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Takeoff and Departure Operations

Preventing Tailstrike at TakeoffFlight Operations Briefing Notes

Flight Operations Briefing Notes


Preventing Tailstrike at Takeoff

I Introduction

A tailstrike occurs if the tail of an aircraft touches the runway during takeoff or landing.It can occur with any type of aircraft although long aircraft may be more prone totailstrike, because tailstrike occurrence is directly related to pitch attitude versus

aircraft geometry and main landing gear status.

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II.2 Operational Consequences

Flight crewmembers may not always be aware that a tailstrike has occurred at takeoff,because the impact may not be felt. Analysis of in-service events indicates that,in some cases, the tail scraped the runway, so gently, that it was not detected bythe flight crew. In such cases, the flight crew may be alerted of a suspected tailstrikeby passengers, cabin crewmembers, crew from other aircraft near the runway, ATC orground personnel.

As a result, the flight crew will then be aware that the fuselage skin is probablydamaged, and that the cabin must, therefore, not be pressurized. Cabin vertical speedtherefore may become the same as aircraft vertical speed, which should then be limitedfor passenger comfort.

Flight at an altitude that requires a pressurized cabin must be avoided, and a diversionto a suitable airport must be performed so that damage assessment can take place.

N o t e : In the event of a tailstrike, refer to the applicable FCOM procedure.

III Operational and Human Factors Involved in Tailstrikes at Takeoff

Analysis of in-service events highlights that the following factors may reduce, whencombined, the tail clearance margin (i.e. distance between the aircraft tail andthe ground) at takeoff:

Early rotation

Rotation technique

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N o t e :

More information on operational and human factors affecting takeoff speed computationand utilization is available in the Flight Operations Briefing NoteUnderstanding TakeoffSpeeds.

III.2

Rotation Technique

Rotation rates that are too fast increase the risk of tailstrike, whereas rotation ratesthat are too slow increase the takeoff distance and takeoff run.

If the established rotation rate is not satisfactory, the pilot must avoid rapid and largecorrections, which cause sharp reaction in pitch from the aircraft.

If, to increase the rotation rate, a further and late aft sidestick (or control column, asapplicable) input is made around the time of liftoff, the possibility of a tailstrike issignificantly increased. This is especially a risk on aircraft that may have a large inertia(e.g. long aircraft) since the initial rotation rate produced by a given sidestick (or

control column, as applicable) input takes time to build up (when the rotation rate hasdeveloped, it remains relatively constant for a stick position).

For long aircraft, the sensory feedback provided to the flight crew, during rotation, isdifferent to that provided for shorter aircraft due to the length of the fuselage and itsflexibility:

The aircraft is longer, therefore for a same rotation rate, the local verticalacceleration sensed by the flight crew is higher.

D t th fl ibilit f th i ft fi tl th il t d l i th t ti
http://www.airbus.com/store/mm_repository/safety_library_items/att00003116/media_object_file_FLT_OPS-TOFF_DEP_SEQ07.pdfhttp://www.airbus.com/store/mm_repository/safety_library_items/att00003116/media_object_file_FLT_OPS-TOFF_DEP_SEQ07.pdfhttp://www.airbus.com/store/mm_repository/safety_library_items/att00003116/media_object_file_FLT_OPS-TOFF_DEP_SEQ07.pdfhttp://www.airbus.com/store/mm_repository/safety_library_items/att00003116/media_object_file_FLT_OPS-TOFF_DEP_SEQ07.pdfhttp://www.airbus.com/store/mm_repository/safety_library_items/att00003116/media_object_file_FLT_OPS-TOFF_DEP_SEQ07.pdfhttp://www.airbus.com/store/mm_repository/safety_library_items/att00003116/media_object_file_FLT_OPS-TOFF_DEP_SEQ07.pdf

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For a given configuration, the lower the VR the higher the risk of tailstrike.The minimum VR is determined by VMU, therefore, when VMU appears as the limit inthe computed takeoff speeds, the tailstrike margin is reduced.

III.5

Erroneous CG Position / Trim Setting

The main purpose of the pitch trim setting for takeoff is to provide consistent rotationcharacteristics. If, for any reason, the trim setting does not match the CG position,

the aircraft will not rotate as usual (Figure 1):

With a forward CG or the pitch trim erroneously set to the nose-down direction,the flight crew will notice that the aircraft is heavy to rotate, and that aircraftrotation will be very slow in response to the usual takeoff control input

With an aft CG or the pitch trim erroneously set to the nose-up direction, the flight

crew might have to counteract an early autorotation, until VR is reached.

