Roxas and Company, Inc. vs. DAMBA-NSFW and DAR 

FACTS:

Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas. On July 27, 1987, the

Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the President. This Congress

passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed

by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988. Before the law’s effectivity, on May 6, 1988,

[Roxas & Co.] filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the

provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by …

DAR in accordance with the CARL. On August 6, 1992 [Roxas & Co.], through its President, sent a letter to

theSecretary of …DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway.The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu,

Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-

agricultural As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda

Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. The petitions nub on the interpretation of Presidential Proclamation

(PP) 1520 reads: DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE IN CAVITE

PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS AS A TOURISTZONE, AND FOR OTHER

PURPOSES Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application for conversion of its three haciendas from agricultural

to non-agricultural on the assumption that the issuance of PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu, Batangas as

a tourism zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural uses. Its pending application notwithstanding, the

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-

beneficiaries in the three haciendas including CLOA No. 6654 which was issued on October 15, 1993 covering

513.983 hectares, the subject of G.R. No. 167505. Roxas & Co. filed with the DAR an application for exemption

from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP 1520 and

of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994

3 which states that all lands already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before the effectivity of

CARP no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.

ISSUES:

Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu tourism zone to non-

agricultural useto exempt Roxas & Co.’s three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage;

RULING:

PP 1520 DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN THE THREE

MUNICIPALITIES INCLUDINGNASUGBU TO NON-AGRICULTURAL LANDS.

Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the three municipalities as each constituting a tourism zone,

reclassified all landstherein to tourism and, therefore, converted their use to non-agricultural purposes.The

perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only "certain areas in the sector comprising the [three Municipalities

that] havepotential tourism value" and mandated the conduct of "necessary studies" and the segregation of

"specific geographic areas" toachieve its purpose. Which is why the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority

(PTA) to identify what those potential tourismareas are. If all the lands in those tourism zones were to be wholly

converted to non-agricultural use, there would have been noneed for the PP to direct the PTA to identify what

those "specific geographic areas" are.In the above-cited case of Roxas & Co. v. CA, 9   the Court made it

clear that the "power to determine whether Haciendas Palico,Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence,

exempt from the coverage of the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] lies withthe [Department of Agrarian

Reform], not with this Court." The DAR, an administrative body of special competence, denied, byOrder, the

application for CARP exemption of Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did not automatically reclassify all the

lands in theaffected municipalities from their original uses. It appears that the PTA had not yet, at that time,

identified the "specific geographic areas" for tourism development and had no pending tourism development

projects in the areas. Further, report from the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI)

indicated that the areas were planted with sugar cane and other crops. 11 Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum

Circular No. 7, Series of 2004,12came up with clarificatory guidelines and therein decreed thatB. Proclamations

declaring general areas such as whole provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands or peninsulas astourist

zones that merely:(1) recognize certain still unidentified areas within the covered provinces, municipalities,

barangays, islands, or peninsulasto be with potential tourism value and charge the Philippine Tourism Authority

with the task to identify/delineate specificgeographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value and

to coordinate said areas’ development; or (2) recognize the potential value of identified spots located within the

general area declared as tourist zone (i.e. x x x x)and direct the Philippine Tourism Authority to coordinate said

areas’ development;could not be regarded as effecting an automatic reclassification of the entirety of the

land area declared as tourist zone. This is sobecause "reclassification of lands" denotes their allocation

into some specific use and "providing for the manner of their utilizationand disposition (Sec. 20, Local

Government Code) or the "act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such

as residential, industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the land use plan." A proclamation that

merelyrecognizes the potential tourism value of certain areas within the general area declared as tourist zone

clearly does not allocate,reserve, or intend the entirety of the land area of the zone for non-agricultural purposes.

Neither does said proclamation direct thatotherwise CARPable lands within the zone shall already be used for

purposes other than agricultural.Moreover, to view these kinds of proclamation as a reclassification for non-

agricultural purposes of entire provinces, municipalities,barangays, islands, or peninsulas would be unreasonable

as it amounts to an automatic and sweeping exemption from CARP in thename of tourism development. The

same would also undermine the land use reclassification powers vested in local governmentunits in conjunction

with pertinent agencies of government.C. There being no reclassification, it is clear that said

proclamations/issuances, assuming [these] took effect before June 15, 1988,could not supply a basis for

exemption of the entirety of the lands embraced therein from CARP coverageD. The DAR’s reading into these

general proclamations of tourism zones deserves utmost consideration, more especially in thepresent petitions

which involve vast tracts of agricultural land. To reiterate, PP 1520 merely recognized the "potential tourism

value" of certain areas within the general area declared as tourism zones

 

. It did not reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use.A mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not

automatically allow a landowner to change its use since there is still that process of conversion before one

is permitted to use it for other purposes

Spouses Castellano vs. Spouses Francisco (GR No. 155640)FACTS:

Since 1955, spouses Francisco had been in possession of a parecel of land in Nueva Ecija. In 1976, pursuant to

PD No. 27,respondent Florentino Francisco (Florentino) was issued Certificate of Land Transfer. Spouses

Francisco alleged that in 1989, dueto extreme poverty, they borrowed P50,000 from petitioner Eugenia

Castellano (Eugenia) and, in return, Eugenia would cultivateand possess the property until full payment of the

loan. Spouses Francisco promised to pay within three years or until 1992. Their agreement was not reduced into

writing. According to spouses Francisco, in the latter part of 1992, they offered to pay the loan butEugenia

refused to accept payment. Spouses Francisco later learned that Eugenia was able to secure Emancipation

Patent No.489877 and Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Erlaine, Eugenia's son.In 1997, spouses

Francisco filed a petition for cancellation of Erlaine's emancipation patent before the DARAB. Spouses

Franciscoclaimed that ownership of the lot was transferred in Erlaine's name without their knowledge and

consent. Spouses Franciscoasserted that all the documents necessary for the valid transfer of rights were

fabricated and falsified.

