Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-106-Caliphate-Grand-Plan

By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence. In The "War of the Cross, we seek a Strategy, our Enemy has one; their Grand-Plan."

In an effort to address the classic question: Al Qaida(AQ) Intent+ Capability = Threat

“Is it possible to look at that map in front of you and claim that the United States policy and strategy is working? Or that al-Qaida is on the run? It is unmistakable that our policies have failed.” --- former vice CoS of the Army, Gen. Jack Keane.

A note: Although I would prefer to replace in the presented texts the acronyms of the self declared Islamic State IS, ISIS and ISIL with Daesh 1, I did not,” as the name developed over time I stick to what is in the timeframe and original text reported.

INTRODUCTION

In regard to the fight against terror, much of the world's attention is currently focused on the Middle Eastern region, and finding solutions to the Ukraine conflict and deservedly so, however: AQ Intent+ Capability = Threat. In front of you is a lengthy document attempting to give some insight in the complex, dangerous environment and developments that the phenomena of the Daesh; so-called self declaring Islamic State under Caliph Ibrahim is presenting. As well as grabbing the threat from growing support, to include from – many young , Muslims in the western counties, spreading Islamic ideology, extremism and Jihadists are presenting to the World. Surprisingly, even after 9-11, London, Madrid, Moscow, Mumbai, the Westgate mall, Boston etc it took a long time for the western political leadership to take some form of action, let alone develop a comprehensive agreed strategy to oppose the growing and fast spreading Jihadists salafy Ideology 2. It took till the rise of the phenomena of the Daesh (the Islamic State) with self declared caliph to awaken the West even more strengthened after the Paris event to see a form of awakening and rise up of the western population. The Al Qaida leadership is already for the last two decades working on their plan, we choose however to ignore their writing, publications, statements and actions.

1 The Islamic State in Iraq and as-Shām Feb2015, by pietervanostaeyen On the origin of the name DAESH; It seems more and more Western media are using the derogatory DAESH when they’re talking about the Islamic State in Iraq and as-Shām (commonly known as ISIS). As nobody seems to have the faintest idea what DAESH stands for, here’s an attempt to explain. The capitals in the word DAESH point out it is an acronym of some sort. And indeed if we single out the beginning letters of the Arabic name for ISIS : العراق في السلمية الدولة:we get the Arabic والشام د (-wa’s) = ش Irāq‘ (-fī’l) =ع Islāmiyya (-al) = ا Dawlat (Nation) = داعش Shām (Greater Syria or the Levant) So, roughly transcribed to the Latin alphabet that leaves us with DAESH. (The E stands for the ‘ayn in ‘Iraq) At first the name DAESH was merely an acronym indeed. Activists and more moderate rebel coalitions used it as referral to Dawlat al-Islāmiyya fī al-Irāq wa s-Shām. But it didn’t take long before all kinds of interpretations arose. In the Arabic word داعش doesn’t even exist. But if we look at the tone of voice within circles (opposing ISIS) ever since they introduced the acronym, we might conclude the acronym has a double meaning. Most likely ISIS opponents are referring to the Arabic verb دعس, meaning : to thread underfoot, trample down, crush (see The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, p. 325 and 326) Another theory is that the name refers to the Jāhiliyya (pre-Islamic) strife between two Arab tribes on the Arabian peninsula : والغبراء Dāhis wa’l-Ghabrā’ can be literary translated as ‘felon and dust’ This داحس referral seems to have a more theological background yet it seems unlikely all sources using this would have in depth knowledge of the Jāhiliyya. Which ever theory suits best, it is quite clear that the acronym DAESH (is mostly, if not only, used by opponents of ISIS in Syria (داعش

2 https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-threats/terrorism/international-terrorism/the-nature-of-the-threat/al-qaidas-ideology.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salafi_jihadism

And wake-up calls.

---, Lieutenant General Vincent R. Stewart, the director of the DIA, testified before the House Armed Services Committee. Stewart warned that al Qaida in Syria may gain ground in 2015, the Islamic State remains capable of launching offensive operations despite the coalition's air campaign, and the Taliban-led insurgency has fought its opposition to a stalemate in Afghanistan

--- “You cannot defeat an enemy you do not admit exists.” U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,

---- “We have not defeated the idea,” he said. “We do not even understand the idea.” Major General Michael K. Nagata, the Special Operations commander for the United States in the Middle East, admitting that he had hardly begun figuring out the Islamic State’s appeal.

“If you close your eyes and pretend that anti-Semitism and Islamist terrorism doesn’t exist it just leads to more tragedies. If you ignore the problem it will come back and hit you in the face and President Obama is ignoring reality,” “We’re in a very grave situation when the leader of the US, which is meant to be the leader of the democratic world, ignores reality and does not see with open eyes Islamic terror as it really is and how it appears in many places around the world.” “Maybe President Obama thinks he can come to agreements with Islamic terrorism and I’m very concerned that this is what is leading him to a seek a compromise agreement with Iran and its desire to develop atomic weapons,” -- Deputy Religious Services Minister Eli Ben-Dahan 3

In the wake of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, beheading 21 Coptic Christians in Libya, retired U.S. Air Force Gen. Tom McInerney is slamming the Obama administration for failing to take obvious military steps to destroy the terrorists and identify radical Islam as the motivating factor for the atrocities committed throughout the region. McInerney is a Vietnam veteran and rose to the No. 3 position in the Air Force during his career in uniform. McInerney added, “Let’s get serious on this. The president has elected not to get serious. The Pentagon wants to do this, but the White House is holding back.”

On New Year’s Day, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi gave an address at Al-Azhar, the oldest and most prestigious religious school of the Sunni world. He said: “It’s

3 http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Obama-ignoring-reality-of-Islamic-terrorism-Deputy-minister-says-of-comments-on-Paris-attack-390807

As a starter: So far Five out of Seven Phases of Al Qaida’s grand plan came to fruition. The question to ask here is this – Paris - a revenge attack, although mentioned or a transit into their – al Qaida - next phase of their Seven stage plan, or is the latest event in France an ordinary – but deadly battle for global jihad control, fought out on the soil of the House of War, Disbelieve – dar al-Harb? Remember Winston Churchill: “the longer you can look back, the further you can look forward”.

inconceivable that the thinking that we hold most sacred should cause the entire umma (multinational community of Muslim believers) to be a source of anxiety, danger, killing and destruction for the rest of the world. Impossible! That thinking – I am not saying ‘religion’ but ‘thinking’ – that corpus of texts and ideas that we have sacralized over the years, to the point that departing from them has become almost impossible, is antagonizing the entire world. It’s antagonizing the entire world!

“Is it possible that 1.6 billion [Muslims] should want to kill the rest of the world’s inhabitants – that is 7 billion—so that they themselves may live? Impossible! … I say and repeat again that we are in need of a religious revolution. You, imams, are responsible before Allah. The entire world, I say it again, the entire world is waiting for your next move… because this umma is being torn, it is being destroyed, it is being lost – and it is being lost by our own hands.”

9 Feb 2015, "Islam is our responsibility. Our identity is our responsibility," said queen Rania in a video about the need to defeat Daesh both militarily and ideologically. "My country, Jordan, is facing crisis and tragedy with patience, faith and determination to fight terrorism and hold accountable those who are committing the most heinous and brutal atrocities of our time," said the queen of Jordan. "We are in a confrontation with those who have hijacked our religion...They claim to be the successors of the Islamic Caliphate but they have no conscience, and no heart...We need to act. And we are in a race against time to adopt policies that address the priorities which confront us today," she said.

Islamist radicals are at war with the U.S. and the Obama Administration has refused to recognize the "enemy," America's first-ever Hindu lawmaker Tulsi Gabbard has said. "What is so frustrating now as we look at the situation there, our administration refuses to recognize who our enemy is. And unless and until that happens, then it's impossible to come up with a strategy to defeat that enemy," "We have to recognize that this is about radical Islam, this is as much a military war as it is an ideological war, and we've got to understand what that ideology is and challenge it, understand it so that we can defeat it and protect our citizens, protect the American people," she said. "We recognize who our enemy is, and come up with a strategy to defeat that enemy. Unless and until you recognize who our enemy is and understand them, then we won't be effective in defeating that threat and we're going to continue to see the kinds of tragic incidents that we've seen most recently in Paris," she said. 6 Feb 2015, CNN 4

4 http://www.indiawest.com/news/global_indian/islamist-radicals-at-war-with-us-tulsi-gabbard/article_96e46b94-ad69-11e4-b566-f3f684dbf450.html

BOTTOM LINE OP FRONT

So far Five out of Seven Phases of Al Qaida’s grand plan came to fruition, and should give us reason for concern 5. The question to ask here is the latest – Paris - a revenge attack for Blasphemy of the Prophet, although mentioned or an initial indicator of transit into their – al Qaida - next phase of their Seven stage plan, or is the latest event in France an ordinary – but deadly battle for global jihad control, fought out on the soil of the House of War, Disbelieve – dar al-Harb? Daesh, the so-called Islamic State has according to Debkafile an expanding focus of the Near6 and their unbeliever” Muslims and apostate governments; it seems that the Egypt President is on the list to topple next. A threat also voiced by Muslim Brotherhood cleric Salama Abd Al-Qawi who said on Rabea TV; Anyone who kills Egyptian President Abd Al-Fattah Al-Sisi and the journalists who support him would be doing a good dead. Meanwhile, cleric Wagdi Ghoneim told Misr Alan TV that “whoever can bring us the head of one of these dogs and Hell-dwellers,” referring to Sisi and his supporters, would be rewarded by Allah. Interestingly it was Al Zawahir: who said in the past; "the road to Jerusalem passes through Cairo. 7" -- Moreover on 30 Jan 2015 8, The Muslim Brotherhood called for “a long, uncompromising jihad 9” in Egypt just days after a delegation of the

5 Awakening” Sept 11 Provoke U.S. attack on Muslims, galvanize Jihadism “Opening the Eyes” 2002–2006 Force West on defensive. “Arising and Standing Up” 2007–2010 Assaults on Turkey and Israel. “Downfall of Apostate Muslim regimes” 2010–2013 Saudi Arabia, Jordan, oil -producing countries and 5; “Declaration of Caliphate” 2013–2016 Mobilization of Muslim forces..

6 Waking Up to the New al-Qaeda, Ahmed Rashid The Yemen branch of al-Qaeda should be a particular concern to the West. AQAP is almost as old as the original al-Qaeda organization formed in Afghanistan and Pakistan by Osama bin Laden in the early 1980s. Moreover, in its fundamental aims, AQAP poses a more direct threat to Western targets than ISIS. From its initial rise to power in Iraq and Syria, ISIS has given top priority to the “near enemy,” what it views as the corrupt secular Arab regimes of the Middle East. AQAP has maintained the original al-Qaeda aim of attacking the “far enemy”—Western countries and Western capitalism—in order to bring about the collapse of Arab regimes. In other words, the Paris attacks could dramatically change the way Western governments operate, which is exactly what the old al-Qaeda tried to do when it attacked the twin towers in New York. AQAP will continue to make this its strategic aim—to bring Western capitalism to its knees. ISIS represents an extraordinary threat of its own, but the Paris attacks have demonstrated that the greatest danger to the West is still al-Qaeda. http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2015/jan/12/paris-attacks-waking-al-qaeda/

7 Al-Zawahiri expressed his early thought in an article in al-Mujahidun in April 1995. Like bin Laden, Zawahiri, now leader of al Qaida, has long placed targeting Israel farther down the operational totem pole than more immediate targets. In the 1990s, Zawahiri maintained, "the road to Jerusalem passes through Cairo." In other words, Palestine could be liberated only after illegitimate and insufficiently Islamic regimes in places such as Egypt were dealt with. Years later, in a letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, Zawahiri would explain that targeting Israel was a "fourth stage" goal following (or coming at the same time as) the expulsion of Americans from Iraq, the establishment of an Islamic emirate there, and extending the jihad to secular countries neighboring Iraq. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/zawahiri-aims-at-israel-behind-al-Qaidas-pivot-to-the-levant 8 http://freebeacon.com/national-security/open-jihad-declared-in-egypt-following-state-dept-meeting-with-muslim-brotherhood-aligned-leaders/9 8 Feb 2015, Muslim Brotherhood-linked television stations based in Turkey have been calling on supporters to use violent means in Egypt in an attempt to overthrow President Sisi and his army-backed government and return the country to Muslim Brotherhood The official Muslim Brotherhood representative in Turkey, Ashraf Abdulgaffar, made a similar call, advocating a policy of "an eye for an eye." He said: "We are now in the retaliation phase. They [Sisi’s government] must taste pain, because there are traitors. My message to the Egyptian people is this: Stand firm and be ready for all sacrifices and prices to be paid.” Other statements went much further. A “communique” issued by an organization claiming to be the “Revolutionary Youth,” and broadcast on Muslim Brotherhood Rabia TV, threatened to launch terrorist attacks on foreign nationals in Egypt. The televised statement gave all foreign nationals until February 11 to leave Egypt, saying "after that they may become targeted by the movements of revolutionary retribution."

Islamist group’s key leaders and allies met with the State Department, according to an official statement released this week. “It is incumbent upon everyone to be aware that we are in the process of a new phase, where we summon what is latent in our strength, where we recall the meanings of jihad and prepare ourselves, our wives, our sons, our daughters, and whoever marched on our path to a long, uncompromising jihad, and during this stage we ask for martyrdom,” it states.

Also Israel is mentioned – By Daesh, and see footnote for Zawahiri thoughts - to be attacked be it from the north or the south or both. On the other hand both AQIM and AQAP and the late Sep established AQIS are signalling in their latest statements a move from the Near to the Far. It is unknown, though likely that AQSL has sanctioned the start into the next strategic Phase: the confrontation in the Far: dar al-Harb, the house of unbeliever. If as mentioned 5 out of 7 stages are in process or came to some form of completion the latest is not unlikely.

As western intelligence officials have warned for some time now, it is highly likely that the fight will come to Europe, sleeper cells – likely over years trained and positioned - are activated, trained and indoctrinated fighters are returning, with the blasphemy of the prophet opposition in the western and global Muslim communities and their leading clerics growing the conditions are increasing in favour of our enemies: be it Daesh or AQ, the later still has the better cards to do so. If AQ decides to launch their next phase into the west, foreseen culminate 2016-2018, it is likely they could absorb the “Near” Daesh activity into their orbit and become a powerfully and dangerous enemy with growing capabilities and motivated, trained, battle hardened fighters. The killing – by a member state of the US led coalition against them -of Daesh caliph Ibrahim, so far targeted more than once, could be AQ blessing and the turning point in favour of the AQSL. They have the long-term plan and vision and don’t like the current Daesh and its leader. As most of us didn’t notice or ignored Zawahiri who’s main focus is the Far around 2006 shifted – temporarily – the strategic focus from the Far to the Near in a likely move to facilitate phase 3,and 4 to set conditions for Five.

The key question here could be: do we see the prelude of an AQSL strategic shift into the next strategic phase? Also is Daesh (IS) circling 10 - 11outwards from their main operating area Iraq-Syria, into the wider Middle East, but still addressing the issues in Near? If so, the two different stages and views in strategies complement each other. Or could we make a bold move and say, -- planned, structured, controlled with some kind of coordination, or following the same shied of paper: the plan, or not -- , that while Daesh is consolidating – the caliphate – AQSL strategic phase Five while AQSL and its subordinates – affiliates – is moving in the next strategic phase of the grand plan? If the afore olds some truth we should ask, who’s plan it is and who is really leading? Whatever the outcome, Europe is in trouble. And than there is the consequences of our previous actions, - what I will call 3 rd order effects of them - and interventions in the Muslim countries, be it removing a leader or reacting to an action of one of them. We likely have reached a point where – reluctance for- any further new intervention will only feed the Salafist doctrine even more and backfire on us. Sadly that’s what the AQSL has anticipated taking place when phase five was reached.

10 3 Feb 2015, Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, made the comments in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, "he warned about the "spread" of the Islamic State beyond Iraq and Syria, to three other countries "With affiliates in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, the group is beginning to assemble a growing international footprint that includes ungoverned and under-governed areas,.11 http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4354/isis-jordan ISIS Threatens to Invade Jordan, 'Slaughter' King Abdullah

Additionally have our political leaders with the declared strategic intent to defeat Daesh envisioned if we succeeds; what next and than what?

http://www.voanews.com/content/india-on-alert-after-al-qaida-announces-local-branch/2438207.html

The Author

Having served in my National army and seen many places and different assignments all over the World, I watched and followed the ever changing world order after the so-called end of the Cold War and the difficulties for many of us to understand or see what’s happening. The Bi-polar World was for me as intelligence officer a relative easy way of analyzing the intent. We were well trained and educated in the conduct of war and way on thinking of our opponents. The fact that there were politic/military doctrines to be studied and learned made, although still complex my way of life simple once you understood: know the enemy. Today however we have a complete different Global picture and a far more complex world. Partially debit to our slipping knowledge and understanding is due to a constant reduction of our intelligence apparatus – part of the so-called peace dividend and economical situations in many of our countries. Additionally and although our enemy struck – as they call it: the Far enemy - in many of our home towns we still lack a comprehensive approach and more worrisome a definition on who we fight. In military term we say threat equals intent and capabilities, our current enemy has mentioned in many publications and statements what they are going to do and how they going to do it. We in the Western world however have responded with ridiculing these statements and publications or even worse ignored them. For me my attention was drawn to our current enemy and their way of life and thinking with the first declaration of war under Usama bin Laden; published in August 1996 - "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places". - and the second in February 1998 - The World Islamic Front is the organization that issued the World Islamic Front Statement of 23 February 1998, "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders",, and a bit later when the Taliban in Afghanistan advantaged in Afghanistan with the speed of light.

Declaration or as they say, Fatwa – ruling- is widely regarded by terrorism experts as the founding document of what become al Qaida (Qaida) .

What draw my attention and urged me to start reading what ever I could was do to the fact that they spoke of things that was beyond my knowledge. I heard and read the words but did not understand so I looked deep into what do they mean with words like: Battle of Badr, in the Trenches, awakening, Ummah, Shia-Sunni rivalry12, vanguard, apostate, infidel, tafkir, hijra, dawa, hesba, the different types of Jihad, salafist,- doctrine etc, to understand and put in perspective what it was what they are really saying. My military postings in theatres gave me the opportunity to talk with locals who have a different look as we through our western glasses. One thing became clear to me and in many cases positively surprised me; they have a fait and a strong relation with their religion that we have lost centuries ago. They also talked with me about the more dark side of all of this, the jihadist/extremist Salafy ideology and how elements tweak it into their advantage. In this document I will try to show how jihadist or as others say salafi: also known as the Salafi methodology and the Salafist movement came about - The popular hadith that quotes Muhammad as saying 'The people of my own generation are the best, then those who come after them, and then those of the next generation,' is seen as a call to Muslims follow the example of those first three generations, the salaf - ideology is becoming a more driving force in the modern theatres and find resonance in many –to include western - Muslim youths. Also our enemy bases much of their conduct on their way of interpretation of the Holy Koran and Islamic jurisprudence, again sadly enough the willing hear is there and growing, awakening, opening the eyes was one of the first orders given by UBL in his strategy to the path of defeat of the West and establish the old ruler: a caliph. – The extremist Salafi follows "literal, traditional ... injunctions of the sacred texts", this drives extremist’s ideology way of thinking and they have a vision, and plan. This document will be an effort to explain their voiced and written intent, strategy, plans, growing capabilities’ in a way so to understand. It is by no means intended to upset the larger part of the Muslim community who have no blame, other than – many not all -being silent when terror strikes. But also a warning to the western world that often interferes in countries and than withdrawals leaving an instable environment behind to be filled by others. Ok it is complex but allow me to try to explain.

12 Radical Salafists consider both Shiites and Jews the enemies of Islam. But anti-Shiite enmity is often stronger than that against Jews among Salafists, who consider the Shiites a fifth column and thus see "damage" by Shiites as more serious than that caused by others http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/salafist-sunnis-shiites-enemy-jews.html

LAY-OUT of the paper

Al Qaida Aim and Strategy; In multiple statements, leaders like Zawahiri have consistently presented a series of objectives that al Qaida is actively pursuing: liberating all "Muslim lands" from occupation by both non-Muslims and "apostate" rulers; imposing their version of sharia (Islamic law) on Muslims and non-Muslims alike in these lands; erecting then a state that they call the "caliphate;" and eventually making God’s word the highest.

AQ The Seven Phased Plan; In publications released in 2005, an article in Spiegel Online by a Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein, who is believed to be a reliable source of information on al-Qaida, gives a detailed insight in AQ long-term plans, known as the 2020 Plan.

Abu-Mus‘ab al-Suri the AQ top strategic thinker, and his manifesto; The Call for Global Islamic Resistance; In 2002, Suri, in his hideout in Iran, began writing his defining work, “Call for Worldwide Islamic Resistance,” 13 which is sixteen hundred pages long and was published on the Internet in December, 2004. Didactic and repetitive, but also ruthlessly candid, the book dissects the faults of the jihadi movement and lays out a plan for the future of the struggle. The goal, he writes, is “to bring about the largest number of human and material casualties possible for America and its allies.”

Intent: Graphical representation of the plan: AQ Strategic plan according to Zawahiri and al Suri

‘AQ Core doctrinal material i.e. Commanders Guidance; “The data don’t get to the top, because the decision-makers are not looking for that kind of information,” a policy analyst who works closely with the American intelligence community told. “They think they know better.” As the writings of Abu Musab al-Suri, Abu Bakr Naji, Fouad Hussein, and others make clear, the tradition of Salafi jihad existed before bin Laden and Al Qaida and will likely survive them; yet, from the beginning of the war on terror, the strategy of the Administration has been to decapitate Al Qaida’s leadership.

Spreading the Word; The author was presumably a leading member of either Ayman al-Zawahri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad or of the Islamic Group of the “blind Sheikh” Omar Abdel Rahmen. In keeping with the manual’s roots, the target of the operations and techniques outlined in it is not the United States but rather what the opening chapter describes as the “godless and apostate” Arab rulers and regimes. This was the original target of the modern jihadist movement, before the focus gradually shifted to the “distant” US enemy in the aftermath of the first Iraq War.

Map with AQ affiliates’ command and capabilities

The Pious Caliphate Will Start From Afghanistan" (Does Mullah Omar fits into 1926 credentials; With the withdrawal of western forces from Afghanistan, Is al-Qaida's Long-Held Afghan Strategy Now Unfolding? Bin Laden's strategic goal of ensuring "the pious Caliphate will start from Afghanistan."

13 See my Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2014 Part 19-78-Caliphate-Manuals-2

Mix of radical ideas and idealism drives Europeans to join global jihad; Gilles de Kerchove: (coordinator of counter-terrorism efforts among EU member states; where we start being concerned is when, and that is what we understand, many of them are mainly joining the groups affiliated to Al-Qaida and groups which not only want to withdraw Assad but have the global jihad rhetoric and share fully the project of Al-Qaida

New al Qaida document sheds light on Europe, U.S. attack plans; A previously secret document found at Osama bin Laden's compound in Pakistan sets out a detailed al Qaida strategy for attacking targets in Europe and the United States.

Ayman al-Zawahiri, has repeatedly threatened Europe; In September 2006 he appeared in a video website on the fifth anniversary of the 11 September attacks, urging to punish France as prime target for Islamist militants. Pierre de Bousquet de Florian, then head of the DST (domestic security service), said the threat of terrorist attack in France remained "very high and very international". // After the beginning of Arab Spring, the terrorist Al-Qaida organization has undergone an important change in strategy. As a result of that change, Al-Qaida has excluded the United States and other Western powers, which it previously considered as “far enemy,” from its new strategy. Instead, the group has focused on the “near enemy,” that is the Arab countries in the region Ayman Al-Zawahiri.

The Caliphate Conference. Cairo. May 1926. The World Muslim Congress Makkah June-July 1926; Shaikh Muhammad al-Ahmadi al-Zawahiri, head of the Egyptian delegation: The grandfather of Ayman al-Zawahri the current leader of Al Qaida. "In the examination of theological questions which were submitted to us, we did not wish to resort to ijtihad 14 and to establish a new doctrine. We confined ourselves to examining the principles admitted by the recognized doctrines of Islam. As for the applicability of these principles, it is for you to declare that that is beyond our competence." "I am advocating neither a new doctrine nor ijtihad. What I seek is your opinion. If you affirm principles which are not susceptible of application in our epoch, what will be the circumstances?"