Takeoff TrimGreen Band

Aircraft heavyto rotate

OOuutt ooffttrriimmaatt FFWWDD CCGG

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III.7

IV

IV.1

Shock Absorber Oleo Inflation

The correct extension of the main landing gear shock absorber (and thereforethe nominal increase in tail clearance during rotation) relies on the correct inflation ofthe oleos. An under inflated oleo-pneumatic shock absorber will decrease the tailclearance.

Preventive Strategies and Lines of Defense

Preflight

Takeoff Flaps Configuration

When performance limits the takeoff weight, the flight crew uses the maximum thrustavailable and select the configuration that provides the highest takeoff weight.

When the actual takeoff weight is lower than the maximum permitted weight, the flightcrew uses a flexible takeoff thrust. For a given aircraft weight, several flapconfigurations are possible. Usually, the flight crew selects the configuration thatprovides the maximum flexible temperature, in order to increase the engine lifespan.

N o t e :

The first degrees of flexible thrust have an impact on maintenance costs about 5 times

higher than the last one.

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N o t e :

The verification of the oleo-pneumatic shock absorbers is performed bythe maintenance personnel. There are no means to check that the pressure is correct,during the pilot external inspection. However, the flight crew should check for

asymmetry between both landing gears, and for any visible hydraulic leak.

IV.2

Crew Rotation Technique

At VR, the flight crew should initiate the rotation with a smooth positive backwardsidestick (or control column) input in order to achieve a continuous rotation rate ofapproximately 3/sec. Avoid aggressive and sharp inputs.

The higher the inertia of the aircraft is (e.g. long aircraft), the more it is importantto initiate the rotation with a smooth positive nose up order.

Figure 2 indicates the sequence for a standard takeoff. However, flightcrewmembers should keep in mind that this sequence can vary depending on

the scenario (e.g. windshear), and the PF should be ready to react in any abnormalsituation.

POWER SET

Aircraft rollingStick half forward

80 kts 100 Kts

Release stick to neutral

ROTATE

towards pitch targetWhen airborne, follow SRS

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IV.3

V

Training Programs

Tailstrike prevention should be part of the recurrent training program due to the factthat many flight crew actions can be improved to help minimize the risk of a tailstrike.

Airbus has released a new document, in electronic format called Tailstrike Avoidance

e-briefing.

The Airbus e-briefing provides various types of information in a single document, forpilot self-education and/or instructors briefing, including: Text, video (e.g. rotationtechnique), powerpoint presentations and audios.

Relevant technical data in the Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM), such as aircraftgeometry limits or pitch attitude after liftoff, also provides an awareness of the aircraftcharacteristics, which helps to avoid a tailstrike.

Summary of Key Points

The following key points will help to reduce the risk of tailstrike at takeoff:

Visually check for any asymmetry between both landing gears and for any visibilehydraulic leak, before the flight

Carefully crosscheck the takeoff data with other flight crewmember

Select the appropriate flaps setting option; consider using a higher flaps

configuration

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VI

Associated Flight Operations Briefing Notes

The following Flight Operations Briefing Notes provide complementary information andcan be consulted to obtain a complete overview on the subject of tailstrike avoidance at

takeoff:

Understanding Takeoff Speeds

Conducting Effective Briefings

Standard Calls

VII

VIII

Airbus References

Flight Crew Operating Manual Bulletins (All Airbus aircraft) Avoiding Tailstrikes

A318/A319/A320/A321 & A330/A340 Flight Crew Training Manuals NormalOperations Takeoff Tailstrike Avoidance

A330/A340 e-briefing Tailstrike Avoidance

Additional Reading Materials / Websites References

Flight Safety Foundation Accident Prevention May 2005

N o t e :