[7]

In their answer, the Castellanos stated that spouses Francisco later informed them that they would no

longer redeem the land. A transfer action was later initiated by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Team

Office and, on 15 October 1992, the Regional Director of the DAR, Region III, issued an order approving the

transfer action in favor of Erlaine. The Castellanos denied that there was fraud and maintained that the standard

procedure for a transfer action was followed. Regional Adjudicator ruled in favor of the Castellanos. It ruled that

there were no irregularities in the transfer proceedings leading to the issuance of Erlaine's emancipation patent.

The Regional Adjudicator declared that the waiver of rights executed by Florentino and his heirs,

duly acknowledged before a notary public, enjoyed the presumption of regularity and validity. No evidence was

presented to contradict the same. The mistake in the status of Florentino describing him as a widower was a

mere oversight which Estelita Francisco later on ratified. Spouses Francisco appealed the decision to

the DARAB. DARAB dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the Regional Adjudicator's Decision.

DARAB stated that it is the issuance of the emancipation patent in favor of the tenant beneficiary that vests him

with absolute ownership of the land. The DARAB ruled that, with the issuance of Erlaine's emancipation patent,

Erlaine had a superior right over spouses Francisco, who were mere holders of a certificate of land transfer. The

DARAB also stated that the issuance of Erlaine's emancipation patent enjoyed the presumption of regularity and

validity that is not overcome by the filing of an information for falsification of public document. Spouses Francisco

appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA reversed DARAB’s decision. The Court of Appeals ruled that Erlaine's

emancipation patent should be canceled because it was issued in violation of PD No. 27. Under PD No. 27,

spouses Francisco could not make any valid form of transfer except to the government or, by hereditary

succession, to their heirs. Since the basis for the transfer action and the issuance of Erlaine's emancipation

patent was spouses Francisco's alienation of their possessory right infavor of Erlaine, the transaction is void.

ISSUES:

Whether Erlaine's emancipation patent is valid.

RULING:

Erlaine's emancipation patent is valid. The Court of Appeals ruled that Erlaine's emancipation patent was void

and should be canceled because spouses Francisco could not validly transfer ownership of the land to Erlaine.

The Court of Appeals ruled that spouses Francisco's transfer of the rights or possession to the Castellanos

violated PD No. 27 and is therefore void. Indeed, the sale or transfer of rights over a property coveredby a

certificate of land transfer is void except when the alienation is made in favor of the government or through

hereditary succession. In this case, however, the Court of Appeals failed to consider that the basis for the

issuance of Erlaine's emancipation patent was Florentino's voluntary surrender of the land to the Samahang

Nayon, which qualifies as surrender or transfer to the government.

Petitioner's voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the

government because such action forms part of the mechanism for the disposition and the reallocation of

farmholdings to tenant-farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of PD 27.

Under Memorandum Circular No. 8-80 of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform, the Samahan shall, upon notice

from the agrarian reform team leader, recommend other tenant-farmers who shall be substituted to all rights and

obligations of the abandoning or surrendering tenant-farmer. In this case, Florentino's intention to surrender the

land to the Samahang Nayon was clear. He executed a waiver of rights and voluntarily surrendered ownership

over the land to the Samahang Nayon which in return, Samahang Nayon issued Resolution No. 6 acknowledging

Florentino's surrender of the land and recommending three farmers, including Erlaine, to the DAR as agrarian

reform beneficiaries. Florentino executed another salaysay  stating that he had no objection to the transfer of the

land in Erlaine's name because he already returned the land to the government. The records also show that the

proper transfer action was undertaken. Therefore, Erlaine's emancipation patent is valid since it  was issued

pursuant to Florentino's voluntary surrender of the land to theSamahang Nayon, not pursuant to spouses

Francisco's alienation of their possessory right to Eugenia

 BEJASA vs. CA

FACTS:

This case involves two (2) parcels of land in Oriental Mindoro. The parcels of land are indisputably

owned by Isabel Candelaria.  On October 20, 1974, Candelaria entered into a three-year lease

agreement over the land with Pio Malabanan(hereinafter referred to as "Malabanan"). In the contract,

Malabanan agreed among other things: "to clear, clean and cultivate the land, to purchase or  procure calamansi,

citrus and rambutan seeds or seedlings, to attend and care for whatever plants are thereon existing, to make the

necessary harvest of fruits, etc. Malabanan hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and to clear it. The Bejasas

claim that they planted citrus, calamansi rambutan and banana trees on the land and shouldered

all expenses of production Candelaria gave Malabanan a six-year usufruct over the land, modifying their first

agreement. As per the agreement, Malabanan was under no obligation to share the harvests with Candelaria. In

1983, Malabanan died. Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan (hereinafter referred to as

"Jaime) as her attorney-in-fact, having powers of administration over the disputed land. Candelaria

entered into a new lease contract over the land with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife with a term of one year.

Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent of P15,000.00 in consideration of an "aryenduhan" o r "  pakyaw na

bunga"

agreement, with a term of one year. The agreement is below quoted: During the first week of December 1984,

the Bejasas paid Victoria P7,000.00 as agreed. The balance of P8,000.00 was not fully paid. Only the

amount of P4,000.00 was paid on January 11, 1985. After the aryenduhan expired, despite Victoria's

demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas continued to stay on the land and did not give any consideration for its

use, be it in the form of rent or a shared harvest. Candelaria and the Dinglasans again entered into a three-year

lease agreement over the land. The special power of attorney in favor of Jaime was also renewed by Candelaria

on the same date. Jaime filed a complaint before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems

("COSLAP"), seeking ejectment of the Bejasas. COSLAP dismissed the complaint. Jaime filed a complaint

with the RTC against the Bejasas for "Recovery of possession with preliminary mandatory injunction

and damages." The case was referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR"). DAR certified that the

case was not proper for trial before the civil courts. The trial court dismissed Jaime's complaint, including the

Bejasas' counterclaim for leasehold, home lot and damages. Bejasas filed with the RTC a complaint for

"confirmation of leasehold and home lot with recovery of  damages against Isabel Candelaria  and

Jaime Dinglasan. Trial court ruled in favor of the Bejasas. First, they reasoned that a tenancy

relationship was established. This relationship can be created by and between a "person who furnishes the

landholding as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor and the person who personally cultivates

the same." Second, as bona-fide tenant-tillers, the Bejasas have security of tenure.Respondents filed their

notice of appeal. Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reversing the trial court's

ruling.Reasoning:First, not all requisites necessary for a leasehold tenancy relationship were met. There was no

consent given by thelandowner. The consent of former civil law lessee, Malabanan, was not enough to create a

tenancy relationship.When Malabanan engaged the services of the Bejasas, he only constituted them as mere

overseers and did not make them "permanent tenants". Hence, petitioners elevated the case in SC.

