Admin Digests 120715.pdf

7/23/2019 Admin Digests 120715.pdf

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NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS

United States vs Ang Tang Ho

Facts:In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and

approved Act No. 2868 entitledAn Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay

and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor

General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of

such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53

which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should

be sold at 63 centavos per ganta.

On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the

price of 80 centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The

sale was done on the 6thof August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of

the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonmentplus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation

of power to the Governor General.

Issue:Whether Act No. 2868 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power

Held:By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is

left to the discretion of the Governor-General. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in

any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment

and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not a cause, and what is

or what is not an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, and as to what is a temporary rule

or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act.

A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative

branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other

appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its

details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the

ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.


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PANAMA v RYAN

Facts:Section:9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933 authorized the

President of the United States to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign

commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced to withdrawn from storage in

excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any statelaw or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer,

or other duly authorized agency of a State.

Any violation of an order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection

shall be punishable by a fine, not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment not to exceed six

months, or both.

The President issued the foregoing prohibition by Executive Order, and then authorized the

Secretary of Interior to exercise all of the powers vested in the President under

Section:9(c). The Secretary of Interior then issued regulations to carry out the Presidentsorders, which required all petroleum producers to file monthly statements, under oath,

with the Division of Investigations of the Department of the Interior. Further, the President

approved a Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry, and designated the

Secretary of Interior with all of the powers vested in him under the Act and the Code.

Section:9(c) was challenged on the ground that it was an unconstitutional delegation of

legislative power by Congress.

Issue:Was the delegation of power to the President under Section:9(c) of the National

Industrial Recovery Act an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power?

Held:Yes. The attempted delegation was plainly void because the power sought to be

delegated was legislative power, but nowhere in the statute did Congress declare or

indicate any policy or standard to guide or limit the President when acting under the

delegation.


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Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts:There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO

626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement

of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef.

On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was

then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it

violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority

provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is

unconstitutional.

The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in

order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of

carabaos.

He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power by the former presidentunder Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergencypowers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD:The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is reallypresidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existinglaw due to the grant of legislative authority over the president underAmendment number6.

While 626-A has the same lawful subjectas the original executive order, it cant be said thatit complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition and thepurpose sought has a gap.

Due process was violated because the owener was denied the right to be heard or hisdefense and punished immediately.

The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of thesupposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against thedoctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislativepowers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the

distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.


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Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Company

Facts:The General Electric Company owned and was operating a broadcasting station atSchenectady, N. Y., when the Radio Act of 1927 went into effect. Thereafter it sought and

obtained from the commission successive licenses under that act for the further operationof the station

January 14, 1928, the company made application for a renewal of that license. Theapplication was not acted upon until October 12, 1928, and then the commission orderedthat a license be not issued with terms like those of the existing license, but that one beissued with other terms much less advantageous to the company and the communitieswhich it was serving; the chief change being a pronounced reduction in the admissiblehours of service

The act of 1927, c. 169, 44 Stat. pt. 2, p. 1162 (47 USCA 81-119), was enacted as aregulation of interstate and foreign radio communication; and it is in such activities thatthe company's broadcasting station is used.

The act authorized the commission to determine the question of public convenience,interest, or necessity; declares that decisions of the commission in all matters over which ithas jurisdiction 'shall be final, subject to the right of appeal' therein given; provides( section 16) that any applicant for a station license or the renewal of such a license, whoseapplication is refused by the commission, may appeal from such decision to the Court ofAppeals of the District of Columbia

We think it plain from this re sume of the pertinent parts of the act that the powersconfided to the commission respecting the granting and renewal of station licenses arepurely administrative, and that the provision for appeals to the Court of Appeals does nomore than make that court a superior and revising agency in the same field. The court'sprovince under that provision is essentially the same as its province under the legislationwhich up to a recent date permitted appeals to it from administrative decisions of theCommissioner of Patents.

ISSUE:Our jurisdiction to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is challenged.

