Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-122-Caliphate-al-Zawahiri-2

By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence.

In The "War of the Cross, we seek a Strategy, our Enemy has one."

The Battle of Deception; 'Taqiyya 1 "for war is deceit"?

Muhammad's companion Abu Darda's advice: "Let us smile to the face of some people while our hearts curse them"?

According to sharia, in certain situations, deception – also known as 'taqiyya', based on Quranic terminology, – is not only permitted but sometimes obligatory

According to the authoritative Arabic text, Al-Taqiyya Fi Al-Islam: "Taqiyya [deception] is of fundamental importance in Islam. Practically every Islamic sect agrees to it and practices it. We can go so far as to say that the practice of taqiyya is mainstream in Islam, and that those few sects not practicing it diverge from the mainstream...Taqiyya is very prevalent in Islamic politics, especially in the modern era."

The primary Quranic verse sanctioning deception with respect to non-Muslims states: "Let believers not take for friends and allies infidels instead of believers. Whoever does this shall have no relationship left with Allah – unless you but guard yourselves against them, taking precautions." (Quran 3:28; see also 2:173; 2:185; 4:29; 22:78; 40:28.)

The fact that Islam legitimises deceit during war cannot be all that surprising; strategist Sun Tzu (c. 722-221 BC), Italian political philosopher Machiavelli (1469-1527) and English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) all justified deceit in war.

If Islam must be in a constant state of war with the non-Muslim world – which need not be physical, as radicals among the ulema have classified several non-literal forms of jihad, such as "jihad-of-the-pen" (propaganda), and "money-jihad" (economic) – and if Muslims are permitted to lie and feign loyalty to the infidel to further their war efforts, offers of peace, tolerance or dialogue from extremist Muslim corners are called into question.

Anyone who truly believes that no less an authority than God justifies and, through his prophet's example, sometimes even encourages deception, will not experience any ethical qualms or dilemmas about lying. This is especially true if the human mind is indeed a tabula rasa shaped by environment and education. Deception becomes second nature.

So-called "moderate" Muslims – or, more specifically, secularised Muslims – do not closely adhere to sharia, and therefore have little to dissemble about. On the other hand, "radical" Muslims who closely observe sharia law, which splits the world into two perpetually warring halves, will always have a "divinely sanctioned" right to deceive, until "all chaos ceases, and all religion belongs to Allah" (Quran 8:39).

Trying to explain the Middle East to someone who is not familiar with the intricacies of its alliance policies can seem so unreal that often the fables of the One Thousand and One Nights may seem more probable.

1 http://www.meforum.org/2095/islams-doctrines-of-deception

“We cannot win this war by killing [jihadists]. We need to go after the root causes that lead people to join these groups, whether it is lack of opportunity for jobs. . . We can work with countries around the world to help improve their governance. We can help them build their economies so they can have job opportunities for these people.” --- Marie Harf, the US Department of State deputy spokesperson.

According to the former IS cleric, “Abu Bakr announced the caliphate without consulting the Sharia Council. This was a disaster that many muftis did not accept.

The split within the Islamic State and al-Qaeda dates back to historical differences between Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (killed in 2006), Ayman al-Zawahiri of al-Qaeda and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (a.k.a. Asim Tahir al-Barqawi); For example, the main difference between ISIS and al Qaeda is not primarily over tactics or a clash of personalities, as we're often told, but over theology. Both ISIS and al Qaeda believe in apocalyptic end-times where an Islamic caliphate will face off against

the forces of Christianity in an ultimate war. But while al Qaeda believes this time to be far off into the future, (C: AQSL 2020 plan foresees this to happen from 2016 onwards) ISIS believes it is now. This is not an idle difference. This apocalyptic scenario requires the establishment of a new Islamic caliphate, (C: Phase 5 of AQSL plan 2013-2016) and ISIS has been working to accomplish precisely this, seizing and holding onto territory instead of working as a decentralized underground network like al Qaeda.

An important outcome of this dispute is that al-Qaeda remains generally much more reluctant to declare takfir against fellow Muslims en masse than the Islamic State, which is quicker to regard all Muslims who have not pledged loyalty to the group as apostates.

Despite the debate over whether IS represents Islam and what “true Islam” is, Islamic movements, sects and scholars perceive IS as truly believing it is enforcing the rule of Allah according to the Quran and the Hadith under the guidance of the organization’s Sharia Council, probably the group’s most vital body.

The former IS cleric, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said of Baghdadi’s decision-making, “Despite him being the head of the Sharia Council, he asks for the muftis’ point of view. All the muftis are high-level clerics with deep understanding of the religion. All are ‘hafiz’ [have memorized the Quran]. The same goes for the major Hadiths — Sahih al-Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, Musnad Ibn Hanbal, al-Tarmathi, etc. It is only the elite who can make it on to this council. In fact, they are the ones who rule.”

And the White House's and western leaders’ inability to understand ISIS and its ideology has severely hobbled the West's efforts to fight ISIS.

‘Fight Them Until There Is No Fitnah’: The Islamic State’s War With al-QaedaPublication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 4February 20, 2015 By: Wladimir van Wilgenburg. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda.Recent events have raised fresh questions over the relationship between the Islamic State militant group and al-Qaeda. For instance, militants from the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the group’s Yemen-based franchise, are reported to have

coordinated the multiple jihadist attacks in Paris in early January 2015. Moreover, recent U.S. airstrikes in Syria have targeted both Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s official local franchise, which could potentially push the two groups to unite against the Western threat. Western media reports have also suggested that there have been meetings between Islamic State and al-Qaeda leaders during the past year, aimed at solving the groups’ differences in order to better fight the West (Daily Beast, November 11, 2014; Guardian, September 28, 2014). At the same time, however, the Islamic State’s official online magazine Dabiq shows that many important ongoing differences remain between the manhaj (methodology) of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The aim of this article is to explore the interplay between the two groups and to show how this relationship may evolve in the coming months.

The Battle Over Takfir ; The split within the Islamic State and al-Qaeda dates back to historical differences between Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (killed in 2006), Ayman al-Zawahiri of al-Qaeda and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (a.k.a. Asim Tahir al-Barqawi), a prominent Salafi-Jihadist Jordanian ideologue who had been Zarqawi’s original mentor, over how to deal with the issues of Shi’a Muslims and when to pronounce takfir (excommunication) against Muslims in general. [1] This dispute, which combined both strategy and ideology, was triggered by al-Zarqawi’s indiscriminate attacks on Iraqi Shi’a civilians in the 2003-2006 period, which prompted Zawahiri to write him a letter in July 2005, asking: “And can the mujahideen kill all of the Shi’a in Iraq? Has any Islamic state in history ever tried that? And why kill ordinary Shi’a considering that they are forgiven because of their ignorance?” This letter further suggested Iran and al-Qaeda should not fight each other since their joint enemy is the West. [2] An important outcome of this dispute is that al-Qaeda remains generally much more reluctant to declare takfir against fellow Muslims en masse than the Islamic State, which is quicker to regard all Muslims who have not pledged loyalty to the group as apostates . These differences were underlined in April 2014, when the Islamic State’s spokesperson Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani issued an audio message called “This was never our manhaj and will never be,” an extensive criticism of al-Qaeda’s marginally less hardline doctrines. [3] Since then, the Islamic State has continued to seek to discredit al-Qaeda leaders as well as scholars with whom they have allegedly cooperated, such as AQAP member Shaykh Harith al-Nadhari, who was killed in an American drone strike in February and who had been a vocal critic of the Islamic State (BBC, February 5). For instance, he is pictured in the sixth issue of Dabiq, together with other AQAP leaders, and is described as “void of wisdom.” [4]