ISSUE:

Whether there is a tenancy relationship in favor of the Bejasas.

RULING:

The elements of a tenancy relationship are:

(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the

purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests.SC held

that there is no tenancy relationship between the parties. Malabanan and the Bejasas. True, Malabanan

(as Candelaria's usufructuary) allowed the Bejasas to stay on and cultivate the land. However, even if we

assume that he had the authority to give consent to the creation of a tenancy relation, still, no such relation

existed. There was no proof that they shared the harvests. Candelaria and the Bejasas. Between them, there is

no tenancy relationship.Candelaria as landowner never gave her consent.The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984,

they had no contact with Candelaria. They acknowledge that Candelaria could argue that she did not know of

Malabanan's arrangement with them. True enough Candelaria disavowed any knowledge that the Bejasas during

Malabanan's lease possessed the land. However, the Bejasas claim that this defect was cured when Candelaria

agreed to lease the land to the Bejasas for P20,000.00 per annum, when Malabanan died.SC do not agree.

In a tenancy agreement, consideration should be in the form of harvest sharing. Even

assuming that Candelaria agreed to lease it out to the Bejasas for P20,000 per year, such agreement did not

create a tenancy relationship, but a mere civil law lease. Even assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority

as civil law lessees of the land to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is no proof that they did. Again, there was

no agreement as to harvest sharing. The only agreement between them is the "aryenduhan", which states in no

uncertain terms the monetary consideration to be paid, and the term of the contract. Not all the elements of

tenancy being met.

SALMORIN vs. ZALDIVAR

FACTS:

On July 15, 1989, respondent Dr. Pedro Zaldivar, as legal possessor of a lot in Antique, entered into an

agreement (Kasugtanan) with Salmorin designating him as administrator of the lot with a monthly salary

of P150. Salmorin allegedly did not comply with the terms of the Kasugtanan when he failed to till the vacant

areas. This compelled Zaldivar to terminate his services and eject him from the lot. When Salmorin refused

to vacate the property, Zaldivar filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against him in the MCTC. In his answer,

Salmorin alleged the existence of a tenancy relationship between him and Zaldivar. Thus, he claimed that the

case was an agrarian matter over which the MCTC had no jurisdiction. MCTC found that the case was in the

nature of an agrarian dispute and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction Zaldivar appealed to RTC which

ruled in his favor. The RTC found that the consent of the landowner and sharing of the harvest, which were

requisites for the existence of a tenancy relationship, did not exist. Thus, it ruled that the MCTC had jurisdiction

over the case and ordered the reinstatement of Civil Case. Salmorin appealed the RTC decision to the CA but

the latter upheld the decision of the RTC. He now seeks a reversal of the RTC and CA decisions.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship between the petitioner and the respondent.

RULING:

 Contrary to the findings of the MCTC, both the RTC and the CA found that there was no tenancy relationship

between Salmorin and Zaldivar. A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. In Saul v. Suarez, we held: There

must be evidence to prove the tenancy relations such that all its indispensable elements must be established, to

wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by

the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing

of the harvests. All these requisites are necessary to create tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or

more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant. All these elements must concur. It is  not

enough that they are alleged. To divest the MCTC of jurisdiction, these elements must all be shown to be

present. Tenancy is a legal relationship established by the existence of particular facts as required

by law. In this case, the RTC and CA correctly found that the third and sixth elements, namely,

consent of the landowner and sharing of the harvests, respectively, were absent. We find no

compelling reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC and the CA. The fact alone of working on

another's landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy .     There

must be substantial evidence on record adequate to prove the element of sharing. Salmorin’s attempt

to persuade us by way of a certification coming from the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee attesting that he

was abonafide tenant of Zaldivar deserves scant consideration. Certifications issued by municipal agrarian

reform officers are not binding onthe courts. In a given locality, merely preliminary or provisional are the

certifications or findings of the secretary of agrarian reform (or of an authorized representative)

concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties;

hence, such certifications do not bind the judiciary. SC noted that agricultural share tenancy was declared

contrary to public policy and, thus, abolished by the passage of RA 3844, as amended. Share tenancy exists:

Whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein

one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or

several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land personally with the aid of labor

available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided

between the landholder and the tenant .

17

Saul vs. Suarez (G.R. No. 166664)

FACTS:

Petitioner Domingo C. Suarez owns hectares agricultural land in South Cotabato. A complaint

for reinstatement with preliminary mandatory injunction, recovery

of possession and damages was filed against him and T’boli Agro-IndustrialDevelopment,  Inc.

(TADI) before the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian

Reform Adjudicatory Board(DARAB), by respondents Leo B. Saul, Roger S. Brillo, Efrain S. Brillo, Eleno S.

Brillo and Ignacio G. Pelaez. Respondents alleged that they were agricultural tenants in petitioner’s land on a 25-

75 sharing agreement; that after two croppings, petitioner voluntarily offered the land for sale to the government

under a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) that they signed the documents for the transfer of the land under the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) as farmer-beneficiaries, and petitioner, as landowner; and

that the sale was approved by the local Land Valuation Office of the Land Bank of the Philippines(LBP).

