in

comparison with the Euratom safeguards system which is the precedent of the regional

safeguards system.

Nuclear non-proliferation: The purpose of the MNA safeguards is to prevent the use of

nuclear materials etc. for nuclear weapons. Thus, this matches more with the goal of nuclear

non-proliferation than that of the Euratom safeguards which aim only to prevent the use of

nuclear materials for other than those for which they are intended. Furthermore, Euratom does

not target non-reported nuclear materials and non-reported nuclear activities, while the MNA

safeguards target both. In this aspect, the MNA safeguards system also contributes to the

nuclear non-proliferation.

Transparency: Transparency can be improved especially for Type C MNA facilities

through material accounting by international cooperative industrial consortium which is

commissioned by the local entity of AMMAO in the site state.

Efficiency of inspection: The following points applied by the Euratom safeguards can also

be incorporated in the MNA safeguards. This way, MNA can avoid the duplication of

safeguards measures by MNA and IAEA and achieve the efficiency.

For the IAEA safeguards for the MNA member states, IAEA will verify the safeguards

inspection results collected by the MNA Safeguards Department

IAEA will carry out inspection together with the inspectors from the MNA Safeguards

Department and observe the Department’s inspection activities as much as possible. If

necessary, IAEA will carry out inspection separately

The MNA Safeguards Department will develop the inspection plan in collaboration with

IAEA. Whether the inspection is carried out with IAEA or not, all inspection results by

the MNA Safeguards Department will be reported to IAEA

In order to utilize the MNA safeguards system, the MNA member states will be treated as

a region base on the IAEA safeguards, and transfer of nuclear materials within the

member states shall not be considered as international transfer

Furthermore, as a difference of safeguards between MNA and Euratom, Euratom

possesses the ownership of nuclear materials and the facilities possess only the right to use

nuclear materials. Thus, when safeguards are violated, the state will be penalized through

“nuclear material withdrawal.” It is possible for Euratom to possess the ownership of nuclear

materials because 1) Euratom was established in the 1950s when the peaceful use of nuclear

energy just began, and 2) Euratom Supply Agency (ESA), which secured smooth and fair

supply of nuclear fuel, existed within the Euratom framework. On the other hand, AMMAO

does not have such a system yet, and thus the MNA Framework does not propose the transfer

of nuclear materials ownership to AMMAO. Euratom’s tasks include promotion of research

and dissemination of information, establishment and application of safety standards, ensuring

nuclear fuel supply, investment in nuclear energy development and securing basic facilities,

and ensuring safeguards is an important part of the tasks. In the background, there is a

political, economic, industrial and cultural integration of Europe such as EC and European

Court of Justice. The MNA regional safeguards are basically the same as the Euratom

safeguards. By standardizing the nuclear material accounting system and inspection system in

the politically, economically and culturally diverse Asia, it is expected that improvement of

nuclear non-proliferation can be achieved.

2) Nuclear safety

As was shown by the Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear

Disaster (Fukushima nuclear accident) in March 2011, nuclear power accidents give damage

to the facility’s surrounding area, community people and environment. Furthermore, as was

57

the case with the Chernobyl Disaster in 1986, the nuclear power accidents can also give

damage to the neighboring countries.

Unlike safeguards, the NPT does not add duties concerning nuclear safety. The main

purpose of establishing the MNA Framework is also nuclear non-proliferation. Despite that,

ensuring the safety of the MNA facilities remains one of the highest priorities, as is the case

with the nuclear power facilities in each state. Furthermore, weak safety of nuclear power

facilities can also lead to vulnerability of nuclear security measures. Thus, ensuring nuclear

safety is required from the nuclear security perspective as well.

In the preamble of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, it is stated that “reaffirming that

responsibility for nuclear safety rests with the State having jurisdiction over a nuclear

installation…” Although the main target of the Convention is the nuclear reactors that

generate power, it is obvious that the states which have jurisdiction over the nuclear power

facilities other than nuclear reactors also own ultimate responsibility for ensuring the safety of

those facilities. In the following section, the overview of the international standards and international

treaties concerning the safety of nuclear power facilities as well as international movement for

strengthening nuclear power safety after the Fukushima nuclear accident are described. Based

on the overview, secure safety measures in the MNA facilities are proposed, followed by

evaluation of the proposal in comparison with Euratom’s nuclear safety systems and current

situations.

2)-1 International standards and international treaties concerning nuclear power safety

Based on the IAEA Statute, IAEA developed safety documents concerning nuclear

power facilities, radiation protection, radioactive waste management and transportation of

radioactive materials. They are called the “IAEA Safety Standards Series.” These IAEA

Safety Standards Series are systematically composed of Fundamental Safety Principles (i.e.

safety concept, goals, fundamental principles), Safety Requirements (i.e. fundamental

requirements to secure safety by theme and by facility), and Safety Guides (i.e. specific

methods to comply with the important fundamental requirements). These documents are not

legally binding on the IAEA member states but are used at each member state’s discretion as

the international standards for the nuclear power activities of each state. IAEA also uses them

for their safety reviews15

of the member states’ responses to the standards.

As for the international conventions concerning nuclear power safety, there are Nuclear

Power Safety Four Conventions which were established after the Chernobyl Disaster. They

are 1) Convention on Early Notification of Nuclear Accident16

, 2) Convention on Assistance

in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency17

, 3) Convention on Nuclear

Safety18

, and 4) Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety

of Radioactive Waste Management19

. Table 6.2 shows their purposes and obligations that are

defined in the Conventions.

15Examples of peer reviews include Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV) Service, Design and Safety Assessment

Review Service (DSARS), Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS), Operational Safety Review Team (OSART)

programme、Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors (INSARR), Site & External Events Design Review Service

(SEED), Transport Safety Appraisal Services (TranSAS), Radioactive Waste Safety Services, Occupational Radiation

Protection Appraisals (ORPAS), etc. 16Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 17Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency 18Convention on Nuclear Safety 19Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/iec/eprev-brochure.pdf

http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/ni/s-reviews/osart/OSART_Brochure.pdf

http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/ni/s-reviews/osart/OSART_Brochure.pdf

58

Table 6.2 Purposes and obligations in the International Conventions concerning Nuclear

Power Safety20

Convention Purpose Obligations 1)Convention on Early Notification of Nuclear Accident

To minimize the consequences of nuclear accidents by notifying nuclear accidents at early stage in the event of a nuclear accident which has the potential for international transboundary release.

A public organization is designated which would notify the other states in case of a nuclear accident.

2)Convention on Assistance in the Cased of a Nuclear Accident or Radioactive Emergency

To minimize the consequences of nuclear accidents by establishing international framework to facilitate prompt assistance in the event of a nuclear accident.

The member state requesting assistance provides necessary information to the assistance providing states. The member states that receive request for assistance will determine the ranges of possible assistance and notify them to the requesting state directly or through IAEA.

3)Convention on Nuclear Safety

To achieve and maintain high standard safety of nuclear power plants for generating power in the world.

Member states must submit reports on the implementation of their obligations for “peer review” at member states’ meetings which are held once in three years

21.

4)Joint Convention on the Safety of SF Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

To achieve and maintain high standard safety of SF and radioactive waste management in the world.

The “3) Convention on Nuclear Safety” is only the conceptual regulation in comparison with

the IAEA safety standards. It only covers the civilian nuclear power plants and it gives

responsibility for and jurisdiction over their safety to each signed state. As of April 2012, 75

signed the Convention. All states which own nuclear power plants have signed the

Convention and the signed states have the following obligations:

Implementing and maintaining national laws and the legislative measures for carrying out

the obligations under the Convention

Separating the functions of the regulatory body from those of any other bodies concerned

with the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy

Taking appropriate steps for identifying site and designing, constructing and operating

nuclear energy facilities

Taking appropriate steps for ensuring that the radiation exposure to the workers and the

public shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable and preparing for emergency

situation

Carrying out comprehensive and systematic evaluation concerning safety before

construction of nuclear energy facility, during the test operation and under operation

20Nuclear Regulation Authority Home Page

http://www.nsr.go.jp/archive/nisa/genshiryoku/international/international_2.html, (Date of access:March 22,

2013) 21 As of June 2011, 74 states have signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and in the fifth meetings in April 2011, 29 states

submitted the reports and received reviews.

http://www.nsr.go.jp/archive/nisa/genshiryoku/international/international_2.html

59

Submission of reports concerning nuclear energy facility to the Review Meeting. At the

Review Meeting, the reports will be reviewed, and each state must take appropriate

measures to respond to the suggestions and recommendations from the Meeting including

termination of a nuclear power facility

The “4) Joint Convention on the Safety of SF Management and on the Safety of

Radioactive Waste Management” defines the following principles.

Radioactive waste should, as far as it is compatible with the safety of the management of

such material, be disposed of in the state where it was generated (Convention, Preamble

(xi), first sentence) Any state has the right to ban import into its territory of foreign SF and radioactive waste

(Convention, Preamble (xii)) Recognizing that safe and efficient management of SF and radioactive waste might be

fostered through agreements among contracting states to use facilities in one of them for

the benefit of the other states, particularly where waste originates from joint projects.

(Convention, Preamble (xi), after “whilst”) The Joint Convention on the Safety of SF Management and on the Safety of

Radioactive Waste Management will be mentioned again later in the Export Control section.

As are defined in Conventions 3) and 4), the responsibility for and jurisdiction over nuclear

power safety lie with the states, as is the case with the nuclear security which will be

described later in this document. Concerning the nuclear safety, Conventions 1) and 2)

promote information sharing, and Conventions 3) and 4) promote implementation of

self-evaluation of nuclear power facilities by each state and implementation of peer review at

Review Meetings by the member states. They also impose obligations to take measures to

respond to the suggestions made in the Review Meetings. In these points, these Conventions

are different from those concerning nuclear security, which do not promote information

sharing and implementation of self-evaluation by each state and peer review among the states.

2)-2 Movement to strengthen nuclear safety after the Fukushima nuclear accident

Between the Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2011 and January 2013, international

meetings concerning nuclear power safety took place one after another. These meetings

include “Kyiv Summit on the Safe and Innovative Use of Nuclear Energy (April 2011),”

“Nuclear Safety Convention Review Meeting (April 2011),” “France/OECD/NEA Ministerial

Conference (June 2011),” “IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety (June 2011),”

“High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security (September 2011),” and “Fukushima

Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety (December 2012).” In these meetings, importance

of ensuring nuclear safety and necessity of strengthening safety were discussed. Concerning the IAEA safety standards, reinforcing compliance with the standards among

the member states were discussed in the “IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety.”

The topic was controversial, and in the Ministerial Declaration, it was only stated that “IAEA

safety standards should be continuously reviewed, strengthened and implemented as broadly

and effectively as possible”22

. Based on the Ministerial Declaration, the “IAEA Action Plan

on Nuclear Safety” was developed, adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors and endorsed

by the General Assembly. Even in the Action Plan, it was only described that the IAEA safety

standards should be revised as needs arise, and the timeframe of the revision was not

mentioned.

Furthermore, concerning the “3) Convention on Nuclear Safety,” it was reported in the

“IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety” that “whether or not to revise the Nuclear

22Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Home Page http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/backdrop/pdf/110621-01.pdf

60

Safety Convention to confer enforcement to the safety inspection was the focus of discussion.”

However, the majority was cautious about revising the Convention. IAEA Director General

Amano also took the position of being cautious about the revision. Thus, in the end, it was

decided that the safety system would be strengthened outside of the framework of the

Convention.”23

In the “IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety,” IAEA Director General

Amano proposed to carry out no-notice peer reviews for 10% of 440 nuclear power plants in

the world. However, in the “IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety,” it was only expressed that

“member states are strongly recommended” to “voluntarily” accept peer reviews. In the

“IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety,” the parts on peer reviews are stated as follows24

:

The IAEA Secretariat, upon request from the member states, to undertake peer reviews of

national assessments.

The IAEA Secretariat to strengthen existing IAEA peer reviews and to make the peer

review results publicly available with the consent of the state concerned.

Member states to be strongly encouraged to voluntarily host IAEA peer reviews

(including follow-up reviews) on a regular basis.

Member states to conduct a prompt national review and thereafter regular reviews of their

regulatory bodies.

Each member state with nuclear power plants to voluntarily host, on a regular basis, an

IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review service (IRRS) mission and a follow-up mission to

be conducted within three years of the main IRRS mission.

Each member state with nuclear power plants to voluntarily host at least one IAEA

Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) mission during the coming three years.

“States that emphasized autonomy of nuclear power policy such as China, France and

the USA and developing countries that insisted on sovereignty were not keen on strengthening

the authority of IAEA” by applying the “IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.” 25

This is

why “each state’s initiative was emphasized.” 26

As descried earlier, even though four

Conventions concerning nuclear safety came into effect following the Chernobyl Disaster and

legal frameworks including obligation of peer reviews for sharing information on safety and

safety measures for nuclear power facilities were established, nuclear power use still remains

one of the most important national matters concerning the national energy policy and many

states still believe that securing the safety should be based on the state’s sovereignty.

Therefore, autonomy by the state was emphasized and the implementation of random peer

review on safety by IAEA was not approved.

On the IAEA Charter, as described above, IAEA established the safety standards from

the health protection point of view and approves inspection from the health and safety

perspectives.27

In the “IAEA Safety Standards and Measures”28

published in 1960,

implementation of inspection on the nuclear power safety is also stated. However, the right for

safety inspection was abandoned at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in 1976 because of

low interest in nuclear safety among the states and financial burden. In the “IAEA Safety

23E-Nikkei, June 24, 2011 “Conferring enforcement to the nuclear power safety inspection was deferred, IAEA”

http://www.nikkei.com/news/print-article/?R_FLG=0&bf=0&ng=DGXNASGM2307I_U1A620C1EB2000 (Accessed on

January 22, 2013) 24Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Home Page http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/atom/iaea/pdfs/plan1109.pdf 25Nobumasa Akiyama, “Politics about strengthening nuclear safety: beyond systematic limitation” 26Yusuke Terabayashi “International actions for nuclear safety and Japanese collaboration for nuclear power – Trend for one

year after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident”, Rippou to Chousa, March 2012, No. 326, edited and

issued by Planning and Research Unit, Secretariat of the House of Councillors. 27IAEA Charter, Article 3, Clause A (6), Article 12, Clause A(1) 28IAEA, INFCIRC/18, May 31, 1960

http://www.nikkei.com/news/print-article/?R_FLG=0&bf=0&ng=DGXNASGM2307I_U1A620C1EB2000

61

Standards and Measures”29

published in 1976, it was amended that, instead of safety

inspection, IAEA would dispatch safety mission to provide advice and support concerning

application of the IAEA safety standards based on the agreement from the member states.

Furthermore, the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) is provided by IAEA in

line with the IAEA Safety Standards in order to approve and improve the effectiveness of the

member states’ regulatory foundation for securing safety of nuclear power, radiation,

radioactive waste and transportation based on the understanding that the ultimate

responsibility for the nuclear safety lies with the states. In other words, IAEA reviews only

the effectiveness of the regulatory foundation and does not offer specific and detailed

evaluation of safety measures of each state. This is because the latter is placed as the task of

each state.

2)-3 Proposal for the legal framework of nuclear safety at MNA facilities and its

evaluation

In this document, the following nuclear safety securing measures are proposed for each

type of MNA facilities. In Table 6.3, safety securing measures in Japan and by Euratom are

also included for comparison.

In Table 6.3, the Nuclear Safety Directive by EU in the Euratom column includes (a)

“Ministerial Executive Board Directive to determine fundamental safety standards to protect

health of workers and public from the risk of ionizing radiation on May 13, 1996 (96/29/

Euratom),” (b) “Ministerial Executive Board Directive to determine the EC Framework to

secure safety of nuclear power at nuclear power facilities on June 25, 2009

(2009/71/Euratom),” and (c) “Directive concerning supervision and management of

transportation of radioactive waste and SF (2006/117/Euratom).” Each state is mandated to

comply with the Directives. When developing the Directive (b), the first draft submitted in

2002 included obligation to accept the IAEA Safety Standards, establishment of the safety

standards with binding force within EU, establishment of jurisdictional regulatory institution

at EU level, and inspection of safety monitoring institution of each state by EC. However,

these measures to secure nuclear safety by Euratom were not included in the final document

because the Ministerial Executive Board “rejected to have strong influence of EC and

authority at the EU level in the nuclear power field.”30

Furthermore, in the notification31

of October 2012 by EC concerning the results of

so-to-called stress tests, which were conducted by EU member states following the

Fukushima nuclear accident stated the need for strengthening nuclear power safety framework

within the EU and revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive. The notification pointed out that

the scope of the existing Safety Directive (i.e. Directive (b)) was limited and could not

address the technical safety issues identified in the Fukushima nuclear accident and the stress

tests. Furthermore, the notification recommended that the Directive must be revised on which

the national regulatory authorities can base their independent decisions and that the provisions

on monitoring and verification by EU should be extended to other areas than the existing peer

review system of the national regulatory framework.

29IAEA, INFCIRC/18/Rev.1, April 1976 30Source: Kenji Uetsuki, “Use of nuclear power in EU and its safety”, Foreign Legislation 244(June 2010), pp49-50. 31“Notification from EC to European Board of Governors and European Parliament on the comprehensive risk and safety

assessment (“stress test”) of nuclear power facilities in EU and their related activities”, COM(2012)571 Final issue, October

4, 2012

62

Table 6.3 Proposal for the systems concerning ensuring nuclear safety at the MNA facilities

Relevant laws (Principle)

Participation in international

conventions and implementation of their

obligations

Utilization and implementation of the

international safety standards

Curr

ent

Japan Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law, etc.

32

Participation in four nuclear safety conventions and compliance with obligations Submission of reports

based on the Nuclear Safety Convention and Radioactive Waste Safety Convention as well as peer review among the signed states

Incorporation of IAEA Safety Standards in the domestic law

Acceptance of peer review by the IAEA Safety Department

Euratom

Laws of member states

Nuclear Safety Directive by EC. However, based on the stress tests following the Fukushima nuclear accident, the need for revising the Directive to strengthen nuclear safety in EU was pointed out.

Same as above

Same as above Nuclear Safety Directive

by EC Implementation of stress

tests following the Fukushima nuclear accident

Pro

posa

l

MN

A

Type A

Law of partner state concerning nuclear

safety Same as above

Volu

nta

ry

Incorporation of international standards (e.g. IAEA Safety Standard, etc.) in domestic law.

Implementation of peer review by MNA Safety Department

Type B

Law of host state concerning nuclear


Type C

Law of site state concerning nuclear


Obli

gat

ory

Incorporation of international standards (e.g. IAEA Safety Standard, etc.) in domestic law.

Implementation of verification by MNA Safety Department

32Act for Prevention of Damage from Radioactive Isotopes, Electricity Business Act, Act on Special Measures Concerning

Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, etc.

63

Common items for all types of MNA facilities:

In principle, all types of MNA facilities shall follow the laws concerning nuclear safety of

the partner, host or site state where the facilities are located.

The partner, host and site states that own any type of MNA facilities must participate in

four conventions concerning nuclear safety, comply with the obligations under the

Nuclear Safety Convention and Radioactive Waste Safety Convention and carry out peer

reviews among the member states. In addition to participating in these conventions as an

individual state, they shall also participate in the Nuclear Safety Convention as part of the

MNA member states, like Euratom.

Type A and B MNA facilities:

In order to have higher nuclear safety within the MNA Framework, the partner and host

states that own Type A or B facilities shall incorporate international safety standards such

as the IAEA Safety Standards in their domestic laws, and the MNA Safety Department

will carry out the peer review to check the implementation status.

The Type A and B MNA facilities are owned by the operators of the partner or host states

that own the facilities. In this sense, the involvement of MNA is limited. Furthermore,

responsibility for ensuring nuclear safety basically lies with the nation. Therefore, peer

review is limited to voluntarily participation.

Type C MNA facilities:

Type C MNA facilities are operated by the MNA operators consisted of the MNA

member states including the site states. If the site states agree, higher safety can be

ensured in terms of construction of facilities and operation. Therefore, the international

safety standards must be incorporated in the domestic laws of the site states, which were

voluntary for the partner and host states that own Type A or B facilities, and the site states

must receive peer review for verification by the MNA Safety Department.

Discussion on Type C MNA facilities:

In theory, if an MNA facility is located in a non-sovereignty area33

, AMMAO, to which

the non-sovereignty area is provided by the site state, would hold the jurisdiction over the area

and be responsible for ensuring the safety of the facility. AMMAO would hold the right to

regulate all laws including nuclear power safety within the scope permitted by the MNA

member states and any safety standards can be established.

However, in reality, the site state would not provide a part of their territory as a

non-sovereignty area to MNA unless AMMAO inform the state in advance the safety

regulations and measures that AMMAO is planning to take for the MNA facility and unless

these regulations and measures are at the similar or higher safety standard level than those of

the site state. Furthermore, even if the safety standards of the Type C MNA facility are at the

higher level than those of the site state, if the safety standards of the site states surrounding

the non-sovereignty area are lower, the damage caused by the nuclear power facilities in those

states may affect the non-sovereignty area. Therefore, in order to ensure effective nuclear

safety for the Type C MNA facilities, whether they are in the non-sovereignty area or not, the

safety standards of nuclear facilities of site states are the key, and the safety standards of

nuclear facilities of the site states and Type C MNA facilities must be at the similar high level.

33

For example, the Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project concerning assurance of nuclear fuel supply proposed

by Germany is proposing to establish a new uranium enrichment facility in a non-sovereignty area which does not

belong to any state.

64

If so, it will also be easier to network and cooperate for the emergency cases such as nuclear

accidents.

Furthermore, if a non-sovereignty area is established along the border with multiple

states, the nuclear safety standards of the site state as well as its neighbouring states must be

at the similar level with the non-sovereignty area in order to have effective nuclear safety of

the Type C MNA facility. In this sense, in order to ensure nuclear safety, the site state which

owns the Type C MNA facility, just like Type A and B, and its neighbouring states must

harmonize their safety standards, regardless of whether the facility is located in the

non-sovereignty area or not. Furthermore, in case of nuclear accident at the MNA facility,

support and network of the site state is essential.

Concerning the legal framework to ensure safety of the MNA facilities, the followings

are the results of the evaluation of the nuclear safety measures for MNA facilities in

comparison with the safety measures of Euratom.

First, similar to Euratom, the MNA member states must participate in international treaties

concerning nuclear safety not only as an individual state but also as a group of MNA and

fulfil the obligations of the treaties. This way, safety can be secured within the MNA

Framework.

Second, the partner and host states which own Type A and Type B MNA facilities shall

incorporate international nuclear safety standards (e.g. IAEA Safety Standards) in their

domestic laws and participate in peer review with the MNA Safety Department although on a

voluntary basis. Euratom reviews compliance with the EU Safety Directives, while the MNA

Safety Department reviews compliance with the international safety standards. Although it is

ideal to establish unique safety standards among the MNA member states, it is not easy to do

so. Therefore, it was decided to apply the international standards.

One of the advantages of peer review by the MNA Safety Department is that it enables

the nuclear advanced states to share their experiences, knowledge and best practices with the

states that are intending to newly introduce nuclear reactors and to improve nuclear safety

measures in the MNA Framework. This is only possible in Asia where nuclear advanced states

and nuclear newly emerging states co-exist. The MNA system may also contribute to build

trust among the member states. The peer review system by MNA can effectively use the

cooperation framework of the regional safeguards which was described earlier.

In addition, it is mandatory for the site states with Type C MNA to comply with the

international safety standards and receive verification for the compliance. By making them

obligatory, nuclear safety can be ensured. However, as was explained in the process of

establishing the nuclear safety standards of Euratom, nuclear safety had been a special power

owned by each state. Furthermore, vulnerability of nuclear facility from the nuclear safety

perspective can be the vulnerability of the facility from the nuclear security perspective.

Therefore, if verification becomes obligatory for the states with Type C MNA Facilities, it

will require high reliability for the MNA member states as well as the MNA Safety

Department.

3) Nuclear security

The nuclear terrorism may occur when nuclear weapon is stolen, nuclear weapon is

produced with stolen nuclear material, “dirty bomb” is produced with stolen radioactive

material, or when obstructive and damaging actions are taken against nuclear facilities and

transport of radioactive substances. The measures to prevent these nuclear terrorism threats

are the nuclear security measures. The nuclear terrorism threats became evident when nuclear

65

materials flowed out abroad from former USSR after the Cold War in 1991 and when there

were terrorism attacks by non-state actors such as September 11 attacks in 2001. Furthermore,

the existence of “nuclear black market” organized by Dr. A.Q. Khan in Pakistan also

increased the nuclear terrorism threats. However, there is a wide gap of several decades

between the understanding as well as measures of nuclear power safety, which had been

worked on since the early days of the use of nuclear power, and those of nuclear security.

Same as nuclear safety, the NPT does not specifically mention nuclear security.

However, some people consider nuclear security as the fundamental concept of three columns

(i.e. peaceful use of nuclear power, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control) of the NPT or the

fourth column of the NPT. Especially in the USA, strengthening of nuclear security is called

for. On the other hand, because nuclear security measures are directly linked to the national

safeguards and autonomy of nuclear power policy, there is still a persistent recognition that

the security measures are the national matters. Thus, harmonization of standards, mandatory

implementation of the measures and peer review system in the nuclear security field are not as

advanced as those in the nuclear safety field.

In the following section, overview of the international standards and international

conventions concerning nuclear security and trend of international movements towards

strengthening nuclear security such as Nuclear Security Summit are explained. Then, MNA

facilities’ nuclear security issues and their countermeasures are proposed and evaluated.

3)-1 International standards and conventions, etc. concerning nuclear security

Similar to the IAEA Safety Standard documents as described in the previous section,

IAEA also developed the IAEA Nuclear Security Series concerning nuclear security. They are

consisted of “Nuclear Security Fundamentals,” “Recommendations,” “Implementing Guides”

and “Technical Guidance.” The “Nuclear Security Fundamentals” contain objectives and

principles of nuclear security and “Recommendations” present best practices that should be

adopted by member states in the specified fields. They include:

“Nuclear security recommendations on physical protection of nuclear material and

nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5)”;

“Nuclear security recommendations on radioactive material and associated facilities”; and

“Nuclear security recommendations on nuclear and other radioactive material out of

regulatory control.”

“Implementing Guides” provide details of how to implement recommendations and

“Technical Guidance” provides more detailed technical measures on how to apply the

“Implementing Guides.” Same as the IAEA Safety Standards Series, these documents are not

legally binding on the IAEA member states but to be used at the member state’s discretion.

INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 includes protection against internal threat, consideration to protect

nuclear facilities against possible stand-off attacks, and force-on-force exercise, etc. and

IAEA provides evaluation of guideline compliance and support for compliance to the member

states.

The IAEA nuclear security advisory services include International Nuclear Security

Advisory Service (INSServ) and International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS),

and among the Euratom member states, Netherland, United Kingdom, France, Spain and

Sweden have already accepted IPPAS based on the evaluation requirements of

INFCIRC/255/Rev.5.

The international conventions concerning nuclear security include Convention on

Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)34

and International Convention for

Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Convention on Nuclear Terrorism)35

. Their

34Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 35International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

66

overview is as follows:

Table 6.4 Overview of International Conventions concerning Nuclear Security

Convention

name

Purpose Obligations

Convention on

Physical

Protection of

Nuclear

Material

(CPPNM)

(Entered into

force in 1987)

To strengthen

protection of

nuclear

material

during

transportation

To ensure that during international nuclear

transport, nuclear material is protected through

monitoring by security guards, etc. at a certain level.

Not to permit importing nuclear material unless

they have received assurances that such material will be

protected.

To consider certain acts such as theft or robbery

of nuclear material as crime and establish jurisdiction

over the offences so that the alleged offender would not

get away from criminal procedures.

To consider the crimes against CPPNM as

offenses and they must extradite the offender or alleged

offender to the relevant state or submit the case to the

state’s authorities for prosecution.

Revised

CPPNM (Not

yet effective36

)

To strengthen

protection of

nuclear

material and

nuclear

power

facilities

In addition to the above, obligations to protect

nuclear materials are expanded to include domestic use,

storage and transport of nuclear material for peaceful use

and nuclear facilities.

Obstruction and destruction of nuclear materials

and nuclear facilities are also considered as offences.

Convention on

Nuclear

Terrorism

(Entered into

force in 2007)

To prevent

terrorism

using nuclear

weapons and

radioactive

substances

To consider intentional possession and use of

radioactive material, production, possession and use of

nuclear explosives, use or damage of nuclear facilities as

criminal offences based on domestic law, and to establish

jurisdiction over the offences so that offender or alleged

offender will not get away with criminal procedures.

To consider the crimes against this Convention as

offenses and they must extradite the offender or alleged

offender to the relevant state or submit the case to the

state’s authorities for prosecution.

As of October 2012, 148 states have joined CPPNM. Euratom member states participate

in it as a group. Meanwhile, 62 states signed the revised CPPNM as of January 2013, but

many states including Japan and South Korea have not ratified it yet. 83 states participate in

the Convention on Nuclear Terrorism.

When developing the draft CPPNM, the USA, which proposed the Convention, initially

intended to include specific standards and technology to protect materials in use, in storage

and during transport. However, some states, particularly developing countries, insisted that

domestic nuclear material protection measures should not be included in the Convention

because they are the national matters. In the end, CPPNM was limited to cover nuclear

36It will come into effect 30 days after 2/3 of the signed states ratify and deposit the Convention. As of March 2012, 79 states

have ratified the Convention.

67

materials during international transport. On the other hand, the revised CPPNM covers the

protection of nuclear materials within a state; however, obligatory international monitoring of

protection measures such as submission of reports concerning implementation of protection

measures, system of peer review among signed states, and mandatory application of

INFCIRC/225 were not included in the final revised CPPNM. On this point, the revised

CPPNM is different from the Nuclear Safety Convention in which submission of reports by

the member states is mandatory and peer review is conducted among the member states.

Under the revised CPPNM, each state is expected to implement and evaluate nuclear security

or protection of nuclear material and facilities by itself.

The above IAEA recommendations and international conventions are not legally

binding on the member states. However, under the “UN resolution concerning

non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)”(UNSCR1540), which was adapted

by the UN Security Council in 2004, all member states have obligations to a) prohibit support

to non-state actors seeking WMD and their means of delivery, b)adopt and enforce effective

laws prohibiting activities involving in and complicity in the development of WMD for

terrorist purposes and their means of delivery to non-state actors and funding for them, and c)

establish domestic management system for related materials such as WMD. Furthermore, all

member states must submit reports on the implementation status. “Especially concerning

nuclear security, UNSCR clearly describes the member states’ responsibilities for maintaining

effective measures to ensure safety for production, use and transport of relevant materials for

designing and producing nuclear weapons, establishing and maintaining appropriate and

effective protection measures, preventing illegal transfer of relevant material, and

implementing effective boarder management. All member states have responsibility to

establish protection related measures within their states.”37

As for strengthening nuclear security measures of nuclear power facilities, in the USA

after the September 11 attacks, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulated the Advanced

Accident Mitigation (B.5.b), in which operators are mandated to install new equipment that

can mitigate the impact of airplane crush or fire accidents in the nuclear power facilities. After

the Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2011, the new equipment which was introduced as a

result of B.5.b. was tested for its function in case of natural disasters. In EU, similar to nuclear power safety, there are no common nuclear security standards

for the member states. Even the nuclear security stress tests, which were conducted after the

Fukushima nuclear accident, used only a questionnaire concerning regulations, nuclear

security culture, design based threat (DBT), and emergency responses plan, instead of

checking the vulnerability of facilities concerning nuclear security. Each state carries out

different nuclear security measures. For example, Germany conducted a unique stress test

based on the assumption that aircrafts crushed.

3)-2 Proposal for legal framework to ensure nuclear security of the MNA facilities and

its evaluation

Table 6.5 shows the proposal for the nuclear security measures for Type A to C MNA

facilities. In the Table, nuclear security measures of Japan and Euratom are also included for

comparison.

37Masayuki Usami, “Development of international actions on nuclear security: History of strengthening measures against

nuclear terrolism and future issues,” Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Research Unit, Rippou to Chousa, October

2010, No. 309

http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/2010pdf/20101001090.pdf (Date

of access: Februrary 2, 2013)

http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/2010pdf/20101001090.pdf

68

Table 6.5 Proposal for the systems concerning nuclear security measures for the MNA

facilities, etc.

Relevant

laws (Principle)

Participation/ ratification/

compliance with international

conventions (4)

Utilization and implementation of the international nuclear security

recommendations

Curr

ent

Japan

Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law, etc.

Not yet ratified the revised CPPNM

Incorporation of the IAEA Nuclear Security Recommendations into domestic law

Euratom Law of member states

Participate in CPPNM as one state

Individual EU member state ratified revised CPPNM

Incorporation of the IAEA Nuclear Security Recommendations into domestic law

Receiving consultative service from the IAEA Nuclear Security Department

Conducting stress tests following the Fukushima nuclear accident

Pro

posa

l

MN

A

Type A

Law of partner state

Participate in CPPNM and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Convention

Ratified revised CPPNM

Implement UNSCR1540 obligations

Volu

nta

ry

Incorporation of international nuclear security recommendations (e.g. IAEA Recommendations)

Receiving advisory review from the IAEA Nuclear Security Department

Type B

Law of host state

Same as above

Type C

Law of site state

Same as above

Incorporation of international nuclear security recommendations (e.g. IAEA Recommendations)

Receiving peer review from the IAEA Nuclear Security Department (including verifying implementation of protection standards described in CPPNM)

Common items for all types of MNA facilities:

In principle, all types of MNA facilities shall follow the law concerning nuclear security

of the partner, host or site state which they belong to.

The member states will participate in CPPNM as the entire MNA.

The partner, host and site states that own any type of MNA facilities shall participate in

the Convention on Nuclear Terrorism and ratify the revised CPPNM. In case multiple

states and their operators are involved with operation and management of a MNA facility,

69

it requires stronger nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security measures. Thus, the

protection measures for use, storage and transport of nuclear material and nuclear

facilities as defined by the revised CPPNM are essential for the Type C MNA facilities.

Many bilateral nuclear power cooperation agreements (e.g. Japan‐U.S. Nuclear Power

Cooperation Agreement, Japan-UK Nuclear Power Cooperation Agreement, Japan-France

Nuclear Power Cooperation Agreement) require maintaining protection level described in

CPPNM as the standard for nuclear material protection measures. By participating in

CPPNM, the said protection level will be maintained for all types of MNA facilities.

Type A and Type B MNA facilities:

The Type A and Type B MNA facilities shall be operated by the operators of partner/ host

states in accordance with the law of each state. The states which own the facilities shall

comply with international recommendations concerning nuclear security such as IAEA

Recommendations (INFCIRC/255 Rev.5) as is the case with Euratom. Furthermore, the

MNA Nuclear Security Department will carry out advisory review to check the

implementation status and provide advises.

The ownership of the Type A and B MNA facilities belong to the operators of the partner

or host states. In this sense, the involvement of MNA is limited. Furthermore,

responsibility for nuclear security of facilities basically lies with the nation, and keeping

information confidential is required from the national security point of view. Therefore,

acceptance of advisory review and reflection of the results are voluntary, and the results

will not be disclosed outside of the partner/host states and the MNA Nuclear Security

Department.

Type C MNA facilities:

Because Type C MNA facilities involve multiple states and their operators with the

construction and operation of the facilities, as compared with Type A and B MNA

facilities, and, as will be described later, in order to obtain comprehensive prior consensus

for the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, the site states with Type C facilities shall

have higher level of nuclear security measures as compared with the partner/host states

with Type A and B facilities and ensure nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore, peer

review (voluntary) of the MNA facilities based on the international nuclear security

recommendations will be carried out by the MNA Nuclear Security Department.

The peer review includes verification of maintaining nuclear material protection

standards described in CPPNM concerning bilateral nuclear power cooperation

agreement. The results will not be disclosed outside of the site states and the MNA

Nuclear Security Department.

The nuclear security measures include matters concerning national security, and

compared to nuclear power safety, they are closer to the national rights. Therefore,

accepting peer review based on the international security recommendations is not

mandatory but voluntary.

Discussion on Type C facilities:

As described in the nuclear power safety section, concerning the Type C MNA facilities,

a site state will not provide a part of its territory to MNA as a non-sovereignty area unless the

nuclear security measures of the area are promised to be at the same or stricter level than

those of the site state. In addition, even if the nuclear security measures of the Type C MNA

facility is stricter than those of the site state, if the neighbouring states of the non-sovereignty

area have lower nuclear security measures, the damage of nuclear power accident caused by

terrorist attack may affect the non-sovereignty area. Therefore, nuclear security measures of

70

nuclear power facilities in the site states are the key for effective nuclear security of Type C

MNA facilities, whether they are located in the non-sovereignty area or not, and the nuclear

security measures of the site states and Type C MNA facilities must be at the similar high

level. Furthermore, if a non-sovereignty area is established in the border area with multiple

states, the security measures of the site state as well as its neighbouring states must be at the

similar level as the non-sovereignty area in order to carry out effective nuclear security

measures of the Type C MNA facility. In this sense, to ensure nuclear security, the site state

which owns the MNA facility and its neighbouring states must harmonize their nuclear

security measures, whether the facility is located in the non-sovereignty are or not.

Furthermore, in case of nuclear terrorism and nuclear power accident caused by nuclear

terrorism, support and network of the partner/host/site states is essential.

Concerning the legal framework of nuclear security measures, the followings are the

evaluation results of nuclear power safety measures of the MNA facilities in comparison with

the nuclear security measures of Euratom.

First, the MNA member states, similar to Euratom, participate in the international

treaties concerning nuclear material protection not only as an individual state but also as a

group of MNA and ensure the regulations of the treaties by incorporating them in the

domestic laws. From this perspective, protection of nuclear material as the entire MNA

facilities is ensured, just like Euratom. Furthermore, as will be described later in this

document, many bilateral nuclear power cooperation agreements demand the CCPNM

standards as the nuclear material protection standards for each target nuclear material. In this

sense, the partner/host/site states that own the MNA facilities must pass the nuclear material

protection standards established by CPPNM.

Second, the partner and host states which own Type A and Type B MNA facilities shall

incorporate international nuclear security recommendations (e.g. IAEA Nuclear Security

Recommendations) in their domestic laws and receive advisory review (voluntary) from the

MNA Nuclear Security Department. The site states which own Type C MNA facilities shall

receive highly effective peer review (for verification). One of the advantages of reviews by

MNA is that, assuming establishing a MNA Framework in Asian region, it enables the nuclear

advanced states to share their experiences and knowledge with the states that are intending to

newly introduce nuclear reactors and to improve ensuring nuclear material protection and

nuclear security. Naturally, unlike nuclear power safety, information and knowledge on

nuclear material protection and nuclear security cannot be passed on to all states.

However, such review by MNA can effectively use the collaborative framework of the

regional safeguards which were described earlier. This is only possible in Asia where nuclear

advanced states and nuclear newly emerging states co-exist. The system may also contribute

to build trust among the member states. However, it should be noted that implementation of

nuclear security measures is within the scope of each state’s authority. Therefore,

implementing advisory review and peer review requires high trust for the MNA member

states and the MNA Nuclear Security Department.

4) Compensation/liability for nuclear damages

At the High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security held in New York in

September 2011, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that “The effects of nuclear

accidents cross borders. This is an issue on a global scale, and a global response is

demanded.”38

Since nuclear accidents may cause damages not only to the residents and

38

United Nations Information Center Homepage http://unic.or.jp/unic/highlight/2407/ (Accessed 28/01/2012)

http://unic.or.jp/unic/highlight/2407/%20(Accessed

71

environment of the country where the accident occurs but also to nearby countries, there is

also a need for an international response to compensation for damages due to accidents in

addition to ensuring nuclear safety. Article 6 of the Japanese Act on Compensation for

Nuclear Damage states that “nuclear power operators must have measures in place for

compensation for nuclear damages in order to operate a nuclear reactor.” In order to carry

out nuclear power activities, it is necessary to ensure that appropriate laws and organizations

are in place for nuclear compensation.

Below is an overview of international treaties on compensation for nuclear damages and

systems in place in several Asian countries including Japan for compensation for nuclear

damages, as well as an evaluation of what compensation systems MNA facilities should

follow.

4)-1 International treaties on compensation/liability for nuclear damages There are international treaties on compensation for nuclear damages, including those

given in the table on the following pages. These treaties all include minimum standards and

requirements for liability for nuclear damages, including no-fault liability for compensation

for nuclear damages, focused liability for nuclear operators, maximum liability amount,

obligation to assure funds available for compensation measures, and establishment of

specialized court jurisdiction and obligation to recognize and carry out court decisions.

In Asia, only Russia, Kazakhstan and the Philippines are signatory to the Vienna

Convention, and many Asian countries including Japan, South Korea and China are not

signatory to any international treaties. The reasons for Japan not being signatory to a treaty

are that, before the Fukushima accident, it was thought unlikely that a nuclear accident would

occur in Japan, and that if a nuclear accident in a neighboring country caused damages then

according to international treaties the venue of the case would be in the country the accident

occurred in (Article 32 of the Japanese Constitution guarantees the right to a trial), and

countries neighboring Japan such as South Korea, China and Taiwan are not signatory to

international treaties either.

The systems of compensation for nuclear damages of major nuclear-capable states in

Asia are given in Table 6.7.

The systems of compensation for nuclear damages in Asian countries vary significantly

by country, with Japan being the only one of the advanced nuclear countries to have unlimited

liability for operators, as well as the compensation amount for Japan being ¥120 billion (for

nuclear power plants over 10,000 kilowatts and for reprocessing facilities. Amounts are set

by cabinet order depending on the type and scale of the facility) which is approximately 4.7

times that of Taiwan and 27 to 28 times that of South Korea and China. However, estimates

made at the Energy and Environment Conference in 2011 gave a minimum of approximately

¥5.7 trillion for compensation for a nuclear accident39

, significantly surpassing the amount of

compensation measures even for operators in Japan.

39

‘Minimum Compensations for Nuclear Accident, ¥5.7 Trillion… Cost Study’, Yomiuri Online 06/12/2011 22:01,

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/atmoney/news/20111206-OYT1T01216.htm (Accessed: 29/01/2013)

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/atmoney/news/20111206-OYT1T01216.htm

72

Table 6.6 Principal Treaties on Compensation for Nuclear Damages40

40 Excerpt from MEXT homepage http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/007/shiryo/08081105/004/001.pdf (Accessed: 28/01/2012)

Revised Paris Convention Revised Vienna Convention Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC)

Signatory

States

Signed by 15 states, mainly by EU member states such as France,

Germany, Italy and the UK who had signed the old convention +

Switzerland. Adopted in 2004, not entered into force

9 states including Argentina, Belarus, Latvia, Morocco and

Romania, adopted in 1997, entered into force in 2003

Argentina, Morocco, Romania, and the USA (4 states,

USA ratified in May 2008) adopted in 1997, not entered

into force (Conditions to enter into force: Ratification by 5

states and nuclear reactors total output of 400 million or

more KW)

Nuclear

Damages

Death or bodily harm

Loss of or damage to property

The following, as decided by the laws of the court of jurisdiction:

Economic loss

Costs for repairing environmental damage

Loss of income due to environmental damage

Cost of preventative measures and loss or damage that occurs

as a result of those measures



The following, as decided by the laws of the court of

jurisdiction:

Economic loss



Cost of preventative measures and loss or damage that

occurs as a result of those measures

Economic losses due to factors other than environmental

pollution covered by general law with civil liabilities



The following, as decided by the laws of the court of

jurisdiction:

Economic loss



Cost of preventative measures and loss or damage

that occurs as a result of those measures

Economic losses due to factors other than

environmental pollution covered by general law with

civil liabilities

Applicabl

e Range

States signatory to the Vienna Convention and Joint Protocol, but

not the Paris Convention

When a nuclear accident occurs, non-member states without their

own territory or nuclear facilities

Other non-member states with nuclear liability laws with similar

mutually beneficially protections based on the same principles as

this convention

Applies to nuclear damages in territories of non-member states

However, if there is a nuclear facility in that territory or its

exclusive economic zone have a nuclear facility at the time of a

nuclear accident, and also they are not providing similar

reciprocal benefits at the time of accident for damages to

non-member states, exemptions from this convention can be

made in the laws of the state with the facility

In principle, applies to nuclear damages within the

territory of a signatory state.

Does not apply to nuclear damages in the territories of

non-member states.

Type of

Liability

No-fault Liability

Liability

Focus

Liability is focused on the operators. However, national laws can be implemented to make transportation operators liable under certain conditions.

Reasons

for

Exemption

Armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection Armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection

Armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection

Unusually large natural disaster

Liability

Amount

(Compensat

ion

Measures)

The amount of liabilities for one accident will be no lower than

€700 million (approx. ¥114.6 billion).

However, new member states may, for up to 5 years from the

acceptance date in 2004, make laws so the value is no lower than

€350 million.

The amount of liabilities for one accident will be no lower than

300 million SDRs (approx. ¥51.3 billion). However,

exceptions are given below.

Value no lower than 150 million SDRs (when the state is

guaranteeing up to 300 million SDRs from public funds).

For 15 years from entering into force, states that have difficulty

acquiring the liability amount may set it at 150 million SDRs

The amount of liabilities for one accident will be no

lower than 300 million SDRs (approx. ¥51 billion).

However, exceptions are given below.

As an interim measure, for up to 10 years the amount can

be set at 150 million SDRs or more

Measures

for Smaller

Amounts

Low-risk nuclear facilities: €70 million (approx. ¥11.5 billion)

Transport: €80 million (approx. ¥13 billion)

* The difference with the liability amount must be covered by

public funds.

5 million SDRs or more (approx. ¥850 million)

* The difference with the liability amount must be covered by

public funds.

5 million SDRs or more (approx. ¥850 million)

* The difference with the liability amount must be

covered by public funds.

Compens

ation

Measures

Insurance, other financial guarantees

73

National

Support

Supplements for the difference between liability amounts and compensation measures/ smaller amounts

Contributi

ons

If large scale nuclear damages occur, amounts over 300

million SDRs (approx. ¥51.3 billion) or the amount

registered with the IAEA by the member state will be

supplemented by funds prepared by all member states

based on specific calculations.

[Supplementary Funds: The total of values below]

- Capacity ratio of nuclear facilities in country with

facilities

= nuclear reactor output 1MW×300SDR

- 10% of the capacity ratio of nuclear facilities given

above

= divided based on share of UN expenses

Court

Jurisdiction

As a rule, jurisdiction will rest with the courts of the member state territory (including EEZs) where the nuclear accident occurred. When the accident occurs outside of member state territories or

the accident location cannot be determined, the facility state courts will have jurisdiction.

74

Table 6.7 Systems of Compensation/Liability for Nuclear Damages of Major Nuclear-capable States in Asia

Member

of

Internatio

nal

Treaties

Liability of Nuclear

Operators Liability Amount

Government Supplements (when

operator cannot compensate for

damages over liability amount)

Exemptions for Operators

Japan × Unlimited Liability ¥120 billion yen41

Available. Given in cases where the

liability amount exceeds

compensation measures.

Government supplements are

unlimited.

Social unrest

Unusually large natural

disaster

South

Korea42

×

Limited liability,

operator liable for 300

million SDRs (approx.

¥51.3 billion yen)

50 billion won

(approx. ¥5.1 billion)



compensation measures.

International military conflict,

enemy actions, civil war or

rebellion

China4

8

× Limited liability,


million yuan (approx.