Paris Attacks Initially, when the attacks on the Charlie Hebdo magazine and Jewish targets in Paris were carried out on January 7-9, both supporters of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State celebrated these as revenge for perceived attacks on the honor of Islam’s Prophet Muhammad. However, the latest evidence suggests that the attacks were made possible by personal connections between the two sets of attackers, Islamic State-inspired Amedy Coulibaly and al-Qaeda-linked Chérif and Said Kouachi, who were both influenced by the France-based al-Qaeda recruiter Djamel Beghal (Wall Street Journal, January 13). Further muddying the waters, Islamic State-supporter Amedy Coulibaly said in a video before the attacks that he had coordinated the Paris operations with the Kouachi brothers and AQAP militants (Daily Beast, January 11). However, senior AQAP official Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi, who claimed responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo attack, said it was a mere coincidence that the operations of the Kouachi brothers had coincided with the attack by Ahmed Coulibaly (Telegraph, January 14). It was therefore no surprise that al-Ansi was criticized in the seventh edition of the Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine as being hizbiyyin (partisan) in favor of al-

Qaeda. [5] Dabiq’s sixth issue also said that although Coulibaly, who attacked the Parisian Jewish targets, helped to finance the brothers, their operations were different. These different views may reflect that among would-be militants in France, the differences between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda are seen as less important than to those in the Middle East.

On the Frontlines in Syria ; Meanwhile, on the frontlines in Syria, relations between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda also do not seem to be improving. In early January 2014, the first major clashes erupted between the Islamic State and other rebel fractions, including al-Nusra (Daily Star [Beirut], February 24). This led to the killing of Abu Khaled al-Suri, the co-founder of the Ahrar al-Sham Islamist group who had long-standing ties to al-Qaeda, in late February. Following his death, al-Nusra issued a call to the Islamic State to stop the infighting (al-Akhbar [Beirut], February 26). Despite this, fighting continued on several fronts, especially in the provinces of Aleppo and Deir al-Zor. The only area where both group were present without conflict was the strategic Lebanese border region of Qalamoun, where there was reportedly cooperation between a small number of Islamic State fighters and al-Nusra against Hezbollah and the Syrian government in early 2014 (McClatchy, April 3, 2014). Although this demonstrates the theoretical ability for these groups to cooperate against hated enemies such as Hezbollah, even this limited cooperation apparently takes place reluctantly and only under pressure (al-Akhbar [Beirut], December 26, 2014). On the other hand, even when al-Nusra moved against Western-backed rebels in the Syrian province of Idlib in October 2014, it apparently did not cooperate with the Islamic State (Washington Post, November 2, 2014). [5] Likewise, after the United States launched airstrikes against the jihadist groups in Syria in September, there were attempts by various jihadist factions to bridge their differences (Middle East Eye, November 14). This was made easier by the fact that the zones of control of the different jihadist factions were more clearly divided after months of infighting. Despite this, a ceasefire offer by the leader of Jaysh al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar to end the bloodshed between the jihadist factions in the face of Western airstrikes was reportedly rejected by the Islamic State leadership in Raqqa in November. The Islamic State further widened rifts by suggesting that jihadist groups fighting against the Islamic State were murtadeen (apostates), just as it has already described other jihadist factions in Syria as apostates. [6] Similarly, tensions between the rival groups have continued in Syria’s Aleppo province, where the Syrian government has been trying to encircle the city. For instance, in December 2014, al-Nusra supporters claimed that the Islamic State launched multiple attacks against it in northern Aleppo. This offensive predictably disrupted al-Nusra’s ongoing assault on the government controlled Shi’ite villages of Nubul and Zahra. [7] “All this infighting isn’t getting us further in our battle against the Nusayriya [Syrian government] and Rawafid [Shi’a],” wrote Dutch al-Nusra-fighter Abu Muhammad on Twitter in response. [8] There were also suspicions among al-Nusra supporters that the Islamic State was behind suicide attacks carried out against al-Nusra-held checkpoints in Aleppo in January (Aranews, January 11). Despite this enduring rivalry, however, some Islamist militants apparently hope for an end to the strife between the groups, especially after the United States formed a coalition to fight jihadist movements in both Iraq and Syria. For instance, one al-Nusra fighter has told the media: “If all the powers of mujahideen worldwide would be united, this would have significant benefits for the jihad” (Middle East Eye, November 14, 2014).

Burning of Jordanian Pilot ; Given that U.S. and coalition airstrikes have targeted both al-Nusra and the Islamic State, one might expect al-Qaeda members to not condemn the burning of Jordanian Air Force pilot Muadh al-Kasasbeh in Syria by the Islamic State. On the contrary, however, Salafi-Jihadist ideologues and allies of al-Qaeda-linked groups in Syria,

such as Abdullah bin Muhammad al-Muhaysini and al-Maqdisi, criticized the Islamic State for the action on Jordanian television (al-Ru’ya, February 6). Indeed, such actions exacerbate the fault line between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda; namely, al-Qaeda fears that excessive violence will alienate ordinary Muslims from jihadist groups. In addition, al-Maqdisi had been secretly involved in negotiations to exchange the Jordanian pilot for prisoner Sajida al-Rishawi, who was convicted of involvment in the 2005 Amman bombings. In an interview after the pilot’s death, al-Maqdisi accused the Islamic State of not being serious in its negotiations to free al-Rishawi, leading to her death, as well as strongly criticizing the way in which the pilot was killed: “Then after that I am being surprised with the burning of the pilot… burning? In which sunnah is this? The Prophet forbade this. And you give the precedence to the speech of Shaykh ul-Islam [Ibn Taymiyyah] over him?” [9] Al-Maqdisi further accused the Islamic State of dividing Muslims: “You are splitting the rows of the Muslims and distorting the deen [Islamic religion] by these positions and this slaughtering and this burning.” In response, the Islamic State argued that the Jordanian government had complicated the negotiations to free the Japanese prisoner Haruna Yukawa by including al-Kasasbeh in the talks, leading to the failure of the negotiations. [10] The Islamic State additionally launched a personal attack on al-Maqdisi, calling him a representative of the Jordanian taghut (tyrant) regime, and describing the Jordanian pilot as an apostate client of al-Maqdisi’s . “Perhaps Allah will facilitate a detailed exposure of how al-Barqawi [al-Maqdisi] (whose campaign of lies carries on) represented the Jordanian taghut in these negotiations,” it added in Dabiq magazine. [11] In response, online supporters of al-Nusra responded by creating a hashtag on Twitter to defend al-Maqdisi. “Every muwahid [onotheist] & mujahid [Jihadist fighter] who stands for the truth; It's time to stand up & defend Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,” wrote a Dutch al-Nusra fighter on his Twitter-account @Abamuhammed07, underlining that at least some al-Nusra fighters continue to look up to al-Maqdisi. [12]