Respondents claimed that while the VOS was being processed, they were summarily ejected from the property

by TADI after the latter entered into a Grower Agreement with Contract to Buy with petitioner thereby depriving

them of their landholdings. Petitioner filed an Answer contending that respondents were installed as

tenants, not by him, but by the Department of  Agrarian Reform (DAR) in South Cotabato. He admitted

that he voluntarily offered his land for sale to the government under the CARP but denied knowledge of the

certification issued by the LBP. He denied the existence of a grower’s contract between him and TADI over the

subject land. For its part, TADI claimed that its grower’s contract with petitioner covered parcels of land different

from those being claimed by respondents. Regional Adjudicator dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The

adjudicator found that respondents failed to prove their alleged tenancy over petitioner’s land. While they were

identified as potential farmer-beneficiaries of the land subject of the VOS, they only have an “inchoate right” to

the land since its coverage under the CARP has yet to be completed. On appeal, the DARAB Central Office

rendered a Decision reversing the Regional Adjudicator. It observed that petitioner admitted that respondents

were his tenants. It further held that: ... it is in fact immaterial whether the subject landholding is covered by the

alleged grower’s contract or not. What is clear in the instant case is the fact that herein appellants were illegally

ejected from their respective tenanted lands. If indeed the subject land is not covered by the grower’s

contract, if there’s any, the act of  defendant-appellee TADI in ejecting the tenants-appellants was beyond

authority, hence, illegal. Assuming arguendo that the subject landholding is truly covered in the said contract, the

contracting parties are required under the law to respect the tenurial rights of the tenants therein.

[11]

 Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the DARAB. Upon denial of the motion

for reconsideration, petitioner filed the instant petition. Petitioner contends that there is no basis in holding that

respondents were his tenants. He denies having admitted that they were his tenants, and insists that there is no

proof to prove the existence of tenancy relations. He asserts that he did not eject respondents from their

landholdings by entering into a grower’s contract over the subject land with TADI. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the respondents are bona fide agricultural tenants under the law.

RULING:

There is nothing in the records to suggest that respondents were petitioner’s bona fide tenants prior to their

designation by the DARas potential farmer-beneficiaries under the CARP. There is no evidence to prove tenancy

arrangement between petitioner and respondents before the former’s voluntary offer to convey the land to the

government. In holding that respondents were bona fide tenants of petitioner, the DARAB and the

appellate court relied solely on the alleged admission in petitioner’s answer to the complaint, to

wit: 3. Defendant admits the averments in paragraph IV of the complaint. The fourth paragraph of the complaint

states: 4. That plaintiffs were instituted sometime in 1993 and were given three (3) hectares each

respectively, while for plaintiff Roger Brillo was given 2 hectares; the sharing of the parties involved was 25-75in

favor of the tenants; after for two croppings defendant D. Suarez approached and offered the land

by Voluntary Offer to Sale (VOS) last November 1993 in our favor (plaintiffs-tenants) and the papers for VOS

was processed in the office of Department [of] Agrarian Reform (DAR) Koronadal, South Cotabato;

[16]

 We find that the above admission was taken out of context. While petitioner admitted that respondents were

tenants in the land, he qualified in paragraph 2 of his answer that it was the DAR who installed them as

such. Clearly, it was the DAR who placed respondents in actual possession of the land upon petitioner’s offer to

transfer the same to the government. Other than this supposed admission, there is no evidence on record to

prove the tenancy relations. Respondents did not substantiate their claim with evidence to show that they were

agricultural tenants in petitioner’s land. They did not allege actual cultivation or specify thecrop produced

thereby. Neither did they mention how much of the produce was delivered to petitioner or submit receipts to

prove the purported 25-75 sharing of harvests. They did not state, much less prove, the circumstances of their

agreement with petitioner as to the alleged tenancy relationship. Thus, there is no basis to the claim that they are

agricultural tenants on the property.SC held that a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be

evidence to prove the tenancy relations such that all its indispensable elements must be established, to wit: (1)

the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the

landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of

the harvests.

 All these requisites are necessary to create tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more

requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant. 

It is clear therefore that the subject matter of  the grower’s contract did not include the land  subject

of the VOS. Thus, petitioner could not have caused respondents’ ejectment from the subject property by virtue

of his transactions with TADI, since whenever authorized the latter to plant on the subject land. Respondents’

ejectment from the land was not pursuant to the contract petitioner had entered into with TADI who appears to

have entered the land without petitioner’s consent. Thus, it was error for the appellate court to affirm

DARAB’s conclusion that it is “immaterial whether the subject landholding is covered by the

alleged grower’s contract or not.” It is, in every sense, material to the determination of the case because

petitioner is sought to be held liable for respondents’ ejectment due allegedly to the contract. If the disputed land

is not the subject of the contract, as in fact it is not, then respondents cannot claim that petitioner illegally ejected

them from the land. Consequently, they have no cause of action against petitioner, since the latter did not commit

any act that resulted in their dispossession.

In this case, there is no showing that there exists a tenancy relationship between petitioner and

respondents .Likewise, respondents have no tenancy relationship with TADI, against whom they

principally have a cause of action. The controversy is civil in nature since it involves the issue of material

possession, independent of any question pertaining to agricultural tenancy. Hence, the case falls outside the

jurisdiction of DARAB; it is cognizable by the regular courts. WHEREFORE, t h e   i n s t a n t   p e t i t i o n   i s

GRANTED. T h e   c o m p l a i n t   i n   D A R A B   C a s e   N o .   X I - 2 4 9 - S C - 9 5   i s hereby DISMISSED

.

Soliman, et al vs. PASUDECO (GR No. 169589)

FACTS:

 

The property subject of this case is situated in Pampanga, with an area of ten (10) hectares, more or less,

previously coveredby Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and formerly owned by one Dalmacio Sicat (Dalmacio).

Dalmacio offered to sell the subjectproperty to respondent Pampanga Sugar Development Company

(PASUDECO), a domestic corporation engaged in sugar milling,to be used as a housing complex for

PASUDECO's laborers and employees. The land was offered for sale at the price of P8.00 per square meter. On

January 26, 1970, Dalmacio reduced the price to P5.00 per square meter. In a meeting held on April 15, 1970,the

Board of Directors of PASUDECO issued Board Resolution No. 057 authorizing the purchase of the subject

property at P4.00per square meter. Dalmacio and his tenants jointly filed a Petition with the then Court of

Agrarian Relations (CAR) seeking approval of the voluntary surrender of the subject property with payment of

disturbance compensation. On the same date, the CAR rendered a Decision, approving the voluntary surrender

of the subject property by the tenants to Dalmacio, thus, terminating their tenancy relationship effective May 21,