This doc ment is a ailable on the Flight Safet Fo ndation ebsite
http://www.airbus.com/store/mm_repository/safety_library_items/att00003116/media_object_file_FLT_OPS-TOFF_DEP_SEQ07.pdfhttp://www.airbus.com/store/mm_repository/safety_library_items/att00003109/media_object_file_FLT_OPS-SOP-SEQ06.pdfhttp://www.airbus.com/store/mm_repository/safety_library_items/att00003109/media_object_file_FLT_OPS-SOP-SEQ06.pdfhttp://www.airbus.com/store/mm_repository/safety_library_items/att00003106/media_object_file_FLT_OPS-SOP-SEQ04.pdfhttp://www.airbus.com/store/mm_repository/safety_library_items/att00003106/media_object_file_FLT_OPS-SOP-SEQ04.pdfhttp://www.airbus.com/store/mm_repository/safety_library_items/att00003109/media_object_file_FLT_OPS-SOP-SEQ06.pdfhttp://www.airbus.com/store/mm_repository/safety_library_items/att00003116/media_object_file_FLT_OPS-TOFF_DEP_SEQ07.pdf

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Landing Techniques

Preventing Tailstrikes at LandingFlight Operations Briefing Notes

Flight Operations Briefing Notes

Landing Techniques

Preventing Tailstrike at Landing

I Introduction

A tailstrike occurs when the tail of an aircraft touches the runway during takeoff orlanding. It can occur with any type of aircraft, although tailstrikes occur more oftenwith long aircraft, because tailstrike occurrence is directly related to pitch attitudeversus aircraft geometry, and the status of main landing gear extension.

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Landing Techniques


Although most of landing tailstrikes are due to deviations from normal landingtechniques, some are associated with external conditions, such as turbulence and windgradient.

II.2 Operational Consequences

Tailstrikes at landing generally cause more damage than tailstrikes at takeoff becausethe tail may strike the runway before the main gear, and cause damage to the aft

pressure bulkhead.

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Landing Techniques


The following factors increase the probability of a tailstrike during landing (Figure 2):

Figure 2

Operational & Human Factors Involved in Tailstrikes at Landing

Prolongedhold-off for a

smooth

touchdown

A decrease in speed

(well below Vapp)before the flare

Sink rate too high just

before the aircraft reaches

the flare height

Flare too high

Crosswinds not handled correctly

Bounce at touchdown

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Landing Techniques


Flare Too High

A flare that is too high can result in a combination of decreased airspeed and a longfloat. Since both increase the aircrafts pitch attitude, the result is reduced tailclearance.

Prolonged Hold-Off for a Smooth Touchdown

As the pitch attitude increases, the flight crew must assess the aircrafts position inrelation to the ground.

Bounce at Touchdown

In the case of a bounce at touchdown, the flight crew may decide to increase the pitchattitude, to ensure a smooth second touchdown. If the bounce results from a firm

touchdown associated with a high pitch rate, it is important for the flight crew to controlthe pitch, so that it does not continue to increase.

Crosswinds Not Handled Correctly

When the aircraft is close to the ground, the wind velocity tends to decrease, andthe wind direction tends to turn (direction in degrees decreasing in northern latitudes).

The flight crew must be aware that during the approach phase, and especially duringthe flare, a crosswind effect could suddenly increase the pitch of the aircraft, and resultin tailstrike.

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Landing Techniques


PNF callouts during the final approach are essential to alert the PF of any excessivedeviation of flight parameters, and/or excessive pitch attitude at landing. Followinga PNF flight parameter exceedance callout, the suitable PF response will be to:

Acknowledge the PNF callout, for proper crew coordination purposes

Take immediate corrective action to control the exceeded parameter back intothe defined stabilized conditions

Assess whether stabilized conditions will be recovered early enough prior to landing,

otherwise initiate a go-around.

Flare

The flight crew should adapt the flare height to the aircraft inertia: It is imperative that

the aircraft reaches the flare height at the appropriate airspeed and flight path angle.

The aircraft should be in trim at the start of the flare. For A300/A310/A300-600aircraft, the flight crew should avoid the use of pitch trim during the flare, or after

touchdown.

During the flare, the flight crew should concentrate on the pitch and roll attitude, usingexternal visual cues.

Finally, the flight crew should set the pitch rate to zero prior touchdown.

Landing

The flight crew should avoid holding off the aircraft in an attempt to make

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Landing Techniques


Continue the landing

Keep thrust at idle

Be aware of the increased landing distance.

In case of a more severe bounce, the flight crew should not attempt to land, becausethe remaining runway length might not be sufficient to stop the aircraft.