No Grey Zones ; Even before the Paris attacks in January, the December 2014 issue of Dabiq had heavily criticized al-Qaeda, particularly arguing that al-Qaeda (and the Taliban) were too lenient on the Rawafid (Shi’a Muslims and Iran). [13] This issue, therefore, contained two important articles that attack al-Qaeda. “Al-Qa’idah of Waziristan – a testimony from within” by Abu Jarir al-Shamali, a former member of Zarqawi’s Jama’at at-Tawhid wal-Jihad group (that pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2004 and then to the Islamic State in June 2014), criticizes Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Taliban. In particular, al-Shamali, previously imprisoned for eight years in Iran, blames Zawahiri for not making takfir on Iran, for praising the Arab Spring, for not making takfir on Muslim Brotherhood leaders and for promoting demonstrations instead of armed jihad. “The strangest matter was the hesitance in making takfir of the rafidah [Shi’a] of the era whose evil is not hidden from anyone whether distant or far,” al-Shamali wrote. A separate article in Dabiq by Abu Maysarah al-Shami, meanwhile, attacks the AQAP leadership and blames them for allowing the Shi’a Houthis for taking over Yemen. [14] The author also points out the contradiction between the Taliban’s Afghanistan “emirate” calling for good relations with Iran, while senior AQAP member al-Nadhari calls for “killing the rafidah.” Both articles also criticize al-Qaeda for renewing its allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Omar in July 2014, with particular complaints being that the Taliban respects international conventions and borders, implements tribal law and is (theoretically) opposed to militant operations outside Afghanistan. The Islamic State’s commitment to these beliefs is not just rhetorical, however; it has consistently sought to put its ideology into practice during the last year, for instance, massacring hundreds of Shi’a soldiers in Tikrit when it started to

take control of most of the Sunni areas of Iraq in mid to late 2014 (al-Alam, September 1, 2014).

Conclusion; In the February 2015 issue of Dabiq (titled, “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy – The Extinction of the Grayzone”), the position of the Islamic State toward other jihadist factions is made even clearer. [15] In it, the Islamic State quotes Osama bin Laden referring to former U.S. President George W. Bush’s “with us or against us” speech in order to make its position toward other jihadist factions clear: the group’s intention is to clarify that these groups will have to join its self-declared Islamic caliphate or else the Islamic State will fight against them, too. This position underlines that for the Islamic State, al-Qaeda is not Islamic enough, since the group does not consider all Shi’a Muslims to be apostates and thus automatically worthy of death. In this ideological environment, fueled by personal insults against al-Maqdisi and AQAP leaders, any substantial cooperation between the Islamic State and other jihadist factions seems unlikely at present, unless they pledge allegiance to the Islamic State’s caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, or if both sides are so weakened by their rivals on the battlefield that they are forced into a pragmatic compromise. Even in this case, however, such cooperation is unlikely to be enduring. Wladimir van Wilgenburg is a political analyst specializing in issues concerning Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey with a particular focus on Kurdish politics.

Notes

1 See: Zawahiri’s letter to Zarqawi, July 9, 2005, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/zawahiris-letter-to-zarqawi-english-translation-2. 2 Ibid. 3. Pieter van Ostaeyen, “Message by ISIS Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani al-Shami,” April 18, 2014, https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/04/18/message-by-isis-shaykh-abu-muhammad-al-adnani-as-shami/. 4. Dabiq (Sixth edition), December 2014. Available at: http://media.clarionproject.org/files/islamic-state/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-issue-6-al-qaeda-of-waziristan.pdf.5. Dabiq (Seventh edition), February 2015. Available at: http://media.clarionproject.org/files/islamic-state/islamic-state-dabiq-magazine-issue-7-from-hypocrisy-to-apostasy.pdf.6. Joanna Paraszcuk, “Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar Emir Visited IS In Raqqa To Ask For Truce,” From Chechnya to Syria, November 13, 2014, http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=22885.7. See the tweet of Nusra supporter @liwaa38, December 11, 2014, https://twitter.com/liwaa38/status/543017939059101696.8. See the tweet of Dutch Nusra fighter Abu Muhammad (@Abamuhammed07), February 6, 2014, https://twitter.com/Abamuhammed07/status/563784069365112834.9. Pieter van Ostaeyen, “Interview and Translation: Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,” February 6, 2015, https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2015/02/09/interview-and-translation-shaykh-abu-muhammad-al-maqdisi-dd-february-6-2015/. 10. Dabiq, February 2015, Op. cit. 11. Ibid. 12. See the tweet of Dutch al-Nusra fighter Abu Muhammad, February 14, 2015, https://twitter.com/Abamuhammed07/status/566743465975767040. 13. Dabiq, December 2014, Op cit. 14. Dabiq, February 2015, Op cit.

Files:TerrorismMonitorVol13Issue4_02.pdf

Who holds the real power in IS 2? Author: Ali Hashem Posted February 19, 2015

2 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/islamic-state-sharia-council-power.html

When the average Islamic State (IS) member is asked why he is fighting, he typically responds, “So that Sharia prevails and Islam’s banner stays high.” Marwan Shehade, an Islamic scholar and expert on jihadist groups, told Al-Monitor, “There’s no doubt the organization is built on three main elements: the Sharia, the military might and media. Their main slogan is derived from Ibn Taymiyyah’s famous saying, ‘The foundation of this religion is a book that guides and a sword that supports.’ By ‘a book’ they mean the Quran and religion.”Despite the debate over whether IS represents Islam and what “true Islam” is, Islamic movements, sects and scholars perceive IS as truly believing it is enforcing the rule of Allah according to the Quran and the Hadith under the guidance of the organization’s Sharia Council, probably the group’s most vital body. The council’s responsibilities include overseeing the speeches of the self-declared Caliph Ibrahim (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) and those under him, dictating punishments, preaching, mediating, monitoring the group’s media, ideologically training new recruits and advising the caliph on how to deal with hostages when it is decided to execute them.It was the Sharia Council that advised on the burning death of Muath al-Kasasbeh and the slaughter and shooting of dozens of Syrian and Iraqi soldiers as well as James Foley and other hostages. A former IS mufti who spoke to Al-Monitor in Iraq in January said, “Such decisions are made after thorough readings into the practices of the prophet and the first generation of Muslims.” At the time, IS had not yet burned a person alive. Muftis across the Middle East denounced the burning death of Kasasbeh on the ground that such a form of killing is an abomination under Islam, no matter the alleged justification.“There’s nothing that is decided without the Sharia Council’s approval,” he explained. “There is the main Sharia Council for the Islamic State, and in each district there’s a smaller council that makes decisions about issues related to the area. There are two main muftis under the head of the council — the mufti of Iraq and the mufti al-Sham [Syria]. While I was there, Sheikh Abu Abdullah al-Kurdi was the mufti of Iraq. He used to contact the muftis of the districts, who are, in other words, the heads of the local Sharia councils, to coordinate on new rulings and give them advice or seek advice from them.”The former IS cleric, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said of Baghdadi’s decision-making, “Despite him being the head of the Sharia Council, he asks for the muftis’ point of view. All the muftis are high-level clerics with deep understanding of the religion. All are ‘hafiz’ [have memorized the Quran]. The same goes for the major Hadiths — Sahih al-Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, Musnad Ibn Hanbal, al-Tarmathi, etc. It is only the elite who can make it on to this council. In fact, they are the ones who rule.”Consisting of elite clerics perhaps makes the council strong, but it also makes it vulnerable to an extent, as such men would not readily accept deeds they considered unjustified. Maybe that is why it has experienced a high number of defections.According to Hisham al-Hashemi, an Iraqi expert on IS and author of the book “World of Daesh [IS],” several well-known IS sheikhs defected in 2014, including Saad Honeiti, Abu Shoiab al-Masry, Abu Soleiman al-Oteibi, the late Sultan al-Harby, Ahmad al-Mutairi, Manea al-Manea and Abu Hamam al-Shamy. They reportedly could not tolerate decisions that contradicted their advice or rulings. In addition, said Hashemi, many apparently rejected the declaration of the caliphate, a controversial issue among Salafists today.It is interesting to learn that there were dissenting voices inside IS opposed to declaring the caliphate. What was their reasoning?According to the former IS cleric, “Abu Bakr announced the caliphate without consulting the Sharia Council. This was a disaster that many muftis did not accept. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was appointed caliph by [traditionally influential people and decision-makers in an Islamic state]. There was a problem with declaring the caliphate, a religious one. If this group