Our problem of understanding; If we pay a close attention to the following sayings of our Prophet we will see that this situation of the Muslim world was predicted and is not really matter of surprise.

The Growing Threat of al Qaida by RAND Corporation research report: A Persistent Threat, also The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists by Seth G. Jones addressing Qaida and Its Affiliates; 2014 study based upon Rand; The report makes several arguments. First, and most important, the United States faces a serious and growing Salafi-jihadist challenge overseas.

Al-Qaida and its affiliates and adherents worldwide continue to present a serious threat to the United States, 25 Nov 2014, According to a State Department Strategic Assessment report al-Qaida is alive and well and remains a top priority for US counter terrorism officials.

14 The exercise of critical thinking and independent judgment – or Ijtihad --was an important way to address questions in the early centuries of Islam. After approximately 400 years, however, the leaders of the Sunni Muslim world closed the "Gates of Ijtihad;" Muslims were no longer allowed use itjihad to solve problems. If a seemingly new problem arose, they were supposed to find an analogy from earlier scholars and apply that ruling to the problem that arose. From the 10th century onwards, Sunni Muslim leaders began to see questioning as politically dangerous to their ability to rule. Regrettably, Sunni Muslim leaders reject the use of itjihad to this day. http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3114/muslims-ijtihad

Islamic State and Al-Qaida: The Threat of Cooperation; while these reports may be speculative, an accord between al-Qaida and the Islamic State, and the end of the infighting between the jihadist organizations would have deleterious ramifications for all those who oppose them including the Kurds, the Assad regime, and any US-led coalition

Al-Qaida Possibilities, AQ insurgencies; Given the news reports of local cooperation between AQ and IS, as well as the stated desire by AQ to reconcile with the group, it seems likely that at least part of IS will end up rejoining the organization that gave birth to them. This would be even more likely if Baghdadi and his command staff are killed....even a partial unification [between AQ and IS] could be dangerous, since it would still add significantly to the power of the al-Nusra Front and make it far more likely that the taking of Damascus would succeed.

Islamic State builds links with al-Qaida landsAnalysis By BBC Monitoring, The Islamic State (IS) group has forged links with militants across North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, embracing regional franchises that have pledged allegiance to the group.

AQ THE SEVEN PHASED PLAN;

In publications released in 2005 The Word Unheard points us to an article in Spiegel Online by a Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein, who is believed to be a reliable source of information on al-Qaida. His main source for this article on al-Qaida strategy is none other than Saif al-Adel, al-Qaida’s military commander who was back than operating from Iran. Al-Qaida’s purported strategy can be broken down into seven “phases” which span from 2000 until 2020, at which time they believe the global Islamist Caliphate will be established and they will achieve “definitive victory.”

Some of the features of the plan were mentioned in a book published in 2005 by Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein, titled Zarqawi – Al-Qaida’s Second Generation. Hussein interviewed Sheikh Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, a prominent al-Qaida ideologue, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the Swaqa prison in Jordan.Another book circulating in jihadi forums, titled This is How We See and Want Jihad, sheds light on the objectives, plans, and stages through which al-Qaida wants to take power. The plan calls for expanding jihadi activities to cover the entire world, “to amplify the nation’s strength and terrorize its enemies.” The plan is divided into seven phases, and covers two decades, from 2000 to 2020, the year “final victory” would be achieved

First, the focus would be on al-Sham (Greater Syria), with sayings of the Prophet Mohammad interpreted to suggest that this region would be next after Iraq in the conflict, “not to mention the clear plans to partition Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan into sectarian statelets to reshape the region.” In his book, quoting Maqdisi and Zarqawi, the Jordanian journalist pointed out that the idea of creating a jihadi division in Greater Syria, known as Jund al-Sham, had actually been proposed in the days of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, though the idea could not be developed further because of the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan 15. Hussein explains that the advocates of this idea returned to Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq at the time (2005), to prepare themselves for any opportunity there. At the end of this phase, al-Qaida would have theoretically finished its preparations to initiate direct operations in Palestine and on the border with the state of Israel, “establishing al-Qaida as the legitimate leader of the nation.”

15 Central Asian leaders, like Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov, have warned that Afghanistan risks becoming another Syria or Iraq, and Vladimir Putin concurred with this assessment (Interfax, December 10, 2014). Meanwhile, Russia’s presidential representative in Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, likewise claims that Uzbekistan and Tajikistan know of and share Russia’s assessment of an imminent Islamic State–led invasion of Central Asia. Though, many Western analysts consider that assessment of the radical militant group’s capabilities, especially in this theater, as overhyped (Interfax, December 29, 2014). With most of the military forces of the United States and the North Atlantic Organization (NATO) having departed Afghanistan, Russia has grown increasingly anxious about a possible deterioration of the regional security situation. As 2014 ended, Moscow flatly called NATO’s Afghanistan policy a failure (Pajhwok Afghan News, December 31, 2014). Yet, at the same time, Russia insists that the North Atlantic Alliance retains responsibility for Afghan security even though its mission has ended. James Town Foundation February 6, 2015 -- Volume 12, Issue 24

1 “Awakening” Sept 11 Provoke U.S. attack on Muslims, galvanize Jihadism2 “Opening the Eyes” 2002–2006 Force West on defensive3 “Arising and Standing Up” 2007–2010 Assaults on Turkey and Israel4 “Downfall of Apostate Muslim regimes” 2010–2013 Saudi Arabia, Jordan, oil -producing countries5 “Declaration of Caliphate” 2013–2016 Mobilization of Muslim forces6 “Total Confrontation” 2016–2020 Total war on “non-believers”7 “Definitive Victory” 2020 Establishmen

The fourth phase, from 2010 to 2013, dubbed “recovery,” coincided in reality with the Arab Spring wave of uprisings and the crisis in Syria. In this phase, al-Qaida would focus on toppling regimes by directly participating in insurgencies against them.Al-Qaida’s plan, according to the documents, would seek to “discredit the regime in the eyes of the people by helping expose their collaboration with US policy.” This, according to al-Qaida’s plan, would be coupled with the growth of al-Qaida and the exhaustion of US power through direct combat, but also “electronic attacks targeting the US economy, and attacks against Arab oil installations, to hurt regimes and their Western backers.” Meanwhile, al-Qaida seems to favor gold as an international reserve currency and wants to peg other currencies to gold. In its belief, this would lead to the US dollar’s collapse, since it is not pegged to gold. In this phase, too, according to al-Qaida’s plan, Israel would be in a weak state as a result of internal conflict, declining international support, and the collapse of Arab regimes that protect Israel.

The fifth phase from 2013 to 2016 would see the “declaration of the caliphate or the Islamic state,” al-Qaida’s ultimate goal. This phase would see many international transformations, beginning with the demise of the Anglo-Saxon axis and the emergence of new world powers that Muslims have no strong antagonisms with, such as India16 and China17, in tandem with the exponential rise of al-Qaida. --- This will be the point at which an Islamic state, or caliphate, can be declared. The plan is that by this time, between 2013 and 2016, Western influence in the Islamic world will be so reduced and Israel weakened so much, that resistance will not be feared. Al-Qaida hopes that by then the Islamic state will be able to bring about a new world order. --- The concept, known as Qualitative Military Edge (QME), February 5, 2015 WASHINGTON — Key lawmakers say they're open to re-examining a decades-old arms policy that guarantees Israel a technological advantage over its neighbours now that they're all facing the same threat. ..

The sixth phase from 2016 to 2020 is the phase of “total war.” Al-Qaida’s ideologues estimate that the beginning of 2016 would be the “beginning of the confrontation between faith and disbelief, which would begin in earnest after the establishment of the Islamic 16 On September 3 2014, Ayman al Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda Central (AQC) announced the establishment of a new branch: al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Zawahiri, often described as “long on words and short on charm” delivered a characteristically ambling and inchoate message. He explained how the new group was the “blessed result” of a two-year effort to consolidate various Al-Qaeda affiliates in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Baluchistan and India into one organization with the (ostensible) purposes of serving embattled Muslims in the region by establishing sharia law and “freeing the occupied land of Muslims.” The Indian states of Kashmir (the site of a six decade long secession struggle), Gujarat (where an infamous pogrom against Muslims occurred in 2002), and Assam (a state where Muslims are persecuted for allegedly being parasitic Bangladeshi immigrants), along with Burma and Bangladesh, are mentioned as loci for potential operations. So while many analysts may view the establishment of AQIS as an ill-fated reactionary maneuver in response to the ascendency of ISIS, it may be better to think of it as AQC digging in for the long haul in South and Central Asia. While its immediate dividends may be low, AQIS may prove to be a crucial component in ensuring AQC’s long-term viability, indicating al-Qaeda’s possible intention to consolidate in the peripheral areas of the Greater Middle East (North Africa, South & Central Asia) while it waits for the ISIS phenomenon to run its course rather than attempting to challenge the upstart head on. In short, proclamations about al-Qaeda’s irrelevance or imminent demise seem as premature today as they were at the outset of the Arab Spring. If there’s one thing al-Qaeda is good at it, it’s reinventing and reviving itself in response to changing circumstances. Counterterrorism experts would do well to take heed. Jordan Olmstead

17 Oct 2014, Al Qaeda declared war on China, when it issued its English-language magazine Resurgence, with a section entitled “10 Facts About East Turkistan” critical of China’s Uyghur policies in Xinjiang. This sudden focus on China follows on the heels of ISIS condemning China in July, when Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi named China first in a string of 20 countries as battlegrounds to wage jihad, as well as threatened to occupy Xinjiang in its aspirant caliphate.

caliphate,” echoing Osama bin Laden’s discourse in many of his speeches. This would be followed by the final phase, the phase of “final victory,” sometime in 2020. By then, according to al-Qaida’s plans, “the Islamic state’s capabilities will be great beyond measure when Muslims would number more than 1.5 billion.” The documents outlining this strategy were published in 2005. Comparing their contents to reality, one realizes that many of the objectives have indeed been achieved: the attacks in New York and Washington in 2001; using Iraq and Afghanistan as a base to build a “jihadi army”; and the subsequent expansion into Syria, culminating with the declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2013, and self-declaring of the return of the Caliph mid 2014, was stated in the documents published in 2005.

Will al-Qaida continue to grow in strength all the way to achieving victory in 2020? So far Five out of Seven Phases of Al Qaida’s grand plan came to fruition. al Qaida - next phase of their Seven stage plan, a deadly battle fought out on the soil of the House of War, Disbelieve – dar al-Harb18 ; The West.

Remember: January 29, 2014 In certain Salafi-jihadi circles, a so-called strategic plan of al-Qaida is being circulated. Al-Qaida has ostensibly been working to implement this plan according to a two-decade timetable, beginning in 2000, with preparations for the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and concluding in 2020. The widespread belief that al-Qaida’s bloody activities are random and not governed by any clear strategy is a misconception. To be sure, counterterrorism agencies possess dozens of documents on al-Qaida’s projects and long-term strategic plans, which have well-defined goals. For example, one security agency, nearly a year after the beginning of the conflict in Syria, was able to intercept correspondence between the leader of al-Nusra Front, Abu Mohammed al-Golani, and a prominent al-Qaida figure in Lebanon, outlining the jihadi group’s plans after the fall of the Syrian regime, which included recruiting experts in medicine, chemistry, IT, and telecommunications, and spreading out across Lebanon in preparation for operations.

Affiliate’s latest SIGNALING

Al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) top clerics, Ibrahim Al Rubaish, “The unbelievers should be struck in their own countries, [and] anyone who insulted our prophet [should] be chastised, as well as anyone who expressed solidarity with he who insulted [the prophet], and [the jihad] work must continue, and the raid must be followed by another raid."

• “Al Rubaish also accuses France of leading the war on Islam and Muslims, and says that France, and all unbelievers, who participate in the aggression against Islam and Muslims and allow their citizens to freely insult Islam must also pay a price, in their security and in their economy.

• With the "weakening" of the United States in recent years, France has replaced America in the "war on Islam," Ibrahim al-Rubaish said in an audio message published by AQAP's media arm on YouTube.

• Ahmed Rashid 19one that has gotten all too little attention in the West in recent months: al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which is based in Yemen. For some years it has been well known in jihadist and Western intelligence circles that the most effective branch of al-Qaida was in Yemen, where the group trained sophisticated bomb makers, recruited mules or suicide bombers of many nationalities,

18 See Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2014 Part 17-24-The Deep Battle against the West

19 http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2015/jan/12/paris-attacks-waking-al-Qaida/

controlled considerable territory, and—unlike ISIS—specifically aimed at attacking the West. The Yemen branch of al-Qaida should be a particular concern to the West. AQAP is almost as old as the original al-Qaida organization formed in Afghanistan and Pakistan by Osama bin Laden in the early 1980s. Moreover, in its fundamental aims, AQAP poses a more direct threat to Western targets than ISIS. From its initial rise to power in Iraq and Syria, ISIS has given top priority to the “near enemy,” what it views as the corrupt secular Arab regimes of the Middle East. Thus, while there have been some attacks in the West by supporters of ISIS, the group itself has set out to seize Arab territory, destroy borders, and establish a unitary Islamic state or Caliphate stretching from Morocco to India. By contrast, AQAP has maintained the original al-Qaida aim of attacking the “far enemy”—Western countries and Western capitalism—in order to bring about the collapse of Arab regimes.

In regard to the fight against terror, much of the world's attention is currently centered on the Middle Eastern region, and deservedly so. However, the West would be remiss to forget that al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM 20) and its militant Islamic allies, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) and Ansar Dine, an AQIM-aligned jihadist group, controlled over half of the sovereign territory of Mali prior to French intervention.

• In Jan According to a tweet by SITE monitoring group, Al Qaida's branch in North Africa (AQIM), commended the attack on Charlie Hebdo magazine and urged Muslims to follow the example of Kouachi brothers who killed 12 people.

• According to West Point's Combating Terrorism Center, AQIM's objectives include ridding North Africa of Western influence; overthrowing governments deemed apostate, including those of Algeria, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia; and installing fundamentalist regimes based on sharia. Analysts say AQIM's ideology blends global Salafi-jihadist dogma with regionally resonant elements, including references to the early Islamic conquest of the Maghreb and the Iberian Peninsula.

The spokesman for al Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS 21), Usama Mahmood, has released a statement calling on all Muslims, including rival jihadist organizations in Syria, to unite against the US. "Once again we call upon the Muslims worldwide to stand in support of the Mujahidīn against the American coalition and join this fard-al-ayn (absolute obligation of) Jihad to gain freedom, to protect their Deen, to guard their holy places and to establish the supremacy of Shari'ah,"

20 http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-Qaida-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p1271721 http://www.thelondoneconomic.com/2014/09/12/al-Qaida-in-the-indian-subcontinent-an-imminent-threat-to-india/

The problem is that intelligence agencies are now looking for Daesh (ISIS) under every bed. The truth — mercifully — is that it has not yet arrived. But what remain present are extremist groups with deep roots in the local soil, and these are just as dangerous. The truth is that, in many countries in the Muslim world, Isis may have sympathisers but it does not yet have well-established roots. Well before the attacks, however, al-Qaida had spent nearly 20 years building up contacts and cells in Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Saudi Arabia

-- Ahmed Rashid December 10, 2014

“The longer you can look back, the further you can look forward”. --- Winston Churchill

If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred battles. --- Sun Tzu

The strategy is not working; we need to define the enemy. There is confusion about what we fight. We need to find out what our strategy is; we need a comprehensive coherent strategy to fight the ideology that is breaking down the Arab world order, as some of them are part of the problem, this is threatening the West. We need to come to grips with the growing issue of the foreign fighter. ISIS is a tactical problem; Salafist Ideology is the strategic one and need to be addressed. We need to face the growing threat of the radical Islam; it may take a very long time to address.

--- Lt Gen Michael Flynn Fox News Sunday, (2 Feb 2015) The “wolf pack is not only ISIS 22

To have a wide angle view, the document is produced with multiple sources used, and where possible given credit to the producers and authors. A special thanks to those who were willing to support me in the effort….

22 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZKgtN3ZT9tc

MAIN BODY Al Qaida Intent+ Capability = Threat

AL QAIDA AIM AND STRATEGY: Many in the Western world believe that: The principal stated aims of al-Qaida are to drive Americans and American influence out of all Muslim nations, especially Saudi Arabia; destroy Israel; and topple pro-Western dictatorships around the Middle East. However a look at the public and private statements of al Qaida’s leaders supports the view that the group seeks to achieve far more than simply attacking the U.S. and its allies. In multiple statements, leaders like Zawahiri have consistently presented a series of objectives that al Qaida is actively pursuing: liberating all "Muslim lands" from occupation by both non-Muslims and "apostate" rulers; imposing their version of sharia (Islamic law) on Muslims and non-Muslims alike in these lands; erecting then a state that they call the "caliphate;" and eventually making God’s word the highest. This phrase, which means many things to Muslims, signifies just one thing for the extremists: that the entire world is ruled by their version of sharia.

Sept. 29, 2005 – (Remember this was in 2005, but also reflects AQSL Phase 5 anticipation of western strength in the region, foreseen to take place around 2014-2016 ) Al Qaida terrorists hope to drive American influence from the Middle East and install a global Muslim leader in Saudi Arabia, Army Gen. John Abizaid said 23. Speaking during Senate testimony, Abizaid, chief of U.S. Central Command, said al Qaida's objectives are clear. "They believe in a jihad, a jihad to overthrow the legitimate regimes in the region," he said.

"In order to do that, they first must drive America from the region." Al Qaida believes the most important prize is Saudi Arabia, which is home to the holy shrines in Mecca and Medina. If al Qaida terrorists manage to take control of Saudi Arabia, they will try to create and expand their influence in the region and establish a caliphate, Abizaid said. The term harkens back to the immediate successors of Muhammed and means a land led by a supreme secular and religious ruler. Al Qaida insists that re-establishing a caliphate would mean that one man, as the successor to Muhammad, would possess clear political, military and legal standing as the global Muslim leader. Abizaid said al Qaida would then apply a very narrow, strict interpretation of Sharia, Islamic law, not believed in or practiced anywhere else in the world today. Such conquest in the Middle East "would certainly allow al Qaida and their proxies to control a vast oil wealth that exists in the region," he said. "They intend to destroy Israel in the process, as well."

The next goal would be to expand into non-Arab Islamic countries. This would include the middle of Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia, the general said. The organization would

23 http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=17178

“Our message to you is clear, strong and final: There will be no salvation until you withdraw from our land, stop stealing our oil and resources and end support for infidel, corrupt rulers.” “Didn't the lion of Islam, the Mujahid Shaykh Osama bin Laden, may Allah protect him, offer you a truce so that you might depart from the Islamic lands? But you were obstinate and were led by arrogance to more crime and your foreign secretary, Jack Straw, said these proposals deserve to be met with contempt.” -- Zawahiri---

operate from these areas and also from cyberspace. He said al Qaida uses to Internet to transmit their hatred. "They aim to take advantage of open societies and will strike at those societies when they are ready at their time and place of choosing," he said. In an allusion that is probably distasteful to American companies, Abizaid said al Qaida is not a monolith like IBM. Rather, it is a franchise operation like McDonald's. This makes it very difficult to cut off the head of the organization. The group uses any and all means to further its goals: drugs, smuggling, so-called charitable organizations and others.

A KEY DOCUMENT: THE CALL FOR GLOBAL ISLAMIC RESISTANCE.

Abu-Mus‘ab al-Suri the AQ top strategic thinker, and his manifesto; The Call for Global Islamic Resistance. Although highly critical then to the actions taken and the way conducted his work is for today’s jihadist the manifesto of which to learn and use, moreover besides to lessons learned it has a large part of what we could call the Intelligence Preparation of the next Battlefield. If you are today surprised why some countries do and do not – yet- have fallen pray this book is a must. In 2002, Suri, in his hideout in Iran, began writing his defining work, “Call for Worldwide Islamic Resistance,” 24which is sixteen hundred pages long and was published on the Internet in December, 2004. Didactic and repetitive, but also ruthlessly candid, the book dissects the faults of the jihadi movement and lays out a plan for the future of the struggle. The goal, he writes, is “to bring about the largest number of human and material casualties possible for America and its allies.” He specifically targets Jews, “Westerners in general,” the members of the NATO alliance, Russia, China, atheists, pagans, and hypocrites, as well as “any type of external enemy.” (The proliferation of adversaries mirrors Al Qaida’s hatred of all other ideologies.) And yet, at the same time, he bitterly blames Al Qaida for dragging the entire jihadi movement into an unequal battle that it is likely to lose. Unlike most jihadi theorists, Suri acknowledges the setback caused by September 11th. He laments the demise of the Taliban, which he and other Salafi jihadis considered the modern world’s only true Islamic government. America’s “war on terror,” he complains, doesn’t discriminate between Al Qaida adherents and Muslims in general. “Many loyal Muslims,” he writes, believe that the September 11th attacks “justified the American assault and have given it a legitimate rationale for reoccupying the Islamic world.” But Suri goes on to argue that America’s plans for international domination were already evident “in the likes of Nixon and Kissinger,” and that this agenda would have been pursued without the provocation of September 11th. Moreover, the American attack on Afghanistan was not really aimed at capturing or killing bin Laden; its true goal was to sweep away the Taliban and eliminate the rule of Islamic law.

In Suri’s view, the underground terrorist movement—that is, Al Qaida and its sleeper cells—is defunct. This approach was “a failure on all fronts,” because of its inability to achieve military victory or to rally the Muslim people to its cause. He proposes that the next stage of jihad will be characterized by terrorism created by individuals or small autonomous groups (what he terms “leaderless resistance”), which will wear down the enemy and prepare the ground for the far more ambitious aim of waging war on “open fronts”—an outright struggle for territory. He explains, “Without confrontation in the field and seizing control of the land, we cannot establish a state, which is the strategic goal of the resistance.” Suri acknowledges that the “Jewish enemy, led by America and its nonbelieving, apostate, hypocritical allies,” enjoys overwhelming military superiority, but he argues that the spiritual commitment of the

24 See my Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2014 Part 19-78-Caliphate-Manuals-2

jihadis is equally formidable. He questions Al Qaida’s opposition to democracy, which offers radical Islamists an opportunity to “secretly use this comfortable and relaxed atmosphere to spread out, reorganize their ranks, and acquire broader public bases.” In many Arabic states, there is a predictable cycle of official tolerance and savage repression, which can work in favor of the Islamists. If the Islamists “open the way for political moderation,” Suri writes, they will “stretch out horizontally along the base and spread. So they once again exterminate and jihad grows yet again! So then they try to open things up once again, and Islam stretches out and expands again!” The Bush Administration has declared a “war of ideas” against Islamism, Suri observes, and has had some success; he cites the modification of textbooks in many Muslim countries. This effort, he writes, must be countered by the propagation of the jihadi creed—and this is what his book attempts to do, offering a minutely detailed account of the tenets of Salafi jihadism. Suri urges his readers to reject their own repressive governments and to rise up against Western occupation and Zionism. Although the leaders of Al Qaida have long excused the slaughter of innocents, and many of its attacks have been directed at other Muslims, Suri specifically cautions against harming other Muslims, women and children who may be nonbelievers, and other noncombatants. Suri addresses the issue of Israel, writing that “the Zionist presence in Palestine 25” is an insult to Muslims; but he also excoriates the secular Palestinian National Authority that governs the country. “Armed jihad is the only solution,” he advises. “Every mujahid must wage jihad against all forms of normalization—its institutions, officials, and advocates . . . destroying them and assassinating those who rely on them . . . while paying attention not to harm Muslims by mistake.”