¥4.55 billion yen)

300 million yuan

(approx. ¥4.55 billion

yen= operator

liability amount)



compensation measures, but

government supplements are limited

to 800 million yuan (approx. ¥12.13

billion).

Social unrest

Unusually large natural

disaster

Taiwan48

× Limited liability,

operator liable for 4.2

billion TWD (approx.

¥14.5 billion yen)

4.2 billion TWD

(approx. ¥14.5 billion

yen = operator

liability amount)

Financing will be available when

insurance and financial guarantees do

not cover the liability amount.

Necessary measures will be taken for

major nuclear accidents

International conflict, civil

war

Severe disaster

Russia43

Member

of

Vienna

Limited liability,


million dollars (approx.

5 million dollars=

operator liability

amount

Available. The government will

provide the necessary amount to

operators

(under investigation)

41 For nuclear power plants over 10,000 kilowatts and for reprocessing facilities. Facilities processing or using plutonium or HE uranium are ¥24 billion, facilities processing or using LE

uranium are ¥4 billion, SF storage facilities are ¥24 billion, vitrified waste burial/management facilities are ¥24 billion, LLW burial/management facilities are ¥4 billion. 42METI homepage, http://www.meti.go.jp/committee/materials2/downloadfiles/g81209c06j.pdf (Accessed: 28/01/2013) 43Russian Federal Law “On the use of nuclear energy”(N170-FZ, 1995), Russian Federal Law “On the radiation safety of the population” (N3-FZ, 1996)

http://www.meti.go.jp/committee/materials2/downloadfiles/g81209c06j.pdf

75

Conventi

on

¥450 million)

Kazak

hstan44

Same as

above

Limited liability, no set

operator liability amount

No amount is

specified

Not stipulated Not stipulated

Vietna

m50

× Limited liability, 150

million SDRs

150 million SDRs

(=operator liability

amount)

Not stipulated (fund system exists) Damages as a result of war,

terrorism, or natural disasters

greater than the security

measures required by

international standards

Philipp

ines48

Member

of

Vienna

Conventi

on

Limited liability,

liability amount of 5

million dollars (approx.

¥530 million)

The types and

conditions of

insurance and other

financial guarantees

are regulated by the

Atomic Energy

Commission

Available. Funds up to the liability

amount will be provided when

insurance and financial guarantees do

not cover the liability amount. The

limited amount is 5 million dollars

(approx. ¥530 million)

Armed conflict, war, civil

war, riots

Severe disaster

Indone

sia48

Signed

CSC (not

ratified)

Limited liability, 900

billion rupiahs (approx.

¥10.2 billion)

(under investigation) No specific stipulations in Indonesian

law

International armed conflict,

civil war

Severe natural disaster

Malays

ia48

× Limited liability, 50

million ringgit (approx.

¥1.64 billion)

The types and

conditions of

insurance and other

financial guarantees

are determined by the

Atomic Energy

Commission

Available. Funds up to the liability

amount will be provided if necessary

when insurance and financial

guarantees do not cover the liability

amount. The limited amount is 50

million ringgit (approx. ¥1.64 billion)

Armed conflict, war, civil

war, riots

Severe disaster

44Law on Atomic Energy Use (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 93-I)

76

4)-2 Proposal for and evaluation of nuclear damage compensation systems at

MNA facilities This section, assuming the international treaties on nuclear damage compensation

above and creating MNA in Asia, proposes the following system for compensation for

nuclear damages.

Table 6.8 Proposal for Nuclear Damage Compensation Systems at MNA Facilities

MNA Applicable Laws

(In Principle) Other Requirements

Type

A

Laws of Partner

State Member states sign international nuclear damages

compensation treaty (Convention of Supplementary

Compensation (CSC)) Type

B Laws of Host State

Type

C Laws of Site State

Same as above

Establish limited liability for operator

compensation liability and state support

Establish special provision for compensation

amount claims to other investors and the states they

belong to, or if signatory to CSC establish a nuclear

damages compensation fund by MNA member state

operators as a temporary measure until CSC

supplementary compensation is provided

Items in Common for MNA Facility Types A-C:

As a rule, Type A, B and C MNA facilities will follow the nuclear compensation

laws for the partner, host or site state that has them. If the state is signatory to an

international treaty on compensation for nuclear damages, then that treaty will

apply.

Assuming the creation of MNA in Asia, many states in the Asia region including

Japan, South Korea and China are not members of any international treaties on

compensation for nuclear damages and compensation amounts vary by state,

meaning there is a lack of procedures to handle nuclear accidents with damages

crossing borders, and so MNA member states will sign international treaties. The

treaty to be signed will be the CSC. The CSC is not yet in force, but assuming the

creation of MNA in Asia, if Japan signs the CSC then it will come into force.

Type C Facilities:

For Type C facilities according to the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damages

the MNA local corporation established through investment by MNA member state

operators will be considered the operator, and the site state will be responsible as

the state with the facility.

If allowed by the laws of the site state, a special provision can be signed by the

MNA local corporation, MNA member state operators, the site state, other MNA

states and the AMMAO so that the local corporation and site state would receive

claims for nuclear damage compensation at a predetermined percentage from MNA

member state operators and other MNA member states. Alternatively if the site

77

state is signatory to the CSC, a pledge could be made to create a pool of funds for

nuclear damages compensation up to a certain amount through contributions from

MNA operators. In either case, limited liability will be prescribed for both

operators and site states.

The above proposal is evaluated below.

For MNA facility Types A-C, in particular including site states and MNA local

corporations established by multiple MNA member state operators, having the facility

operator considered the operator and the partner/host/site state the state with the facility

according to the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damages focuses liability and

follows the basic principle in the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damages of

focusing liability on the operator.

Assuming the creation of an MNA model in the Asian region, the following merits

exist for joining the same international nuclear damages compensation treaty that

nearby MNA member states are signatory to;45

Only the state where the accident occurred has jurisdiction in that territory, so

proceedings will not be carried out in other signatory states, and rapid and fair

compensation can be carried out under common rules (however, there exists the

demerit that if states near the one where the accident occurred suffer cross-border

damages, these neighboring states would have to carry out proceedings in the

jurisdiction of the state where the accident occurred)

Substantial compensation safeguard amounts and unified judicial proceedings in the

state the accident occurred. Eliminate unfair compensation between states.

When signatory to an international treaty with international fund measures available,

the operator can cover some of the compensation with contributions from other

signatory states, contributing to the protection of injured parties

Considering which of the above international treaties on compensation for nuclear

damages is most desirable assuming the establishment of an MNA in the Asian region,

the revised Paris Convention targets western European countries, and the revised Vienna

Convention only has a few signatory states (as of March 2011, 38 states had signed the

Vienna Convention). Although the CSC is not yet in force, for functionality and as a

source of funds if large scale nuclear damages occur, amounts over 300 million SDRs

(approx. ¥51.3 billion) or the amount registered with the IAEA by the member state will

be supplemented by funds prepared by all member states based on specific calculations,

which is similar to the fund procurement method for Type B and C MNA facilities

invested in by multiple states. The liability amount for the CSC is also set lower than

that for the revised Vienna or Paris Convention, and has exemptions for nuclear

damages from unusually large natural disasters, making it easier for both states newly

introducing nuclear reactors and advanced nuclear states such as Japan and South Korea

to sign the convention. Therefore, of the three treaties on nuclear damage

compensation above the CSC is the most appropriate international treaty for an MNA in

45Katsuhiko Tomino, “Framework of International Treaties on Nuclear Damages Compensation - Necessity of

International Treaties and Characteristics of 3 Types of International Treaty”, Atomos 2012.8、

http://www.aesj.or.jp/atomos/tachiyomi/2012-08mokuji.pdf (Accessed: 08/02/2013)

http://www.aesj.or.jp/atomos/tachiyomi/2012-08mokuji.pdf

78

Asia. As mentioned above, it would be necessary for all neighboring MNA member

states to join the treaty at the same time and bring the treaty into force.

In the case that a Japanese operator caused a nuclear accident with cross-border

damages and the compensation amount including domestic amounts was greater than

the compensation safeguard amount, the operator is supposed to pay the damages

amount but in cases where that is not possible the government would provide aid after

passing a motion in the Diet (Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damages, Article 16).

If Japan was member to the CSC, then it would be possible to use supplementary funds

from all CSC member states for the amount surpassing compensation safeguards, with

50% of those funds used for compensation of cross-border damages. Similarly, if an

accident in another country caused cross-border damages within Japan, if the operator

of the accident belonged to a state that was a CSC member then compensation for

damages exceeding the amount of compensation safeguards could be paid from CSC

supplementary funds. In the Asian region in particular, despite the Fukushima nuclear

accident the trend towards newly introducing nuclear power or expanding its use

continues except in Japan, making it desirable that both advanced nuclear states and

states newly introducing nuclear reactors all sign onto the same international treaty46

.

However, the Japanese government remains tentative, saying there it is important to

sign onto a treaty, but there is a need to reform domestic laws to do so47

.

The operator for Type C MNA facilities is the MNA local corporation, but in

addition to the host state operator, operators from MNA member states have also

invested. If the nuclear damages compensation laws of the site state allow it and the

operators of the site state and investing operators from other MNA member states agree,

a special provision could be signed so that after the site state operator makes

compensation payments in the case of a nuclear accident according to the laws of the

site state, they may make claims to the other MNA member state operators for an

amount of the compensation paid. Similarly, if the site state and the states the MNA

operators belong to agree, a special provision could be signed so that after the site state

makes compensation payments according to the laws of the site state, they may make

claims to the other MNA member states for an amount of the compensation paid. Type

B MNA facilities are also invested in by operators from states other than the host state,

but Type B MNA facilities have precedents in the LEU storage of Russia’s IUEC

uranium enrichment center and the URENCO English, Dutch and German facility

which do not have special provisions such as those mentioned above, and host state

operators take all liability.

Additionally for Type C MNA facilities, if the site state has unlimited liability for

operators such as Japan does, the operator must pay compensation until they are

46For example, IAEA Deputy Director General Flory’s remarks at the JAEA “International Forum on Peaceful Uses

of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security - Lessons from the Fukushima Accident at the Seoul Nuclear Security

Summit-“ (8-9 December, 2011), http://www.jaea.go.jp/04/np/activity/2011-12-08/report.html (Accessed:

29/01/2013) 47Atomic Energy Commission Homepage

http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei/siryo2012/siryo32/siryo3.pdf (Accessed: 28/01/2012). If Japan

joins the CSC, domestic systems to handle contributions of funds and receipt of funds, procuring public funds for

compensation safeguards, and civil law systems will need to be adjusted for consistency, and international

transportation and other factors must be considered.

http://www.jaea.go.jp/04/np/activity/2011-12-08/report.html

http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei/siryo2012/siryo32/siryo3.pdf

79

bankrupt, and if a special provision such as that mentioned above existed other

operators would also have to continue compensation. According to the Japanese Act

on Compensation for Nuclear Damages, if the operator does not have enough funds for

compensation then the site state will likely provide support for the operator, in which

public funds (taxes) may be used by the site state, and MNA member states may receive

claims for these funds. Therefore, considering the positions of operators outside the

site state and that of the state the relevant operator belongs to, it is necessary that the

laws of the site state have limited liability for operators and states with facilities.

Even if all MNA member states joined the CSC at the same time, if large-scale

nuclear damages occurred then the MNA operator would have to cover up to the “300

million SDRs or the amount registered with the IAEA” to receive supplementary funds.

In that case for Type C MNA facilities, the site state operator could make claims after

compensating MNA member state operators, but if for example MNA member state

operators created a nuclear damages compensation fund in advance on the basis of the

agreed amount, then compensation could be carried out until the supplementary funds

were available. This is similar to the mutual aid system that exists in the American

Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act (Price-Anderson Act). The mutual aid system

mentioned here likely responds more quickly than the claiming system mentioned

earlier, but it is necessary for the main body of the MNA (AMMAO) to collaborate with

site state operators and site states when it comes to compensation for nuclear damages.

Figure 6.1 Mutual Aid System for Type C MNA Facilities in Particular Until CSC

Supplements Are Functional

Many states are also taking the necessary measures to exempt operators from

liability if a nuclear accident occurs due to social unrest and/or unusually large natural

disasters. The CSC also provides exemptions for “Armed conflict, hostilities, civil war

or insurrection or a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character”. Therefore, in

cases such as these where the operator is exempt from liability, the mutual aid system

between operators mentioned above would be changed into a mutual aid system

between states, with states that the operators belonged to establishing the fund.

Injured Party, Injured Business

Payment Claim

Mutual Aid System

Issuing Funds MNA Local Corporation MNA Nuclear

Damages

Compensation

Organization (Control

Pooled Funds)

Contribution

s MNA Member State Business

MNA Member State Business



80

5) Export controls

5)-1 Treaties and guidelines regarding export controls

Export controls are an important aspect of nuclear non-proliferation, as are

safeguards and nuclear security measures.

Doctor A.Q. Khan is known as the father of nuclear research in Pakistan, said to

have stolen uranium enrichment technology from a Dutch URENCO subsidiary MNA

facility to build nuclear bombs in Pakistan which led to the creation of a “nuclear black

market”. Uranium enrichment technology and devices as well as technology for

producing nuclear weapons was then sold from Pakistan to Asia, the Middle East and

Africa and from there to North Korea and Iran, contributing to uranium enrichment and

nuclear weapons development in those countries. This shows how critical export

controls in each country are to nuclear non-proliferation.

A set of guidelines on export controls for nuclear materials and technology that

carry no legal obligations for member states (a gentleman’s agreement) are the Nuclear

Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines48

. The NSG Guidelines cover rules that should be

followed when a nuclear supplier stat is exporting nuclear materials or technology to a

non-nuclear state, and are composed of NSG Guidelines Part 1 on Nuclear Transfers

and NSG Guidelines Part 2 on Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment,

Materials, Software and Related Technology. For recipient states, government

assurance is required of confirmation of the application of IAEA full-scope safeguards,

peaceful use of the materials transferred, protective safeguards of the material

transferred, and in the case the material is transferred again the same assurances are

required of the recipient state in that transfer.

As of September 2012, the NSG has 46 member states49

, with Japan, South Korea,

China, Russia and Kazakhstan as its Asian members, and in Japan’s case the NSG

Guidelines are guaranteed in the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act. The NSG

Guidelines also suggest that for transfers of facilities, equipment or technology related

to enrichment or reprocessing that safeguards should involve the supplier state and

multiple other states, encouraging international efforts for regional fuel cycle centers

shared between multiple states, and encourages an MNA for the transfer of uranium

enrichment and reprocessing technologies (Paragraph 6(e)).

In the June 2011 revision to the NSG Guidelines, compared to the transfer of other

nuclear materials and technology, special conditions were set for the export of sensitive

facilities, equipment and technology (enrichment/reprocessing) such as uranium

enrichment and reprocessing, as indicated below (NSG Guidelines Paragraph 6:

Transfer of Enrichment and Reprocessing Facilities, Equipment and Technology).

Uranium enrichment related transfers in particular have special guidelines (Paragraph 7:

Arrangements for Enrichment Facilities, Equipment and Technology). In the previous

guidelines, the NSG only went so far as to state they would act with restraint in

exporting enrichment and reprocessing related items.

48 INFCIRC/254/Rev.11/Part 1, Date: 12 November 2012 49As of September 2012, there are 46 member states with NPT non-member states not members

81

If the recipient state does not fulfill all the following conditions, the supplier state

will not permit the transfer of enrichment or reprocessing related items (Paragraph

6(a), objective criteria).

Member of NPT, fulfilling NPT obligations

IAEA reports have no mentions of major safeguard agreement infractions, no

additional measures have been requested by decisions of the IAEA committee

regarding fulfillment of safeguard obligations or building trust for peaceful

uses of nuclear energy, no report from IAEA Secretariat that fulfillment of

safeguard agreement is not possible

Reported to the UN Security Council that NSG Guidelines are being followed

and export controls are being carried out according to Resolution 1540 of the

UN Security Council

Entered into an agreement between governments with the supplier state

guaranteeing non-explosive use, perpetual safeguards and guidelines on

re-transfer

Supplier state commitment to a mutual agreement on physical protection

measures for the nuclear materials based on international guidelines

A commitment to IAEA safety standards and having an international treaty on

nuclear safety in force

If the recipient state can fulfill the above conditions, then aside from the

subjective criteria of the supplier state listed below (‘take into account any relevant

factors’’ when the supplier state is determining whether or not to allow transfer (second

half of Paragraph 6(b)), the Guidelines indicate the possibility of transfer for enrichment

and reprocessing items. The agreements for uranium enrichment facilities, equipment

and technology as stipulated in Paragraph 7 are given below.

The recipient state has in force a full-scope safeguards agreement and additional

protocols, or if these are not in force then an appropriate safeguard agreement

(including regional agreements on nuclear material measurement controls)

recognized by the IAEA committee and carried out with IAEA cooperation

(Paragraph 7(c))

Transfer of an enrichment facility (existing enrichment facility) based on a

particular enrichment technology which has been demonstrated to produce enriched

uranium on a significant scale as of 31 December 2008 will be carried out by

blackbox method50

(Paragraph 7(b)). Blackbox method transfers of new base

plants for uranium enrichment before they are put into use are allowed (Paragraph

7(c)).

Supplier and recipient states should work together to ensure that the design and

construction of transferred facilities facilitates implementation of IAEA safeguards

(Paragraph 7(e)).

Suppliers should satisfy themselves that recipients have security arrangements in

place that are equivalent or superior to their own (Paragraph 7(f)).

If the guidelines above are followed, then transferring existing uranium enrichment

50The London Guidelines do not explicitly use the term ‘blackbox method’, and instead state ‘do not permit or enable

replication’.

82

technology to new facilities will be done with the blackbox method.

5)-2 Ban on imports of radioactive waste for disposal purposes

For the receipt (import) of spent fuel and radioactive waste, the Joint Convention

on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste

Management mentioned above has the following guidelines.

Ultimate responsible for the safe management of SF and radioactive waste is

the obligation of the state (Preamble (vi))

As long as safe management can be carried out, radioactive waste should be

disposed of in the state that produced it (Preamble (xi), first paragraph)

Every state has the right to refuse the import of SF or radioactive waste from a

foreign state into their territory (Preamble (xii))

In the case that radioactive waste is produced from joint ventures, then under

an agreement between the states facilities in one state can aid in the safe and

efficient management of SF and radioactive waste from the other states (Preamble

(xi), provisions)

For the last point, MNA facilities can also be interpreted as being able to manage

SF and radioactive waste produced in other MNA member states if the MNA member

states are in agreement51

.

The Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty) that ten

Southeast Asian states52

are members of bans the dumping or emission of radioactive

materials or waste into the atmosphere, sea, or land territories within the zone. The

Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Semey) that five Central

Asian states including Kazakhstan53

are members of bans the disposal within member

state territory of radioactive waste produced in other states. Therefore, if members of

these treaties are part of the MNA, it would not be possible to dispose of radioactive

waste from other states within the territories of those states.

There are also countries with national or state laws regulating the transportation of

SF. For example, according to Russian law temporary storage and reprocessing of SF

brought into Russia from other states is allowed, either returned without reprocessing to

the originating state after storage, or reprocessed and returned together with the waste.

5)-3 Proposal for and evaluation of export control systems for MNA

Considering the items mentioned above, this section proposes the following export

control system.

51The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste

Management defines ‘radioactive waste management’ as ‘activities related to the handling, pre-processing, processing,

manipulation, storage or disposal of radioactive waste (including decommissioning), including emissions, excluding

transport off-site’, and defines ‘spent fuel management’ as ‘activities related to the handling and storage of spent fuel,

including emissions, excluding transport off-site’. 52Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and

Vietnam 53Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan

83

Table 6.9 Proposal of Export Control System for MNA Facilities

MNA Applicable Laws


Type

A

Laws of Partner

State

Comply with NSG Guidelines (excluding subjective criteria

for supplier states (NSG Guidelines Part 1 Paragraph 6(b)

latter half)

Understand that as a rule responsibility for disposal of

radioactive waste lies with the state that made it.

Handling of SF and radioactive waste is to comply with the

Convention on the Safety or Radioactive Waste

Management and nuclear weapon free zone treaties

Standardization of export control systems for nuclear

resources in member states

*However, partner/host states that fulfill the requirements for

site states will treat them all as 1 state, and not consider the

transfer of nuclear materials between member states as

international transfer

Type


Type


Same as above

*In addition to site states that have Type C facilities,

partner/host states that fulfill the requirements for site

states will treat them all as 1 state, and not consider the



Items in Common for MNA Facility Types A-C:

Since the MNA facilities for Types A-C are under the jurisdiction of each

partner/host/site state, as a rule they will follow the export controls of those states.

The partner/host/site states that have Type A-C MNA facilities, the nuclear will

comply with NSG Guidelines for export of nuclear resources (excluding subjective

criteria for nuclear supplier states).

MNA member states will comply with the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent

Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, comply

with nuclear weapon free zone treaties, understand that as a rule responsibility for

disposal of radioactive waste lies with the state that made it, and not transfer

(export) radioactive waste to other states. Keeping that in mind, MNA member

states will attempt to standardize export control systems.

In addition to the items listed above, partner/host states meeting requirements for

Type C MNA facilities will, along with site states that have Type C MNA facilities,

treat these as being 1 state, and not consider the transfer of nuclear materials

between member states as international transfer.

The above proposal is evaluated below.

MNA member states comply with NSG guidelines for export of nuclear resources

but excluding supplier subjective criteria for the transfer of enrichment or reprocessing

84

items (NSG Guidelines Part 1 Paragraph 6(b), latter half), the following approaches can

be taken.

The phrase ‘take into account any relevant factors’ in the subjective criteria is not

defined, and the supplier state is free to interpret it as they like in order to refuse the

transfer of enrichment or reprocessing items. Therefore, for MNA uranium

enrichment and reprocessing facilities, considering that the NSG Guidelines suggest

this type of facility for the transfer of sensitive technology (NSG Guidelines

Paragraph 6(e)) the subjective criteria will be excluded, increasing the possibility

that transfer of uranium enrichment and reprocessing items and technology be

allowed due to the recipient state fulfilling the objective criteria.

With the measures mentioned above, in addition to carrying out non-proliferation as

is the goal of the NPT, it also guarantees the unalienable right of NPT member

states to peaceful uses of nuclear energy stipulated in Article 4 of the treaty.

By standardizing export control systems, it will become possible to more quickly

issue approvals for import/export, transport and passage of nuclear materials between

MNA member states (states sending nuclear materials, recipient states and states

included in the transport route), ensuring the timely and smooth transport of nuclear

materials. With MNA nuclear fuel cycle facilities, the number of facilities will be

limited but the more MNA member states there are the greater the volume and quantity

of shipments of nuclear materials will be, making the rapid acquisition of import/export

approval vital. However, if states that are not MNA members exist on the transport

route, then other export control systems will be necessary, and the regulations in place

in the system of that state will have to be followed.

Also, by treating those MNA member states (partner/host/site states) that fulfill

the requirements for Type C MNA facilities as a single state, and not regarding transfers

of nuclear material between those states as international transfers, it would mean that

between MNA member states the processes for international transfer of nuclear

materials based on existing bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements would no longer be

necessary, nor the prior approval of the nuclear supplier state or a note verbale regarding

the end user as long as nuclear materials stopped within an MNA member state. This

would contribute to a reduction of workload and time savings for supplier states,

recipient states and operators.

Additionally, the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements that would have been

necessary between individual MNA member states and MNA non-member states

regarding nuclear materials and providing services could instead be handled by bilateral

agreements between non-member states and the AMMAO acting as a representative for

MNA member states as a whole (for details, see the next section on bilateral nuclear

cooperation agreements). The paperwork between MNA member states and

non-member states based on these bilateral agreements would all be handled by the

AMMAO, as well as eliminating the need for member states to get individual

permission from each MNA non-member supplier state for nuclear material

reprocessing and transfers. Export controls would also all be handled by the AMMAO

for export control with MNA non-member states. Overall, this would significantly

reduce the amount of procedures and the complexity and time required by them for

MNA member states.

85

6) Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements

As mentioned above, regarding transfer of nuclear resources to

nuclear-weapon-free states the NSG Guidelines require of that government assurance of

1) application of IAEA full-scope safeguards, 2) peaceful use of the materials

transferred, 3) protective safeguards of the material transferred, 4) in the case the

material is transferred again the same assurances are required of the recipient state in

that transfer. For the export of sensitive facilities, equipment and technology such as

uranium enrichment and reprocessing in particular, there are special conditions. Many

nuclear supplier states enter into bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with the

recipient state considering these guidelines, and confirm that 1) to 4) above are being

followed by the state government. From the perspective of ensuring peaceful uses of

nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation, bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements

are entered into to ensure that the recipient state is legally obligated to peacefully use

the nuclear materials and major nuclear related materials and technology such as nuclear

reactors transferred to them54

.

6)-1 Existing bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements

Currently, the following bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements exist between

the major nuclear supplier states and Asian states newly introducing nuclear power.

Table 6.10 Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements between Major Nuclear Supplier

States and Asian States55

USA RUS UK FRA CAN AUS EURAT

OM

Kazakhstan JAP KOR CHN Indonesia Vietnam

USA56 ― ✔ * * ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Memo

Russia ✔ ― ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ UK57 * ✔ ― ✔ ** ✔ ― ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ France * ✔ ✔ ― ** ✔ ― ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Canada ✔ ✔ ** ** ― ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Australia ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ― ** ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ EURATO

M58 ✔ ✔ ― ― ✔ ** ― ✔ ✔ ✔

Kazakhsta

n ✔ ✔ ** ✔ ✔ ✔ ― ✔ ✔ ** **

Japan ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ― ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Korea ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ― ✔ ✔ ✔ China ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ** ✔ ✔ ― ✔

54MOFA homepage http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/atom/topics/jyoyaku.html (Accessed: 21/01/2012),

other 55 James F. Keeley, Department of Political Science and Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of

Calgary Calgary, Alberta Canada, T2N 1N4, “A List of Bilateral Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreements”.

Checkmarks in the table are only for those agreements with ‘peaceful uses of nuclear energy’ in their names. 56USA National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) homepage

http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/treatiesagreements/123agreementsforpe

acefulcooperation (Accessed: 21/01/2012), other 57UK Department of Energy & Climate Change homepage http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/meeting_energy/en_security/nonprolif/nuclear_non_pr/agreeme

nts/agreements.aspx (Accessed: 21/01/2012) 58 European Commission homepage http://ec.europa.eu/research/energy/EURATOM/coop/index_en.htm

(Accessed: 21/01/2012)

http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/atom/topics/jyoyaku.html

http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/treatiesagreements/123agreementsforpeacefulcooperation

http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/treatiesagreements/123agreementsforpeacefulcooperation

http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/meeting_energy/en_security/nonprolif/nuclear_non_pr/agreements/agreements.aspx

http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/meeting_energy/en_security/nonprolif/nuclear_non_pr/agreements/agreements.aspx

http://ec.europa.eu/research/energy/euratom/coop/index_en.htm

86

Indonesia ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ** ** ✔ ✔ ✔ ― Vietnam Memo ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ―

✔: Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement for peaceful uses of nuclear energy exists.

*: The bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement between the USA and EURATOM

includes EURATOM members Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech

Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,

Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,

Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK

**: Although not overall agreements on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, agreements

exist for specific aspects such as safety or science and technology

As one of the primary nuclear supplier states, based on the “Atoms for Peace”

December 1953 speech at the UN general assembly by American president Eisenhower,

the USA worked towards peaceful cooperation on nuclear energy with various countries.

One of the methods used was to revise the American Atomic Energy Act (AEA) in 1954,

revealing information on nuclear research, allowing civilian possession of nuclear

facilities and materials, the transfer of information and nuclear materials. Up to 1960,

the USA entered into bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with 44 states59

. After

the Indian nuclear tests in 1974, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act in 1978 had Article

123 appended to the AEA, stipulating nine requirements for nuclear non-proliferation to

be included in bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements between the USA and other

states.

(1) Application of perpetual safeguards to all nuclear materials and facilities covered

by the agreement

(2) When cooperating with non-nuclear weapon states, application of IAEA

full-scope safeguards

(3) Assurances that all nuclear materials, facilities and SNTs covered by the

agreement will not be used in explosive nuclear devices, their research or other

military applications

(4) When cooperating with non-nuclear weapon states, should that state carry out

nuclear testing or terminate IAEA safeguards agreements, there exists a right to

claim the nuclear materials and facilities covered under the agreement

(5) Assurance that the nuclear materials and confidential documents covered by the

agreement will not be transferred to a 3rd

party individual or state without consent

by the USA

(6) Application of proper physical protection measures for the nuclear materials

covered by the agreement

(7) Prior consent from the USA from changes to reprocessing, enrichment, state and

contents of the nuclear materials covered in the agreement

(8) Prior consent from the USA for storage of plutonium, uranium-233 and highly

enriched uranium covered by the agreement

59 “Infrastructure Development through Civil Nuclear Cooperation”, Marc Humphrey, Ph.D., Physical

Scientist, U.S. Department of State, First Arab Conference on the Prospects of Nuclear Power for

Electricity Generation and Seawater Desalination, Hammament, Tunisia, June 23－25、2010

87

(9) Apply conditions equivalent to those given above for nuclear materials or

facilities produced or built using the SNTs covered by the agreement

The conditions above are what the USA requires of non-supplier states, but not all

supplier states require these same conditions, and they vary by state.

For example, Japan has entered into bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with

natural and enriched uranium supplier states such as the USA, Canada, Australia, Russia,

the UK and France, and for (7) of Article 123 of the American AEA regarding uranium

enrichment, the USA requires prior consent, but Canada and Australia require prior

consent only for enrichment over 20% while Russia, the UK and France have no

specific stipulations. For the reprocessing requirement of (7), the agreements with

Canada and Australia have the same prior consent and indication of transfer facility

requirements that the American agreement has, while the agreements with Russia, the

UK and France stipulate nothing. A comparison of the requirements in agreements

between Japan and major nuclear supplier states is shown in the table below, for

uranium enrichment, reprocessing, changes to state or contents, storage of plutonium or

HE uranium and transfer outside of jurisdiction.

Table 6.11 Comparison between Japan and Major Nuclear Supplier States of

Requirements for Uranium Enrichment and Reprocessing

USA Canada Australia Russia UK France

Uranium

Enrichment

Prior

consent

necessary

Prior

consent

necessary

for

enrichment

over 20%

Prior

consent

necessary

for

enrichmen

t over 20%

Not

stipulated

Not

stipulated

Not

stipulated

Reprocessi

ng

Prior

consent

necessary

Prior

consent

necessary

Prior

consent

necessary

Not

stipulated

Not

stipulated

Not

stipulated

Changing

State/Conte

nts

Prior

consent

necessary

Prior

consent

necessary

Prior

consent

necessary

Not

stipulated

Not

stipulated

Not

stipulated

Storage of

Plutonium

or HE

Uranium

Prior

consent

necessary

Not

stipulated

Not

stipulated

Not

stipulated

Not

stipulated

Not

stipulated

Transfer

Outside of

Jurisdiction

Prior

consent

necessary

Prior

consent

necessary

Prior

consent

necessary

Prior

consent

necessary

Prior

consent

necessary

Prior

consent

necessary

Figure 6.2 shows an example of the necessity of prior consent for the movement

of nuclear materials according to bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. As shown

in the table above, the requirements for each supplier state are different, but the

agreements with the USA, Canada and Australia in particular require prior consent in

the following cases:

88

State A provides natural uranium to State B, State B enriches the uranium and then

provides enriched uranium to State C to fabricate fuel: prior consent from State A is

required

State C fabricates a fuel assembly to provide to State D for its national reactor:

prior consent is required from States A and B

State D transfers SF to State E for reprocessing: prior consent is required from

states A, B and C

State E transfers the plutonium acquired from providing reprocessing services to

State C to fabricate MOX fuel: prior consent is required from States A and B

State D stores SF in State F: prior consent is required from states A, B and C

MOX fuel is stored or used in State G: prior consent is required from states A, B, D

and E

Figure 6.2 Example of Necessity of Prior Consent for Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation

Agreements

Considering the above, the common issues facing Type A-C MNA facilities are

given below.

The necessity of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with nuclear supplier

states for the supply of nuclear materials, and the number of agreements: In

principle, the transfer (supply) of nuclear materials between states requires a

nuclear cooperation agreement between the supplier and recipient states.

Therefore, it is necessary to sign bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements between

a) MNA member state nuclear suppliers and recipients, and b) MNA member and

non-member state nuclear suppliers and recipients. However, the more MNA

member states there are and the more MNA member states perform nuclear cycle

services for MNA non-member states, the greater the number of agreements and the

possibility of them conflicting. Also as mentioned above, the specifics of nuclear

燃料集合体

D国(原子炉）

E国(再処理）使用済燃料

プルトニウム

A国 B国(濃縮）

C国（燃料製造）

天然ウラン濃縮ウラン

A

B CA

BA

事前同意

BA

F国(使用済燃料貯蔵）

使用済燃料 B CA

G国（MOX燃料貯蔵、MOX燃料利用)

MOX燃料

A EB D

MOX Fuel State G (MOX fuel storage, MOX fuel use)

State A

Natural Uranium

State B

(enrichment)

Enriched Uranium State C (fuel

fabrication)

Fuel Assembly

Plutonium

State E

(reprocessing) Spent fuel

State D

(nuclear reactor)

State F (SF storage)

Spent fuel

Prior Consent

89

cooperation agreements vary by supplier state60

. The fewer agreements the MNA

requires, the smoother the transportation of nuclear materials will become.

Necessary Prior Consent from Supplier States for Reprocessing or Transfer of

Spent Fuel: As shown in the figure above, nuclear material recipient states are

required to receive prior consent from the supplier state for reprocessing, changing

state/content, storing plutonium or HE uranium, and transfers outside jurisdiction of

the materials covered by agreements. Therefore, the greater the nuclear fuel cycle

backend services provided, the more countries will likely become involved in the

nuclear fuel cycle process, requiring more prior consent from various countries.

On the off chance that a country refuses prior consent or a significant length of time

is required for prior consent, it could have a negative effect on the smooth and

efficient operations of MNA member states.

6)-2 Proposal and evaluation for MNA facility bilateral nuclear cooperation

agreements

Solutions to the issues listed above are given in the table below for bilateral

nuclear cooperation agreements for MNA facilities of Types A-C.

Table 6.12 Proposal for MNA Facility Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements

MNA Applicable Laws (In

Principle) Other Requirements

Type

A Laws of Partner State

A bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement is necessary

for transfer of nuclear materials

For partner states that fulfill the conditions of host

states with Type B facilities, relaxation of prior

consent requirements in the bilateral nuclear

cooperation agreement will be sought similar to that

for host states

For partner states that fulfill the conditions of site

states with Type C facilities, relaxation of prior

consent requirements in the bilateral nuclear

cooperation agreement will be sought similar to that

for site states

60For bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, the USA in particular does not have the same requirements stipulated

in AEA Section 123 for all recipient states, and has the following double standards. One of these is requiring the

recipient state follow nuclear non-proliferation conditions greater than those stipulated in AEA Section 123. For

example, Article 7 of the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement between the USA and the UAE stipulates that the

UAE will have no SNT facilities in their territory and will not carry out uranium enrichment or reprocessing, legally

obligating the UAE to abandon uranium enrichment and reprocessing. Another double standard is prior consent for

reprocessing varying by recipient state, with the US-Japan nuclear cooperation agreement granting comprehensive

prior consent when Japan reprocesses materials covered by the agreement in Japan, whereas the US-South Korea

nuclear cooperation agreement does not grant comprehensive prior consent when materials covered by the agreement

are reprocessed in South Korea. Despite South Korea having declared they would not have uranium enrichment or

reprocessing facilities as part of the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, much as

with the UAE, the USA did not grant comprehensive prior consent for reprocessing in South Korea from the

perspective of nuclear non-proliferation in the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, if MNA member states and the USA

already have bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements and double standards exist in these agreements between the

USA and MNA member states, the MNA may not function smoothly.

90

Type


Same as above

Since compared to Type A facilities more states are

involved in this MNA facility, thus helping nuclear

non-proliferation, prior consent requirements of the

bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement will be

relaxed if possible

Type


As mentioned in the export controls section, MNA

member states will be considered as a single state and

bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements will be made

between AMMAO representing the MNA and MNA

non-member states

Since Type C MNA facilities include bilateral nuclear

cooperation agreement contents in the MNA export

controls agreement (including conditions of the

American AEA Article 123), and include regional

safeguards and enhance nuclear security for

significant nuclear non-proliferation capability, the

bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement will be

relaxed if possible

Type A MNA Facilities:

Unlike Type B and C MNA facilities, Type A MNA facilities do not assume

providing nuclear fuel cycle services. Therefore, as is standard partner states with

Type A facilities that receive nuclear material supplies must have bilateral nuclear

cooperation agreements with both 1.a) MNA member states and 1.b) MNA

non-member states.

However, for partner states that fulfill the conditions of host states with Type B

facilities, or of site states with Type C facilities, relaxation of the bilateral nuclear

cooperation agreement will be sought similar to that for host/site states

Type B MNA Facilities:

Host states with Type B MNA facilities require bilateral nuclear cooperation

agreements when receiving nuclear material supplies, just as Type A MNA facilities

do. However, compared to Type A facilities more states are involved in Type B

MNA facilities and regional safeguards are in place, thus helping nuclear

non-proliferation. Therefore prior consent requirements of the bilateral nuclear

cooperation agreement between the host state and supplier state will be relaxed if

possible

Also, for partner states with Type A facilities that fulfill the conditions of host states,

the same relaxation of prior consent requirements of the bilateral nuclear

cooperation agreement as host states receive will be sought

Type C MNA Facilities:

Compared to Type A and B facilities, Type C facilities have stronger regional

safeguards and nuclear security, for improved nuclear non-proliferation. Also, the

MNA export controls agreement includes items from bilateral nuclear cooperation

agreements (degree of cooperation, conditions of cooperation, limitations for

91

peaceful uses, ban on nuclear explosive devices, application of safeguards,

restrictions on transfer of nuclear materials, definition of regulated SNTs, prior

consent for transfer of nuclear materials under agreement, physical protective

measures for nuclear materials, reprocessing regulations, regulations on changes to

state/content or uranium enriched over 20%, regulations on storage of

plutonium/HEU, etc.), in particular conditions the USA requires in nuclear

cooperation agreements with nuclear-weapon-free states (AEA Article 123

conditions61

).

Therefore, site states with Type C MNA facilities will be considered as one state,

with bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements signed between MNA non-member

states and the AMMAO representing the MNA (see export controls section). Due

to these reasons, prior consent requirements of the bilateral nuclear cooperation

agreement between the site state and supplier state will be relaxed if possible.

Also, for partner states with Type A facilities that fulfill the conditions of site states,

the same relaxation of prior consent requirements of the bilateral nuclear

cooperation agreement as site states receive will be sought.

The proposal above is evaluated below.

Type A MNA Facilities:

Compared to existing single-state facilities, the number of bilateral nuclear

cooperation agreements and prior consent necessary for nuclear materials supplies

will not change for partner states with Type A facilities.

However, compared to existing single-state facilities states with Type A facilities

will have improved regional safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation systems,

which should make it easier to receive prior consent from supplier states with

bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements.

If partner states fulfill the conditions of host/site states, then it should be easier to

receive prior consent similar to host/site states, making the transportation and

supply of nuclear materials smoother than a single-state facility or partner state not

fulfilling host/site state requirements.

Type B MNA Facilities:

The number of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements and prior consent

necessary for receiving/supplying nuclear materials will not change for host states

with Type B facilities compared to partner states with Type A facilities, but with

more states involved in the MNA facility compared to partner states nuclear

61American AEA Section 123(a) states that the following 9 conditions should be included in nuclear cooperation

agreements with nuclear-weapons-free states. However, since all the agreements made so far have banned the

transfer of SNTs, the final condition has not been included in any agreements.

(1)Nuclear material and equipment (conditions vary by type) transferred to the country must remain under

safeguards in perpetuity, (2)Maintain full-scope IAEA safeguards, (3)Guarantee that transferred nuclear material,

equipment, and technology will not have any role in nuclear weapons development or any other military purpose,

(4)n the event that a non-nuclear-weapon state partner detonates a nuclear device using nuclear material produced or

violates an IAEA safeguards agreement, the United States has the right to demand the return of any transfers,

(5)Guarantee items under agreement will not be transferred to any party not recognized by the USA without prior

consent, (6)Nuclear material transferred or produced as a result of the agreement is subject to adequate physical

security, (7)U.S. prior consent rights to the enrichment or reprocessing of nuclear material obtained or produced as a

result of the agreement, (8)Guarantees that items obtained as part of the arrangement will not be stored in a facility the USA has not recognized prior, (9)The above nonproliferation criteria apply to all nuclear material or

nuclear facilities produced or constructed as a result of the agreement.

92

non-proliferation is improved, making it easier to receive prior consent.

If partner states fulfill host state conditions, that makes receiving prior consent

simpler, making the transportation and supply of nuclear materials smoother.

Type C MNA Facilities:

Since MNA member states are considered as a single state as a whole (MNA

Framework), the number of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements and prior

consent site states require with MNA non-member states is less compared to

partner/host states with Type A or B facilities. There is also increased nuclear

non-proliferation (safeguards) and nuclear security compared to partner/host states,

and with the observation of conditions for bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements

with the USA included in the agreement establishing the MNA, these states will

have an even easier time receiving prior consent from supplier states with bilateral

nuclear cooperation agreements.

If partner states fulfill the same level as site state conditions, those partner states are

also considered as part of the single state, reducing the number of bilateral nuclear

cooperation agreements and prior consent required. With significant nuclear

non-proliferation functionality, they will have an easier time receiving prior consent

from MNA non-member states. Therefore, transportation and supply of nuclear

materials will be even smoother than in the facilities mentioned above.

4) Summary and Future Issues

This section looked at issues involved in the legal requirements for states with

Type A-C MNA facilities regarding (1) Safeguards, (2) Nuclear Safety, (3) Nuclear

Security, (4) Compensation/Liability for Nuclear Damages, (5) Export Controls and (6)

Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements.

Type A-C MNA facilities will in principle follow the laws of the state to which

they belong (Type A: partner state, Type B: host state, Type C: site state) in addition to

requirements for the 3S in (1) to (3). States with Type C MNA facilities in particular

will require higher 3S standards than single-state facilities due to the representative

body of the multiple states composing the MNA (AMMAO) holding ownership of the

facility, but due to handling MNA member states as a single state for (5) and (6) and

relaxing bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement requirements, it should help create a

system allowing for effective receipt/supply of nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel cycle

services.

However, the following issues must be solved for (1) to (6).

(1) Safeguards: This section assumed states in the Asian region as MNA members,

and proposed regional safeguards using EURATOM as a model. However,

EURATOM has a history of half a century and is built on the EU base of

consolidated politics, economics, law, legislation and policy. In comparison,

the number of nuclear powers in Asia as well as the diversity of politics,

economies and cultures is bereft of opportunities for consolidation. An

optimal solution must be sought for assuring nuclear non-proliferation with

nuclear uses, and building functional systems for joint nuclear material

measurement controls and inspections.

(2) &(3) Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security: These 2Ss have long been the

93

purvey of nations, and as (3) Nuclear Security in particular is closely related to

national security issues it is as a rule classified and carried out as a responsible

of the nation. Considering this, cooperation between AMMAO and site

states will have to overcome national rights and nationalism in order to deal

with (2) and (3) through AMMAO reviews (voluntary or obligatory), which

not even EURATOM has handled.

(4) Compensation for Nuclear Damages: As seen in the Fukushima accident, if a

nuclear accident occurs then the cost of damages incurred could rise above

¥10 trillion, as well as the possibility of cross-border damages. With a large

number of businesses and nations involved in MNA facilities as operators and

facility states, limited liability for nuclear damages compensation is

preferable for acquiring a financial base for MNA facilities to operate on.

However, it may not be possible for a country such as Japan with unlimited

liability for operators to change that policy to limited liability in order to join

the MNA, when an accident such as Fukushima has actually occurred and

their exist damages that must be compensated for.

(5) Export Controls: The possibility of standardizing export control systems for

member states. Also, the possibility of treating site states with Type C

facilities and partner states that fulfill site state requirements as a single state.

(6) Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements: The problem exists of how much

it would be possible to relax spent fuel handling prior consent conditions with

the USA, which supplies Japan and South Korea with a large amount of

nuclear fuel.

The issues above must be individually examined in more detail.

94

6.2 Further study and evaluation from transport (Geopolitics) and economic

perspectives

1) Transport (Geopolitics)

The MNA was evaluated from the perspective of transport (geopolitics). This

study separates cooperative structures into Types A, B and C, but when considering

geopolitics related to the transport of nuclear materials, there are no significant

differences in the 3 types, and instead the feasibility of cooperation between member

states is important. Therefore, issues of cooperation between the states being

considered for members of the MNA international fuel cycle and issues with transport

in those regions will also be considered under a geopolitical lens.

1)-1 Characteristics of the international fuel cycle model viewed

geopolitically

(a) Definition of Geopolitics

In this section, geopolitics is defined as “a method to analyze the actions of a

particular state based on geographical characteristics”. (referring to the definition of

traditional geopolitics by Rudolf Kjellén62

)

Geopolitics originated in 19th

century Germany, but since Nazi Germany used this

theory as a justification for their war to acquire territory (Lebensraum) for the Germanic

people, geopolitics was viewed as taboo after the war and neglected for some time.

In the latter half of the 20th

century, Kissinger and Brzezinski63

started using the

term in the USA, and in the 21st century Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan

used the term geopolitical risk64

in 2002, casting the spotlight on geopolitics mainly in

America.

Also in the latter half of the 20th

century, criticism of traditional geopolitics being

applied to foreign policy led to the new trend of critical geopolitics, with critical

geopolitics being the focus of most geopolitical research today.

Geopolitics in Japan was influenced by Germany, with interest in geopolitics seen

in Kyoto University in particular before WWII, and geopolitics are now considered to

have been the backbone of the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ ideal behind

the Pacific War65

.

However, after losing the Pacific War geopolitics was thought of as a militaristic

or expansionist theory, and the GHQ banned geopolitical research after the war, which

continued for quite some time.

After entering the 21st century, in 2006 Minister of Foreign Affairs Aso had a

foreign policy based on geopolitical ideas described in Figure 6.3a that he called the

‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’66

, and in 2012 Prime Minister Abe announced ‘Asia’s

62 “The study of nations as a geographic organism, or a phenomenon in space”, -Geopolitics- A Map of America’s

Global Invasion, 28/01/2004. Gogatsu-shobo, Shinji Okuyama, p.22 63 “How Brzezinski’s World Works” Zbigniew Brzezinski, Nikkei Newspaper (1997/12), other 64 13/11/2002 Japan- US Federal Reserve Board Committee Chairman Greenspan commenting on economic

recovery “There are geopolitical risks with negotiations with Iraq”, (at US Congress Joint Economic Committee) 65 “The Spread of Geopolitics in Japan: The Signs and Danger in Pre-war Geopolitics”, Daihougaku Kenkyuuka

Junior Research Journal 11, Ken Sato 66 MOFA homepage, 30/11/2006 Foreign Minister Aso’s speech “Creating an Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”

http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/18/easo_1130.html Accessed 24/01/2013

http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/18/easo_1130.html

95

Democratic Security Diamond’67

, showing a rebirth of geopolitics in recent years.