HELD: A proceeding in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia under the Radio Act

of 1927, to review an order of the Radio Commission refusing an application for therenewal of an existing license for full time operation of a broadcasting station, is not a caseor controversy within the meaning of the judiciary article of the Constitution, but is anadministrative proceeding, and the decision therein is not reviewable by this Court.

The court's province under that provision is essentially the same as its province under thelegislation which up to a recent date permitted appeals to it from administrative decisionsof the Commissioner of Patents


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'The decision of the Court of Appeals under section 9 of the act of 1905 2 is not a judicialjudgment. It is a mere administrative decision. It is merely an instruction to theCommissioner of Patents by a court which is made part of the machinery of the PatentOffice for administrative purposes.'

In the cases just cited, as also in others, it is recognized that the courts of the District ofColumbia are not created under the judiciary article of the Constitution but are legislativecourts, and therefore that Congress may invest them with jurisdiction of appeals andproceedings such as have been just described.

It was brought into being by the judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested withjudicial power only, and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases and controversiesfalling within the classes enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions which aremerely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which areessentially legislative or administrative.

MERALCO v PASAY TRANSPORTATION

Act No. 1446 above referred to is entitled. "An Act granting a franchise to Charles M. Swiftto construct, maintain, and operate an electric railway, and to construct, maintain, andoperate an electric light, heat, and power system from a point in the City of Manila in aneasterly direction to the town of Pasig, in the Province of Rizal." Section 11 of the Actprovides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person orcorporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of thegrantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such right ofway, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or

corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as aboard of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final."

Pursuant to said Act, MERALCO filed a petition before the court requesting the members ofthe SC sitting as board of arbitrators to fix the terms upon which certain transportationcompanies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Meralco.

Copies were sent to affected transportation companies including Pasay Tanspo

Examining the statutory provision which is here invoked, it is first noted that power isattempted to be granted to the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of

arbitrators and to the Supreme Court as an entity. It is next seen that the decision of amajority of the members of the Supreme Court is made final.

The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties' own choice. Asubmission to arbitration is a contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement may notoust the courts of jurisdiction of the matters submitted to arbitration. These are familiarrules which find support in articles 1820 and 1821 of the Civil Code.


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ISSUE:Whether or not the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitratorsthe decision of a majority of whom shall be final, can act in that capacity.

Held: The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of

power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised bythe Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise anypower or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected withthe administering of judicial functions.

The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required orauthorized to exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being defined inthe organic law of the government, and being all strictly judicial, Congress cannot requireor authorize the court to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other

duty.

Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court holds that section11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democraticgovernment constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for themembers of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majorityof whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result, themembers of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the matter.

DELEGATION TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Pelaez vs. The Auditor General

Facts:From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President FerdinandMarcos issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in theimplementation of said executive orders.Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:

The President may by executive order define the boundaryof any municipality andmay change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as thepublic welfare may require

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action toprohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the saidmunicipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 ofthe RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barriosmay not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of

Congress.


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If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create amunicipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units ofmunicipalities?

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred

from being created by the President.

He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such powerto create municipalities to the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the Presidentby virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.

HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to anotherbranch of the governmentthat said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,

carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of whichare sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in theperformance of his functions.

In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration ofpolicy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence ofevery law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means todetermine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond thescope of his authority.

Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or

bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does notmerely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives thePresident more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution.

The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and therespondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public fundsin implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalitiesreferred to.


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SUFFICINECY OF STANDARDS

People v. Rosenthal & Osmena

Facts:Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmea were founders and shareholders of the O.R.O.

Oil Company. The main objects and purposes of the company are to mine, refine, market,buy and sell petroleum, natural gas and other oil products.

Rosenthal and Osmea were found guilty by the RTC in two cases of selling their shares toindividuals without first obtaining the corresponding written permit or license from theInsular Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

This is in violation of Sections 2 & 5 of Act No. 2581, commonly known as the Blue Sky Law.

Section 2 of said law provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporationattempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character

whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the variousdocuments and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos.

On appeal, Rosenthal & Osmena argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional on three groundsone of which is:

1) That it constitutes undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular treasurer

Issue:WON the law is unconstitutional?