For more information, refer to the Flight Operations Briefing NoteBounce Recovery

Rejected Landing.
http://www.airbus.com/store/mm_repository/safety_library_items/att00004746/media_object_file_FLT_OPS-LAND-SEQ09.pdfhttp://www.airbus.com/store/mm_repository/safety_library_items/att00004746/media_object_file_FLT_OPS-LAND-SEQ09.pdfhttp://www.airbus.com/store/mm_repository/safety_library_items/att00004746/media_object_file_FLT_OPS-LAND-SEQ09.pdfhttp://www.airbus.com/store/mm_repository/safety_library_items/att00004746/media_object_file_FLT_OPS-LAND-SEQ09.pdfhttp://www.airbus.com/store/mm_repository/safety_library_items/att00004746/media_object_file_FLT_OPS-LAND-SEQ09.pdf

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Landing Techniques


V Summary of Key Points

The following key points will help the flight crew to reduce the risk of tailstrike atlanding:

Fly a stabilized approach (i.e. pitch, thrust, flight path angle, VAPP)

Do not chase the glide slope when close to the ground, and carefully monitor

the pitch and sink rate Adapt the flare height to the aircraft inertia

Reinforce PNF callouts during final approach to prevent excessive deviation of flightparameters (e.g. high sink rate when close to the ground, a decrease in speedbelow VAPP, etc.)

Maintain the pitch attitude prior to touch down

Do not hold off the aircraft to make an extra smooth landing

Do not wait to bring the nose wheel to the ground just after main landing geartouchdown

Avoid increasing the pitch, or letting the pitch increase (e.g. ground spoilers effect)after a bounce.

Perform a walk-around inspection to detect any marks that might have resulted froma tailstrike that was not noticed during the landing.

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Landing Techniques


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Avoiding Tail StrikeAvoiding Tail Strike

Operational Liaison Meeting FBW aircraf

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4 ContentContent

z Statistics

z Most common causes

z Factors affecting the margins

z Aircraft design featuresz Operational recommendations

z Conclusions

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4 StatisticsStatistics

Total number of events

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

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10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Cumulative number of events per million d

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64%

25%

9% 2%

Per flight phases:

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Events at T/O per million of departures

4

6

8

10

12

14

1618

20

A320

A321

SA

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Events at landing per million of departures

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

A320

A321

SA

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4 Most Common CausesMost Common Causes

z At takeoff Excessive rotation rate

Increasing rotation rate, rotation in two steps

Premature rotation VR computation error

Over-rotation

Improper use of FD pitch command barAggressive rotation into FD pitch bar

Improper pitch trim setting

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z At landing

Unstable approach

Large thrust and pitch attitude variations

Too high sink rate close to the ground

Too low airspeed and high pitch attitude

Flare/landing technique

Improper flare initiation height Too high, leading to significant speed drop

Too low, leading to high pitch rate

improper anticipation of aircraft inertia

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z At landing (contd)

Turbulence, wind shear/downburst

Bouncing at landing

Pitch rate not stopped after touchdown

Aft stick order not released

Pitch up effect at spoiler extension not controlle

Pitch increase, attempting to smooth the second

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4 Factors affecting the marginsFactors affecting the margins

Ground Clearance Geometry

Pitch attitude to ground c

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4Factors affecting the margins (Takeoff)Factors affecting the margins (Takeoff)

The rotation speed VR :Margin increases with VR / VR min , and V2

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4 Factors affecting the margins (TakeFactors affecting the margins (Takeo

Performance

takeoff

Performance

takeoff

Typical in-service

Ris

tai

Pitch angle

Back stick

Sidestickin pitch Time

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4 Factors affecting the margins (TakeFactors affecting the margins (Takeo

z Other factors to be considered at TO Thrust to weight ratio

margin is decreasing with more FLEX

Configuration is not a factor for same rota But for the same side stick input, the margin inc

flaps

Large lateral side stick input Spoilers extension modify the lift to AOA ratio, t

margin

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4 Factors affecting the margin (LandinFactors affecting the margin (Landin

The airspeed at touchdown The flare technique

AircraftGeometry limit at

touchdown

Pitch attitude attouchdown(Vapp - 8)

Cle

A319 15.5 7.7

A320 13.5 7.6

A321 11.2 6.6

*

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4 Factors affecting the margin (LandinFactors affecting the margin (Landin

z Other factors to be considered at landing High and increasing pitch rate at touch do

Large lateral side stick inputs

Excessive vertical speed

Aircraft inertia

Thrust reduction height

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4 Aircraft design featuresAircraft design features

z Properly designed direct law for TO: Pitch rate damping on all Airbus FBW exc

z In addition for A340-600:

Take-offRotation Law

Automatic pitch trim setting, function of C

start and for touch-and-go

TRIM SETTING DISAGREE ECAM mess

CONFIG (comparison of MCDU PERF T/

actual pitch trim setting and CG from FCM

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GainPitch rate-

Direct law

PitchRA

-

Tail distanceprotection

Ga

integ

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z Pitch limit i

provided: At take-o

From po

3 sec af

Maximu

optimize

14 (for

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4 Operational recommendationsOperational recommendations

z For takeoff Cross check TO speeds and trim setting

Be aware of turbulence

Initiate rotation at VR (not before)

Make a positive side stick input to initiate

rotation rate

it is always better to release the stick if the rotat

never add pitch up input when the rotation rate

Adapt the rotation rate to circumstances

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z For landing Fly a stabilised approach (pitch, thrust, fli

Do not chase the G/S close to the ground

Progressively give priority to the pitch and the s

Adapt the flare height to the aircraft inertia

Monitor the global energy

Co-ordinate thrust reduction with speed, verticatouchdown with thrust at idle

Zero the pitch rate prior touch down

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z Bouncing Freeze the pitch attitude

pitch up effect of spoiler extension may have to

Do not attempt to soften the second touch Increasing the pitch

Adding thrust

If the bounce is too large: Initiate a go around maintaining the pitch attitud

Do not attempt to avoid a temporary touch down

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Reinforcement of PNF specific call outs for excess

pitch attitude on take off and landing

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4 ConclusionsConclusions

Apply proper rotation technique at take of

Fly a stabilized approach

Avoid excessive sink rate close to the gro

Control the pitch in case of bounce

Enhance pitch awareness

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4 ConclusionsConclusions

z During transition training course (standarrecurrent training, outline the following fa

Specific geometry limits

Specific TO rotation technique

Specific flare and derotation technique

PNF pitch attitude monitoring

z Refer to SOP and FCOM Bulletins

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4

I hope it will not

happen to me!

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So how does it handle wind? It doesn't, youdo. If you start on profile, as you descend,you'll notice that a large tailwind will trend togive an answer less than the track miles torun on the bottom of the FPLN page. So youneed to modify the profile with more speed,speedbrake or more track miles.

A large headwind would require the use of

60nm 300kt

48nm 300kt F110

10kft / 30nm

15kft / 45nm

20kft / 60nm

25kft / 75nm

How to Monitor the Descent - Descent Profile Management

Notional 3 G/S at VAPP

3 x profile + delta V

4 x profile

At ToD, multiply FL by 4; this gives notional Dmultiplied by 3 = notional 3 G/S distance. (Y

should be altitude divided by 3 but multiplicatwash!!)

Continue with FL x 4 at 300kt down to FL150above VAPP (call it 150kt for simplicity), pink li

F130 at 300kt with a VAPP of 140kt (KISS = 1(13 x 3) + (150/10) = 39 + 15 = 54nmNow look at the FPLN distance to go; compa54nm, say 49nm, you're high by 3 times the d

So now we sF110 at 250(11 x 3) + 10when crossi

Use speedb

attain profile

80nm 300kt

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PFPF PNFPNFCommon LR

UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION

LR - Version 01e

IAS Fluctuations

Flight parameters abnormal correlation

Abnormal AP/FD/ATHR behavior

Undue stall warning or overspeed warning

When indicated speed aerodynamic noise

When indicated speed aerodynamic noise

Suspect unreliable

speed indication

WrongWrongAP / FD

WrongOKFPV

WrongOKV/S

WrongOKALT

WrongWrongIndicated speed / Mach

sta t ic P i t o t F a i lu re

P r o b e s s c h e m a t i c

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PFPF PNFPNFCommon LR1. PITOT PROBES BLOCKED

FLIGHT IS FROZEN TO PERMIT THE PROCEDURE APPLICATION ON THE M/FTD

DETECTION

FLIES THE AIRCRAFT

NAVIGATES

CONSIDER AUTOMATION USE

E C A M A C TIO N S

DECISION

ECAM PROCEDURE

SYSTEM DISPLAY

STATUS

RETURN TO NORM AL TASK SHARING

LD G D I S TLDG DIST

WEATHERWEATHER

OPERATIONAL AND

COMMERCIAL

CONSIDERATIONS

OPERATIONAL AND

COMMERCIALCONSIDERATIONS

NOTIFYNOTIFY

DECISIONDECISION

OPS OPS

PURSER /PAXPURSER /PAX

ATCATC

STATUS,or

SUMMARY

PFCOMMUNICATES

Check IAS indications

All indications may be c o n s i s t e n t

BUT equally u n r e lia b le !