1970, the date when the parties entered into the agreement. On May 22, 1970, a Deed of Sale

with Mortgage was executed between Dalmacio and PASUDECO. Thereafter, the documents

needed for the conversion of the land to residential purposes were prepared, However, due to

financial setbacks suffered after the imposition of Martial Law in 1972, PASUDECO deferred the construction

of the housing project. PASUDECO averred that no person was authorized to occupy and/or cultivate the subject

property. On the other hand, the petitioners have a totally different version. Petitioners claimed that, sometime in

November 1970, they started working on the subject property with a corresponding area of tillage. A

Certification was also issued by the Samahang Nayon in favor of petitioner Joaquin Soliman with

respect to the remaining area of 1.5 hectares. Likewise, the Barangay Chairperson of Macabacle, Bacolor,

Pampanga, certified that the eight (8)petitioners had been the actual tenant-tillers of the subject property from

1970 up to the present, and that petitioner Baldomero Almario (Baldomero) was issued Certificate of Land

Transfer (CLT).

The Ocular Inspection and the Investigation Report issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) on

March 13,1990 showed that since 1970, petitioners cultivated the subject property, allegedly managed by the

late respondent Gerry Rodriguez(Gerry), manager of PASUDECO from 1970-1991. Petitioners alleged that in

1970, Gerry made one Ciriaco Almario (Ciriaco) hisoverseer/caretaker, tasked to collect lease rentals from

petitioners. In turn, Ciriaco remitted the rentals to Gerry. On May 14,

1990,C i r i a c o   c e r t i f i e d   t h a t   p e t i t i o n e r s   w e r e   t h e   a c t u a l   t e n a n t - t i l l e r s  

o f   t h e   s u b j e c t   p r o p e r t y .   M o r e o v e r , petitioners deposited their alleged rentals with

the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), as land amortizations, in varying amounts,from 1989 to 1993, as shown

by the official receipts issued by LBP. Thus, petitioners averred that from 1970 up to 1990 or for aperiod of

almost twenty (20) years, they had been in actual and peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject

property. The real controversy arose when PASUDECO decided to pursue the development of the property into a

housing project for itsemployees. Petitioners filed a Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with a

Prayer for the issuance of a PreliminaryInjunction against Gerry before the PARAD to restrain him from harassing

and molesting petitioners in their respective landholdings.Petitioners alleged that Gerry, together with armed

men, entered the property and destroyed some of their crops. Traversing thecomplaint, Gerry raised as one of

his defenses the fact that PASUDECO was the owner of the subject property. Thus, on November 26, 1990,

petitioners filed their Amended Complaint impleading PASUDECO as a party-

defendant. Meanwhile, PASUDECOasserted that petitioners were not tenants but merely interlopers,

usurpers and/or intruders into the subject property. Trial on the merits ensued. In the process, the PARAD

conducted an ocular inspection and found that the subject property was planted with  palay . There were also

several dikes or  pilapil dividing the subject property. The PARAD also observed that there wasa big

sign installed therein, reading “Future Site of PASUDECO Employees Housing Project.”The PARAD dismissed

petitioners' complaint and denied their application for the writ of preliminary injunction. ThePARAD

held that petitioners had not shown direct and convincing proof that they were tenants of the subject property.

Petitionerscould not show any receipt proving payment of lease rentals either to PASUDECO or Gerry. In

addition to the absence of sharing,the PARAD ruled that there was no consent given by PASUDECO in

order to create a tenancy relationship in favor of thepetitioners. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Notice

of Appeal with the DARAB. DARAB rendered its Decision in favor of the petitioners, reversing the

findings and conclusions of the PARAD. The DARAB held that, without the approval of the conversion application

filedby PASUDECO, it could not be substantiated that the subject property

was indeed residential property intended for housingpurposes. Because of this, and the fact that

petitioners tilled the subject property for almost twenty (20) years, the same remainedagricultural in character.

Moreover, the DARAB held that, contrary to the findings of the PARAD, the elements of consent

andsharing were present in this case. The DARAB, citing Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, ratiocinated

that petitioners enteredthe subject property in 1970 upon the request of Ciriaco who, with the consent of Gerry as

manager of PASUDECO, was authorizedto look for people to cultivate the subject property. Petitioners cultivated

the same and shared their harvests with PASUDECO,received by Gerry through Ciriaco. Later on, when Gerry

refused to accept their lease rentals, petitioners deposited the money withLBP. The DARAB opined that

these pieces of evidence established the fact of consent and sharing. While express consent was notgiven, the

fact that Gerry accepted the lease rentals for a considerable number of years signified an implied consent which,

in turn,bound PASUDECO.CA reversed the DARAB's ruling and reinstated the PARAD's decision. The CA held

that, while the subject property wasagricultural, there was no tenancy relationship between the parties, express

or implied. The CA concurred in the findings of thePARAD and found no credible evidence to support the

contention that petitioners were de jure tenants inasmuch as the elements of consent and sharing were absent.

CA reiterated that tenancy is not merely a factual relationship but also a legal relationship; hence,the fact that

PASUDECO, being the owner of the subject property, was uninvolved in and oblivious to petitioners' cultivation

thereof,tenancy relations did not exist. Thus, the CA concluded that in the absence of any tenancy relationship

between the parties, thecase was outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Petitioners filed their Motion for

Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its Resolution. 

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners are de jure tenants of the subject property.

 

RULING:

Tenants are defined as persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from within their immediate farm

households— cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of

production, sharing the producewith the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the

landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or  money or both under the leasehold tenancy

system. Based on the foregoing definition of a tenant, entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential

elements of tenancy: 1)the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter

of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3)there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the

purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5)there is personal cultivation on the part of

the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner andtenant or agricultural

lessee. The presence of all these elements must be proved by substantial evidence. Unless a person

hasestablished his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure and is not covered by the

Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. Tenancy relationship cannot

be presumed. Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure.The

pronouncement of the DARAB that there is, in this case, tenancy by operation of law under Section 5 of R.A.

No. 3844 isnot correct. In

Reyes v. Reyes SC held: Under R.A. 3844, two modes are provided for in the establishment of an agricultural

leasehold relation:(1) by operation of law in accordance with Section 4 of the said act; or (2) by oral or written

agreement, either express or implied. By operation of law simply means the abolition of the agricultural

share tenancy system andthe conversion of share tenancy relations into leasehold relations.