Held:The law is CONSTITUTIONAL.

The Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Treasurer to follow in reaching a decisionregarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit

The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person,partnership, association or corporation applying therefor has complied with the

provisions of this Act, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions

of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer whenthe provisions of Act 2581 have been complied with.

Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permitis expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation is in the public interest. Inview of the intention and purpose of Act 2581 to protect the public against speculative

schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky and against the sale of

stock infly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other likefraudulent exploitations, we hold that public interest in this case is a sufficient standard

to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuanceor cancellation of certificates or permits.


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The maxim delegatus non potest delegare or delegata potestas non potest delegare has

beenmade to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to theadoption, within certain limits, of the principle of subordinate legislation, in practically allmodern governments.

CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL

Facts: Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of National Abaca and Other FibersCorporation (NAFCO) with annual salary of P15,000.00. The NAFCO Board of Directorsgranted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner amounting to P1,650 for 1949.

On October 4, 1946, Republic Act No. 51 was approved authorizing the President of thePhilippines, among other things, to effect such reforms and changes in government ownedand controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy andefficiency in their operation Pursuant to this authority, the President on October 4, 1947,

promulgated Executive Order No. 93

This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the government enterprisecouncil under Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by NAFCO auditor andconcurred in by the Auditor general on two grounds:

a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting managers salary to P15,000/year.

b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.

It is argued, however, that Executive Order No. 93 is null and void because it is as an illegaldelegation of legislature power to executive, and was promulgated beyond the period ofone year limited in said law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over Government Ownedand Controlled Corporations (GOCC) implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null andvoid. And R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is Constitutional.

HELD: The rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard isestablished by the statute" there is no undue delegation.

Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the Philippines, among others, to makereforms and changes in government-controlled corporations, lays down a standard andpolicy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment ofthe free and independent government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity,economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed. ThePresident had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order inquestion which, tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation oflegislative power.


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People v. Jolliffe (1959)

Facts:William Ernest Jolliffe is a canadian, born in China, permanently residing in HK. Sonof former Chancellor of West China Union University and had been Trade Commissioner forCanada in Shanghai and HK. He made several trips to manila for business or to meet his

wife and children.

One day he came to Manila to collect on a debt from Woo. He was paid in cold cash whichhe hid under his shirt. On his way to his hotel room, he was acoosted by a secret serviceagent, Amanda Arimbay. The 4pcs of gold bullion and $100 travellers check was found onhim.

He does not deny he had no license to export the gold. He was arrested for violationg RA265: An act establishing the Central Bank of the Philippines

SEC 34: whenever anyone willfully violates this act or any order legally issued by Monetary

board, he shall be punished by imprisonment.

CB Circular 21: any person desiring to export gold bullions must obtain license fromCentral Bank

Jolliffe was arrested. He questioned validiy of Circular 21 for being an undue delegation oflegistlative power.

ISSUE:Whether or not CB 21 vaild?

HELD: Yes. The rule is that the delegated power, if the law authorizing the delegation

furnishes a reasonable standard which sufficiently marks the field within which theadministrator is to act so that it may be known wheteher he has kept within it incompliance with the legislative will.

In this case, Sec 74 of RA 265 conferred upon Monetary board and President the power: subject to licensing all transactions in gold and foreign exchange to protect the

international reserve of central bank take such apporpirate remedial measures to protect the international stability of the

peso

These powers must be exeriesed in relation to the objectives of the law creating the central

bank which is to maintain monetary stability & promoto a rising level of production,employment, and income.

These standards are sufficiently definite to vest in the deleagated authority the charactherof administraive details in the enforcment of the law.


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Balbuna v Secretary of Education

Facts:Members of the Jehovas Witnesses filed a petition for prohibition and mandamusbefore the CFI of Capiz against the Sec. of Education, et al. It was to prevent theenforcement of Dept. Order No. 8 issued pursuant to RA 1265 promulgating rules and

regulations for the conduct of the compulsory flag ceremony in all schools.