There are five regions, according to Suri, where jihadis should focus their energies: Afghanistan, Central Asia, Yemen, Morocco, and, especially, Iraq. The American occupation of Iraq, he declares, inaugurated a “historical new period” that almost single-handedly rescued the jihadi movement just when many of its critics thought it was finished.1. Countries of the Arabian Peninsula, al-Sham countries, Egypt, and Iraq. This land contains the holy places, oil, Israel, and countries surrounding it..2. Countries of North Africa from Libya to Mauritania:3. Turkey, Pakistan and countries of central Asia: It contains the second largest reserves of oil in the world. It contains a huge and historical Islamic movement. It is considered to provide strategic depth to the Jihadist movement and Arab resistance.4. The remainder of Islamic countries:Confrontation in open fronts, the most favourite are 1. Afghanistan: 2. Central Asian Countries and areas behind the river:3. Yemen and Arabian Peninsula: 3. Yemen and Arabian Peninsula:4. Al-Sham land [TC: Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Palestine] and Iraq:

THE MASTERPLAN INTENT: Based upon multiple publications, statements and released books: Graphical representation of the plan: AQ Strategic plan according to Zawahiri and al Suri

For some basic understanding of the salafists thinking and text in their statements we need briefly look back: according to Wikepedia, the popular hadith that quotes Muhammad as saying 'The people of my own generation are the best, then those who come after them, and then those of the next generation,' is seen as a call to Muslims to follow the example of those

25 Be aware when he speaks about Palestine it is the historical ground of, and not the geographical area we in the West think off.

first three generations, known collectively as the salaf or "pious Predecessors" (as-Salaf as-Saleh) They include the "Companions" (Sahabah), the "Followers" (Tabi‘un) and the "Followers of the Followers" (Tabi‘ al-Tabi‘in). There a number of records of the hadith it is narrated in the Sahih al-Bukhari of `Abd Allah ibn `Umar (a companion of Muhammad) These have been revered in Islamic orthodoxy and by Sunni theologians since the fifth Muslim generation or earlier used their example to understand the texts and tenets of Islam, sometimes to differentiate the creed of the first Muslims from subsequent variations in creed and methodology to oppose religious innovation (bid‘ah) and, conversely, to defend particular views and practices.

‘AQ Core doctrinal material i.e. Commanders Guidance; Although American and European intelligence communities are aware of the jihadi texts, the work of these ideologues often reads like a playbook that U.S. policymakers have been slavishly, if inadvertently, following. “The data don’t get to the top, because the decision-makers are not looking for that kind of information,” a policy analyst who works closely with the American intelligence community told me. “They think they know better.” As the writings of Abu Musab al-Suri, Abu Bakr Naji, Fouad Hussein, and others make clear, the tradition of Salafi jihad existed before bin Laden and Al Qaida and will likely survive them; yet, from the beginning of the war on terror, the strategy of the Administration has been to decapitate Al Qaida’s leadership. Bruce Hoffman, who is the author of “Inside Terrorism” and a professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, 2006.

Spreading the Word.” "I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media," al-Zawahiri writes, Oct 2005.

See also my: Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2014 Part 19-78-Caliphate-Manuals-3 Is Libi’s Al-Qaida Manual a Blueprint for Arab Spring? Al Libi was a loyal al Qaida operative. Documents recovered in Osama bin Laden's compound show that Al Libi was appointed to al Qaida's security committee after he was released from Iranian custody in 2010. He sought permission from al Qaida's most senior leaders before relocating to his native Libya. They granted al Libi's request and he moved back to Libya in 2011. An unclassified report published by the Library of Congress in August 2012 identified al Libi as a key player in al Qaida's strategy for building a fully operational network in Libya.

Jihad with the Pen 26, Many take up the pen, but few are granted the spirit to conduct the Jihad in the most acceptable manner. Many wish to take up the pen, but their incorrect beliefs and lack of knowledge prevent them from doing so, and thus they drop back into a state of undeclared truce. But, it is the Jama'at Ahmadiyya only which has not stopped this great struggle ever since its inception and it has become the only vehicle to usher in the revival of Islam through its peaceful, yet determined intellectual process which was initiated

26 http://www.alislam.org/library/links/00000064.html

a century ago by Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, the Promised Messiah and Mahdi in Islam..

A 2007 NYPD report - analyzing the radicalization process of American youth. It laid out the phases of pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and "Jihadization" which turn an "unremarkable individual" into a terrorist. While everyone does not have to go through each phase, the report underscores, this sequential pattern played out perfectly in Ahmad's case, barring one huge difference. Ahmad joined a group of "Jihadis" who emphatically rejected the notion of violence in the name of Islam. Instead they were waging a Jihad of the pen, not sword. They were letter writers, not sword fighters. The group, "Muslim Writers Guild," was founded by the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in 1936 (India), established in America in 1980 and revived after 9/11.

One of our current main problems: UNDERSTANDING WHAT THEY SAY AND SIGNIFY, our ANALITACL PROBLEM

Our problem of understanding ; Just as an simple example, when we in the West talk or write about Palestine -- Proposals for a Palestinian state refers to the proposed establishment of an independent state for the Palestinian people in Palestine on land that was occupied by Israel since the Six-Day War of 1967 and prior to that year for 18 years (1949) by Egypt (Gaza) and by Jordan (West Bank)

--we could have total different understanding than, our enemy. As they mean in their messaging: The historical land of Palestine27

and by doing so it is depending on how far we look back; generally it is defined as a geographic region in Western Asia between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, and various adjoining lands, however looking future back; Historic Map of Palestine – 1759 right. .or..

looking back at 100 AD, left.. (map by Claude Reignier Conder of the Palestine Exploration Fund)

That’s why for at least one reason it is so time consuming reading texts, and hard to understand what they say and mean if published by the “jihadists” leadership.

27 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_name_%22Palestine%22

On the slide words are reflecting what is used in many of their formal statements, publications and books. So far many of us fail to understand the meaning let alone their significances if mentioned in the text. Or if we pay a close attention to the following sayings of the Prophet we will see that this situation of the Muslim world was predicted and is not really matter of surprise. They – the target audience of the jihadists leaders, thinkers etc understand, but do we? Moreover many of them believe it.

1. "Allah will take away Caliphate, only to bring it back later."2. "A time will come, when Islam will appear to be something new."3. "...My Ummah will be divided into 73 groups, and only one among them will be successful. The group that would strictly follow the Qur'an and Sunnah."4. "Arabs will face a threat of war from the Christians. The war would last for about 7 years. On the 2nd year of the war, the world would face drought, which would intensify in the 3rd year resulting into worldwide famine."5. "Mehdi will fight Dajjal, and Dajjal will fight Mehdi..."6. “..Muslims will die like ants..”

While study of the ideology cannot provide advance warning for the future tactical actions of jihadis – since these are too heavily influenced by organisational imperatives and local tactical conditions – the ideology does define the end goals of the jihadist groups and provides the vital justification for determining, intensifying and perpetualizing enmity. The most serious deficits are those which are caused by a failure to take into consideration the jihadists’ own account of the struggle – their presentation of their case as something essentialist and unconnected with specific militant groups and their indifference to the denomination of their cause as ‘defensive’ or ‘offensive’ jihad. Nowhere in root cause analysis is any consideration taken of the jihadists’ own version of root causes, as encapsulated in the doctrine of al-walā’ wal-barā’ (‘Loyalty and Renunciation’) and its core position within militant confrontation and internal erosion strategies.

What is somewhat puzzling is that despite constant reference by jihadists to ideological starting points, the importance of ideology in determining the behaviour and aims of the mujāhedeen, salafists is yet to be universally accepted. Many western analysts and

commentators do not take the ideology of al-Qaida seriously, in comparison to factors of economic deprivation or the lack of democratic systems in the Muslim majority states.

Reluctance to identify the greater source of the threat – an ideology as opposed to a specific group – is what is increasingly coming to inform policies at the highest levels. There is a perilous misconception implied in this reticence – that the refusal to discuss the relationship between Islam and militant jihad (the bread and butter of radical Islamist propaganda) will in some way weaken their case and diminish their platform, instead of simply leaving the field open to them and unchallenged. Islamist radicals thrive on the opaqueness of the distinctions between Jihadism and Islam, and it is the lack of public debate on these distinctions that is keeping them blurred. The establishment of ‘no-go areas; name it as it is’ to non-Muslim analysts in particular isolates Muslim progressives and is a process which Islamist intellectuals and activists would certainly be eager to endorse.

Jihadism cannot be understood without identifying the religious core, irrespective of how responsibly or tendentiously this core is adapted to the user’s purposes. All of the shades of radical Islam are characterized by fundamental doctrinal principles. Since the movements beginnings these principles not only serve to define and elaborate their agendas but also constitute an important source of the appeal that it continues to exercise over the Muslim public

The result of western misconceptions to date as to the nature of the threat has allowed the Islamist radicals to progress unhindered on the ideological front, leaving the indoctrination factory intact, and to pursue their strategy to establish radical Islamism (the effective springboard for militant jihadism) as the established form of Islam both in the Muslim majority states and in the western diasporas. Without a knowledge of the mental geography of Islamist radicalism – of the starting points, core foundations, areas of strength and weakness, and the internal points of tension – any attempts to confront the phenomenon will continue to fall victim to these ideological filters and identity walls, and any counter-ideology program that is attempted will be doomed to irrelevancy and failure. The problem is that most analysis on jihadism is fixated on the militant violent fringe manifestation of what is in fact a massive social engineering project which the radical ideologues are undertaking. This opacity on the starting points of jihadism has left us unable to understand why jihadism is so resilient. The language, to the contemporary reader, appears so antiquated, the political program so anachronistic, the argumentation so arcane, that for many commentators the ideology surely could not possibly occupy the attention of thinking people.

The religious essence of the struggle (leaving aside how tendentiously jihadists interpret the demands made upon them by their faith) is continually emphasized by the jihadists themselves as justification for their cause. “Jihad in the path of Allah,” according to Ayman al-Zawāhirī: “is greater than any individual or organization. It is a struggle between Truth and Falsehood, until Allah Almighty inherits the earth and those who live in it.” Theirs is an eternal struggle to which they in their generation are making their due contribution, reviving what has become a ‘neglected duty’ – the neglect being responsible for the current failure of Muslims to enjoy supremacy. If western analysts demonstrate confusion on what the aims of these new revolutionaries are, Jihadists themselves have no doubt as to what motivates their enemy. “The West is ultimately hostile to Islam” Root cause analysis generally fails to take into account the doctrine of al-walā’ wal-barā’ (‘Loyalty and Renunciation’) which forms the central core of the jihadist ideology. The doctrine prescribes essential and eternal hatred for the infidel, irrespective of the latter’s behaviour past, present or future. The primacy given to

this doctrine by jihadism, even over other considerations that might logically appear to be more pressing, is demonstrated by Ayman al-Zawahiri himself. In his book Knights under the Banner of the Prophet, he states: Making the masses of the Islamic nation understand al-walā’ wal-barā’ will require a long time, and our enemies will not give us that time. Therefore, we must use jihad in Palestine as a means of making the Islamic nation understand al-walā’ wal-barā’

The belief system underpinning the jihadis is neither arcane nor obscure. It is a serious, well-argued, academically and ideologically coherent intellectual system painstakingly constructed over decades. These ideological works have direct strategic and operational relevance to the course of the jihad. The works are designed to attract the turn anyone sympathetic to the militants’ world view, and:• detach him from his social and intellectual environment,• undermine his self-image hitherto as a practising Muslim,• introduce what the ideologues term the ‘real Islam’,• re-script history in terms of a perennial conflict.After this major task has been achieved, the ideological training towards the Jihadi-Salafist world view is merely a matter of:• centralizing jihad as his Islamic identity,• training him not only militarily but also doctrinally and psychologically as ‘mujāhidman’,• defending doctrinally the behavior of the mujāhidīn against criticism and maintaining the moral high ground.

Understanding these starting points will go a long way towards explaining some apparent contradictions and curious pre-occupations in the ideology of the jihad. In the context of the failure of western analysis to understand the true ‘root causes’ of the jihad phenomenon, the comments by the Jordanian political commentator Shaker al-Nabulsi are illuminating: We are blind fools, our minds disabled by ignorance, if we continue to believe that the daily bloodbaths in the centre and south of Iraq are caused by the American occupation of that country. If terrorism were caused by American occupation, where was the foreign occupation of Morocco that needed to be resisted with booby-trapped cars and suicide bombers? Where was the American military occupation of Algeria? What is being resisted in Iraq, Morocco, Algeria, and other parts of the Arab world is not American military occupation. If that were the case there would be terrorist attacks in Qatar, where the American military has been firmly established for some time. It is not foreign military occupation that the terrorists are bombing, but the flower of modernity.

It is difficult to overestimate the significance of ideology in the defense and promotion of the jihad, and the greater importance, in terms of the longevity of the movement, held by its scholars and thinkers over their more famous men of action, such as Bin Laden (killed May 2011) and Ayman al-Zawahiri. While these latter will remain on the level of symbols long after they have passed away, the contribution of scholars such as Abū Muhammad al-Maqdisī will forever constitute the true force of the jihad. Indeed, underestimation to date of their role, and lack of attention to the foundations of their argumentation, has only lent the movement greater resilience.

The importance of the ‘relatively uninteresting’ materials – doctrinal propaganda in a religiously conceived conflict – and the fact that the ‘Islamic insiders’ are actually those that constitute the entirety of the intended audience (and not the westerner) was clearly not understood. Yet it is a mistake to think of jihadism as flaky due to the flakiness or

opportunism of these commentaries to us. Communication to the West is just one, peripheral, strand of the jihadist propaganda war.

Studying the ideology from the starting point of the Jihadi-Salafists, via their own writings, elucidates the techniques employed by Jihadists and Islamists to defend their case, and undermine - from argumentation couched in conceptual language internal to Islam - the religious identity and affiliation of the activists. More importantly, the study of the ideology allows us to locate the points of tension with more mainstream currents of Islamic belief, highlight their anomalies, and develop greater policy selfconfidence on what does and does not constitute legitimate expressions of belief in pluralist societies. Indeed, it is impossible to fully understand the motivations, manifestations and purposes of radical Islam and the activities of the mujāhidīn, or address the challenge these present to U.S. security and foreign policy, without a thorough understanding of its ideological starting points and doctrinal development, or without a sound grasp of the current dynamics taking place within its own mental universe.

The study of the ideology can therefore be defended for its role in establishing that while the movement of Islamist radicalism and Jihad is not a monolith and comprises a number of different organizations and trends of varying life expectancy, the underlying ideologies are far more consistent, resilient and perennial. They operate to a far longer timescale and admit to vulnerability not to the ephemeralities of military reverse so much as to intellectual defeat and the destruction of doctrinal propriety. (with thanks to a the Jamestown Foundation publication)

Here I want to draw your attention to the eye-opening book "The Closing of the Muslim Mind" 28, foreign policy expert Robert R. Reilly - is a writer and senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council - locates the roots of contemporary troubles in a pivotal struggle that occurred within the Muslim world nearly a millennium ago. Reilly, mentions the Immanuel Kant of Islam; Imam Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (1058-1111), - His works were so highly acclaimed by his contemporaries that al-Ghazali was awarded the honorific title "Proof of Islam" (Hujjat al-Islam). -who pounded the final nails into the edifice of Islam as we know it. In his various works, according to Reilly, he codified Islam’s final and permanent stance on all matters, personal, political, and social, including what he claimed was the ephemeral nature of reality itself. Man perceives reality through the evidence of his senses, but because Allah controls not only what man perceives but his means of perceiving, reality is illusory, because Allah can change things at will. For man, there is not even a “primacy of consciousness” (as opposed to the primacy of existence, which is the rational position) that allows him to see things as they are not or as he wishes. Reilly; by “closed,” I mean that access to reality has been blocked. I do not mean that the minds of every individual Muslim are closed, or that there are not varieties of Islam in which the Muslim mind is still open. I do mean that a large portion of mainstream Sunni Islam, the majority expression of the faith, has shut the door to reality in a profound way. Today, this can be seen in the highly dysfunctional character of the Arab world in particular. The great twentieth-century Muslim scholar, the late Fazlur Rahman, said that, “person that deprives itself of philosophy necessarily exposes itself to starvation in terms of fresh ideas — in fact, it commits intellectual suicide.” It was and still is a battle over the role of reason - and the side of irrationality won. The deformed theology that resulted, Reilly reveals, produced the spiritual pathology of Islamism, and a deeply dysfunctional culture. Terrorism is only the most obvious manifestation of this crisis and provides the answers the West has so desperately needed in confronting the Islamist crisis. (And that is why the Egyptian President al-Sisi early 2015 call to democratise Islam will back fire on him)

28 http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3114/muslims-ijtihad Ijtihad was important in early Islam: when questions arose - even while Muhammad was alive - for which there were no answers, Muhammad would call the Muslims together in their mosque. They would discuss the issues at hand, reason them through, and come to a consensus -- so came into being the Islamic concept of ijma' (consensus among the scholars).After Muhammad died, however, the Muslim community rapidly expanded; the community of scholars became too large, and ijma' no longer practical. What developed was a body of traditions – called hadiths – sayings and deeds attributed to their prophet Muhammad. When new questions arose, people would seek out individuals who had known Muhammad and ask them whether they had seen or heard Muhammad address the matter at hand.Within 200 years, the number of hadiths was thought to be in the hundreds of thousands, but people had no way of knowing which were true and which were fabricated. The great Muslim scholar, al-Bukhari (810 -870 CE), who analyzed them, concluded that only a few thousand were reliable. Later, when still more questions arose, diverse schools of thought developed. The Quran, the hadiths, and those schools of thought were collected into Islamic law. This body of Islamic religious guidance is known as the Shari'a, or "The Path." The exercise of critical thinking and independent judgment – or Ijtihad --was an important way to address questions in the early centuries of Islam. After approximately 400 years, however, the leaders of the Sunni Muslim world closed the "Gates of Ijtihad;" Muslims were no longer allowed use itjihad to solve problems. If a seemingly new problem arose, they were supposed to find an analogy from earlier scholars and apply that ruling to the problem that arose. From the 10th century onwards, Sunni Muslim leaders began to see questioning as politically dangerous to their ability to rule. Regrettably, Sunni Muslim leaders reject the use of itjihad to this day. As questioning could very likely upset the established order and bring down the autocracies and despotic regimes which rule most of the Muslim world, even Muslims who live in freer Muslim countries such as Turkey often hesitate to exercise ijtihad. How did the Muslim world succumb to this situation, and is there a way out?

Remember: "The Pious Caliphate Will Start From Afghanistan" See below, Does Mullah Omar fits into 1926 Caliphate conference credentials; 2. "By appointment by the classes of influential Muslims, i.e., men whom the public must obey such as ulama, amirs, notables, men of opinion and administration. 3. "By conquest by a Muslim even if he does not fulfil the other conditions." In Afghanistan the forefather of the Taliban, the mujahedeen claim to defeated century ago the British colonial forces, some decades ago the Russian invading Army, the Taliban claim the have defeated NATO and the US.

A BRIEF but important LOOK BACK

Some things we need to understand before we can start: The Qur’an says, “Verily the most honorable of you with God are the most pious among you.” [Qur’an 49:13] The wise, the pious, the knowledgeable in Islam, and the true in practice are Islam’s natural leaders. Emir sometimes transliterated Amir, Amier or Ameer, is a title of high office used in a variety of places in the Muslim world. It can often be translated as prince, making an "emirate" analogous to a sovereign principality. Amīr al-Mu'minīn usually translated Commander of the Faithful or Leader of the Faithful, is the Arabic style of Caliphs and other independent sovereign Muslim rulers that claim legitimacy from a community of Muslims. It has been claimed as the title of rulers in Muslim countries and empires and is still used for some Muslim leaders. It is also translated as "Prince of the believers" since "Amir" or "Emir" is also used as a princely title in states ruled by the royalty or monarchies.

J U N E 2 4 , 2 0 0 5 Is al-Qaida's Long-Held Afghan Strategy Now Unfolding? Bin Laden's strategic goal of ensuring "the pious Caliphate will start from Afghanistan." [9] In 1998, bin Laden pledged personal loyalty to Mullah Omar, describing him as "our chief" and "the legitimate ruler of the state of Afghanistan … [the] embodiment of Islamic respect." [10] These facts are downplayed by Western leaders who say bin Laden was paying lip service to Omar and that al-Qaida is now solely focused on the jihad in Iraq. No one, however, should doubt bin Laden's resolve to help retake Afghanistan for Mullah Omar. In June 2000, Bin Laden stressed Afghanistan's central place in al-Qaida's strategy" "Any aggression by the United States today against Afghanistan would not be against Afghanistan itself, but against the Afghanistan that hoists the banner of Islam in the world, the true, mujahid Islam, which fights for the sake of God… Allah has blessed Afghanistan, the people of Afghanistan… They were able to unify the country under the Taliban and under the leadership of Amir ul-Mu'mineen [Commander of the Faithful] Mulanna [our Mullah] Omar. So today, Afghanistan is the only country in the world that has the Shari'ah. Therefore, it is compulsory upon Muslims all over

the world to help Afghanistan. And to make hijra to this land, because it is from this land that we will dispatch our armies to smash all kuffar all over the world." [11]9. Mufti Jamal Khan, "Bin Ladin: Expel Jews, Christians from Holy Places," Jang [Pakistan], 18 November 1998. 10. "Hero of Modern Times," The Nation, Lahore Edition (Internet version), 21 August 1998.11. "Usama Speaks on Hijrah and the Islamic State," Al-Jihaad Newsletter, Issue No. 4, 22 June 2000.

A small side note but an important one on the importance of Khorasan / Khurasan and Al-Zawahiri’s repeated sworn allegiance to the Taliban leader and “commander of the faithfull”mullah Omar, moreover they have the strong believe in the prophesying of the End of Times. 29: What may don’t know or understand. Khorasan plays an important role in the Islamic prophecies of end times. In modern day world the ancient Khurasan is divided into five central Asian countries i.e. 1. Iran 2. Afghanistan 30 31 3. Tajikistan 4. Turkmenistan 5. Uzbekistan. The largest part of the ancient Khurasan is in Afghanistan today. Khorasan plays an important role in the Islamic prophecies of end times, the wars before appearance of Dajjal and the second coming of Jesus Christ. One must wonder why Afghanistan has been the centre stage of the world for more than three decades now. What is there in the barren land of rugged mountains of Afghanistan that attracted almost every super power in the course of history? Every super power in the world, since the time of Alexander the Great till the United States, have turned to Afghanistan when it was their turn to fall from grace. We have already established that Afghanistan has the most land area of ancient Khurasan in it.

29 http://www.grandestrategy.com/2009/06/research-paper-by-bilal-khan-paper-is.html30 Afghanistan the land of The Pashtuns or Pathans are the world’s largest patriarchal ethnic group in existence with an estimated population of around 40 Million distributed in present day countries of Pakistan, Afghanistan, UAE, Iran, UK, USA and India with the largest population in Pakistan that is approximately 28 Million. A lot of research has been done on the origin of Pashtuns. Taaqati-Nasiri, a book that records historical traces of Pashtuns, states that in the 7th century a people called the Bani Israel settled in Ghor, southeast of Herat, Afghanistan, and then migrated south and east. These Bani Israel references are in line with the commonly held view by Pashtuns that when the twelve tribes of Israel were dispersed the tribe of Joseph, among other Hebrew tribes, settled in the region. -- What many don’t know: There were the Bani Al-Nadheer Jews, the Bani Qaynuqa' Jews, the Bani Quraytha Jews, and several more. The Jews were rich and successful in their businesses. A great asset to the young Islamic Nation. Prophet Mohammed marched towards the Jews in order to either exile them or make a treaty with them. The Bani Al-Nadheer Jews refused to make a treaty with Mohammed so they fought against him, lost, and subsequently were exiled. The Bani Quraytha Jews saw the fate of their Bani Al-Nadheer brethren so they had no choice but to make a peace treaty with him [Saheeh Muslim - 1766 and Sunan Abi Dawood - 3004]. The Bani Assad have been complimented by Muhammad as only few Arab tribes have been. The Bani Assad spread and developed the Arabic language since the 1st or the 2nd century. It has been noted from historians that before Muhammad, the Bani Assad used to practice the religion of Abraham who believed in one God. The tribe embraced Islam in the 7th century during the beginning of Muhammad's life. 31 Israel is the alternate name of Prophet Jacob who was the son of Prophet Isaac . Haroon or Aaron was the brother of Moses and both of them were descendants of Isaac and Jacob . So the army of Imam Mehdi will be from the descendants of Prophet Isaac and Jacob or popularly Bani-Israel. Now, the very term Israel itself hints of the present day Jewish nation-state of Israel and one would ask why Israel would help Imam Mehdi. No, they certainly will not. This army of Imam Mehdi that will come from the East, with black flags, will be from Bani-Israel who would already be Muslims. -- Today, many ethnic groups claim descent from the lost tribes of Israel. In all these ethnic groups, there are only two groups that are Muslims and only one group that is geographically present in Khurasan i.e. the Pathans of Afghanistan and Pakistan --

The Islamic prophecies that speak of the appearance of Imam Mehdi also speak of an army of black flags from Khurasan 32 that will come to help Imam Mehdi to establish his Caliphate in the Holy Kabah.