Figure 6.3a Structure of the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity

In order to look at how much Japan could contribute to an MNA based on

geographical conditions and on what issues would arise when transporting nuclear

materials vital to the MNA, this study will focus on a traditional geopolitical approach.

(b) Geopolitical Stability of Nuclear Energy

When compared to oil reserves, the current energy leader, the facilities necessary

to convert resources to a product (uranium mines, refinement, enrichment, processing,

reprocessing) and transport routes for nuclear power exist in more geopolitically

stable areas.

This is both due to nuclear fuel cycle processes including nuclear power plants

requiring high levels of technology backed up by a broad industrial infrastructure and

in order to acquire SNTs there needs to be a stable domestic government that the

international community trusts to respect international promises for nuclear

non-proliferation and security reasons, meaning the state must be very stable

domestically and abroad in order to take part in the nuclear fuel cycle.

Oil is a significant contrast. Over 50% of confirmed oil reserves are located in the

67 Project Syndicate HP Dec.27.2012 “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond” Shinzo ABE

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe Accessed 25/01/2013

Cooperation between Japan, the EU and NATO

Support for democratization

of Eastern Europe in the

‘90s

Support for stability of GUAM states

Support for Community of Democratic Choice

(CDC)

Support for peace and

reconstruction in former

Yugoslavian states

Support for Iraq reconstruction

Stability in

Afghanistan

Increased strategic

relationship with India, the

largest democratic state in the

world

Discussions between Central Asia

and Japan, increased regional

cooperation to support independent

growth

- Universal Values

(freedom, democracy,

human rights, rule of law)

- Consistent pacifism since

WWII.

- Helping young democratic

states.

-> Partnership for

Democratic Development

(PDD)

Japan and CLV

Ministerial

Conference

ASEAN States: Peace and prosperity through

democracy and economic development

->Support for poverty crisis in late ‘90s

Structure of the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity

Expand diplomatic relations

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe

96

Middle East with high country risk, with the rest in South America and Eurasia68

.

Also, since oil transport routes from the Middle East must pass through choke

points (straits, canals) such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab-el-Mandeb, the Strait of

Malacca, the Suez Canal, or the Panama Canal, there is high geopolitical risk on the

resource transport route from the supplier state to consumer states.

Oil also has a less efficient conversion ratio from resource to energy, so that more

resources are necessary for the same amount of energy compared to nuclear energy,

meaning the frequency of transportation between supplier and consumer states is that

much higher.

Transporting oil requires passing through regions with high geopolitical risk, so

the chokepoint risk which increases every time a chokepoint is passed also tends to

be high.

In order to avoid chokepoint risk for oil transport, pipelines exist primarily in

some states located on the Eurasian continent, but since uranium cannot be converted

into a liquid or gas form that would allow transport by pipeline, making this option

unrealistic for nuclear fuel transportation.

This differences show how increased diversification of resource importation

sources and risks in transport routes make nuclear energy more geopolitically stable

than oil.

(Note: Looking at uranium reserves by country, the top 10 countries are spread

throughout Europe and Eurasia, Pacific Asia, North America, Africa and South

America instead of being concentrated in a single region.)

68 “Energy White Paper”, 2011. Part 2: Energy Trends, Chapter 2: International Energy Trends.

Section 2: Primary Energy Trends 1．Fossil Fuel Trends

http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/hakusho/2011energyhtml/2-2-2.html

Figure 6.3b Energy Transport Routes and Chokepoints1

97

1)-2 Geopolitical characteristics of MNA candidate states

From a geopolitical perspective, the MNA participant states looked at in this study can be

divided into the following groups:

a) Land Power States: Russia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia

b) Rimland States: China, South Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia

c) Sea Power States (Offshore States): Japan, Indonesia

Figure 6.4 Land Powers, Rimlands and Sea Powers According to Spykman’s Definition69

1)-3 Potential flow of international nuclear fuel cycle

Based on the MNA participant states, the following roles are assumed in our study.

- Uranium Production: Kazakhstan, Mongolia

- Conversion: Russia, Kazakhstan

- Enrichment: Russia, Japan, China

- Reconversion, Fuel Fabrication: Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, China

- Nuclear Power Plant Operation: Russia, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, China, emerging

nuclear states (Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia)

- SF Medium-term Storage: Russia, Kazakhstan

- SF Reprocessing: Russia, Japan, China

(- MOX Storage: Japan, South Korea, China)

In this case, the result would be that the supplier side consists mostly of land power states

(Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Russia) and the consumer side consist mostly of rimland and sea power

states, meaning that as mentioned in the previous section transportation from supplier states to

consumer states would be crucial.

69 Based on page 60 of “Introductory Geopolitics”. 31/07/1981. Hara Shobo, Osamu Kono.

Rimland Power States ：Continent Surrounding states

シーパワー国：オフショア

Rimland States: Continental Fringe

ランドパワー国：ハートランド

Land Power States: Heartland

Sea Power States: Offshore

98

When transporting nuclear material, supplier states located inland (if they also handle fuel

processing, then after processes from mining the uranium to processing the fuel) would have to

transport materials overland to ports, then use ships to carry the nuclear materials from the ports to

rimland and offshore consumer states, making the transportation route a combination of land and

sea routes.

Because of this, it is necessary to determine an efficient transportation route considering

conditions of route safety, distance (time) and transfer of cargo for both land and sea routes.

1)-4 Position of Japan in this structure

(a) Geopolitical Perspective

The characteristics of Japan based on Alfred Thayer Mahan’s definition of sea power states70

are given below.

- Positioned far from the Eurasian continent, offshore with a lot of space in the Pacific

direction

- With the 6th highest amount of coastline in the word at 29,751km71, borders with

neighboring countries are all nautical

- There are multiple ports that do not freeze over allowing approaches by large vessels

- The people feel an affinity for the ocean, and there are secondary schools and universities

for training ship crew

- Excellent shipping power (merchant fleet) and a mid-size, well-prepared navy

- Considering the participant states for this international nuclear fuel cycle model, Japan is in

a good geographic position as a hub connecting the land power states (supplier states in the nuclear

fuel cycle) such as Russia and Kazakhstan located near the center of the Eurasian continent with

emerging nuclear states (consumer states) in Asia located at or near the maritime area (offshore) of

the Eurasian continent

Considering the position of emerging nuclear states in Asia where demand for nuclear energy

is likely to increase, Japan is positioned far closer than most other advanced nuclear states

concentrated in Europe and the Americas.

For example, if a circle with a radius of 5000km is drawn centered on eastern Japan, the

central region for Japan’s nuclear cycle, the majority of relevant regions for the emerging Asian

nuclear states being considered in this study fit within that circle, demonstrating how little the

distance is.

Also, the US 7th

Fleet, which has a major role in assuring safety in the waters of Southeast

Asia and the Far East where the emerging Asian nuclear states being considered are located, has

bases in Japan (Yokosuka and Sasebo).

International cooperation based on the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy

and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP)72

is carried out with Japan in a leading role,

70 “Mahan’s Influence of Sea Power on History”, page 47 onwards. Alfred T. Mahan, 16/06/2008, Hara Shobo. 71 “CIA World Fact Book” (2005) 72 MOFA homepage “ReCAAP：Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery

against Ships in Asia”, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaiyo/kaizoku_gai.html Accessed 23/01/2013

http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaiyo/kaizoku_gai.html

99

and the Japanese Ship Reporting System (JASREP)73

is used to determine ship positions,

demonstrating the central role that Japan plays in cooperation to ensure naval transportation

security in the Far East and Southeast Asia regions.

Since Japan is already involved in multilateral efforts to protect the security of transportation

ships in the region, Japan can be thought of as already having the basis for a security system for

the transportation of nuclear fuel.

(b) Japanese Nuclear Power Infrastructure Perspective

With one of the largest nuclear power industries in the world, Japanese nuclear power

infrastructure has the following characteristics.

- The only nuclear fuel cycle state both in the Asian region and nuclear-weapon-free, Japan

has the technologies necessary for the nuclear fuel cycle from conversion to reprocessing,

and has atomic energy research institutes to support this nuclear fuel cycle.

- Japan has an excellent industrial infrastructure that can support the nuclear energy

technology necessary for the nuclear fuel cycle, and exporting nuclear power materials is

part of a national industrial strategy.

- Key companies in the global nuclear power industry and their partners are located in Japan

(Toshiba (WH), Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (AREVA), Hitachi (GE)).

With Japan being a country with one of the most advanced nuclear energy infrastructures in

the Asian region, it can act as a useful frontline base in the Asian region for advanced nuclear

states in Europe and the Americas, and fulfills the conditions necessary to respond to

emergencies and act as a base for providing materials.

(c) Possible Transportation Routes for International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Model

The current potential international nuclear fuel cycle model is based on land power states

(Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Russia) being suppliers and rimland and sea power states (China,

South Korea and Japan) focusing mainly on emerging nuclear states (Vietnam, Thailand,

Malaysia and Indonesia) being the consumers.

The following 3 routes are considered to link suppliers and consumers:

i) Route from Kazakhstan and Mongolia overland through European Russia, using St. Petersburg

in Russia as the shipping port, exporting to emerging nuclear states through the Suez Canal and

the Strait of Malacca.

ii) The same route as i) from Kazakhstan and Mongolia to St. Petersburg, then taking the North

Sea, Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean to the Bering Strait to reach East Asia and export to emerging

nuclear states.

iii) Transport overland from Kazakhstan and Mongolia to a far eastern Russian port, and export to

emerging nuclear states.

Of these, Japan has already used i) as a transport route, but as the distance covered is the

73 Japan Coast Guard homepage “Japanese Ship Reporting System JASREP

“http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/jasrep/ Accessed 24/01/2013

http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/jasrep/

100

longest and multiple chokepoints exist along the route, it has issues of risks during transportation

similar to the transportation of oil.

In particular, when entering the Indian Ocean from the Red Sea off the Somalia coast, as

indicated in Figure 6.5 pirates have repeatedly interfered with transport ships, and with sensitive

materials such as nuclear materials having a high value and the potential for valuable ransoms it

would make nuclear fuel transports a prime target for pirates, making it clear that this route is not

a low risk one for the transport of nuclear fuel.

Figure 6.5 Areas of Somalia Pirate Operations74

For route ii), recently the news reported that liquefied natural gas was transported from

Hammerfest in Norway to Japan via Arctic Ocean (Northeast Passage) by LNG tanker75

.

According to the news, a Russian icebreaker vessel accompanied the LNG tanker.

According to the newspaper report, this Arctic Ocean Northeast Passage route can be 40%

shorter than route i) by distance, and 20 days shorter by time. If this route was established it

would be useful not only for transporting uranium resources but also for transport from Europe,

as this route has high potential as a new shipping route.

This Arctic Ocean route was also used in the summer of 2009 by a German commercial

shipping vessel transporting building material from South Korea to Rotterdam, but a Russian

icebreaker vessel accompanied them in this instance as well.

As these examples show, since this route involves crossing a significant distance through the

74 BBC homepage “Kenya opens fast-track piracy court in Mombasa” 24.June.2010

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10401413 Accessed 25/01/2013 75 Jiji.com “Successful LNG Transport via Arctic Ocean= First Ever, from Russia to Japan” 06/12/2012 http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=201212/2012120600062&g=ind Accessed 25/01/2013

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10401413

http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=201212/2012120600062&g=ind

101

Arctic Ocean, icebreaker ships would be necessary to clear the route. Therefore cooperation

with Russia is essential, but as Russia’s policy regarding this route is currently being debated, it is

not possible to reach a conclusion at this time.

Also, in order to use this Arctic Ocean route as a permanent commercial shipping route

infrastructure would need to be built, including ships with ice-resistant structure capable of

navigating arctic waters safely, route information and facilities to support the route, establishment

of a route support system and amendments to laws regarding passage76

. Additionally,

confrontations between Russia which insists Russian laws apply to passage through this route and

the USA which claims right to safe passage through these waters as an international strait mean

that first a solution needs to be found to these issues.

Based on these circumstances, it is not possible for the Arctic Ocean route to be opened as a

commercial shipping route any time soon, and a feasibility study will have to be carried out to

look at the possibilities as a commercial route, including having icebreakers vessels accompany

transport ships.

Figure 6.6 Distance Comparison for Arctic Ocean Route and Suez Canal Route77

When crossing from the Arctic Ocean into the Pacific Ocean in this route, although the Bering

Strait is a chokepoint it is located between Russia and the USA, which are relatively politically

stable countries, and therefore this strait is not a significant obstacle for this route.

The vast majority of this route is off the coast of politically stable countries in Northern

76 Ocean Policy Research Foundation, Arctic Ocean Seasonal Report 14 (June to August 2012) page 13 “Increasing Japanese

Geopolitical Value Through Development of Arctic Ocean Shipping Route” Yasunori Ooyama, Accessed 25/01/2013 77 NY Times HP Sep.11.2009 “Arctic Shortcut Beckons Shippers as Ice Thaws”

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/11/science/earth/11passage.html?_r=2& Accessed 25/01/2013

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/11/science/earth/11passage.html?_r=2&

102

Europe and Russia, and as the route is in the Arctic it requires advanced navigation skills and

ice-resistant vessels, making it extremely unlikely that piracy would occur there.

In the case that this route was used to transport nuclear fuel from Russia (St. Petersburg) to

South Korea and China, in addition to the Bering Strait there are three other straits that could be

chokepoints, the La Pérouse Strait, the Tsugaru Strait and the Tsushima Strait, but in the current

situation each of these straits is geopolitically stable and if a commercial route was established

they would cause no particular problems.

As mentioned above, currently this route is only listed as a reference, but if it became

available for use as a commercial shipping route then the geopolitical stability of its coastal states

would make it an excellent choice for transporting nuclear materials78

.

For route iii), the Japanese government has already performed a feasibility study and during

a discussion with experts from Russia and Kazakhstan that took place in December 2012

(December 2012 MNA Workshop (the University of Tokyo)) it was mentioned by Russian experts

that there should be no issues with using a route transporting nuclear fuel from Kazakhstan to a

far eastern Russian port (Vostochny) and loading it onto a ship there, and currently TENEX is in

the process of building infrastructure to use this route to transport nuclear fuel.

At this conference, the same experts mentioned that as Russian law has restrictions on

accepting SF it would be necessary for domestic public opinion to accept the transport of SF in

Russia.

The Kazakhstan experts noted that as Kazakhstan law forbids the import of radioactive waste,

it would be necessary for domestic public opinion to accept the transport of and medium-term

storage of SF in Kazakhstan.

The Kazakhstan experts also mentioned that although no leaseback system for nuclear fuel is

currently being considered, if there was a market demand for such a system then it may be

possible to adopt this system in the future.

Therefore, something that can be said for all of the routes i) to iii) above is that for

medium-term storage of SF in Russia and Kazakhstan which this study is taking as a given, future

trends in public opinion in Russia and Kazakhstan and acceptance of SF transport and

medium-term storage are critical to establishing this system.

As a variation on route iii), the land route could be taken from Kazakhstan through China to

the Chinese port of Lianyungang and then transport by ship from that port (Eurasian Land

Bridge).

Unlike with the Siberia rail route (Siberia Land Bridge), this route has no system to track the

position of freight trains in real-time and there is a need to transfer goods at border stations due to

railway tracks being different in Kazakhstan and China.

However, compared to the Siberia rail route this route has more stable winter weather and

78 Looking at this route from a geopolitical perspective, instead of being a case where due to the changes in technology that have

occurred, the normally unchanging distance has changed from the human perspective, it is instead a much rarer case where the

phenomenon of global warming has led to a change in distance from the human perspective.

103

lower freight costs, so it is currently handling increasing amounts of freight as a primary rail

transport route between Europe and Asia.

If this route is further investigated (it was not covered in this study) and the problem of having

to transfer freight at border stations between Kazakhstan and China solved and facilities for

transferring nuclear fuel established in Lianyungang port in China, then this could be a good

choice for a transport route from Kazakhstan for the international nuclear fuel cycle.

However, even if that were the case there are still issues of Chinese law permitting (spent)

nuclear fuel from other states to pass through China and of the Chinese public accepting this, so

these points must also be studied.

Figure 6.7 Siberia Land Bridge Route and Eurasia Land Bridge Route

The table 6.13 displays evaluations of routes i) to iii):

(d) Hub Concept for International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Model

Of the routes examined in the previous section, as indicated in the table above route i) is an

already established route, but from a security perspective for the distance and route travelled it is

not a stable situation for a permanent nuclear fuel transport route.

In addition to route ii) not yet being a commercial route, estimates for the cost of

accompanying icebreakers (icebreaker vessels for nuclear materials) are difficult and there is a

lack of infrastructure on the coast along the route, meaning this route could not be used

immediately at this point.

Therefore, the remainder of this study will assume the use of route iii).

Siberia Land Bridge

Eurasia Land Bridge

104

Table 6.13 Comparison of Possible Routes for International Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Route

Length

Route

Safety

Access to

Facilities

Port

Facilities

Notes

Route i)

St. Petersburg

(via Suez Canal)

△ △ ○ ◎ Choke points and

pirates (Suez Canal,

Somalia, Malacca)

Route ii)

St. Petersburg

(via Arctic

Ocean)

○ △ ○ ◎ Viability as a

commercial route

(accompaniment by

icebreakers,

establishing shipping

lane, etc.)

Route iii)-1

Eastern Russia

Port (Vostochny)

(via Siberian

Land Bridge)

◎ ◎ ◎ ○

Route iii)-2

China,

Lianyungang

(via Eurasian

Land Bridge)

◎ ◎ △ (Unknown) Railway gauge

differences between

Kazakhstan/Mongolia

and China (need to

transfer cargo)

(△=average, ○=good, ◎=excellent)

For this international fuel cycle model, due to Japan’s geographical position between nuclear

supplier land power states in the heartland of the Eurasian continent and nuclear consumer state

in the rimland of the Eurasian continent and rimland and offshore states off the coast of Eurasia,

Japan could fulfill a role as a hub to control logistics by moderating supply and demand for

nuclear fuel.

In order to fulfill a hub role in this international fuel cycle model, in addition to the

geographic conditions mentioned above it is also necessary to be a supply source for nuclear

energy resources, have the infrastructure necessary to control the flow of nuclear fuel and

have/improve the domestic security appropriate for this infrastructure, as well as having public

support for these policies.

The items below are specific requirements:

- Supply primary materials and equipment for nuclear energy

- Carry out quality control for materials from other states

- Guarantee peaceful uses of nuclear energy by user states

- Improved (facilities) for enrichment and reprocessing

- Have an emergency response system in the case of nuclear accidents (take advantage of the

shorter distances relative to Europe/North America and have material bases, create an

emergency response team)

105

- Management facilities for nuclear fuel (materials) transportation

- Nuclear fuel transport ships and system to operate them

- Control system for nuclear fuel transport ships

- Storage facilities for temporary storage of nuclear fuel, etc.

1)-5 Geopolitical perspective on issues with the international nuclear fuel cycle model

(a) Issues with geopolitical situations of MNA participant states

The potential MNA participant states are centered in the Asian region, but they are still spread

over a wide area and thus the conditions facing each state are different case by case.

For example, MNA participant states include some with weaker geopolitical stability such as

those with neighboring states carrying out nuclear experiments and missile launches despite

international objections, states with pirates operating within or near their borders79

, and states with

active anti-government guerrilla forces.

With MNA participant states including countries in these kinds of situations, it is an issue

whether or not decisions can be made in general on establishing facilities handling sensitive nuclear

technologies and materials such as uranium enrichment facilities, SF reprocessing facilities and SF

medium-term storage facilities.

For these reasons, it is necessary for MNA membership requirements and requirements for

establishing MNA facilities to include discussions on geopolitical stability.

(b) Issues with border or territorial disputes near the transport route (ex: Spratly Islands, Paracel

Islands, Senkaku Islands, Takeshima islands)

Of the MNA participant states considered, some are involved in nautical border or territorial

disputes with other states.

Since these types of territorial disputes are an issue of national dignity, it is very rare that

territories are returned during peacetime, and these problems take time to solve.

For China in particular with its rapid ocean expansion in recent years, the area near the Spratly

Islands in the South China Sea is not only an area which has always been fished, there may also

be resources in the seabed such as oil or natural gas and it is an important nautical route linking

China to the rest of the world, making it a higher priority than other regions for Chinese ocean

policy.

This has led to increased tensions with other states that have interest in the region, and there is

no simple solution.

These territorial disputes between MNA related states currently mainly focus on issues around

the extension of continental shelves or sovereignty of island groups, but as mentioned previously

some of these territorial disputes are occurring in areas near the ocean portion of the nuclear fuel

transport route, including the South China Sea mentioned above.

The nuclear fuel transport vessels travelling through these waters near disputed areas would

79 MOFA homepage September 2012 “Pirate Activity in the Southeast Asia Region and Japanese Measures”

With 46 incidents of piracy in 2011, Indonesia accounted for over half of piracy incidents, followed by Malaysia at 16, Malacca and

Singapore Straits at 12, and Philippines at 5 incidents.

http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pirate/asia.html Accessed 25/01/2013

http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pirate/asia.html

106

have to consider the situation during transport. If safe travel was not possible, it would have to

take an alternate route well away from those areas.

In cases where alternate routes avoiding these areas becomes necessary, it may be necessary to

pass through the waters of a third party state, which would require permission from that state to

pass through their waters as described below.

(c) Issues with passing through waters of third party states (right of passage in international

channels and national waters)

Although not generally considered for normal transport, in the case of emergencies such as

mentioned in the previous section it may be possible for cases to arise where the (spent) nuclear

fuel transport ship being used by the MNA has to pass through the waters of a third party state.

Based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea80

, when necessary to safeguard the

security of their nation then these third party states may temporarily suspend the right of innocent

passage for foreign vessels.

When this suspension of the right of passage is carried out, it would mean nuclear transport

would stop and could have an effect on the entire nuclear fuel cycle.

As a preventative measure for this issue, the countries related to these international channels

(Indonesia, Malaysia) and third party states whose waters may need to be passed through (such as

the Philippines) can be made partner states for the international nuclear fuel cycle model, building

a cooperative relationship ahead of time and ensuring the right of passage through their territory.

Thinking further about the issue above, the measures led by Japan that are currently being

taken to prevent piracy in Southeast Asia, specifically dispatching patrol ships and aircraft,

donating patrol ships and cooperating to improve ocean security with coast guard training

specialists and the like, could be used to improve cooperation between MNA participant states for

increasing ocean security.

Using the current ReCAAP as a base for more expanded cooperation, the coast guards of

MNA participant states could work improve nuclear security by cooperating on security for

nuclear fuel transport ships and ensuring safe passage through their waters for MNA nuclear fuel

transport ships.

By sharing a system such as JASREP for participant states to track nuclear fuel transport ships

as part of the international nuclear fuel cycle model, it would be possible to guard nuclear fuel

transport ships both directly and indirectly and secure their passage.

These kinds of security measures for nuclear fuel transport have, as mentioned previously,

already begun in some form with efforts by Japan and other countries. Expanding current

activities and the degree of cooperation is feasible to start these measures.

These kinds of joint efforts to achieve ocean security through multilateral cooperation could

also help to build trust between MNA participant states and to deter the activities of or creation of

illegal organizations such as pirates and guerrillas.

80 * According to UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Article 52 Paragraph 1, “ships of all States enjoy the right of innocent

passage through archipelagic waters”, however in Article 52 Paragraph 2 it says ” The archipelagic State (states consisting of 2 or

more islands. According to UNCLOS Article 46. Includes Indonesia, Philippines) may suspend temporarily in specified areas of

its archipelagic waters the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security”.

107

Figure 6.8 Comparison of Potential Routes for International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Model:

Chokepoints in Southeast Asian Region

Chokepoint

Waters where joint ocean security activities may be carried out by MNA participants

1)-6 Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements of potential MNA participant states

a) Japan

Nuclear Cooperation Agreements With: Canada, Australia, China, the USA, France, the UK,

Kazakhstan, Vietnam, Jordan, Russia, South Korea, EURATOM

b) Russia

Nuclear Cooperation Agreements With: Canada, France, the UK, Germany, South Korea,

Vietnam, China, Mongolia, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Czech Republic, Finland, India,

Iran, Romania, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, etc.

c) China

Nuclear Cooperation Agreements With: Japan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil,

Canada, Chile, Egypt, Finland, France, the UK, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, (Kazakhstan:

fuel supply agreement), South Korea, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Russia, Spain, Switzerland,

Ukraine, the USA, EURATOM

d) South Korea

Nuclear Cooperation Agreements With: Canada, Australia, China, the USA, France, Japan, the

UK, Germany, Spain, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Russia, Vietnam, Jordan, Brazil, etc.

e) Vietnam

Nuclear Cooperation Agreements With: Japan, Russia, China, France, South Korea, Argentina

f) Indonesia

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Nuclear Cooperation Agreements With: Argentina, Canada, China, France, Germany, India,

Italy, Pakistan, Russia, the USA

g) Malaysia

Nuclear Cooperation Agreements With: the USA (to provide TRIGA research reactor), Pakistan

h) Thailand

Nuclear Cooperation Agreements With: the USA, Argentina, India

i) Mongolia

Nuclear Cooperation Agreements With: Russia

j) Kazakhstan

Nuclear Cooperation Agreements With: Japan, the USA, Russia, South Korea, (India: signed),

EURATOM

*Underlines indicate nuclear cooperation agreements with potential MNA participants.

When providing nuclear resources and nuclear fuel materials, the supplier and recipient states

must have a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, but as indicated above currently the potential

MNA participant states are not building cooperative relationships.

Also, the current MNA cooperative framework being examined does not include guarantees

on the provision of nuclear resources between member states in the agreement, so bilateral nuclear

cooperation agreements would also be necessary in addition to the MNA agreement.

Therefore, in addition to signing the cooperative agreement for the MNA framework, it is also

necessary for these MNA participant states to create bilateral cooperative relationships and build an

environment where nuclear resources can move freely between MNA participant states (refer to 6.1

6)).

1)-7 Specific case studies

(a) Frontend Transport (1)

(Mining, Refining, Conversion: Kazakhstan/ Mongolia → Uranium Enrichment: Russia/ Japan)

i) Transport to Russia from Kazakhstan and Mongolia

For transport to Russia from Kazakhstan and Mongolia (assuming transportation to Angarsk

in Russia, which has a uranium enrichment facility), transport will primarily occur by land.

When examining this route, both transportation by rail and automobile can be considered,

but due to the possibility of serious accidents occurring during transport81

, rail transport will be

considered here.

Also, due to the reasons given in e) (c), the transport route in this case would basically

follow the Siberia Land Bridge route.

Regarding the state of railroad infrastructure in Kazakhstan and Mongolia, Mongolia in

particular does have some issues82

, but nuclear fuel materials have been transported using these

81 “Accident Prevention Proposals and Evaluation Based on Analysis of Statistical Data on Major Railroad Accidents”, Masashi

Miwa, Tatsuo Ooyama. Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Vol.66.No.2 p89 2010.4

https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jscejd/66/2/66_2_89/_pdf Accessed 25/01/2013 82 2011-2012 Study on Overseas Coal Development “Examination of Transport Infrastructure for Asian Pacific in Development of

Coal Resources in Mongolian Southern Gobi Region”, P.12, February 2012.New Energy and Industrial Technology Development

Organization http://coal.jogmec.go.jp/result/docs/029.pdf

https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jscejd/66/2/66_2_89/_pdf

109

railroads in the past83

and due to the former Soviet Union managing the railroads in these two

states in the past they both have rails of the same size as Russia and the same type of railroad

system, meaning there are no major issues in using this route as a transport system.

Also, since Kazakhstan and Russia eliminated customs as part of a customs union they

entered into in 2010, there are also no tax issues with transporting goods between the two

states.

In order to support the export of Mongolia coal overseas, Russia and Mongolia already have

a deal to reduce freight tariffs on coal, and if this policy to encourage Mongolian mineral

exports was also applied to uranium exports then it could help reduce tax issues with transport

between the two states.

ii) Transport to Japan from Kazakhstan and Mongolia

- Transporting to Japan from Kazakhstan/ Mongolia via Russia

Transporting to Japan (eastern Japan assumed) from Kazakhstan and Mongolia will involve a

mixture of land and sea transport routes.

In this case, for the next frontend process of reconversion and fuel fabrication there are no

planned routes to return from Japan to Kazakhstan due to transportation costs. Instead, this will

also look at carrying out reconversion and fuel processing after transporting materials to Japan

(eastern Japan), South Korea and China.

With this route, first there is the issue of establishing a route from Kazakhstan to Japan. As

indicated in d) (c), there are past examples of using land routes from Kazakhstan through

Russia to transport uranium to the European side, transfer it to ship at St. Petersburg, transport

it to the UK or France by sea, process fuel there and then transport it to Japan by sea from

Europe.

As this route goes through Europe, in addition to the land distance covered the distance of the

sea route is very long, and involves passing through chokepoints including the Suez Canal,

Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Strait of Malacca to reach Japan. This route has both high

transportation costs and geopolitical risks, especially in the area in the Indian Ocean where

Somalia pirates are operating.

As another option, recently the Japanese government has been examining a route using the

Siberia railroad from Kazakhstan through Russia, to a far eastern Russia port (Vostochny, near

Vladivostok) and then shipping by sea from that Russian port to Japan.

For this route, in addition to nuclear fuel having been transported in the past overland using

the railroad route between Kazakhstan and Russia there is also the relatively short distance of

the sea route from Russia to Japan, which passes from Russian waters→international

waters→Japanese waters without passing through any third party states, and due to the fact that

Japanese and Russian cooperation already exists for maritime security84

, securing the safety of

83 “Preparations to Introduce Nuclear Energy in Mongolia and Uranium Mining”, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Summary of

International Section 27/12/2011

www.jaif.or.jp/ja/asia/mongol/mongol_data.pdf Accessed 25/01/2013 84 September 2000, Japanese and Russian Coast Guard directors signed “Memorandum on Cooperation between Japanese Coast

Guard and Russian Federation Border Guard (Russian FSB Coast Guard). Based on this memorandum, information exchange,

mutual visitations and joint training are carried out. MOFA homepage http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/russia/kankei.html

http://www.jaif.or.jp/ja/asia/mongol/mongol_data.pdf

http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/russia/kankei.html

110

the route between Russia and Japan (stable transport can be carried out as no security issues

exist near the route, such as piracy or armed conflict) is not a difficult option.

Issues with the land route include the capacity of the port (Vostochny), but since Vostochny

Port has qualifications and experience in transporting nuclear materials, the Russian Customs

Agency has proposed to the government using Far East ports to export nuclear fuel, and as

mentioned previously TENEX is currently building infrastructure to use this route for

transporting new fuel, the possibility of any major issues occurring when using this route are

quite low.

Also, Vostochny Port does not freeze over, meaning its facilities can be used year round.

As mentioned above, the Russia→Japan sea route does not pass through the waters of any

other states and is a short distance, so there are not likely to be any problems for transport.

If uranium mining, refinement and conversion was carried out in Mongolia, and this route

through Russia (port: Vostochny) was to be used, then it should be possible to transport

between the two states since uranium has been transported from Mongolia to Russia

(Krasnokamensk) in the past and there are no major technical issues transporting from

Krasnokamensk to Vostochny Port.

Therefore, when TENEX finishes building infrastructure and if there are no issues with

Vostochny Port’s capabilities sending transport to Japan then this route could be used as a

primary transport route for the MNA frontend same as the route from Kazakhstan to Japan.

- Transporting to Japan from Kazakhstan via China

For a route where mining, refinement and conversion is carried out in Kazakhstan before

shipping to Japan, a possible route is using the Eurasia Land Bridge

(Kazakhstan→China→Chinese port: Lianyungang) to transport to Japan.

This route was opened in 1992 for container railroad transport (Kazakhstan is passed

through) from Asia to Europe (final destination is Rotterdam in the Netherlands). Since it

operates as a transport route between China and Europe, if this route could be used for transport

from Kazakhstan then transport should be very stable, as it already has a solid track record for

transporting standard freight.

Technical issues for this route include the difference in rail specifications between

Kazakhstan and China, and therefore the capability to transfer cargo at Chinese border stations

(Alashankou) and at Lianyungang Port.

Since the capacity of the infrastructure for transferring cargo at Alashankou station and

Lianyungang Port has not yet been studied, no decision can be made at this time on the

usability of this Eurasia Land Bridge route.

Looking at this route from Japan, the distance from Lianyungang to Japanese destinations

(assuming eastern Japan) is longer, and if fuel processing is to occur in Japan the transport

route would be rather circuitous.

If the decision was made to use this route, then the geographic conditions of Lianyungang in

China would make it a very appropriate route for transporting nuclear fuel materials to South

Korea, and if South Korea is going to be involved in the MNA nuclear fuel cycle then this route

Accessed 29/01/2013

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should be considered.

Also, if Mongolia is the point of origin then Chinese railways could be used for transport to

the largest open port in China’s northeast, the Port of Tianjin, as an example, but as there is a

limit to the capacity for transferring cargo at border stations due to the differences in

Mongolian and Chinese railways85

, there is likely very little leeway for accepting the

transportation of new sensitive nuclear materials, as well as the capacity of Tianjin’s

infrastructure being unknown, the feasibility of this route is therefore unknown.

For these reasons, when transporting nuclear fuel originating in Mongolia the Russian route

is currently more realistic.

(b) Frontend Transport (2)

(Uranium Enrichment: Russia/ Japan → Reconversion, Fuel Manufacturing: Kazakhstan/

Japan/ South Korea/ China)

Since the issue of transporting enriched nuclear materials from Russia/Japan to Kazakhstan

has already been considered, it won’t be repeated here (Based on transportation costs,

transporting uranium enriched in Russia/Japan to Kazakhstan is not a possibility considered for

this MNA framework. This case may be considered if several Central Asian states were to

join the MNA framework).

For the case where uranium enriched in Japan is then reconverted and fuel fabricated inside

Japan, since Japan already has experience in processes from enrichment to fuel fabrication

there should be no particular technical problems, including domestic transport, and so there is

no need to re-evaluate it here.

Therefore, here we will consider issues in the case of transporting uranium enriched in

Russia or Japan to South Korea or China.

- Transporting Enriched Uranium from Russia or Japan to South Korea

When transporting uranium enriched in either Russia or Japan to South Korea to be

fabricated into nuclear fuel, the transport route used would be a sea route.

There are few obstacles to sea transport between Japan and Korea, and Japan and Korea hold

a conference between the heads of their Coast Guards every year, demonstrating the

cooperation between their maritime security services, and there should be no significant

problems in building a cooperative system for nuclear security for transportation of nuclear

materials between the two countries.

Russia and South Korea do not have any particular problems between their Coast Guards

either, and it should not be difficult to create a cooperative maritime security system.

Therefore, there should be no major problems with ensuring security for the transport of

nuclear material between Russia and South Korea.

For uranium enrichment, South Korea uses services from the USA, France and Russia86

, and

85 2011-2012 Study on Overseas Coal Development “Examination of Transport Infrastructure for Asian Pacific in Development of

Coal Resources in Mongolian Southern Gobi Region”, P.24, February 2012.New Energy and Industrial Technology Development

Organization 86 Japan Atomic Industrial Forum “Expanding Asian Atomic Energy: South Korean Nuclear Development” page 25, 12/04/2010

http://www.jaif.or.jp/ja/asia/korea/korea_data.pdf Accessed 29/01/2013

http://www.jaif.or.jp/ja/asia/korea/korea_data.pdf

112

South Korea’s largest shipping port Incheon, near Daejeon where enriched uranium is used for

reconversion and state processing of fuel, should have the necessary infrastructure for

transporting nuclear fuel materials.

While Daejeon is located near the center of the Korean Peninsula, it is only approximately

150km from Incheon, which is the largest shipping port in South Korea, and based on South

Korea’s experience transporting nuclear fuel materials domestically there should be few issues

with transport.

From a technical perspective, South Korea is already processing enough fuel domestically to

operate its nuclear power plants, and so there should be no issues with their nuclear fuel

processing technology.

Therefore the biggest issue with the possibility of having South Korea handle nuclear fuel

manufacturing within the MNA is their neighboring state that continues to perform nuclear tests

and develop missiles despite efforts from the international community, creating an unstable

geopolitical situation.

- Transporting Enriched Uranium from Russia or Japan to China

China is said to carry out form processing of fuel inland (Inner Mongolia Autonomous

Region, Sichuan) at nuclear fuel plants87

.

Assuming Russia (Angarsk) as the state to enrich uranium, when using railway for transport

from Russia to the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region then as mentioned previously the

Mongolian People's Republic is not an appropriate route choice due to the limited capacity for

transferring cargo at Chinese/Mongolian border stations, so if an appropriate route could be

determined via Manzhouli then total transport distance would not be particularly long, and

aside from the issues of transferring cargo there are no other particular problems for

transportation.

For transporting uranium enriched in Russia to the nuclear fuel plant in Sichuan, the distance

from Russia is fairly significant and so a more appropriate route should be chosen.

These issues with determining a transport route also exist for the case of transporting

uranium enriched in Japan to Lianyungang in China by sea and then transporting it to nuclear

fuel plants in Sichuan or the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

As China has not transported nuclear fuel materials (enriched uranium) with other countries

before, it is necessary to look at establishing other transportation routes to nuclear fuel

processing plants in addition to the routes from Russia and Japan mentioned here.

Due to these issues, within the current MNA framework being considered transporting

enriched uranium from Russia or Japan to China and then having China process the fuel

involves too many uncertain factors, including the positioning of nuclear plants in China, to

seem a possibility at this time.

(c) Frontend Transport (3)

(Reconversion, Fuel Fabrication: Kazakhstan/ Japan/ South Korea/ China → LWR: Advanced

states, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia)

87 Nuclear Pocketbook 2010 Edition (September, 2010) page 552, Japan Electric Association Newspaper Department, other

113

- Transporting Fuel from Kazakhstan to Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia

A route for transporting LWR fuel from Kazakhstan to emerging Asian nuclear states

(Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia) would pass through Russia (Vostochny Port) just as

the routes previously considered.

As Kazakhstan has no experience in the fabrication of nuclear fuel at this time, the case

should be considered where a third party performs quality assurance on the fuel bundles to be

certain they match the specifications of the nuclear power plants built in the emerging Asian

nuclear states.

Japan has experience fabricating the nuclear fuel used in its nuclear power plants

domestically, and possesses a significant amount of nuclear fuel fabrication technology.

In the case that fuel fabricated in Kazakhstan for emerging Asian nuclear states is to undergo

quality assurance to confirm it matches specifications, Japan is a possible candidate to carry out

this quality assurance, and after the fuel is shipped out from Vostochny Port it could be

transported to Japan to undergo inspection.

These quality assurance activities would not only ensure the soundness of nuclear fuel

fabricated in Kazakhstan, but by reserving the right for Japan to inspect the use of this nuclear

fuel (by the state with the nuclear facility using this fuel) that it has checked, it would enable

Japan to guarantee peaceful use of nuclear energy by the state using this fuel, and could also

make it feasible for this fuel to be sent to Japan for reprocessing once spent.

This case would use the same route as if Japan fabricated fuel using uranium mined in

Kazakhstan.

This route going from a far eastern port in Russia (Vostochny Port) to Japan (eastern Japan)

and then onto emerging Asian nuclear states would not be a significant detour in terms of

distance compared to transporting directly to emerging Asian nuclear states, so if the quality

assurance in Japan was carried out in a timely fashion it would not have a significant influence

on either time or cost.

The issues with transporting this fuel from Japan to Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand and

Indonesia are the same as those indicated in the transportation cases given below.

- Transporting Fuel from Japan to Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia

The route for transporting fuel from Japan to emerging Asian nuclear states passes several

regions with potential territorial conflicts, and it may be necessary to avoid them and pass

through the waters of third party states, as shown in Figure 6.9.

Therefore, for transportation from Japan to the emerging Asian nuclear states mentioned here

the MNA framework or some other framework should be used to quickly build a cooperative

system to ensure maritime security, as indicated in e) (c). Currently, Japan concludes the

nuclear cooperation agreement with only Vietnam in the Southeast Asian region, and this is also

an issue that should be dealt with.

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Figure 6.9 MNA Participant States and Regions with Possible Obstacles for Nuclear Fuel

Transport Routes

- Transporting Fuel from South Korea to Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia

As mentioned previously, South Korea’s fuel fabrication plant is located in Daejeon, inland

in the Korean Peninsula, and it is approximately 150km to the shipping port, but as South

Korea has already demonstrated transportation capabilities processing fuel for their domestic

nuclear reactors, there should be no issues with this overland section of transportation.

However, when shipping by sea from South Korea to Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand or

Indonesia the same areas of territorial conflict exist as when shipping from Japan and it may be

necessary to avoid them and pass through the waters of third party states.

Considering these circumstances, the same necessity exists to build a cooperative system

between maritime security forces of participant states to ensure nuclear security for maritime

transport as exists with the route from Japan.

- Transporting Fuel from China to Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia

As mentioned above, the nuclear fabrication plants in China are located inland, and if

processed fuel was to be transported from China to other states such as emerging Asian nuclear

states then the biggest issue would be the route from the plants to the shipping ports.

Since China has no experience exporting this kind of nuclear fuel for energy generation, it is

not possible to determine the feasibility of a transport route from the inland (Sichuan or the

Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region) to the shipping port on the coast.

Assuming Lianyungang as the shipping port for the Eurasia Land Bridge, the distance from

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that port to South Korea is relatively short and there are no areas with territorial disputes or

security issues such as pirates along the route, so much as with the route assuming fuel

fabrication in Kazakhstan, it should not be difficult to perform quality assurance in South

Korea on the nuclear fuel fabricated in China.

On the other hand, if fuel is sent from Lianyungang to Japan (eastern Japan) to perform

quality assurance and then sent on to emerging Asian nuclear states it would require a

significant increase in the length of the sea route, and would not be as beneficial from a time or

cost standpoint as with other routes.

Due to these factors, when considering the case of transporting nuclear fuel fabricated in

China, carrying out quality assurance in South Korea seems the most reasonable option.

(d) Backend Transport (1) Transporting SF to Reprocessing Facilities

(Nuclear Power Plants: Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia→ SF Reprocessing: Russia,

Japan, (South Korea), China)

i) Transporting from Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia to Russia

Since this route would be the opposite of the route taken for the frontend, it would involve

transport to a far eastern port in Russia (Vostochny Port) and then transport by land to SF

reprocessing facilities in Krasnoyarsk or elsewhere.

As mentioned in the section about the frontend route, there are areas with the potential for

territorial conflict near the sea route, and the possibility of diverting into the waters of third

party states will be considered in particular around the conflict area.

To deal with these situations, especially when transporting sensitive materials such as SF,

there is a need to create a cooperative system between the maritime security forces of

participant states in order to ensure nuclear security for maritime transport.

If it is possible to use the railway (Siberia Land Bridge) for the land route, then there should

be few technical problems transporting the SF to the SF reprocessing plant planned for

construction in Russia’s far east (assuming Krasnoyarsk).

However, as mentioned in e) (c), the biggest issue with this route is Russian law regarding

the acceptance of SF.

Therefore, in order to use this route to reprocess SF, Russia would have to be able to accept

SF from other states for domestic transport, and so public opinion in Russia on acceptance of

this issue needs to be confirmed.

At the lecture by A. Haperskaya, advisor to Rosatom’s Nuclear/ Radioactive Safety

Department SF/ Radioactive Waste Management and Decommissioning Project, held on March

3 2011 by the Japanese Atomic Industrial Forum, it was reported that Russia’s current plans for

reprocessing facility RT-2 (Krasnoyarsk) were made considering the possibility of reprocessing

fuel from reactors Russia built outside the country88

.

In cases in the future where Russia includes a condition that SF from reactors they have

exported will be reprocessed in Russia, this type of transportation may be recognized.

As the Russian VVER design is unique, currently only Russia can fabricate the nuclear fuel

88 Japan Atomic Industrial Forum homepage “Rosatom, Plans Comprehensive Center in Krasnoyarsk”

http://www.jaif.or.jp/ja/kokusai/russia/sf-lecture_meeting110303.html Accessed 06/02/2013

http://www.jaif.or.jp/ja/kokusai/russia/sf-lecture_meeting110303.html

116

necessary for nuclear power plants with this type of reactor.

ii) Transporting from Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia to Japan


transport to Japan (eastern Japan) by sea route.

As mentioned in the section about the frontend route, there are areas with the potential for

territorial conflict near the sea route, and the possibility of diverting into the waters of third

party states will be considered in particular around the conflict area.

To deal with these situations, especially when transporting sensitive materials such as SF,

there is a need to create a cooperative system between the maritime security forces of

participant states in order to ensure nuclear security for maritime transport.

Since Japan has not officially examined reprocessing SF from other states, even if the

capacity is available at reprocessing facilities and reprocessing is technically possible, the

current laws prevent Japan from reprocessing SF from other states, and it is unclear whether

public opinion in Japan would accept reprocessing SF from other states.

After the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in particular, public

opinion is very critical of nuclear power and in order for the public to accept this kind of case it

would be necessary to demonstrate the safety of the SF and reprocessing facilities and have the

public understand the necessity of Japan carrying out this reprocessing.

In order to do this, by having Japan carry out quality assurance for new fuel and flag that fuel

so that Japan can ensure it is used for peaceful uses, it will give a reason for Japan to bring that

SF into the country.

iii) Transporting from Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia to China

China is said to be building a commercial reprocessing facility inland in Jiayuguan, Gansu89

and China is also looking at transporting SF to this facility from their nuclear power plants

located in coastal areas, which would involve both land and sea transport.

Although there is an international rail running between Vietnam and China, due to

differences in the rail tracks it is necessary to transfer at border stations and so it is not realistic

to use this system for transport.

Considering this situation, a transport route from Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia

to China would have to first transport the SF to a Chinese port, and then be transported by land

to the commercial reprocessing facility.

According to news reports, in January 2011 China succeeded at reprocessing experiments

with SF from nuclear power plants90

and if this is true and this technology is used at the

commercial reprocessing facility then it should be possible to reprocess the SF from these

countries.

However, recent news seems to indicate the Chinese population is becoming more aware of

89 ATOMICA “Nuclear Fuel Cycle in China”

http://www.rist.or.jp/atomica/data/dat_detail.php?Title_No=14-02-03-04 Accessed 09/02/2013 90 China Succeeds at Reprocessing Spent Fuel (Beijing Gongtong)

http://www.47news.jp/CN/201101/CN2011010301000569.html Accessed 09/02/2013

http://www.rist.or.jp/atomica/data/dat_detail.php?Title_No=14-02-03-04

http://www.47news.jp/CN/201101/CN2011010301000569.html

117

their rights, and much like Russia it is uncertain whether the public would accept transporting

SF a long distance from coastal areas to reprocessing facilities inland.

This was also mentioned for frontend transport when transporting new nuclear fuel from

inland nuclear fuel plants to shipping ports on the coast, but public opinion is likely to be even

stronger when it is SF instead of new fuel that is being transported.

Therefore, the most significant problem for SF from other states being reprocessed in China

is whether a transport route can be established that the public will accept.

In particular, the distance from coastal areas to Gansu province where the current

commercial reprocessing facility is located is several thousand kilometers and passes through

heavily populated areas, making the establishment of this route seem difficult.