The facts are the same with the Gerona case. It allegedly denies them freedom of worshipand of speech, however, new issues have been raised this time such as:

it is an undue delegation of legislative power Is it unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power?

Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power

Held: The requirements in Sections 1 and 2 of the department order constitute an

adequate standard, to wit, simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of theNational Anthem.

Specifically, to observe daily flag ceromony which shall include the playing or singing of thePhilippine National Anthem and rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flagceremony.

In our opinion, the requirements above-quoted constitute an adequate standard, to wit,simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the National Anthem specially when contrasted with other standards heretofore upheld by the Courts: "publicinterest"

The Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no objection to thevalidity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down of standards and policythat will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency

To require the statute to establish in detail the manner of exercise of the delegated powerwould be to destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation is intended to achieve.


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A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States

Facts:In 1935 the FDR administration sought to regulate the poultry industry through theNational Industrial Recovery Act procured by the executive branch.

Section:3 of the Act authorized the President to approve codes of unfair competition for

trades and industries, and a violation of any code provision in any transaction in oraffecting interstate or foreign commerce was made a misdemeanor punishable by a fine.

The relevant portion of the law regulated the price of chickens as well as the eventual saleof unhealthy chickensUnder this regulation, Plaintiff was convicted of 18 counts of sellingunhealthy chickens.

Petitioners contended that the Code had been adopted pursuant to an unconstitutionaldelegation by Congress of legislative power.

Issue:Did Congress, in authorizing the codes of unfair competition establish thestandards of legal obligation, thereby performing its essential legislative function?

Held:No. The code-making authority conferred was an unconstitutional delegation oflegislative power.

Under Title 1, Section:1 of the Act there was a broad Declaration of Policy, and thePresidents approval of a code was simply conditioned on his finding that it would tend to

effectuate the policy of this title. The Act imposed no limitations on the scope of the new

laws, and there was a very wide field of legislative possibilities.

Section:3 of the Act was without precedent in that it supplied no standards for any trade,industry or activity. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorized the President tomake the codes to prescribe them. Congress made an unconstitutional delegation becauseit vested in the President a clearly legislative function without imposing necessarystandards and restrictions.


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PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION

EDU v ERICTA

Facts:

1. Assailed is the validity of the Reflector Law and Admin Order No. 2 which implements it.Under the law, a vehicle has to comply with the requirements of having reflective deviceprior to being registered at the LTO.

2. The respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorists, filed a suit for certiorariand prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act asan invalid exercise of the police power for being violative of the due process clause. This hefollowed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedythat, in the event that respondent Judge would hold said statute constitutional,Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner, now petitioner,

implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power.

Issue: W/N Reflector Law is unconstitutional, and w/n AO2 is valid

HELD:

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers thatCongress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of thegovernment, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairsparticipate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitutionto make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all

its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whetheror not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to thescope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate itsfunctions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope ofhis authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which thelegislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made betweendelegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what itshall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretionas to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no validobjection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying thelegislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at thevery least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay downfundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. Astandard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries andspecifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which thelegislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be


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carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuanceof the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.

The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objectionis easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be

implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.

It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land TransportationCode. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stressand emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of thischaracter. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as LandTransportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to andtranslate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been noabuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable,launched against it by respondent Galo.

CRUZ v YOUNGBERG

FACTS: Cruz filed for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent, StantonYoungberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for thelanding of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof.

The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits theimportation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.

Among other things in the allegation of the petition, it is asserted that "Act No. 3155 of the PhilippineLegislature was enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the introduction of cattle diseases intothe Philippine Islands from foreign countries, as shown by an explanatory note and text of SenateBill No. 328

SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five existing contracts for theimportation of cattle into this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall be strictly prohibited toimport, bring or introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from foreign countries: Provided,however, That at any time after said date, the Governor-General, with the concurrence of thepresiding officers of both Houses, may raise such prohibition entirely or in part if the conditions of thecountry make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to theagriculture and live stock of the lands.