“Narrated by Hazrat Abdullah bin Masood (RA) that Prophet (SAW) said: A Nation will come from the east with black flags and they will ask for some “Khair” (because of them being needy) but the people will not give them, then, they will fight and win over those people (who did not give them what they asked). Now the people will give them what they asked for but they will not accept it until they will hand it over to a person from my progeny who will fill this earth with justice just as it was previously filled with oppression and tyranny. So if anyone of you finds this nation (i.e. from the east with black flags) then you must join them even if you have to crawl over ice” --- A Nation will come from the east with black flags; -- We have to keep in mind that the holy Prophet Muhammad lived most his life in Makkah and the last 10 years in Medina in present day Saudi Arabia. Geographically there were in his time only three Muslim countries, today, in exact east of Saudi Arabia i.e. Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. So it becomes easy for us to establish that whoever this army of black flags is, it belongs to one or more of these three countries; The largest part of the ancient Khurasan is in Afghanistan today .

One of the Ahadith further elaborate: “Narrated by Abdur Rehman Al-Jarshi that I heard companion of Prophet (SAW), Hazrat

Amr Bin Marra Al-Jamli (RA) that Prophet (SAW) said: Surely Black Flags will appear from the Khurasan until the people (under the leadership of this flag) will tie their horses with the Olive Trees between Bait-e-Lahya and Harasta 33. We asked are there any Olive trees between these places: He said, “If there isn’t then soon it will grow so that those people (of Khurasan) will come and tie their horses there.”

“Abu Huraira (RA) reported Allah’s Apostle (SAW) saying: You have heard about a city; the one side of which is in the land and the other is in the sea (Constantinople). They said: Allah’s Messenger, Yes. There upon he said: The last hour would come unless seventy thousand persons from

32 Al-Qaida will mobilize four armies that will march from the periphery of the Muslim world to the heart of Palestine: one army from Pakistan and Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and the last from the Levant. AQAP is responsible for establishing the army that will be launched from Yemen. - Abdul Elah Hider Shayea reviving the Dead: www.arabinsight.org // The Last Hour would not come until the Romans (European forces) would land at al-A'maaq or in Dabiq. -- The place Dabiq is in Syria, north of Aleppo (Halab) and al-A'maaq is towards the south coast of Yemen. -- An army consisting of the best (soldiers) of the people of the earth at that time will come from Medinah (to counteract them). When they will arrange themselves in ranks, the Romans would say: "Do not stand between us and those (Muslims) who took prisoners from amongst us, let us fight with them", and the Muslims would say: "Nay, by Allaah, we would never get aside from you and from our brethren that you may fight them". They will then fight and a third (part) of the army would run away, whom Allaah will never forgive. A third (part of the army). which would be constituted of excellent martyrs in Allaah's eye, would be killed and the third who would never be put to trial would win and they would be conquerors of Constantinople. And as they would be busy in distributing the spoils of war (amongst themselves) after hanging their swords by the olive trees, the Satan would cry: The Dajjaal has taken your place among your family. They would then leave (to return to Syria), but it would be of no avail (it was a false alarm). And when they return to Syria, he (Dajjaal) would come out while they would be still preparing themselves for battle drawing up the ranks...// Dajjal – anto Christ - will also have an army of Bani-Israel. Both Muslim and Christian sources (other than evangelical Christians) establish that the Anti-Christ will be a Jewish Leader. The Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad clears that the Dajjal will have an army of Persian Jews from Isfahan. Interestingly, Iran supports the largest Jewish population in the Muslim world of approximately 40,000 mainly in Tehran, Isfahan and Shiraz. It has already been said that in Hadith language 70 thousands mean a very large number that may or may not be actually 70 thousand. This leaves us with the judgment that Imam Mehdi will lead an army of Muslim Bani-Israel from Khurasan and Dajjal will lead an army of Jew Bani-Israel from Isfahan.33 (C: Bait-e-Lahya = northern Gaza strip, Harasta = Syrian city. According to this they want to extend from Iran/Iraq through Jordan to Syria and Gaza to set up their new Caliph.

Bani Ishaq would attack it 34. When they would land there, they will neither fight with weapons nor would show arrows but would only say: There is no god but Allah and Allah is the Greatest, that one side of it would fall. Thaur (one of the narrators) said: I think that he said: The part by the side of the ocean. Then they would say for the second time: There is no god but Allah and Allah is the Greatest that the second side would also fall, and they would say: There is no god but Allah and Allah is the Greatest, that the gates would be opened for them and they would enter therein and, they would be collecting spoils of war and distributing them amongst themselves that a noise would be heard and it would be said: Verily, Dajjal has come. And thus they would everything there and would turn to him.”

Another of the Ahadith says: “Abu Huraira (RA) says that Rasul-Ullah (SAW) said: (Armies carrying) black flags will come from Khurasan, no power will be able to stop them and they will finally reach Eela (Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem) where they will erect their flags”

A LOOK BACK: THE 1926 CALIPHATE CONFERENCE

The Caliphate Conference. Cairo. May 1926. The World Muslim Congress Makkah (Mecca) June-July 1926.Remember Winston Churchill: “the longer you can look back, the further you can look forward”.

With a view on current developments and events; first let’s recall history: The Caliphate Conference. Cairo. May 1926. The World Muslim Congress Makkah June-July 1926. Internet Edition - http://imranhosein.org. The resolution affirmed that the Caliphate was capable of being realized. Another Congress should be convened in which all the Islamic peoples would be adequately represented and that Congress would take the measures necessary for establishing the Caliphate fulfilling all the conditions prescribed in the Shari'ah. In short, such a Congress would elect a new Caliph.

Shaikh Muhammad al-Ahmadi al-Zawahiri, head of the Egyptian delegation: The grandfather of Ayman al-Zawahri the current leader of Al Qaida. "In the examination of theological questions which were submitted to us, we did not wish to resort to ijtihad and to establish a new doctrine. We confined ourselves to examining the principles admitted by the recognized doctrines of Islam. As for the applicability of these principles, it is for you to declare that that is beyond our competence." "I am advocating neither a new doctrine nor ijtihad. What I seek is your opinion. If you affirm principles which are not susceptible of application in our epoch, what will be the circumstances?" Shaikh al-Zawahiri: "It is dangerous for Islam to raise the question of the applicability, at one epoch rather than another, of the dispositions of the Shariah. We feel that the application of the general principles of religion ought to be subject to no exceptions, and we consider that there is no condition to establish new conditions in deference to the exigencies of the age." Shaikh al-Zawahiri was, of course, perfectly justified in insisting that the Shari'ah, or divinely revealed sacred law of Islam, admitted of no revisions to suit differing situations and ages. The Shari'ah had to be retained in its revealed form regardless of whether or not the Muslims found themselves competent or not to apply it in a particular age. And so, for Shaikh Zawahiri, the restoration of the

34 Regarding the "Bani Ishaaq" (Children of Isaac) mentioned in this hadeeth, Ibn Katheer writes in his book "an-Nihayah fil-Fitan wal-Malaahim", through "Ashraat us-Saa'ah" of Yusuf bin Abdullaah al-Waabil: It indicates that ar-Room (the Romans, meaning Europeans) will become Muslims at the end of time, and perhaps the conquering of Constantinople (Istanbul) will be through their hands, as the aforementioned hadeeth has stated, that 70,000 from Bani Ishaq will attack it.

Caliphate was a religious obligation. He was quite correct! In respect of the third question How is the Caliphate achieved or constituted? (Think about point 2 and 3 and look at Mullah Omar, or the new (2nd) self declared Caliph Ibrahim) the Committee answered as follows: 1. "By appointment by the preceding Caliph. 2. "By appointment by the classes of influential Muslims, i.e., men whom the public must obey such as ulama, amirs, notables, men of opinion and administration. 3. "By conquest by a Muslim even if he does not fulfill the other conditions."

Either, then, the Caliphate was not a necessity in Islam, or it was a necessity and could not be realized. In which case failure to re-establish the Caliphate would be a collective sin for which the believers would be punished. The fundamental verse of the Qur'an concerning the dynamics of leadership in the model of Islam stated that Muslims must conduct their affairs on the basis of mutual consultation: "And their affairs are (conducted) on the basis of mutual consultation (amongst themselves)." (Qur'an, a-Shura, 42:58)

In their conclusion: The World of Islam is today without power. Our conclusion is that the institution of the Caliphate, which forms part of Dar al-Islam, is indispensable for the restoration of power. Without power there will be many more Bosnias, Kashmirs, Algerias, Chechnyas, Palestines etc. The only way this deplorable state of affairs can be changed is through the restoration of the supremacy of Islam in the public life of Muslims and in the international relations of the Muslim world. That requires the restoration of Dor al-Islam and the Caliphate. We need, therefore, to articulate anew the provisions of the Islamic Public Order (Dar al-Islam) and Islam's Conception of an International Order, and to demonstrate their clear superiority over the secular rival which has emerged from western civilization.

(And on To the House of Saud) As the members of the conference call it; in CHAPTER FOUR; THE FRAUDULENT SAUDI-WAHHABI ALTERNATIVE TO THE CALIPHATE. We also need to recognize, as this booklet has made clear, that it is impossible, and will remain impossible, to restore the Caliphate so long as the Hejaz remains under the control of

the Saudi -Wahhabi alliance. Power cannot be restored without the liberation of the Haramain and the Hajj from the control of those who participated in the destruction of the Caliphate. The liberation of the Haramain and the Hajj will be possible when the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance breaks down. There are indications that alliance is under great pressure and can fall apart. There are many Saudi Ulama who now imprisoned or under house arrest. The issue which is most likely to tear the alliance apart would be Saudi recognition' of the Jewish State of Israel, - hence the importance of our recent work entitled: "The Religion of Abraham and the State of Israel', in which we analyze, from a purely Islamic religious perspective, the implications for Muslims of the "recognition' of the Jewish State of Israel. // In fact the Third Committee should have pointed out that the cities of

Makkah and Madina were under Saudi-Wahhabi control and, as a consequence, any Caliph who was appointed would suffer from the incalculable liability of not having the capacity to exercise control over the Haramain.

Hizb-ut-Tahrir, an international political party whose stated goal is reviving the caliphate – or khilafah: Since that day the Islamic ummah [nation, community] has lived a life full of

calamities; she was broken up into small mini states controlled by the enemies of Islam in every aspect. The Muslims were oppressed and became the object of the kuffar’s [that is, unbelievers’] derision in Kashmir, Philippines, Thailand, Chechnya, Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Palestine and other lands belonging to the Muslims [...]“Without the Khilafah, the Islamic lands will remain torn up and the Islamic peoples will remain divided. Without the Khilafah the kafir, crusader and colonial states will continue to control us, plunder our resources and create divisions amongst us. Without the Khilafah, the Jews will continue to occupy our sacred places and kill and humiliate our brothers in Palestine. Without the Khilafah, the Islamic peoples in Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kashmir, Uzbekistan and so on will continue to be killed….Without the Khilafah, those Muslims who do not work seriously for its implementation will be sinful and incur the anger of Allâh, even if they fast, pray, make Hajj [pilgrimage] and pay Zakah [alms]. This is because the work to establish the Khilafah Rashidah is a fard [obligation] on every Muslim, and it should be conducted with the most extreme effort and utmost speed.[...] And Late June 2014, after ninety years. The militant Sunni group Isis has said it is establishing a caliphate, or Islamic state (Daesh), in the territories it controls in Iraq and Syria. It also proclaimed the group's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as caliph and "leader for Muslims everywhere".)

The so-called “Al-Qaida Manual” AuthorJohn RosenthalPosted October 20, 2013 In May 2000, British police raided the Manchester home of reputed al-Qaida operative Nazih Abdul Hamed al-Raghie, better known by his nom de guerre Abu Anas al-Libi. On Oct. 15, arrested by US forces. The author was presumably a leading member of either Ayman al-Zawahri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad or of the Islamic Group of the “blind Sheikh” Omar Abdel Rahmen. In keeping with the manual’s roots, the target of the operations and techniques outlined in it is not the United States but rather what the opening chapter describes as the “godless and apostate” Arab rulers and regimes. (C; this was in 2000, it is unclear if by then the Seven phased plan was already in place and known to him?) This was the original target of the modern jihadist movement, before the focus gradually shifted to the “distant” US enemy in the aftermath of the first Iraq War. The document does not fail to name names.

Thus, the author writes: "Unbelief is still the same. It pushed Abou Jahl — may Allah curse him — and Kureish’s valiant infidels to battle the prophet — God bless and keep him — and to torture his companions — may Allah’s grace be on them. It is the same unbelief that drove [former Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat, [former Egyptian President] Hosni Mubarak, Gadhafi, [former Syrian President] Hafez Assad, [deposed Yemeni President Ali Abdullah] Saleh, [late Saudi King] Fahd — Allah's curse be upon the non-believing leaders — and all the apostate Arab rulers to torture, kill, imprison and torment Muslims." If we leave aside the somewhat anomalous inclusion of Fahd and abstract from Sadat — who had already been succeeded by Mubarak at the time of the document’s composition — then we need only substitute Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for his father Hafez to obtain a list consisting of none other than four of the most prominent Arab leaders to come under attack in the contemporary Arab uprisings: Mubarak, Gadhafi, Assad and Saleh. Seen in this perspective, the so-called “Al-Qaida Manual” starts to look suspiciously like a blueprint for the Arab Spring. The document calls for the overthrow of the “apostate” Arab regimes and the restoration of an Islamic caliphate (-- C; This was May 2000! Published: phase 4 predicts “Downfall of Apostate Muslim regimes” 2010–2013 Saudi Arabia, Jordan, oil -producing countries --- Jordan lurde in: -- With the killing; burning of the Jordanian pilot early Feb 2015 by Daesh, the Jordan King

declared revenge and State TV said "We are waging this war to protect our faith, our values and human principles and our war for their sake will be relentless and will hit them in their own ground," "We are talking about a collaborative effort between coalition members to intensify efforts to stop extremism and terrorism to undermine, degrade and eventually finish Daesh," Mohammad al-Momani said, using an Arabic acronym for Islamic State. "All the State's military and security agencies are developing their options. --) This program is in fact already contained in the document’s actual title, "I'alan al-Jihad 'ala al-Tawaghit al-Bilad," which has been translated as “Declaration of Jihad against the Country’s Tyrants.” But the term that has been translated as “tyrants” — tawaghit — in fact has a religious connotation. It refers to (false) “idols” that are worshipped in the place of Allah. The idea is that the “apostate” leaders are idols or tawaghit inasmuch as their rule substitutes human sources of legislation for sacred text. It should be noted that per this definition, democratic regimes would be every bit as much tawaghit as autocratic ones. The author insists that “Islam does not coincide or make a truce with unbelief.” Or, as he puts it in the epigraph to the document: "The confrontation that we are calling for with the apostate regimes does not know Socratic debates … Platonic ideals … nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing and destruction and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine gun."

MAP WITH AQ AFFILIATES’ AND CAPABILITIES; Data from US State department Strategic Assessment AL Qaida 24Nov 2014.

C: Just a reference to the plan and Intent see the next slide for Capability and disposition of Command: Affiliates and sub- forces: loose affiliations.

STATE DEPARTMENT STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT REPORT AL-QAIDA

“Al-Qaida and its affiliates and adherents worldwide continue to present a serious threat to the United States”, according to report; 25 Nov 2014, According to a State Department Strategic Assessment report al-Qaida is alive and well and remains a top priority for US counter terrorism officials. The Strategic Assessment reads as follows: “Al-Qaida (AQ) and its affiliates and adherents worldwide continue to present a serious threat to the United States, our allies, and our interests. While the international community has severely degraded AQ’s core leadership, the terrorist threat has evolved. Leadership losses in Pakistan, coupled with weak governance and instability in the Middle East and Northwest Africa, have accelerated the decentralization of the movement and led to the affiliates in the AQ network becoming more operationally autonomous from core AQ and increasingly focused on local and regional objectives. The past several years have seen the emergence of a more aggressive set of AQ affiliates and like-minded groups, most notably in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Northwest Africa, and Somalia. AQ leadership experienced difficulty in maintaining cohesion within the AQ network and in communicating guidance to its affiliated groups. AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was rebuffed in his attempts to mediate a dispute among AQ affiliates

operating in Syria – al-Nusrah Front and al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), now calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL- Daesh) – which resulted in the expulsion of ISIL from the AQ network in February 2014. In addition, guidance issued by Zawahiri in 2013 for AQ affiliates to avoid collateral damage was routinely disobeyed, notably in attacks by AQ affiliates against civilian religious pilgrims in Iraq, hospital staff and convalescing patients in Yemen, and families at a shopping mall in Kenya.”

Al-Qaida has the following direct affiliates:Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qaida in SomaliaAl-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Qaida in SyriaAl-Qaida in the Indian SubcontinentAl-Qaida has the following indirect affiliates:Abdullah Azzam Brigades, Al-Mulathameen Brigade, Al-MourabitounAnsar Dine, Abu Sayyaf, Ansar al-Islam, East Turkestan Islamic MovementCaucasus Emirate, Fatah al-Islam, Islamic Jihad UnionIslamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jaish-e-MohammedJemaah Islamiyah, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West AfricaMoroccan Islamic Combatant Group, Rajah Sulaiman movementAl-Qaida Kurdish Battalions. Source: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224819.htm

27 Jan 2015, Tuesday at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing 35, former vice chief of staff of the Army, Gen. Jack Keane, said President Barack Obama’s “policies have failed” which has allowed al-Qaida to “grow fourfold in the last five years.” Keane said, “As you can see on the map, al Qaida and its affiliates exceeds Iran and is beginning to dominate multiple countries. In fact, al-Qaida has grown fourfold in the last five years. Third, the Islamic State of Iraq, ISIS, is an outgrowth from al-Qaida in Iraq which was defeated in Iraq by 2009. After U.S. troops pulled out of Iraq in 2011, ISIS emerged as a terrorist organization in Iraq, moved into Syria in 2012.” “Is it possible to look at that map in front of you and claim that the United States policy and strategy is working? Or that al-Qaida is on the run? It is unmistakable that our policies have failed,” he added.

We need to keep in mind that according to AQSL they do not need to build an Islamic Army, in their strategy there comes a time that regular standing forces in the Muslim lands will turn over to them and conduct the fight in the next phase: total confrontation. They include deserting of so-called trained “moderates36” fighters, as seen recently and in the past.

Graphical disposition of AQ affiliates in the network; source US state department 25 Nov 2014

35 http://www.breitbart.com/video/2015/01/27/gen-keane-obama-allowed-al-qaida-to-grow-fourfold-in-5-years/36 http://www.wnd.com/2015/01/u-s-doesnt-know-who-moderate-rebel-trainees-will-shoot/

So who is Keane talking about when he says "al-Qaida"? Back in the early 2000s, and before 9/11, al-Qaida was generally understood to mean the several hundred people who swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden, said Larry Johnson, a consultant specializing in counterterrorism and a former CIA employee. Now when people think of al-Qaida, they usually think of a much broader category consisting of that core group, plus affiliates and other Sunni Islamic extremists, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, located throughout the Middle East, North Africa and the Indian subcontinent. Under this broad definition, Johnson said Keane’s claim that al-Qaida has grown fourfold since 2010 -- while impossible to verify -- is probably accurate. "Fourfold is probably an underestimate," added Frederick Kagan, director of the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats project. But not everyone agrees to such a broad discussion. Anne Stenersen, a research fellow in terrorism at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, said the narrowly defined al-Qaida -- that is, its core members -- has stayed relatively stable at fewer than 300 members since 2010. She prefers this definition because the affiliates have varying strategies and objectives. For example, al-Qaida actually split from the Islamic State due to ideological differences.

Johnson also noted that some regional groups that have al-Qaida in their names -- like al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb or al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula -- were given those names

by the West, so they do not necessarily reflect how close those groups are to the core al-Qaida group. "All that said, al-Qaida is almost certainly bigger than it was five years ago. It's the fourfold that I would question," said J.M. Berger, a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution. "For each of these groups, we can only estimate their size, and all estimates are disputed." Kagan, of the American Enterprise Institute, said several al-Qaida groups are much larger than they were five years ago because of the 2011 Arab Spring. The revolutions left many countries without stable leadership and institutions, making them vulnerable to the rise of extreme religious groups. This is what’s happening in Libya with the rise of al-Qaida affiliates, in Syria with the al Nusra front and Yemen with al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. Kagan added that in the past five years, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb in West Africa, as well as Boko Haram in Nigeria, which doesn’t have official ties to al-Qaida, have grown tremendously.

Keane told us his advisers came up with the fact that al-Qaida has increased fourfold by relying on a 2014 report from the think tank RAND (See further one) . The RAND report found that between 2010 and 2013, the number of Islamic jihadist fighters doubled, and the number of attacks tripled. Given the continued rise in activity since 2013 and based on discussions with experts, Keane and his advisers concluded that the size of al-Qaida and its affiliates has essentially doubled again since the RAND report was published. The RAND report relied on both unclassified and classified primary sources to come up with its counts.

The evidence; At the Senate hearing, Keane shared this map that shows various al-Qaida affiliates and other Islamic extremist groups throughout the region as of January: Map: source http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2015/feb/01/jack-keane/retired-general-says-al-qaida-has-grown-fourfold-l/

GROWING RADICAL IDEAS AND IDEALISM

Mix of radical ideas and idealism drives Europeans to join global jihad

RT News time: November 06, 2013 Gilles de Kerchove: (coordinator of counter-terrorism efforts among EU member states) Radicalization in Europe – it is not much different from the past. We are in the process of trying to understand better the reason why so many Europeans are going to Syria. We start with the idea that they are not all radicals when leaving because some maybe just driven by idealistic ideas and they just want to be helpful. Some are just joining refugee camps and rarely may join the most radical groups. But where we start being concerned is when, and that is what we understand, many of them are mainly joining the groups affiliated to Al-Qaida and groups which not only want to withdraw Assad but have the global jihad rhetoric and share fully the project of Al-Qaida. And therefore we think, I think we’ll see that in the future but that many of them will get back in Europe much more radical. They may inspire others, recruit others, or they may, some, even direct attacks in Europe and that’s why all member states are very mobilized by this subject. In fact the terrorist threat has evolved a lot since 9/11 in recent years. It is no longer one, single organization, very well structured like Al-Qaida was on 9/11. It is something that is much more diversified, much more diverse. We still have the Al-Qaida, but of course the core of Al-Qaida has been very much degraded. But we have different other manifestations. //

At the European Security conference in Munich, February 2014, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates told European nations that they were under direct threat from Islamist extremists and that this phenomenon would not go away. His warning followed Western intelligence services which already established operational links between al-Qaida in Afghanistan and the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) whose goals include striking at the heart of Europe. "I am concerned that many people on this continent may not comprehend the magnitude of the direct threat to European security" the secretary lamented. Gates warned: "The threat posed by violent Islamic extremism is real - and it is not going away. Europeans knew "all too well" about the Madrid bombings that killed 191 people in

March 2004 and the attacks in London that left 56 dead in July 2005, but further from the spotlight there had been "multiple smaller attacks" in cities from Glasgow to Istanbul", Secretary Gates said.