(e) Backend Transport (2) Transporting SF to Medium-term Storage Facilities

(Nuclear Power Plants: Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia→ Medium-term Storage

Facilities: Russia, Kazakhstan)

i) Transporting from Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia to Russia

Analysis of this route would overlap with the same route described in “Transporting SF to

Reprocessing Facilities” above, so it will not be analyzed here.

ii) Transporting from Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia to Kazakhstan


transport to a far eastern port in Russia (Vostochny Port) and then transport by land via Russia

to SF medium-term storage facilities in Kazakhstan. For the location of SF medium-term

storage facilities in Kazakhstan, we will assume the Semey nuclear test site.

The issues with the sea and land portions within Russia of this route have already been

described in “Transporting from Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia to Russia” above,

but in this case the final destination of the SF is Kazakhstan instead of Russia and so the issue

remains of how Russian public opinion would view this.

In the case that SF was transported by land via China, then the issue of public opinion within

China still exists, making either route have uncertain factors.

According to the expert from Kazakhstan in e) (c), Kazakhstan law prohibits the import of

radioactive waste and so in order to transport SF to Kazakhstan and store it for the

medium-term it would be necessary to acquire public acceptance of the idea, meaning the issue

of public opinion exists in Kazakhstan as well.

However, as the same expert mentioned the possibility of implementing a nuclear fuel

leaseback system should there be demand for one, then if nothing else the medium-term storage

of SF in Kazakhstan from the nuclear fuel leaseback system may be possible.

Therefore, the medium-term storage of SF in Kazakhstan may be considered as an option

assuming this nuclear fuel leaseback system is introduced.

(f) Geopolitical Merits of MNA, What MNA Means to Japan and Issues

Until this point, geopolitical issues with the MNA were considered, so last we would like to

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look at the merits of the MNA for Japan and other participant states.

As indicated previously, the MNA framework would have the following benefits for Japan:

i) By developing new routes for transportation of nuclear fuel, Japan will have access to new

sources for nuclear fuel

ii) By taking advantage of the geographic characteristics that exist between nuclear fuel

producer and consumer states, Japan could act as a hub for nuclear fuel transport routes and

control the flow of nuclear fuel while providing a fuel supply guarantee service to consumer

states

iii) As part of this hub functionality, Japan could carry out quality assurance on completed

nuclear fuel and flag it so that Japan would be able to inspect the state it was consumed in to

guarantee it was being used for peaceful purposes

As these examples make clear, for future global expansion of Japanese nuclear industry the

MNA cooperative framework provides Japan with merits that cannot be overlooked.

For other participant states, it could lead to opening new trade routes for nuclear fuel in the

Asian region for nuclear fuel producing states such as Russia and Kazakhstan, and by including

an international organization (AMAO) and third party states (hub states) in providing nuclear

fuel cycle services from uranium mining to medium-term storage of SF to nuclear fuel

consumer states it can reduce the country risk of those states involved. By using the MNA

cooperative framework, there is also the possibility of technological cooperation and

partnerships with nuclear power resource companies in other MNA states.

For South Korea, it may provide a solution to the issue of SF kept within the country by

storing the SF at a medium-term storage facility that is part of the MNA nuclear fuel cycle.

For China, it could open up the possibility of providing nuclear fuel cycle services to other

states in the Asian region.

For Mongolia, by building cooperative systems with other states it could help open up new

trade routes within this multilateral framework as a nuclear fuel producer state.

Finally, for emerging Asian nuclear states it could provide the possibility of acquiring a

supply of nuclear fuel and having other states deal with SF processing and storage.

These are some of the merits the MNA could provide to the potential participants considered

here, and if this framework is used effectively it could be an excellent opportunity for Japan

considering the geopolitical position of the country.

However, several issues exist when it comes to establishing this framework.

First, whether the policy makers in the states considered for participation in the MNA

understand the merits of the MNA listed above and make the decision to join the MNA. As

described in the following section, there is no significant difference in the cost of the nuclear

fuel cycle operated by a single country compared to the MNA framework, and so the incentives

to join the MNA are not cost-based and instead depend on how each state views the merits

listed above.

For the states considered for participation here, the merits above are likely to be of some

benefit, but not to the extent that they make the decision to join the MNA. Therefore, in

addition to the commercial and economic merits mentioned here, it will be necessary to

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demonstrate the political merits of the MNA such as strengthening cooperation between MNA

participant states as part of foreign policy, and then have all these factors considered together to

make the decision to join the MNA.

The next issue is that of allowing passage of nuclear fuel materials originating in other states

and reprocessing them in domestic facilities or storing SF for the medium-term, which public

opinion is unlikely to accept in any of these states.

Of the states considered for MNA participation, there are other states in addition to Russia

and Kazakhstan which was mentioned previously where federal law prohibits the importation

of SF originating in other states, as well as the recent activity of the Chinese public, making it

unclear whether states will accept the points indicated above. Therefore it will be necessary to

continually examine public opinion trends in each state in order to make decisions on these

matters.

Finally, an issue that is closely related to that of acceptance by public opinion is the

establishment of transportation routes necessary to the MNA.

Based on considerations up to this point, the transport route for Kazakhstan and Russia being

(nuclear fuel) supplier states and Far Eastern rim land and offshore states including Japan being

(nuclear fuel) consumer states would currently use a land route through Siberia to St.

Petersburg and then travel by sea through the Suez Canal to the Far East, but as this route

covers a vast distance and there are multiple chokepoints on the sea route it is not an ideal route.

Therefore, it is vital to create a new route using the Siberia Land Bridge or some other route to

reach a Russian far eastern port. Fortunately, as TENEX is currently building infrastructure in

Russian far eastern ports (December 2012 MNA Workshop (the University of Tokyo)), this

route should be available before long as a substitute for the current route for transporting

nuclear fuel materials. Also, if the issue of accepting SF originating in other states is solved

this route could also be used for transporting SF, a major step towards creating the MNA.

The creation of a route such as this that would allow for the transportation of SF is likely the

final hurdle that remains before the MNA can become a reality.

2) Economic efficiency: comparison with country-based management

The international management of the nuclear fuel cycle has been discussed by many study

groups.91, 92

Their studies have shown that the multilateral management framework is not only

effective in nuclear nonproliferation but is also cost-effective. It has also been mentioned that in

terms of economic efficiency, facilities under multilateral management are superior to facilities

under country-based (country-by-country) management because the larger scale of the former

makes the economy of scale work greatly.

Many studies 93, 94, 95, 96, 97

have been conducted on the cost evaluation of nuclear fuel cycles

91 V. Meckoni, R.J. Catlin, L.L. Bennett, “Regional nuclear fuel cycle centres: IAEA study project,” Energy Policy, 5, 267-281 (1977). 92 IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), “Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle,” Expert Group Report to the

Director General of the IAEA, Vienna (2005). 93 OECD/NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency), “The economics of the nuclear fuel cycle.” OECD/NEA, Paris (1994). 94 M. Bunn, S. Fetter, J.P. Holdren, B. van der Zwaan, “The economics of reprocessing vs. direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel,”

120

and reprocessing facilities. In one of those studies, LaMontagne (2005) conducted economic

evaluation concerning multilateral management. Paying attention to the front end of the fuel cycle,

LaMontagne (2005) estimated the uranium enrichment cost including capital cost in a

country-based management case to be several billion dollars. In contrast, he estimated the cost in a

multilateral management case to be 600 million dollars. Thus, in front-end evaluation, too, the

multilateral management framework is economically more advantageous than the country-based

management framework. The evaluation by LaMontagne (2005), however, did not analyze the

economy of scale, which is one of the economical advantages of multilateral management as

mentioned above, nor did it take the back-end cost into consideration.

IAEA (2005) mentioned marine transportation of nuclear materials in multilateral

management. In the multilateral management framework, large-scale sensitive nuclear technology

facilities are established in a limited number of member countries. As a result, the number of sites

becomes relatively small, and nuclear proliferation risk becomes small. On the other hand,

opportunities for the marine transportation of nuclear materials should increase. The study also

points out that an increase in marine transportation opportunities should result in an increase in the

possibility of a transportation accident. Overall transportation cost, therefore, is higher in

multilateral management than in country-based management.

Thus, in multilateral management and country-based management, the economy of scale and

transportation cost are in a trade-off relationship. In multilateral management, the economy of scale

is an advantage, but higher marine transportation cost than in country-based management is a

disadvantage.

In this section, nuclear fuel cycle cost in a multilateral management framework taking into

consideration both the front-end and the back-end of the fuel cycle is evaluated. The economic

efficiency of multilateral management and country-based management is compared with respect to the

economy of scale, transportation cost and delay in starting reprocessing to determine the level of

transportation cost at which multilateral management becomes economically advantageous. Then, by

assuming that there are interim storage, reprocessing and other facilities in Asian countries, scenarios

for transportation between those facilities are developed. By calculating the transportation cost in each

scenario and incorporating the costs thus determined into the abovementioned model, the economic

efficiency of the multilateral management framework taking the transportation scenarios into

consideration is evaluated.

Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard

University, Cambridge, MA (2003). 95 S.A. LaMontagne, “Multinational approaches to limiting the spread of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle capabilities,” Belfer Center

Programs or Projects: International Security; Preventive Defense Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. John F.

Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, MA (2005). 96 E.A. Schneider, M.R. Deinert, K.B. Cady, “Cost analysis of the US spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facility,” Energy Economics, 31,

627-634 (2009). 97 G.D. Recktenwald, M.R. Deinert, “Cost probability analysis of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel in the US,” Energy Economics, 34,

1873-1881 (2009).

121

2-1) Evaluation model

An economic evaluation model is constructed by referring to the nuclear fuel cycle cost models 98

developed by the Japan Atomic Energy Commission's Technical Subcommittee on Nuclear Power,

Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Etc.

The Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC)'s estimation models calculate cost in three cases

using the “Reprocessing Model”, “Direct Disposal Model” and the “Current Status Model” and

compare them. In this section, evaluation is made using the model shown in Figure 6.10 by referring

to the interim storage case in the “Current Status Model”. Following the in-core residence period

(from 0 to tgp), spent fuel is transported to an interim storage facility at time ttst. The spent fuel is kept

in storage from time tts to tr and transported to a reprocessing facility at time tr so that reprocessing

and MOX fuel fabrication are started. At time tg, power generation is started using reprocessed fuel

and MOX fuel, and at time td the disposal of high level waste (HLW) is conducted.

The total cost Call (yen/tU) of this nuclear fuel cycle can be expressed as follows:

where Cuf, Ctst, Cts, Crt, Cr, Cmox and Cd are unit costs (yen/tU) of uranium fuel, transportation to the

interim storage facility, interim storage, transportation to the reprocessing facility, reprocessing,

MOX fuel fabrication and HLW disposal, respectively, and ρ is the discount rate.

Figure 6.10 Evaluation model

98 JAEC Technical Subcommittee on Nuclear Power, Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Etc., Estimation of nuclear fuel cycle cost,

http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/tyoki/tyoki_hatsukaku.htm

Uranium fuelfabrication

Power generation

Temporary storage

Transport, Reprocessing and MOX fuel

fabrication

・・・

gpt0 tstt

Transport to Temporary

storage

tstrt gt

Power generation

・・・

dt

HLW Disposal

122

The amount of electric energy generated, P (kWh/tU), can be expressed as follows:

where H is the average burn-up (MWd/tU); Th, the number of hours per day (24 h/d); η, thermal

efficiency; ξ, unit conversion of the amount of power generation (1000 MW/kW). By dividing Eq.

(1) by Eq. (2), the nuclear fuel cycle cost Call/P (yen/kWh) can be calculated.

As mentioned earlier, it is assumed that the economy of scale works in favor of facilities

under multilateral management as opposed to facilities under country-based management.

Schneider et al. (2009) pointed out, as a result of their analysis, that the economy of scale works in

favor of reprocessing facilities. This study, therefore, focuses on reprocessing facilities and derives

the unit cost (yen/tU) of reprocessing facilities under country-based management using the

following formula:

where Crm and Cri are reprocessing costs (yen) under multilateral management and country-based

management, respectively; and Mrm and Mri, the capacity (tU) of reprocessing facilities under

multilateral management and country-based management, respectively. The scaling parameter γ

takes values ranging from 0.6 to 1. For example, Eq. (3) shows that if the capacity of facilities under

country-based management is assumed to be smaller than that of facilities under multilateral

management (Mri < Mrm), when γ = 1, the unit costs (yen/tU) of country-based management and

multilateral management are the same. When γ < 1, however, the unit cost of country-based

management is higher than that of multilateral management. In this study, it is assumed, using the

condition concerning the economy of scale expressed by Eq. (3), that there is a difference in

reprocessing cost between multilateral management and country-based management.

In this study, it is also assumed, for the purpose of analysis, that the cost of transportation to

interim storage facilities and reprocessing facilities is higher in multilateral management than in

country-based management. Differences in cost structure, therefore, between multilateral management

and country-based management are as follows:

where Ctstm and Ctsti represent the costs of transportation to interim storage facilities in multilateral

management and country-based management cases, respectively; and for Crtm and Crti, the costs of

transportation to reprocessing facilities in multilateral management and country-based management

cases.

𝑃 = 𝐻𝑇ℎ𝜂 1 − 𝐿 𝜉1

𝑡𝑔𝑝

1

1 + 𝜌 𝑥

𝑑𝑥𝑡𝑔𝑝

0

𝑟𝑡−1

1 + 𝜌 𝑡𝑔 𝑡−1

∞

𝑡=1

(2)

𝐶𝑟𝑖

𝐶𝑟𝑚=

𝑀𝑟𝑖

𝑀𝑟𝑚 𝛾

→ 𝐶𝑟𝑖 = 𝑀𝑟𝑖

𝑀𝑟𝑚 𝛾

𝐶𝑟𝑚

(3)

𝐶𝑟𝑚 < 𝐶𝑟𝑖

𝐶𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑚 > 𝐶𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑖

𝐶𝑟𝑡𝑚 > 𝐶𝑟𝑡𝑖

(4)

123

2-2) Numerical analysis

(a) Parameters

In this section, cycle cost is estimated in the multilateral management case and the

country-based management case using the evaluation model mentioned in the preceding section,

and the relationship of trade-off between the economy of scale and transportation cost is analyzed.

The parameters used in the basic cases in the analysis are those (discount rate ρ = 3%) used in

the interim storage scenarios for the “Current Status Model”, one of the JAEC estimation models.

The parameters at different points in time are tgp = 5 yr, ttst = 10 yr, tts = 30 yr, tr = 50 yr, tg = 51 yr

and td = 90 yr, and the interim storage period is 20 years, which is the difference between tr and tts

(tr − tts). In the analysis in this section, the interim storage period (tr − tts) of 20 years is considered

in the base case. The cases involving interim storage periods ranging from 20 years to 100 years are

analyzed later in this report.

As mentioned earlier, the reprocessing cost in a country-based management case is calculated

from Eq. (3). Based on the data of the JAEC estimation models, the total discounted present cost of a

reprocessing project at a discount rate of 3% is estimated to be 6,060.4 billion yen, and the total

discounted reprocessing throughput is estimated to be 14,759 tU. 99

Since the reprocessing capacity of

the Rokkasho reprocessing plant is 800 t, Crm and Mrm in Eq. (3) are assumed to be 6,060.4 billion yen

and 800 t, respectively. Schneider et al. (2009) analyzed the reprocessing costs corresponding to

scaling parameters γ of 0.8 and 1.0. In this study, a comparative analysis for scaling parameters γ of

0.7 to 0.9 is shown later in this report using the scaling parameter γ of 0.8 as the basic value. Using

these settings, Cri can be calculated for the reprocessing plant capacity Mri in a given case of

country-based management. For example, if the capacity is 80 t, which is one-tenth the capacity of the

Rokkasho reprocessing plant, then Cri = 960.5 billion yen and the unit cost of reprocessing is 650.8

million yen/tU. This means that the cost is 1.58 times as large as the cost in the case in which the

capacity is 800 t, indicating that the economy of scale is in effect.

Spent fuel transportation cost in the multilateral management case is assumed to be higher

than in the country-based management case. In this analysis, cycle cost is calculated in the cases in

which transportation cost is higher than in country-based management by a parameter of 1 to 10.

These are summarized in the table below.

99 It can be seen from these values that the unit cost of reprocessing when the discount rate is 3% is 410.62 million yen/tU. Since,

however, the value indicated by the JAEC estimation model is 411 million yen/tU, it seems that only three significant digits are shown.

124

Table 6.14 Unit costs of different project elements (discount rate: 3%)

Multilateral management

Country-based

management

Uranium fuel 10,000

yen/tU 27,100 27,100

Spent fuel transportation

(plant interim storage)

10,000

yen/tU 1,600－16,000 1,600

Interim storage 10,000

yen/tU 5,200 5,200

Spent fuel transportation

(interim storage

reprocessing)

10,000

yen/tU 1,700－17,000 1,700

Reprocessing 10,000

yen/tU 41,100 65,100（80tU）

MOX fuel 10,000

yen/tHM 41,500 41,500

HLW disposal

10,000

yen/tU 11,000 11,000

0.5

0.7

0.9

1.1

1.3

1.5

1.7

1.9

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Cyc

le c

ost（

yen

/kW

h）

Ratio of transport cost to the indigenous approach

Indigenous approach

MNA

Figure 6.11 Effect of transportation cost on cycle cost

125

(b) Cost comparison: multilateral management vs. country-based management

In this section, under the parameter conditions shown in the preceding section, cycle costs in

multilateral management and country-based management are calculated, and the calculated costs are

compared with transportation costs. Figure 6.11 shows the dependence of transportation cost on the

cycle cost (1.410 yen/kWh) in the country-based management case and the cycle cost in multilateral

management. As shown, as the transportation cost increases, the cycle cost in multilateral

management increases. It can also be seen that at around the point where the transportation cost in

multilateral management is 4.47 times as high as the transportation cost in country-based management,

the advantage–disadvantage relationship is reversed. This means that at or below 4.47, the cycle cost

in multilateral management is lower, and above 4.47, the cycle cost in country-based management is

lower.

Figure 6.12 analyzes the effect of the capacity of reprocessing facilities in the country-based

management case. As shown in Figure 6.13, as the capacity of reprocessing facilities increases from 40

tU through 80 tU to 200 tU, cycle cost (yen/kWh) decreases. As this occurs, the break-even point

relative to multilateral management falls from 5.87 through 4.46 to 2.89, indicating that the economic

advantages of the multilateral management case become smaller. Figure 6.12b shows the break-even

points for reprocessing capacity in a country-based management case and transportation cost in a

multilateral management case. For example, in Figure 6.12b, when the capacity of reprocessing

facilities in the country-based management case is 100 tU and the transportation cost in the multilateral

management case is three times as high, cycle cost is lower in the multilateral management case than in

the country-based management case. When, on the other hand, the capacity of reprocessing facilities in

the country-based management case is 200 tU and the transportation cost in the multilateral

management case is five times as high, cycle cost in the country-based management case is lower than

in the multilateral management case. This indicates that multilateral management is economically

advantageous when the capacity of reprocessing facilities in country-based management is relatively

small and the difference in transportation cost from country-based management is small.

(a) Effect of reprocessing capacity in

country-based management case

(b) Break-even point for reprocessing

capacity and transportation cost

Figure 6.12 Effect of transportation cost and reprocessing capacity on cycle cost

0.5

0.7

0.9

1.1

1.3

1.5

1.7

1.9

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Cyc

le c

ost（

yen

/kW

h）


40 tU

80 tU

200 tU

Indigenous approach

MNA

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0 100 200 300 400

Rat

io o

f tr

ansp

ort

co

st t

o t

he

ind

igen

ou

s ap

pro

ach

Capacity of reprocessing facility for the indigenous

approach (tU)

MNA

Indigenous approach

126

(a) Effect of delay in reprocessing facility

operation

(b) Break-even point for reprocessing delay

and transportation cost

Figure 6.13 Effect of transportation cost and reprocessing delay on cycle cost

Figure 6.13 analyzes the effect of the period of spent fuel storage at interim storage facilities,

that is, a delay in reprocessing facility operation. In this analysis, the same delay periods are

assumed for both cases to evaluate the effects of a delay in reprocessing facility operation in

multilateral management and country-based management. If the effects of delay in the two cases are

similar, break-even points are likely to show little difference. As shown in Figure 6.13 (a), however,

if the delay period is unexpectedly extended from 20 years to 40 years, the break-even point falls

from 4.47 to 3.16. This indicates that the present value of reprocessing cost, which has a great effect

on the country-based management case, decreases because of the delay to an extent greater than the

degree of decrease in cost in the multilateral management case. Figure 6.13 (b) shows the

break-even points for the effects of the delay in reprocessing facility operation and the

transportation cost in the multilateral management case. For example, in Figure 6.13 (b), if the

delay in reprocessing facility operation is 40 years and the transportation cost in the multilateral

management case is 2.5 times as high as the cost in the country-based management case, then the

cycle cost in the multilateral management case becomes lower. On the other hand, if the delay in

reprocessing facility operation is 80 years and the transportation cost in the multilateral

management case is four times as high as the cost in the country-based management case, then the

cycle cost in the country-based management case becomes lower. This means that because of a

delay in reprocessing facility operation, the relative economic advantage of the multilateral

management case decreases.

(c) Evaluation with respect to the economy of scale

The preceding section compared cycle costs in the country-based management and

multilateral management cases under the effect of the capacity of reprocessing facilities in

country-based management and the transportation cost in multilateral management. This section

focuses on the economy of scale, which was not taken into consideration in preceding studies, and

analyzes a scaling parameter.

0.5

0.7

0.9

1.1

1.3

1.5

1.7

1.9

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Cyc

le c

ost（

yen

/kW

h）


Temporary storage 20 years

Temporary storage 40 years

Indigenous approach(TS 40 years)

Indigenousapproach(TS 20 years)

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

0 20 40 60 80 100

Rat

io o

f tr

ansp

ort

co

st t

o t

he

ind

igen

ou

s ap

pro

ach

Temporary storage times (years)

MNA

Indigenous approach

127

Figure 6.14 shows the effect of the capacity of reprocessing facilities on cycle cost in

country-based management. The figure shows the cycle costs in country-based management

corresponding to scaling parameters γ of 0.7 to 0.9 and the cycle costs (blue straight line: 1.341

yen/kWh) in the multilateral management framework in which transportation cost is 3 times as high

as the cost in country-based management. As shown, in both cases, as the capacity of reprocessing

facilities increases, cost (yen/kWh) decreases because of the economy of scale. For example, when

the scaling parameter γ is 0.7 and the capacity of reprocessing facilities in country-based

management is 100 tU, cycle cost is 1.489 yen/kWh so that the cost in multilateral management

becomes lower. The break-even points corresponding to scaling parameters γ of 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9 are

303 tU, 187 tU and 43.5 tU, respectively. This indicates that as the effect of the economy of scale

becomes smaller, the economic advantage of the multilateral management framework decreases.

2-3) Spent fuel transportation scenario analysis

In the preceding section, break-event points under various conditions were calculated by

expressing the transportation cost in multilateral management as a ratio to the transportation cost in

country-based management and comparing the cycle costs in the two cases. In this section, actual

transportation distances and transportation costs are calculated using the transportation scenarios

developed in the previous section, “6.2, 1) Transportation (Geopolitics)”.

Figure 6.14 Cycle cost relative to the capacity of reprocessing facilities in country-based

management (blue line: cycle cost in multilateral management framework [transportation cost 3

times as high as the cost in country-based management])

(a) Derivation of unit cost of transportation

Spent fuel is transported to its destination by two means of transportation, namely, marine

transportation and land transportation. In order to calculate total transportation cost, it is necessary to

obtain unit cost (yen/tU-km) data for both marine transportation and land transportation. In this

1

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.6

1.7

1.8

0 100 200 300 400

Cyc

le c

ost（

yen

/kW

h）

Capacity of reprocessing facility for the indigenous

approach (tU)

γ= 0.7

γ= 0.8

γ= 0.9

128

analysis, the transportation data for the JAEC estimation models (17 million yen/tU) is used to

calculate the unit cost of marine transportation.100

The marine transportation distances from 17 nuclear

power plants in Japan to the Rokkasho reprocessing plant are calculated using the shortest distances in

the marine route network. The sum of those distances is 14,081 km. From these values, the unit cost of

marine transportation can be calculated as 1,200 yen/t-km. For land transportation, the unit cost is

calculated using data shown in Fairlie (2000).101

According to Fairlie (2000), the cost of transportation

from the nuclear power plants of RWE and KfK-PAE to the La Hague reprocessing plant in France is

117 dollars/kg and 79 dollars/kg, respectively.102

In this analysis, unit cost is calculated by assuming

that RWE's nuclear power plant is Biblis or Mülheim-Kärlich and KfK-PAE's nuclear power plant is

Karlsruhe MZFR and calculating their distances to the La Hague reprocessing plant. As shown in Table

6.15, these distances are about 900 km. From the cost data of Fairlie (2000), the unit cost of

transportation ($/tU-km) is 80 to 130 dollars/t-km. Hence, if $1 = ¥80, the unit cost is 6,400 to 10,400

yen/tU-km. The median value of 8,400 yen/tU-km, therefore, is used as the unit cost of land

transportation in the base case.

(b) Transportation costs in different scenarios

The section "Classification of Types Assumed in Multilateral Nuclear Approaches (MNA) and

Geopolitics" evaluated four routes, namely,

A. The route via Saint Petersburg Port (via the Suez Canal)

B. The route via Saint Petersburg Port (Arctic Sea Route)

C-1. The route via Vostochny Port

C-2. The route via Lianyungang Port

Since these four routes are analyzed in this section, Route A, which is the route currently used for

uranium transportation from Kazakhstan, is referred to as CR,103

and Route B, Route C-1 and Route

C-2, which are regarded as alternative routes, are referred to as AR1, AR2 and AR3, respectively.

Table 6.15 Distances to The La Hague reprocessing plant and unit costs of land transportation

Nuclear power plant

Distance to The La

Hague reprocessing

plant (km)

Transportation cost

($/kg)

Unit cost of

transportation ($/tU

km)

Biblis 909 117 129

Mülheim-Kärlich 968 117 121

Karlsruhe MZFR 918 79 86

100 The cost of spent fuel transportation from each plant to the interim storage facility is 16 million yen/tU. The cost of spent fuel

transportation from the interim storage facility to the reprocessing facility and then to the plant is 17 million yen/tU. In this analysis,

the latter data was used. 101 I. Fairlie, “Dry Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel: The Safer Alternative to Reprocessing,” Report on Greenpeace International, In

Response to Cogema Dossiers to the La Hague Public Inquiry (2000). 102 The unit of weight used by Fairlie (2000) for spent fuel is kgHM. Like the unit of weight (tHM) used by the JAEC estimation

models for MOX fuel, however, kgHM is assumed to be equivalent to kgU. 103 Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, FY2010 Study on Nuclear Power Reactor Environment (Study on Transportation

Reliability Improvement), 2011.

129

(a) Via Saint Petersburg (CR) (b) Via Saint Petersburg (AR1)

(c) Via Vostochny (AR2)

(d) Via Lianyungang (AR3)

Figure 6.15 Transportation routes in different scenarios

For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that the reprocessing facility within the multilateral

management framework is located somewhere in an Asian country, and the interim storage facility is

located somewhere in Central Asia. In this analysis, for the purpose of calculating cost and distance

from data on real facilities, the reprocessing facility is assumed to be located in Japan (assumed, for

the purpose of calculation, to be located in Aomori), and the interim storage facility is assumed to be

located in Central Aria, e.g. Kazakhstan for the sake of calculation. In the assumed scenarios, spent

fuel is transported from Japan to Central Asia and is stored temporarily. After being kept in storage for

a certain period, the spent fuel is transported to Japan for reprocessing. Figure 6.15 shows the shortest

routes in different scenarios determined using marine route network and railway network data. In the

figure, the green line represents marine transportation, and the red line represents transportation by

rail. It is assumed here that the route from Japan to Kazakhstan and the return route are the same. CR

(a) and AR1 (b) pass through the same port (Saint Petersburg), but CR is the currently used route via

Southeast Asia and the Suez Canal, while AR1 is a route via the Arctic Sea Route. As shown, the

marine transportation distance can be made shorter using the Arctic Sea Route.

130

Table 6.16 shows the actual distances in different scenarios. A comparison of CR and AR1

shows that the transportation distance can be reduced by half using the Arctic Sea Route. It can be

seen that AR2 and AR3, both of which pass through Russia and China, are much shorter than the

abovementioned CR and AR1. It can also be seen that AR2, which passes through Vostochny, is the

shortest among the four routes considered in the analysis.

Table 6.16 Transportation distances in different scenarios

Scenario Via (port)

Marine

transportation

distance (km)

Land

transportation

distance (km)

Total distance

(km)

CR

Saint Petersburg

port (currently used

route)

23,576 3,234 26,810

AR1

Saint Petersburg

port (Arctic Sea

Route)

13,566 3,234 16,800

AR2 Vostochny port 830 4,507 5,337

AR3 Lianyungang port 2,311 3,852 6,163

The total transportation cost in each scenario can be calculated from the transportation

distance mentioned above and the unit costs of marine transportation and land transportation

calculated in the preceding section (Table 6.17). The total transportation cost in each scenario

includes the cost of two-way transportation between Japan and Semipalatinsk and the cost of

transportation in Japan. For example, the total transportation cost in the CR scenario can calculated

as

23,576 × 1,200 + 3,234 × 8,400 × 2

10,000+ 1,600 + 1,700 ≅ 143,91 million yen/tU

As shown in the table, in the base case of this analysis, the transportation cost in the

multilateral management case is higher than the cost in the country-based management case by a

parameter of about 3 to 4. It can be seen that the transportation cost is lower in the three alternative

routes than in the currently used route (CR) scenario. It can also be seen that although the shortest

route is the route in the AR2 via Vostochny port, the scenario involving the lowest transportation

cost is AR3 via Lianyungang Port. The reason is that since the unit cost of land transportation is

higher than that of marine transportation, the total transportation cost in the AR3 scenario, which

involves a relatively short distance of land transportation, becomes the lowest.

131

Table 6.17 Transportation costs in different scenarios

Scenario

Marine

transportation

cost (10,000

yen/tU)

Land

transportation

cost

(10,000 yen/tU)

Total

transportation

cost

(10,000 yen/tU)

Ratio to transportation

cost in country-based

management

CR 8,958 5,433 14,391 4.36

AR1 6,556 5,433 11,989 3.63

AR2 3,499 7,572 11,071 3.35

AR3 3,855 6,471 10,326 3.13

(a) Base case (b) Arctic sea route 150% cost case

Figure 6.16 Effect of land transportation cost on total transportation cost

In the calculation shown above, the unit cost of land transportation is assumed to be 8,400

yen/tU-km, and the actual unit cost of land transportation in each scenario is not used. Furthermore,

it is thought likely that if a new route is used, cost should increase so that the route can be used for

nuclear material transportation. In view of such uncertainties, total transportation cost is calculated

for unit costs of land transportation of 2,000 to 24,000 yen/tU-km in each case (Figure 6.16a). As

shown, as the unit cost of land transportation increases, total transportation cost increases in all

scenarios. It can be seen, however, that the relative magnitude of total transportation cost varied

depending on the unit cost of land transportation. When the unit cost of land transportation is 2,714

yen/tU-km or lower, the cost of transportation via Vostochny port (AR2) is the lowest; when it is

between 2,714 yen/tU-km and 21,854 yen/tU-km, the Lianyungang Port route (AR3) minimizes

transportation cost; and when it is higher than 21,854 yen/tU-km, the Arctic Sea Route (AR1)

minimizes transportation cost. As shown, in almost all ranges of unit cost of land transport, AR3

minimizes transportation cost. A comparison with the currently used route indicates that the Arctic

Sea route is much shorter, but it can be seen that the Arctic Sea route does not have an economic

advantage unless the unit cost of land transportation is relatively large. Furthermore, the Arctic Sea

route requires the use of an icebreaker or an ice-resistant ship thus making, at least under the present

conditions, marine transportation more expensive than in other routes. In view of this, the unit cost

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

2000 6000 10000 14000 18000 22000

Tota

l tra

nsp

ort

co

st (

104

yen

/tU

)

Land transport cost (yen/tU km)

CR

AR1

AR2

AR3

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

2000 6000 10000 14000 18000 22000

Tota

l tra

nsp

ort

co

st (

104

yen

/tU

)

Land transport cost (yen/tU km)

CR

AR1

AR2

AR3

132

of marine transportation on AR1 is assumed to be 1,800 yen/tU-km (1.5 times the unit cost in the

base case), and the unit cost thus obtained is shown in Figure 6.16(b). As shown, in the range of the

unit cost of land transportation from 2,000 to 24,000 yen/tU-km, there is no condition under which

the total cost of transportation on AR1 becomes the lowest. The fact that the break-even point for

AR1 and AR2 is 12,006 yen/tU-km in the base case, while it is 18,400 yen/tU-km in the Arctic Sea

route 150% cost case indicates that the Arctic Sea route is economically less advantageous than the

Vostochny port route.

Figure 6.17 Cycle costs under different scenarios

Figure 6.17 shows the ratios between the cycle costs in multilateral management and

country-based management shown in Figure 6.11 and the transportation cost in country-based

management (base case) under different scenarios. Under all scenarios, the ratio is located on the

left side of the break-even point at 4.47 (black dotted line), indicating that in the base case the

multilateral management framework is economically advantageous.

Table 6.18 Effect of unit cost of land transportation under different scenarios (marine transportation

cost: 1,200 yen/tU-km, cycle cost in country-based management: 1.410 yen/kWh)

Unit cost of land transportation (yen/tU-km)

8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000

CR

○

(1.401

yen/kWh)

×

(1.420

yen/kWh)

×

(1.438

yen/kWh)

×

(1.457

yen/kWh)

×

(1.476

yen/kWh)

AR1

○

(1.367

yen/kWh)

○

(1.385

yen/kWh)

○

(1.404

yen/kWh)

×

(1.423

yen/kWh)

×

(1.441

yen/kWh)

AR2

○

(1.352

yen/kWh)

○

(1.378

yen/kWh)

○

(1.404

yen/kWh)

×

(1.430

yen/kWh)

×

(1.456

yen/kWh)

AR3 ○

(1.342

○

(1.364

○

(1.386

○

(1.409

×

(1.431

0.5

0.7

0.9

1.1

1.3

1.5

1.7

1.9

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Cyc

le c

ost（

yen

/kW

h）


CRAR1AR2AR3

Indigenous

approach

MNA

133

yen/kWh) yen/kWh) yen/kWh) yen/kWh) yen/kWh)

Table 6.19 Effect of unit cost of marine transportation under different scenarios (land transportation

cost: 8,400 yen/tU-km, cycle cost in country-based management: 1.410 yen/kWh)

Unit cost of marine transportation (yen/tU-km)

800 1,600 2,400 3,200 4,000

CR

○

(1.378

yen/kWh)

×

(1.432

yen/kWh)

×

(1.486

yen/kWh)

×

(1.540

yen/kWh)

×

(1.595

yen/kWh)

AR1

○

(1.355

yen/kWh)

○

(1.386

yen/kWh)

×

(1.417

yen/kWh)

×

(1.448

yen/kWh)

×

(1.480

yen/kWh)

AR2

○

(1.356

yen/kWh)

○

(1.358

yen/kWh)

○

(1.360

yen/kWh)

○

(1.362

yen/kWh)

○

(1.364

yen/kWh)

AR3

○

(1.344

yen/kWh)

○

(1.349

yen/kWh)

○

(1.355

yen/kWh)

○

(1.360

yen/kWh)

○

(1.365

yen/kWh)

Just as in the transportation cost analysis described above, cycle cost under different scenarios

was calculated for unit costs of land transportation ranging from 8,000 to 16,000 yen/tU-km. The

calculation results are shown in Table 6.18. In the table, a circle (○) indicates that the calculated

cycle cost is not larger than the cycle cost under country-based management (1.410 yen/kWh), and

an ex (×) indicates that the calculated cycle cost is higher than that. As shown in Figure 6.17, when

the unit cost of land transportation is 8,000 yen/tU-km, which is close to the base case, the cycle

cost is lower than the cost in country-based management under all scenarios, while when the unit

cost of land transportation is twice as high (i.e. 16,000 yen/tU-km), the economic advantage is lost

under all scenarios. Table 6.19 shows the effect of the unit cost of marine transportation analyzed in

a similar way. When marine transportation cost reaches or exceeds 2,400 yen/tU-km, which is twice

as high as in the base case, the economic advantage is lost under the CR and AR1 scenarios. In

contrast, under AR2 and AR3 scenarios there is an economical advantage even if the marine

transportation cost is more than three times as high as the cost in the base case. This is because the

marine transportation distances of AR2 and AR3 are relatively short (particularly AR2) and total

cost is hardly dependent on changes in marine transportation cost.

The results shown in Table 6.18 and Table 6.19 indicate that the AR3 scenario using the

Lianyungang Port route via the Eurasian Land Bridge is economically advantageous under almost all

conditions related to marine transportation.

2-3) Summary on economic efficiency

In this section, an evaluation model for comparing country-based management and

134

multilateral management with respect to nuclear fuel cycle cost was constructed, and the effects of

the economy of scale, transportation cost and delay in reprocessing facility operation on cycle cost

were analyzed. By showing break-even points associated with cost in country-based management

and multilateral management, economic advantages of multilateral management with respect to

transportation cost were shown. Furthermore, by taking the capacity of reprocessing facilities into

consideration, the economy of scale in the multilateral management framework was analyzed

quantitatively, and break-even points with respect to the capacity of reprocessing facilities relative

to country-based management were shown.

Also, scenarios concerning alternative routes including the existing uranium transportation

route were analyzed. It was found that in the base case, the multilateral management framework is

economically advantageous under all scenarios, but it loses its economic advantage when the unit

cost of land transportation is very high. It was also found that the scenario involving the route via

Lianyungang Port is economically advantageous under almost all transportation unit cost conditions.

It is thought, however, that because that scenario does not use an existing route, it may be difficult

under the present conditions to use the scenario of nuclear material transportation. It is believed that

in trying to construct a multilateral management framework assumed in this report, it is necessary to

establish or modify regulatory systems related to the transportation of nuclear materials via the

Eurasian Land Bridge.

In this section, attention was paid to the economy of scale of reprocessing cost and the cost of

spent fuel transportation with respect to the comparison between multilateral management and

country-based management frameworks, and economic evaluation was discussed without going into

details. Cycle cost within the multilateral management framework was analyzed without

considering a particular host country or partner country because overall cost within the framework

was estimated without considering particular entities. One of the next challenges, therefore, is to

estimate cost within an actual country-based management framework or a partially multilateral

management framework by calculating cycle cost from the standpoint of each country participating

in the multilateral management framework.

As shown in IAEA (2005), in the multilateral management framework, therefore, it is

important to decide on how cost should be allocated among the host countries and partner countries

in each project. This means that it is necessary to construct a model that encourages participation in

the multilateral management scheme instead of the country-based management scheme by offering

economic incentives. Another further challenge, therefore, is to create an evaluation model capable

of allowing for funding and capital contribution ratios, risk allocation and cost allocation among

host and partner countries for each project.

3) Demand–supply balance within framework

Concerning the demand–supply balance related to the front-end aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle in

the Asia region being considered in this study, it can be said that expected needs associated with

nuclear fuel cycle services in the MNA region can be met by considering the demand–supply

135

balance from the viewpoint of parameters such as the capacity of each country as shown in Table

1.3.4 in the appendix (at the end of this report). Concerning the back-end aspects (Table 2 in the

appendix), there is a lack of a sufficient amount of data, but the demand–supply balance is beyond

the scope of this study because it is not necessary to reprocess all spent fuel in the near future.

136

6.3 Further study and evaluation of nonproliferation

1) Study on regional safeguards systems

Regional safeguards constitute a core element in nuclear nonproliferation measures, and the

regional safeguards (regional system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, or RSAC)

implemented by IAEA and a number of countries are expected to further enhance nuclear

nonproliferation. A study was conducted, therefore, on the safeguards systems of EURATOM and

ABACC. Two major advantages of regional safeguards (RSAC) are as follows.

First, regional safeguards make it possible to ensure transparency of nuclear power use and

promote a relationship of trust while monitoring for non diversification of nuclear materials for

nuclear weapons among the member countries.

Second, human resources and research and development costs associated with safeguards

involving the member countries and IAEA can be used efficiently and effectively.

It is believed that the first advantage, namely, transparency and the relationship of trust, can

be enhanced by RSAC as described below.

Usually, safeguards, that is, nuclear material accounting is conducted on a country-by-country

basis. Nuclear material accounting consists of the accounting and control of nuclear materials and

reporting to IAEA conducted by facility operators and the state concerned and IAEA's independent

activities to check on the accuracy of the reports thus received. These activities are explained below

at the facility, state and IAEA levels.

Facility level

(a) Classifying the areas in which nuclear materials are handled as material balance areas

(MBA)

(b) Keeping records of the quantity of nuclear materials in each MBA

(c) Measuring and recording the transfer of all nuclear materials from one MBA to any other

MBAs and all changes in nuclear material quantity such as nuclear production and loss

(d) Taking physical inventory periodically to determine the quantity of nuclear materials in each

MBA

(e) Closing the material balances of two consecutive physical inventory periods and calculating

the quantity of material unaccounted for (MUF) in each period

(f) Preparing accounting programs for determining the accuracy of calibration and

measurement and recorded source data and batch data

(g) Evaluating the calculated MUF, which may indicate the occurrence of an unrecorded nuclear

loss or an accident, with respect to error limits

(h) Analyzing accounting information to determine the cause and magnitude of error in

recording unaccounted-for loss, accidental loss and unaccounted-for inventory

137

State-level

(a) If appropriate, preparing nuclear material accounting reports and submitting them to IAEA

(b) Ensuring that technical means and rules for nuclear material accounting are correctly used

and observed

(c) Making rules concerning IAEA inspectors' access and coordination necessary for IAEA's

verification activities

(d) Verifying the facility operator's nuclear material accounting capability as stipulated in the

SSAC rules

IAEA level

(a) Independently verifying nuclear material accounting information in facility records and state

reports and conducting activities stipulated in safeguards agreements

(b) Evaluating the effectiveness of SSAC

(c) Submitting statements concerning IAEA verification activities to the country concerned

Now that the Additional Protocol (AP) has been enacted, IAEA's activities stipulated in the

AP are added to the activities listed above (see Figure 6.18).

For the three-level safeguards mentioned above, the RSAC listed below may be used for the

Type A and Type B approaches as defined in this study (see Figure 6.19).

Nuclear material accounting and control and reporting of accounting data to the state by facility

operators

Accounting data check and reporting to IAEA by the state and MNA members

CSA activities and AP activities by IAEA and MNA members

RSAC activities in the Type C approach may include the following (see Figure 6.20):

Nuclear material accounting by MNA facility operators

Accounting data check and reporting to IAEA by MNA members

CSA activities and AP activities by IAEA and MNA members

Thus, if MNA members participate in or conduct facility accounting data checks, information

on nuclear materials increases considerably and nuclear material-related transparency of facilities

can be enhanced. Furthermore, since complementary access under the Additional Protocol (AP) is

based on information provided by other countries, the amount of interregional information increases

so that transparency and reliability are enhanced.

With respect to the second advantage, regional safeguards activities and appropriate allocation

of IAEA's verification roles contribute to effective allocation of human resources. Joint

development and use of equipment contributes to cost reduction.

138

Figure 6.18 Conventional country-based safeguards system

CSA inspection activities, AP activities

Reporting

Accounting data reporting by facility operator

International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA)

Nuclear power facilities

State Accounting data check

Figure 6.19 Regional safeguards system (Type A/Type B)


International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)


State, MNA Accounting data check

Reporting

Accounting data reporting by facility operator

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)


Reporting

MNA

Accounting data check

Figure 6.20 Regional safeguards system (Type C)


Accounting data reporting by MNA

139

2) Evaluation of nonproliferation in multilateral management

For the purpose of nonproliferation evaluation, nuclear proliferation resistance in the nuclear

fuel cycle multilateral management scheme has been evaluated more qualitatively and

quantitatively.

In 2000, IAEA launched the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel

Cycles (INPRO). The project comprises nine areas, and three of them, collectively called the "3S's"

(i.e. nuclear proliferation resistance [IAEA safeguards], physical protection, and safety), are to be

evaluated comprehensively by INPRO assessors. Nuclear proliferation resistance is dealt with in

IAEA-TECDOC-1575 Rev. 1 Volume 5 (Nov. 2008),1)

which describes qualitative and quantitative

evaluation methods based on the design concept of the IAEA safeguards system (Safeguards

Concepts).

Its overall objective is to provide INS assessors in a country planning to introduce a nuclear

power generation program (or maintain or expand an existing program) with guidance on how to

apply the INPRO methodology in that particular area. This manual focuses specifically on the

method of evaluating an innovative nuclear energy system (INS) incorporated into an existing (or

planned) nuclear nonproliferation system. The main objective of this manual is to provide guidance

to INPRO assessors on how to check on the effectiveness of INS in achieving proliferation

resistance goals. The manual, however, is also designed to provide some guidance on methods of

strengthening proliferation resistance measures to developers of nuclear technologies.

One of the main purposes of research on multilateral management schemes is to evaluate

nonproliferation associated with nuclear power facilities mainly in the Asian countries planning to

introduce a nuclear power generation program (or maintain or expand an existing program). We

considered it appropriate, therefore, to adopt the evaluation method described in the INPRO

proliferation resistance manual mentioned above. Hence, qualitative and quantitative evaluation was

made by referring directly to the manual.

2-1) Evaluating proliferation resistance according to IAEA's INPRO manual

Nuclear nonproliferation of the multilateral management scheme was evaluated in accordance

with the Guidance for the Application of an Assessment Methodology for Innovative Nuclear

Energy Systems (INPRO Manual: Proliferation Resistance, Volume 5 of the Final Report of Phase 1

of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles).

"INPRO: Proliferation Resistance " mainly describes basic concepts for the conceptual design

of IAEA safeguards to be applied on a country-by-country basis. Proliferation resistance consists of

intrinsic features and extrinsic measures. The former constitute resistance due to the characteristics

of nuclear material or facilities, and the latter constitute technological resistance due to IAEA

safeguards activities. Overall proliferation resistance is the totality of the two types of resistance.

The manual also identifies characteristics of proliferation resistance under a multilateral

140

management scheme. In this section, therefore, proliferation resistance under a multilateral

management scheme is evaluated by the method described in the manual.

First of all, there is INPRO's basic principle (BP) in the area of proliferation resistance. Under

the basic principle, five user requirements (UR1 to UR5) were specified. For each of those

requirements, a number of criteria (CR) were specified. For each of those criteria, there is an

indicator (IN), and acceptance limits (AL) have been specified for each criterion.

The evaluation of the multilateral management scheme under consideration in this study

involves the determination of the degree of achievement of these URs, CRs and INs relative to their

ALs. The ALs are further classified into more specific evaluation parameters, EP. Proliferation

resistance is evaluated by following the procedure described above.

Basic principle (BP) in proliferation resistance: Proliferation resistance intrinsic features and

extrinsic measures shall be implemented throughout the full life cycle for innovative nuclear energy

systems to help ensure that INSs should continue to be an unattractive means to acquire fissile

material for a nuclear weapons program. Both intrinsic features and extrinsic measures are essential,

and neither shall be considered sufficient by themselves.

(a) UR1: State commitments

User requirement UR1: States' commitments, obligations and policies regarding nonproliferation and its

implementation should be adequate to fulfill international standards in the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Criteria (CR)

Indicator (IN) Acceptance Limits (AL)

CR1.1 Legal framework

IN1.1: States' commitments, obligations and policies

regarding nonproliferation established?