The petitioner does not present any allegations in regard to Act No. 3052 to show its nullity orunconstitutionality though it appears clearly that in the absence of Act No. 3155 the former act wouldmake it impossible for the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry to grant the petitioner a permit

for the importation of the cattle without the approval of the head of the corresponding department.

Petitioner conteds that the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not,at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of thelegislative powers.

Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers?


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Held: No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarilyinvolves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to itsexecution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latterno valid objection can be made.

SOLICITOR GENERAL v MMA

FACTS: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the SC ruled

that (1) the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the

sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605; and, that (2) even the

confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it

allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission.

Several complaints were filed in the SC against the confiscation by police authorities of driver's licenses

and removal of license plates for alleged traffic violations. These sanctions were not among those that

may be imposed under PD 1605.

The Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detachthe license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or

obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."

The Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted

pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. There was no conflict between the decision and

the ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter.

The Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an

invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. It violated PD 1605 which does not permit, and so

impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic

violations in Metropolitan Manila.

ISSUE & HELD: WON Ordinance No. 11 is valid (NO)

RATIO:

The problem before the Court is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question the

SC must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

A municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not

be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate

trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.

PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for

traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the

Metropolitan Manila Commission, now the Metropolitan Manila Authority, to impose such sanctions.

Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power

from the national legislature. They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate

legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at


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all times the will of their principal. Here, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin,

cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.

The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose

sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits.

There is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the

imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they

cannot be imposed by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.

NOTE: SC emphasized that the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan

Manila area. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by RA 413 on the Commissioner of

Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction

therein prescribed, including those here questioned.

ALEGRE v COLLECTOR

FACTS:

Act No. 2380 entitled "An Act providing for the inspection, grading, and baling of abaca, maguey,sisal, and other fibers" was enacted by the Philippine Legislature. The PURPOSE and INTENT of thelaw was to provide in detail for the inspection grading and baling of abaca and other fibers, and fora uniform scale for grading, and to issue official certificates as to the kind and quality of the hemp,so that an intending purchaser from an examination of the certificates might be assured and knowthe grade and quality of the hemp offered for sale. It was later amended to provide for the creationof Philippines Fiber Inspection Service, which shall have charge of the classification, baling, andinspection of Philippine fibers

Alegre, who is engaged in the production of abaca and its exportation to foreign markets, applied tothe Collector of Customs for a permit to export 100 bales of abaca to England. However, hisapplication was denied and he was advised that he would not be permitted to export the abacawithout a certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board. Alegre filed a petition for a writ ofmandamus, alleging that the said certification of fibers and, in particular, sections 1772 and 1244of the Admin Code, are unconstitutional and void for the authority vested in the board is an unduedelegation of legislative power.

ISSUES: WoN the there is undue deleagtion of legislative power

DECISION: NO. It is a delegation of administrative power. The maxim that power conferred uponLegislature to make laws cannot be delegated to any other authority does not preclude the

Legislature from delegating any power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.

This means that the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles, whichare to control in given cases; but an administrative officer or body may be invested with the powerto apply principles. This is done not only to avoid confusion in the laws, but also not to misssufficiency both in provision and execution in an effort to detail and to particularizeIN OTHER WORDS, though legislative power cannot be delegated to boards and commissions, theLegislature may delegate to them administrative functions in carrying out the purposes of a statute


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and various governmental power for the more efficient administration of the laws. Congresslegislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable. However, the necessities of the casecompelled them to leave to executive officials the duty of bringing about the result pointed out bythe statute. To deny the power of Congress to delegate such a duty would amount to declaring thatthe power vested in Congress to regulate foreign commerce could not be efficaciously exerted

IN THIS CASE, the Legislature, by enacting Act No. 2380, is saying that before any hemp is exportedfrom the Philippines it must be inspected, graded and baled, and it has created a board for thatpurpose and vested it with the power and authority to do the actual work. Applying the principlesmentioned above, such a delegation is not a delegation of legislative power. Rather, it is a delegationof administrative power in the Fiber Board, to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. That isbecause in the very nature of things, the Legislature could not perform such tasks.