and state are to fall one day, it is because of the violations of Sharia under the name of Islam.” The cleric left IS because he believes there was no religious justification for proclaiming the caliphate.Shehade said the IS Sharia Council consists of several committees, including on research and fatwas, religious schools, promotion of virtue and prevention of vice, mosques and judiciary. The committee for religious schools has courses for new recruits. It is also responsible for training judges and mosque imams, while the committee for the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice, of course, makes sure people are behaving in accordance with IS’ version of Islam. He also noted, “They have several well-known clerics on the Sharia Council. They are from different nationalities, but Iraqis have the upper hand. I recall among them Abu Ayoub al-Bregi, Abu Monzer al-Ordoni and Turki Benali.”Shehade explained that most of the organization's fatwas are based on specific books of Hadith, in particular “The Jurisprudence of Jihad” by Abu Abdallah al-Mohajer. For strategic issues, including the use of violence to terrorize, they depend on “Management of Savagery,” a volume on jihad written by Abu Bakr Naji.

What is ISIS? What do its members want? What makes them tick?Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry .These sound like basic questions. But it turns out that surprisingly few people have been trying to answer them — including, very scarily, within the U.S. government. And the White House's inability to understand ISIS and its ideology has severely hobbled the West's efforts to fight ISIS. The celebrated reporter Graeme Wood, on the other hand, has tried very hard to answer these questions, in one of the most important stories to be written on ISIS. (Wood had already done impressive reporting on extreme Islamists.) ISIS, as it turns out, is motivated by a specific interpretation of Islam. And understanding the beliefs of ISIS's members helps to explain — and even predict — their actions. For example, the main difference between ISIS and al Qaeda is not primarily over tactics or a clash of personalities, as we're often told, but over theology. Both ISIS and al Qaeda believe in apocalyptic end-times where an Islamic caliphate will face off against the forces of Christianity in an ultimate war. But while al Qaeda believes this time to be far off into the future, (C: AQSL 2020 plan foresees this to happen from 2016 onwards) ISIS believes it is now. This is not an idle difference. This apocalyptic scenario requires the establishment of a new Islamic caliphate, (C: Phase 5 of AQSL plan 2013-2016) and ISIS has been working to accomplish precisely this, seizing and holding onto territory instead of working as a decentralized underground network like al Qaeda. The centrality of the vision of the caliphate in ISIS's worldview suggests that the group will act in ways that are different from al Qaeda — and can be predicted.Our lack of understanding of ISIS has led to epic bungling and needless death. The White House tried to have hostage Peter Kassig freed by using al Qaeda ideologue Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi as a go-between. This was doomed from the start, and not only because of the theological differences between al Qaeda and ISIS (al Qaeda views hostages as pawns in a power game, who can be useful alive or dead depending on circumstances, whereas ISIS views executing hostages as fulfilling a divine mandate to establish its legitimacy as a caliphate). This move also probably expedited the death of Kassig, who was beheaded. But it would have been worse if the White House had succeeded in its effort. It would have meant a rapprochement between ISIS and al Qaeda, a prospect that should give any sane person nightmares.

Now, why are our policymakers so blind about ISIS?

Most of my fellow conservatives have flagged a simple answer: political correctness. Political correctness dictates that "Islam is a religion of peace" and, therefore, if there are Islamic terrorists they cannot be motivated by Islam and must be motivated by something else. That something else can only be sheer insanity. And insane people, by definition, are illogical. (ISIS's logic is, of course, in some sense, "insane" — but it is still a logic, one that can be comprehended and has internal consistency, unlike sheer insanity.)At his trial, the Islamist murderer of Theo van Gogh had to explain: "You should know that I acted out of my own conviction and not because I hated your son for being Dutch or for having offended me as a Moroccan. [...] I acted on the basis of my belief." People had tried to come up with all sorts of explanations for his behavior — instead of the obvious one.But, of course, the problem is deeper than political correctness. For progressives, it's something I've come to call Vulgar Marxism.While most progressives today disavow actual communism, those that care about the history of ideas still typically regard Karl Marx as an important and serious thinker. And his idea that has had the most influence is dialectical materialism, or the idea that the only driver of history is socioeconomic forces.According to this view, religions, philosophies, ideologies, worldviews, and even culture at large are simply illusions, embraced after the fact to justify this or that move in our class warfare. Marx's views of history were influenced by 19th-century evolutionism. Think of the idea that we're just genes trying to reproduce: You may think that you're in love, or that you do your work for some higher purpose, but really it's just your genes tricking you into thinking that to increase their odds of spreading. Hence, for example, his notion that religion is just "the opium of the people" (a quote that is much kinder to religious believers in its context than is usually thought, by the way): beliefs have no influence on history.This is why progressives view redistribution as almost a holy duty: If everything is about dollars and cents, well, everything is about dollars and cents. Conservatives also believe everyone should have a good standard of living, but they also believe that if people achieve this through work they will attain a greater degree of human flourishing than if they just get a check in the mail, since people's flourishing is not just limited to the material. That's why we have more nuanced views about redistribution.Human beings are human beings — we are not just animals. We do not just want to feed and reproduce. We actually have beliefs and we actually make choices on the basis of those beliefs. It's kind of crazy to have to point this out. We were made with an orientation toward ultimate truth, goodness, and beauty, and we seek it however we understand it — and how we understand it determines our actions.The historian N.T. Wright talks about a worldview being like a set of glasses: not something you look at but something you look through; something that you don't think about — until there's a problem with it. Almost no progressive will make an explicit argument for Vulgar Marxism, but it's hovering in the background of much of their writing on almost every issue. And, in the case of ISIS, this mistaken worldview has almost certainly led to more bloodshed than there would have been had the progressives in the Obama White House actually tried to understand what ISIS believed, and why.

ISIL, CIA, Mossad, Quds Force, etc The rise of ISIL gave a whole new momentum to US, Iranian interventionism in the Middle East. 26 Feb 2015

Four years ago, when the Arab Spring blossomed, the US, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the al-Qaeda network that dominated the Middle East during the previous decade were forced into retreat and retrenchment. US President Barack Obama took the backseat and only reacted to the momentous changes in the region between 2011 and 2013. For the Obama administration,

the problem wasn't the positive change taking shape, but rather the discomfort of losing control over events.  The ayatollahs, who repressed Iran's Green Revolution in 2009, became more isolated with the outbreak of the Arab revolution against dictatorship and autocracy.Riyadh lost some of its most valuable allies like Hosni Mubarak of Egypt as its Sunni nemesis, the Muslim Brotherhood, began to gain power. And al-Qaeda & affiliates became ever more discredited and isolated, leading many observers to predicted their demise.Even Israel's (false) pretensions of being the "only democracy" in the region lost their effect, as its occupying regime was exposed to be integral to the old order; a chronic violator of human rights.