AL1.1: Yes, they are established in accordance with

international standards.

CR1.2 Institutional structural arrangements

IN1.2: Institutional structural arrangements in support of

PR have been considered?

AL1.2: Yes, they are considered based on expert

judgment.

Acceptance limits (AL) are evaluated according to the evaluation parameters EP and their

evaluation scales. Evaluation results for the multilateral management scheme based on EPs and

evaluation scales have been tabulated below.

UR1 Illustrative evaluation scale for adequacy of States' commitments, obligations and policies

User requirement UR1: States' commitments, obligations and policies regarding nonproliferation and its

implementation should be adequate to fulfill international standards in the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Indicator

IN

Evaluation parameter

EP

Evaluation scale

W S N/A*

IN1.1： EP1.1.1: Party to NPT. No Yes

141

States' commitments,

obligations and

policies regarding

nonproliferation to

fulfill international

standards.

EP1.1.2: Party to Nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) treaty. No Yes

EP1.1.3: Safeguards agreements according to the NPT in force. No Yes

EP1.1.4: Additional Protocol in force. No Yes

EP1.1.5: For those who are not party to the NPT, other

safeguards agreements (e.g. INFCIRC/66) in force.

No Yes

EP1.1.6: Export control policies of NM and nuclear

technology.

No Yes

EP1.1.7: Regional SAC in force. No Yes

EP1.1.8: State SAC in force. No Yes

EP1.1.9: Relevant international conventions/treaties in force. No Yes

EP1.1.10: ** Recorded violation of nonproliferation

commitments.

Yes No

IN1.2：

Institutional

structural

arrangements

EP1.2.1: Multi-lateral ownership, management or control of

NES (multilateral, multi-national).

No Yes

EP1.2.2: International dependency with regard to fissile

materials and nuclear technology.

No Yes

EP1.2.3: Commercial, legal or institutional arrangements that

control access to NM and INS.

No Yes

* Not Applicable (N/A) is only for EP that may not be relevant because the treaty or commitment is not available

for the country being assessed.

Evaluation of UR1

MNA member countries fulfill the commitments and obligations specified in evaluation

parameters (EP). Since the acceptance limits (AL) are met, the user requirement UR1 is met.

(b) UR2: Attractiveness of nuclear material and nuclear technology

User requirement UR2: The attractiveness of nuclear material (NM) and nuclear technology in an INS for a

nuclear weapons program should be low. This includes the attractiveness of undeclared nuclear material that

could credibly be produced or processed in the INS.

Criteria (CR)

Indicator (IN) Acceptance limits (AL)

CR2.1 Attractiveness of nuclear material characteristics

IN2.1: NM quality AL2.1: Attractiveness based on NM

characteristics considered in the design of INS

and found acceptably low based on expert

judgment.

CR2.1 Attractiveness of nuclear material quantity

IN2.2: NM quantity AL2.2 = AL2.1

CR2.3: Attractiveness of nuclear material shape

142

IN2.3 NM classification AL2.3 = AL2.1

CR2.4: Attractiveness of nuclear technology

IN2.4: Nuclear technology AL2.4: Attractiveness of technology considered

in the design of INS and found acceptably low

based on expert judgment.

Evaluation of UR2

The INPRO manual states as follows:

Criterion CR2.1, CR2.2 and CR2.3 attractiveness of nuclear material

At the time this report was written, no metric exists that could be used to determine quantitatively

the attractiveness of a nuclear system. Therefore, at the moment, the INPRO assessor can assess the

attractiveness of nuclear material and technology (see the following criterion) of an INS only

qualitatively.

Thus, the acceptance limits AL2.1 to AL2.3 are met, if evidence is available to INPRO assessors

that the technology developer has considered the attractiveness of the nuclear material to be used in

the INS and safeguards experts have judged it acceptably low in the context of the requirement to

implement safeguards effectively and efficiently.

Criterion CR2.4 attractiveness of nuclear technology

No metrics exist to determine the attractiveness of a nuclear system quantitatively.

Thus, the acceptance limit AL2.4 is met, if evidence is available to INPRO assessors that the

technology developer has considered the attractiveness of the nuclear technology used in the INS

and safeguards experts have judged it acceptably low in the context of the requirement to implement

safeguards effectively and efficiently.

Regardless of the attractiveness of the nuclear material and technology used in an INS, sufficient

proliferation resistance of an INS must and can be achieved by the implementation of effective

safeguards in each of its nuclear facilities. Broadly speaking, a higher attractiveness of the nuclear

material and technology to be used in an INS may result in an increased effort for safeguards

implementation.

Thus, if safeguards experts judge that safeguards (extrinsic measures) have been implemented

effectively and efficiently, INPRO assessors may judge that the attractiveness of the nuclear

material at the facility concerned is acceptably low. In other words, if effective and efficient

safeguards (extrinsic measures) are not implemented, the attractiveness of the nuclear material at

the facility concerned cannot be made acceptably low. Proliferation resistance, therefore, directly

143

reflects the characteristics of nuclear material.

(c) UR3 Difficulty and detectability of diversion

User requirement UR3: The diversion of nuclear material (NM) should be reasonably difficult and detectable.

Diversion includes the use of an INS facility for the production or processing of undeclared material.

Criteria (CR)


CR3.1 Quality of measurement system

IN3.1: Accountability AL3.1: Based on expert judgment, equal or

better than existing facilities, meeting

international state of practice.

CR3.2 C/S measures and monitoring

IN3.2: Amenability AL3.2: Based on expert judgment, equal or


international best practice.

CR3.3 Detectability of NM

IN3.3: Detectability of NM. AL3.3: Based on expert judgment, equal or

better than existing facilities.

CR3.4 Facility process

IN3.4: Difficulty in modifying process. AL3.4: Based on expert judgment, equal or


international best practice.

CR3.5 Facility design

IN3.5: Difficulty in modifying facility design. AL3.5 = AL3.4

CR3.6 Facility misuse

IN3.6: Detectability of misuse of technology or facilities. AL3.6 = AL3.4

Acceptance limits (AL) are evaluated according to evaluation parameters (EP) and their evaluation

scales.

Evaluation of UR3

This user requirement concerns the implementation of effective and efficient safeguards

(extrinsic measures) for MNA facilities. This requirement may be a requirement to be met more by

implementers of extrinsic measures (safeguards) rather than users. Under the multilateral

management scheme, however, the multilateral management scheme (AMMAO), like IAEA, is an

organization involved in the implementation of regional safeguard measures. What is to be judged,

therefore, is whether UR3 is met by the establishment of the concept of safeguards and their

implementation by the safeguards-implementing organizations (IAEA, AMMAO). With respect to

regional safeguards, although that judgment is to be made by safeguards experts, effective and

efficient safeguards (extrinsic measures) must be achieved and can be achieved. UR3, therefore, can

be met.

144

(d) UR4 Multiple barriers

User requirement UR4: Innovative nuclear energy systems should incorporate multiple proliferation

resistance features and measures.

Criteria (CR)


CR4.1 Defence in depth

IN4.1: The extent by which the INS is protected by

multiple intrinsic features and extrinsic measures.

AL4.1: All plausible acquisition paths are (can

be) protected by extrinsic measures at the

facility or State level and by intrinsic features

that are compatible with other design

requirements.

CR4.2 Robustness of PR barriers

IN4.2: Robustness of barriers protecting each acquisition

path.

AL4.2: Robustness is sufficient based on

expert judgment.


scales. Evaluation results obtained by using the EPs and evaluation scales under the multilateral

management scheme have been tabulated below.

Illustrative scales for the evaluation of multiplicity of PR features and measures

User requirement UR4: Innovative nuclear energy systems should incorporate multiple proliferation resistance

features and measures.

Indicator

IN

Evaluation parameter

EP

Evaluation scale **

W S

IN4.1: The extent by which

the INS is protected by

multiple intrinsic features

and extrinsic measures.

EP4.1: All plausible

acquisition paths are (can

be) protected by extrinsic

measures at the facility or

State level and by intrinsic

features that are compatible

with other design

requirements.*

No Yes

IN4.2: Robustness of

barriers protecting each

acquisition path.

EP4.2: Robustness is

sufficient based on expert

judgment. No Yes

145

* The evaluation of these indicators requires detailed acquisition path analysis (see Annex D for an example of

such an approach).

** Scales for evaluation parameters are subject to further consideration.

Evaluation of UR4

Under the multilateral management scheme (AMMAO), multi-barrier measures such as IAEA

safeguards, regional safeguards, nuclear security measures and safety criteria are applied. Because

of the multiplicity of proliferation resistance features and measures, requirement UR4 can be met.

(e) UR5: Optimization of design

User requirement UR5: The combination of intrinsic features and extrinsic measures, compatible with other

design considerations, should be optimized (in the design/engineering phase) to provide cost-effective

proliferation resistance.

Criteria (CR)


CR5.1 Incorporation of PR into INS design

IN5.1: PR has been taken into account as early as possible

in the design and development of the INS.

AL5.1: Yes.

CR5.2 Cost of PR

IN5.2: Cost of incorporating into an INS those intrinsic

features and extrinsic measures, which are required to

provide or improve proliferation resistance.

AL5.2: Minimal total cost for all of the

intrinsic features and extrinsic measures

implemented to increase PR over the life cycle

of the INS.

CR5.3 Verification approach

IN5.3: Does a verification approach with a level of

extrinsic measures agreed to between the State and

verification authority (e.g. IAEA, regional SG

organization, etc.) exist?

AL5.3: Yes.


scales.

Evaluation of UR5

Under the multilateral management scheme, any type of analysis must be conducted.

IN5.3, a verification approach with a level of extrinsic measures agreed to between the State and

verification authority (e.g. IAEA, regional SG organization, etc.), is particularly important. Valid

and effective extrinsic measures must be analyzed and agreed to by and between IAEA, AMMAO

and the state concerned. As a result, UR5 is met.

146

(f) Summary

Nuclear proliferation resistance requires both intrinsic features and extrinsic measures, and an

adequate level of proliferation resistance cannot be achieved without having both of them. Upon

this basic principle, five user requirements (UR1 to UR5) have been specified. A number of criteria

(CR) have been specified for each requirement, and proliferation resistance is evaluated according

to indicators (IN) and acceptance limits (AL) for each criterion. Acceptance limits (AL) consist of

evaluation parameters (EP) and evaluation scales.

UR1: The user requirement concerning state commitment can be met because the MNA member

countries are required to be party to NPT, safeguards agreements and regional nonproliferation

treaties, etc.

UR2: With respect to the attractiveness of nuclear material and nuclear technology, the

attractiveness of the nuclear material at the facility concerned cannot be made acceptably low unless

effective and efficient safeguards (extrinsic measures) are implemented.

UR3: The requirement UR3 concerning the difficulty and detectability of diversion can be met

because with respect to regional safeguards, effective and efficient safeguards (extrinsic measures)

must be and can be achieved.

UR4: As for multiple barriers, various multiple barrier measures such as IAEA safeguards, regional

safeguards, nuclear security measures and safety criteria are implemented under the multilateral

management scheme (AMMAO).

UR5: Design is optimized among IAEA, AMMAO and the state concerned for effective and

efficient extrinsic measures.

Thus, under the multilateral management scheme (AMMAO), although the attractiveness of

nuclear material and nuclear technology is the same as in conventional country-by-country

management, member countries are required to become party to necessary conventions and agreements,

and effective extrinsic measures are taken under the regional safeguards scheme. Combined use is

made of various measures including nuclear security measures, and optimization efforts are made for

extrinsic measures. As a result of these measures, overall proliferation resistance is enhanced.

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6.4 Participation incentives for candidate countries

As mentioned earlier, potential MNA member countries in Asia include Japan, Korea, China

(including Taiwan), Russia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and emerging nuclear power countries in

Southeast Asia (e.g. Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia).

In addition to technological capability and industrial capacity, “political stability” is one of the

requirements for an MNA facility site country (host country). How nuclear security can be ensured

is another important consideration. From those viewpoints, host countries and site countries were

considered.

Even if a country is to start or continue activities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the

country has to participate in an international system, and nonproliferation constraints due to NSG

and bilateral agreements are considerable. In cases where a country participates in the MNA

framework, overall advantages are thought to be considerable as long as the nuclear fuel cycle

consisting of different constituent technologies of the member countries can be used successfully

even if the member countries' commitments to nonproliferation become stronger. Likely incentives

for the potential member countries are listed below.

Incentives for Kazakhstan may include expanded front-end business opportunities for the

production and sale of fuel, future entry into back-end business and smooth provision of

services (including transportation).

Mongolia: Front-end business (technological assistance from industrialized countries), smooth

provision of services (including transportation)

Russia: Front-end and back-end business—use of Russian-made fuel for PWRs and BWRs in

the Western countries, expanded enrichment business, diffusion of VVER and smooth provision

of services (including transportation)

Korea: Expanded nuclear power business, solution to spent fuel/back-end (including

reprocessing) problems (including smooth provision of services [including transportation])

China: Entry into nuclear power (mainly front-end) business in Asia and smooth provision of

services (including transportation)

Japan: Solution to spent fuel problems, stable supply of fuel, new possibilities of plutonium

utilization, smooth provision of services (including transportation), and comprehensive nuclear

fuel cycle-related services to promote the export of Japan's nuclear power materials and

equipment

Service recipient countries including Taiwan: Receiving supply of fuel and spent fuel-related

services (Taiwan: solution to spent fuel problems) as member countries and smooth provision of

services (including transportation)

Emerging countries: To enjoy benefit of assured services on nuclear fuel supply at market price

and on spent fuel treatment

(Industry: Smooth implementation of projects under agreement among member countries, host

countries and site countries, promotion of “Principles of Conduct” (see Section 6.5))

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Particularly noteworthy here are the fact that Kazakhstan, which is a non-nuclear weapons

state, is exploring business opportunities including the use of enrichment facilities located outside

the territory (Russia) for Kazakhstan's uranium and Russia's interest in back-end business. In

Kazakhstan's case, there are two reasons (MNA workshop held in December, 2012, at the

University of Tokyo). One is political concern about a possible negative reaction of the international

community if uranium enrichment is started in Kazakhstan. The other reason is that since there is

already an established uranium enrichment market, the commencement of uranium enrichment from

scratch is not economically justifiable. The same thing can be said about the reprocessing of spent

fuel and the handling of recovered MOX. Within the international framework (i.e. beyond the scope

of management by a single country) of MNA, political concern about a negative reaction from the

international community is not necessarily a major concern related to nuclear nonproliferation. It

can be said, therefore, that there may be business opportunities if economically justifiable. It should

be kept in mind, however, that the discussions on the incentives mentioned above focus mainly on

business potential and needs. Challenges (disincentives) to be addressed in order to make the

multilateral management scheme a reality may include public acceptance of the scheme,

nationalism and response to complex legal regulation dealt with in this study.

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6.5 Research on role of industry in international nuclear fuel cycle

1) Content of "Principles of Conduct"

As part of nuclear power-related services, front-end (uranium fuel supply) services are being

provided, along with nuclear reactors, by private corporate entities. Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 in the

Appendix list resource-supplying countries and corporate entities in the world engaged in

conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication (the differences between the data shown in the tables

and the data shown in Tables 1 and 2 are due to the differences in when and where the data were

obtained).

As is evident from the tables, it can be said that front-end services are managed by the market

mechanism and a number of consortiums. On the other hand, there are few corporate entities

offering back-end services (particularly interim storage and waste disposal).

The MNA framework can only be established through the involvement of corporate entities. It

is believed, therefore that those corporate entities must set standards of conduct to take

responsibility as nuclear power related service providers and consider offering comprehensive

services related to the back-end of the fuel cycle.

On September 15, 2011, the world's leading nuclear power reactor manufacturers announced

the Nuclear Power Plant Exporters' Principles of Conduct (hereafter referred to as the "Principles of

Conduct"). The Principles of Conduct, which are a set of self-imposed standards of conduct that

exporters of nuclear power reactors promise to observe voluntarily, are the culmination of

discussions held since October 2008 under the leadership of the U.S. think-tank Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace with the assistance of experts in various disciplines.

The Principles of Conduct specify a set of principles in six categories (Safety, Health and

Radiological Protection; Physical Security; Environmental Protection and Handling of Spent Fuel

and Nuclear Waste; Liability for Nuclear Damage; Nonproliferation and Safeguards; and Ethics)

that nuclear reactor manufacturers should consider when exporting nuclear reactors as an

integration of the standards and best practices that have so far been internationally established in

each field (details are shown below).

Principle 1: Safety, Health and Radiological Protection

Before entering into a contract to supply a nuclear power plant to a Customer, Vendors expect that

the Customer State:

Is a party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, or has indicated its intention to become a

party before operation of the plant begins (1.1).

Before entering into a contract to supply a nuclear power plant to a Customer, Vendors should

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have made a reasonable judgment that the Customer has:

A legislature, regulatory, and organizational infrastructure required for implementing a

nuclear power program with due attention to safety either in place or under development

following the guidance provided in the IAEA Safety Standard "Establishing the Safety

Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme" (1.2);

Either an existing industrial infrastructure to support safe long-term operation, or a credible

plan to develop such an infrastructure before operation of the nuclear power plant begins

(1.3); and

Taken into account international operating experience and severe accident considerations

(1.4).

Vendors commit to:

Export reactors conforming to IAEA's safety standards, etc. (1.5);

Exchange information with the scientists and experts of the Customer State, as required, to

adapt the design to local conditions (1.6);

Provide for, among the items that should be covered by a contract to supply a nuclear power

reactor, the provision of safety documentation and safety analysis reports, the promotion of

a safety culture, the assurance of competent construction management, subcontracting

requirements, the development of the Customer's human resources, etc. (1.7); and

Cooperate in improving the infrastructure that influences safe nuclear power reactor operation

(development of local technological infrastructure, development of comprehensive plans for

emergency response).

Principle 2: Physical Security

In designing nuclear power reactors, Vendors should:

Incorporate design provisions made for security (2.1);

Ensure security design provisions are compatible with safety and emergency response

requirements (2.2);

Cooperate with the Customer State to incorporate the Customer State's Design Basis Threat

(2.3); and

Incorporate within design provisions the potential for damage from security threats in

accordance with the Customer State's Design Basis Threat (2.4).

Before entering into a contract to supply a nuclear power reactor to a Customer, Vendors should

have made a reasonable judgment that the Customer State has or in a timely manner should have:

Provided information to the Vendor on the results of Design Basis Threat analysis (2.5);

Become a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (2.6);

Participated in the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear

Terrorism (2.7); and

Developed a legislative and regulatory infrastructure for nuclear security (2.8).

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Vendors may, if requested, help the Customer State and the Customer:

Ensure physical security provisions have been undertaken based on an established standard

(2.9);

Make routine evaluations of security response capabilities (2.10);

Establish an integrated safety and security oversight organization (2.11); and

Ensure coordination between law enforcement and other Customer State agencies and plant

security and continuous improvement (2.12).

Principle 3: Environmental Protection and the Handling of Spent Fuel and Nuclear Waste

Before entering into a contract to supply a nuclear power reactor to a Customer, the Vendor

should have made a reasonable judgment that the Customer State either has or should have in a

timely manner:

Enacted national nuclear laws or developed a regulatory framework that formalizes a

credible national strategy and/or a plan to, in a safe, secure and environmentally sound

manner, manage or dispose of spent fuel and radioactive waste and addresses safeguards

obligations, safety, security, human health issues, etc. (3.1); and

Ratified, accepted, or otherwise applied the principles of the “Joint Convention on the

Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management”

(3.2).

Vendors should seek to design plants that:

Enhance environmental benefits and minimize environmental impact (3.3);

Provide for safe and secure on-site storage of spent fuel (3.4); and

Facilitate ultimate plant decommissioning (3.5).

In exporting a nuclear power reactor, Vendors should seek to:

Address the responsible management by Customers of spent fuel and other radioactive

materials and waste (3.6).

Vendors should help the Customer State and the Customer in:

The protection of the environment through the responsible use of natural resources, the

reduction of waste and emissions, and the minimization of harmful impacts on the

environment (3.7);

A precautionary approach to the environment consistent with the definition provided in the

United Nations Global Compact and the Rio Declaration (3.8); and

The development in Customer States of systems for the long-term management of spent

fuel and/or radioactive waste that are rational, economic, safe, secure, and consistent with

Customer States' safeguards obligations (3.9).

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Principle 4: Liability for Nuclear Damage

Before entering into a contract to supply a nuclear power reactor to a Customer, the Vendor

should independently make a reasonable judgment that the Customer State has in force, or should

have in force before fuel is delivered in the Customer State's territory, a legal regime for

providing adequate liability for nuclear liability in the unlikely event of an accident, with

protection in effect equivalent to one or more of the following best practices:

A legal regime for adequate liability for nuclear liability that contains adequate liability limits

and financial protection, is backed by Customer State guarantees, ensures that claims for liability

should be channeled to the operator of the nuclear power reactor(s) that would be strictly and

exclusively liable, etc. (4.1);

Being in a treaty relationship with the Vendor State under either the Vienna Convention on

Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage or the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the

Field of Nuclear Energy (4.2); and/or

Being a party to the Convention on Supplementary Liability for Nuclear Damage (CSC)

(4.3).

Principle 5: Nonproliferation and Safeguards

As a manifestation of their strong commitment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and

nonproliferation, Vendors undertake to:

Pay special attention to and promote proliferation-resistant designs and take into account

safeguards requirements in design (5.1);

Pay special attention to the exclusively peaceful use of NSG Guidelines' trigger list and

dual-use list items delivered by the Vendor (5.2);

Seek to obtain a commitment from the Customer to implement at the facility a System of

Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials and a safeguards approach consistent with

its obligations to IAEA(5.3);

Inform in a timely manner the appropriate authority of the Vendor State and, as appropriate,

other Vendors adhering to these Principles, of any serious nonproliferation concerns related

to the equipment, materials, and technology provided by the Vendor to the Customer (5.4);

and

Consult closely with the Vendor State and act in accordance with its instructions upon being

informed by the Vendor State or becoming directly aware of actions or events that would

raise serious concerns about compliance with the global nonproliferation regime (5.5).

In addition to the above-mentioned provisions, Vendors welcome the inclusion by the Vendor

States of provisions in bilateral agreements requiring a Customer State to implement effective

nuclear export controls and to have an IAEA Additional Protocol in force.

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Principle 6: Ethics

In conducting their activities, Vendors seek to:

Comply with high business standards in their interactions with Customers (6.1);

Communicate with good faith, and in the spirit of transparency, about these principles

(6.2);

Promote worker safety and protect public health and the environment (6.3);

Take into account the principle of sustainable development, including the effects of

projects on the environment and society (6.4);

Proactively cooperate with Customers to inform and consult in a participatory manner with

nearby communities (6.5);

Have in place internal programs to discourage corruption and to encourage compliance

with anticorruption laws (6.6);

Respect fundamental labor rights (6.7);

Respect human rights (6.8); and

Encourage their suppliers, subcontractors, and other participants in the nuclear power

industry to demonstrate the same respect for these ethical commitments (6.9).

2) Nature of the “Principles of Conduct”

Representing self-imposed principles that nuclear reactor manufacturers promise to adhere to

in their nuclear power business activities, the Principles of Conduct are not legally binding. The

“Principles of Conduct” include items requiring that in exporting nuclear power reactors, their

manufacturers should judge that the countries receiving the nuclear power reactors or Customers

(i.e. operators of the nuclear power reactors) meet certain requirements and items requiring that

nuclear power reactor manufacturers themselves make commitments.

The former items include enactment of treaties in various fields and the observance of IAEA

standards and guidelines. The latter include the incorporation of safety, security and safeguards

requirements in the design of nuclear power reactors and assistance in infrastructure development in

the countries receiving nuclear power reactors.

3) Characteristics of the “Principles of Conduct”

(1) Integrated efforts for nuclear safety and nuclear security

Nuclear safety management and nuclear security management deal with different types of

events (nuclear safety: natural disasters and nuclear accidents due to negligence, nuclear security:

nuclear accidents due to acts of sabotage), but public health and environmental protection are their

common objectives. Furthermore, measures taken for nuclear safety (or nuclear security) may also

contribute to nuclear security (or nuclear safety). It is becoming an increasingly common view,

therefore, that integrated efforts should be made for nuclear safety and nuclear security, instead of

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dealing with them separately.104

The loss of power sources and other events that took place in the

Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident in March, 2011 could have resulted from an act of terrorism

by a non-state entity instead of a natural disaster. It has been suggested, therefore, that there is a need

to reconsider measures to be taken at nuclear power facilities and regulatory measures to be taken

from the viewpoint of not only nuclear safety but also nuclear security and to pursue a more integrated

approach to both nuclear safety and nuclear security.105

Items 2.2 and 2.11 in the “Principles of Conduct” reflect such changes and mention integrated

management of nuclear safety and nuclear security in the design of and regulation associated with

nuclear reactors. Japan's newly established “Nuclear Safety Agency” is to be responsible for nuclear

security, too, and Korea also established the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission.106

It is

possible that the approach of establishing a single organization responsible for both nuclear safety

and nuclear security is adopted in other countries, too.

(2) Treatment of safeguards

Many items in the “Principles of Conduct” state that in supplying nuclear power reactors,

Vendors should judge that Customer States meet certain requirements. The item concerning

safeguards, however, does not require that Vendors judge that Customer States have an IAEA

Additional Protocol in force. Instead, it merely states that Vendors welcome the inclusion by Vendor

States of provisions in bilateral agreements requiring a receiving state to have an IAEA Additional

Protocol in force. Whether having the IAEA Additional Protocol in force should be made a

requirement for the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment or technology was discussed among the

NSG members in response to the suggestion by President Bush of the United States in 2004, but it

has not yet become a reality. The agreed “Principles of Conduct” is considered to indicate that this

is a delicate political issue that has not yet been settled at the Vendor State level.

The “Principles of Conduct” do not seem to require receiving states to enter into a

comprehensive safeguards agreement. It is thought that the intent here is to avoid creating an

obstruction to the transfer of nuclear power reactors to India, which has not yet entered into a

comprehensive safeguards agreement.

(3) Incorporation of nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security into design requirements

The “Principles of Conduct” include items providing for the incorporation of not only nuclear

safety107

but also nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security into requirements for the design of

nuclear power reactors (2.1, 5.1). Although there are guidelines created by IAEA concerning

104 For example, The Interface between Safety and Security at Nuclear Power Plants (INSAG-24)

Report by the International Nuclear Safety Group, 2010

http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1472_web.pdf 105 For example, Time for an Integrated Approach to Nuclear Risk Management, Governance and Safety/Security/Emergency Arrangements 106 Statement by Dr. Chang-Kyung KIM, Vice Minister of Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, Head Delegate of

Republic of Korea, at the 55th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency 107 Nuclear safety is mentioned in Item 1.5.4 as follows: "(nuclear power reactors) are designed in accordance with the IAEA Safety

Requirements, giving due consideration to relevant IAEA Safety Guides, and meeting regulatory requirements of the Customer State."

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nuclear safety, there are no guidelines concerning the incorporation of safeguards, nuclear security

or proliferation resistance into design requirements, and the extent of such incorporation is left to

the judgment of Vendors. The inclusion of such provisions itself, however, is thought to be

significant. In order to make them more effective, it is necessary to agree upon more specific

requirements to be met at the design stage through guidelines, etc.

(4) Treatment of liability for nuclear damage

International treaties in the field of nuclear liability, namely, the Vienna Convention on Civil

Liability for Nuclear Damage, Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear

Energy, and domestic laws incorporating these treaties stipulate that except in the event of a nuclear

accident caused intentionally by a third party such as a Vendor, only the organization operating the

nuclear reactor concerned be held liable for damage resulting from a nuclear accident. In India,

however, under the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act enacted in 2010, in the event of a

nuclear accident caused by a defect in nuclear materials or equipment supplied by a nuclear reactor

manufacturer, the operating organization may demand liability from the manufacturer. High risks to

manufacturers, therefore, are hindering the supply of nuclear materials or equipment to India.

The “Principles of Conduct” promise that the Vendor judges that the receiving state meets,

before fuel is delivered, at least one of the following conditions: (1) having in force a domestic law

that ensures that claims for liability should be channeled to the operator of the nuclear power reactor

strictly and exclusively (2) becoming a party to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for

Nuclear Damage or the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy,

and (3) becoming a party to the Convention on Supplementary Liability for Nuclear Damage (CSC).

At present, India meets none of these conditions. It is thought, therefore, that in order to meet one or

more of those conditions, it is necessary to take some type of action such as amending current

domestic laws that allow liability for nuclear liability by a nuclear reactor manufacturer. We do not

think that the “Principles of Conduct” are designed specifically to cope with India-related issues.

We should pay attention, however, to the response of the Indian government since leading nuclear

power reactor manufacturers have unanimously expressed their support for the Vienna Convention,

Paris Convention and the international rules stipulating the exclusive responsibility of plant

operators.

4) Significance

Nuclear power generation involves risks in terms of safety, security and nuclear proliferation.

Vendor States and Vendors of nuclear power materials and equipment, therefore, have a stake in and

are responsible for activities to keep under control risks due to nuclear power generation in the

receiving states. At the government level, it is standard practice for a Vendor State of nuclear power

materials and equipment to enter into a bilateral agreement to obtain the receiving state's commitment

concerning nonproliferation and physical protection.108

In order to ensure fair competition in nuclear

108 Nuclear power cooperation agreements include those containing commitments associated with nuclear safety.

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power transactions, it is desirable to minimize differences in the commitment to be obtained from

receiving states between Vendor States. A certain level of standardization is achieved by the NSG

Guidelines.

There have been no common rules, however, to be observed by Vendors when exporting their

nuclear materials and equipment to nuclear power generation organizations in receiving states under

nuclear power cooperation agreements.109

The recently agreed “Principles of Conduct” are

noteworthy because they cover a number of fields that are not covered by the NSG Guidelines, such

as safety, spent fuel and waste management, liability for nuclear damage, and ethics, and include

detailed provisions in each field.

It is hoped that the “Principles of Conduct” are adhered to so that they are firmly established,

and similar efforts increase throughout the nuclear power industry including enrichment suppliers

and fuel manufacturers.

5) Role of industry associated with international nuclear fuel cycle

In the multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle, international efforts are made to deal

with back-end issues, which are currently difficult to cope with because of poor feasibility in the

nuclear power industry, along with front-end issues. The multilateral approach is being hailed as a

means of promoting nuclear power business. Economic rationality and business equality are the

keys to industry involvement.

The fact that the nuclear power industry voluntarily established the “Principles of Conduct”

concerning the 3S's, environmental protection and the handling of spent fuel and waste, liability for

nuclear damage, and ethics associated with the export of nuclear power plants indicates that this

special industry is aware of their necessity and importance. In reality, however, efforts to maintain

economic rationality and equality under the principle of competition need to be backed by

international-level rather than government-level commitments.

In this sense, it is believed that the proposed agreements among the MNA member countries

concerning the 3S's, export control, transportation, liability for nuclear damage, handling of waste,

etc. should be effective in promoting front-end and back-end business.

6.6 Forum for discussion on establishment of international nuclear fuel cycle framework

Options available to make the proposed framework a reality include using an existing

framework such as APEC as a foundation for a new framework and creating a new framework

involving a small number of countries and expanding it later. The approach of creating a new

109 Similar rules include the Charter of Ethics of the World Nuclear Association. The Charter of Ethics, however, is a brief description

of a set of principles of nuclear power business.

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framework involving a small number of countries and expanding it according to emerging needs in

the years to come, as can be seen in the regional safeguards framework established by Argentine

and Brazil (ABACC), is definitely an option. Since, however, cooperation activities are limited and

later expansion is thought to be no easy task, starting discussions within an existing framework may

be a more realistic approach.

In connection with the approach of using an existing framework, Table 6.20 compares some

of the existing frameworks for cooperation in Asia. The activities of the Association of Southeast

Asian Nations (ASEAN; formed in 1968), the expanded successor of the Association of Southeast

Asia (ASA, established in 1961), cover regional cooperation in economy, society, politics, security,

culture and other areas. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) held the first ministerial

meeting in 1989. As a framework for economic cooperation involving 21 countries in the

Asia-Pacific region, APEC operates on the basis of non-binding commitments, and its activities are

characterized by "cooperative and voluntary actions" and "open regionalism." The Regional

Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP),

which was proposed by Japan in 2001 (Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi) and was enacted in 2006,

is an international treaty focusing on measures against piracy. The Forum for Nuclear Cooperation

in Asia (FNCA) is a Japan-led framework for international cooperation in connection with the

peaceful use of nuclear power formed with the aim of promoting effective and efficient cooperation

with neighboring Asian countries in the field of nuclear power. FNCA's activities include

ministerial meetings, coordinator meetings, panel activities and projects. Another existing

framework for safeguards is the Asian-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN).110

Since, however, it is

an organization consisting of operators in different countries, it has not yet reached the level of

safeguards implementation, and Kazakhstan, which is one of the leading nuclear Vendor States in

Asia, is not a member.

Different frameworks have different characteristics, but it may be possible to discuss the

proposed approach by using FNCA or APSN because they are in the field of nuclear power. If legal

binding force is a requirement, the framework of ReCAAP would be informative. The frameworks

of ASEAN and APEC are not likely to be usable, whether as they are or by upgrading them, in view

of factors such as the member countries, the fields of cooperation and legal binding force, but they

may be usable as forums for discussion.

In any case, further discussion on forums for discussing framework creation is beyond the

scope of this study because it is a highly political subject. In reality, however, it is an important

issue to consider in order to discuss further details of MNA.

110 The current members are as follows: Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission,

China Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IAEA, Japan Nuclear Material Control Center,

Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Disarmament and

Arms Control, Philippine Nuclear Research Institute, Singapore Center for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Science, National

Environmental Agency, Russia State Atomic Energy Commission, Thailand Office of Atomic Energy for Peace, Ministry of Science

and Technology, U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration, Vietnam Ministry of Science and Technology

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Table 6.20 Comparison of existing frameworks in Asia

Abbreviation Name How it was formed Member states Characteristics Remarks

ASEAN Association of

Southeast Asian

Nations

Evolved from the

Association of Southeast

Asia (ASA; Thailand, the

Philippines and the

Federation of Malaya).

In August, 1967, ASEAN

was formed in Bangkok,

Thailand as the successor of

ASA.

Original members: Thailand,

Indonesia, Singapore, the

Philippines, Malaysia

In 1984, Brunei joined.

In the second half of the 1990s,

Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and

Cambodia joined.

Observers: Papua New Guinea,

East Timor

Organization for regional cooperation

of 10 countries in economy, society,

politics, security and culture

Headquartered in Jakarta, Indonesia

APEC Asia-Pacific

Economic

Cooperation

In 1989, the first ministerial

meeting of APEC was held.

Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile,

China, Hong Kong (China),

Indonesia, Japan, Korea,

Malaysia, Mexico, New

Zealand, Papua New Guinea,

Peru, the Philippines, Russia,

Singapore, Chinese Taipei,

Thailand, United States, Vietnam

Framework for economic cooperation

involving 21 countries and regions in

the Asia-Pacific region

"Cooperative and voluntary actions"

"Open regionalism"

Non-binding, loosely knit

intergovernmental framework for

cooperation

ReCAAP Regional

Cooperation

Agreement on

Combating Piracy

and Armed Robbery

against Ships in Asia

Proposed by Prime Minister

Koizumi in 2001.

Adopted in November, 2004.

Enacted in September, 2006.

Contracting parties: 18 countries

Japan, Singapore, Laos,

Thailand, the Philippines,

Myanmar, Korea, Cambodia,

Vietnam, India, Sri Lanka,

China, Brunei, Bangladesh,

Norway, the Netherlands,

Denmark, United Kingdom

Information sharing and cooperation

system using Information Sharing

Centre (ISC) as Piracy

countermeasures

Promotion of bilateral cooperation

between contractors not using ISC

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FNCA Forum for Nuclear

Cooperation in Asian

Activities including

ministerial meetings,

coordinator meetings, panel

activities and projects

Japan, Australia, Bangladesh,

China, Indonesia, Kazakhstan,

Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, the

Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam

Japan-led framework for cooperation

in the peaceful use of nuclear power

formed with the aim of effective and

efficient promotion of cooperation

with neighboring Asian countries in

the field of nuclear power

Projects: radiation breeding,

biofertilizer, electron accelerator

utilization, radiotherapy,

research reactor network,

neutron activation analysis,

nuclear safety management,

radiation safety and waste

management, human resource

development, nuclear security

and safeguards

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7. Summary

7.1 Background and purpose of study

The accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power

Company during the Great East Japan Earthquake was a serious event that affected the global

trend until that time of expanding peaceful uses of nuclear power. In Japan, it may influence the

continuance of peaceful use of nuclear power. On the other hand, it is undeniable that nuclear

power remains one of the most important methods to handle global growth of economies/energy

consumption and issues with greenhouse gases. Although slowing down in nuclear power growth

may be unavoidable for the moment, we predict with high probability that global need for nuclear

power should grow again in the long run to accommodate the increasing energy consumption due

to rapid economic growth, especially in areas such as Asia, unless a replacement of nuclear power

is found.

If the demand for nuclear power increases, the demand for not only the generation of power

but also for refining uranium, conversion, enrichment, re-conversion, and fuel manufacturing

should increase. In addition, concerns for the proliferation of “Sensitive Nuclear Technologies

(SNTs)” such as uranium enrichment technology (front-end) and spent fuel (SF) reprocessing

technology (back-end), and proliferation of fissile materials should also increase. An increase in

the amount of SF should mean that SF should be stored in many nations. In other words, from a

nuclear non-proliferation perspective there should be concerns that plutonium may proliferate

globally in the form of SF. There should also be more issues with regards to nuclear security

and SF safeguards (collectively referred to as 3S).

Previously, international society prevented nuclear proliferation with schematic measures

under the NPT and IAEA, as well as taking additional measures by setting conditions on supplier

countries for nuclear technologies, equipment and nuclear fuel (supply-side approach: export

control regulations, controls on technology transfers through bilateral agreements, etc.).

However, with nuclear technologies being exported, the supply of nuclear fuel and services

related to the nuclear cycle should in the future likely expand from the Western Bloc nations to

former Eastern Bloc nations, raising concerns that nuclear non-proliferation systems should

weaken. On the other hand, if nations with advanced nuclear power technologies were to

introduce stronger nuclear non-proliferation measures, they could interfere with the right to

peaceful use of nuclear energy guaranteed in Article IV of the NPT.

Under the circumstances, one influential idea that was examined is a demand-side

approach, where the nuclear fuel cycle would be implemented among multiple countries. With

this approach, nuclear fuel cycle services, in particular those using SNTs, are multilaterally

executed and controlled, thereby preventing unnecessary proliferation of SNTs, and enabling safe

and appropriate control of nuclear technologies and nuclear materials. This can effectively and

efficiently assure risk control and risk reduction with regard to 3S while also avoiding interfering

in emerging countries’ peaceful use of nuclear power, thanks to the sharing of the nuclear fuel

cycle.

Although many debates and studies have already looked at the multilateral management

concept, most of them focus on the front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle and assurance of the supply

161

of nuclear fuel (enriched uranium fuel) to nuclear power generating states. These approaches

may be effective for preventing proliferation of uranium enrichment technology, which addresses

one of the above concerns. However, they do not address issues such as proliferation of

plutonium due to the accumulation of “spent fuel” and handling of reprocessing technology for

the back-end. Since most of the approaches to assure the supply of nuclear fuel focus on dealing

with the termination of fuel supply during emergencies, the need has arisen to examine the

international framework for fuel supply and handling of SF in normal conditions.

In Japan, plutonium use should not be proceeding as planned for some time. When looking

at options for long-term storage of SF and storage of plutonium for effective use of resources (as

MOX), having these be carried out under multilateral control could help to gain acceptance in

international society while also solving the problems of an overburdened back-end and

contributing to the creation of a system that helps prevent nuclear proliferation. If Japanese

reprocessing stops due to the international concerns on plutonium accumulation, or causes

significant delay, needs on restitution of SF to individual reactor sites and SF’s long storage would

increase. Thereby, it appears that the needs of not only domestic but also international SF storage

become more significant.

This study investigated specific measures to achieve a sustainable multilateral international

nuclear fuel cycle including a stable supply system for enriched uranium, system for handling SF

(including reducing the environmental burden of waste), usage of plutonium, establishment of a

regional safeguards system for the international nuclear fuel cycle, requirements for organizations

that carry out the international nuclear fuel cycle, and the role of industry in the international

nuclear fuel cycle system. In addition to looking at these issues and solutions for them regarding

the systems of an international nuclear fuel cycle, the study looked at Asia as part of a feasible,

sustainable international nuclear fuel cycle that avoided nuclear proliferation. The purpose was

to make this proposal to international society and demonstrate how Asia could contribute to an

international nuclear non-proliferation system and stable energy supply. The reason Asia was

chosen as the focus of this study is due to the needs mentioned previously, in other words, 1) The

necessity of compensating for changes in nuclear non-proliferation regimes with the predicted

increase in nuclear energy in the Asian region (a weakening of nuclear non-proliferation due to

expansion of nuclear business in the former Eastern Bloc), 2) The necessity of stable front- and

back-end nuclear fuel cycle services for promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Asia, 3)

Of the 3S areas that require strengthening with nuclear expansion in Asia, Safety and Security in

particular are difficult to improve systematically (improvement can occur by agreement of those

nations participating as part of the system), but the 3S all require strengthening.

7.2 Final framework proposal

An overview of the final proposal is given below.

1) Targeting the near future and Asia (Central Asia including uranium producing countries,

Northeast Asia including countries with developed nuclear power, and Southeast Asia with

countries new to nuclear power). All elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium

refinement and SF reprocessing should be included. Supplementary Explanation 1, 12

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2) Define cooperation (activity) types for each element of the nuclear fuel cycle, including Type A

(cooperation for 3S only, services received), B (MNA without transfer of ownership), C (MNA

holding ownership rights). Countries involved in the 3 types of activity should be referred to as

partner states, host states, and site states respectively.

3) To represent the MNA framework, an MNA management organization (Asian Multilateral

nuclear fuel cycle MAnagement Organization - AMMAO) should be established with cooperation

from the IAEA. See Supplementary Explanation 2

4) Member states should sign, ratify and bring into effect a MNA framework treaty. Agreements

necessary for a smooth implementation of the treaty should be carried out between the AMMAO,

member states and the IAEA (and technology holders (states), if necessary). The AMMAO

should enter into facility management and operation agreements with host and site states. The

operation of facilities in host states or MNA facilities in site states should be carried out by an

international consortium. See Supplementary Explanation 2

5) Member states should be responsible for a commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.

However, pursuant to Article IV of the NPT they should also assure not interfering with peaceful

uses of nuclear energy. The AMMAO should also enter into export control agreements with

member states who should be obligated to fulfill the objective criteria listed in the 2011 NSG

Guidelines (INFCIRC 254 rev11, part 1, 6-7). See Supplementary Explanation 3, 4

6) A nuclear non-proliferation regime should be maintained within the framework; i) Regional

safeguards agreements should be entered into between the IAEA and member states to establish a

regional safeguards system (measurement/ control, safeguards) for the MNA, ii) Within the

framework, i.e. the AMMAO and member states, accords (agreements) should be made on

nuclear non-proliferation (for example, requests for non-proliferation as strong as those of

bilateral agreements with the USA), and the AMMAO should enter comprehensive nuclear energy

agreements with states outside of the framework (Type C). (This should lead to a loosening of

restrictions from bilateral agreements that had been made with countries outside of the framework

(due to being handled comprehensively), and should help services within the framework operate

more smoothly) see Supplementary Explanations 5, 6, 7, see explanations for Types A, B, C

below

7) The AMMAO and member states should enter agreements on nuclear safety and security.

These should include creating guidelines/standards and a peer review system (with different levels

of reviews; advisory reviews and peer reviews to make a more effective review inspection

system). (This should ensure an international level of safety and nuclear security for facilities

within the framework (both nuclear fuel cycle facilities and power plants)). See Supplementary

Explanations 8, 9, 10, 11; see explanations for Types A, B, C below

8) The AMMAO should enter agreements with technology holders (states) regarding control of

SNTs, to ensure strict control of SNTs. see Supplementary Explanation 3

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9) Regardless of type, the ownership of nuclear materials shall vest in the client state. In other

words, when requesting refining and reprocessing services, there would be no transfer of

ownership of the nuclear materials.

10) Both recycling (reprocessing) and direct disposal services should be handled jointly for SF.

International storage services for a set length of term (such as 100 years) should also be

implemented. Direct disposal and high level waste (HLW), byproducts of recycling, should be

disposed of in the country that produced them as a general rule. In order to make final disposal

of radioactive waste simpler for individual nations, the AMMAO should research technologies to

reduce the radioactive toxicity of HLW (making it medium level waste). See Supplementary

Explanation 12

11) The supply of nuclear fuel and handling of SF, including transportation, within the MNA

framework should be more or at least equally economical for member states than carrying out all

the processes as an individual state.

12) The transport of nuclear materials should be the responsibility of the state requesting services,

both on the outward and return journey. Member states should enter into a transportation

agreement with the AMMAO (simplifying export approval, mutual support for security in

national waters) and commit to cooperating in the transportation necessary to the nuclear fuel

cycle supply and services. See Supplementary Explanation 2

13) Liability for nuclear damages should be set for each type. As a rule, they should follow the

laws of the partner, host and site states, as well as any international treaties on liability for nuclear

damages they are a party to. For Types A and B, responsibility for liability lies with the states

concerned, while for Type C responsibility for liability should exist within the MNA framework if

necessary due to nuclear damage liability agreements between the AMMAO and member states.

See Supplementary Explanation 11 See explanations for Types B, C below

14) Legal regulations should as a rule assume international rules and bilateral agreements

(AMMAO - 3rd

state) take precedence over laws of the state, requiring member states (site states

in particular) to modify the laws of their state.

15) Selection of Type B host states and Type C site states should include consideration for

geopolitical issues. The selection of transportation routes should also consider geopolitical

issues. See Supplementary Explanation 13

16) By entering into agreements for assurance of additional supply with international

organizations, the AMMAO should be able to assure a supply of uranium fuel to member states.

See Supplementary Explanation 2

17) In order to maintain the balance of supply and demand for uranium fuel and its reasonable

cost in each state, the MNA should support to flexibly acquire the fuel from outside the

framework. In addition to the assurance of supply mentioned in 16) above, individual states

should be able to procure fuel. See Supplementary Explanation 7

164

18) When a member state violates the treaty/agreements or leaves the MNA framework, they

should be obligated to take penalties or meet conditions for withdrawal.

Differences in Proposed Types A, B and C

(1) Type A (3S Cooperation, Activities Not Including Providing Services)

・ No changes to facility ownership or control such as legal regulations

・ Safeguards: Regional Safeguards - Generally, measuring control should be carried out by the

state (commissioned company) and the NMA. Inspections by the NMA and IAEA should

be probated.