The other method is the agriculturalleasehold contract, which may either be oral or in writing. Rather,

consistent with the parties' assertions, what we have here is an alleged case of tenancy by implied

consent. As such,crucial for the creation of tenancy relations would be the existence of two of the essential

elements, namely, consent and sharingand/or payment of lease rentals. 

 After a meticulous review of the records, we find that the elements of consent and sharing and/or

payment of leaserentals are absent in this case.

Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is either the

owner, lessee,usufructuary or legal possessor of the property, and not through the acts of the

supposed landholder who has no right to the property subject of the tenancy. To rule otherwise would

allow collusion among the unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true and lawful landholder . As duly found by the

PARAD and the CA, Gerry was not authorized to enter into a tenancy relationship with thepetitioners. In fact,

there is no proof that he, indeed, entered into one.  Other than their bare assertions, petitioners

rely on thecertification of Ciriaco who, likewise, failed to substantiate his claim that Gerry authorized him to

select individuals and install themas tenants of the subject property. Absent substantial evidence showing

Ciriaco's authority from PASUDECO, or even from Gerry, togive consent to the creation of a tenancy relationship,

his actions could not give rise to an implied tenancy.

[49]

 Likewise, the alleged sharing and/or payment of lease rentals was not substantiated other than by the deposit-

payments withthe LBP, which petitioners characterized as amortizations. We cannot close our eyes to the

absence of any proof of payment prior tothe deposit-payments with LBP. Not a single receipt was ever issued by

Gerry, duly acknowledging payment of these rentals fromCiriaco who, allegedly, personally collected the same

from the petitioners. Notably, the fact of working on another's landholding,standing alone, does not raise a

presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. Substantial evidence necessary to establishthe fact of

sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere scintilla of evidence; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate

to provethe element of sharing. Thus, to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other credible evidence must

be presented, becauseself-serving statements are inadequate.

[50]

 The certifications attesting to petitioners' alleged status as de jure tenants are insufficient. In a given locality,

the certificationissued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or an authorized representative, like the MARO or the

BARC, concerning the presenceor the absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties, is

considered merely preliminary or provisional, hence,such certification does not bind the judiciary. The onus

rests on the petitioners to prove their affirmative allegation of tenancy, which they failed to discharge with

substantial evidence. Simply put, he who makes an affirmative allegation of an issue has the burden of proving

the same, and in the case of the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. The same rule applies

to administrative cases. In fact, if the complainant,upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action,

fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases hisclaim, the respondent is under no

obligation to prove his exception or defense.

[52]

 Petitioners' assertion that they were allowed to cultivate the subject property without opposition,

does not mean thatPASUDECO impliedly recognized the existence of a leasehold relation.

Occupancy and continued possession of the land willnot ipso facto make one a de jure tenant,

because the principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. This much we said in

VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,   where we held that: Indeed, a

tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this allegation.The

principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is  intent. Tenancy is not

a purelyfactual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal

relationship .As we ruled in Chico v. Court of Appeals

[347 SCRA 35 (2000)]:"Each of the elements hereinbefore mentioned is essential to create a de jure leasehold or

tenancyrelationship between the parties. This de jure relationship, in turn, is the terra firma for a security of

tenurebetween the landlord and the tenant. The leasehold relationship is not brought about by a mere

congruence of facts but, being a legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be

primordial." Thus, the intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their

writtenagreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important. 

WHEREFORE , the instant Petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED

Jeremias vs. Estate of Mariano (GR No. 174649)

FACTS:

Irene P. Mariano (Irene), a widow, owned two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) with

an aggregate area of a little more than 27 hectares. In 1972, the said parcels of land were placed under the

Operation Land Transfer program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, and accordingly, the tenanted portion

of the landholdings were subdivided amongidentified tenant-beneficiaries, and a subdivision plan was made. One

of the more than 40 tenant-beneficiaries of the two titledproperties of Irene P. Mariano, who were already given

emancipation patents, was Santiago Jeremias, father of petitioner LeopoldoJeremias (Leopoldo), whose

apportionments consisted of three lots within TCT. On 26 June 1988, Irene P. Mariano died intestateand was

succeeded by her two children, Jose P. Mariano and Erlinda M. Villanueva. In an unsigned hand-written letter

dated, Helen S. Mariano, wife of heir Jose P. Mariano, and despite the fact that the estate of thelate Irene

Mariano remained unpartitioned and still under intestate proceedings, allegedly instituted Ruben

Vias (Ruben) as atenant.Sometime in 1991, Danilo David P. Mariano (Danilo) was appointed as administrator

of respondent Estate of Irene P. Mariano.Danilo, lodged before the PARAD two separate complaints for

ejectment and damages against Leopoldo and Ruben. In the complaint against Leopoldo, respondent Danilo

averred that sometime in July 1993, he discovered that the former entered theland, which lands were inside the

Estates landholding covered by TCT No. 6887, and planted various agricultural products, withouthis knowledge

and consent. Respondent Danilo further alleged that Leopoldo was not a tenant of Irene. It was his father,

SantiagoJeremias, who was her tenant in lots, which are also inside the property covered by TCT

No. 6887. After Leopoldos refusal tovacate said lots despite oral and formal demands, respondent made a

formal complaint for ejectment with the Barangay AgrarianReform Council (BARC), which proved futile since the

parties failed to amicably settle the case. In his answer, Leopoldo denied he unlawfully entered the lots.

He claimed that he cultivated and farmed these lots upon thepermission and tolerance of Irene P.

Mariano, the registered owner.