The rebound; However, two years later, the seasons began to turn as counter-revolutionary forces - the dark forces of the old Arab world - began to organise and conspire against the young voices of freedom and justice, whether in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya or elsewhere. Washington, Tehran, as well as Tel Aviv and al-Qaeda took advantage of the ensuing chaos to advance their own agendas. And a year later, they rebounded and began to dominate the region once again under the pretext of the danger of the newly found Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant group and its affiliates.Meanwhile, Daesh, ISIS, ISIL, IS - or whatever its name - broke away from al-Qaeda to become the definitive regional, and even global threat. Its pornographic barbarity provided a new bloodier banner for al-Qaeda affiliates throughout the region, with a prime real estate location to erect a whole new caliphate on Syrian and Iraqi soil. In the process, the rise of ISIL gave a whole new momentum to American and Iranian interventionism in the greater Middle East.ISIL replaced al-Qaeda as the new pretext for pre-emptive and revenge air strikes, redeployments, war, and occupation. Thanks to ISIL, the main losers of the Arab Spring emerged as the new hegemons. Moreover, ISIL became the alibi or the justification for all regional warmongers to carry any atrocities.Regimes in Syria, Iraq, and Egypt exploited the scourge - or the pretext - of terror to justify repressions and murder on a large scale. Revenge bombings and attacks became the new rule, as international law took the backseat in the Middle East. And the non-Arab powers took advantage of ISIL to reshape their strategies, redraw maps and even reinvent relationships. As the New York Times put it: US and Iran Both Attack ISIS, but Try Not to Look Like Allies.Likewise, Israel exploited the world's preoccupation with ISIL to attack the Gaza Strip, take over more Palestinian lands and deny Palestinians their basic rights with no repercussions, even when it turned its back to Washington.This strange, even spectacular turn of events led many to question the mystery surrounding ISIL. Who's behind it and why? Are those benefitting from it, behind it?

Invisible hands behind ISIL? Iran's first female vice president, Masoumeh Ebtekar, singled out the United States and the CIA as the progenitor of ISIL. And Iran's former Iranian minister of intelligence, Heydar Moslehi, went further by arguing that Mossad, MI6, And CIA created ISIL, or Daesh. Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir agreed. He told Euronews this week that America's CIA and Israel's Mossad are behind Boko Haram and ISIL. "I said CIA

The question one must ask is not who's behind the rise and expansion of ISIL, but rather what led to its rise and what helps it withstand the international coalition's bombings and pressures.

and the Mossad stand behind these organisations. There is no Muslim who would carry out such acts," he said. (Bashir also blames the US and Israel for the ICC's 2013 warrants accusing him of responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts of genocide.)And so does Fidel Castro. He believes that Israel and certain American elements are behind ISIL. Others believe the opposite; that it's actually Iran that's culpable. Former Syrian National Coalition President Ahmad Jarba insisted that Iran is behind rise of ISIL. Could "Quds Force be behind the ISIL in Iraq?" asked one observer. And yet, more than a few argued that the Saudi Arabia stood behind ISIL. Then Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, claimed in a statement last summer that the Saudis were supporting ISIL and "facilitating genocide".A former US general, Wesley Clark, reckons it's all part of an ongoing strategic conflict: "Our friends and allies funded ISIL to destroy Hezbollah." For Clark, radical Islam is not the issue per se, as it's been generally exploited for strategic ends. For example, according to him: "The United States used radical Islam to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. We begged the Saudis to put the money in; they did."And the seasoned journalist, Patrick Cockburn, the author of "The Jihadis Return: ISIS and the New Sunni Uprising", claimed that Saudi Arabia "helped ISIL take over north Iraq". He cited British intelligence sources that believe the Saudi plan goes back a decade. Is "the enemy of my enemy my friend" or my enemy? Or could it be both, depending on the level of cynicism involved? Clearly, those who highlight the savagery of ISIL seem to also be benefitting most from it.

Conspiracy or consequence? Most of the claims about the responsibility for the rise and spread of ISIL are either ideologically driven, or pure speculation.It's not clear how any one of these prime suspects would be willing or able to put an organisation like ISIL together. Money is not nearly enough to sustain or explain its drive.Even if ISIL proves day-in day-out to be at their service; providing them with pretexts for any policy and every action, it doesn't prove that any of these players are behind its rise.In short, benefitting from ISIL's actions doesn't necessarily translate into creating it.The question one must ask is not who's behind the rise and expansion of ISIL, but rather what led to its rise and what helps it withstand the international coalition's bombings and pressures.Obama, as I explained a few days ago, gave his own explanation for the rise of ISIL; one that included dictatorship, sectarianism, alienation and marginalisation of Arabs and Muslims.Seasoned former UN diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, who served as special envoy to Afghanistan and Syria, and was somewhat close to the Washington circles, said this week that there was "no doubt that the original sin which led to the emergence of ISIL is the US-led invasion of Iraq. There was no justification for the war in Iraq, and we all suffer the consequences".To be clear, Brahimi later clarified: "I don't mean the US created ISIL, but the conditions following the invasion led al-Qaeda to come to Iraq and for ISIL to gain power."To sum it all up, the US occupation of Iraq, the Iranian manipulation of instability in Iraq and Syria, the cruelty and brutality of dictators like Bashar al-Assad, and the sectarian cynicism that followed are certainly to blame.But there's more… Marwan Bishara is the senior political analyst at Al Jazeera.

11 Feb, A number of Islamist militants in Yemen have renounced their loyalty to Al-Qaeda in favor of the Islamic State (Daesh) according to a Twitter message analyzed by the American monitoring group SITE, Reuters reports. “We announce the formation of armed brigades specialized in pounding the apostates in Sanna and Dhamar,” the message said, referring to two central provinces. “We announce breaking the pledge of allegiance to the sheikh, the holy warrior and scholar Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri… We pledge to the caliph of

the believers Ibrahim bin Awad al-Baghdadi to listen and obey,” the message continued. The announcement comes shortly after militants in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and Libya pledged their allegiance to Daesh.  Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is the most powerful cell of the global terrorist network headed by Ayman al-Zawahiri, though the organization recently has faced increasing competition from  Daesh for loyalty among Islamist militants worldwide.

So,.

“The question one must ask is not who's behind or”… .should we, we need to..

Regards Cees. Allow me to recall- Leader of Al Qaeda group in Iraq was fictional, U.S. military says By Michael R. Gordon Published: Wednesday, July 18, 2007

3

As The New York Times exposed in 2007, Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi, the titular head of the Islamic State, according to Brigadier General Kevin Bergner – the chief American military spokesman at the time - never existed (and was actually a fictional character whose audio-taped declarations were provided by an elderly actor named Abu Adullah al-Naima). The ploy was to invent Baghdadi, a figure whose very name establishes his Iraqi pedigree, install him as the head of a front organization called the Islamic State of Iraq and then arrange for Masri to swear allegiance to him. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s deputy, sought to reinforce the deception by referring to Baghdadi in his video and Internet statements.