New al Qaida document sheds light on Europe, U.S. attack plans

March 20, 2013 (CNN) -- A previously secret document found at Osama bin Laden's compound in Pakistan sets out a detailed al Qaida strategy for attacking targets in Europe and the United States.The document -- a letter written to bin Laden in March 2010 by a senior operational figure in the terror group -- reveals that tunnels, bridges, dams, undersea pipelines and internet cables were among the targets. It was written by Younis al-Mauretani, a senior al Qaida planner thought to have been behind an ambitious plan to hit "soft" targets in Europe in the fall of 2010. CNN has obtained details of the document from sources briefed on its contents. The 17-page letter is in Arabic. Al-Mauretani proposed that al Qaida recruits take jobs with companies transporting gasoline and other sensitive companies in the West, and await the right moment to strike. He said targets should include tunnels, airports and even "Love Parades" -- gay and lesbian events held every summer in Germany. He said recruits should infiltrate university courses in the West in key subjects useful to the group including physics and chemistry, so that they could later be re-activated and help the group, according to Die Zeit. He also suggested attaching mines to undersea pipelines using mini-submarines -- and appears to have researched ways to circumvent safety valves on such pipelines. Al Mauretani also proposed that al Qaida attack financial centers and think-tanks -- specifically mentioning the RAND Corporation, whose headquarters are in California.

Yassin Musharbash, an investigative reporter with Die Zeit in Berlin, says the document seems "to support information gleaned from other terror trials that Al Qaida in 2010 was trying to plan a comprehensive plot against the West," and al-Mauretani appears to have been bent on "hitting Europe and the U.S. by targeting critical infrastructure and economic targets." Some of al-Mauretani's ideas may seem far-fetched, but they underline al Qaida's continuing fascination with bringing down airliners. He proposed that men recruited into the Yemeni al Qaida affiliate AQAP become pilots with airlines, and then drug their co-pilots before flying the plane into a target. One target he identified was the massive petrochemical facility at Abqaiq in Saudi Arabia. Al Mauretani suggested that Osama bin Laden signal the go-ahead for attacks in Europe with a public message that al Qaida's patience with Europe had run out. And he had a clear sense of how to finance attacks, saying that al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) had "millions" and its leaders trusted him, according to Die Zeit. Mauretani himself was originally from Mauritania in north-west Africa. Sources briefed on the contents of the letter told CNN that al-Mauretani wrote that al Qaida Central in Pakistan could only cover the starting costs of the operation against Europe and additional costs would have to be covered by AQIM and others.

Analysts tell CNN al-Mauretani's call for the various nodes of al Qaida to work together was emblemmatic of a shift within the terrorist network towards greater coordination and pooling of resources. Al-Mauretani added that AQIM had a "great deal of trust" in him, according to the sources. According to analysts the North African operative paved the way for direct cooperation between AQIM and al Qaida's senior leadership in the late 2000s after he travelled to Pakistan. In late 2011 Moktar Belmoktar, then a senior figure in AQIM, told a Mauritanian journalist that al-Mauretani was the "first direct contact between us and our brothers in Al-Qaida."Bin Laden appears to have liked the ideas in al-Mauretani's letter, and assigned them high priority. Other documents found at his Pakistani compound in Abbottabad suggest he forwarded it to at least one other senior figure in al Qaida. In around June 2010, bin Laden wrote to senior Libyan operative Atiyah abd al Rahman, then al Qaida's head of operations in Waziristan, instructing him to tell the leaders of the al Qaida affiliates AQIM in North Africa and AQAP in Yemen to "put forward their best in cooperating" with al-Mauretani "in whatever he asks of them." "Hint to the brothers in the Islamic Maghreb that they provide him with the financial support that he might need in the next six months, to the tune of approximately 200,000 euros," bin Laden wrote. // As for al-Mauretani, he is unlikely to have any role in bringing his terror plans to fruition. He was picked up by Pakistani police in Quetta in August 2011 and remains in detention. Pakistani authorities appear to have uncovered some of his terror plans. In announcing his arrest a month later, they stated: al-Mauretani "was tasked personally by Osama bin Laden to focus on hitting targets of economical importance in United States of America, Europe and Australia, including gas pipelines, power generating dams and oil tankers." Several of al-Mauretani's western recruits -- trained in the tribal territories of Pakistan -- have been arrested on their return home. // In 2010, al-Mauretani was seen as the mastermind of planned attacks in Europe. Fears that such attacks would materialize led the U.S. State Department to issue a travel alert in October 2010. Sources briefed on the letter told CNN that al-Mauretani requested bin Laden issue a statement saying al Qaida's patience with Europe had run out following the al Qaida leader's previous offering of a conditional truce, and that his statement needed to be choreographed with an attack shortly afterwards. "We ask you undertake certain steps in order to threaten Europe before the attacks happen. And these steps should be in synch with the preparations of those attacks. Inform Europe that patience has come to an end, as has our hope that they

end their campaign against us. Also [make clear] that they have not understood our message thus far. One or two weeks after that we will strike ... and then we will threaten them again. After we hit Europe we will hit America, so we isolate the Americans," the sources said al-Mauretani wrote in the letter. Die Zeit's Musharbash says al-Mauretani's blueprint "has very likely little operational value now. But certain ideas may have trickled down and may still be alive elsewhere in the network."

Ayman al-Zawahiri, has repeatedly threatened Europe.

In September 2006 he appeared in a video website on the fifth anniversary of the 11 September attacks, urging to punish France as prime target for Islamist militants. Pierre de Bousquet de Florian, then head of the DST (domestic security service), said the threat of terrorist attack in France remained "very high and very international". // After the beginning of Arab Spring, the terrorist Al-Qaida organization has undergone an important change in strategy. As a result of that change, Al-Qaida has excluded the United States and other Western powers, which it previously considered as “far enemy,” from its new strategy. Instead, the group has focused on the “near enemy,” that is the Arab countries in the region Ayman Al-Zawahiri (phase 4 of the master plan that should come to a close between 2010- 2013, a shift largely unnoticed by the west. Let alone the implications linked to the plan). From the viewpoint of Ayman Al-Zawahiri, as long as the dictatorial regimes, which govern various countries in the Arab world, continue to bask in the support they receive from the United States and the European countries, they will never let go of power reins. On the other hand, he argues, the mercantilist Western powers will withdraw their support for any of their regional allies when and where they reach the conclusion – according to a simple cost-benefit calculation – that the cost of supporting their allies would be way higher than its benefits. That, Al-Zawahiri believes, is exactly the time that Al-Qaida can get active and help the

opposition forces to overthrow dictatorial regimes in the Arab world. The next phase would be Five; the caliph established.

ADDRESSING A GROWING THREAT

Upfront Daesh , 3 Feb 2015, the Islamic State group (ISIS)/ Daesh released a grisly video of Jordanian First Lieutenant Moaz al-Kasasbeh - "a devout Muslim, - being burned alive in a cage like something out of a cheap horror film. But this was real, and it may well mark the beginning of the end for a group that will eventually rot from the inside out. This is by no means ISIS's first atrocity -- the group has been carrying out crucifixions, beheadings, mass murders, trafficking in women and systematic rape for some time now. More than anything we in the West can say or do, more than any counter-radicalization campaign, it is ISIS's own actions that undermine its credibility and standing among fellow Muslims and blunt its magnetism. This is a group primarily engaged in the wanton killing of fellow Muslims, including fellow Sunnis like al-Kasasbeh.

More than anything else, two things will herald the beginning of the end for ISIS, and both are furthered by al-Kasasbeh's tragic death. First, the group is beginning to decay from within as reports emerge detailing its abuse of local populations; the stories of disappointed foreign fighters who return home to debunk the myths of this so called true "Caliphate"; and the anger of the vast majority of Muslims around the world reacting to the group's barbarism. Burning a fellow Muslim alive checks that box in a very graphic way.

Second, losses on the battlefield, such as the defeat at Kobane and the blows ISIS is surely about to suffer from Jordan and its allies, severely undermine the group's appeal. Success breeds followers, fighters, and funds -- it is the group's single greatest draw, both for radical true believers and "5 star jihad" followers on. Defeating ISIS on the battlefield will speed up that decay from within 37.

The Growing Threat of al-Qaida and Its Affiliates 38

Published on Tuesday, 20 January 2015 Written by Glen Asher

With terrorism and terrorists making headline news relatively frequently over the past few months, it appears

like terrorism is on the rise again, 13 years after the "War on Terror" began. Is it our imaginations or is it a fact that al-Qaida, the world's major motivator of terrorists, is on the rise again or are they no longer an existential threat to the United States and the rest of the world. A 2014 study by Rand 39looks at the evolution and status of al-Qaida and gauges the state of al-Qaida and other Salafi-jihadist groups to see which viewpoint is correct. For those of you who are not aware, Salafi-jihadism describes an extreme form of Sunni Islam that rejects both democracy and Shia rule. Most Salafi-jihadist groups are not al-Qaida, however, al-Qaida is Salafi-jihadist. Salafi-jihandists focus on the holy war against infidel

37 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-composting-of-isis-let-it-rot38 http://www.oyetimes.com/news/middle-east/77013-the-growing-threat-of-al-qaida-and-its-affiliates39 http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR637/RAND_RR637.pdf

regimes and reject any form of innovation to Islam, preferring a "pure" form of Islam. They believe that it is a duty for Muslims to perform violent jihad with many of them preferring to overthrow regimes in Muslim countries (the "near enemy") as opposed to attacking Western countries (the "far enemy") since they lack the resources to attack the far enemy, although we have to keep in mind that the far enemy has assets in near enemy nations (i.e. embassies). They base their ideology on the persistent attacks and humiliation that Muslims faced as part of the anti-Islamic movement (i.e. the Crusaders or Zionists). Most Salafi-jihadist groups consider America to be an enemy and are quite willing to both attack the U.S. homeland and its overseas interests as well as local enemies and are more than willing to kill civilians, preferring to have a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead.

As background, al-Qaida first appeared among the world's terrorist groups in 1988. It grew throughout the 1990s and peaked in September 2001. It declined in prominence during the early 2000s as key leadership figures were killed in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other nations around the world. It began to rise again around 2003 after the invasion of Iraq, claiming responsibility for a wave of attacks across Iraq, in Madrid and in London. Around 2006, the U.K. and the U.S. foiled a number of al-Qaida plots and used drones to once again kill key leadership figures. Between 2007 and 2009, there was a third wave of growth as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) took prominence and began to decline in importance after the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011, the same year that al-Qaida began to spread to Syria. While bin Laden's death was a watershed moment, recent activity from AQAP would suggest that al-Qaida is alive and well and that the group is more than its leadership. Most of al-Qaida's current leadership resides in Pakistan, however, it has become more decentralized and less hierarchical in organizational structure as the years have passed since Osama bin Laden was at the helm. By decentralizing, al-Qaida and its Salafi-jihadist groups are more easily able to survive government crackdowns since killing one of many leaders is not critical to the health of the organization. That said, research shows that groups with high levels of centralization are more likely to achieve victory (41.5 percent chance of success) than those with low levels of centralization (17.4 percent).

Today, al-Qaida can be divided into four tiers: 1.) Core al-Qaida which includes the organization's leadership, mainly based in Pakistan. This group is led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. The core leadership is committed to establishing a caliphate that liberates all Muslim lands.

2.) Affiliated al-Qaida groups which include Salafi-jihadist groups whose leaders have sworn bay'at (an oath of allegiance) to al-Qaida leaders. Theses include AQAP in Yemen, al Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb in Algeria, AQIS and Jabhat al-Nusrah in Syria. These groups are formal branches of the al-Qaida franchise. They tend to focus on overthrowing local governments and establishing emirates, for example, Boko Haram leaders in Nigeria have focussed on establishing an emirate in Nigeria.

3.) Other Salafi-jihadist groups, some of which have established a relationship with al-Qaida but were not created by core al-Qaida, are not formal members of al-Qaida and have not sworn bay'at to core al-Qaida.

4) Individuals and networks that have no direct contact to core al-Qaida and have little or no organizational structure. These individuals and groups are inspired by al-Qaida's cause and are generally outraged by what they perceive as injustices in how Muslims are treated in Afghanistan, Palestine, Chechnya and other nations. They are motivated by a hatred of the West. Now that we have all of this background information, let's look at whether Salafi-jihadist groups are growing in number. See bar graph showing the number of Salafi-jihadist groups by year since 1988: the number of Salafi-jihadist groups40 and fighters has grown over the past several years, particularly in North Africa and the Levant. Examples include groups operating in such countries as Tunisia, Algeria, Mali, Libya, Egypt (including the Sinai Peninsula), Lebanon, and Syria. Second, there has been an increase in the number of attacks perpetrated by al Qa’ida, especially by al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (which eventually broke with al Qa’ida), al Shabaab, and Jabhat al-Nusrah. Third, not all of these groups threaten the United States or other Western countries. Some groups, such as al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, have plotted attacks against the U.S. homeland. Others, such as Ansar al-Sharia Libya and al Shabaab, have planned attacks against U.S. embassies and citizens overseas. Others have been focused exclusively on local regimes. This increase in Salafi-jihadist groups has likely been caused by weakening governance across North Africa and the Middle East, as well as the expansion of Salafi-jihadist operatives that have spent time at terrorist training camps, fought on jihadist battlefields, or been released or escaped from prison.

There has been a significant jump in the number of Salafi-jihadist groups since 2010, the number of growing by 58 percent over a three year period alone.

See graph showing both the high and low estimates for the number of active Salafi-jihadist fighters by year since 1988:

Ascertaining the exact number of fighters is difficult since groups obviously do not publish membership lists, however, between 2010 and 2013, the number of Salafi-jihadists doubled in both the high and

low estimates, mainly on growth in the number of figures in Syria which saw its numbers grow to between 25,000 and 51,000, based on growth in the number of Syrian rebel fighters. The concern about the situation in Syria cannot be understated, particularly since between 1000 and 1500 rebel fighters in Syria have come from Europe, particularly France, Belgium

40 Graphics originally published in http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR637/RAND_RR637.pdf

and Sweden. It could prove to be problematic if these fighters are further indoctrinated on the battlefield and return to Europe as "agents of instability".

Why has there been such growth in the number of Salafi-jihadist groups and fighters? Here are two main reasons

1.) The weakness of governments in Africa and the Middle East; militant groups function best where weak governments have difficulty establishing the rule of law. The fact that the number of terrorist groups and terrorists mushroomed after the Arab Spring is no coincidence. As we found in the case of Saddam Hussein, sometimes the heavy hand of a dictator is what is required to maintain social order in a very diverse society that is split along religious lines (i.e. Sunni and Shi'a) 2.) The spread of militant networks; as individuals train together, they develop a social network that connects them as they move from nation to nation/battlefield to battlefield. Like military personnel in traditional military roles, their social interaction creates a strong bond. Interestingly, one other nation that had effectively targeted terrorist groups in the past is now seeing a resurgence. Since Muammar Qaddafi's overthrow in 2011, Libya has become one of the most active Salafi-jihadist sanctuaries in North Africa; this is in sharp contrast to Libya's 2003 decision to renounce terrorism, a decision that was quite effective at reducing the strength of Libya's domestic terrorist network. Despite the 2012 "democratic" elections, armed militias now control much of rural Libya and Ansar al-Sharia Libya is looking to establish shari'a law in the countryside. Let's close with this graph that shows the growing number of attacks by al-Qaida and its affiliates between 2007 and 2013: The violence levels for attacks by core al-Qaida and its affiliates are highest in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Syria and include a mix of suicide attacks, assassinations, use of improvised explosive devices against governments and civilians and complex attacks using multiple fighters. Approximately 99 percent of the attacks were against "near enemy" targets in 2013. The report notes that some Salafi-jihadist groups pose a high threat to the U.S. homeland since they are involved in active planning against America and Americans. The highest threat comes from al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the same group that claimed responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo and grocery store attacks in Paris. While core al-Qaida has historically had difficulty in recruiting volunteers that are both willing and capable in the West, their recent use of both Hollywood-style videos and the Resurgence and Inspire magazines suggest that they are still very dedicated to radicalizing Westerners, a move that appears to be having some success. In case you were curious, here is the promotional video trailer for the Resurgence magazine: https://archive.org/details/AlQaidaMediaArmAnnouncesNewEnglishLanguageMagazine On top of these methods, al-Qaida has proven to be quite savvy when it comes to the use of social media, particularly YouTube, Facebook and Twitter. The authors of the report express concerns that the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in 2016 will seriously jeopardize the West's security interests because the Taliban could well take over the nation once again, allowing al-Qaida and other terrorist groups that are currently present in Pakistan, Afghanistan and along the inaccessible frontier regions between the two nations to increase their presence. We also have to keep in mind that, while core al-Qaida and its affiliates seem to focus on "near enemy" targets, the tactics that they use (i.e. in al Shabaab's attack on the Westgate Mall in Kenya) could be used as learning experiences for attacks on "far enemy" targets. As well, the fact that thousands of potential fighters hold passports for Western

nations, allows them to travel freely from their "near enemy" battlegrounds to Europe, North America and Australia, among other nations.

RAND Corporation research report: A Persistent Threat, The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists by Seth G. Jones 41

Summary, This report examines the status and evolution of al Qa’ida and other Salafi-jihadist groups, a subject of intense debate in the West. Some argue that al Qa’ida—especially core al Qa’ida—has been severely weakened, and there is no longer a major threat to the United States from Salafi-jihadist and other terrorist groups. Former CIA officer Marc Sageman concluded that “al Qaida is no longer seen as an existential threat to the West” and “the hysteria over a global conspiracy against the West has faded.” According to University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer, “Terrorism—most of it arising from domestic groups—was a much bigger problem in the United States during the 1970s than it has been since the Twin Towers were toppled.” Brian Jenkins argued that few of America’s jihadists were dedicated or competent terrorists, resembling “stray dogs” rather than “lone wolves.” According to Jenkins, of the 32 jihadist terrorist plots uncovered since September 11, 2001, most never moved beyond the discussion stage. Only ten had what could be described as an operational plan, and of these, six were FBI stings. By comparison, the United States saw an average of 50 to 60 terrorist bombings a year in the 1970s and a greater number of fatalities. Some contend that the most acute threat to the United States comes from homegrown terrorists. Still others maintain that al Qa’ida is resilient and remains a serious threat to the United States. Finally, some claim that while the al Qa’ida organization established by Osama bin Laden is in decline, “al Qa’idism”—a decentralized amalgam of freelance extremist groups—is far from dead.

Which of these views is most accurate?

To better gauge the state of al Qa’ida and other Salafi-jihadist groups, this report uses a combination of qualitative and quantitative data. It examines thousands of unclassified and declassified primary source documents, such as the public statements and internal memoranda of al Qa’ida and other Salafi-jihadist leaders. In addition, it builds a database that includes information like the number of Salafi-jihadist groups, their approximate size, and their activities (attacks, fatalities, and casualties). Some of this information—particularly the database—is new and provides an important gauge of Salafi jihadists. The report makes several arguments. First, and most important, the United States faces a serious and growing Salafi-jihadist challenge overseas. Beginning in 2010, there was a rise in the number of Salafijihadist groups and fighters, particularly in Syria and North Africa. There was also an increase in the number of attacks perpetrated by al Qa’ida and its affiliates. Several data points illustrate these trends:• There was a 58-percent increase in the number of Salafi-jihadist groups from 2010 to 2013. Libya represents the most active sanctuary for Salafi-jihadist groups in North Africa, and Syria the most significant safe haven for groups in the Levant.• The number of Salafi jihadists more than doubled from 2010 to 2013, according to both our low and high estimates. The war inSyria was the single most important attraction for Salafi-jihadist fighters.• There was a significant increase in attacks by al Qa’ida–affiliated groups between 2007 and 2013, with most of the violence in 2013 perpetrated by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham

41 http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR637/RAND_RR637.pdf

(43 percent), which eventually left al Qa’ida; al Shabaab (25 percent); Jabhat al-Nusrah (21 percent); and al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (10 percent).• Approximately 99 percent of the attacks by al Qa’ida and its affiliates in 2013 were against “near enemy” targets in North Africa, the Middle East, and other regions outside of the West, the highest percentage of attacks against the near enemy in our database.

This suggests that al Qa’ida and its affiliates have deliberately chosen to focus on the near enemy for the moment, found it increasingly difficult to strike “far enemy” targets in the West, or a combination of both. One country in the Middle East where Salafi-jihadist groups have lost ground is Egypt, where the regime has targeted the Muhammad Jamal Network and groups in the Sinai. But the broad trends indicate that the United States needs to remain focused on countering the proliferation of Salafi-jihadist groups, which have started to resurge in North Africa and the Middle East, despite the temptations to shift attention and resources to the Asia-Pacific region and to significantly decrease counterterrorism budgets in an era of fiscal constraint.Second, the broader Salafi-jihadist movement has become more decentralized among four tiers: core al Qa’ida in Pakistan, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri; formal affiliates that have sworn allegiance to core al Qa’ida, located in Syria, Somalia, Yemen, and North Africa; a panoply of Salafi-jihadist groups that have not sworn allegiance to al Qa’ida but are committed to establishing an extremist Islamic emirate; and inspired individuals and networks. Using the state of core al Qa’ida in Pakistan as a gauge of the movement’s strengths (or weaknesses) is increasingly anachronistic for such a heterogeneous mixture of groups.In addition, while there are some similarities among Salafi jihadists, there are also substantial differences. Salafi-jihadist leaders and groups often disagree about how much, if at all, to target Western countries and their citizens; the size and global nature of their desired emirate; and their willingness to attack Shi’a. This decentralized structure creates substantial vulnerabilities for al Qa’ida and other Salafi-jihadist groups, as outlined in more detail later in the report.Third, the threat posed by this diverse set of groups varies widely, though several of these groups pose a substantial threat to the U.S. homeland or U.S. interests overseas. Some are locally focused and have shown little interest in attacking Western targets. Others, like al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, present an immediate threat to the U.S. homeland, along with inspired individuals like the Tsarnaev brothers—the perpetrators of the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. In addition, some Salafi-jihadist groups pose a medium-level threat because of their desire and ability to target U.S. citizens and facilities overseas, including U.S. embassies. Examples include Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia, al Shabaab, al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, and the various Ansar al-Sharia groups in Libya.Fourth, in response to these threats the United States should establish a more adaptive counterterrorism strategy. It should pursue long-term engagement in countries where there is a high threat to the United States and low local government capacity. Engagement involves the use of special operations, intelligence, diplomacy, and other capabilities to conduct precision targeting of groups and their financial, logistical, and political support networks. It often includes training, advising, and assisting local governments in their struggle against terrorism.Engagement can also involve pursuing clandestine operations against adversarial regimes that support terrorist groups. The United States should pursue forward partnering in countries where there is a threat to the United States but limited local government capacity. Forward partnering involves training, equipping, and advising local governments but refraining from becoming directly involved in operations.Finally, the United States should pursue offshore balancing in countries where there is a low threat to the United States and sufficient local government capacity or an ally (like a NATO

country) willing to counter Salafi-jihadist groups. Offshore balancing involves relying on allies and local governments to counter terrorist groups while avoiding the deployment of any U.S. forces for training or other purposes. It generally includes utilizing offshore air, naval, and rapidly deployable ground forces rather than onshore combat power. This framework and the analysis in this report highlight the need for a long-term engagement strategy—including direct U.S. involvement—in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, and possibly Syria, where there are significant terrorism threats to the United States and limited government capacity. It also highlights the importance of developing a long-term forward partnering relationship with a small set of countries in Africa (Nigeria, Algeria, Somalia, Libya, and Egypt) and the Middle East (Lebanon and Iraq), with the involvement of regional allies like Israel and Jordan. Finally, this framework identifies a subset of countries—such as Morocco and Mali—where the United States may want to encourage others (like NATO allies) to work with local governments, since the terrorist threat to the United States is limited. The United States will need to reassess these categorizations when there are changes in the threat environment and the capacity and willingness of local governments to counter terrorist groups.

In addition, this framework highlights several U.S. foreign policy issues. A complete withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan by 2016 could seriously jeopardize U.S. security interests because of the continuing presence of Salafi-jihadist and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A growing civil war or successful Taliban- led insurgency would likely allow al Qa’ida and other terrorist groups—such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Haqqani network, and Lashkar-e-Taiba—to increase their presence in Afghanistan. Al Qa’ida and associated movements would likely view an American exit from Afghanistan—if it were to happen—as their most important victory since the departure of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989.