ALT

V/S

FPV

Remain c o r r e c t

in this case

A330 / A340-600 : A340-300 :

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PROBES SCHEMATIC

ADR 1 ADR 3 ADR 2

Normal display

Reconfigurations

CAPT

probes

STBY

probes

F/O

probes

PFD 1 PFD 2

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DETECTION

FLIES THE AIRCRAFT

NAVIGATES


E C A M A C TIO N S

DECISION

ECAM PROCEDURE

SYSTEM DISPLAY

STATUS



WEATHERWEATHER

OPERATIONAL AND

COMMERCIAL

CONSIDERATIONS

OPERATIONAL AND


NOTIFYNOTIFY

DECISIONDECISION

OPS OPS


ATCATC

STATUS,or

SUMMARY

PFCOMMUNICATES

Check the 3 airspeed indications



ADR 1

ADR 3

ADR 2

SPEED > VFEFWC

SPEED > VFE OR

SPEED > VFE

At least one ADR speed > VFE or VMO/MMO OVERSPEED warning

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PFPF PNFPNFA330/A340-600


MEMORY ITEMS

B e l o w T H R R E D A L T : TOGA/15

THRUST/PITCH A b o v e T H R R E D A L T : CL/10 Below FL 100

CL/5 Above FL 100

AP.OFF

FD.OFF

A/THR..OFF

FLAPSMAINTAIN CURRENT CONFIG

SPEEDBRAKESCHECK RETRACTED

L/G.UP WHEN AIRBONE

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PFPF PNFPNFA340-300


MEMORY ITEMS

B e l o w T H R R E D A L T : TOGA/12.5

THRUST/PITCH A b o v e T H R R E D A L T : CL/10 Below FL 100

CL/5 Above FL 100

AP.OFF

FD.OFF

A/THR..OFF

FLAPSMAINTAIN CURRENT CONFIG

SPEEDBRAKESCHECK RETRACTED

L/G.UP WHEN AIRBONE

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PFPF PNFPNFCommon LRCommon LR1. PITOT PROBES BLOCKED


DETECTION

FLIES THE AIRCRAFT

NAVIGATES


E C A M A C TIO N S

DECISION

ECAM PROCEDURE

SYSTEM DISPLAY

STATUS



WEATHERWEATHER

OPERATIONAL AND

COMMERCIAL

CONSIDERATIONS

OPERATIONAL AND


NOTIFYNOTIFY

DECISIONDECISION

OPS OPS


ATCATC

STATUS,or

SUMMARY

PFCOMMUNICATES




ALT

V/S

FPV


in this case

A330 / A340-600 : A340-300 :

QRH

2.00

A D R c h e c k p r o c

&

Un r e l ia b le sp e e d i n d i c a t i o n

Revert to pitch / thrust setting

references

Any doubt regarding speed indication

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DETECTION

FLIES THE AIRCRAFT

NAVIGATES


E C A M A C TIO N S

DECISION

ECAM PROCEDURE

SYSTEM DISPLAY

STATUS



WEATHERWEATHER

OPERATIONAL AND

COMMERCIAL

CONSIDERATIONS

OPERATIONAL AND


NOTIFYNOTIFY

DECISIONDECISION

OPS OPS


ATCATC

STATUS,or

SUMMARY

PFCOMMUNICATES




ALT

V/S

FPV


in this caseALT

GSAvailable on GPS

A330 / A340-600 : A340-300 :

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ECAM PHILOSOPHY

LR - Version 02b

SITUATION ASSESSMENT / DECISION

DETECTION

E C A M A C TION S

E CA M P ROCE DURE

SYSTEM DISPLAY ( i f r e q u i r e d )

STATUS

LDG DISTLD G D IST

WEATHERWEATHER

OPERATIONAL AND


OPERATIONAL AND


NOTIFYNOTIFY

DECISIONDECISION

OPS OPS


ATCATC

STATUS,or

SUMMARY

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F i r s t p i l o t w h o n o t i c e s :

MASTER CAUTION/MASTER WARNINGRESETANNOUNCE.....TITLE OF FAILURE

FLIES THE AIRCRAFT

NAVIGATES

1. DETECTION

If failure at takeoff:

400ft AGLNO ACTION unti l , with safe f l ight path established.