He likewise averred that being the son of Santiago Jeremias

,the tenant of Irene P. Mariano,

he lawfully acquired the right to cultivate said lots by virtue of succession

. In the case against Ruben Vias (Ruben), respondent Danilo alleged that in June 1993, he came

to know of the fact of Rubens intrusion and cultivation of Lots No. 25 and No. 48 which are within the

landholding covered by TCT No. 6886. When respondentmade verbal and formal demands for Ruben to vacate

the areas, the latter declined to heed the demands. Ruben, on the other hand, answered that his cultivation of the

areas was pursuant to a hand-written letter of Helen S. Mariano instituting him as a tenantof said lots. PARAD

ruled in favor of the respondent and ordered Leopoldo and Ruben to vacate the subject lots. Leopoldo and

Ruben filed a notice of appeal with the PARAD. In their Appellants Brief before the DARAB, they

assailed thePARADs reliance on the subdivision plan in ruling that the lots that were the subject

matter of the controversy were nottenanted. They asserted that the PARAD should not take all the

annotations in the subdivision plan as the absolute truth, since theywere not privy to its preparation; there was a

possibility therefore, that they were not notified by the authorities of the date of thesurvey; hence, it could happen

that the lots they tilled as tenants were not identified or listed in their names. Leopoldo lamented thePARADs

failure to give weight to the receipts of rentals and certification from the Land Bank of the Philippines in his favor.

Although these receipts and certifications did not indicate the farm lots the payments pertained to,

he insisted that such doubt must be resolved in his favor in line with the constitutional and agrarian statutes

mandate that interpretation must be on the tenants side. For his part, Ruben stressed that the proviso in the letter

instituting him as tenant in Lots No. 25 and No. 48, which stipulated that hewould vacate the same was neither

legal nor binding on him since it violated Section 49 of Republic Act No. 1199,otherwiseknown as the Agricultural

Tenancy Act of 1954. DARAB promulgated its decision which favored Leopoldo and Ruben, by reversing and

setting aside the PARAD decision. Under the belief that all the lots of respondent Estates landholdings

covered under TCTs No. 6886 and No. 6887 were tenanted, the DARAB was of the opinion that

respondent could not claim that the disputed lots (within TCTs No. 6886 and No. 6887) could not be

legally retained by respondent Estate, since the area of respondents landholdings exceeded 24

hectares; and under Presidential Decree No. 27, landowners are not entitled to retention if they

own more than 24 hectares of rice and corn lands.

 

The DARAB said that even if respondent merely owned tenanted rice and corn land totaling less

than 24 hectares, still it had noright of retention, since he had other lands used for residential,

commercial and other urban purposes wherein it derived sufficient income to support itself 

. Under Administrative Order No. 4, Series of 1991, a supplemental guideline of Presidential Decree No. 27,the

right of retention cannot be had by a landowner even if he has less than 24 hectares of rice and corn lands if he

additionallyowns lands for residential, commercial, industrial or urban purposes, from which he derives adequate

income to support himself andhis family. The DARAB considered the subdivision plan as a mere scrap of paper,

and it could not be used as evidence, becausesaid document was not signed by the

approving officer who made it. Moreover, the DARAB ruled that the letter signed by Mrs.Helen

Mariano, the wife of Jose Mariano, a co-owner of the subject lots, effectively made Ruben a lawful possessor and

cultivator.The DARAB explained that since Helen Mariano signed on behalf of her husband, the principal, then

she became the agent of her husband. Considering that the husband did not repudiate the act of Helen Mariano,

such agency subsists. Hence, the institution of Ruben to till the lots in question must be respected. Petitioners

filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by DARAB. Dissatisfied, respondent appealed the judgment

to theCourt of Appeals. The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision in favor of respondent. It

reversed and set aside the verdict of the DARAB andreinstated the decision of the PARAD. Leopoldo

filed a motion for reconsideration as well as Ruben’s heirs but it was denied by CA.To support his stance,

Leopoldo maintains that he cultivated Lots No. 1B3D, No. 1B3E, No. 1B3H and No. 1B3Q since the 1960swith

the consent and permission of the late Irene P. Mariano. The Heirs of Ruben are of the posture that Ruben

became a tenant of Lots No. 25 and No. 48 pursuant to a written letter instituting him as such.

ISSUE:

Whether or not they are tenants of the lands belonging to respondent and, consequently, entitled to security of

tenure. 

RULING:

 Tenancy relationship arises if all the following essential requisites are present: 1) that the parties are the

landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural

land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to

bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural

lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

[9]

 Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure.

[10]

The elements of tenancy must first be proved inorder to entitle the claimant to security of tenure. A tenant has

been defined under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of

thePhilippines, as a person who, himself, and with the aid available from within

his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another,

with the latters consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the

landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or

ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold system.

 This Court had once ruled that self-serving statements regarding tenancy relations could not establish the

claimed relationship. Thefact alone of working on another’s landholding does not raise a presumption of the

existence of agricultural tenancy.

Substantial evidence entails not only the presence of a mere scintilla of evidence in order that the

fact of sharing can be established; there must also be concrete evidence on record that is

adequate to prove the element of sharing. [14]   In fact, this Court likewise ruled that to prove sharing of

harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented; self-serving statements are deemed

inadequate.

In this case, there is no substantial evidence that the petitioners were installed by the owner of

the lots in question as agricultural tenants on the property. There is, likewise, no evidence that

the petitioners shared with the landowner the harvest and/or produce from the landholding.

There is no evidence on record, other than the self-serving declaration of Leopoldo and his

witnesses, that indeed, the landowner had authorized him to till the disputed lots. Leopoldos

failure to adduce a significant morsel of evidence that  he was authorized as an agricultural

tenant of the contested lands makes his supposition - that he has legal right to work on the

said lands - frail and empty.This makes him a usurper, devoid of any right to remain in the

premises of the properties in question. 

Rubens evidence is likewise remotely substantial. The hand-written letter allegedly instituting Ruben as tenant is

unsigned. ThisCourt has ruled that the unsigned handwritten documents and unsigned computer

printouts, which are unauthenticated, areunreliable. This is mere self-serving evidence, which should be

rejected as evidence without any rational probative value, even inadministrative proceedings. The letter

presented by Ruben, being unsigned, falls within this category of evidence. It hardly has anyprobative value;

hence, it barely bolsters his hypothesis. Presidential Decree No. 27 provides:

This shall apply to tenant-farmers of private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn

under a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not 

.For lands to fall under the coverageof the said law, the same must be tenanted private agricultural

lands. Thus, in Daez v. Court of Appeals, the Court said that Presidential Decree No. 27 would not

apply if: (1) the land is not devoted to rice or corn crops even if it is tenanted; or (2) the land is untenanted even

though it is devoted to rice or corn crops. There is no question that Irenes landholdings with a total area of a little

more than 27 hectares, of which the disputed lots form apart, were subjected to agrarian reform in 1972 under

Presidential Decree No. 27. However, it is also established by the records of the case that disputed lots were

classified as untenanted by the Bureau of Lands.