The United States should also consider a more aggressive strategy to target Salafi-jihadist groups in Syria, either clandestinely or with regional and local allies. According to our data, Salafi jihadists in Syria made up more than half the total number of Salafi jihadists worldwide in 2013 and were engaged in a growing number of attacks. In addition, Jabhat al-Nusrah and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham orchestrated approximately two-thirds of al Qa’ida’s attacks in 2013. U.S. counterterror operations in Syria are complicated because the Assad government is an enemy, not an ally. Nevertheless, U.S. intelligence and special operations units have several options, which are not mutually exclusive: clandestinely target Salafi-jihadist groups operating in Syria; work through allies such as Jordan, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia; and work through surrogate partners, such as Syrian rebel groups that oppose Salafi-jihadist groups in Syria. The failure to weaken Salafi-jihadist groups in Syria will likely have serious repercussions for the United States, in part because of Syria’s proximity to allies like Jordan, Turkey, Israel, and European Union countries. The access of Syrian groups such as Jabhat al-Nusrah to foreign fighters, terrorist networks in Europe, and bomb-making expertise suggest that they may already have the capability to plan, support, and potentially conduct attacks against the West.

CTTA: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis (January/February 2015)Building a Global Network for Security

A Journal of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research

Volume 7, Issue 1 (January/ February 2015) of the Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis (CTTA) by the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

From a terrorism and counterterrorism perspective, the year 2014 was particularly significant. This was due as much to the potential impact of drawdown of US and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) from Afghanistan as to the declaration of the establishment of a so-called Islamic Caliphate by the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS). While the former has emboldened old and established groups like Al Qaida Central, the Afghan Taliban, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, among others, the claim of the establishment of the “so called Islamic State” by ISIS seem to have galvanized disparate elements within the Muslim world, drawing fighters in thousands to Iraq and Syria and spurring radicalization and extremism in many countries in an unprecedented scale.

Southeast Asia; Even if there were no major attacks, the countries in Southeast Asia had to deal with the impact of ISIS. This was most evident in Indonesia and Malaysia with a number of citizens of respective countries found to be involved with ISIS – either joining the fight in Iraq or Syria or indulging in recruitment for the same or both. At the same time regional groups, especially in Indonesia, continue to target the “near enemy” – the government establishment and its security apparatus and personnel. In the Philippines, even as Manila proceeds to finalize the negotiated settlement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), it had to deal with other armed groups in the country such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Communists. Thailand continues to grapple with a fragile political process that has relegated Bangkok’s dealing with the Southern Thai militancy to the background. Finally, while Myanmar has been striding along on the routes to democratization, it is still grappling with myriad ethnic armed groups, not the least of which has been the Rohingiyas.

South Asia; Afghanistan underwent a smooth democratic transition in terms of its presidency and government. However, with rising levels of violence by the Taliban and no sign of a negotiated settlement between the warring parties, Afghanistan’s future has become more uncertain which portends significant challenges for the country, the region and the international community at large. In Bangladesh, old groups continue to present threats, whilst new outfits like Al Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) are also targeting the country. AQIS also has India in its sights, despite an overall decline in terrorist activity. The threat in India is further heightened with the growing influence of ISIS in the country and the spread of left-wing militancy. Pakistan continues to reel under its home-grown terrorist threat, the most significant being the massive attack on a school in Peshawar in December 2014, perpetrated by the Pakistan Taliban. In Sri Lanka, the revival of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), with challenges from Islamist and Sinhalese extremist groups have become an emerging concern.

Central and East Asia Countries in Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan - have two main concerns. The first is the drawdown of the US-led international forces from Afghanistan, and the second is the increasing number of Central Asians travelling to Syria and Iraq to fight along with the ISIS and other jihadist groups. At the same time, the violence in Xinjiang and other parts of China and the presence of Uighur militants in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia raised new concerns about the terrorist threat and Beijing’s response to the same.

Middle East; In 2014, events in the Middle East were completely dominated by the rise of ISIS which brought the involvement of the US and the countries in Europe and most importantly some of the Muslim countries in the region to the forefront. Despite significant

losses in terms of territory, personnel and financing, ISIS threat is still not out. At the same time the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a major determinant of Middle East stability, as before. The resignation of the Yemeni President, the death of the Saudi King and the growing instability in Libya and Syria portend significant challenges for the region’s security in months ahead.

Africa; Egypt’s challenges stemmed from frequent attacks on civilians and security forces by non-state armed groups galvanized by political instability. The outlook for Libya remains bleak with diverse militias – once instrumental for the removal of Muammar Gadaffi - themselves becoming country’s greatest security concern. While Nigeria reeled under Boko Haram threats, Somalia was hammered with attacks by al-Shabaab, despite the killing of its leader Ahmed Abdi Godane in September 2014.

THE THREAT OF COOPERATION

Islamic State and Al-Qaida: The Threat of Cooperation

Robby Dunn-Bernstein 01.06.15 Several open sources have claimed that al-Qaida’s (AQ) affiliate in Syria, the al-Nusra Front, has agreed to a non-aggression pact with the Islamic State (IS). While these reports may be speculative, an accord between al-Qaida and the Islamic State, and the end of the infighting between the jihadist organizations would have deleterious ramifications for all those who oppose them including the Kurds, the Assad regime, and any US-led coalition. However, given the costly and bloody falling out between al-Qaida and IS, it is highly unlikely that the present conditions could foster a potential truce or accord between these fratricidal jihadist organizations.As a result of recent and increasing hostilities, the divide between al-Qaida Central and the Islamic State is too great to expect a formal merger under a centralized leadership. However, there is one interest common to all militant, criminal, and terrorist organizations – their own survival. Cooperation in Syria and Iraq is about survival for both al-Qaida and IS. While their enemies rejoiced in their fracture the two groups risked much with their ongoing and open conflict. With multiple fronts and an array of enemies against them, both al-Qaida and the Islamic State would benefit with one less front to worry about. However, these ascendant jihadist organizations are in competition over territory, recruits, and the future of a Salafi-Jihadist established caliphate, and the level of trust and sophistication needed to facilitate such cooperation must be mutually beneficial.

While cooperation between similar ideologically motivated organizations often exists due to common enemies, motives, or goals, and the broader agenda of al-Qaida and IS is the establishment of a Salafi-Jihadist caliphate under Sharia law, the organizations are at odds

over how it will be governed – and who will rule as caliph. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has already declared the territory governed by his group as the ‘Islamic State’ and ‘Caliphate’ – A proclamation Zawahiri and al-Qaida’s central leadership have rebuked and declared as blasphemous. Additionally, al-Qaida and its affiliates distanced themselves from what they believe to be an increasingly brutal and extremist Islamic State organization, whose overzealous commander prematurely proclaimed the establishment of an Islamic caliphate – and perhaps most unforgivably for Zawahiri, Baghdadi himself as the Caliph. If Zawahiri were to openly cooperate with Baghdadi and IS he would undermine himself, undoubtedly degrading the respect and brand of al-Qaida.

After formally disowning Baghdadi and the Islamic State in January 2014, Zawahiri severed all ties proclaiming that al-Qaida bore no responsibility for the actions of IS. While this political move was designed to outmaneuver an increasingly negative reputation of brutality, disobedience to al-Qaida, and extremism by Baghdadi and IS, it was also about retaining the al-Qaida brand. However, in disowning Baghdadi and his group, Zawahiri perhaps calculatingly relinquished al-Qaida’s capabilities in Iraq to IS, its former AQI branch. Al-Qaida has since lost its ability to effectively operate in Iraq and has greatly suffered from this costly decision. Al-Nusra Front is the only al-Qaida affiliate in Syria and must therefore remain active and involved if al-Qaida is to remain relevant in the region. Neither al-Qaida nor its affiliates can ill afford to lose recruits or defectors to the Islamic State. The inverse is that given the potential increase of defectors from IS who have become disheartened by the strict adherences to Baghdadi’s interpretation of Sharia law, al-Qaida and the al-Nusra Front may benefit if defectors from IS seek a less extremist ideology, and find they are no longer able to return to their countries of citizenship. If the al-Nusra Front has agreed to a non-aggression pact with the Islamic State, secretly sanctioned by al-Qaida or not, then Zawahiri would save face for disowning the Islamic State while continuing to influence an al-Qaida’s presence in Syria. Even a non-aggression pact carries the potential for the Islamic State and the al-Nusra Front to further their own agendas and prolong their survival without the threat of further escalation.

The success and survival of militant organizations depends on recruitment, reinforced by an ability to operate at the forefront of clandestine and military theaters, but due to the amount of visceral distrust, broken allegiances, and competition between al-Qaida and the Islamic State, the likelihood of cooperating for the purpose of joint operations is highly unlikely at this point. Since being disowned by al-Qaida, IS has sought to establish its own brand — but at a price. However, the Islamic State has set itself apart by achieving what al-Qaida never fully could by establishing and controlling territory. Although IS has uniquely distinguished itself from al-Qaida by securing territory and fertile grounds for recruitment and resources, it still lacks the Salafi-Jihadist validation once endorsed while under the al-Qaida flag. Despite shared interests and common enemies, the current level of mutual benefits and interests is not likely to yield the potential for joint operations without the threat of further betrayal.

The Islamic State was funded by al-Qaida when it existed as its affiliate ‘al-Qaida in Iraq’ (AQI), though the Islamic State has since subsequently established its own increasingly sustainable lifeline independent of al-Qaida and its subscribers. IS has been achieving sustainability through the group’s seizure of territory, allowing the group to generate revenue and resources through criminal activities, which include the illegal sale of oil, extortion of the local populations for food and resources, and trafficking in weapons and people. Additionally, while it may seem conceivable that al-Qaida and IS could establish the foundations of trust necessary for possible future cooperation through trafficking in weapons or specialized

training, the proliferation of these activities continues to increase dramatically throughout the Middle East, allowing both IS and al-Qaida to remain well supplied, effectively reducing any need for cooperation. The Islamic State has greatly increased its own capabilities by ransacking and capturing equipment from the Iraqi and Syrian militaries. Zawahiri and Baghdadi know that every bullet prolongs their own survival, and that aiding one another will only prolong the competition and future confrontations between two organizations.

Cooperation relies on the level and extent of trust established between organizational hierarchies, which may be unattainable at present given the body count and expended resources of this violent and ideological feud – something militant jihadists do not easily forgive. There is limited trust between al-Qaida and the Islamic State required for fostering fertile ground on which to establish potential future cooperation in repelling Kurdish militias, the al-Assad regime, and US-backed forces. If the present benefits of cooperation are not compelling enough to foster a truce, perhaps increased airstrikes and threat of mobilized and better equipped enemies will be enough for al-Qaida and IS to resolve their conflict in order to prolong their own survival.

LWJ, Al-Qaida Possibilities, AQ insurgencies:

1) AQ and IS merge into a new organization dominated by AQ’s High Command in Afghanistan-Pakistan.Discussion: Given the news reports of local cooperation between AQ and IS, as well as the stated desire by AQ to reconcile with the group, it seems likely that at least part of IS will end up rejoining the organization that gave birth to them. This would be even more likely if Baghdadi and his command staff are killed. ...even a partial unification [between AQ and IS] could be dangerous, since it would still add significantly to the power of the al-Nusra Front and make it far more likely that the taking of Damascus would succeed.Possible results: The full unification of AQ with IS would be a disaster for the region and eventually the world, especially if IS territory comes under AQ control. Given the bad blood between the two organizations and the likelihood of infighting if al-Baghdadi is killed, a full reconciliation seems improbable, although it should not be ruled out entirely. However, even a partial unification could be dangerous, since it would still add significantly to the power of the al-Nusra Front and make it far more likely that the taking of Damascus (outlined below) would succeed. Much of the potential success for al-Nusra Front in this scenario hinges on the groups unifying without serious infighting or the collapse entirely of IS into warring factions.2) Al-Nusra Front, in cooperation with other groups, takes Damascus and declares an Emirate in Syria dominated by AQ.

Discussion: As the Institute for the Study of War has shown, Nusra Front and its allies have made steady progress in encircling Damascus over the past few months. The leader of Nusra Front was also recorded this summer discussing the possibility of creating an “emirate” (i.e. Islamic territory) in Syria. Taking Damascus could be a milestone big enough for the declaration of this state.Possible results: The fall of Damascus to al-Nusra Front and its allies would give the group—and AQ—an unprecedented boost, overshadowing the conquest of Mosul by IS and setting up AQ as the undisputed leader of the global jihad. While it might seem unlikely that Assad’s allies would allow this to happen, both Russia and Iran have challenges on their own borders (i.e. Ukraine and Iraq) that they might consider far more important and deterring them from coming to Assad’s rescue. In addition to setting up al-Nusra Front and AQ for further spread into Lebanon, Jordan, and elsewhere in the region, such a take-over would

also give the group the opportunity to compete for the ideal of the “Caliphate” by declaring an emirate run by AQ. Syria would act then as a rallying point for recruits and a safe haven in the center of the Middle East for AQ to plot and plan its next insurgent and terrorist moves.3) AQAP seizes control of Aden and most of southern Yemen, then launches an assault on the capital of Sana’a and the Houthis.

Discussion: In September, the Hadi government in Yemen collapsed under assault from the Huthis (a rebel group made up of Zaydis—a form of Shi’ism) and the capital of Sana’a also fell to the insurgents. AQAP has taken advantage of this opportunity to spread rapidly across the south of the country and seems poised to hold territory as it did before the Yemeni government offensive in 2012. In 2015, it might be strong enough to carry out a full-on assault of the capital and to use the rallying cry of Sunni vs. Shi’a, already a part of the group’s propaganda, to win recruits around the region to its cause.Possible results: There is a growing likelihood that the entire Middle East—and South Asia—could be consumed with a sectarian war, as Sunnis and Shi’a choose to fight for their co-religionists and ignore national affiliations and boundaries. An offensive by AQAP on Sana’a might act as an impetus for the outbreak of this regional sectarian war. In addition, if AQAP is able once again to hold territory, it could use this terrain to plan and train for attacks against the U.S. and others.4) As the U.S. draws down in Afghanistan, AQ is able to reestablish a safe haven in that country.

Discussion: The Long War Journal has been carefully following reports of the return of AQ to Afghanistan. Given the weaknesses of the central government in that country, and the strength of the Taliban, it seems possible that, as the U.S. walks out the door, AQ will be able to return to reclaim the areas in Afghanistan that were once used as its only safe haven.Possible results: While there are many places that could be used by AQ to plan attacks against the U.S. (this article does not even discuss Libya), the return of the organization to Afghanistan should be understood as particularly dangerous. The central command node of the group is apparently still located somewhere in South Asia, and control of territory in Afghanistan would give it more protection from U.S. interference than would be possible in other, more accessible, areas of the world.

AQ terrorism:1) AQIS carries out a mass-casualty attack on India.Discussion: The creation of AQIS, a new affiliate of AQ that claims to represent Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Burma, brings the potential for serious terrorism and perhaps even insurgency to the entire subcontinent. Attacks in Karachi and elsewhere have already been claimed by the group, and it seems very likely that AQIS will attempt to carry out a spectacular attack in India itself.Possible results: There are many ways that this sort of attack could occur, but undoubtedly the most dangerous for the entire world would be if AQIS were able to find serving Pakistani officers to carry out the assault. One of the attacks in Karachi claimed by AQIS—at least according to news reports—employed serving Pakistani naval officers. If AQIS were able to find officers to carry out a mass casualty attack on India, this might set off a crisis between Pakistan and India to rival that of December 2001.2) Through the Khorasan Group, AQ manages to carry out a terrorist attack against the U.S. or Europe.

Discussion: The revelation in September of an “imminent threat” posed by the Khorasan Group was a surprise to the entire world. News reports suggest that the group has been working with both al-Nusra Front and AQAP to plan some sort of terrorist attack on aviation, and that the air strikes carried out by the U.S. to deal with the threat have, up to this point, been ineffective.Possible results: If the Khorasan Group survived the attempts by the U.S. to deal with this imminent threat, then AQ might be able to carry out a significant attack on the U.S., Europe, or elsewhere in 2015. This possibility is, of course, dependent on the failure of future air strikes or other actions taken by the U.S. and its allies in Syria. In addition to the horrific loss of life, there are other significant implications of a successful terrorist attack by AQ: it would burnish the group’s image, increase its recruiting potential among radicalized youth, undercut the appeal of IS, and return to AQ the undisputed leadership of the global jihad.

4 Feb 2015, Washington 42: Al Qaida core is now focused on physical survival following battlefield losses, but the terrorist outfit will remain a difficult and critical intelligence challenge this year, Pentagon has said 43."Beyond the immediate threats posed by ISIL, the Afghan insurgency, and homegrown violent extremists aspired to travel overseas, particularly to Syria and Iraq, al Qaida will remain a difficult and critical intelligence challenge in 2015," Lt Gen Vincent Stewart, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency told members of House Armed Services Committee during a hearing on global threat assessment yesterday. "Al Qaida core is now focused on physical survival following battlefield losses. At the same time, the group is also trying to retain its status as vanguard of the global extremist movement, being eclipsed now by ISIL's rising global prominence and powerful competition for adherents," he said. "Despite the fracturing of the global extremist movement, al Qaida core in Pakistan continues to retain the loyalty of its global affiliates in Yemen, Somalia, North Africa, Syria, and South Asia," Stewart said. "Al Qaida also will likely try to expand its limited presence in eastern Afghanistan as Western CT operations there decline, and in the face of continued CT pressure from Pakistan," he said as listed out some of the other terrorist groups.Al Qaida in Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) recently increased efforts to expand its operating areas across North and West Africa by working with, and through, other regional terrorist groups. AQIM almost certainly continues to plan attacks and kidnapping operations against US allies in the region, Stewart added. "As part of the larger al Qaida network, we are concerned about the support Al-Nusrah Front provides to transnational terrorist attack plotting against US and Western interests. We expect the group will try to expand its territory in 2015 beyond its Syrian operating areas and enhance its operational capabilities in Lebanon, where it already conducts operations," the Pentagon official said. Stewart said the Khorasan Group is a cadre of experienced al Qaida operatives that works closely with and relies upon al-Nusrah Front to provide personnel and space for training facilities in northwestern Syria. (C: Is it focused on physical survival or shifting to not identify next phase, as our focus on Daesh is giving them the opportunity?)

42 LWJ 4 Feb43 http://zeenews.india.com/news/south-asia/al-Qaida-core-now-focused-on-physical-survival-pentagon_1541144.html

AND WHAT ABOUT THE OTHER; DAESH

The Islamic State, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), follows a distinctive variety of Islam whose beliefs about the path to the Day of Judgment matter to its strategy, and can help the West know its enemy and predict its behavior. Nearly all the Islamic State’s decisions adhere to what it calls, on its billboards, license plates, and coins, “the Prophetic methodology 44 which means following the prophecy and example of Muhammad, in punctilious detail. Following takfiri doctrine, the Islamic State is committed to purifying the world by killing vast numbers of people, but the End of Days is a leitmotif of its propaganda. These include the belief that there will be only 12 legitimate caliphs, and Baghdadi is the eighth; that the armies of Rome will mass to meet the armies of Islam in northern Syria; and that Islam’s final showdown with an anti-Messiah will occur in Jerusalem after a period of renewed Islamic conquest. -- Some Daesh supporters makes a case that Rome meant the Eastern Roman empire, which had its capital in what is now Istanbul. We should think of Rome as the Republic of Turkey—the same republic that ended the last self-identified caliphate, 90 years ago. Other Islamic State sources suggest that Rome might mean any infidel army, and the Americans will do nicely. -- The Islamic State has attached great importance to the Syrian city of Dabiq, near Aleppo; .It is here, the Prophet reportedly said, that the armies of Rome will set up their camp. The armies of Islam will meet them, and Dabiq will be Rome’s Waterloo or its Antietam.

Did we sleep? The group’s ambitions and rough strategic blueprints were evident in its pronouncements and in social-media chatter as far back as 2011, when it was just one of many terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq and hadn’t yet committed mass atrocities. Adnani, the ISIS

44 http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/

spokesman, told followers then that the group’s ambition was to “restore the Islamic caliphate,” and he evoked the apocalypse, saying, “There are but a few days left.” Baghdadi had already styled himself “commander of the faithful,” a title ordinarily reserved for caliphs, in 2011. In April 2013, Adnani declared the movement “ready to redraw the world upon the Prophetic methodology of the caliphate.” In August 2013, he said, “Our goal is to establish an Islamic state that doesn’t recognize borders, on the Prophetic methodology.” By then, the group had taken Raqqa, a Syrian provincial capital of perhaps 500,000 people, and was drawing in substantial numbers of foreign fighters who’d heard its message. If we had identified – or did we choose to ignore - the Islamic State’s intentions early, and realized that the vacuum in Syria and Iraq would give it ample space to carry them out, we might, at a minimum, have pushed Iraq to harden its border with Syria and preemptively make deals with its Sunnis. That would at least have avoided the electrifying propaganda effect created by the declaration of a caliphate just after the conquest of Iraq’s third-largest city. Chastened by our earlier indifference, we are now meeting the Islamic State via Kurdish and Iraqi proxy on the battlefield, and with regular air assaults. Those strategies haven’t dislodged the Islamic State from any of its major territorial possessions, although they’ve kept it from directly assaulting Baghdad and Erbil and slaughtering Shia and Kurds there. An invasion would be a huge propaganda victory for jihadists worldwide: irrespective of whether they have given baya’a to the caliph, they all believe that the United States wants to embark on a modern-day Crusade and kill Muslims. Yet another invasion and occupation would confirm that suspicion, and bolster recruitment. Add the incompetence of our previous efforts as occupiers, and we have reason for reluctance.

The humanitarian cost of the Islamic State’s existence is high. But its threat to the United States is smaller than its all too frequent conflation with al-Qaeda would suggest. Al-Qaeda’s core is rare among jihadist groups for its focus on the “far enemy” (the West); most jihadist groups’ main concerns lie closer to home. That’s especially true of the Islamic State, precisely because of its ideology. It sees enemies everywhere around it, and while its leadership wishes ill on the United States, the application of Sharia in the caliphate and the expansion to contiguous lands are paramount. Baghdadi has said as much directly: in November he told his Saudi agents to “deal with the rafida [Shia] first … then al-Sulul [Sunni supporters of the Saudi monarchy] … before the crusaders and their bases.”

The death of the Islamic State is unlikely to be quick, and things could still go badly wrong: if the Islamic State obtained the allegiance of al-Qaeda—increasing, in one swoop, the unity of its base—it could wax into a worse foe than we’ve yet seen.

February 12, 2015 The head of Iran's powerful Quds Force has been quoted as saying the Islamic State (IS) group is nearing its demise. General Qassem Suleimani was quoted by Fars news agency as saying in a ceremony on February 11, "Considering the heavy defeats suffered by [IS militants] and other terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria, we are certain these groups are nearing the end of their lives." Suleimani, who has reportedly been near the front line against the IS group, has frequently been pictured on social media in Iraq with pro-government forces in battle areas. Iran supports the Shi'ite-led government in Baghdad, and is a key ally of the regime in Damascus. Iran, however, is not part of U.S.-led air campaign that strikes IS targets in Iraq and Syria. The Quds Force -- the foreign wing of Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards -- conducts sensitive security functions abroad, including intelligence, special operations, and political action deemed necessary to protect the Islamic republic.