・ Nuclear Safety: National legal guidelines regarding safety should be used as a base, there

should be a peer review by the AMMAO on implementing international guidelines (to the

extent that it is possible under agreements), and the results of this review are not binding (a

recommendation)

・ Nuclear Security: National legal guidelines regarding nuclear security should be used as a

base, there should be an advisory review by the AMMAO on implementing international

guidelines (to the extent that it is possible under agreements), and the results of this review

are not binding (a recommendation)

(If not mentioned above, should remain unchanged)

・ Bilateral Agreements on Nuclear Cooperation and Import/Export Control: When there are

states carrying out Type B or Type C activities within the framework (MNA), respectively

( the comments included in (2) (3) below on bilateral agreements on nuclear cooperation and

import/export control also apply to countries carrying out only Type A activities)

・ Type A should generally be membership in the framework via power plants, in which case

receiving nuclear fuel cycle services (fuel supply, handling of SF) is included.

(2) Type B (MNA Without Transfer of Ownership)

・ Organization under the control of the state government established in the territory of the

state* (operation may be commissioned to a consortium, investors may include other states)

*An organization that the legal regulations of the state apply to

・ Safeguards: Regional Safeguards- Generally, measuring control should be carried out by the

host state (commissioned company) and the NMA. Inspections by the NMA and IAEA

should be probated.

・ Nuclear Safety: National legal guidelines regarding safety should be used as a base, there

should be a peer review by the AMMAO on implementing international guidelines (to the

extent that it is possible under agreements), and the results of this review are not binding (a

recommendation)

・ Nuclear Security: National legal guidelines regarding nuclear security should be used as a

base, there should be an advisory review by the AMMAO on implementing international

165

guidelines (to the extent that it is possible under agreements), and the results of this review

are not binding (a recommendation)

・ Nuclear Damage Liability: Most liability should be the obligation of the host state. There

should be some MNA supplementary liability measures (insurance) (additional liability

(insurance) proportionate to services received).

・ Bilateral Agreements on Nuclear Cooperation: Bilateral agreements by individual states

should remain as is, however by agreeing to significant nuclear non-proliferation conditions

(on the level required for bilateral agreements with the USA) between MNA member states

(with the AMMAO), attempts should be made to relax the bilateral agreements mentioned

above (allowing exceptions for transport of nuclear materials and other transport in the MNA

framework).

・ Import/Export Control: Decisions for international control of exports (by the NSG, etc.)

should be used as a base. Import/export controls among member states should be

consolidated as much as possible. For international storage of SF, there should be an accord

not to treat it as waste within the MNA. When reprocessing, final waste should be returned

to the originating state as a rule.

(3) Type C (Ownership with MNA)

・ A facility owned by the MNA established in the territory of the state (operations

commissioned to consortium, investment from multiple states)

・ Safeguards: Regional Safeguards - Generally, measuring control should be carried out by the

NMA (commissioned company). Inspections by the NMA (AMMAO) and IAEA should be

probated.

・ Nuclear Safety: International safety standards should be implemented, with AMMAO peer

reviews examining implementations of these standards with more effective peer reviews

・ Nuclear Security: International nuclear security guidelines should be implemented, with

AMMAO peer reviews examining implementations of these guidelines with more effective

peer reviews (to a degree at least equal to MNA peer reviews of nuclear material protection at

nuclear facilities based on bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with the NMA)

・ Nuclear Damage Liability: MNA member states should join an international treaty (such as

CSC) on nuclear liability. By the AMMAO entering into nuclear liability agreements with

member states when necessary, it should establish indemnity liability for damages within the

MNA framework. For example, pooling funds from member states and their businesses

(pooling payments from electric companies). These funds should be determined based on

MNA facility services.

・ Bilateral Agreements on Nuclear Cooperation: The MNA should be treated as a state, with

bilateral agreements made between non-MNA states (such as the USA) and the MNA

(AMMAO) for comprehensive agreement on items in the bilateral nuclear cooperation

agreement. By agreeing to significant nuclear non-proliferation conditions (on the level

required for bilateral agreements with the USA) between MNA member states (with the

AMMAO), attempts should be made to relax the bilateral agreements mentioned above

166

(allowing exceptions for transport of nuclear materials and other transport in the MNA

framework)

・ Import/Export Control: International export controls such as the NSG should be handled by

treating the MNA as a single state. By agreeing to strict import/export controls between

member states, the transport of nuclear materials should not be treated as international

transfer.

When Multiple Types Coexist

As indicated in Supplementary Documentation 12: Fuel, multilateral control of services for the

nuclear fuel cycle can be realistically expected to include different types coexisting within the

framework. Below are guidelines for the coexistence of Types A/B or Types A/C.

Types A/B

When a Type B state with nuclear fuel cycle service facilities (enrichment, reprocessing)

provides services to a state with only Type A facilities (such as a light water reactor), i) the Type A

state can receive nuclear fuel cycle services due to membership in the framework, ii) a Type A

state should cover the framework treaty and related agreements. The Type B state should, iii)

carry out nuclear fuel service business within the MNA framework, including smooth

transportation of nuclear materials, iv) enter framework treaty and related agreements to cover the

contents indicated in (2) above. When handling Type A and B within a single state, it should be

treated as Type B as indicated in (2).

Types A/C

In Type C state (as site state), MNA having nuclear fuel cycle service facilities (enrichment,

reprocessing) provides services to a state with only Type A facilities (such as a light water reactor),

i) the Type A state can receive nuclear fuel cycle services due to membership in the framework, ii)

a Type A state should cover the framework treaty and related agreements. MNA in the Type C

state, should, iii) carries out nuclear fuel service business within the MNA framework, including

smooth transportation of nuclear materials, iv) enter framework treaty and related agreements to

cover the contents indicated above. When handling Type A and C within a single state, it should

be treated as Type C as indicated in (3).

167

Potential Member States for Multilateral Control in Asia:Japan, South Korea, China (and Taiwan), Russia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and new

nuclear ASEAN states (Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, etc.)

Reasons• Expanded use of nuclear energy is expected in Asia• There is a significant need to deal with issues of supplying enriched uranium and handling

SF in Asia• With changes to fuel supply and demand in Asia (greater supply from the former Eastern

Bloc), there is a need for stronger non-proliferation measures• Northeast Asian and Central Asian states with advanced nuclear energy and resources,

and Southeast Asian new nuclear states will be the main targets• North Korea is currently excluded： For political reasons, India and Pakistan are not

options： As they are not signatories to the NPT, they do not meet the requirements for the framework(NPT nuclear non-proliferation obligation) (with IAEA safeguards being the base)

• The Arab states of Western Asia are, like North Korea, excluded from consideration due to issues of political stability

• The USA, Canada and Australia will be treated as companies participating from outside the Asia framework, as nuclear supplier states

and leaders in nuclear non-proliferation

(Supplementary Explanation 1) Potential Member States for Multilateral Control

Support for establishment

ContractContract

A-11 Comprehensive Nuclear Co-op Agreement

• A-2 Export Control Agreement *1, *2, *3

• A-3 Safety/ Security/ Agreement on Liability *1, *2 , *3

• A-4 Transport Agreement *1, *2 , *3

• A-5 Agreement on Transferring Facility Ownership to MNA*2

• A-6 MNA Facility Control/Operation Agreement *2

• A-7 Nuclear Fuel Supply Agreement*1,*2,*3

• A-8 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Service Agreement*1,*2 ,*3

Contract

Contract

（Supplementary Explanation 2）Structure of Multilateral Asian Framework (Treaties and Necessary Agreements)

Type A Type CType B

A-5, A-6Agreement

Partner State*3Host State*1

Consortium

Member State

Site State*2

A-10 供給保証及び追加的保証S

Assurance

A-1 Regional SafeguardsA

greement*1, *2 , *3

A-9 Agreement on Control of SNTs

Inspections/ Peer Reviews

Regional Safeguards, Nuclear Security, Safety

International Organization IAEA SNT Holder (State)

IAEA

Multilateral Treaty on Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Supply/ Services in Asia (MNA Framework

Treaty)

Agreement on Additional

MNA

3rd State

International Consortium

Asian Multilateral Framework Management Organization (AMMAO)

168

(Supplementary Explanation 3) Respecting Right to Peaceful Use of Nuclear

Energy for MNA Member States

• Issue：

✓How to ensure both nuclear non-proliferation and the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy for MNA member states

• Possible Solutions：

✓Base: Respect the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy for MNA member states as stated in NPT Article IV

At the same time, ensure non-proliferation similar to national facilities at MNA facilities

✓Nuclear Non-proliferation Conditions for Joining MNA

- Requiring member states to enter and follow international treaties and agreements on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security

- Respect guidelines for export controls of nuclear materials and technology, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security

✓ Improve nuclear non-proliferation in MNA member states, with regional safeguards and standardization of measurement controls, etc.

（Supplementary Explanation 4）MNA Entry Requirements: Export Regulations (NSG Guidelines)(INFCIRC/254/Rev.11/Part 1)

The objective requirements below for transport of enriched/reprocessed items (Paragraph 6(a)) will be basic requirements for MNA entry.

• Signatory to NPT, compliance with all NPT obligations

• Having no major infractions on safeguards agreements in IAEA reports, and no requests for additional measures to respect safeguard obligations or build trust in peacefully using nuclear energy due to IAEA Board of Governors decisions, and not having the IAEA Secretariat report an inability to implement safeguards agreements

• Respect NSG Guidelines, and report to the United Nations Security Council that export controls are being implemented as required by UNSC Resolution 1540.

• Have agreements between governments with supplier states including assurances on non-explosive uses, safeguards in perpetuity and retransfer.

• Based on international guidelines, have a mutual accord with supplier countries on a commitment to physical protection of nuclear materials.

• Have a commitment to IAEA safety standards, and have international treaties regarding nuclear safety in effect

169

Export Control Agreement

Existing Bilateral Nuclear Co-op

Agreement

Regional Safeguards Agreement

IAEA

（Supplementary Explanation 5） Handling Bilateral Nuclear Energy Agreements (Type B+A)

Nuclear Supplier States

Outside of Framework

USA, Canada, Australia, etc.

Member State

AMMAO

MNABy entering into MNA framework treaties and related agreements between the AMMAO and member states that have nuclear non-proliferation standards on the same level as most bilateral agreements, the bilateral agreements that each state had been party to could slowly be relaxed (as exceptions).

⇒ Enable smooth fuel cycle services and movement of nuclear materials within the framework

MNA Framework

Treaty

Comprehensive Nuclear Co-op.

Agreement (including 3S guarantees)

Existing Bilateral Nuclear Energy

Agreement

Regional Safeguards Agreement

（Supplementary Explanation 6） Handling Bilateral Nuclear Energy Agreements (Type C+A)

Nuclear Supplier States

Outside of Framework

USA, Canada, Australia, etc.

Member State

AMMAO

MNA

MNA Framework

Treaty

A comprehensive nuclear energy agreement will be entered into by the AMMAO and nuclear supplier states. By entering into MNA framework treaties and related agreements between the AMMAO and member states that have nuclear non-proliferation standards on the same level as most bilateral agreements, the bilateral agreements that each state had been party to could slowly be replaced.

⇒ Smooth services and movement of nuclear materials within the framework


IAEA

170

Supply Enriched UraniumReprocessing

Partner States (Type A)

Power Plants

States Outside of MNA Framework

Enrichment, Reprocessing

Supply Enriched UraniumSF - Services

Host States (Type B)

Enrichment, Reprocessing, SF Storage, etc.

Site States (Type C)

Enrichment, Reprocessing, SF Storage, etc.

Type B/AType C/ANon-FW to Type BNon-FW to Type C

MNA Internal AgreementsMNA Type A+B:Non-proliferation: strict requirements for non-proliferation between MNA member states (and AMMAO)Import/Export Control: International guidelines on export (NSG, etc.) used as base. Standardization of import/export control standards between member states

MNA：Type A+B Cooperation:Bilateral nuclear co-op agreements between outside state and individual state in MNA: activities regarding movement of nuclear materials and export controls within MNA will be changed to comprehensive accord (relaxed)

MNA： Type A+C Cooperation:Bilateral nuclear co-op agreements between outside state and AMMAO: transport of nuclear materials and export controls in MNA will enter agreement for comprehensive accord (relaxed)

MNA Internal AgreementsMNA Type A+C:Non-proliferation: strict requirements for non-proliferation between MNA member states (and AMMAO)Import/Export Control: International guidelines on export within MNA (NSG, etc.) used as base (standardization), MNA transport of nuclear materials not considered international

：

AMMAO

（Supplementary Explanation 7） Types of Cooperative Activities in MNA Framework

MNA

Measurement control/report by state/ commissioned company

Report

SG Information Sharing/ Segregation of Duties

SG Inspection

Safety Peer Review

Nuclear Security Advisory Review

Export Control Observation (based on NSG Guidelines)

（Supplementary Explanation 8） Type A Involvement by AMMAO and IAEA (Inspections, Peer Reviews, etc.)

Member StatePower Plant

IAEA

Uranium Supplier State

AMMAO

SF Service Supplier State

SG Inspection

Uranium SF Services

Regional SG Agreement


Safety/ Nuclear Security/ Agreement on Liability

171




Report

SG Inspection

Monitoring Safeguards (Measurement Reports Checks)Safety Peer Review

Nuclear Security Advisory Review

Export Control Observation (based on NSG Guidelines)

Partner StatePower Plant

IAEA

Host State 1

AMMAO

Host State 2

Measurement control/report by state/ commissioned company

SG Inspection


Uranium SF Services

（Supplementary Explanation 9） Type B Involvement by AMMAO and IAEA (Inspections, Peer Reviews, etc.)


SG Inspection

More effective safety peer reviews based on international standards

More effective nuclear security peer reviews based on international guidelines

Export Control Observation (treating the MNA as 1 state)

（Supplementary Explanation 10）Type C Involvement by AMMAO and IAEA (Inspections, Peer Reviews, etc.)

Partner StatePower Plant

IAEA

Site State 1

AMMAO

Site State 2

SG Inspection

Uranium SF Services

Report

Measurement control by NMA (AMMAO)




172

（Supplementary Explanation 11）Mutual Aid System for Type C MNA Facilities

Injured Party, Injured Business

Payment Claim

Mutual Aid System

MNA Nuclear

Damages Liability

Organization (Control

Pooled Funds)

Issuing Funds

Contributions MNA Member

State MNA Member

State MNA Member

State MNA Member State Company

MNA Local

Corporation

（Supplementary Explanation 12） Example Model for Future Multilateral Control in Asia

U Enrichment

Nuclear Power Plant (LWR)

MOX Fuel Production

Disposal: High-level waste (including approaches to reduce radioactive toxicity) and SF

Natural U

Reconversion/ U Fuel Production

Reprocessing (Advanced)

U Refinement/Conversion

Fast Reactor -Type (B) CMOX – LWR -Type A（B)

MOX Storage

International Storage of SF

Asian state with plentiful uranium resources

SF generated

state

Other LEU Suppliers (Outside Asia)

E.g. U originator state, enriched U supplier state

Type (B) C

Type B(C)

Type (B)C

SF-Case:Type (A) B

Type (B) C

Type (B) C

Type (A) B Type (A) B

Type A

173

Cargo Transfer Point

Uranium mine, conversion, SF storage, disposal, etc.

Eurasian Land Bridge (Auxiliary Route)

Russia/Kazakhstan Customs Union

Russia/Mongolia Resource Exports Promotion Policy

Region of Territorial Dispute

Choke point

Fuel processing, SF storage, etc.

Fuel processing, reprocessing, SF storage, etc.

Fuel processing, enrichment, reprocessing, etc.

Land RouteSea RouteNuclear FacilityLikely Areas for

Maritime Security

NMA Member States and Likely Fuel Transport Routes

Siberian Land Bridge (Primary Route)

Conversion, enrichment, reprocessing, SF storage, etc.

Uranium mine, SF storage, disposal, etc.

Core Area for International Fuel Cycle

（Supplementary Explanation 13)

１

174

7.3 Overview of nuclear fuel cycle framework treaties and agreements

Legal regulations from international treaties and agreements, bilateral agreements, and

nuclear weapon free zone treaties can cause problems and issues with the 3Ss (nuclear

non-proliferation, nuclear security, safety) when creating a framework, nuclear fuel cycle services,

selecting host and site states, transporting and liability. In order to resolve these issues, it is

important to consider what corporate status the AMMAO should have as the operating organization

for the MNA and how to handle bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements.

(Corporate Status)

Based on the concept that this framework should be an international organization on the level

of the IAEA, the ideal corporate status for the AMMAO is, 1) Corporate status recognized by

international law, allowing the AMMAO to enter into treaties and agreements with states and

international organizations, 2) Corporate status within the territory of member states, allowing the

AMMAEO to enter contracts in member states, possess movable and immovable assets, jurisdiction,

and apply for permits. Therefore, the framework treaty should include separate provisions for

corporate status and include the items listed above.

The framework treaty includes a preamble, the main body (Articles 1 to 26), ending and

attached documents (I to V) (see Appended Document 1.). An overview is given below.

Treaty Name: Treaty on Multilateral Cooperation Framework for the Provision of Nuclear

Fuel Cycle Supply and Services in Asian Region (Abbreviated: Asian Multilateral

Cooperation Framework Treaty, MNA Framework Treaty)

Preamble: Background, Purpose, Cooperation, Member State Prerequisites, Definitions,

Rights and Responsibilities of Member States

Body, Article 1: Contents of Cooperation, Scope of Activities

Article 2: Commitment to Non-proliferation

Article 3: Corporate Status/ Legal Regulations

Article 4: Safeguards

Article 5: Nuclear Security

Article 6: Import/ Export Controls

Article 7: Safety

Article 8: Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Services

Article 9: Access to SNTs, Security of SNTs and Information

Article 10: Selection of Host States and Site States

Article 11: Degree of Involvement with MNA

Article 12: Liability

Article 13: Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements

Article 14: Transport

Article 15: Organization and Duties

Article 16: Prohibited Cooperation Items

Article 17: Patents/ Industrial Ownership

Article 18: Resolution of Disputes

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Article 19: Signatory to Cooperation with Other States, Organizations

Article 20: Applicable Scope of Treaty

Article 21: Ratification and Consignment of Treaty

Article 22: Amendments to Treaty

Article 23: Withdrawal

Article 24: Invalidation of Membership

Article 25: Termination of Treaty

Article 26: Necessary Measures, etc.

Ending: Signatories to treaty, languages used, date of signatures

Attached Document I: Related Agreements

Attached Document II: Organization and Duties of MNA Observation Center

Attached Document III: Security Procedures and Confidentiality Classification

Attached Document IV: Liability for Damages

Attached Document V: Patents and Industrial Properties Ownership

The Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement (Attached Document I, A-11) is a bilateral

agreement between the AMMAO and 3rd

party states outside of the MNA framework, primarily

dealing with Type C facilities and cooperative activities. Resolutions between the AMMAO and

MNA member states related to this agreement are included in the export control agreement. An

overview of the preamble, main body and attached documents is given below.

Name: Model Comprehensive Nuclear Cooperation Agreement for Asian Multilateral

Framework

Preamble: Background, Purpose, Signatories (3rd

Party States, AMMAO)

Article 1: Definitions

Article 2: Cooperation Methods

Article 3: Limits on Storage

Article 4: Transportation of Resources

Article 5: Changes to Form Due to Reprocessing, Irradiation, Etc.

Article 6: Enrichment

Article 7: Physical Protection Measures

Article 8: Peaceful Uses

Article 9: Measures Preventing Use in Explosive Nuclear Devices

Article 10: Rights in Other Countries

Article 11: Prior Consent

Article 12: End of Agreement and Necessary Measures and Reparations

Article 13: Effective Length of Agreement

Article 14: Resolution of Disputes

Article 15: Handling Attached Documents

Article 16: Coming into Effect, Validity, Termination, Amendments

Attached Documents:

Overviews of other agreements (name, signatories, and principal contents) are given in the

176

table below.

Export Control Agreement (A-2): Include, comply with and consent in advance to

international rules regarding export control, NSG Guidelines (2012 edition), and non-proliferation

requirements equal to those in the US Atomic Energy Act in MNA (for Types A and B, it would

include nuclear non-proliferation requirements* such as the US Atomic Act Section 123 regarding

bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. For Type C, with the AMMAO (treating member

states as 1 state) entering into comprehensive nuclear cooperation agreements with 3rd

party states

the transport of nuclear materials within the framework would not be viewed as international

transport)

Safety/ Nuclear Security/ Liability Agreement (A-3): Safety, Nuclear Security: follow

international standards/guidelines, create and follow common standards, inspect compliance,

carry out peer reviews, Liability: Based on the laws of member states as well as international

treaties on liability that members are signatory to, create a nuclear liability system within the

MNA (liability insurance, pooled funds) (Safety and Nuclear Security: separate for Types A and

B and for Type C, Liability: separate for each Type)

Transport Agreement (A-4): Comply with international standards/guidelines on

transportation, cooperate with transportation (simplify transportation approval, mutual support for

transport security in national waters), responsibility for transport (the one requesting

transportation is responsible)

Agreement on Transferring Facility Ownership to MNA (A-5): Conditions on contributing

to companies controlling and operating facilities, decisions on taxation laws, conditions for

approval of transfer of ownership/construction of facilities, safety/nuclear security conditions

(including building new facilities in Type C site states)

MNA Facility Control/ Operation Agreement (A-6): Role of consortium and promotion of

establishment/operation, conditions for approval, conditions for safeguards, safety/nuclear

security conditions (for Type C)

Nuclear Fuel Supply Agreement (A-7): Assurance of supply of enriched uranium according

to contracts (Type B, C)

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Services Supply Agreement (A-8): Assurance of services handling SF

(storing SF/ direct disposal of SF) according to contracts (Type B, C)

Agreement on Control of Sensitive Nuclear Technologies (A-9): Technology holders

(states) and the AMMAO should protect relevant materials, facilities, SNTs and information (only

the technology holder (state) is allowed access to prevent proliferation of SNTs)

177

Agreement on Additional Assurances (A-10): Details of cooperation between international

organizations such as the IAEA and the AMMAO on uranium fuel supply assurances

The ‘non-proliferation requirements*’ in the Export Control Agreement (A-2) are:

complying with Paragraph 6a of the NSG Guidelines (INFCIRC/254/Rev.11/Part 1); making strict

internal MNA rules on export control. Examples of export control rules for this are given in the

following list (equivalent to overall requirements of the US Atomic Energy Act Section 123)

1. Application of perpetual safeguards to all nuclear materials and facilities covered by the

agreement

2. Items required in the NSG Guidelines

3. Assurances that all nuclear materials, facilities and SNTs covered by the agreement should

not be used in explosive nuclear devices, their research or other military applications

4. When cooperating with non-nuclear weapon states, should that state carry out nuclear

testing or terminate IAEA safeguards agreements, there exists a right to claim the nuclear

materials and facilities covered under the agreement

5. Assurance that the nuclear materials and confidential documents covered by the agreement

should not be transferred to a 3rd

party individual or state without consent by the USA

6. Application of proper physical protection measures for the nuclear materials covered by

the agreement

7. Prior consent from the USA to changes to reprocessing, enrichment, state and contents of

the nuclear materials covered by the agreement

8. Prior consent from the USA for storage of plutonium, uranium-233 and highly enriched

uranium covered by the agreement

9. Apply conditions equivalent to those given above for nuclear materials or facilities

produced or built using the SNTs covered by the agreement

178

7.4 Evaluation of feasibility of nuclear fuel cycle framework

The proposed entity model framework was evaluated under the following labels.

Label A Nuclear Non-proliferation (Safeguards, Nuclear Security, etc.)

Label B Nuclear Fuel Cycle Services (Uranium Fuel Supply, SF Storage, SF Disposal

(Reprocessing), MOX Storage)

Label C Selection of Host States (Site States)

Label D Access to Technologies

Label E Degree of Involvement with Multilateral Control

Label F Economic Efficiency

Label G Transport

Label H Safety

Label I Liability

Label J Political Acceptance, Public Acceptance

Label K Geopolitics

Label L Legal Aspects (Legal aspects were evaluated separately for A-E, G-I)

(1) Label A: Nuclear non-proliferation (safeguards, export controls, nuclear security)

Safeguards

Creating a regional measurement control (safeguard) system (RSAC) increases transparency

and credibility (first merit). Generally, safeguards, specifically measurements of nuclear

materials, are carried out by the state. In order to meet safeguard agreement conditions,

measurement of nuclear materials includes nuclear material measurement controls carried out by

the facility (operator) and state coupled with the IAEA independently validating the accuracy of

the reports made to them. This study proposed the following RSAC for Types A and B (see left

table below).

・Nuclear material measurement controls carried out by the facility, measurement control data

reported to state

・Data checks of measurement control by state and MNA, reported to IAEA

・CSA inspections and AP activities carried out by IAEA and MNA

RSAC proposal for Type C is shown in the right table below.

・Nuclear material measurement controls carried out by the MNA facility

・Data checks of measurement control by MNA, reported to IAEA

・CSA inspections and AP activities carried out by IAEA and MNA

This way, by having the MNA involved in checking facility measurement control data or

implementing facility measurement control itself, the amount of information on nuclear materials

increases significantly while also increasing transparency for nuclear materials in the facility.

Complementary access based on the Additional Protocol (AP) should, based on information

provided by multiple states, increase the information in the region and thus transparency and

credibility, as compared to state-level safeguards.

The second merit is that by segregating duties for inspection activities by the IAEA and

regional safeguards, human resources can be divided more effectively. Equipment can be shared

179

for joint development and other uses, decreasing cost.

Export Controls

Since the MNA facilities for Types A-C are under the jurisdiction of each partner/host/site

state, as a rule they should follow the export controls of those states. As an item in common for

MNA facilities for Types A-C, partner/host/site states that have Type A-C MNA facilities should

comply with NSG Guidelines for export of nuclear resources (excluding subjective criteria for

nuclear supplier states). MNA member states should comply with the Joint Convention on the

Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, comply

with nuclear weapon free zone treaties, understand that as a rule responsibility for disposal of

radioactive waste lies with the state that made it, and not transfer (export) radioactive waste to other

states. Keeping all of that in mind, MNA member states should attempt to standardize export

control systems. Doing so should enable smoother transport of nuclear materials within the NMA.

In addition to the items listed above, partner/host states meeting requirements for Type C

MNA facilities should, along with site states that have Type C MNA facilities, treat them as being 1

state, and not consider the transfer of nuclear materials between member states as international

transfer.

MNA Applicable Laws


Type

A

Laws of Partner

State

Comply with NSG Guidelines (exceeding subjective

criteria for supplier states (NSG Guidelines Part 1

Paragraph 6(b) latter half)

Understand that as a rule responsibility for disposal of

radioactive waste lies with the state that made it.

Handling of SF and radioactive waste is to comply with the

Convention on the Safety or Radioactive Waste

Management and nuclear weapon free zone treaties

Standardization of export control systems for nuclear

Type


図地域保障措置システム（タイプA, B）

報告

CSA査察活動,AP活動

事業者による計量管理データ報告

国際原子力機関（IAEA）

国、MNA計量管理データチェック

MNA

原子力施設

Report

IAEA

図地域保障措置システム（タイプC）

報告

CSA査察活動、AP活動

MNAによる計量管理データ報告

国際原子力機関（IAEA）

原子力施設

MNA計量管理データチェック

MNA

Figure Regional Safeguards System (Types A, B)

(Types A, B)

Figure Regional Safeguards System (Type C)

Report

CSA Inspection AP

Activities

Measurement Control Data Reported by Operator

Measurement Control Data Reported by MNA

State, MNA

Measurement Controls Data Check

MNA


IAEA

Nuclear Facility

Nuclear Facility

Report

CSA Inspection AP

Activities

IAEA

MNA


Report

Nuclear Facility

Measurement Control Data Reported by Operator

180

resources in member states

*However, partner/host states that fulfill the requirements for

site states should treat them all as 1 state, and not consider

the transfer of nuclear materials between member states as


Type


Same as above

*In addition to site states that have Type C facilities,

partner/host states that fulfill the requirements for site

states should treat them all as 1 state, and not consider the



Nuclear Non-proliferation Assessment with INPRO Method

For assessment of overall nuclear non-proliferation for the multilateral nuclear fuel cycle,

the INPRO (International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles) nuclear

proliferation resistance methodology was used for quantitative and qualitative assessments. The

INPRO method has 5 User Requirements (UR1 to UR5) based on a set of Basic Principles. The

results of assessments of each User Requirement are given below.

UR1: For commitment of the state, MNA member states must be signatories to the NPT,

safeguard agreements, regional nuclear weapons free zone treaties, and export controls, thus

fulfilling this User Requirement.

UR2: The attractiveness of nuclear materials and technology cannot be decreased,

regardless of the existence of the MNA.

UR3: For difficulty and detectability of diversion, regional safeguards should, as proposed

earlier, involve the MNA checking measurement controls by the state (operator), as well as

the state/IAEA carrying out safeguards for highly transparent safeguards. Compared to

other methods, this should enable effective and efficient safeguards (external measures) and

thus fulfill UR3.

UR4: For multiple barriers, under the AMMAO multiple barrier measures should be carried

out including IAEA safeguards, regional safeguards and applying NSG requirements for

membership.

UR5: Optimization should be carried out with effective external measures by the IAEA,

AMMAO, and states involved.

As mentioned earlier, by considering the inclusion of export controls and nuclear

non-proliferation requirements equivalent to those in bilateral agreements within the MNA

framework, overall assessment indicates that nuclear non-proliferation should be improved under

the AMMAO. Based on the discussion above, a qualitative display of the effects of nuclear

non-proliferation based on the existence of the MNA and by type is given in the figure below.

181

Nuclear Security

Partner/host states with Type A or Type B MNA facilities should incorporate international

recommendations for nuclear security (such as IAEA nuclear security recommendations) into

domestic law and allow (voluntary) advisory reviews by the MNA Nuclear Security Section.

Site states with Type C MNA facilities should allow effective peer reviews (inspections).

Assuming the creation of an MNA framework in the Asian region, the benefit of MNA reviews

are that with Asia having both advanced nuclear states and states with newly introduced nuclear

power plants, within the MNA framework the former can use their experience and knowledge to

benefit the latter, improving physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear security. Of

course, unlike nuclear safety it is not possible to provide information and knowledge on physical

protection of nuclear materials and nuclear security to all states, but with reviews by the MNA, it

should enable effective use of the regional safeguards framework mentioned above. This

method is an option only due to the existence of both advanced and emerging nuclear states in

Asia, and should also help build trust between these states.

However, implementation of nuclear security measures is up to each state even more so than

nuclear safety and carrying out advisory and peer reviews should require high levels of trust

between MNA member states and the MNA Nuclear Security Section.

Degree of Nuclear Non-proliferation in Multilateral Model (Approximation)

Low Prevention of Possession of SNTs High

High

Degree of

Nuclear Non-

proliferation

Low

MNA(Type A)

All States

MNA(Type C)

All States

(Non-MNA)

MNA(Type A)

Many States

MNA(Type A)

Few States

MNA(Type C)

Many States

MNA(Type C)

Few States

MNA(Type B)

All States

MNA(Type B)

Many States

MNA(Type B)

Few States

Limited Number of Facilities

Possessing SNTS

SNTs Possessed by Each State

182

Applicable

Laws (In

Principle)

Signatory to

/Ratifying/Complying

with International

Treaties (4)

Using International Nuclear Security

Recommendations and Confirming

Status of Implementation

Pro

posa

l

MN

A

Type

A

Partner State

Laws

Signatory to

CPPNM and

International

Convention for

the Suppression

of Acts of Nuclear

Terrorism

Ratified amended

CPPNM

Executed UNSCR

1540 responsibilities

Volu

nta

ry

Adoption of international

nuclear security

recommendations (such as

IAEA recommendations)

Allowing advisory reviews by

MNA Nuclear Security Section

Type

B

Host State

Laws Same as above

Type

C

Site State

Laws Same as above

Adoption of international

nuclear security

recommendations (such as

IAEA recommendations)

Allowing peer reviews by MNA

Nuclear Security Section

(including inspections of

maintenance for CPPNM

physical protection standards)

(Nuclear Security for Transportation)

With expanded cooperation based on the existing Regional Cooperation Agreement on

Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) in order to secure

routes for ships transporting nuclear fuel in the MNA framework, the coast guards of MNA

member states may also carry out joint security operations for ships carrying nuclear fuel to

ensure nuclear security. Additionally, ship information for ships transporting nuclear fuel for

member states of the international nuclear fuel cycle model may use a ship reporting system

such as JASREP to share information with related states, providing direct and indirect

protection to ships transporting nuclear fuel and securing routes within the region. These

methods for ensuring secure transport of nuclear fuel are already being carried out, led by Japan,

and therefore it is possible all that is necessary is an expansion of existing activities and

cooperative networks.

These joint activities to ensure maritime security through cooperation of multiple states may

also act as a method to build trust between MNA member states and contribute to deterring the

activities of pirates and guerrillas.

183

(2) Labels B, C, E Fuel cycle services (Supply of uranium fuel, SF storage, SF processing,

MOX storage), Selection of host states (site states), Incentives for NMA membership, degree

of involvement with multilateral control

Targets for Nuclear Fuel Cycle Services

This study, when considering an MNA framework in the Middle and Eastern Asia region

based on Supplementary Documentation 1 the target for nuclear fuel cycle services were the nuclear

fuel cycle elements (operations) indicated in Supplementary Documentation 12, and the states given

below are potential candidates for these services. For nuclear fuel cycle services, this study

estimates that the supply and demand balance of the nuclear fuel cycle front-end in the Asian region

is enough to meet the needs of the MNA region. For the back-end, since there is no urgency in

reprocessing all SF in the near future this study does not discuss its supply and demand balance.

Potential Host States/ Site States and Estimated Incentives

In addition to technological capabilities and industrial capacity, one requirement for MNA

facility site (host) states is political stability. How nuclear security should be ensured is also

important. With these points also in mind, the following host states/site states were considered.

(2) Front-end Member State Candidates

① Uranium Mining, Refining: Kazakhstan, Russia, China (states with future

potential: Mongolia)

② Conversion: Russia, China

③ Uranium Enrichment: Russia (Kazakhstan*), Japan, China (

*facilities in Russia）

④ Reconversion, Fuel Manufacturing: Kazakhstan, Russia, Japan, South Korea,

China

(3) Back-end Member State Candidates

① SF Storage: Russia, Kazakhstan

② SF Reprocessing: Russia, Japan, China (states with future potential: South Korea,

Kazakhstan)

③ MOX Storage: Russia, Japan, China (states with future potential: South Korea,

Kazakhstan)

④ SF Disposal: Member States

(Power Plant Member State Candidates: Advanced Nuclear States, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand,

Indonesia)

The fact that Kazakhstan, a nuclear weapon free state, is engaging in business with an

enrichment facility outside of its own territory (in Russia) deserves attention. This is due to two

reasons: the political concern that engaging in uranium enrichment may be criticized by

international society, and the fact that a uranium enrichment market already exists, making starting

new uranium enrichment economically infeasible (December 2012 MNA Workshop (University of

Tokyo)). In this model, the same could be said regarding SF reprocessing and MOX storage

(South Korea, Kazakhstan, etc.). However, the political concern of criticism from international

society is likely not present for the MNA (including enrichment), with the possibility that if

economically feasible members should join.

184

When beginning/continuing peaceful uses of nuclear energy as an individual state, entry

into the international systems is also unavoidable and involves stricter restrictions on nuclear

non-proliferation with the NSG and bilateral agreements, so joining the MNA framework and

having increased nuclear non-proliferation commitments within the framework should likely still

hold more merits overall if the nuclear fuel cycle operates smoothly with states in the framework

possessing different component technologies. Estimated incentives for potential member states

are given below.

Kazakhstan: expansion of front-end fuel manufacturing and sales business, future expansion

into back-end business, smooth implementation of services (including transport)

Mongolia: Front-end business (after technology support from an advanced country), smooth

implementation of services (including transport)

Russia: Front-end and back-end business- Russian fuel for western PWRs and BWRs,

increased enrichment business, adoption of VVER, smooth implementation of services

(including transport)

South Korea: expanded nuclear business, solution to SF problem - back-end (including

reprocessing), (smooth implementation of services (including transport))

China: entry into nuclear business in Asia focusing on front-end, smooth implementation of

services (including transport)

Japan: solution to SF problem, stable fuel supply, new uses for Pu, smooth implementation of

services (including transport), and possible promotion of exports of Japanese nuclear

resources with comprehensive business cooperation in the nuclear fuel cycle.

States Receiving Services including Taiwan: membership provides fuel supply and services

for SF (Taiwan: solves SF problem), smooth implementation of services (including transport)

Emerging States：be steadily assured normal nuclear fuel supply and backend (SF)-related

services

Businesses (Industry): Smooth promotion of businesses and “Principles of Conduct” under

the agreements among member states, host states and site states

As an example of states pursuing business, the services currently possible for Russia and

Kazakhstan are as follows: for handling SF in Russia, if Russian uranium was enriched and molded

in Russia and then irradiated in a Russian reactor (VVER) the SF could be taken, but in cases where

it was enriched in Russia and irradiated in a Russian reactor VVER but was molded outside of

Russia, the SF could not be taken. In other words, the Russian nuclear business strategy requires

the client state to accept uranium enrichment- molding- Russian reactor (VVER) or the SF cannot

be taken.

In the case of Kazakhstan, if the uranium is from Kazakhstan and molded in Kazakhstan then

the SF can be taken. In other words, Kazakhstan aspires to, 1) Acquiring nuclear reactor fuel

manufacturing technology (molding) that allows for manufacturing fuel that fits a variety of

reactors, or 2) Acquiring a license to use said technology, or 3) Sales of nuclear reactor fuel

products manufactured using said technology. These points must be considered for taking SF for

storage.

185

Involvement with Multilateral Control

As previously indicated, involvement includes Types A, B and C, but for the specific states

mentioned above this study considered the involvement in the table below for the start of the MNA

and in the future.

Functionality of Framework and Steps to Realize

This proposed MNA framework would, as indicated earlier, function to an appreciable degree

if the MNA framework treaty (Treaty on Multilateral Cooperation Framework for the Provision of

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Supply and Services in Asian Region) and the appropriate domestic and

international legal regulations are followed, but for functionality upon realization of the framework,

further detailed examination is vital.

Also, in the case that a framework such as this was created, there is one method for creating

this organization or another for changing or expanding existing frameworks. Existing frameworks

in Asia include ASEAN+3, APEC, and APSN for safeguards, but ASEAN+3 does not include states

considered this time such as Russia and Kazakhstan. Although APEC includes the majority of

states considered, its primary concern is economic, and it is unclear whether discussions on nuclear

non-proliferation would be possible. In any case, steps towards realizing this proposal are in the

realm of international politics, and this study would like to consider them as issues for the future.

(3) Label D Access to technologies

As the URENCO-Kahn example shows, SNT access control and information security are

important issues for the MNA framework. In this study, Type B would have no transfer of

ownership, making control of SNTs relatively feasible. With Type C, when exchanging opinions

with specialists there were concerns regarding reliable control of SNTs. However, black box

Front-end Power Plant Back-end

Facility Mining,

Refining,

Conversion

Uranium

Enrichment

Reconversion,

Fuel

Manufacture

LWR LWR MOX

FBR

SF Mid-term

Storage

SF

Reprocessing

MOX

Storage

SF

Disposal

Post-

reprocessing

Waste

Time

MN

AS

tart

Pote

nti

al F

utu

re

Sta

te

MN

AS

tart

Pote

nti

al F

utu

re

Sta

te

MN

A S

tart

Pote

nti

al F

utu

re

Sta

te

MN

A S

tart

Pote

nti

al F

utu

re

Sta

te

MN

A S

tart

Pote

nti

al F

utu

re

Sta

te

MN

A S

tart

Pote

nti

al F

utu

re

Sta

te

MN

A S

tart

Pote

nti

al F

utu

re

Sta

te

MN

A S

tart

Pote

nti

al F

utu

re

Sta

te

MN

A S

tart

Pote

nti

al F

utu

re

Sta

te

MN

A S

tart

Pote

nti

al F

utu

re

Sta

te

Candidate

States

Kaz

akh

stan

Kaz

ak

hst

an

,Mon

goli

a

Ru

ssia

, C

hin

a

Russ

ia,

Japan

Ru

ssia

, Ja

pan

, C

hin

a, (

Kaz

ak

hst

an

)

Kaz

akh

stan

, R

uss

ia,

Jap

an, S

ou

th K

ore

a, C

hin

a

Kaz

akh

stan

, Ja

pan

, S

ou

th K

ore

a, C

hin

a

Adv.

Sta

te, V

ietn

am,

Mal

aysi

a, T

hai

land, I

ndones

ia

Ad

v. S

tate

, Vie

tnam

, M

alay

sia

Th

aila

nd

, In

don

esia

, O

ther

Adv.

Sta

te

Ad

v. S

tate

, Vie

tnam

, M

alay

sia

Th

aila

nd

, In

don

esia

, O

ther

Kaz

ak

hst

an

, Ru

ssia

, (M

ember

Sta

te)

Kaz

ak

hst

an

, Ru

ssia

, (M

ember

Sta

te）

Jap

an

, R

uss

ia,

Ch

ina

Jap

an

, R

uss

ia,

Ch

ina, S

ou

th K

ore

a,

Kaz

ak

hst

an

Jap

an

, R

uss

ia, (

Ch

ina）

Jap

an, R

uss

ia, C

hin

a, S

ou

th

Kore

a, K

azak

hst

an

Mem

ber

Sta

te

Mem

ber

Sta

te

Mem

ber

Sta

te(H

AW

)

Mem

ber

Sta

te(M

AW

)

Choice

Type A ✓ ✓ ✓✓ ✓ ✓✓ ✓ ✓✓ ✓✓ ✓✓ ✓(LWR-

MOX)

✓✓ ✓✓ ✓✓ （✓） ✓✓ （✓） ✓✓

Choice

Type B ✓✓ ✓ ✓ ✓✓ ✓(LWR-

MOX)

✓ ✓✓ ✓ ✓

✓✓

Inte

rn

ati

on

al

Dis

po

sal

Sit

e

✓

Choice

Type C ✓✓(FBR)

✓ ✓✓ ✓✓

✓(I

nte

rn

ati

on

al

Dis

po

sal

Sit

e)

MNA Candidate States and Sample Choices (Types A, B, C)

Note 1) Considering circumstances and plans for facilities of each state.

Note 2）Based on feasibility, sustainability and non-proliferation, ✓: recommended ✓✓: strongly recommended:

Note 3）Determined assuming nuclear non-proliferation is the same for Type A and B and higher for Type C.

Note 4）Assuming state facilities participating in fuel cycle services and those that do not both exist.

Note 5）For Types A, B and C, considerations including existence of fuel cycle services, presence of SNTs, bulk or item facilities, indirect

or direct use of nuclear materials, irradiated or not irradiated nuclear materials, plutonium-239 concentration.

✓

✓✓

186

technology control and preventing technology leaks is an issue not just for nuclear energy, but for

general companies as well, and the majority of companies have managed to succeed at it despite

globalization. A key issue is whether the MNA should be able to take appropriate measures

similar to a private company to prevent technology leaks. Complying with systems for SNT

control such as those in the Cardiff Treaty, as well as ensuring strict black box policies in the

consortium operating facilities should make access control and information security for SNTs

possible within the MNA model.

(4) Labels G, K, J Transport, geopolitics, political/public acceptance

The potential member states for the MNA are as indicated above focused mainly in the

Asian region, but are nonetheless spread out and the conditions for each state differ case by case.

For example, the potential MNA member states include some with weaker geopolitical

stability such as those with neighboring states suspected of nuclear programs, states carrying out

missile launches despite international objections, states with pirates operating within or near their

borders, and states with active anti-government guerrilla forces. This study looked at 3 different

routes between Kazakhstan and Eastern Asia. Air transport of new fuel is well known, and an

exclusively marine and land route was also examined as a rare case that Russia and Kazakhstan

have successfully implemented.

a) Route from central Asia (hereafter we take Kazakhstan for a study), overland through

European Russia, using St. Petersburg in Russia as the shipping port, exporting to emerging

nuclear states through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca.

b) The same route as a) from Kazakhstan to St. Petersburg, then taking the North Sea, Barents

Sea and Arctic Ocean to the Bering Strait to reach East Asia and export to emerging nuclear

states.

c) Transport overland from Kazakhstan to an eastern Russian port, and export to emerging

nuclear states.

d) From Kazakhstan overland through the Chinese mainland, using Lianyungang as the

shipping port (Eurasian Land Bridge).

Route a) has already been used for transport to Japan, but since it involves the longest

distance and requires passing multiple choke points during transport, there are risks during

transport. Route b) through the Arctic Ocean can be approximately 40% shorter by length and

20 days shorter in time than Route a), so if this route could be established it would be useful not

only for transporting uranium resources but also transport from Europe, as this route has high

potential as a new shipping route. Since this route involves crossing a significant distance

through the Arctic Ocean, icebreaker ships would be necessary to clear the route. Therefore

cooperation with Russia is essential, and infrastructure would need to be built, including ships

capable of navigating arctic waters safely, route information and facilities to support the route,

establishment of a route support system and amendments to laws regarding passage. Route c)

has already been examined in a feasibility study by the Japanese government, and since it was

shown that no practical problems existed with a route transporting nuclear fuel overland from

187

Kazakhstan to an eastern Russian port (Vostochny) and using that as the shipping port,

infrastructure is already been put in place to use this route for the transport of nuclear fuel.

For the medium-term storage of SF (their origin material-based) in Russia and possibly

Kazakhstan looked at in this study, future trends in public opinion and acceptance of SF transport

and medium-term storage are critical to this system working.

For Route d), there exist the issues of no system being in place to track the position of

freight trains in real-time, and the need to transfer goods at border stations due to railway tracks

being different in Kazakhstan and China. On the other hand, due to inexpensive transport costs

it is possible to handle a greater volume of goods. There is the issue of whether Chinese laws

and public opinion should allow nuclear fuel from other states, including SF, to pass through

China.

Although it is an issue for all the routes, public acceptance is becoming a particularly

noticeable issue in Russia and must be examined. Overland transport of nuclear fuel: How to

gain understanding from local residents of states that are passed through is an issue, especially if

the state is not an MNA member. The issue of transporting radioactive wastes from other states

when state laws prohibit importing it (Kazakhstan, Russia) also must be examined. Russian law

strictly specifies which ports can handle what nuclear materials, and St. Petersburg can handle

nuclear fuel (and SF). Bolshoy Kamen (in East Asia) has a business operated by TENEX but

cannot currently handle SF. Bolshoy Kamen is a location where nuclear materials could be

temporarily stored, but this only applies to fresh fuel. Handling SF in the same way (temporary

storage) would face significant public acceptance issues.

Table Comparison of Possible Routes for International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Model

Route

Length

Route

Safety

Access to

Facilities

Port

Facilities

Notes

Route a)

St. Petersburg

(via Suez Canal)

△ △ ✓ ✓✓ Choke points and pirates

(Suez Canal, Somalia,

Malacca)

Route b)

St. Petersburg

(via Arctic Ocean)

✓ △ ✓ ✓✓ Viability as a commercial

route (accompaniment by

icebreakers, establishing

shipping lane, etc.)