CONSIDER AUTOMATION USE : A/THR, AP

LRLR

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PFPF PNFPNFCommon LR2. ECAM PROCEDURE

ORDER.ECAM ACTIONS

ECAM ACTIONS COMPLETE.CHECK

CONFIRM. CLEAR name of SYS?

ECAM ....CONFIRM (using SD

and overhead panel)

ECAM ACTIONS.PERFORM

REQUESTCLEAR name of SYS?

ECAM..CLEAR

Both pilots should confirmirreversible/guarded actions

This is to be repeated for each failure displayed on theECAM.

Example :

LAND ASAP

*Task sharing:As soon as he announced ECAMACTIONS, the PF is in charge ofcommunications, until all the ECAM

actions have been completed.PF

A330 A340

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PFPF PNFPNFCommon LR3. SYSTEM DISPLAY Analysis

CONFIRM CLEAR name of SYS?

SYSTEM PAGE DISPLAYED.ANALYSE

REQUEST...CLEAR name of SYS?

SYSTEM DISPLAY..CLEAR

This is to be repeated until all the displayed system pageshave been reviewed, and the STATUS page is displayed.

I f a SYST EM page is displayed on the lower ECAM screen:

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PFPF PNFPNFCommon LR4. STATUS

CONFIRM..READ STATUS

CONFIRMCLEAR STATUS

REQUEST...STATUS?

STATUS .....READ

LIMITATIONS.....CHECK

PROC.....CONSIDER

LANDING DIST&SPEED INCREMENT..CHECKINOP SYS....CHECK

REQUESTCLEAR STATUS ?

STATUSCLEARANNOUNCEECAM ACTIONS COMPLETED

Landing distance and approach speed

computation:

For complex procedures (dual hydraulicfailure or electrical emergency

configuration): Use SUMMARY

For other cases:

Review FCOM procedure:

3

Applying ECAM procedure ensures

flight safety.However, referring to FCOM 3.02, if

t i m e p e r m i t s , may provide useful

additional information.

02ABN

-

EMER

RETURN TO NORMAL TASK SHA RING

QRH

1.00

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PFPF PNFPNFCommon LR5. SITUATION ASSESSMENT/DECISION

LDG DISTLDG DIST

WEATHERWEATHER

OPERATIONAL ANDCOMMERCIAL

CONSIDERATIONS

OPERATIONAL ANDCOMMERCIAL

CONSIDERATIONS

NOTIFYNOTIFY

DECISIONDECISION

OPS OPS

PURSER / PAXPURSER / PAX

ATCATC

STATUS, or

SUMMARY

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PFPF PNFPNFCommon LR6. SYNTHESIS

FLY / NAV

ECAM ACTIONS

(until STATUS page)

Consider:Normal C/L

OEB

Computer resets

CONTINUE ECAM

(STATUS page)

APPROACH C/L

ECAM APPROACHPROC (if any)

APPROACHPREPARATION

Briefing

DECISION

COM

T

EA

M

W

O

R

K

PF

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IRREVERSIBLE / GUARDED ACTIONS

CONFIRMATION

Confirmation from both pilots is required, when the action concerns:

How to proceed for confirmation ?

Master switch or

ADIRS control

PNFPNF

Hand on related control:

REQUEST...CONFIRM ?

ACTION.PERFORM

PFPF

ACTION...CHECK

ANSWER....CONFIRM

PNFPNFPFPF

ACTION...CHECK

ANSWER....CONFIRM


REQUEST...CONFIRM ?

ACTION.PERFORM


Any guarded switchThrust lever is a PF actiongiven that it may influence flight path

!

PFPF

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IRREVERSIBLE / GUARDED ACTIONS

CONFIRMATION

Confirmation from both pilots is required, when the action concerns:

Master switch or

ADIRS control


PNFPNF


REQUEST...CONFIRM ?

ACTION.PERFORM

PFPF

ACTION...CHECK

ANSWER....CONFIRM

PNFPNFPFPF

ACTION...CHECK

ANSWER....CONFIRM


REQUEST...CONFIRM ?