To the story: BAGHDAD July 2007 — For more than a year, the leader of one the most notorious insurgent groups in Iraq was said to be a mysterious Iraqi named Abdullah Rashid

al-Baghdadi (Left A man believed to be Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, aka Abu Omar al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi,). (C- Hamid Dawud Mohamed Khalil al Zawi, most commonly known as Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi, al-Zarqawi’s successor died 18 April 2010, The U.S. however since July 2007 consider this person to be fictional 4. 'Leader of Al Qaeda group in Iraq was fictional, U.S. military says'. The New York Times, 18 July 2007. Retrieved 17 January 2015. --- The Washington Times -/- Sunday, July 13, 2014

The other Baghdadi, now self declared Caliph: The U.S. held him captive for a time in 2004 before an unconditional release put him back into Iraq’s growing Sunni insurgency. A year later, the Multi-National Force-Iraq labeled him a kidnapper and murderer. It boasted of probably killing him in an airstrike, only to find out it hadn’t. In 2010, the coalition announced his arrest. But whoever it held, it either was not Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, or he somehow won quick release. The elusive al-Baghdadi, known then by his nom de guerre, Abu Du’a, -- Baghdadi apparently joined the insurgency that erupted in Iraq soon after the 2003 US-led invasion. In October 2005, American forces said they believed they had killed “Abu Dua”, one of Mr Baghdadi’s known aliases, in a strike on the Iraq-Syria border. But that appears to have been incorrect, as he took the reins of what was then known as the Islamic State of Iraq in May 2010 after two of its chiefs were killed in a US-Iraqi raid. Since then, details about him have slowly trickled out. --would go on to become the most dominant figure in today’s radical Islamic movement. A Sunni mullah who is in his early 40s and reportedly hails from Fallujah or Samarra, al-Baghdadi commands his own terrorist army and controls much of Iraq north and west of the capital, Baghdad, as well as a smattering of towns in Syria. He also has declared the establishment of a new country — the Islamic State. )As the titular head of the Islamic State in Iraq, an organization publicly backed by Al Qaeda, Baghdadi issued a steady stream of incendiary pronouncements. Despite claims by Iraqi officials that he had been killed in May, Baghdadi appeared to have persevered unscathed.

3 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/18/world/africa/18iht-iraq.4.6718200.html?_r=04 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Abdullah_al-Rashid_al-Baghdadi

A senior American military spokesman provided a new explanation for Baghdadi's ability to escape attack: He never existed. Brigadier General Kevin Bergner5, the chief American military spokesman, said the elusive Baghdadi was actually a fictional character whose audio-taped declarations were provided by an elderly actor named Abu Adullah al-Naima.The ruse, Bergner said, was devised by Abu Ayub al-Masri, the Egyptian-born leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, who was trying to mask the dominant role that foreigners play in that insurgent organization. The ploy was to invent Baghdadi, a figure whose very name establishes his Iraqi pedigree, install him as the head of a front organization called the Islamic State of Iraq and then arrange for Masri to swear allegiance to him. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's deputy, sought to reinforce the deception by referring to Baghdadi in his video and Internet statements.The evidence for the American assertions, Bergner announced at a news briefing, was provided by an Iraqi insurgent: Khalid Abdul Fatah Daud Mahmud al-Mashadani, who was said to have been captured by American forces in Mosul on July 4. According to Bergner, Mashadani is the most senior Iraqi operative in Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. He got his start in the Ansar al-Sunna insurgent group before joining Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia more than two years ago, and became the group's "media emir" for all of Iraq. Bergner said that Mashadani was also an intermediary between Masri in Iraq and bin Laden and Zawahiri, whom the Americans assert support and guide their Iraqi affiliate. "Mashadani confirms that al-Masri and the foreign leaders with whom he surrounds himself, not Iraqis, made the operational decisions" for Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, Bergner said. The struggle between the American military and Qaeda affiliate in Iraq is political as well as military. And one purpose of the briefing Wednesday seemed to be to rattle the 90 percent of the group's adherents who are believed to be Iraqi by suggesting that they are doing the bidding of foreigners.An important element of the American strategy is to drive a wedge between Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, other insurgent groups and the Sunni population. -- // -- Bruce Riedel, a former CIA official and a Middle East expert, said that experts had long wondered whether Baghdadi actually existed. "There has been a question mark about this," he said.Nonetheless, Riedel suggested that the disclosures made Wednesday might not be the final word on Baghdadi and the leaders of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Even Mashadani's assertions, Riedel said, might be a cover story to protect a leader who does in fact exist."First, they say we have killed him," Riedel said, referring to the statements by some Iraqi government officials. "Then we heard him after his death and now they are saying he never existed. That suggests that our intelligence on Al Qaeda in Iraq is not what we want it to be."American military spokesmen insist they have gotten to the truth on Baghdadi. Mashadani, they say, provided his account because he resented the role of foreign leaders in Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. They say he has not repudiated the organization.While the American military says that senior Qaeda leaders in Pakistan provide guidance, general direction and support for Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, they did not provide any examples of a specific raid or operation that was ordered by Pakistan-based leaders of Al Qaeda.An unclassified National Intelligence Estimate on terrorist threats to the United States homeland, which was made public in Washington on Tuesday, suggested that Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia draws support from Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan but also has some autonomy. It described Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia as "an affiliate." "We assess that Al Qaeda will probably seek to leverage the contacts and capabilities of Al Qaeda in Iraq, its most visible and capable affiliate and the only one known to have expressed a desire to attack the homeland."

5 http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=6b6_1422111263

We known that DECEPTION is written in capital letters in the many “Salafist”Jihadist doctrine and Zawahiri knows how to play the game; at time and place of his choosing, however if this story has some truth to it than we have the greatest games of all, pre-planned and played to the full.. and Zawahiri plays the puppet master.

Think the unthinkable.. What if… Cees

Let me reacall; Islam's doctrines of deception, by Raymond Ibrahim Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst October 2008 http://www.meforum.org/2095/islams-doctrines-of-deceptionTo better understand Islam, one must appreciate the thoroughly legalistic nature of the religion. According to sharia (Islamic law) every conceivable human act is categorised as being either forbidden, discouraged, permissible, recommended, or obligatory."Common sense" or "universal opinion" has little to do with Islam's notions of right and wrong. Only what Allah (through the Quran) and his prophet Muhammad (through the Hadith) have to say about any given issue matters; and how Islam's greatest theologians and jurists – collectively known as the ulema, literally, "they who know" – have articulated it.According to sharia, in certain situations, deception – also known as 'taqiyya', based on Quranic terminology, – is not only permitted but sometimes obligatory. For instance, contrary to early Christian history, Muslims who must choose between either recanting Islam or being put to death are not only permitted to lie by pretending to have apostatised, but many jurists have decreed that, according to Quran 4:29, Muslims are obligated to lie in such instances.