Route c)-1

Eastern Russia Port

(Vostochny)

(via Siberian Land

Bridge)

✓✓ ✓✓ ✓✓ ✓

Route d)-2

China, Lianyungang

(via Eurasian Land

Bridge)

✓✓ ✓✓ △ (Unknown) Railway gauge

differences between

Kazakhstan/Mongolia and

China (need to transfer

cargo)

188

(△=average, ✓=good, ✓✓=excellent)

(5) Label F Economic efficiency

An assessment model was made to compare the cost of unilateral and multilateral control of

the nuclear fuel cycle, with analysis carried out on how economies of scale, transport costs and

reprocessing facility operating delays affect cycle cost. The reprocessing facility for the

multilateral control framework considered in this study was assumed to be in an Asian state, and

medium-term storage facilities to be in Central Asia. To calculate distances and costs from

actual locations for this analysis, reprocessing facilities were assumed to be in Japan (Aomori for

the sake of calculations), and medium-term storage facilities in Central Asia (e.g. Kazakhstan for

the sake of calculations). SF was assumed to be transported from Japan to Semipalatinsk and

temporarily stored there until reprocessing. In this scenario, after being stored for a certain

length of time, it would be transported back to Japan and reprocessed. For the routes from Japan

to Semipalatinsk, the same were used there and back. The unit prices are broken down by

category below, but the unit cost for maritime transport was set at ¥1,200/t km and land transport

was set at ¥8,400/tU km for basic cases, and assessment was carried out on their effect on overall

cost. The table below indicates cycle cost lower than unilateral control with a ✓, and costs that

are higher with a ×.

Table Unit Price for Each Factor (3% discount, see main text for values used)

Multilateral Control Unilateral Control

Uranium Fuel ¥10,000/tU 27,100 27,100

SF Transport

(Power

Plant→Medium-term

Storage)

¥10,000/tU

1,600－16,000 1,600

Medium-term Storage ¥10,000/tU 5,200 5,200

SF Transport

(Medium-term Storage

→ Reprocessing)

¥10,000/tU

1,700－17,000 1,700

Reprocessing ¥10,000/tU 41,100 65,100 (80tU)

MOX Fuel ¥10,000/tH

M 41,500 41,500

HLW Disposal ¥10,000/tU 11,000 11,000

189

Table Effect of Land Transport Cost Unit Price for Each Route

Land Transport Cost Unit Price (¥/tU km)

8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000

CR

Via St.

Petersburg,

South (Suez)

✓

(¥1.401/kWh)

×

(¥1.420/kWh)

×

(¥1.438/kWh)

×

(¥1.457/kWh)

×

(¥1.476/kWh)

AR1

Via St.

Petersburg,

Arctic

Ocean

✓

(¥1.367/kWh)

✓

(¥1.385/kWh)

✓

(¥1.404/kWh)

×

(¥1.423/kWh)

×

(¥1.441/kWh)

AR2

Russia Land

Route, via

Vostochny

✓

(¥1.352/kWh)

✓

(¥1.378/kWh)

✓

(¥1.404/kWh)

×

(¥1.430/kWh)

×

(¥1.456/kWh)

AR3

China Route,

via

Lianyungang

✓

(¥1.342/kWh)

✓

(¥1.364/kWh)

✓

(¥1.386/kWh)

✓

(¥1.409/kWh)

×

(¥1.431/kWh)

(Maritime transport cost: ¥1,200/tU km, unilateral cycle cost ¥1.410/kWh)

Table. Effect of Maritime Transport Cost Unit Price for Each Route

Maritime Transport Cost Unit Price (¥/tU km)

800 1,600 2,400 3,200 4,000

CR

Via St.

Petersburg,

South

✓

(¥1.378/kWh)

×

(¥1.432/kWh)

×

(¥1.486/kWh)

×

(¥1.540/kWh)

×

(¥1.595/kWh)

AR1

Via St.

Petersburg,

Arctic Ocean

✓

(¥1.355/kWh)

✓

(¥1.386/kWh)

×

(¥1.417/kWh)

×

(¥1.448/kWh)

×

(¥1.480/kWh)

AR2

Russia Land

Route, via

Vostochny

✓

(¥1.356/kWh)

✓

(¥1.358/kWh)

✓

(¥1.360/kWh)

✓

(¥1.362/kWh)

✓

(¥1.364/kWh)

AR3

China Route,

via

Lianyungang

✓

(¥1.344/kWh)

✓

(¥1.349/kWh)

✓

(¥1.355/kWh)

✓

(¥1.360/kWh)

✓

(¥1.365/kWh)

190

(Land transport cost: ¥8,400/tU km, unilateral cycle cost ¥1.410/kWh)

The results show that there are economic merits to a multilateral control framework.

However, the high cost of land transport is enough to eliminate any economic merit. It was also

found that with most conditions for unit price of transport costs, the Lianyungang scenario had the

greatest economic merit. However, as this scenario does not use an existing route, it would be

difficult to transport nuclear materials in its current state. In the future, laws regarding the

transport of nuclear materials via the Eurasian Land Bridge (through China) should need to be

made or amended as part of building the multilateral control framework proposed in this study.

When comparing multilateral control and unilateral control frameworks, this study

examined economies of scale for reprocessing costs and transport costs of SF for a general

economic assessment. In particular, due to looking at the cycle cost for multilateral control

frameworks as the cost for the framework as a whole, the analysis did not divide states into hosts

and partners. Calculating cycle cost for each state participating in the multilateral control

framework and also calculating the actual cost for unilateral control or a portion of a multilateral

control framework is something to be pursued in the future. Also, as indicated by the IAEA

(2005), how host and partner states divide the cost for each operation in a multilateral control

framework is also an important issue. In other words, a multilateral control framework model

with economic incentives superior to unilateral control must be created. To do so, in the future

an assessment model must be made that sets host and partner states for each operation and

considers procuring funds, investment ratios, and division of risk and cost.

(6) Label H Safety

Type A-C MNA facilities are under the jurisdiction of their respective partner/host/site

states, and in principle follow the legal regulations of each state for nuclear safety. A common

item between Type A-C MNA facilities is that in addition to partner/host/site states being

members of 4 treaties on nuclear safety, they should also comply with obligations set by the

Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management

and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and be peer reviewed by member states.

Also, like Euratom the MNA member states as a whole should be party to the Convention on

Nuclear Safety in addition to each individual state.

In order to ensure greater nuclear safety, partner states and host states with Type A and B

MNA facilities should incorporate international safety standards such as the IAEA safety

standards into the laws of their state and be subject to peer review by the MNA Safety Section

regarding implementation. However, Type A and B MNA facilities are owned by the partner

state or host state operators, limiting the involvement of the MNA. With nuclear safety being

the responsibility of the state in essence, peer reviews can be voluntary halted.

Type C MNA facilities are operated by MNA operators consisting of MNA member state

operators including the site state, and if the site state that provides approval for construction and

operation of facilities agrees, it is possible to attempt to ensure even greater safety. Therefore,

the inclusion of international safety standards into state law that was voluntary for partner states

and host states is required for site states, and the MNA Safety Section should carry out more

191

effective peer reviews (inspections).

Although creating unique safety standards among MNA member states would be ideal, this

would be very difficult and so international standards were chosen as a base. Also, assuming the

creation of an MNA framework in the Asian region, the benefit of AMMAO Safety Section

reviews are that with Asia having both advanced nuclear states and states with newly introducing

nuclear reactors, within the MNA framework the former can use their experience and knowledge

to benefit the latter and share best practices, improving nuclear safety measures. This method is

possible due to both advanced nuclear states and emerging nuclear states existing in Asia, and

should also contribute to building trust between both parties. These peer reviews by the MNA

can effectively use the cooperative framework for regional safeguards mentioned earlier.

Applicable Laws

(In Principle)

Signatory to

International Treaties

and Carrying Out

Treaty Obligations

Using International Safety

Standards and Confirming Status

of Implementation

Pro

posa

l

MN

A

Type

A

Laws of Partner

State Regarding

Nuclear Safety

Signatory to and

comply with

obligations of 4

nuclear safety treaties

Submitting reports

and peer reviewing

other member states

in the Convention on

Nuclear Safety and

the Joint Convention

on the Safety of Spent

Fuel Management and

on the Safety of

Radioactive Waste

Management

Volu

nta

ry

Incorporating

international safety

standards (such as

IAEA safety standards)

into state law

Allowing peer reviews

by MNA Safety

Section

Type

B

Laws of Host

State Regarding

Nuclear Safety

Same as above

Type

C

Laws of Site State

Regarding

Nuclear Safety

Same as above

Insp

ecti

on

Incorporating

international safety

standards (such as IAEA

safety standards) into

state law

Allowing peer reviews

by MNA Safety Section

192

(7) Label I Liability

Type A-C MNA facilities are under the jurisdiction of their respective partner/host/site

states, and in principle follow the legal regulations of each state for nuclear damages liability. If

the state is party to international treaties on nuclear damages liability, then that treaty may apply.

Assuming the creation of an MNA framework in the Asian region, there are many states in

Asia such as Japan, South Korea and China that are not signatory to any international treaties on

nuclear damages liability, liability limits vary by state, and if a nuclear accident should occur

there is no strategy to handle damages across borders. Therefore, MNA member states should

sign international treaties. The international treaty to be joined should be the CSC. Although

currently the CSC is not in effect, assuming the creation of an MNA framework in the Asian

region the CSC should come into effect when Japan signs.

For Type C facilities according to the Act on Liability for Nuclear Damages the MNA local

corporation established through investment by MNA member state operators should be considered

the operator, and the site state should be responsible as the state with the facility. If allowed by

the laws of the site state, a special provision can be signed by the MNA local corporation, MNA

member state operators, the site state, other MNA member states and the AMMAO so that the

local corporation and site state would receive claims for nuclear damage liability at a

predetermined percentage from MNA member state operators and other MNA member states.

Alternatively if the site state is signatory to the CSC, a pledge could be made to create a pool of

funds for nuclear damages liability up to a certain amount through contributions from MNA

operators. In either case, limited liability should be prescribed for both operators and site states.

Assuming the creation of an MNA model in the Asian region, the following merits exist for

joining the same international nuclear damages liability treaty that nearby MNA member states

are signatory to.

Only the state where the accident occurred has jurisdiction in that territory, so proceedings

should not be carried out in other signatory states, and rapid and fair liability can be carried

out under common rules (however, there exists the demerit that should states near the one

where the accident occurred suffer cross-border damages, these neighboring states would

have to carry out proceedings in the jurisdiction of the state where the accident occurred)

Substantial liability safeguard amounts and unified judicial proceedings in the state the

accident occurred. Eliminate unfair liability between states.

When signatory to an international treaty with international fund measures available, the

operator can cover some of the liability with contributions from other signatory states,

contributing to the protection of injured parties

Assuming the creation of an MNA in the Asian region, of the international treaties on

nuclear damages liability mentioned above the CSC is the most appropriate international treaty

for an MNA in Asia. However as mentioned above, neighboring MNA member states would

also have to sign the CSC and bring it into effect.

193

MNA Applicable Laws


Type

A

Laws of Partner

State Member states sign international nuclear damages liability

treaty (Convention of Supplementary Liability (CSC)) Type


Type


Same as above

Establish limited liability for operator liability and state support

Establish special provision for liability amount claims to other

investors and the states they belong to, or if signatory to CSC

establish a nuclear damages liability fund (fund pool) by MNA

member state operators as a temporary measure until CSC

supplementary liability is provided

7.5 Sustainability of stable nuclear fuel cycle framework

When evaluating the sustainability of a stable nuclear fuel cycle framework, the keys are

promoting peaceful use and compatibility of 3S enhancement, making nuclear fuel cycle service

business smooth and solving the problem of handling SF, as well as the impact of the industry. A

summary of the evaluation results are written below.

(1) Policy for effective promotion of peaceful use of nuclear power and compatibility of 3S

enhancement in Asia

Regarding the importance of including 3S in a MNA; MNA started from the concepts of

non-proliferation and peaceful use but then another thought came that it would be effective to

cover the community that is the region by adding in 2S (safety, security). The Non-proliferation

(safeguard) S has an international regime based on the NPT and it is the international

community’s duty to abide by these rules and standards, however, the other 2 S’s, safety and

security, while international standards and guidelines exist, they are entrusted to each nation for

handling. In response to this, this study proposes to have agreement within each regional

framework for a surveillance system, based on type and level, divided into advisory reviews and

peer reviews without compelling force, and peer reviews with compelling force (inspection). Like

nuclear nonproliferation, the safety and security issue is not something to be completed as a single

state, but, because it has an impact on other nations, in participation in a framework, there should

be a mutual consent to accept adherence to 3S in exchange for receiving nuclear fuel cycle

service. Specifically, by member states entering into legal agreements pertaining to safety, nuclear

security, and nuclear liability with AMMAO, it establishes to ensure safety on an international

level and nuclear security including that of the facilities within the framework (not just nuclear

fuel cycle facilities but power reactors as well) as targets.

Mr. Chaim Braun of Stanford University, known for his MNA research, has also referenced

3S; safety has no national border, and, while it is a little different than nuclear security, there is

also a precedent of international obligation in the UNSC1540 which already has states working

194

together.

Also, even in Article 123 of the US bilateral cooperation treaty, in addition to the IAEA

liability for damages, the following are also required:

• Adhere to NSG guidelines, and following UN Security Council’s Decision 1540,

report an intent to implement export controls to the UN Security Council;

• the supplying state shall show a commitment to apply mutually agreed upon

measures based on international guidelines to physically protect the nuclear

materials; and

• show a commitment to IAEA safety standards, and bring into effect an international

treaty in the nuclear safety field.

In the case of creating an MNA, particularly in Type C, bilateral treaty requirement

stipulations, that is, the requirement stipulations relating to the aforementioned 3S, become

indispensable in making the MNA one group, and should necessarily lead to strengthening 3S. In

Type B, country based bilateral treaty execution and maintenance (especially with states beyond

the limit) is necessary but, within the MNA (between member states and AMMAO), for example,

by promising high 3S conditions such as those that are required in a bilateral treaty with the US,

and by seeking mitigating plans such as obtaining exceptional handling of the bilateral treaty, it

should become possible to realize smooth management that comprehensively agrees with the

activities of moving and transporting nuclear materials within the MNA framework.

(2) Making nuclear fuel cycle service business smooth and solving the SF handling problem

Until now, as a general rule, when moving (supplying) nuclear materials between countries, it

is necessary for the supplying state and the recipient state to enter into a nuclear cooperation

agreement. In general, in this agreement, in addition to strict export control requirements, there are

many nonproliferation conditions such as limits on shape modification timing and movement of

nuclear materials, as outlined below:

・ Application of perpetual safeguards to all nuclear materials and facilities covered by the

agreement

・ Items required in the NSG Guidelines

・ Assurances that all nuclear materials, facilities and SNTs covered by the agreement should

not be used in explosive nuclear devices, their research or other military applications

・ When cooperating with non-nuclear weapon states, should that state carry out nuclear

testing or terminate IAEA safeguards agreements, there exists a right to claim the nuclear

materials and facilities covered under the agreement

・ Assurance that the nuclear materials and confidential documents covered by the agreement

should not be transferred to a 3rd

party individual or state without consent by the USA

・ Application of proper physical protection measures for the nuclear materials covered by

the agreement

・ Prior consent from the USA to changes to reprocessing, enrichment, state and contents of

the nuclear materials covered by the agreement

195

・ Prior consent for storage of plutonium, uranium-233 and highly enriched uranium covered

by the agreement

・ Apply conditions equivalent to those given above for nuclear materials or facilities

produced or built using the SNTs covered by the agreement

Namely, in status quo, the nuclear materials recipient state is required to obtain prior mutual

consent from the supplier state regarding the reprocessing or modification to shape or content of the

materials within the scope of the agreement that are received, and regarding the storage of

plutonium and high enriched uranium, as well as regarding the movement outside the jurisdiction.

Accordingly, if you supply on the nuclear fuel cycle backend service, the more that you do, the

more there is the possibility that many states are involved with the nuclear fuel cycle manufacturing

process until then, and consequently, there is the possibility that prior mutual consent needs to be

obtained from many different countries.

If these are applied as-is to the MNA, a) between the nuclear power supplying state within the

MNA member states and the recipient state, and b) between the MNA non-member state, the

nuclear supplier state within the MNA member states, and the recipient state, there is a need to enter

into a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. However, this number of agreements increases as the

number of MNA member states, and the number of MNA non-member states that conduct nuclear

fuel cycle services with MNA member states increases, leading to greater complication between

member states with many agreements.

However, on one hand, if agreement can be obtained on this type of contents within the MNA

framework (AMMAO and between each nation), nuclear activities (including movement of nuclear

materials) within the MNA should become clear and trustworthy, resulting in not only a decrease in

the number of agreements entered into, but also, the possibility, that restrictions on bilateral

agreements between MNA member states and states outside the framework are mitigated, is

expectedly high (for example, as comprehensive agreement), and through this, we can hope for the

nuclear fuel cycle service business within the framework to become smoother. Typical case can be

seen in Type C. Because the entire MNA member states are seen as one state, being endowed with a

high level of nuclear nonproliferation characteristic in terms of nuclear nonproliferation (safeguard)

and nuclear security, and by sharing the requirements hitherto shown in bilateral nuclear

cooperation agreement within the MNA, it can be hoped that bilateral nuclear cooperation

agreement requirements with states outside the MNA should be comprehensively handled and

alleviated. Namely, through this, nuclear fuel service within the MNA including transport can be

conducted smoothly.

On one hand, a solution plan for the accumulation of SF in Asia is urgent business but, by not

stopping MNA framework activity to reprocessing of SF and international storage, by expanding to

the solution of final waste problem, it can be hoped that there should be increased incentive in

sustainability and participation. Through advanced furnace and advanced treatment processes, by

establishing technology within the MNA for separation and transmutation of actinides and long

half-life nuclides, through the reduction (MA/LA) of the radioactive environmental burden of waste

matter, along with making it easier to return to the origin state, it can be hoped that there should be

a decrease in transport costs at the time of return. As a requirement that comes along with

participation in the framework, to include taking on this problem with cooperation between many

nations, we can aim for the completion of a nuclear fuel cycle as a framework total.

196

(3) Role of the industry

(About general rules for movement and framework between many nations)

On September 15, 2011, the world’s important nuclear power generation furnace

manufacturers announced the “Nuclear Power Plant Exporters’ Principles of Conduct” (called

“Principles of Conduct” below). The “Principles of Conduct” has the personality as a code of

conduct where, when it comes to the export of nuclear reactors, each company has voluntarily

pledged to adhere to it. The “Principles of Conduct” shows principles in 6 areas (safety, health

and radiation protection, physical security, environmental protection and SF, handling of waste,

liability for nuclear damages, nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards, and ethics) that nuclear

reactor manufacturers ought to keep in mind when exporting nuclear reactors, and it has come to

be a compilation of models and best practices built up internationally until now in each area.

Because the “Principles of Conduct” agrees with the thoughts of this study, it was used as a role

of the industry.

Not only from a nuclear safety perspective, the “Principles of Conduct” proposes that it is

necessary to review the measures and regulations of nuclear facilities from a nuclear security

perspective, and further that it is necessary to pursue greater unity with nuclear safety and nuclear

security. Also, it includes items with provisions for including nonproliferation and nuclear

security requirements in nuclear power generator designs. There are already guidelines set forth

by IAEA regarding nuclear safety but there are no guidelines to include safeguards, nuclear

security, and nuclear nonproliferation in the design, and it is left to the discretion of each supply

manufacturer as to what extent these ought to be included. Going forward, in order to further

improve effectiveness, it is believed that specific agreement is needed on what requirements ought

to be included in the design according to the guidelines.

In the “Principles of Conduct,” regarding liability for nuclear damages, there is a pledge that

the supplying manufacturer make a decision that, at the latest, before the fuel is acknowledged,

the receiving state must fulfill at least one of the following: 1. establish national law that includes

a concentration of the responsibility for operating engine of the power generator; 2. become a

member to the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention; and 3. become a member of the

convention on supplementary liability for nuclear damage (CSC).

Because there is risk in the safety, security and nuclear nonproliferation fronts when it

comes to nuclear power generation, supplying states and supplying manufacturers of nuclear

materials and equipment must take an interest in and take responsibility so that nuclear power

generation in recipient states is not conducted in a manner that actualizes these risks. At the

government level, when supplying nuclear materials and equipment, in the nuclear cooperation

agreement entered into between the state supplying the appropriate nuclear materials and

equipment and the recipient state, a commitment from the recipient state is demanded regarding

nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear physical safety. When a fair competitive market for nuclear

transactions is ensured, a desirable commitment for the recipient state to demand is that there is

little difference between the supplying states, and a fixed level of standardization according to the

197

NSG guidelines is designed.

On the other hand, under the nuclear cooperation agreement, for the actual nuclear power

generation agency in the recipient state, hitherto common rules on what the manufacturer who

supplies nuclear materials and equipment should adhere to in exporting have not existed. This

time, along with covering the areas of safety, SF, waste management, liability for nuclear damages,

and ethics, that the NSG guideline does not, the agreed upon “Principles of Conduct” stands out

for its detailed regulations in these areas. Going forward, by adhering to this code of conduct,

along with there should be greater standardization, it is thought that it is desirable for this same

handling to spread to the entire nuclear industry including the concentration manufacturers and

fuel production manufacturers.

As mentioned above, the “Principles of Conduct” is a model characterized by the industry

adhering autonomously but as much as in the end the nuclear industry is a for-profit organization,

it is predicated on adherence under the principle of competition. In this study, opinions were

exchanged with the US NEI but, regarding the “Principles of Conduct,” as an expert, although the

industrial world welcomes the continuation of this argument, it became clear that it is thought that

the impact on the US industrial world would be insignificant. The industrial world accepts the

facts but, because it is a general movement, it is seen as not having special pledges or promises. In

other words, ultimately the “Principles of Conduct” is only a model, and it can be taken with the

mindset that adherence voluntary within the scope of possibility (not proactive). As such, to

execute the “Principles of Conduct” in a competitive society, some sort of backup that exceeds the

civilian level is indispensable.

Entering nuclear cooperation agreements has become the foundation for seeking recipient

state commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear physical protection through the

abovementioned government level but, in order to ensure an international place of fair

competition in nuclear transactions, a backup structure that goes beyond the nuclear cooperation

agreement (bilateral) and has multilateral commitment is important. That is, through agreement to

cooperation in 3S, nuclear liability, and waste, within the multilateral framework, it is possible for

the nuclear power industry to have uniform standards for principles of conduct that are adhered to.

This time the “Principles of Conduct” target the export of power generators but it is thought

that it ought to go beyond this and be developed into an argument for the role of the industry

including the nuclear fuel cycle.

(From the opinion exchange with the industry)

In this study we held an opinion exchange with the US nuclear power industry and persons

affiliated with the domestic nuclear power production, the representative opinions are listed

below.

・ One topic confronting the US industry that is a matter of great interest and concern is how to

handle SF accumulating in domestic and foreign nuclear power plants. The storage period for

SF is considered 120 years. Including management of foreign SF, they are interested in a

proposal with a multilateral approach, especially a nuclear fuel cycle regarding the backend.

198

・ Because the US nuclear power industry think that a multilateral approach is a more

governmental world, despite the industry having an interest in the same approach toward

nuclear fuel cycle, it is believed that a leadership type role cannot be accomplished in this

type of concept or proposal.

・ However, a field that a defined important role can be achieved by the industry, for example,

with introducing nuclear power in other countries, in order to prompt partiality on the nuclear

power export and political measures, the US nuclear power industry may take proactive

action against the policymaker. In this point, it welcomes a multilateral approach concept

that has the possibility to provide a fair place for competition for member states when it

comes to the nuclear power export and sales.

・ University of Tokyo’s Gr research, including Kazakhstan as a partner, showed affirmative

attitude to a way of thinking to handle nuclear fuel cycle service in a package. On one hand,

they identified the many difficulties toward realization such as the topic of “equality” and

neighboring state agreement that goes along with the transport of SF.

・ Different from the nuclear fuel cycle front end, the market does not exist on the back end, and

the back end alone is difficult to become a business. As a result, it is necessary to develop

business attached to the front end, one of which is 1) nuclear fuel lease that includes

collecting SF, and 2) long-term storage of SF.

・ There has to be business rationale because actual participation from industry has importance

when realizing a multilateral approach.

(Promoting creation of an MNA framework and a nuclear industry with responsibility)

A multilateral approach related to the nuclear fuel cycle is an international handling way of

thinking in a form that joins the front-end to the back-end which has issues because it reaches its

limits due to difficulty in establishing in the nuclear power industry, and thus is welcomed from a

perspective of promoting nuclear business. Important keys to entering the industry are business

rationale and equality in business.

On one hand, when it comes to the export of nuclear power generation, the nuclear power

industry autonomously deciding on the “Principles of Conduct” regarding 3S, environmental

conservation and SF, waste handling, liability for nuclear damage and ethics can only mean that

this industry is aware of the necessity and importance of these things in the particular field of

nuclear power. However, to realistically secure equality and business rationale under the principle

of competition, to adhere to this type of principle, backup of a commitment at the “international”

level that surpasses the “government” level is funfamental.

From this viewpoint, it is possible to think that the proposal in this study for agreement

between member states of a regional framework regarding with 3S to start, export management,

transport, liability for nuclear damages, handling waste, should work effectively to the promotion

of a smooth industry (business) relating to front-end/back-end service.

7.6 Comprehensive evaluation of proposed MNA: discussion on feasibility and sustainability

Sides

This study divided an MNA with the Asia region (middle Asia – Eastern Asia –

Southeastern Asia) as the target, into 3 cases, Types A, B, and C, and researched from the

199

perspectives of nuclear nonproliferation (safeguard, nuclear security, etc.), safety, SF cycle service,

host state (site state) selection, access to technology, amount of participation in multilateral

approach, economy, transport, liability, political reception, public reception, geopolitics,

regulations, stakeholder incentives, and industry involvement in planning.

Here, as a consideration of this study, we should further evaluate the description up to the

preceding paragraph from feasibility and sustainability standpoints in type distinct evaluation, and

regarding specific participating states and form of participation.

About Type A

1) In Type A, because of the reasons listed next, improvement in 3S (nuclear nonproliferation

(safeguard), nuclear security, safety) can be expected. However, safety and nuclear security

should not be something great enough to be significant.

A) Because using the measurement management by the host state (entrusted business

operator) and the MNA as the base, inspection (validation) activity is conducted through

the MNA and IAEA, in order to realize a strong form of regional safeguards.

B) Because of performing AMMAO peer reviews (performed within the possible scope

based on agreement) regarding the fulfillment of international guidelines although

regulations of each state pertaining to “safety” are the base. It is not significant

(recommendation level) but contribution to the improvement in the safety culture of

states concerned can be hoped for.

C) Because regulations of each state pertaining to “nuclear security” are the base, but

AMMAO advisory reviews regarding the fulfillment of international nuclear security

guidelines (performed within the possible scope based on agreement) are conducted with

a result that is not significant (recommendation level).

2) Newly, because there is requirement for commitment to nuclear nonproliferation within the

MNA, a smooth nuclear fuel cycle service can be enjoyed.

About Type B

1) In Type B, business is conducted in the form of each state maintaining status quo of the nuclear

materials facilities that they own (no transfer of ownership). Because of the reasons described

next, through participation in the MNA framework, it is possible for smoother administration of

this business as compared to the present (transfer and transport of nuclear materials, etc. within

the MNA framework);

A) Because although the existing bilateral cooperation agreement continues as is in form, it

can be highly anticipated that, by mutually consenting between MNA member states

(between AMMAO) to higher nuclear nonproliferation requirements (for example, the

requirements in the bilateral agreement with the US), the above written bilateral

cooperation agreement is alleviated (for example, comprehensive consent).

B) Because processing is simplified and designing practical cooperation becomes possible

through mutual consent between MNA member states (among AMMAO), although

nuclear materials transfer and export/import control is currently barriers in international

200

business. Along with compliance with the decisions on international control relating to

export (NSG, etc.) being a basis, to the extent possible, unification of export/import

control standards between member states can be planned.

2) In Type B, due to the reasons listed next, an improvement in 3S (nuclear nonproliferation

(safeguard), nuclear security, safety) can be anticipated. However, regarding safety and nuclear

security, it does not become strong enough to have significance.

A) Because of realizing a strong shape of regional safeguard such as performing inspection

(validation) activity through the MNA and IAEA, based on the measurement management

by the host state (entrusted business operator) and the MNA.

B) Because of performing AMMAO peer reviews (performed within the possible scope based

on agreement) regarding the fulfillment of international guidelines although regulations of

each state pertaining to “safety” are the base. It is not significant (recommendation level)

but contribution to the improvement in safety culture of states concerned can be hoped for.

Also, although the liability for nuclear damages is the host state’s responsibility,

complementary measures from complementary damages (insurance) can be anticipated

(additional damages (insurance) proportionate to the service received).

C) Because advisory review (performed within the possible scope based on agreement) is

conducted through AMMAO regarding adherence to international nuclear security

guidelines although regulations of each state pertaining to “nuclear security” are the base.

It does not have significance (recommendation level) but contribution to improvement in

the security culture of states concerned can be anticipated.

3) In Type B, including back-end service (reprocessing, etc.), even in the case considering

transport costs, it can be carried out more economically rationale when compared to cases of

carrying out in individual countries (However, when reprocessing, it is fundamental that the final

waste be returned to the country of origin).

About Type C

1) In Type C, for facilities owned by the MNA which are established in territories of member

states, operation is entrusted by consortium. For the reasons listed next, smooth operation is

possible compared to what exists now (transfer and transport of nuclear materials, etc. within the

MNA framework)

A) Because the MNA is treated as one state (region), and a bilateral nuclear cooperation

agreement is entered into between non-member states (i.e. US) and MNA (AMMAO). In

the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, through mutual consent among MNA

member states (among AMMAO) to strict nuclear nonproliferation requirements (for

example, requirements required in the bilateral agreement with US), alleviating the above

bilateral agreement is planned (gain special treatment such as comprehensive mutual

consent for activities such as transfer and transport of nuclear materials within the MNA

framework).

B) Because processing is simplified and designing practical cooperation becomes possible

through strict mutual consent between MNA member states (among AMMAO), although

201

nuclear materials transfer and export/import control is currently barriers in international

business. For MNA non-member states, the MNA is treated as one state.

2) In Type C, because of the reasons listed next, a significant 3S (nuclear nonproliferation

(safeguard), nuclear security, safety) can be anticipated.

A) Because of realizing a strong shape of regional safeguard such as performing inspection

(validation) activity through the MNA (AMMAO) and IAEA, based on the measurement

management by the MNA (entrusted business operator).

B) Because international safety standards can be adhered to regarding nuclear safety. In the

peer review through AMMAO, significant safety measures are possible because

adherence to the same standards is inspected.

C) Because adherence to international nuclear security guidelines, and adherence to these

same guidelines is inspected through the AMMAO peer review (items in the scope of

and beyond the equivalent of the nuclear physical protection peer review for MNA

nuclear facilities based on the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with a NMA).

3) In Type C, even in cases considering transport costs, it is performed more economically

including back-end service (reprocessing) when compared to performing as a standalone country

(however, if there is reprocessing, it is fundamental that final waste be returned to the country of

origin).

4) In Type C, because facility ownership is transferred to MNA, service is smooth, and while

improvement of 3S can be anticipated, regulations become more complicated in areas such as

having to follow site state regulations (such as safety) and adhering to international standards.

While the responsibility of safety transfers to MNA and, through this, MNA member states enter

the international convention on supplementary liability (for example CSC) regarding liability for

nuclear damages, new measures are necessary such as system where member states and those

business operators together contribute capital for pooling (pooled with investment from each

power company).

In so far as the above, when comparing Types A, B, and C, looking at it from a SNTs and

nuclear non-proliferation viewpoint, ideally a Type C where the operation of facilities is entrusted to

MNA is probably the best shape. However, in a multilateral control concept focused on Type C (a

combination of Types C and A), when it comes to transfer of MNA activities that go beyond the

state level, it can be predicted that, following the laws of the site state, the business operator

(international consortium appointed by the MNA) would submit facility construction and operation

license and permits applications to the site state government institution. In this case, an important

condition to receiving approval is who has responsibility for, or how the responsibility should be

divided, when it comes to safety, nuclear security, and liability. How the sovereignty of the site state

should affect the MNA owned facility is a major problem and it cannot really be anticipated that the

decision on division of responsibility in matters such as the safety of local residents and ensuring

nuclear security, etc. should proceed smoothly. Further, just how nationalism should be cut apart is

another point at issue. Until now, unlike Europe that has repeated actions toward a community

formation, when thought of the current conditions of nuclear activity at the national level in the Asia

region, it is thought that conditions leave no choice but for each nation to think of its own business

as a basis when considering the incentive to participate in the MNA. As the industry’s globalization

202

progresses, it is not impossible that in the MNA jurisdiction, business should also move forward as

an international consortium, but in order for that the MNA – AMMAO fully operate the nuclear fuel

cycle including the abovementioned safety, taking full responsibility, it is expected that a great deal

of discussion and time is needed including revision of laws and regulations. Thus, from a feasibility

viewpoint, it is thought that a shape focused on Type B (an MNA combining Types B and A) is the

most realistic choice.

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7.7 Future work

In this study, Types A, B, and C were imagined as cooperative forms of multilateral

frameworks and, as a framework figure, discussion was conducted on a combination of Types

A and B as well as on a combination of Types A and C. Cases with even more complex

mixtures of A, B, and C can be thought of but, as discussed in the comprehensive evaluation

in section 7.6, realistically, a Type A/B shape has a high feasibility. Models including Type C

have low feasibility when thought of in terms of the nuclear activity and history at the

national level in the Asia region but, going forward, it is thought that studying theses types of

cases should be meaningful.

As for legal systems, this study discussed deeply non-proliferation (safeguard, export

management, and nuclear security), nuclear safety, transportation, liability, host country

selection, and access to sensible nuclear technologies, etc. As mentioned above, if more

concrete and realistic options are considered, it should be necessary to discuss legal systems

further.

When states join MNA as type A, strong requirement on nuclear non-proliferation should be

imposed in exchange for enjoying receiving nuclear fuel cycle services. When talking about

“attractiveness” to join MNA, it can be said that procurement of new fuel may not be difficult

through normal commercial channels/contracts, while SF may not be a serious issue for the

emerging states. Namely, in this context, incentive to join MNA may not be high for the

emerging states. For such states, it may be needed to persuade the importance of long term

stable supply from the political and geopolitical viewpoints. For that, it is of importance to

have functions to procure and supply fuel from the outside of MNA by itself at market prices

in case that internal supply comes to be insufficient. It also implies to activate fuel supply

business when nuclear fuel is available from such multichannel suppliers.

In addition, it should be emphasized that cooperative agreements on 3S be considered

positive support to promote safe and secure implementation of nuclear energy, not as an

additional load.

In this study, USA, Canada and Australia were put as the states that can supply nuclear fuels

from outside of the MNA, expecting Japan’s leadership on nuclear non-proliferation based on

its long non-proliferation history, which may encourage to create Asia own new framework.

However, it may not be realistic to exclude USA and states concerned unless MNA-AMMAO

becomes so strong organization as EURATOM. Further study should be made for an option

where the framework involves those states.

In other words, e.g. USA may not change its forms of bilateral nuclear agreement (BNA) to

each nation in spite of the fact that the MNA proposal expects to make USA’s BNA more

flexible and comprehensive in exchange for strengthening non-proliferation regime within

MNA. Steadfast systems/functions to be able to impose penalty against non-compliance or

condition for withdrawal of MNA Treaty are needed. For that, further studies to strengthen

AMMAO’s authority and relations to UN organizations should be made.

The following issues remain when it comes to legislation. Safeguards: Compared to the

EURATOM safeguard in the EU which has a long history, how to design a unified nuclear

measurement control system and compliance system with the goal of nuclear nonproliferation

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security in Asia with its various governments, economies and cultures; Nuclear safety and

nuclear security: These are historically items left to the discretion of the nation, especially

nuclear security has been concealed because it is closely related to national security problems,

and it is on the premise that this should be carried out under the nation’s responsibility. Based

on this premise, how to overcome the national sovereignty and limits of nationalism to

coordinate cooperation between AMMAO and site states, and further, how to make AMMAO

reviews, which even the EURATOM has not undertaken, function effectively; Liability for

Nuclear Damages: As the Fukushima Nuclear Accident exposed, once a nuclear accident has

occurred, the damage leads to extremely large sums of money, and the possibility of this

damage crossing national borders cannot be denied. From the standpoint of MNA facility

business operators, which many business operators and countries that take part in, and facility

states, when it comes to responsibility for liability for nuclear damages, introducing limited

liability should ensure the financial affairs basis of the MNA facility is desirable. However,

regarding nuclear accidents, how to reduce parent language due to participation in the MNA

of countries like Japan where it is established that the business operator has no responsibility;

Export Control: whether a unified export control system for member states is feasible;

Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements: as a current problem, whether relaxed

requirements can be drawn out of the US who provides a great deal of nuclear fuel to Japan

and Korea and then has the prior consent right on how to handle SF, as listed above, these are

issues that must be explored individual specifically.

In order to use the framework effectively, it is necessary to establish AMMAO headquarters,

office, and monitoring center (regional safeguard, safety, and nuclear security sections), and

secure personnel and equipment. Accordingly, we need to calculate initial and maintenance

costs and develop a financial base for them.

This study was focused on the services for the supply of enriched uranium fuel, the storage

and reprocessing of used fuel, and mentioned the toxicity reduction of collected final wastes.

However, from now on, it is necessary to discuss the reuse of collected uranium and how to

use MOX (short-term and long-term viewpoints), etc. As for the storage of used fuel, we need

to have the policy of returning it to the country that produced it in the end, rather than leaving

it to others. To do so, it is important to reduce the radioactivity of highly radioactive final

wastes in a collaborative manner, etc. In addition, it is necessary to discuss how to cooperate

in technological development for reducing the toxicity (radioactivity) of final wastes and how

to combust long-half-life FP radionuclides and actinide radionuclides (technologies and

practice), etc.

In this study, it was assumed that possible front-end member country candidates are

Kazakhstan, Russia, China, and (Mongolia in the future) for uranium mining and refining,

Russia and China for conversion, Russia (Kazakhstan using facilities in Russia), Japan, and

China for enrichment, Kazakhstan, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and China for fuel

production; while possible back-end member country candidates are Russia and Kazakhstan

for SF storage, Russia, Japan, and China (and South Korea and Kazakhstan in the future) for

MOX storage, and member countries for SF disposal; and reactor member country

candidates are advanced countries in nuclear power, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and

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Indonesia. These are mere “possible countries” estimated based on the analysis of current

situations and the opinion exchanges at the academic level, and so there should be many

uncertainties when making more realistic discussions including politics.

From now on, it is necessary to develop an evaluation model while assuming host and partner

countries for each project and considering fund raising, contribution ratio, risk sharing, and

cost allocation.

As for economic performance, this study was focused on scale economy and transportation

cost. In the comparison of frameworks between multinational and one-country managements,

we made general discussions on economic performance evaluation focusing on the scale

economy of reprocessing cost and the transportation cost of used fuel. The option of direct

disposal was not excluded, but we placed importance on the problem of direct disposal from a

long-term non-proliferation viewpoint, and compared the case of small-scale reprocessing in

a single country and the case of large-scale reprocessing by several countries. In reality, some

countries select the option of direct disposal, and so it is important to compare the

reprocessing (including transportation) including the costs for returning final wastes and

disposal and the direct disposal of used fuel including the cost for disposing of used fuel

(without transportation). Since the cycle cost in the multinational management framework

was calculated as the cost for the entire framework without specifying actors, we conducted

the analysis without assuming host and partner countries. Accordingly, our future mission is

to estimate the actual cost for one-country management or multinational management

framework, by calculating the cycle cost from the viewpoint of each member country. There

are many other factors, such as the expenses for temporary storage, the cost for developing

ports, railway bridges, and facilities, and the cost for using collected uranium, and so more

careful discussions are necessary.

The actualization of MNA requires the participation of the industrial sector, and it is

important to provide incentives for participating in MNA and make more detailed discussions

about economic rationality.

A major issue in the development of a multinational management framework is how host and

partner countries allocate costs in each project. When host and partner countries have

economic incentives, they are encouraged to participate in a multinational management

framework, and so it is necessary to develop an evaluation model assuming host and partner

countries and considering fund raising, contribution ratio, risk sharing, and cost allocation.

Since existing routes are not used, it is considered difficult to transport nuclear materials as of

now. In order to develop a multinational management framework assumed in this report, it is

necessary to enact and revise legal systems regarding the transportation of nuclear materials

through Eurasian Land Bridge. It would be necessary to discuss the cost for each project

other than transportation more carefully.

We were able to discuss and compare the following transportation routes: (a) to cross Europe

and Russia from Kazakhstan by land, and export to nuclear power developing countries via

the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca from Saint Petersburg Port in Russia, (b) to

transport by land from Kazakhstan to Russia like (a), reach the Far East waters via the North

Sea, the Barents Sea, the Arctic Ocean, and the Bering Strait, and export to nuclear power

206

emerging countries, (c) to transport by land from Kazakhstan to the Far East port in Russia,

and export from the Far East port to nuclear power emerging countries, and (d) to cross China

from Kazakhstan and export from Lianyungang (Eurasian Land Bridge). However, it is

anticipated that nearby citizens should oppose the use of ports and transportation routes like

the cases of Russia and Kazakhstan.

A primary obstacle in actualizing a multinational framework is the opposition from citizens

in each project, especially transportation. Even if a basic agreement is concluded between

governments, the opposition from citizens should linger. Especially, in a multinational

framework for radioactive materials, it is anticipated that citizens should be reluctant to

accept a plan of receiving and reprocessing the nuclear materials or used fuels from foreign

countries and a plan of transporting used fuel via their countries or storing it temporarily in

their countries. The unavoidable factors for actualizing this scheme include non-proliferation,

technological, economic, and social feasibilities, including the acceptance by citizens.

Researches in this field are essential.

The options for realizing the framework include (1) to use an existing framework, such as

APEC and (2) to initiate a new framework among a small number of countries and diffuse it,

but these would be influenced by political factors significantly, and so these were not

discussed in this study. However, these would be important for discussing how to embody

MNA.

This study did not discuss nationalistic issues or international relations (international politics)

at all, but these would be important for actualization. In this light, we think that the proposal

for a framework emphasizing business feasibility in each country in Type B is realistic.

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8. Conclusion

This study made specific proposals to establish a regional multilateral control framework

for the nuclear fuel cycle in the Asian region, with a focus on nuclear non-proliferation, feasibility

and sustainability. Priorities for the framework included: eliminating inequality for peaceful

uses of nuclear power, making membership attractive (motivating) to the participant states and

industry, maintain or improve nuclear non-proliferation capabilities (including political and

geopolitical perspectives), implement safety and security at an international level, increased

economic potential for fuel cycle compared to a single state approach, eliminate

conflicts/inconsistency with existing laws and regulations, and solve transport issues for nuclear

fuel, etc. As a result, we were able to give an example of a multilateral control framework that

meets these needs.

This study is essentially a single case study based on the conditions given above, and in

order to pursue more realistic approaches in the future it is important to consider the many issues

presented in 7.7.

As mentioned in the background and purpose of this study, a regional multilateral approach

is an efficient way to promote the use of nuclear energy in the age of globalization, and is also an

important potential solution to backend issues facing nuclear power, nuclear non-proliferation,

nuclear security and nuclear safety. Although this study was only carried out at the university

level, it is hoped that the results will contribute to further examination at a higher level while this

study continues as a second track.

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Appendix 1 Nuclear power situation of each state at frontend

As of February 2011

Uranium mining/uranium

refining

(Source: IAEA INFCIS)

Conversion, re-conversion

(Source: Same as left) Enrichment (Source: Same as left) Processing (Source: Same as left)

Nuclear power generation

(operation, construction, plan)

(Source: World Nuclear Power Plants,

2010)

Russia Dalur: 800 t U/year

（Hereafter, the same unit)

Priargunski /

Krasnokamensk: 3,500

Angarsk(Conversion to UF6): 20,000 t

HM/year（Hereafter, the same unit)

Chepetski Machine Plant- Conversion

(Conversion to UF4 )：2,000

Ekaterinburg (Conversion to UF6 ,

Sverdlovsk-44): 4,000

Angarsk: 1,000 MTSWU/year (Hereafter, the same unit)

Ekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk-44): (No

description of facility size provided.)

Krasnoyarsk: (No description of

facility size provided.)