Is the Past Prologue for the Islamic State?Kevin Woods and Jessica Huckabey February 13, 2015 · in (W)ARCHIVES45 The Islamic State’s (IS) capture of large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria has reignited interest in what many had hoped was a closed chapter of U.S. military history in Iraq: the fight against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). While AQI was defeated, it was not destroyed. In fact, as a timeline offered by the Brookings Institution suggests, the Islamic State’s emergence appears to be just another step in AQI’s regional evolution. A challenge for the American objective of degrading and ultimately defeating IS is developing a clear understanding of how AQI failed. In addition, because IS’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, isn’t likely to publish a tell-all memoir any time soon, being able to see what the organization’s predecessors were learning in Iraq during AQI’s supposed demise would also help us understand IS’s growth. Finally, it would also be useful to examine what the Islamic State learned from AQI’s “defeat,” and how it is applying those lessons. Notwithstanding its remarkable innovations in funding and information operations, the Islamic State has a lot in common with its AQI predecessors. It faces the same, if not more challenging, tasks of population control, internal and external power struggles, and security—especially from the rapid influx of unvetted foreign fighters. Unsuccessful execution of these tasks doomed past Salafist jihadist groups. Those familiar with Abu Musab al-Suri’s writings assessing failed jihads, especially in Syria, will recognize the jihadist movements’ miserable track record in moving past the recruit-fight-martyr stages of state-building. Students of these movements know a great deal about these problems thanks to the jihadists’ reliance on the Internet for everything from daily communication to recruiting. But there is another source of insights. Information about the tensions and challenges of al-Qaeda and its affiliates is also available in the form of high-level jihadist records captured during military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan during the past decade. These records provide a rare window into the groups’ internal organizational dynamics and decision-making processes. They also enable the comparison of the public narratives about jihadist groups with their own self-perceptions in private discussions. Such records are available through the United States Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center. Another collection of them is also available at the less well-known Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) in Washington, DC. The CRRC has a digital collection that includes almost 6,000 pages of captured records from al-Qaeda’s early days in Afghanistan (pre-2003) and a growing collection of AQI records. In fact, the CRRC’s government sponsor, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, has charged the Center with focusing on growing its holdings of records that cover al-Qaeda–affiliated groups in Iraq. Even a cursory examination of the documentary evidence available at these two venues underscores the idea that the past may be prologue for the Islamic State. One well-known example of this is a 2005 letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s then-second-in-command, to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, AQI’s founder. The captured letter reveals serious disagreement within the movement over the role of violence. In this document, Zawahiri warns that, apart from some “zealous young men,” Muslims will “never find palatable…the scenes of slaughtering the hostages.” If the Zawahiri letter indicated disapproval at the strategic level, correspondence at the operational level showed equal displeasure among the ranks of Islamist fighters. Another captured record, dated to early 2007, expressed the grievance of one allied jihadist group’s leader (likely the leader of Ansar al-Islam) with AQI’s relations with other militant groups fighting coalition forces in Iraq. Jihadist heavy-handedness was particularly noteworthy during the U.S. surge, when alienating AQI’s local allies could least be afforded. This appears to be a lesson lost on IS.

45 http://warontherocks.com/2015/02/warchives-is-the-past-prologue-for-the-islamic-state/

The 2007 letter’s author discussed disunity among the various groups and their causes; matters on which AQI—by then also known as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI)—has generally preferred to remain silent. He wrote, “You have been previously warned many times about the behavior of some of your affiliated members who greatly doubted our brothers and issued statements that are misleading, heretic[al], and doubting even the legitimacy of the Jihad action of those who dissent from you…” The concerned jihadist commander’s specific complaint centered on the killing of one of his fighters after his group failed to answer letters quickly enough to satisfy AQI. He warned the AQI commander, “Brothers…do not think that you are the only ones who are right; such bad thinking instills discord among Muslims, cuts all brotherly ties, tears the bonds of love, and plants animosity, hatred, and enmity.” Events in Iraq and Syria remind us that extremism and authoritarianism remain a potent presence in Iraq and elsewhere. Captured AQI records offer the opportunity to understand the origins of the Islamic State as an adversary and to identify its vulnerabilities. The CRRC archive provides terrorism researchers a unique insight into those aspects of the region’s recent past that will shape its future.

4 Feb 2015, The Islamic State has reportedly threatened France with more attacks and called for French Muslims to join the new “caliphate.” A new video by the group has emerged online, nearly a month after the deadly attacks in Paris. The video, reportedly seen by AFP, shows a masked individual surrounded by armed fighters calling on French Muslims to take up the cause for the creation of an “Islamic caliphate,” which has taken root in parts of Iraq and Syria. The group is also demanding that the French government release suspected jihadists that were detained for participating in the fighting in the Middle East. The Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) militants have also urged attacks on police and military targets, as well as individuals who participated in a Parisian movement last month to express outrage over the slaying of 12 people at the offices of French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo on January 7th. Last month, Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility for the massacre, which claimed the lives of 11 people, including the magazine’s top editors.

Islamic State builds links with al-Qaida lands 30 January 2015

Analysis By BBC Monitoring The Islamic State (IS) group has forged links with militants across North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, embracing regional franchises that have pledged allegiance to the group. The latest branch was announced in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, on 26 January. The first new branches beyond the group's strongholds in Syria and Iraq were announced by IS leader Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi in November when he accepted pledges of allegiance from jihadists in Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Some of those pledges came from existing groups which went on to re-brand themselves as new IS "provinces", or wilayat, such as the Egyptian Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis and Algeria's Jund al-Khilafah. The most prolific branches have been those in Libya and Egypt, which have tapped into the IS media network to publish a steady flow of

propaganda, highlighting attacks and publicising their attempts at governance. Others have maintained a shadowy presence. For example, the IS Yemeni and Saudi provinces have yet to claim any activities or establish propaganda channels. But the impact of the IS expansion has nevertheless been felt by its jihadist rivals in al-Qaida, which has branches in many of the areas IS has moved into.

Egypt The IS branch in Egypt, Sinai Province, was essentially a re-branding of an existing group known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, which first emerged in 2011 in the wake of the Egyptian revolution. Logo for IS in Sinai based in Egypt. Sinai is the highest-profile established jihadist group to be accepted into the fold by Baghdadi and has kept up the tempo of its operations following the change in November. The group swiftly changed its name and re-branded its media to reflect the new affiliation, adopting a new logo reminiscent of IS branches in Syria and Iraq. Its activities are focused on the Sinai Peninsula (where it launched a deadly attack on soldiers on 30 Janaury) but it has also claimed attacks in Cairo and Egypt's western desert, suggesting it might have some ability to link up with the IS branch in Libya

Libya; The Libyan branch of IS has been the most active since it was formally embraced in November and its propaganda output has most closely resembled that of IS branches in Syria and Iraq. Three distinct Libyan IS "provinces" were announced in November - Barqah in the east, Tripoli in the west and Fazzan in the south. This still from a video promotes another IS in Libya group, with this one active in Tripoli Since then, most activity has been centred on the country's coastal strip, reflected in a steady stream of propaganda highlighting the group's attempts at governance alongside brutal attacks and executions. Only one attack has been claimed by Fazzan Province. Barqah Province, active mainly in the eastern urban centres of Darnah and Benghazi, appears to have grown out of the jihadist group Majlis Shura Shabab al-Islam, which pledged allegiance to IS in October. This IS propaganda map claims swathes of Libyan territory for the groupThe branch's highest-profile operation took place in the west - the 27 January attack on the Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli, which left at least nine people dead including five foreigners.

Algeria; Little has been heard of the Algerian branch of IS since the pledge of allegiance from Jund al-Khilafah was accepted by Baghdadi in November.

Logo for IS in Algeria. The group, which broke away from al-Qaida's North Africa branch (AQIM) last year, later restyled itself as the Algeria Province of IS. The group rose to prominence in September when it beheaded French tourist Herve Gourdel. But it has been largely silent since then, failing to comment on reports that its leader Khalid Abu-Sulayman (aka Abdelmalek Gouri) was killed by Algerian forces in December. It has not claimed any activities.

Yemen and Saudi Arabia; IS drew the ire of al-Qaida's Yemen branch (AQAP) when Al-Baghdadi unilaterally announced new "provinces" in Yemen and Saudi Arabia in November. Although the new branches have not claimed any activities or set up any propaganda feeds, the move represents a symbolic challenge to al-Qaida, which is competing for ascendancy in the leadership of the global jihad. When IS originally declared its caliphate in Syria and Iraq in June 2014, al-Qaida restricted itself to veiled criticism. But the gloves came off after the expansion into al-Qaida territories in November, with various al-Qaida branches issuing angry and explicit condemnation.

Afghanistan-Pakistan; The new Afghanistan-Pakistan branch of IS is the only franchise to have been formally announced since the November flurry of allegiances. The leader of the new province is said to be Hafiz Sa'id Khan, a former Pakistan Taleban commander.Two weeks earlier, Khan appeared in a video which showed 10 jihadist commanders from Afghanistan and Pakistan pledging allegiance to IS under his local leadership. That film

included the beheading of a Pakistani soldier. Commanders from Afghanistan and Pakistan pledging allegiance to Islamic StateThe new branch has taken the name Khorasan Province, after the historical term jihadists use to refer to the region, and covers Afghanistan, Pakistan and "other nearby lands", according to IS. The move amounts to another major

challenge to al-Qaida and the Taleban, which have been the main jihadist operators in the region.

Other regions; While IS has made no further declarations of new "provinces" elsewhere, there have been reports that other groups of jihadists around the world have pledged allegiance to IS. The group recently signalled in its English-language magazine Dabiq that new announcements may be in the pipeline. Graphics from new Boko Haram video The November edition, issued after Baghdadi's expansion declaration, acknowledged that other unnamed groups in the Caucasus, Indonesia, the Philippines, Nigeria and elsewhere had also pledged allegiance and that IS had accepted them. But it said further conditions needed to be met before new "provinces" were formally announced. The mention of Nigeria could be a reference to Boko Haram, whose propaganda output has recently received a boost - apparently with help from IS media operatives.

Debkafile 2 Feb, Ex-Maj. Gen. Abu Ali al-Anbari, its outstanding figure, acts as Al Baghdadi senior lieutenant. He also appears to be the brain that has charted ISIS’s current military strategy which, our sources learn, focuses on three major thrusts: the activation of sleeper cells in Europe for coordinated terrorist operations: multiple, synchronized attacks in the Middle East along a line running from Tripoli, Libya, through Egyptian Suez Canal cities and encompassing the Sinai Peninsula; and the full-dress Iraqi-Syrian warfront, with the accent currently on the major offensive launched Thursday, March 29, to capture the big Iraq oil town of Kirkuk.

• Their mission is to topple the rule of President Abdel-Fatteh El-Sisi. • Another former Iraqi army officer was entrusted with coordinating ISIS operations

between the East Libyan Islamist contingent and the Sinai movement • If Kobani is the only military gain achieved by US-backed forces in months of

coalition effort, who will be able to stop the brutal ISIS offensive going forward in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East?

ISIS strategists, not content with these "successes," are still in full thrust and believed to be planning to expand their operations and hit Israel – whether from the south or the north.

• The British government keeps on warning that an Islamist attack is coming soon.• ” It was obvious from these lame comments that the West is totally at a loss for ways

to pre-empt the thrusting danger.

Additionally, Jordan has pledged to step up its role in the international coalition fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), after the armed group killed a captured Jordanian pilot. "We are waging this war to protect our faith, our values and human principles and our war for their sake will be relentless and will hit them in their own ground," state television said. Like it or not the downing of the plane and now the burning alive of the Jordanian pilot will have participating Arab countries starting to think. Reportedly 5 Feb Key Arab member of anti-ISIL coalition reportedly stopped conducting air strikes in Syria over fears for pilots' safety. Among them the head of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood, Hammam Said, who is against Jordan being in the US-led coalition fighting ISIL, but condemned the killing. “We have said that we do not agree with the ISIL approach which is not related to Sharia Law, nor with the morals which God has ordered us to follow.”

For Daesh still the NEAR with intent, and propaganda statement hinting (in) to the FAR, but..

let us recall 12 June 2014, The terrorists, who belong to The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS -- known as DAESH in Arabic] and are said to be an offshoot of al-Qaida, are planning to take their jihad to Jordan, Lebanon, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula -- after having already captured large parts of Syria and Iraq, the sources said. According to the sources, ISIS leader Abu Baker al-Baghdadi recently discussed with his lieutenants the possibility of extending the group's control beyond Syria and Iraq. One of the ideas discussed envisages focusing ISIS's efforts on Jordan, where Islamist movements already have a significant presence. Jordan was also chosen because it has shared borders with Iraq and Syria, making it easier for the terrorists to infiltrate the kingdom. Jordanian political analyst Oraib al-Rantawi sounded alarm bells by noting that the ISIS threat to move its fight to the kingdom was real

and imminent. "We in Jordan cannot afford the luxury of just waiting and monitoring," he cautioned. "The danger is getting closer to our bedrooms. It has become a strategic danger; it is no longer a security threat from groups or cells. We must start thinking outside the box. Jordan could become the next target on Daesh agenda, but… remember: In an audio recording released on December 14, 2009, Zawahiri renewed calls to establish an Islamic state in Israel and urged his followers to “seek jihad against Jews” and their supporters. He also called for jihad against America and the West, and labeled Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, King Abdullah II of Jordan and King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia as the “brothers of Satan.” Additionally, July 20, 2010 He went on to accuse Jordan's king Abdullah II, Saudi King Abdullah and Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas of being "Zionists." "Who is providing his intelligence service to serve US intelligence and (Israel's) Mossad? Is he not the heir of traitors, Abdullah, the son of (late King) Hussein" of Jordan, he said. For now there is an uproar for this burning a Muslim alive, a punishmenthighly critisized : ‘Do not punish with Allah’s punishment.’ I would have merely executed them…” With the whole world reacting, what if Daesh intent “lure them in; Jordan”– with this appalling burning -is to drag Jordan in the wider War against the so-called Islamic State?

"Cannon fodder." 2 Feb, A social media account linked to the Chechen-led faction Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (JMA), which considers itself to be the Syrian affiliate of the North Caucasus militant group the Caucasus Emirate, has accused the Islamic State (IS) group of using inexperienced young recruits as "cannon fodder." The post on February 2 accuses the Islamic State group and its propagandists, of deceiving young recruits. "Young people cheated by propaganda from those such as Murad Atayev and similar media workers of the "Baghdadi State" [a pejorative term for the IS group used by some Russian-speaking militants] about a "great victory" are rushing to join this sect, thinking that they are going to a "caliphate" that is growing every day". The post goes on to claim that the Islamic State's leadership is in disarray. "In reality, [the IS group's] leadership is panicking and throwing these novices into battle without giving them necessary information about the enemy and without equipping them with the required weapons (which it hasn't got, it's been left in Kobani, etc.)," Salagayeva goes on to say. The post ends with a call to wanna-be militants not to join Islamic State. "So you who are in a hurry come here to wage jihad; if you want to die in a questionable way and get a dubious martyrdom [a term used by militants to refer to dying in battle], considering where and how you will die -- you should really go to [IS]. But those of you who want to fight in Allah's path, stay away from this meat grinder," the post concludes.

The likely why, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi

Jan 2015, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi called for a renewed vision of Islam in a recent speech to Muslim clerics. “We have to think hard about what we are facing,” Sisi said. “It’s inconceivable that the thinking that we hold sacred should cause the entire ummah (Islamic community) to be a source of anxiety, danger, killing and destruction for the rest of the world. Impossible!” “It’s antagonizing the entire world!” Sisi said. “Is it possible that 1.6 (Muslim) people should want to kill the rest of the world’s inhabitants – that is 7 billion – so that they themselves may live? Impossible!” “I say and repeat again that we are in need of a religious revolution,” Sisi said. “You, imams, are responsible before Allah. The entire world, I say it again, the entire world is waiting for your next move … because this umma is being torn, it is being destroy, it is being lost – and it is being lost by our own hands .” (Egypt's Sisi: Islamic "Thinking" Is "Antagonizing the Entire World"January 1, 2015 http://www.meforum.org/4951/egypt-sisi-islamic-thinking-is-antagonizing )

WMD late Jan 2015, Egypt’s military leader, who called for a revolution in Islam to change its violent reputation, has stirred Muslim clerics and commentators on Muslim Brotherhood television channels to call for his death. Anyone who kills Egyptian President Abd Al-Fattah Al-Sisi and the journalists who support him would be doing a good dead, cleric Salama Abd Al-Qawi 46 said on Rabea TV. Meanwhile, cleric Wagdi Ghoneim told Misr Alan TV that “whoever can bring us the head of one of these dogs and Hell-dwellers,” referring to Sisi and his supporters,

would be rewarded by Allah. The calls for Sisi’s death, translated and reported by the Middle East Media Research Institute, were made on programs broadcast in January by Muslim Brotherhood channels based in Turkey. As WND reported, four weeks after Sisi’s fiery speech to Islamic clerics at Al-Azhar University calling for a “revolution” in the faith to change its reputation as a violent religion at war with the world, the Muslim world has been largely silent. This week, a delegation of senior exiled members of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood seeking to restore the Brotherhood to power in Egypt came to Washington and met with several senators, according to the Investigative Project on Terrorism. Meanwhile, on Rabea TV, a moderator asked the cleric Qawi: “Is it possible that someone will be influenced by what you say and will simply kill Al-Sisi and rid us of all this?”Qawi replied: “Doing this would be a great deed that would bring (the killer) closer to Allah.” “So are you issuing a fatwa?” the moderator asked. Salama Abd Al-Qawi Qawi said: “Anyone who can do this to Al-Sisi will be doing a good deed, and if he gets killed in the process, he will become a martyr. “You mean Al-Sisi?” the moderator clarified. “No, the killer will become a martyr. The same goes for all the criminal leaders. This is a good deed, and anyone who can do this will become closer to Allah.” A guest asked: “Who says this? You or the religion of Islam?” Qawi replied: “Islam does. Who am I? I’m nobody.” On Misr Alan TV, the cleric Ghoneim was asked by the moderator: “Is it fair to say that (Egyptian TV host) Ahmad Musa and other journalists are like the [poets who affronted the Prophet Muhammad in early Islam]?” The cleric replied: “They are even worse. I say this live on TV. By Allah, whoever can bring us the head of one of these dogs and Hell-dwellers, will be rewarded by Allah.” Ghoneim further stated: “We can say this loud and clear. … These people spread falsehoods and fabricate lies. They are like worn-out shoes on the feet of ScumSisi.” Commentator Muhammad Awadh said the journalists who support Sisi “are the mouthpieces of this violent regime.” “They are complicit in all crimes with their incitement,” he said. “The crime of the accomplice is the crime of the perpetrator. Since the article 87 of the penal code stipulates that Al-Sisi and his gang of coup leaders should be punished by death, then the punishment for those inciting coup journalists is also death.” In his New Year’s Day remarks at Al Azhar University in Cairo, Sisi urged the imams to take responsibility to change the world’s view of Islam. “I say and repeat again that we are in need of a religious revolution,” he said. “You, imams, are responsible before Allah. The entire

46 http://www.wnd.com/2015/01/death-threats-against-bold-egyptian-president-aired/

world, I say it again, the entire world is waiting for your next move … because this ummah (Muslim community) is being torn, it is being destroyed, it is being lost – and it is being lost by our own hands.”

*** Ban Ki-moon: Stop ISIL 'in the name of humanity' 47 We have to unite. ISIL have committed unspeakable crimes, brutality ... I cannot describe the horror how a human being can be so cruel.... We have to mobilise all resources and the influence to stop this ***

Recently retired Gen. Keith Alexander, “We’re at greater risk,” he said. “Look at the way al-Qaida networks. From al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, and now in Syria, the al-Nusra front. Look at the number of jihadists going into Syria and what they want to do. When put all that together, you can say those are distant countries, but a lot of these groups are looking to attack the United States. “I take that threat very seriously,” he said.

Seven out of Five…..

47 http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2015/02/ban-ki-moon-stop-isil-humanity-150205152121577.html

OUTLOOK;

After nearly a century of absence the spirit and phenomena of the Caliph and Caliphate is out of the bottle, in line with AQSL long-term plan to establish. However and although highly pursued, and planned by AQSL for now they do not like the self declared caliph Ibrahim and still prefer the Taliban Commander of the Faithfull Mullah Omar; in their eyes the so-called “first” Caliph established in line with the protocol of the 1926 Cairo conference. The Internal Battle” between AQSL and Daesh is far from over and likely just beginning, and although the outcome is remote from clear for now our focus should remain with the known plans and declared intent, as it is likely that both AQ and Daesh are pursuing the (Seven phased) long-term plan known to them. In both cases the West is next on the list…. “The big question remains as whether messaging or signalling or whether there are intermediaries between the two groups. 48” Yet, despite Daesh ’ growing appeal, the major branches of AQ in Yemen, Somalia, North Africa and the India sub Contingent have remained in the ranks. Despite clear antagonisms when it comes to strategy, AQ and Daesh can be thought of as ideological siblings. “Daesh and al-Qaida both want global jihad, but the way they go about it is very different.” While al-Qaida’s strategy under Osama bin Laden, and now Zawahiri, focused on preaching its form of Islam and toppling regimes aligned with the West before trying to establish a caliphate, Daesh believes in simultaneously establishing a state — a strategy first championed by AQ in Iraq’s deceased ideologue, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. “The Daesh is a competitor in leading the global jihad and it is currently winning the race,” but what has been Daesh’ success — its ability to conquer and control territory — could be the source of its demise as the group will have to defend its territorial conquests. “Daesh wants to be a global entity, but it’s very much locally grounded.” “The territory they hold is their strength because they extract resources, but territory is where you can be found – and where you can be targeted — that is strategically a more difficult position to hold.”

... Still AQ for at least the last two decades has a long-term planning in progress, established its networks all over the Globe and working hard to get Daesh back into their orbit, as currently Daesh is signalling, trying to do the opposite: moving into AQ areas and forging bay’at to the new caliph. Therefore we need to think the unthinkable: what if they succeed and we the west kills” caliph” Ibrahim; a phenomena highly underestimated in the west……Al Qaida could still become the victor out of this and in 3rd order effect we will likely help it becoming a fact; sadly what ever the outcome Europe is next, and if we follow the timeline of the grand plan it will start as soon as 2016..

The current full focus on Daesh and its pursued defeat gives the AQSL or whatever salafist inspired other lead organisation, time to analyze, and plan for picking up the remnants of the Daesh. Do we understand the phenomena of the caliph, and will it go away, after we likely kill the caliph Ibrahim, or declare the ground victory? Will that bring sustainment in the peace? What to do with the growing Shia- Sunni divide? Do we get the phenomena of the caliph spirit back in the bottle? Moreover are regional players willing and allowing that to happen? Who will embrace the large swat of Sunni fighters? What to do with – as we allow - the influence and military support of Iran and its support to the Shia? With western reluctance to deploy ground forces will we turn to Assad, who has them? What about the Peshmerga which uses as their emblem the flag of Kurdistan and their territorial intentions? Is our strategy of training and arming “vetted moderates” going to blowback? etc

48 http://time.com/3695200/islamist-radicals-connections/

And, what about the other instable theatres; as the Traditional Religious Salafist – not every Salafist is by definition a terrorist, but they see it as religious duty to give undisputed obedience and have no other option than to follow the call of the Caliph. Just ask ourselves how many of them - Traditional Religious Salafist - are there and not only in the Syria - Iraq area, but over the globe? And how many them follow the duty call?.

Both Jordan and Egypt reacted military to the “lure trap set - The more the group expanded, the more it developed its schemes. Not only did Daesh resort to beheading its hostages in public, but it also began to film these executions and disseminate them widely on social media. It did this in order to meet strategic objectives - primarily to publicise its cause worldwide and to attract jihadists. - 49”by Daesh after the burning of the Jordan pilot and killing of the Copts Christians. A tactic seen and developed over time by AQ now likely used by Daesh to widen the conflict and create internal divide in the target countries. Others like Lebanon and Saudi Arabia could be next. All and all the conflict is widening, Daesh is spiralling out in the Middle East and likely still following AQ grand Plan. And finally it is still unclear but not impossible that the ever growing “push” flow of refugees seen crossing - and many drowning in - the Mediterranean Sea is part of a larger plan, if so it could further undermine Europe’s stability. Moreover, the latest atrocities and remark of the IS leader conducting the Coptic Christians decapitating on the Libyan Mediterranean shores mentioning “standing South of Rome” creates fear in the southern Europe states. As it could indicate Europe your next just a small part of the Sea is dividing us” but more likely: The Islamic State awaits the army of “Rome,” whose defeat at Dabiq, Syria, will initiate the countdown to the apocalypse. --- Turkey, Istanbul Some Daesh supporters makes a case that Rome meant the Eastern Roman empire, which had its capital in what is now Istanbul. We should think of Rome as the Republic of Turkey—the same republic that ended the last self-identified caliphate, 90 years ago. Other Islamic State sources suggest that Rome might mean any infidel army, and the Americans will do nicely---

It could well be that one morning we wake up and realise it was not a dream but reality.. Western leaders claim that the AQ leadership is in total disarray, reduced to no use, hide in caves, on the brink of defeat. However as history has shown Bin Laden been not in a cave, -- At a press conference following the 2011 Abbottabad raid that killed Bin Laden, a U.S. intelligence official noted that initial analyses of recovered documents “clearly show that Bin Laden remained an active leader in Al Qaida, providing strategic, operational and tactical instructions to the group. -- ”Zawahiri was and likely is able to write books and give general guidance to the jihad. The world focus is today on the phenomena Daesh, an offshoot from AQ and seems to ignore the mother: In a 2013 speech on counterterrorism policy, President Obama described Al Qaida’s senior leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan as being “on the path to defeat.” He discussed the rise of Al Qaida affiliates, characterizing them as lethal but “less capable” than the central organization that planned the 9/11 attacks. In President Barack Obama’s 2015 State of the Union address, "the words ‘al-Qaida’ were never used, the first time those words have not been used in a State of the Union address since February 2001."