MUN. Of CARDONA v MUN. Of BINANGONAN

Facts: This action by the municipality of Cardona to prohibit the municipality of Binangonan fromexercising municipal authority over the barrios of Tatala, Balatik, Nambug, Tutulo, MahabangParang, Nagsulo, and Bonot. Municipality of Binangonan claims authority on the basis of ExecutiveOrder No. 66, series of 1914, issued by the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands on the 1stday of July, 1914. The plaintiff further alleges that the executive order referred to and above quotedand the Act under which it was issued are "unconstitutional" in that said Act confers on theGovernor-General legislative authority. The Municipality of Cardona also claims that the EO is voidbecause it does not contain a statement that the change in the division line between the saidmunicipalities was required by the public good; and that it does not appear in said order itself thatthere was a present urgency requiring the promulgation of such an order.

Issue: Whether the said Executive Order of the Governor General confers an authority to fix theboundary line of a certain municipality?

Held: We do not think that plaintiff's objections are well founded. No reason has been given why theAct is unconstitutional and no argument or citation of authorities has been presented on thatsubject. Every Act of the legislature is presumed to be constituted until the contrary is clearlyshown; and no showing of unconstitutionality having been made in this case, the objection to theorder of the Governor-General based on that ground must be overruled.

The other two objections are frivolous. Although it be admitted, for the sake of argument, that theGovernor-General ought not to make such an order unless the public good requires it, that fact neednot be stated in the order. The same may be said with regard to its urgency. The Governor-Generalhaving full authority to promulgate such an order this court will assume, if it should act on thematter at all, that there was public necessity therefor and that the matter was of such urgency asproperly to evoke action by the Chief Executive.


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CALALANG v WILLIAMS

Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend tothe Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications thatanimal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from PlazaCalderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30

p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to EchagueStreet, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the ColganteBridge to traffic.

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director ofPublic Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of theprovisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with theapproval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules andregulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. It was later modified andapproved to the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portionthereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street.The Mayor ofManila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rulesand regulations thus adopted.

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before theSupreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of theNational Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as ActingSecretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila;and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila

Issues: Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power?

Held: There is no undue deleagation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer

legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and underwhich they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine whatpublic policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the NationalAssembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and

streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of thePresident of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic whenever

the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the publicconvenience and interest.

The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, butmerely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law isto be predicated.

To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and howlong a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the trafficthereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative functionwhich cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.

It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty ofdetermining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that theexercise of such discretion is the making of the law.


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EASTERN SHIPPING v POEA

FACTS: A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint forcharges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No. 2,issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers.

ESL questioned the validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA topromulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents anexercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Issuance of the Memorandum is a violation of non-delegation of powers.

HELD:No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No.797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shallpromulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functionsof the Administration (POEA)."

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what thelaw shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. Thisprerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularlyapplicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and theirattendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to

entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions ofthe statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by"filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as theimplementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulationshave the force and effect of law.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislativepower:

1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves thelegislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out theboundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, whois not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.


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OSMENA v ORBOS

" To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of the power to tax, there must be a standard whichimplies that the legislature determines matter of principle and lays down fundamental policy."

FACTS: Senator John Osmea assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, as amended

by EO 137, empowering the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase of fuel pricesor impose additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue to the Oil PriceStabilization Fund (OPSF) established for the reimbursement to ailing oil companies in the event ofsudden price increases. The petitioner avers that the collection on oil products establishments is anundue and invalid delegation of legislative power to tax. Further, the petitioner points out that sincea 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State, such amountsbelong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which itwas created. It thus appears that the challenge posed by the petitioner is premised primarily on theview that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of thetaxation power of the State.

ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation?

HELD: None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they areexacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a special fund isplain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; andwhile it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonethelessremains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA.

The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "specialfund." With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that theprovision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleumproducts provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the

general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domesticpump rates, P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment theresources of the Fund.

What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or "a specificlimit on how much to tax." 19 The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on thepremise that what is involved here is the power of taxation; but as already discussed, this is not thecase. What is here involved is not so much the power of taxation as police power. Although theprovision authorizing the ERB to impose additional amounts could be construed to refer to thepower of taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable thedelegate to act with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced by thepolice power of the State.