Siberian Chemical Combine

(Seversk)：4000

Machine - Building Plant (FBR): 50t HM/y

Machine - Building Plant (LWR): 950 t HM/y

Machine - Building Plant (RBMK): 950 t HM/y

Machine - Building Plant (pellets): 1,100 t HM/y

Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant (Assembly) :

1,200 t HM/y

Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant (Pellets): 660

t HM/y

Operation: 27 reactors (23.194 million

kW)

Construction: 10 reactors (8.38 million

kW)

Plan: 7 reactors (8.02 million kW)

China Benxi: 120 t U/year


Chongyi: 120

Fuzhou: 300

Lantian: 100

Qinglong: 100

Shaoguan: 160

Tengchong: 20

Yining: 300

Lanzhou(Conversion to UF6): 3,000t

HM/year

Shaanxi Uranium Enrichment Plant:

500 MTSWU/year(Hereafter, the

same unit)

Lanzhou: 500

Candu Fuel Plant (PHWR) :200t HM/y

Yibin Nuclear Fuel Element Plant （PWR) : 400t HM/y


kW)

Construction: 26 reactors (29.444

million kW)


United

States of

America

(USA)

Canon City-II：210 t U/year


Crow Butte：380

Smith Ranch：770

Sweetwater (Green

Mountain)：350

Vasquez：310

White Mesa：2,000

Metropolis / Converdyn (Conversion

to UF6)：17,600tU/y

Under operation：

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion：11,300MTSWU/year

Under construction/plan：

American Centrifuge：3,500

MTSWU/year

National Enrichment Facility

(NEF)：3,000 MTSWU/year

Areva Eagle Rock Enrichment

Facility：3.3 to 6.6 million

SWU/year

BWXT (Fuel Fabrication for research Reactors) : 100 t

HM/year)

Columbia (Westinghouse, U Assembly): 1, 150 t

HM/year

Richland (ANF) (U Assembly): 700 t HM/year

Lynchburg - FC Fuels (U Assembly): 400 t HM/year

Wilmington (GNF) (U Assembly) : 1,200 (t HM/year)

Operation: 104 reactors (105.344

million kW)

Construction: 1 reactor (PWR 1.20

million kW)


France No data Comurhex Malvesi (Conversion to

UF4 ): 14,000 t HM/year

Comurhex Pierrelatte (Conversion to

UF6): 14,000 t HM/year

W Defluorinat (e-Conversion to U3O8

(Dep. U) : 14,000 t HM/year

Under operation：Eurodif George

Besse-I：10,800 MTSWU/year

Under construction：George

Besse-II：7,500 MTSWU/year

FBFC - Romans: 1,400 t HM/year Operation: 59 reactors (66.02 million

kW)

Construction: 1 reactor (PWR 1.63

million kW)

United

Kingdom

(UK)

（No data） Springfields Enr. U Residue Recovery

Plant (Conversion to UO2 ): 65 t

HM/year（Hereafter, the same unit)

Hex Plant (Conversion to UF6): 6,000

Springfields Main Line Chemical

Plant Hex Plant (Conversion to UF4):

10,000

Springfields OFC IDR UO2 Line

(Conversion to UO2 ): 550

Springfields U Metal Plant

(Conversion to U Metal): 2,000

Urenco Capenhurst: 4,000

MTSWU/year

Springfields OFC LWR Line: 330t HM/y

Springfields（AGR): 290tHM/y


kW)

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Russian%20Federation&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=686&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Dalur&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Russian%20Federation&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=509&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Priargunski%20/%20Krasnokamensk&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Russian%20Federation&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=509&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Priargunski%20/%20Krasnokamensk&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Russian%20Federation&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=CONV&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=545&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Angarsk&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Russian%20Federation&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=CONV&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=557&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Chepetski%20Machine%20Plant-%20Conversion&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Russian%20Federation&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=CONV&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=701&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Ekaterinburg%20(Sverdlovsk-44)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Russian%20Federation&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=CONV&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=701&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Ekaterinburg%20(Sverdlovsk-44)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Russian%20Federation&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=ENRI&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=544&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Angarsk&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Russian%20Federation&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=ENRI&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=402&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Ekaterinburg%20(Sverdlovsk-44)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Russian%20Federation&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=ENRI&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=541&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Krasnoyarsk&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Russian%20Federation&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=ENRI&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=542&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Siberian%20Chemical%20Combine%20(Seversk)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Russian%20Federation&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=ENRI&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=542&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Siberian%20Chemical%20Combine%20(Seversk)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Russian%20Federation&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=UFAB&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=559&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Novosibirsk%20Chemical%20Concentrates%20Plant%20(Assembly)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Russian%20Federation&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=UFAB&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=714&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Novosibirsk%20Chemical%20Concentrates%20Plant%20(Pellets)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=China&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=711&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Benxi&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=China&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=698&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Chongyi&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=China&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=499&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Fuzhou&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=China&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=710&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Lantian&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=China&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=937&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Qinglong&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=China&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=938&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Shaoguan&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=China&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=699&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Tengchong&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=China&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=505&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Yining&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=China&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=ENRI&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=590&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Shaanxi%20Uranium%20Enrichment%20Plant&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20States%20of%20America&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=575&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Canon%20City-II&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20States%20of%20America&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=450&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Crow%20Butte&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20States%20of%20America&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=298&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Smith%20Ranch&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20States%20of%20America&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=267&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Sweetwater%20(Green%20Mountain)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20States%20of%20America&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=267&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Sweetwater%20(Green%20Mountain)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20States%20of%20America&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=829&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Vasquez&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20States%20of%20America&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=363&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=White%20Mesa&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20States%20of%20America&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=ENRI&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=243&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Paducah%20Gaseous%20Diffusion&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20States%20of%20America&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=ENRI&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=838&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=National%20Enrichment%20Facility%20(NEF)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20States%20of%20America&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=ENRI&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=838&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=National%20Enrichment%20Facility%20(NEF)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20States%20of%20America&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=UFAB&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=861&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=BWXT&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20States%20of%20America&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=UFAB&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=68&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Columbia%20(Westinghouse)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20States%20of%20America&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=UFAB&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=275&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Richland%20(ANF)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20States%20of%20America&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=UFAB&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=191&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Lynchburg%20-%20FC%20Fuels&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20States%20of%20America&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=UFAB&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=364&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Wilmington%20(GNF)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=France&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=CONV&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=194&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Comurhex%20Malvesi%20(UF4)&RightP=Facility


http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=France&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=CONV&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=69&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Comurhex%20Pierrelatte%20(UF6)&RightP=Facility


http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=France&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=CONV&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=78&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=W%20Defluorinat%20(Depl.%20UF6)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=France&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=CONV&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=78&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=W%20Defluorinat%20(Depl.%20UF6)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=France&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=UFAB&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=280&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=FBFC%20-%20Romans&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20Kingdom&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=CONV&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=589&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Springfields%20Enr.%20U%20Residue%20Recovery%20Plant&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20Kingdom&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=CONV&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=589&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Springfields%20Enr.%20U%20Residue%20Recovery%20Plant&RightP=Facility



http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20Kingdom&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=CONV&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=33&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Springfields%20Main%20Line%20Chemical%20Plant&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20Kingdom&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=CONV&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=33&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Springfields%20Main%20Line%20Chemical%20Plant&RightP=Facility


http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20Kingdom&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=CONV&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=585&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Springfields%20OFC%20IDR%20UO2%20Line&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20Kingdom&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=CONV&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=38&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Springfields%20U%20Metal%20Plant&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20Kingdom&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=ENRI&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=341&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Urenco%20Capenhurst&RightP=Facility

209

Japan （No data）（No data） Rokkasho Uranium Enrichment

Plant: 1,050 MTSWU/year

Global Nuclear Fuel-Japan Co. Ltd. (GNF-J,BWR): 750

tU /year (Hereafter, the same unit じ)

Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Ltd. (MNF, PWR) : 440

Mitsubushi Nuclear Fuel Ltd. (MNF) : 450

Nuclear Fuel Industry Ltd. (NFI Kumatori, PWR): 284

Nuclear Fuel Industry Ltd. (NFI Tokai, BWR) :250


kW)


kW)


India UCIL-Jaduguda:

175 (t U/year) NFC (UOP) - Block-A （Conversion

to UO2 ）：450 t HM/year

（No data） NFC (BWR、24t HM/y)

NFC (PELLET、335t HM/y)

NFC (PHWR、300t HM/y)

NFC (PHWR、300t HM/y)

Trombay FBTR (FBR、No description of facility size

provided.)

Trombay, Fuel Fabrication (PHWR、135 HM/y)


kW)


kW)


Australia Beverley：848 t U/year

(Hereafter, the same unit)

Olympic Dam：3,930

Ranger：4,660

（No data） (No data. The operation of Silex

ended in 2007. Currently it is

being decommissioned.）

（No data） No reactor for commercial purpose

Canada Key Lake/McArthur River：7,200t U/year (Hereafter, the

same unit)

McClean Lake：3,075

Rabbit Lake：4,615

Cameco -Blind River (Conversion to

UO3 ) ：18,000tU/y（Hereafter, the

same unit)

Cameco - Port Hope (Conversion to

U Metal)：2,000

Cameco - Port Hope (UF6)

(Conversion to UF6) ：12,500

Cameco - Port Hope (UO2) （Conversion to UO2：2,800

（No data） Chalk River Laboratories, NFFF（No description

of facility size provided. N. Fuel PLLT. OP. （U Pellet-Pin、1,300t HM/y)

Peterborough （PHWR、1,200 (t HM/y)

Zircatec Precision Ind. （PHWR、1,200 (t HM/y)


kW)

Kazakhstan Betpak-Dala JV LLP：3,000

U/year (Hereafter, the same

unit)

Appak LLP：500

Centralnoye (Taukent)：1,000

JV Inkai：700

JV Katco (Moynkum)：700

KenDala.kz JSC：1,000

Mining Group 6 LLP：1,000

Stepnogorsky Mining and

Chemical Complex

(SMCC)：3,000

Stepnoye Mining Group

LLP：1,300

（No data）

According to the WNA, Cameco

signed on an Agreement with

Kazatomprom to examine conversion

plant construction in 2007. In 2008,

they collaboratively established a new

company for a construction of a

conversion facility (i.e. 12,000 tU/y)

in Ulba. The feasibility study was to

be completed in mid-2009. The

operation of the facility should begin

in 2015, and it should be fully

operationalised in 2018. Comeco

provides technology and occupies

49% of the project.

（No data） Ulba Metalurgical Plant (UMP, 2,800 (tHM/y)

In 2007, Kazakhstan made an Agreement for

collaboration with the Kansai Electric Power Co., Ltd.,

Nuclear Fuel Industries, Inc., and Sumitomo

Corporation. The Agreement is called the “Minutes of

Agreement for the Partnership for manufacturing

nuclear fuel for Japan”. In the Minutes, it was agreed

that 1) “Ulba Mining Plant”, an affiliate of

Kazatomprom, would manufacture and provide nuclear

fuel compound to the nuclear power plant of the Kansai

Electric Power Co., Ltd, and 2) Sumitomo Corporation

would be responsible for developing market in Japan

for the service provided by the UMP (e.g. handling

different uranium blended materials from uranium

dioxide powder to fuel pellet, to be used for producing

fuel at Nuclear Fuel Industries, Inc.). (Source: IAIF)

In 2008, Kazakhstan signed on the Comprehensive

Agreement with AREVA in France in the field of

nuclear fuel cycle. It was agreed that AREVA would

provide technical assistance to Kazatomprom to

produce 1,200 tons of nuclear fuel assembly every year

at UMP. This includes the support by France for fuel

assembly line for reactor (400 tons). Kazatomptom

would supply fuel pellet for the fuel assembly and also

establish a joint venture corporation called Integrated

Asia Star (IFASTAR) which sells the fuel assembly

(AREVA 51%, Kazatomptom 49%). All 800 tons of fuel assembly (the total production volume of 1,200

tons minus 400 tons for the French plants) can be used

Plan: 1 reactor (No description on its

outputs)

There are 4 research reactors (IGR,

WWR-K (VVER-K), EWG-1M, RA) +

fast reactor 1(BN-350, it was decided

for decommission in 1999).

In October 2006, “Atomstroyexport

(ASE)”, a company dealing with

engineering, procurement and

construction in Russia, “Techsnabeport

(TENEX)”, a company dealing with

conversion and enrichment, and

“Kazatomprom” of Kazakhstan signed

on a document to establish 3 joint

venture corporations (i.e. uranium

mining joint venture “Akbastau”,

“Uranium Enrichment Center”, and

“Atomnayastancha”). The

“Atomnayastancha (meaning a nuclear

power plant)” is a joint venture

corporation to construct a nuclear

power plant (equal contribution). They

are deliberating the feasibility of

constructing 2 middle-to-small size

plants VBER-300, which is based on

the module marine reactor, near Aktau

in western Mangyshlak. (Source: JAIF)

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Japan&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=ENRI&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=150&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Rokkasho%20Uranium%20Enrichment%20Plant&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Japan&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=ENRI&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=150&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Rokkasho%20Uranium%20Enrichment%20Plant&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Japan&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=UFAB&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=709&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Mitsubushi%20Nuclear%20Fuel%20Ltd.%20(MNF)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Japan&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=UFAB&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=170&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Nuclear%20Fuel%20Industry%20Ltd.%20(NFI%20Kumatori)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Japan&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=UFAB&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=224&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Nuclear%20Fuel%20Industry%20Ltd.%20(NFI%20Tokai)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=India&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=146&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=UCIL-Jaduguda&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=India&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=CONV&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=217&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=NFC%20(UOP)%20-%20Block-A&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=India&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=UFAB&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=322&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Trombay,%20Fuel%20Fabrication&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Australia&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=27&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Beverley&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Australia&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=239&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Olympic%20Dam&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Australia&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=266&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Ranger&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Canada&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=162&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Key%20Lake/McArthur%20River&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Canada&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=398&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=McClean%20Lake&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Canada&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=92&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Rabbit%20Lake&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Canada&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=CONV&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=95&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Cameco%20-%20Port%20Hope%20(UF6)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Canada&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=CONV&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=96&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Cameco%20-%20Port%20Hope%20(UO2)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Canada&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=UFAB&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=512&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Chalk%20River%20Laboratories,%20NFFF&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Kazakhstan&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=830&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=%20Betpak-Dala%20JV%20LLP&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Kazakhstan&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=831&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Appak%20LLP&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Kazakhstan&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=700&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Centralnoye%20(Taukent)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Kazakhstan&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=596&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=JV%20Inkai&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Kazakhstan&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=597&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=JV%20Katco%20(Moynkum)&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Kazakhstan&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=835&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=KenDala.kz%20JSC&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Kazakhstan&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=594&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Mining%20Group%206%20LLP&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Kazakhstan&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=536&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Stepnogorsky%20Mining%20and%20Chemical%20Complex%20(SMCC)&RightP=Facility



http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Kazakhstan&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=562&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Stepnoye%20Mining%20Group%20LLP&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Kazakhstan&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=562&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Stepnoye%20Mining%20Group%20LLP&RightP=Facility

210

for any purposes by Kazatomptom. Currently they are

planning to sell it to the nuclear emerging countries in

Asia. (Source: WNA)

South Korea （No data）（No data） (No data. Based on the Korean

Peninsula Non-Nuclear Weapon

Declaration, it was declared that the

country would not possess enrichment

and reprocessing facilities）

CANDU Fuel Fabrication Plant (PHWR、400 t HM/y)

DUPIC Fuel Dev. Fac. (DFDF、 Laboratory 0.2t

HM/y)

PWR Fuel Fabrication Plant Fuel （PWR、400t HM/y)


kW)


kW)


Mongolia （No data）

According to the red-book by OECD/NEA, Mongolia has about 49,000 tU (reasonably assured resources) +

inferred resources. After 2008, Russia and China had been trying to influence over the uranium resources of

Mongolia.

In 1995, uranium production on the Dornod uranium deposit in Mongolia began with assistance from Russia. In

August 2009, a joint venture corporation with Russia should be established, and uranium development began. An

affiliate of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) signed on an agreement with Mongolia in 2007 for

uranium exploration and bought Western Prospector Company – uranium right to mine.

Areva took a right to mine. They did mining test (in site leaching uranium recovery) successfully.

（No data） No reactor for commercial purposes

Viet Nam （No data）（No data）（No data）（No data） There is only Dalat research reactor.

There is no reactor for commercial

purposes.

Plan: Out of 4 reactors (4 million kW),

the first 2 reactors should be contracted

with Russia. Japan is planning to have

orders for the other 2 reactors. The

former reactors should be either

VVER-1000 or 1200, for which Russia

would provide financial assistance.

Throughout the reactor life, Russia

should provide the fuel. Russia should

also take back the spent fuel. (Source:

JAIF)

Thailand （No data）（No data）（No data）（No data） There is only a research reactor. There

is no reactor for commercial purposes.

In the Thailand Power Development

Plan 2007-21 (PDP, Revised in 2007

and 2009), it is described that nuclear

power plants at the level of 1 million

kW should be established in 2020 and

2021 (same as above).

Indonesia （No data）（No data）（No data） Experimental Fuel Element Facility Fuel Fabrication

(Research Reactors、No description of facility size

provided)

RR Fuel Element Production Installation (IFEBRR、Pilot plant No description of facility size provided)

There are only 3 research reactors and

no reactor for commercial purposes.

The country is planning to construct 4

reactors (total of 4 million kW) on the

Muria Peninsula in the center of Java

Island. The construction of the first

began in 2010 and the second in

2011.The construction of the third and

fourth should begin after the

completion of the first and second

reactors. It is aimed that the operation

of the first should begin by 2016, the

second by 2017 and the third and forth

by 2025. In 2007, the Feasibility Study Minutes Concerning 2 Reactors was

signed between Thailand and South

211

Korea (same as above).

Malaysia

（No data）（No data）（No data）（No data） There is only a research reactor and no

reactors for commercial purposes.

Aiming at beginning operation of the

first reactor in 2021, Malaysia is

deliberating the introduction of

GEN-III or GEN-III + reactor with the

latest technology as well as the

selection of a corporation that enables

technology transfer for Malaysia to

establish independent technology.

Philippines （No data）（No data）（No data）（No data） There are Philippines research reactor

and Bataon reactor. The construction of

the latter is completed but is abundant

without fuel being loaded.

The National Energy Plan of 2008

mentioned the need for a nuclear

reactor of 0.6 million kW (operation in

2025)

Taiwan91

(Imported from the USA,

France, South Africa,

Canada, Australia, and

Namibia)

(They are procured from 3

suppliers from the West based on

long-term contracts.)

(Long-term contracts with 2

companies from Europe and the

USA. For safeguards purpose, the

uranium from Canada and

Australia must be enriched by the

USA.)

(Long-term contracts with 3 companies at both

BWR and PWR reactors).


kW)


kW)

Brazil INB - Caetite Mining &

Ore Plant：340 t U/year)

（No data） Aerospace Technical Center：(No

description of facility size

provided.)

RF Enrichment (Pilot plant)：

4 MTSWU/year (Hereafter, the

same unit)

BRN Enrichment (Experimental

size)：5

INB - Resende Enrichment Plant

(Test run)：120

BRQ Pellet Production Fuel Fabrication (U Pellet-Pin、Laboratory 2.55t HM/y)

BRTG Fuel Fabrication Fuel Fabrication (U

Pellet-Pin、Laboratory 21 (Elements/year)

Brazil INB - FCN Resende - Unit 1 Fuel Fabrication

(U Assembly、240t HM/y)

IPEN - Fuel Element Fabrication Plant for Research

Reactors Fuel Fabrication (Pilot plant、10 (Elements/y)


kW)

Plan: 1 reactor (1.35 million kW)

Argentina （No data） Cordoba Conversion Facility

（Conversion to UO2 ）：175 t

HM/year （Hereafter, the same unit）

Pilcaniyeu Conversion Facility

（Conversion to UF6 ）：62

Pilcaniyeu Enrichment Facility (Pilot

plant)： 20 MTSWU/year

Ezeiza - Nuclear Fuel Manufacture Plant Fuel Fabrication

(U Assembly、PHWR、270t HM/y）


kW)


Israel （No data）（No data）（No data）（No data） Plan: 1 reactor (0.664 million kW)

Iran92

There is a uranium mining

and refining facility in

Saghand and a yellow cake

manufacturing facility in

Ardakan.

There is a conversion facility in Esfahan. There is an enrichment facility in

Natanz.

There is a fuel production facility in Esfahan. Construction: 1 reactor (1 million kW)


91

Except for nuclear reactors, information is obtained from the University of Tokyo – UKM International Conference materials 92

Except for the nuclear reactors, information is obtained from NTI

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Brazil&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=180&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=INB%20-%20Caetite%20Mining%20&%20Ore%20Plant&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Brazil&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=MILL&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=180&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=INB%20-%20Caetite%20Mining%20&%20Ore%20Plant&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Brazil&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=ENRI&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=695&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Aerospace%20Technical%20Center&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Brazil&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=ENRI&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=813&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=BRN%20Enrichment&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Brazil&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=ENRI&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=694&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=INB%20-%20Resende%20Enrichment%20Plant&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Argentina&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=CONV&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=72&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Cordoba%20Conversion%20Facility&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Argentina&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=CONV&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=72&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Cordoba%20Conversion%20Facility&RightP=Facility

212

Pakistan

BC-1(Pilot plant)：

30 t U/year （Hereafter,

the same unit）

Issa Khel / Kubul

Kel(Pilot plant)：

Islamabad (Conversion to UO2 ):

(No description of facility size)

Kahuta: 5 (MTSWU/year) Chashma Fuel Fabrication (U Assembly、PHWR: 20 t

HM/year


kW)

Construction: 1 reactor (0.325 million

kW)

EU,

excluding

UK and

France, and

others

Czech：400 t U/year

Rumania：410 t U/year

Ukraine：1,000 t U/year

Uzbekistan：3,000 t U/year

Gruanu (Germany, URENCO, 1,800

tU/year)

Almelo (Netherland, URENCO,

4,500tU/year)

Belgium: FBFC International - LWR Fuel Fabrication

Plant (U Assembly, UOX-PWR,BWR): 500 t HM/y

Germany: Advanced Nuclear Fuels GmbH Lingen

Plant (U Assembly, LWR): 650 t HM/y

Spain :Fabrica de combustible (U Assembly, LWR):

400 t HM/y

Sweden: Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB (U

Assembly, LWR): 600 t HM/y

Germany: 17 reactors (21.507 million

kW)

Sweden: 10 reactors (9.384 million

kW)

Spain: 8 reactors (7.727 million kW)

Belgium: 7 reactors (6.201 million kW)

Czech: Operation: 6 reactors (3.93

million kW), Plan: 2 reactors (2 million

kW)

Switzerland: 5 reactors (3.405 million

kW)

Finland: Operation: 4 reactors (2.80

million kW), Construction: 1 reactor

(1.72 million kW)

Netherland: 1 reactor (0.51 million kW)

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Pakistan&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=All&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=81&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=BC-1&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Pakistan&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=All&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=142&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Issa%20Khel%20/%20Kubul%20Kel&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Pakistan&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=All&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=142&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Issa%20Khel%20/%20Kubul%20Kel&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Pakistan&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=All&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=141&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Islamabad&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Belgium&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=UFAB&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=110&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=FBFC%20International%20-%20LWR%20Fuel%20Fabrication%20Plant&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Belgium&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=UFAB&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=110&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=FBFC%20International%20-%20LWR%20Fuel%20Fabrication%20Plant&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Germany&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=UFAB&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=186&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Advanced%20Nuclear%20Fuels%20GmbH%20Lingen%20Plant&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Germany&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=UFAB&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=186&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Advanced%20Nuclear%20Fuels%20GmbH%20Lingen%20Plant&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Spain&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=UFAB&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=154&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Fabrica%20de%20combustible&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Sweden&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=UFAB&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=350&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Westinghouse%20Electric%20Sweden%20AB&RightP=Facility

213

Appendix 2 Nuclear power situation of each state at backend

As of February 2011

Spent fuel storage Reprocessing Spent fuel/radioactive waste processing/disposal Nuclear fuel cycle policy Legal system, etc.

Russia Under operation

Kursk NPP Site: 2000t HM

Leningrad NPP Site: 4,000t HM

Novovoronezh NPP Site: 400t HM

RT-1, Mayak, Reprocessing Plant

Site: 560t HM

RT-2, Krasnoyarsk, Reprocessing

Plant Site : 8,6000t HM

Smolensk NPP Site : 2,000t HM

Plan

Mining and Chemical Complex Site,

Stage I: 8,130t HM

RT-1, Combined Mayak

Spent Fuel Reprocessing

(400t HM/year)

RIAR (Research Institute

of Atomic Reactors、

Pilot plant)：1 t HM/year

The study on high level waste disposal sites is carried out in 5

locations in the Kola Peninsula, Novaya Zemlya Islands,

Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Far East (as of 2004. Source:

ATOMICA).

Because Russia prohibited the interim storage of radioactive

waste and substances generated overseas as well as bringing in

radioactive waste from overseas for final disposal through its

1992 Environmental Protection Act Article 50, the storage of

such items in Russia had been limited for reprocessing of spent

fuel generated within Russia. However, in order to obtain

foreign currency, the following 3 laws were discussed at the

Parliament: 1) revision of the above Act to include an exemption

case, 2) revision of the Nuclear Power Act to only allow the

contracts compliant with the Civil Code to export/import as well

as accept interim storage and reprocessing of spent fuel from

overseas, including leasing, and 3) establishment of the Special

Ecological Environmental Plan Act that determines the use of

foreign currency that can be obtained from the international

trade of spent fuel for environmental protection actions and

establishment of fuel cycle related infrastructure in Russia. The

laws were signed by the President and were enacted in July

2001.

Russia is aiming at the closed cycle using

fast reactor. However, currently, the spent

fuel from RBMK and VVER-1000 reactors

is stored but not reprocessed. Russia is

planning to construct a spent fuel storage

facility which allows them to store up to

40,000tU until the reprocessing facility

begins to be fully operationalised around

2022.

Russian government approved the concept

of “new generation nuclear reactor

technology between 2010 and 2015 and the

prospective up to 2020”, aiming to move to

the closed-fuel-cycle-based fourth

generation reactor. Their first priority is the

fast reactor. In addition to natrium

cooled-reactor, they are also planning to

develop/construct lead and lead-bismuth

cooled-reactor.

＜Radioactive waste related

＞

Environmental Protection

Act

China LanZhou Centralized Wet Storage

Facility (CWSF): 500t HM

Lanzhou (RPP) 0.1 t

HM/year

Selection of a disposal site should be completed in 2020. China

is aiming to begin the geological disposal research facility

from 2020 and the disposal from 2050.

The high-level radioactive waste should be intensively disposed

via geological disposal (People’s Republic of China Radiation

Pollution Prevention Act of October 2003). In February 2006,

the “Research Development Plan Guideline for Geological

Disposal of High-level Radioactive Waste” was announced. In

the Guideline, it is clearly stated that a disposal site should be

constructed by mid-Century. To achieve this objective, China is

planning to organize various regulatory systems, select a site,

construct and test geological disposal research facility, and carry

out safety evaluation of the geological disposal method.

China is aiming to materialize the closed

nuclear fuel cycle using fast reactors.

By 2020, 70 light-water reactors (LWRs)

should be operationalised and 30 LWRs

should be constructed. After 2020, Gen-3

PWR (CAP1400) should be the

mainstream. As for the heavy-water

reactors (HWRs), CERF (20MWe) should

reach critical in September 2010. CDFR

(800MWe) should be constructed by 2020

and FBR commercial reactor by 2035.

＜Radioactive waste＞

People’s Republic of

China Radiation Pollution

Prevention Act (2003)

“Research Development

Plan Guideline for

Geological Disposal of

High-level Radioactive

Waste” (Feb. 2006)

USA Currently under operation for

commercial purpose: 36 facilities, total

of 9,869.4 t HM

Currently waiting for license: 1 facility

(Private Fuel Storage LLC)、40,000 t

HM

Postponed: 1 facility (Owl Creek NPP

Site)、40,000 t HM

Only Los Alamos Plutonium

Facility Spent Fuel

Reprocessing is registered at

the Integrated Nuclear Fuel

Cycle Information Systems

(INFCIS) as currently under

operation. However, the

facility size is 0t MH/year.

Currently the spent fuel is not reprocessed but stored within the

power generating plant site

Based on the recommendation concerning the site from

Secretary to the DOE to the President, the President

recommended Yucca Mountain (YM) as a site to the Congress in

February 2002. Although Nevada State submitted a disapproving

notification to the Congress, it was overturned and the resolution

to approve YM as a site was approved in July 2002. Later, the

DOE submitted to application to the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) for their approval of site in June 2008, and

the review process began. However, in March 2010, the DOE

submitted an application to the NRC to withdraw the previous

submission for approval based on the decision of the new

Administration, born in 2009, to cancel the YM plan. The NRC

is currently reviewing the submission for the cancellation.

In order to identify a replacement of the YM plan, the Blue

Ribbon Commission was established and back end replacement plan is being examined.

Since the 1970s, there had been no

construction of a new nuclear power plant.

However, after 30 years of interval, the

construction of a new nuclear power plant

should begin.

＜nuclear energy in general

＞

Atomic Energy Act

Nuclear Non-proliferation

Act


Radioactive Waste Policy

Act in 1982

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Russian%20Federation&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=SFSF&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=785&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Mining%20and%20Chemical%20Complex%20Site,%20Stage%20I&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Russian%20Federation&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=SFSF&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=785&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Mining%20and%20Chemical%20Complex%20Site,%20Stage%20I&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Russian%20Federation&Status=In%20operation&Scale=All&Type=SFRR&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=691&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=RIAR%20(Research%20Institute%20of%20Atomic%20Reactors)&RightP=Facility



http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20States%20of%20America&Status=All&Scale=Commercial&Type=SFSF&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=689&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Private%20Fuel%20Storage%20LLC&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20States%20of%20America&Status=All&Scale=Commercial&Type=SFSF&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=591&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Owl%20Creek%20NPP%20Site&RightP=Facility

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=United%20States%20of%20America&Status=All&Scale=Commercial&Type=SFSF&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=591&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Owl%20Creek%20NPP%20Site&RightP=Facility

214

France La Hague - C：4,800t HM

La Hague - D：4,600t HM

La Hague - E：6,200t HM

La Hague - HAO：400t HM

La Hague - NPH：2,000 t HM

La Hague - UP2-800：1,000t HM/y

La Hague - UP3： 1,000t

HM/y

The policy is to reprocess spent fuel.

It is stipulated in the “Plan Act Concerning Sustainable

Management of Radioactive Waste and Radioactive Substance

(Radioactive Waste, etc. Management Plan Act)” established in

June 2006 that the high-level and long-life middle-level

radioactive wastes shall be disposed deep in underground. The

Act also regulates that the application for the approval of the

disposal site shall be submitted by 2015 and the operation of the

site shall begin in 2025. The Act was determined based on the

study results and the evaluation of 3 fields (i.e. nuclide

separation/conversion, geological disposal, long-term

aboveground storage) in order to examine management methods

of high level and long-term middle level radioactive waste under

the Radioactive Waste Management Study Act of 1991.

In March 1974, France announced its

policy as “all new power source

development should be done by nuclear

power plants in the future”. They export

the power generated through nuclear power

plants to its neighboring countries. They

have fuel cycle facilities that cover from

front end to back end within the country.

The spent fuel is reprocessed. The glassy

solid, a vitrified form of high level

radioactive waste liquid generated from

reprocessing as well as the other long-life

middle level radioactive waste are handled

by plastic geological disposal.


“Radioactive Waste

Management Study Law,

Radioactive Waste

Management Study Act”

in 1991

“Plan Act Concerning

Sustainable Management

of Radioactive Waste and

Radioactive Substance”

(Radioactive Waste, etc.

Management Plan Act)

established in June 2006

UK NDA Sellafield B27 Pond：2,300t HM

NDA Sellafield Fuel Handling Plant：2,700t HM

NDA Sellafield Pond 4：1,500t HM

NDA Thorp RT and ST-1,2：3,800t HM

NDA Wylfa NPP Site：700t HM

NDA B205 Magnox :

1,500t HM/y

NDA Thorp : 900t HM/y

The high level radioactive wastes are stored in the Sellafield

reprocessing factory in the form of glassy solid.

As for the spent fuel management policy, “as long as needed

regulatory requirements are met, the owner of the spent fuel may

determine whether the spent fuel is reprocessed or not.” All

spent fuel generated from the Gas Cooled Reactor (GCR) is

reprocessed due to safety reasons. However, for about half of the

spent fuel generated from the Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor

(AGR) and for the spent fuel generated from the Pressurized

Water Reactor (PWR), the contracts for reprocessing have not

been made so far.

As for the management of the high-level radioactive waste, in

response to the advice from the CoRWM, an advisory council,

the government established a radioactive waste management

policy that includes both geological disposal and interim storage

in October 2006. Based on the results of the public deliberation

concerning the procedure for site selection plan development for

the geological disposal, the government published a white paper

called “Managing Radioactive Waste Safely- A Framework for

Implementing Geological Disposal” in June 2008. The paper

contains 6 steps of the site selection process. The government

began soliciting local governments that wish to participate in the

discussion with the government concerning the disposal site in

the future, as a first step of the site selection process as described

in the White Paper. So far, 1 state and 2 cities expressed their

willingness, and the initial screening of the second step is being

carried out.

After the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, the

government had been negative about

nuclear power. However, they changed the

policy and decided to build a new nuclear

power reactor. Although the Labor Party

lost at the Lower House election in 2010, it

is expected that the nuclear power plant

construction policy should still continue.

However, it is agreed that no public

subsidization should be provided to the

construction of the new power plant. There

is also an issue to set the price for the

carbon dioxide emissions trading. Thus, the

future prospect is unclear.


There are no laws and

regulations that directly

regulate disposal plan of

high level radioactive

waste.

There are also no laws

and regulations that

directly regulate the

implementation scheme

of high-level radioactive

waste disposal. However,

in response to the advice

from the Committee on

Radioactive Waste

Management (CoRWM),

the government stated in

their announcement in

October 2006 that they

would give responsibility

to the Nuclear

Decommissioning

Authority (NDA) for the

planning and

implementation of

geological disposal.

Japan Fukushima Daiichi: 408t HM

(Cask-Bund.)

Fukushima Daiichi: 6,840t HM

(Cask-Bund.)

Rokkasho: 3,000t HM

Tokai Daini: 915 (Cask-Bund.)

(Interim storage facility: Mutsu-city,

Aomori. The operation should begin

in July 2012. The capacity is planned

to be approximately 5,000tU.

Information from Mutsu-city Home

Page)

Under construction：JNFL:

800tHM/y

The policy is to reprocess spent fuel.

The policy is to carry out geological disposal for high-level

radioactive waste.

The radioactive waste should be processed as high-level vitrified

radwaste. More than 40,000 radwastes should be disposed of

over 300 meters under the ground. As of now, the site and rock

type are not specified yet. The NUMO is soliciting candidate

sites for the study. They should select a study site from the sites

that express their willingness to be the test site. The disposal

should begin from the late 2030s.

The spent fuel is reprocessed, and the

recovered plutonium and uranium are used.

The nuclear fuel cycle including fast reactors

is promoted.

＜Nuclear energy in general

＞

Atomic Energy Basic

Law

The Law for the

Regulations

of Nuclear Source

Material, Nuclear Fuel

Material and Reactors


＞

The handling of radioactive waste is regulated by the

Atomic Energy Basic Law

215

India Rajasthan NPP Site: 570t HM

Tarapur (AFR) : 275t HＭ

Tarapur NPP: 20t HM

Coral is registered but the

capacity is 0 (t HM/year)

The following

reprocessing facilities

were constructed or are

under operation or under

construction with the

country’s own technology

(Source: JAIF).。

The deep geological disposal is being studied. There is a Waste

Isolation Plant (WIP) in Kurapool to handle high-level radioactive

waste. The Plant was successful in solidifying the waste generated

from PREFERE in 1999.

The policy is directed towards the

HWR-plutonium fast reactors.

All processes including production of

uranium and thorium resources, fuel

forming, reprocessing, and waste disposal

are carried out within the country.

Trombay Reprocessing Plant: Reprocessing capacity: 50? t/year. India

carried out a nuclear test in 1974 using the plutonium generated from

this reprocessing facility. Plutonium seems to be used for military

purposes. This facility is not a subject of the IAEA safeguards.

Tarapur Reprocessing Plant (PREFERE): Reprocessing capacity: 100

to 150 t/year. PUREX method.

Kalpakkam Reprocessing Plant (KARP): Reprocessing capacity: 100

to 125 t/year. PUREX method.

Fast reactors fuel reprocessing plant (FRFRP): The plant is currently

under construction. The reprocessing capacity, etc. is unknown.

Australia （No data）（No data） The radioactive wastes are currently stored in over 100 facilities

including universities, hospitals, offices, research institutes, etc.

In addition to these wastes, the radioactive wastes which should

be reprocessed in UK and France between 2015 and 2016 should

be returned to Australia. There is a need to build a storage

facility to store all of these wastes.

In 2010, the Commonwealth Government abrogated the

“Commonwealth Radioactive Waste Management (Related

Amendment) Bill 2006” and submitted the “National

Radioactive Waste Management Bill 2010” to the Lower House.

The purpose of this Bill is to take away from the Government

the right to select construction sites for radioactive wastes

management facilities for the use of medicine, industry and

research. Currently, 3 sites in Northern territory are chosen as

the candidates for the radioactive waste management facilities.

Australia is the only developed country that

does not use nuclear power as energy source.

This is because the country is abound in coals

and can use them inexpensively.


＞

Commonwealth

Radioactive Waste

Management Bill 2005

National Radioactive

Waste Management Bill

2010

The construction of

nuclear power facilities,

etc. is prohibited in the

following states:

Victoria:

Construction and

operation of nuclear

reactors are

prohibited.

New South Wales:

Construction and


reactors are

prohibited.

West Australia:

Construction of

nuclear waste

storage facilities

within the state is

prohibited. Use of

sites for nuclear

waste storage and

processing within

the state is

prohibited.

South Australia:

216

Construction and


waste facilities

within the state is

prohibited.

Queensland:

Nuclear facilities

except for uranium

mining are

prohibited. Canada Douglas Point NPP Site：0t HM

Gentilly 1 NPP Site：0t HM

Gentilly 2 NPP Site：0 t HM

NPD Spent Fuel Storage：75t HM

Point Lepreau NPP Site：0t HM

Whiteshell Laboratories：0t HM

（No data） The policy for spent fuel is the direct geological disposal,

instead of reprocessing,

Nuclear Fuel Waste Act was established in 2002, and the

Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) as an

executing body of disposing high-level radioactive waste was

established. The NWMO examined the long-term management

approach of spent fuel, and, in 2005, submitted a proposal called

the “Adaptive Phased Management (ADP)” to the Government

of Canada. The ADP proposes the storage for the time being

and, ultimately, geological disposal. The proposal was adapted

in June 2007. In May 2010, the NWMO announced the final

version of the site selection plan and began site selection which

is composed of the total of 9 processes.


Act Respecting the

Long-term Management

of Nuclear Fuel Waste (Nucl

ear Fuel Waste Act, enacted

in November 2002).

Kazakhstan （No data）（No data） Decommissioning of BN-350 is on-going. 1,000 tons of spent

fuel including activated sodium is being stored on the site.

Furthermore, at the Semipalatinsk Test Site where nuclear tests

were carried out for 470 times, the residues from the test are still

stored, and the damage to environment is of concern.

The government is considering establishing law concerning

storage and disposal system of radioactive waste (Source:

WNA).

The long-term strategies of nuclear power are

1) to be the largest natural uranium production

country in the world, 2) to aim at the

integrated added value creation structure from

front end to back end, 3) to strengthen

collaboration with overseas key partners

(creation of a consortium, acquisition of

stocks of the partners, etc.). Specifically, the

government is aiming to secure the share of

30% of uranium prospecting, 12% of

conversion, 6% of enrichment, and 30% of

fuel production.

＜Nuclear power in general

＞

Republic of Kazakhstan

Act No. 93 concerning

nuclear power use as of

Apr. 14, 1997 (Nuclear

Power Use Act)



licensing as of Jan. 11,

2007



export management as of

Jul. 21, 2007


The government is

considering the

establishment of a law

concerning radioactive

waste storage and

disposal system

South

Korea Wolsong Dry Storage：6,250 t HM

（No data） The spent fuel is managed at interim storage facilities until the

government decides whether to opt for reprocessing or direct

disposal reprocess in the future.

Currently, the spent fuel generated from nuclear power plants is

stored at each plant site.

Future plan of nuclear reactors: 32 reactors

to be operational by 2022 and 40 reactors

by 2030.

As for the spent fuel, the storage capacity

within a nuclear power plant can be filled

at earliest 2016, while the site selection for

interim storage facilities is faced with

difficulties. Due to this situation,

reprocessing approach is also emerging.

South Korea is promoting the development

Nuclear Power Act

Radioactive Waste

Management Act

http://www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/NFCISMain.asp?Country=Korea,%20Republic%20of&Status=All&Scale=All&Type=SFSF&DetailedType=&Order=1&WhichFacility=616&RPage=1&Page=1&FacilityName=Wolsong%20Dry%20Storage&RightP=Facility

217

of dry-reprocessing technology. It is also

reported that the government is planning to

demand for domestic reprocessing at the

time of revising USA-South Korea Nuclear

Power Collaboration Agreement in 2014.

(Source: World Nuclear Power Plant 2010)

Mongolia （No data）（No data）＜Future nuclear power introduction plan＞

The government is intending to refine uranium ore, make uranium concentrate (yellow cake) and export it in the

future, instead of exporting uranium as raw material.

The purpose of the “Mongolia Nuclear Initiative (MNI)” is to enhance role of Mongolia in the development

process of nuclear power. This is to contribute to the global scale nuclear power development by adapting

high-level knowledge and technology through international collaboration and regional collaboration, using the

uranium resources of Mongolia as a lever. The essence of the MNI may include contribution of Mongolia as a fuel

producer, taking back spent fuel, “from cradle to grave” approach, and hosting a multilateral facility. (Source: The

University of Tokyo – UKM International Conference material)

Nuclear Energy Law (2009):

It regulates uranium

exploration, development

and mining and grants the

government the status of

uranium benefits and

ownership as well as

uranium resource

management.

Viet Nam （No data）（No data）＜Future nuclear power introduction plan＞

The government is aiming to begin construction of the first reactor in 2014 and its operation in 2020.

In 2 sites within Ninh Thuan Province, 2 nuclear reactors per site should be constructed. The output of each site is

approximately 2 million kW, and the total is 4 million kW. The former 2 reactors are under the contract with

Rosatom, Russia. For the latter 2 reactors, on Oct. 31, 2010, then-Prime Minister of Japan, Naoto Kan, and Prime

Minister of Viet Nam, Dung, had a talk and agreed that Japan would receive the order for the contraction of the 2

reactors from Viet Nam.

Nuclear Energy Act

Thailand （No data）（No data）＜Future nuclear power introduction plan＞

The government aims to begin operating the reactors of the total of 2,000 MW by 2021 (1,000 MW x 1 reactor in

2020, 1,000 MW x 1 reactor in 2021)However, as of now (March 2010), no political decision had been made

concerning introduction of nuclear power generation, and political instability is on-going. Thus, the prospect of

nuclear power plant plan is still unclear.

The Atomic Energy for

Peace Act should be

reviewed including

Articles concerning

Additional Protocol,

approval process and

security.

A comprehensive nuclear

power regulation is being

drafted.

Indonesia （No data）（No data）＜Future nuclear power introduction plan＞

The government is aiming to begin operating the first PWR equivalent of 600 to 1,000 MW in 2016 -2017 and

begin operating all 4 reactors by 2025.

The Government Regulation No. 27/2002 prohibits spent fuel reprocessing. It stipulates that the spent fuel shall

be tentatively stored during the life of a reactor, and after the tentative storage period, the spent fuel shall be

disposed of or handed over to BATAN to be returned to the generating country.

Nuclear Power Act,

Radioactive Waste

Management Act, Nuclear

Materials Export Safety

Act, etc.

Article 24 of Nuclear

Power Act No.10/1997

stipulates that the

high-level radioactive

waste shall be tentatively

stored at least during the

life of a reactor.

Malaysia （No data）（No data）＜Future nuclear power introduction plan＞

The first nuclear power plant in Malaysia is planned to be operationalised in 2021.

As for the radioactive waste

management, the new

regulations are at the final

drafting stage.

Philippines （No data）（No data）＜Future nuclear power introduction plan＞

Sign of the re-operation of nuclear power

The government positions nuclear power as a long-term energy option for power generation. KEPCO carried out a

feasibility study to explore the possibility of restoration of nuclear power in the Philippines. The study results

were submitted in 2009.

Republic Act 2067

Taiwan All spent fuels should be stored in the nuclear reactor pool.

The capacity of the pool as of March 2011 is

（No data） The spent fuel is directly disposed The Taiwan Power Company has been investigating the final

disposal method of the spent fuel since 1986.

<Radioactive waste related> Radioactive Wastes and

Material Administration A

218

20,528 tons. (Meanwhile, the already stored

amount of spent fuel is 15,278 tons. The

occupancy rates of the spent fuel storage pools

of 2 nuclear reactors at the Chinsan nuclear

power plant exceed 85%.)

Currently, the construction projects of

dry-storage facilities at Chinsan Nuclear Power

Plant and Kousheng Power Plant are on-going.

ｃｔ、

LLW Final Disposal

Siting Act

Basic Environment Act

(December 11, 2002)

Singapore （No data）（No data） The government is intending to

collaborate with other ASEAN countries

(particularly, Malaysia) that are going to

introduce nuclear reactors, instead of

introducing the reactors in Singapore.

Brazil The spent fuel is stored at the Angra Nuclear

Power Plant. The decision of reprocessing or

direct disposal is still pending. (Source: WNA)

（No data） The government is intending to

self-supply enriched uranium for their

own power generation plants. As for

reprocessing, the government’s decision

is pending.

Argentine Atucha SF Storage Facility: 986 t HM

Embalse SF Storage Facility: 2,000 t HM （No data. The pilot

plant (5t HM/y) in

Ezeiza has been

postponed.）

HWR is used with natural uranium fuel.

Although the scale is small, the country

possesses conversion, enrichment, fuel

production and heavy water production

facilities.

The country possesses an enrichment

facility in order to retain enrichment right

as well as to provide enrichment services in

the future.

Israel （No data） There is a

reprocessing

facility in

Dimona.

Currently, there is no nuclear power program

for commercial use. Although the country

mentioned its intention to have plant

collaboration with Jordan in 2010, there has

been no response.

Pakistan The spent fuel is stored in each power plant’s

pool. A long-term dry-storage is proposed.

(Source: WNA)

80 km away from

Chashuma, there

is a reprocessing

factory for

military purpose.

It is also reported

that the second

reprocessing

factory is under

construction.

The government

has not yet

decided whether

they begin

reprocessing for

commercial use

in the future or

not.

There is a proposal to establish the Nuclear Waste Fund (NWF)

and construct radioactive waste management centers in Karachi

and Chashuma. (Source: WNA)

It is still an open question whether the spent fuel should be

reprocessed or not.

The current nuclear power program is

small, but the country is planning to

expand it significantly.

In response to the IAEA safeguards, the

Pakistan Nuclear Power Committee

announced in 2006 that they were

preparing for establishing the Pakistan

Nuclear Fuel Complex that includes

conversion for commercial use,

enrichment, and fuel manufacturing plant.

These facilities are completely separated

from the existing facilities. However, the

country cannot obtain necessary uranium

due NSG Guidelines, and there has been no

program on the said-Complex.

EU,

excluding

UK and France,

and others

Germany: Under operation: 16 sites, total 22,681t HM

Belgium: Under operation: 2 sites, total 3,860t HM

Bulgaria: Under operation: 1 site, total 600t HM Czech: Under operation: 2 sites, total 1,940t HM

Finland: Under operation: 3 sites, total 1,742t HM

Finland: The spent fuel is handled via direct disposal. At the end of 2000, the government decided to construct a

geological disposal site in Olkiluoto. From 2004, the construction of the Underground Characterization and

Investigation Facility (ONKALO) began for a detailed study in Olkiluoto. According to the plan, the application for the approval of the disposal site construction should be submitted in 2012 and the operation of the disposal

site should begin in 2020 (The application states that the maximum disposal amount should be 12,000t).

219

Hungary: Under operation: 1 site, total 850t HM

Lithuania: Under operation: 1 site, total 98 Cask-Bund.

Rumania: Under operation: 1 site, total 36,000 (Bundle/year)

Slovakia: Under operation: 1 site, total 1,690t HM

Spain: Under operation: 1 site, total 1,680 Cask-Bund.

Sweden: Under operation: 1 site, total 8,000t HM

Switzerland: Under operation: 1 site, total 2,500t HM

Ukraine: Under operation: 2 sites, 2,518t HM + 9120 Cask-Bund

Sweden: The spent fuel is handled via direct disposal. The government selected Forsmark in Est Hanmal

municipality as the disposal site. SKB is planning to apply for the approval of siting and constructing the disposal

facility in March 2011.

Germany: The high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel are handled via geological disposal in the salt dome.

Based on the policy to dispose high-level radioactive waste via geological disposal method in the salt dome in

Gorleben, exploration had been carried out since the1970s. The exploration was temporary frozen since 2000.

However, the center-right alliance, which was established as a result of the general election in the fall of 2003,

presented a policy to remove the freeze of exploration. Currently, preparation is on-going for resuming the

exploration on the Gorleben site.

Switzerland: Since 2001, the government has been intensively using interim storage in Zwilag to store the

high-level radioactive. Since 1983, the Grimsel Test Site has been carrying out high-level radioactive waste

disposal research.

Belgium: There is an intensive storage facility in Dessel. The government is aiming to begin construction of a

disposal site from around 2035.

Spain: The government is aiming to begin intensive interim storage in Trillo. The decision of the geological

disposal research should be done after 2010.

Sources/references: IAEA INFCIS Database, World Nuclear Power Plants 2010, Home Pages of Radioactive Waste Management Funding and Research Center (RWMC), World Nuclear Association (WNA), ATOMICA, Atomic Energy

Commission, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, etc.

220

Source: World Nuclear Association, http://www.wna.org

Appendix 3 Global Uranium Production Capacity Appendix 4 Global Uranium-Conversion Capacity

Appendix 5 Global Uranium Enrichment Capacity Appendix 6 Global Uranium Fuel Production Capacity

Source: World Nuclear Association,

http://www.wna.org

Source: http://www.wise-uranium.org Source: http://www.wise-uranium.org

http://www.wna.org/

http://www.wna.org/

http://www.wise-uranium.org/

http://www.wise-uranium.org/