49 ISIL classifies hostages according to the reaction their killing generates if it is publicised. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/02/dead-hostage-valuable-isil-150211093300769.html

Thanks, in closing some remarks and statements and comments seen during the building of this document..

Never leave in one way or the other a partially defeated enemy back on the battlefield.

16 Feb, Cairo also called on the U.S.-led coalition fighting Islamic State in Iraq and Syria to broaden the scope of their operations to include Libya, highlighting how the militant group is expanding its reach around the Arab world

9 Feb Secretary of State John Kerry and a top White House official claimed Sunday that the U.S. strategy to defeat the Islamic State is working – despite warnings from other corners of the Obama administration that the terror network is in fact spreading

"Al-Qaida has grown fourfold in five years." — Jack Keane on Sunday, February 1st, 2015 in comments on "Fox News Sunday 50" --- ISIS jihadists have lost only a tiny fraction of captured territory in Iraq after five months of U.S.-led air strikes, --- the Pentagon spokesman Rear Admiral John Kirby said 24 January 2015 51.

In early 2014, DNI James Clapper responded in the negative to a question on whether Al Qaida was on the path to defeat, noting that the group was instead, “morphing and franchising itself.” Retired Marine Corps general James Mattis in late 2013 described predictions of Al Qaida’s demise as “premature” and “discredited.” Also 2014, Two of the nation’s chief intelligence officials confirmed to Congress that al Qaida is no longer “on the run,” as leaders have been saying for years. “Is al Qaida on the run and on the path to defeat?” Sen. Jim Inhofe, R-Okla., asked in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper responded, “No, it is morphing and -- and franchising itself and not only here but other areas of the world.” Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, added, “They are not.” Clapper and Flynn echoed that assessment. Clapper said there is a “proliferation” of al Qaida groups or “al Qaida wannabes” in Africa, where there is a “perfect storm” of conditions for those groups to develop, such as large ungoverned areas, porous borders and the availability of weapons primarily from Libya. “Core al Qaida -- the central leadership -- picks and chooses who is among the wannabes or are actually knighted, if you will, so designated as an al Qaida organization.” Flynn, terrorist leaders like Osama bin Laden represent the leadership of al-Qaida, but “core al-Qaida” is its ideology of perpetual jihad. The views discussed above are not necessarily binary or mutually exclusive, and some Al Qaida watchers point out that the group may simply be evolving in ways whose effects are not yet known.

Debate continues regarding the United States’ long-term strategic goal vis-à-vis Al Qaida, its affiliates, and similar groups. President Obama, in his May 2013 speech to the National Defense University, argued that United States should focus on those that directly threaten the United States: We must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it

50 http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2015/feb/01/jack-keane/retired-general-says-al-qaida-has-grown-fourfold-l/51 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/01/24/ISIS-lost-one-percent-of-Iraq-territory-says-U-S-.html

will define us [ ... ] Neither I, nor any President can promise the total defeat of terror [ ... ] But what we can do—what we must do—is dismantle networks -- Congressional Research Service October 10, 2014

Al Qaida and the ideological movement it has sought to lead are in a state of flux. The goals of Al Qaida affiliates will probably remain diverse, encompassing a range of local, regional, and international aims—sometimes within the same group. The ability of Al Qaida’s senior leadership to exert control over affiliates is likely to fluctuate, or, if current trends hold, possibly weaken further. However, ongoing dynamics are likely to include

• Spillover. Al Qaida is likely to seek continued expansion, as shown by its support for combatant groups in Syria. Countries bordering ongoing civil conflicts are particularly vulnerable to a spillover Al Qaida presence, although some of the offshoots established in these countries may initially assume financing or logistical support roles rather than directly seeking to destabilize the countries in which they are based.

• Leadership Struggles. Al Qaida and the broader international salafist-jihadist movement also are likely to continue to struggle with internal divisions and legitimacy issues. Al Qaida’s center of gravity may continue to shift from Afghanistan and Pakistan to areas of Yemen or Syria, although the planned withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in late 2014 could relieve some pressure on the group’s senior leadership. At the same time, Al Qaida is likely to encounter ongoing competition from the Islamic State, which split from Al Qaida earlier this year and later emerged as the group’s most prominent rival. -- Congressional Research Service October 10, 2014

“We believe that some of the Norwegians in DAESH [Isis] have risen to middle-management functions,” Kjell Grandhagen, the head of the Norwegian Intelligence Service, he believes ISIS has reached its peak, a culmination point, after being shaken by the considerable loss near Kobani and it needs to change its tactics, but its power should not be underestimated. He assumes the anti-ISIS airstrikes will make Islamic State shift to a guerrilla war. “We see an Isis… which is impaired in some areas and must change its tactical concept to adapt to the situation.” “But we have no faith in those who think that this is an organization that will let itself be defeated militarily in the near future. They have all the qualities needed to stand militarily for a long time, both in the areas where they reside and as a base for international terrorism.”

General Qassem Suleimani was quoted by Fars news agency as saying in a ceremony on February 11, "Considering the heavy defeats suffered by [IS militants] and other terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria, we are certain these groups are nearing the end of their lives."

“I have been monitoring al Qaida’s leaders’ rhetoric towards Baghdadi," "They are getting softer and softer. ... The Islamic State, regardless of how big or small it becomes, will come back to its mother: al-Qaida." --- Riyadh Mohammed, The Fiscal Times October 10, 2014.

--- Hisham al-Hashimi, a former adviser to the Iraqi Security Forces and the author of a just-completed book about ISIS, in an interview with The Fiscal Times. He predicted that ISIS's current leader, al-Baghdadi, would be killed either by al Qaida or by U.S.-led airstrikes against the Islamic State in Syria. The result, would be that the Islamic State's fighters -- and its extensive arsenal of sophisticated, internationally made weapons -- would join al Qaida's ranks.

Feb 12, "In many ways, we are no longer talking about terrorist groups," McCaul said. "We are talking about terrorist armies." He also warned that the calls being made by ISIL and Al-Qaeda terrorist groups for westerners to join in waging "individual jihad in their homes countries" was working. -- Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security Representative Michael McCaul

"United Nations (UN)" has for many years been trying to invent a common definition of terrorism: "Writing for the Harvard International Review, Jori Duursma tells us that “though in the General Assembly no majority of member states agreed on a definition of terrorism, all member states agreed that terrorism was contrary to international peace and security”. Which is worryingly close to: we don’t know what it is, but we know that it’s bad", writes The Guardian. Nevertheless, an UN’s unit called Security Council, consisting of several Member States, was a bit more decisive. In 2004, they agreed on this formulation: "[Terrorism comprises] criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, and all other acts which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism".

30 January 2015 Numerous British media outlets reported on the refusal of some Arabic media outlets, to call Mujahideen "terrorists". The Express 52 wrote in this regard: "Tarik Kafala, head of BBC Arabic, said the term "terrorist" is too "loaded". Kafala, who is in charge of the Broadcasting Corporation BBC's largest non-English language service, told The Independent: "We try to avoid describing anyone as a terrorist or an act as being terrorist. That’s enough, we know what that means and what it is”. Kafala said: "Terrorism is such a loaded word. The UN has been struggling for more than a decade to define the word and they can’t. It is very difficult to.

9 Feb 2015, "Islam is our responsibility. Our identity is our responsibility," said queen Rania in a video about the need to defeat Daesh both militarily and ideologically. "My country, Jordan, is facing crisis and tragedy with patience, faith and determination to fight terrorism and hold accountable those who are committing the most heinous and brutal atrocities of our time," said the queen of Jordan. "We are in a confrontation with those who have hijacked our religion...They claim to be the successors of the Islamic Caliphate but they have no conscience, and no heart...We need to act. And we are in a race against time to adopt policies that address the priorities which confront us today," she said.

"ISIS savagery should not blind us to the fact that ISIS is self-destructing. ISIS is strangling itself. ISIS is pitting itself against the Muslim mainstream, Muslim public opinion, Arab public opinion. There is really shock and outrage throughout the Arab and Muslim world. I would argue that ISIS is digging its own grave. And the reality is, this is where you want ISIS to be. You want it to be pitted against Arab and Muslim public opinion. This is how ISIS should be defeated, from within by Arab and Muslim public opinion, because even if you

52 http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2015/01/30/19946.shtml

defeat ISIS militarily, you have to deconstruct, dismantle the ideology, which is insidious and which has done a great deal of damage, in particular to Arab and Muslim societies."--- Fawaz Gerges, professor of Middle East studies at The London School of Economics,

Al-Zawahiri actually is a product of Egypt, repression regimes of Mubarak. But let's remember the guy that built Al Qaeda in Iraq. He's a Jordanian man, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who fought Shiites in Iraq, but also sent people to blow up themselves in Jordan nine years ago. We need to think on how to - you know - to decimate extremism. And extremist is not only ISIS. It's also al Qaeda. It's also Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Nusra Front. So how do you dry up this? We need consensus and inclusion in these states. But also we need this war between Shiites and Sunni to end. We need Iran and Saudi Arabia to come to terms and eventually reach some kind of an agreement that end up these extremists."

--- Rula Jebreal, an Israeli-Arab journalist

Finally, just think about this for a moment, while we are counting, flown sorties, dropped bombs and death terrorist, or fighters and claim regaining ground as progress, here a message we can not afford to ignore….

“The U.S. bombing is not helping reduce Daesh’s influence in Syria, (but) God willing Nusra will prevail.” Do we again have a clear view of the 3rd order effects of our actions ““I envision a free Syria under Nusra’s rule,” he- a refugee - sighed. “It is the best option for the future. “

- , and are we critically answering to the question: are we doing the right things and are we doing them right. So far it seem that AQ’s Dawa is getting hold, an outcome we likely did not anticipate. However Zawahiri discussed this a decade ago, but we likely ignored.

ZAATARI CAMP, Jordan 53 — Refugees see al-Qaida-linked militants as best option for Syria’s future. With the world’s attention focused on the Islamic State, Syrian refugees say rival al-Qaida-affiliated rebels are gaining support inside Syria — even among moderate factions battling Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime.And in some parts of Syria, including the so-called southern front just north of the Jordanian border, Jabhat al-Nusra — also known as the Nusra Front and listed by the State Department as a terrorist group — appears to be working so closely with American-backed groups that the two have become virtually indistinguishable operationally. Such fusing between moderates and religious extremists could undermine the Obama administration’s effort to expand training for moderate Syrian insurgents to fight the Islamic State. The U.S. military plans to send about 400 instructors to Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia to train a vetted force of 5,000 fighters to take on Islamic State. Congressional critics have complained that weapons sent to “moderates” such as the U.S.-backed Free Syrian Army could end up in extremist hands — a possibility that appears more likely if those supposed pro-U.S. troops are working closely with al-Qaida-linked fighters.Even if the U.S.-led campaign of airstrikes and training manages to help degrade Islamic State, it could also lead to the ouster of Assad and his replacement with a leadership that includes members or supporters of an al-Qaida-linked group.“The FSA and the al-Nusra are the same people,” said Anwar Nofal, a preacher in one of the many makeshift mosques in this sprawling refugee camp 70 miles northeast of the Jordanian capital of Amman. “They are our own sons and neighbors, we know them well.” During numerous interviews at this camp, just five miles south of the border with Syria, refugees spoke of the close cooperation between U.S.-backed moderates and the Nusra Front. Several

53 http://www.stripes.com/news/refugees-see-al-qaida-linked-militants-as-best-option-for-syria-s-future-1.328101

refugees said that individual fighters and even entire units routinely switch back and forth between the al-Qaida-affiliated group and the moderate FSA.Analysts say that much of Nusra’s appeal stems from its humanitarian work and good governance in areas under its control. “Nusra Front adherents are observant Muslims, but much less extreme than the Islamic State,“ said Mohammad Abu-Ruman, a Jordanian expert on militant groups. “Many Jordanian volunteers, as a result, have joined Nusra because their less extreme ideology appeals to young Jordanians.” (C remember al Zawahiri’s strategic directives given over time: a result of the call Dawa 54 and remember: The Zawahiri Letter and the Strategy of al-Qaeda 55) Both organizations share the same roots. The Islamic State’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who assumed command of the organization in the final two years of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, helped found the forerunner of the Nusra Front by sending cadres to Syria when the revolt against Assad began in 2011. The Nusra Front’s leadership decided to break with the Islamic State when al-Bagdadi insisted in 2013 that the “brothers in jihad” merge under his leadership.Although both organizations want to replace Assad’s regime with a Sunni Islamic state, Nusra has focused on building up local networks and gaining grass-roots support among local populations. In contrast, the Islamic State has preferred to rule the areas it has conquered through fear and brutal coercion of the inhabitants, analysts say. Jordan, which borders Syria and Iraq, is home to 1.5 million Syrian refugees and about 450,000 Iraqis. Almost all of the Syrians at Zaatari are members of the Sunni Muslim majority and are vehemently opposed to Assad’s secular government, comprising mainly the Shiite Alawite sect. Although Nusra fighters may be cooperating with the more moderate anti-Assad rebels in the south and elsewhere, there have also been clashes between the two in the north.Last October, Nusra fighters routed U.S.-backed militias in the northwestern province of Idlib near the Turkish border, and reportedly seized large quantities of U.S. and other Western-supplied weapons and ammunition. Rivalry in the north, however, doesn’t appear to have affected cooperation in the south. The two groups have worked together to prevent the Islamic 54 Note that Ayman al Zawahiri’s immediate call is not to violence, but rather to “incitement and dawa.” As noted earlier, Muhammad al Zawahiri said that his television appearance represented the first time that the jihadi current was allowed to speak for itself. Beyond that, some of the changes in the new Middle East — regardless of whether this process of opening up is on the whole good for these societies — provide jihadis with the opportunity to undertake more intense dawa efforts than they have before, in an effort to draw others toward their understanding of Islam. This advocacy of undertaking dawa in the wake of the revolutions is widespread among jihadi observers, including Hamzah bin Muhammad al Bassam, Abu al Mundhir al Shinqiti, and Ayman al Zawahiri himself. One should not conclude, however, that intensified dawa efforts mean a repudiation of violence. Thinkers such as Ayman al Zawahiri see the salafi jihadi response to the “Arab Spring” as moving in stages, and a current dawa strategy will in Zawahiri’s view give way to a stage of jihad. Bassam has argued that dawa efforts need to eventually produce “real and open existence for jihad,” which will in his view produce a true implementation of sharia. Without violence, Bassam asserted, the efforts of Islamists will have no results “other than gathering and dispersion,” because a number of different “intellectual trends” will be competing for power. - See more at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/ayman-al-zawahiris-new-video-messages/

55 Although Zawahiri focuses on these short- and medium-term goals, two long-term aims can be deduced from the letter as well. The first objective entails “homogenizing” Islam by “correcting mistakes of ideology” among Muslims that is, the “re-conversion” of all Muslims not simply to Sunni Islam, but also to the Wahhabi school and the elimination of the ‘Ashari-Matridi school and others. This goal cannot be achieved by force or in a short time; it is not the role of the mujahidin, but calls rather for generations of proselytizing (dawa) and education. The second objective is the expansion of the Islamic Caliphate throughout the whole of Iraq, al-Sham—Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine—Egypt, and the Arabian peninsula. Even these are not final borders, however, as the Caliphate is eventually supposed to spread its domain over the entire Land of Islam (Dar al-Islam) from North Africa to Southeastern Asia, and ultimately, over the entire world . The letter delves into the structure of the future emirate or Caliphate and the desired form of governance in Iraq. Zawahiri stresses that the mujahidin cannot rule by force or take power directly. The government should adhere to the Islamic principles of shura (consultation) and of “commanding good and forbidding evil” (amr bil—ma’aruf wa—nahi ‘an al—munkar). It should also be based on the ahl al-al wal-aqd ahl ar-ray (those who allow and bind) and the ulama who are experts in Sharia.http://www.hudson.org/research/9901-the-zawahiri-letter-and-the-strategy-of-al-qaeda

State from making inroads into south, including the main southern border town of Daraa, where the Syrian revolt began.“The people of Daraa will not allow Daesh to come to our area,” said Hussein al Jalam, a merchant from Daraa, who referred to Islamic State by its Arabic acronym. “Nobody in this camp supports Daesh; it is a despicable group.” But Jalam, who, with his wife and two small children, lives in one of the ubiquitous prefabricated metal containers that house many of Zaatari’s inhabitants, also condemned the U.S.-led coalition airstrikes against Islamic State militants in Iraq and northern Syria, saying they were also hitting Nusra positions and killing innocent civilians.In addition to hitting Islamic State forces, U.S. air strikes in Syria have targeted the so-called Khorasan group, which Washington describes as an al-Qaida cell planning attacks against the West. But Syria’s moderate rebels have criticized the strikes, saying they actually hit Nusra troops fighting alongside them against government forces in the northern province of Aleppo.The Khorasan group comprises a team of seasoned al-Qaida veterans, including bomb-makers, planners, facilitators, and money men, seeking to recruit foreign volunteers fighting the Assad regime for operations against the West, said Ed Blanche, a Beirut-based analyst and member of London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies. While the group operates under Nusra’s auspices, it is not part of the militia, he added. “The Khorasan group is with Jabhat Nusra, but not of it,” Blanche said. But that distinction appeared lost on the refugees at Zaatari, who unanimously condemned the U.S. bombing of the Khorasan group. “Al-Nusra is certainly much better than Daesh,” said Lina Farwan, a high school teacher of sociology who fled Daraa last year with her husband and two small children. “The U.S. bombing is not helping reduce Daesh’s influence in Syria, (but) God willing Nusra will prevail.”Jordanian analysts have warned that the widespread support for Nusra in the refugee camps may not be representative of public opinion in Syria as a whole. Almost all of those housed in the camps are Sunnis from the Daraa area, which has close tribal ties with clans just across the border in Jordan. “The Nusra Front has managed to find a base in Daraa because it is part of the social fabric there. Many of its followers are from Daraa, not outsiders like in the case of Daesh,” said Abu-Ruman, the Jordanian analyst. “Nusra was nurtured by the undeclared support from Jordan and Saudi Arabia for a while,” Abu-Ruman said. “Most of the arms going to the Free Syrian Army ended up with Nusra.”While Nusra militants have been successful against Islamic State forces in the south, they have fared much worse in other parts of Syria. Its forces were beaten last year in fighting around the provincial capital of Deir ez-Zour, where the Islamic State is now in control.Sitting under a plastic tent blown away on the side by desert winds and snow earlier this month, Daraa refugee Mohammad Radwan, 39, said he yearns to go back home to a post-Assad Syria. “I envision a free Syria under Nusra’s rule,” he sighed. “It is the best option for the future.” Jamal Halaby in Amman

02.13.15 Former DIA Chief Flynn Calls for Global War on Islamic ExtremistsThe respected general tells Congress it’s time to launch—and fund—a war that will last generations. Authorize the use of military force against ISIS? Yeah. And then some. The Obama administration’s former military intelligence chief is warning Congress that Islamic extremism has expanded in every way imaginable over the past year—and the administration he was once part of is not doing enough to stop it. “According to every metric of significance, Islamic extremism has grown over the last year,” said retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn Friday, in remarks submitted to the House Armed Services Committee which were obtained by The Daily Beast. “We are at war with violent and extreme Islamists (both Sunni and Shia) and we must accept and face this reality.”

His remarks are a pointed attack on the Obama administration’s handling of the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, and a public airing of some of the frustrations that led Flynn to leave his post as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency last summer—a year early. “There are some who counsel patience, arguing violent Islamists are not an existential threat and therefore can simply be managed as criminals,” he said. “I respectfully and strongly disagree.” His comments also reflect frustration with the White House’s refusal to use the term “Islamic militant”—linking the religion with acts of violence. Flynn stated in earlier remarks to a group of retired special operators in January that only by calling the movement by its name can one martial the right kind of tools to fight it.“We must engage the violent Islamists wherever they are, drive them from their safe havens and kill them.”“You cannot defeat an enemy you do not admit exists,” Flynn told the National Defense Industry Association in Washington last month. Administration officials have said they reject using such a term at the request of Arab and Muslim allies who do not want to play into the Islamic State group’s aspirations of building a caliphate.Flynn also took issue with that, railing against U.S. cooperation with Arab nations he says support militancy by supporting extreme versions of Islam—a dimly veiled reference to Saudi Arabia and Qatar who support Islamic schools and charities beyond their borders that practice a strict version of Islam. “If our so-called partners do not act in accordance with internationally accepted norms and behaviors or international law, the United States must be prepared to cut off or severely curtail economic, military and diplomatic ties,” he said.The White House rejected Flynn’s comments. “There is no question that we are at war those who carry out acts of terrorism in service to a corrupted version of the Muslim faith,” including al-Qaeda, ISIS and others said Ned Price, the National Security Council’s assistant press secretary. “The President has not shied away from this confrontation with those who would do us harm, and anyone who may be inspired by their hate-filled rhetoric, and we will continue to be aggressive in confronting them,” he wrote by email Friday, in response to an emailed copy of Flynn’s prepared remarks. “Regardless of what you call them, at their core, these individuals are terrorists,” Price wrote, adding that after six years in office, “no one can doubt the President’s resolve to confront this threat. He’s made it clear that we are at war with terrorist groups—AQ and ISIL. He’s taken scores of high level terrorists off the battlefield—from Osama Bin Laden to Anwar al-Aulaqi and Abu Khattalah, the Benghazi plotter. Whatever others call these individuals, we call them our enemies, and we will continue to treat them as such.” Flynn, however, is calling for a wider, worldwide campaign against militancy. “We have to energize every element of National Power—similar to the effort during WWII or during the Cold War—to effectively resource what will likely be a multi-generational struggle,” he said. “There is no cheap way to win this fight.”The Iraq and Afghan war veteran, who once served as intelligence chief for the elite counterterrorist force, the Joint Special Operations Command, urged going on the attack, rather than waiting for the enemy to launch new violence inside the U.S. “We must engage the violent Islamists wherever they are, drive them from their safe havens and kill them,” he said. “There can be no quarter and no accommodation.”Flynn said he supported Congress issuing a new Authorization for the Use of Military Force to fight the new threat, but said the legislation should be free from time limits and other restrictions to allow the military to fight the enemy as long as it exists. Flynn’s sentiment was reflected by many on the committee including ranking member, Washington state Democrat Adam Smith, who sees the fight against the militants as a “long-term ideological struggle,” much like the 75-year campaign against communism.

But Smith caveated that, saying the fight-back had to include moderate Muslim voices. “The Muslim world does not want the United States to show up and tell it what it ought to do,” he said. “We have to figure out how we can be helpful to support those moderate voices so that they can triumph, so that they can defeat these extremist ideologies.”Flynn’s testimony was countered by one of his fellow panelists, Dr. Marc Lynch, a Mideast specialist from George Washington University, who said the administration’s campaign against the Islamic State Group is working. “The momentum of ISIL (ISIS)...has been halted,” he said. “They’re no longer able to advance, they suffered a serious defeat in—in Kobani thanks to coalition air power.” Committee chairman Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, said he hoped Lynch was right, but his tone seemed to indicate doubt, throughout a hearing which seemed mostly designed as a vehicle to hear Flynn warn against a sweeping battle with militants to come.

Thank you.