Origins of taqiyya; As a doctrine, taqiyya was first codified by Shia Muslims, primarily as a result of their historical experience. Long insisting that the caliphate rightly belonged to the prophet Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, Ali (and subsequently his descendents), the Shia

were a vocal and powerful branch of Islam that emerged following Muhammad's death. After the internal Islamic Fitna wars from the years 656 AD to 661 AD, however, the Shia became a minority branch, persecuted by mainstream Muslims or Sunnis – so-called because they follow the example or 'sunna' of Muhammad and his companions. Taqiyya became pivotal to Shia survival.Interspersed among the much more numerous Sunnis, who currently make up approximately 90 per cent of the Islamic world, the Shia often performed taqiyya by pretending to be Sunnis externally, while maintaining Shia beliefs internally, as permitted by Quranic verse 16:106. Even today, especially in those Muslim states where there is little religious freedom, the Shia still practice taqiyya. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, Shias are deemed by many of the Sunni majority to be heretics, traitors and infidels and like other non-Sunni Muslims they are often persecuted.Several of Saudi Arabia's highest clerics have even issued fatwas sanctioning the killing of Shias. As a result, figures on the Arabian kingdom's Shia population vary wildly from as low as 1 per cent to nearly 20 per cent. Many Shias living there obviously choose to conceal their religious identity. As a result of some 1,400 years of Shia taqiyya, the Sunnis often accuse the Shias of being habitual liars, insisting that taqiyya is ingrained in Shia culture.Conversely, the Sunnis have historically had little reason to dissemble or conceal any aspect of their faith, which would have been deemed dishonorable, especially when dealing with their historic competitors and enemies, the Christians. From the start, Islam burst out of Arabia subjugating much of the known world, and, throughout the Middle Ages, threatened to engulf all of Christendom. In a world where might made right, the Sunnis had nothing to apologise for, much less to hide from the 'infidel'.Paradoxically, however, today many Sunnis are finding themselves in the Shias' place: living as minorities in Western countries surrounded and governed by their traditional foes. The primary difference is that, extremist Sunnis and Shia tend to reject each other outright, as evidenced by the ongoing Sunni-Shia struggle in Iraq, whereas, in the West, where freedom of religion is guaranteed, Sunnis need only dissemble over a few aspects of their faith.Articulation of taqiyyaAccording to the authoritative Arabic text, Al-Taqiyya Fi Al-Islam: "Taqiyya [deception] is of fundamental importance in Islam. Practically every Islamic sect agrees to it and practices it. We can go so far as to say that the practice of taqiyya is mainstream in Islam, and that those few sects not practicing it diverge from the mainstream...Taqiyya is very prevalent in Islamic politics, especially in the modern era."The primary Quranic verse sanctioning deception with respect to non-Muslims states: "Let believers not take for friends and allies infidels instead of believers. Whoever does this shall have no relationship left with Allah – unless you but guard yourselves against them, taking precautions." (Quran 3:28; see also 2:173; 2:185; 4:29; 22:78; 40:28.)

Al-Tabari's (838-923 AD) Tafsir, or Quranic exegeses, is essentially a standard reference in the entire Muslim world. Regarding 3:28, he wrote: "If you [Muslims] are under their [infidels'] authority, fearing for yourselves, behave loyally to them, with your tongue, while harbouring inner animosity for them... Allah has forbidden believers from being friendly or on intimate terms with the infidels in place of believers – except when infidels are above them [in authority]. In such a scenario, let them act friendly towards them."

Regarding 3:28, the Islamic scholar Ibn Kathir (1301-1373) wrote: "Whoever at any time or place fears their [infidels'] evil, may protect himself through outward show."

As proof of this, he quotes Muhammad's companions. Abu Darda said: "Let us smile to the face of some people while our hearts curse them." Al-Hassan said: "Doing taqiyya is acceptable till the day of judgment [in perpetuity]."

Other prominent ulema, such as al- Qurtubi , al-Razi, and al-Arabi have extended taqiyya to cover deeds. Muslims can behave like infidels – from bowing down and worshipping idols and crosses to even exposing fellow Muslims' "weak spots" to the infidel enemy – anything short of actually killing a fellow Muslim.

War is deceit ; None of this should be surprising considering that Muhammad himself, whose example as the "most perfect human" is to be tenaciously followed, took an expedient view on the issue of deception. For instance, Muhammad permitted deceit in three situations: to reconcile two or more quarreling parties; husband to wife and vice-versa; and in war (See Sahih Muslim B32N6303, deemed an "authentic" hadith).During the Battle of the Trench (627 AD), which pitted Muhammad and his followers against several non-Muslim tribes collectively known as "the Confederates", a Confederate called Naim bin Masud went to the Muslim camp and converted to Islam. When Muhammad discovered the Confederates were unaware of Masud's conversion, he counseled him to return and try somehow to get his tribesmen to abandon the siege. "For war is deceit," Muhammad assured him.Masud returned to the Confederates without their knowledge that he had switched sides and began giving his former kin and allies bad advice. He also went to great lengths to instigate quarrels between the various tribes until, thoroughly distrusting each other, they disbanded and lifted the siege. According to this account, deceit saved Islam during its embryonic stage (see Al-Taqiyya Fi Al-Islam; also, Ibn Ishaq's Sira, the earliest biography of Muhammad).

More demonstrative of the legitimacy of deception with respect to non-Muslims is the following account. A poet, Kab bin al-Ashruf, had offended Muhammad by making derogatory verse about Muslim women. Muhammad exclaimed in front of his followers: "Who will kill this man who has hurt Allah and his prophet?" A young Muslim named Muhammad bin Maslama volunteered, but with the caveat that, in order to get close enough to Kab to assassinate him, he be allowed to lie to the poet. Muhammad agreed.Maslama traveled to Kab and began denigrating Islam and Muhammad, carrying on this way till his disaffection became convincing enough for Kab to take him into his confidences. Soon thereafter, Maslama appeared with another Muslim and, while Kab's guard was down, they assaulted and killed him. They ran to Muhammad with Kab's head, to which the latter cried: "Allahu akbar" or "God is great" (see the hadith accounts of Sahih Bukhari and Ibn Sad).The entire sequence of Quranic revelations are a testimony to taqiyya and, since Allah is believed to be the revealer of these verses, he ultimately is seen as the perpetrator of deceit. This is not surprising since Allah himself is often described in the Quran as the "best deceiver" or "schemer." (see 3:54, 8:30, 10:21). This phenomenon revolves around the fact that the Quran contains both peaceful and tolerant verses, as well as violent and intolerant ones.

The ulema were uncertain which verses to codify into sharia's worldview. For instance, should they use the one that states there is no coercion in religion (2:256), or the ones that command believers to fight all non-Muslims until they either convert or at least submit to Islam (9:5, 9:29)? To solve this quandary, they developed the doctrine of abrogation – naskh, supported by Quran 2:105. This essentially states that verses "revealed" later in Muhammad's career take precedence over those revealed earlier whenever there is a discrepancy.

Why the contradiction in the first place? The standard answer has been that, because Muhammad and his community were far outnumbered by the infidels in the early years of Islam, a message of peace and co-existence was in order. However, after Muhammad migrated to Medina and grew in military strength and numbers, the militant or intolerant verses were revealed, urging Muslims to go on the offensive.According to this standard view, circumstance dictates which verses are to be implemented. When Muslims are weak, they should preach and behave according to the Meccan verses; when strong, they should go on the offensive, according to the Medinan verses. Many Islamic books extensively deal with the doctrine of abrogation, or Al-Nasikh Wa Al-Mansukh.