This important piece of evidence, absent any substantial evidence to the contrary, only leads to

the conclusion that the lots which are the subject matter of the controversy arebeyond the pale of

the said statute.

 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, reinstating the decision of the Provincial

Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of  Camarines Sur, is herebyAFFIRMED

. 

Ceneze vs. Ramos (GR No. 172287)

FACTS:

Petitioner Welfredo Ceneze filed an action for declaration as bona fide tenant-lessee of two parcels of

agricultural landowned by respondent Feliciana Ramos. Petitioner alleged that in 1981, Julian

Ceneze, Sr. (Julian, Sr.), petitioner’s father,transferred his tenurial rights over the landholding to

him with the consent and approval of respondent and that, since then, petitioner had been in actual and

peaceful possession of the landholding until April 12, 1991, when respondent forcibly entered and cultivated the

land for the purpose of dispossessing petitioner of his right as tenant. The complaint prayed that

judgment be rendered declaring petitioner as the bona fide tenant-lessee of the landholding. In her defense,

respondent denied that a tenancy relationship existed between her and petitioner, asserting that she had never

instituted petitioner as a tenant in any of her landholdings. She averred that petitioner had never been in

possession of the landholding, but admitted that it was Julian, Sr. who was the tenant of the landholding. When

Julian, Sr. migrated to the United States of America (USA) in 1985, respondent allowed Julian, Sr.’s wife to

cultivate the land, but she herself migrated to the USA inJune 1988. Respondent later allowed Julian, Sr.’s son,

Julian Ceneze, Jr. (Julian, Jr.), to cultivate the landholding, but he likewisemigrated to the USA in 1991 without

informing respondent. From then on, she took possession of the landholding, cultivated it andappropriated for

herself the harvest therefrom. On April 8, 1991, she reported to Gloria Calpito, Municipal Agrarian Reform

Officer (MARO) of Manaoag, Pangasinan, the abandonment of the landholding by Julian, Sr., his wife and his

son, Julian, Jr .

[5]

 On December 19, 1997, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Provincial

Adjudicator reliedon the following documents: (a) Certification issued by Perfecto Dacasin, Barangay Agrarian

Reform Committee (BARC) Chairmanthat petitioner is a bona fide tenant of the subject landholding and that he

was ejected from it sometime in April 1991; (b) Affidavit executed by Julian, Sr., stating that, with respondent’s

consent and approval, he transferred his tenurial rights to petitioner before he migrated to the United States in

1981; and (c) Joint Affidavit of Epifanio Castillo, Romulo Camesario and Maximo Caquin, tenants

of ad jacen t   l andho ld ings ,  a t tes t ing   tha t  pe t i t i oner  was  a   tenan t  o f   the   landho ld ing  s ince  

1988 ,  and   tha t   they  he lped   inharvesting  palay  products and delivering to respondent her share in the

harvest. On April 21, 2004, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) affirmed the

decision. Respondent elevated the case to the CA through a petition for review. On December 29,

2005, the CA resolved thepetition in favor of respondent landowner and dismissed petitioner’s complaint. In a

Resolution, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioner filed this petition for

review,alleging that the CA decided the case not in accord with existing law and jurisprudence when it held that

petitioner failed to establishthat he had a tenancy relationship with respondent.

[10]

 

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner had a tenancy relationship with the respondent.

RULING:

In resolving this petition, the Court is guided by the principle that tenancy is not purely a factual relationship

dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land; it is also a legal relationship. A tenancy relationship

cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove the presence of all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1)

the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the

landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of

the harvest. The absence of one element does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, its cultivator or planter,

a

de jure tenant. From our own assessment of the evidence at hand, we find that petitioner failed to establish the

existence of a tenancy relationship between him and respondent. To prove a tenancy relationship,

the requisite quantum of evidence is substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The Certification of the BARC Chairman and the

affidavits of Julian, Sr. and of the tenants of the adjacent landholdings certainly do not suffice. By themselves,

they do not show that the elements of consent of the landowner and of sharing of harvests are present. To

establish consent, petitioner presented the Affidavit executed by Julian, Sr. However, the affidavit —which was

not notarized— cannot be given credence considering that it was not authenticated. It is self-serving and

unreliable. There should have been other corroborative evidence showing that respondent

consented to and approved of the transfer of tenurial rights to petitioner.The other tenants’ Joint

Affidavit, likewise, fails to prove that petitioner is a tenant, more particularly, that there was

personal cultivation and sharing of the harvest. In this affidavit, the affiants stated that they “helped hand in hand

with [petitioner] in harvesting and threshing our 

 palay products and helped him in delivering the share of [respondent] every year.” The affidavit is ambiguously

worded, considering that the affiants are also tenant-lessees of respondent and they could be referring to their

own harvest. Moreover, as noted by the CA, the affiants’ averment that petitioner became a tenant of the

landholding since 1988 runscounter to petitioner’s allegation that he became a tenant in 1981. In any case, the

fact alone of working on a landholding does not give rise to a presumption of the existence of agriculturaltenancy.

Substantial evidence requires more than a mere scintilla of evidence in order that the fact of sharing can be

established;there must be concrete evidence on record adequate enough to prove the element of sharing.

[16]

 To prove sharing of harvests, are ceipt or any other evidence must be presented, because self-serving

statements are inadequate. In this case, petitioner failed to present a receipt for respondent’s share in  the

harvest, or any other solid evidence proving that there was a sharing of harvest. To recap, petitioner is not a de

jure tenant entitled to security of tenure. There being no tenancy relationship between the parties, the DARAB

did not have jurisdiction over the case. We, therefore, sustain the ruling of the CA, dismissing

petitioner’s complaint. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision are AFFIRMED