ACTION.PERFORM


Any guarded switch

Thrust lever is a PF actiongiven that it may influence flight path

!

PFPF

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PFPF PNFPNFCommon LR2. ECAM PROCEDURE

ORDER.ECAM ACTIONS

ECAM ACTIONS COMPLETE.CHECK

CONFIRM.CLEAR

ECAM ....CONFIRM (using SD

and overhead panel)

ECAM ACTIONS.PERFORM

REQUESTCLEAR name of SYS?

ECAM..CLEAR

Both pilots should confirmirreversible/guarded actions

This is to be repeated for each failure displayed on theECAM.

Example :

LAND ASAP

*Task sharing:As soon as he announced ECAM

ACTIONS, the PF is in charge ofcommunications, until all the ECAMactions have been completed.

PF

Depending on the failure, , or , may be displayed, in

the right column of the ECAM procedure.

RED : Land at the next suitable airport.

AMBER : Assess the seriousness of the situation and consider the

selection of a suitable airport.

LAND ASAP LAND ASAP

LAND ASAP

LAND ASAP

PFPF PNF

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LANDING DISTANCE COMPUTATION

SYSFAILURE A NORM (1) - 1.1

FAILURE A 3 10 1.2

(1) If NORM is indicated for landing configuration, and if CONF3 is used, apply an additional 1.1 coefficient to the landingdistance.

Determine the landing

distance coefficient.

Determine the landingdistance in CONF FULLCONF FULL

without failure

Apply the coefficientdetermined above to thisdistance.

APPR SPD-LDG DIST CORRECTIONS

FOR FAILURES

LANDING DISTANCE WITHOUT

AUT OBRAKE CONF FULL

QRH

2.00

QRH

4.00

PFPF PNFPNF

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APPROACH SPEED COMPUTATION

Select CONF FULL

Read VREF = VLS CONF FULL

Add VREF to VREF Add wind correction, if applicable

Enter VAPP manually

If LDG in CONF 3 :

Select CONF 3

MCDU PERF APPRpage

LDG CONF

CONF 3

LDG CONF

FULL

VLSVAPP

VAPP = VREF + VREF + WIND CORRECTION (if applicable)

N o t e : T h i s c o m p u t a t io n m u s t b e d o n e a c c o r d i n g

to the appropriate weight at destination, so, with

F-PLN properly updated.

When applicable, VREF isgiven on the QRH.

In this case:

Wind correction only

applies when VREF islower than 20 kts.

If the ECAM shows a VLS :

PFPF PNFPNF

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APPROACH SPEED COMPUTATION

The ECAM shows a VLS, while the QRH shows a VREF .

VLS increase due to

the actualconfiguration VREF =

VLS CONF FULL

VLS OF THE

LANDING CONF

Speed increase for

handling qualities

Shown on PFD,

when landing

conf is

selected

VLSshown

on

ECAM

VREFshown

onQRH

PFPF PNFPNF

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PFPF PNFPNFCommon LR4. STATUS

CONFIRM..READ STATUS

CONFIRMCLEAR STATUS

REQUEST...STATUS?

STATUS .....READ

LIMITATIONS.....CHECK

PROC.....CONSIDER

LANDING DIST&SPEED INCREMENT..CHECKINOP SYS....CHECK

REQUESTCLEAR STATUS ?

STATUSCLEARANNOUNCEECAM ACTIONS COMPLETED

Landing distance and approach speed

computation:

For complex procedures (dual hydraulicfailure or electrical emergency

configuration): Use SUMMARY

For other cases:

Review FCOM procedure:

3

Applying ECAM procedure ensures

flight safety.However, referring to FCOM 3.02, if

t i m e p e r m i t s , may provide useful

additional information.

02ABN-

EMER

RETURN TO NORMAL TASK SHA RING

QRH

1.00

The PNF should not start reading the STATUS before confirmation from the PF.

For any priority reason Status analysis can be postponed by PF

e.g. C/L, ATC communication

In some cases, some other checks or actions may have to be performed, before reading the STATUS:

In case of failure at takeoff, the NORMAL TAKEOFF C/LNORMAL TAKEOFF C/L has to be performed

OEBOEB (if applicable) is to be applied at that time (Refer to QRH 6.00),

Computer resetsComputer resets may be considered (Refer to QRH 2.00)

QRH

6.00QRH

2.00

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