War is eternal; The fact that Islam legitimises deceit during war cannot be all that surprising; strategist Sun Tzu (c. 722-221 BC), Italian political philosopher Machiavelli (1469-1527) and English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) all justified deceit in war.However, according to all four recognised schools of Sunni jurisprudence, war against the infidel goes on in perpetuity, until "all chaos ceases, and all religion belongs to Allah" (Quran 8:39). According to the definitive Encyclopaedia of Islam (Brill Online edition): "The duty of the jihad exists as long as the universal domination of Islam has not been attained. Peace with non-Muslim nations is, therefore, a provisional state of affairs only; the chance of circumstances alone can justify it temporarily. Furthermore there can be no question of genuine peace treaties with these nations; only truces, whose duration ought not, in principle, to exceed ten years, are authorised. But even such truces are precarious, inasmuch as they can, before they expire, be repudiated unilaterally should it appear more profitable for Islam to resume the conflict."

The concept of obligatory jihad is best expressed by Islam's dichotomised worldview that pits Dar al Islam (House of Islam) against Dar al Harb (House of War or non-Muslims) until the former subsumes the latter. Muslim historian and philosopher, Ibn Khaldun (1332- 1406), articulated this division by saying: "In the Muslim community, holy war [jihad] is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the Muslim mission and the obligation to convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force. The other religious groups did not have a universal mission, and the holy war was not a religious duty for them, save only for purposes of defence. But Islam is under obligation to gain power over other nations."This concept is highlighted by the fact that, based on the ten-year treaty of Hudaibiya , ratified between Muhammad and his Quraish opponents in Mecca (628), ten years is theoretically the maximum amount of time Muslims can be at peace with infidels (as indicated earlier by the Encyclopaedia of Islam). Based on Muhammad's example of breaking the treaty after two years, by citing a Quraish infraction, the sole function of the "peace-treaty" (hudna) is to buy weakened Muslims time to regroup for a renewed offensive. Muhammad is quoted in the Hadith saying: "If I take an oath and later find something else better, I do what is better and break my oath (see Sahih Bukhari V7B67N427)."

This might be what former PLO leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner Yasser Arafat meant when, after negotiating a peace treaty criticised by his opponents as conceding too much to Israel, he said in a mosque: "I see this agreement as being no more than the agreement signed between our Prophet Muhammad and the Quraish in Mecca."On several occasions Hamas has made it clear that its ultimate aspiration is to see Israel destroyed. Under what context would it want to initiate a "temporary" peace with the Jewish state? When Osama bin Laden offered the US a truce, stressing that "we [Muslims] are a people that Allah has forbidden from double-crossing and lying," what was his ultimate intention?

Based on the above, these are instances of Muslim extremists feigning openness to the idea of peace simply in order to bide time.If Islam must be in a constant state of war with the non-Muslim world – which need not be physical, as radicals among the ulema have classified several non-literal forms of jihad, such as "jihad-of-the-pen" (propaganda), and "money-jihad" (economic) – and if Muslims are permitted to lie and feign loyalty to the infidel to further their war efforts, offers of peace, tolerance or dialogue from extremist Muslim corners are called into question.

Religious obligation? Following the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001, a group of prominent Muslims wrote a letter to Americans saying that Islam is a tolerant religion that seeks to coexist with others.Bin Laden castigated them, saying: "As to the relationship between Muslims and infidels, this is summarised by the Most High's Word: 'We renounce you. Enmity and hate shall forever reign between us – till you believe in Allah alone' [Quran 60:4]. So there is an enmity, evidenced by fierce hostility from the heart. And this fierce hostility – that is battle – ceases only if the infidel submits to the authority of Islam, or if his blood is forbidden from being shed [a dhimmi – a non-Muslim subject living as a "second-class" citizen in an Islamic state in accordance to Quran 9:29], or if Muslims are at that point in time weak and incapable [a circumstance under which taqiyya applies]. But if the hate at any time extinguishes from the heart, this is great apostasy! Such, then, is the basis and foundation of the relationship between the infidel and the Muslim. Battle, animosity and hatred, directed from the Muslim to the infidel, is the foundation of our religion. And we consider this a justice and kindness to them."

This hostile world view is traceable to Islam's schools of jurisprudence. When addressing Western audiences, however, Bin Laden's tone significantly changes. He lists any number of grievances as reasons for fighting the West – from Israeli policies towards Palestinians to the Western exploitation of women and US failure to sign the Kyoto protocol – never alluding to fighting the US simply because it is an infidel entity that must be subjugated. He often initiates his messages to the West by saying: "Reciprocal treatment is part of justice."This is a clear instance of taqiyya, as Bin Laden is not only waging a physical jihad, but one of propaganda. Convincing the West that the current conflict is entirely its fault garners him and his cause more sympathy. Conversely, he also knows that if his Western audiences were to realise that, all real or imagined political grievances aside, according to the Islamic worldview delineated earlier, which bin Laden does accept, nothing short of their submission to Islam can ever bring peace, his propaganda campaign would be compromised. As a result there is constant lying, "for war is deceit".If Bin Laden's words and actions represent an individual case of taqiyya, they raise questions about Saudi Arabia's recent initiatives for "dialogue". Saudi Arabia closely follows sharia. For instance, the Saudi government will not allow the construction of churches or synagogues on its land; Bibles are banned and burned. Christians engaged in any kind of missionary activity are arrested, tortured, and sometimes killed. Muslim converts to Christianity can be put to death in the kingdom.Despite such limitations on religious freedom, the Saudis have been pushing for more dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims. At the most recent inter-faith conference in Madrid in July 2008, King Abdullah asserted: "Islam is a religion of moderation and tolerance, a message that calls for constructive dialogue among followers of all religions."Days later, it was revealed that Saudi children's textbooks still call Christians and Jews "infidels", "hated enemies" and "pigs and swine". A multiple-choice test in a book for fourth-

graders asks: "Who is a 'true' Muslim?" The correct answer is not the man who prays and fasts, but rather: "A man who worships God alone, loves the believers and hates the infidels".

These infidels are the same people the Saudis want dialogue with. This raises the question of whether, when Saudis call for dialogue, they are merely following Muhammad's companion Abu Darda's advice: "Let us smile to the face of some people while our hearts curse them"?There is also a philosophical – more particularly, epistemological – problem with taqiyya. Anyone who truly believes that no less an authority than God justifies and, through his prophet's example, sometimes even encourages deception, will not experience any ethical qualms or dilemmas about lying. This is especially true if the human mind is indeed a tabula rasa shaped by environment and education. Deception becomes second nature.

Consider the case of former Al-Qaeda operative, Ali Mohammad. Despite being entrenched in the highest echelons of the terrorism network, Mohammed's confidence at dissembling enabled him to become a CIA agent and FBI informant for years. People who knew him regarded him "with fear and awe for his incredible self-confidence, his inability to be intimidated, absolute ruthless determination to destroy the enemies of Islam, and his zealous belief in the tenets of militant Islamic fundamentalism", according to Steven Emerson. Indeed, this sentiment sums it all up: for a zealous belief in Islam's tenets, which, as has been described above, legitimises deception, will certainly go a long way in creating incredible self-confidence when deceiving one's enemies.

Exposing a doctrine; All of the above is an exposition on doctrine and its various manifestations, not an assertion on the actual practices of the average Muslim. The deciding question is how literally any given Muslim follows sharia and its worldview.So-called "moderate" Muslims – or, more specifically, secularised Muslims – do not closely adhere to sharia, and therefore have little to dissemble about. On the other hand, "radical" Muslims who closely observe sharia law, which splits the world into two perpetually warring halves, will always have a "divinely sanctioned" right to deceive, until "all chaos ceases, and all religion belongs to Allah" (Quran 8:39).