The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors involved in the determination of theprice of oil and petroleum products, and the frequently shifting need to either augment or exhaustthe Fund, do not conveniently permit the setting of fixed or rigid parameters in the law as proposedby the petitioner. To do so would render the ERB unable to respond effectively so as to mitigate oravoid the undesirable consequences of such fluidity. As such, the standard as it is expressed,suffices to guide the delegate in the exercise of the delegated power, taking account of thecircumstances under which it is to be exercised.


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For a valid delegation of power, it is essential that the law delegating the power must be (1)complete in itself, that is it must set forth the policy to be executed by the delegate and (2) it mustfix a standard limits of whichare sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform.

This Court thus finds no serious impediment to sustaining the validity of the legislation; the express

purpose for which the imposts are permitted and the general objectives and purposes of the fundare readily discernible, and they constitute a sufficient standard upon which the delegation ofpower may be justified.

GUINGONA v CARAGE

The 1990 budget totals P233.5B in automatic appropriation. It consists of P155.3B appropriated byCongress under RA6831 (General Appropriations Act of 1990 or GAA 1990), of which 27B will go toDECS, the highest among all departments; and P98.4B in automatic appropriations (P86B for debtservicing) pursuant to:PD81 (which amends RA4860, Foreign Borrowing Act),PD1177 (entitledRevising the Budget Process in Orderto Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the NewSociety), and PD1967 (An Act Strengthening the Guarantee andPayment Positions of the Rep. of the Phil. On Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent andGuaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds for the Purpose)

Petitioners state said decrees violate Section 29(l) of Article VI of the Constitution which providesas follows

Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriationmade by law.

They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, otherwiseit is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the

amount appropriated for the debt service.

ISSUES: W/N there is undue delegation of legislative power

HELD: On the third issue that there is undue delegation of legislative power, in Edu vs. Ericta,14 thisCourt had this to say

What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter andrepeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it leavesthe hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislativepower, the inequity must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. Thelegislature does not abdicate its function when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it,

and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way inwhich legislative process can go forward . . .

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation there must be a standard, which implies at the very leastthat the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy . . .

The standard may be either express or implied . . . from the policy and purpose of the act consideredas whole . . .


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In People vs. Vera,15 this Court said "the true distinction is between the delegation of power tomake the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what the law shall be, and conferringauthority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. Thefirst cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."

Ideally, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the

legislature so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him exceptenforce it. If there are gaps in the law that will prevent its enforcement unless they are first filled,the delegate will then have been given the opportunity to step in the shoes of the legislature andexercise a discretion essentially legislative in order to repair the omissions. This is invaliddelegation.16

The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms andconditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.

The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of thePhilippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans,credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the needto enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose of these lawsis to enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect andmaintain the credit standing of the country.

Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated bythe very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by thelegislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to theamounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxesand other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds,debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred

by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executiveimplementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of theTreasury.indebtedness. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be theexact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury.

Section 29(1), Article 6 merely states that appropriation should be made by law. It does not provideor prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which authorization orappropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be done by law. This is precisely what thedecrees did, it made appropriations by law

ere being no undue delegation of legislative power as clearly above shown, petitioners insistnevertheless that subject presidential decrees constitute undue delegation of legislative power to

the executive on the alleged ground that the appropriations therein are not exact, certain ordefinite, invoking in support therefor the Constitution of Nebraska, the constitution under whichthe case of State v. Moore, 69 NW 974, cited by petitioners, was decided. Unlike the Constitution ofNebraska, however, our Constitution does not require a definite, certain, exact or "specificappropriation made by law." Section 29, Article VI of our 1987 Constitution omits any of thesewords and simply states:

Section 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriationmade by law.


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More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes anyparticular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation byCongress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization orappropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons,an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly

for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as saidappropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorizationmay be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions oflaws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes,such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intentionclearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P.272), whether in the past or in the present.

Documents

Admin Digests 120715.pdf