Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-122-Caliphate-al-Zawahiri-8

By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence.

In The "War of the Cross, we seek a Strategy, our Enemy has one."

'The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see;' --- Winston Churchill

According to the Weekly Standard, bin Laden was using an upstart terrorist organization called ISIL to his advantage. With the U.S. focused on ISIL, where is al-Qaida and what is it

plotting now?

Far from fading away, al-Qaeda’s legacy has only grown, says START Executive Director William Braniff. “It is clear that groups generally associated with al-Qaeda remain the most lethal groups in the world, and it is their violence that has driven global increases in activity and lethality,” Braniff reported in congressional testimony Feb. 13. About half of the terrorist attacks and fatalities occurred in just three countries: Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda spinoff ISIS was responsible for more terrorist activity than any other single group.

ISIS has adjusted to the U.S. air campaign by expanding beyond the Iraqi and Syrian theaters. It recently announced the creation of new wilayat (governorates) in Afghanistan, Algeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen and introduced a new slogan: “Remaining and Expanding.” In order for U.S. President Barack Obama to fulfill his promise to “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIS, he must weaken ISIS’ control of Mosul, Raqqa, and other large population centers, as well as stop its expansion. By announcing himself as caliph, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has revealed that his ambitions extend beyond capturing Iraq and Syria. He has essentially demanded that all other jihadist groups pledge their allegiance to him. If Baghdadi were to succeed, he would command a much more powerful force, with assets throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe.

• Although al Qaeda agrees that jihadists should collaborate against their shared enemy the United States, it nevertheless refuses to join ISIS by following Baghdadi. Notwithstanding the fact that Zawahiri is less influential than his predecessor, he has so far been able to keep all of al Qaeda’s branches on his side.

• As long as Zawahiri is alive, the leaders of al Qaeda’s branches who are beholden to him by personal oath are less likely to shift allegiances and join ISIS.

It is certainly ironic that at this point, when the United States is the closest it has ever been to destroying al Qaeda, its interests would be better served by keeping the terrorist organization afloat and Zawahiri alive.

C: As the publications and statements below will show: the ongoing discussion for now is about should we allow al Qaida slipping back in, to counter the Daesh. First and foremost what we have be it Daesh or AQ in general terms we created it ourselves some decades ago. Be it to kick-ass with the then Soviet Union or getting rid of “dictators” the leftovers – 3rd order effect -of it does not serve us well. Even worse it’s threatening large parts of the globe. Thinking that we can do it again but this time better shows a serious lack of an in-depth strategy to deal with the issues at hand.

Moreover we simply ignore that what the Daesh is doing and intending – global expansion – is an original plan created by AQSL strategic thinkers. And although the AQSL is very silent do not underestimate their intent, preferably without the current Caliph Ibrahim, install their own caliph and pursue the plan. So thinking to let them comeback to the forefront in one way or the other is not what we should allow to happen. We need a comprehensive and lasting strategy.

Documents 1 recovered by U.S. forces that stormed the compound in which Osama Bin Laden was hiding in Pakistan reveal he was the al-Qaida leader until his last day, contrary to suggestions he was incommunicado. According to the newly uncovered documents, some of the notions expressed by certain government officials regarding Bin Laden don’t match with the reality. The Obama administration characterized the al-Qaida leader as living in “comfortable retirement,” “sidelined,” or “a lion in winter” prior to his death. Contrary to assertions from President Obama that al-Qaida was “on the run,” the terror group was very much active.

ilk “khwarij” — a term used for Muslims who endanger Islam. Osama bin Laden “was kind-hearted and naive back then, but his mind was

manipulated by [Egyptian doctor and current Al Qaeda leader] Al-Zawahiri. It was the doctor that started this dangerous ‘us and them’ mentality we see now.” It’s the “us and them” takfiri extremism Bin Laden espoused that Al Qaeda, and now IS, use to religiously legitimize the killing of anyone they deem to be an infidel, which is basically anyone who disagrees with them. A “takfiri” is a Muslim who arbitrarily accuses another Muslim of apostasy, and the accusation of “takfir” can only be made through Islamic courts. .. “The scenario in Iraq is very similar to what happened in Syria,” he says. “In Iraq there were also national groups. Then afterwards Al Qaeda appeared and they said whoever is not with us is against us, which is where we are now in Syria.” “ISIS has the dream. They have the Islamic state,” says Sheikh Abu Omar Shishani. “The Syrian people were poor to begin with, and the war made them poorer. ISIS is the strongest in terms of money and weapons so people resort to it because they think they have no choice.” Since the beginning of the war, rebel fighters have been attracted to the strongest and richest groups.

In the last six months, funding for moderate groups has slowed significantly, with private Gulf donors spooked by the uptick of anti-terrorist financing laws. Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s forces, meanwhile, have been bolstered by Iranian, Lebanese Hezbollah and Afghan Shia militias. For rebels, the thought of joining IS or Al Qaeda’s Jabhat al-Nusra, a strong, secure and well-funded operation, grows more appealing. “It’s bad for us, the Syrians, that the funding pulls us around.” . The first Western-backed group — the Syrian Revolutionary Front, led by Jamal Maarouf — collapsed in a matter of days last autumn when seriously challenged by Jabhat al-Nusra.

Last weekend, a key base of a second US-armed group, Haraket Hazm, fell to al-Nusra, with pictures of US-supplied weapons in Al Qaeda hands posted online just hours after the US led train-and-equip program of Syrian rebels was due to start in Turkey. The plan aims to train a force of 5,000 starting this year specifically to take on IS, although whether they will also fight Jabhat al-Nusra remains unclear. Many observers say the US support will not be enough to challenge IS on the ground. --- Sheikh Abu Omar Shishani

2.

The Ahl Al-Hadith Center, an Islamic institute based in Reyhanli on the Turkish-Syrian border, has made it their mission to preach against the extremists and their intolerant version 1 http://www.inquisitr.com/1881432/osama-bin-laden-documents-reveal-he-was-al-qaeda-leader-until-the-end/2 http://www.mintpressnews.com/meet-the-syrian-sheikh-battling-islamic-state-ideology-one-mind-at-a-time/203092/

of Islam espoused by Bin Laden and his takfiri legacy. The sheikh insists the texts explain why or when the tactics can’t be justified by the Koran or the Hadith, a collection of the Prophet Muhammad’s teachings; A quick glance at the table of contents shows topics including “Explosions and assassinations: reasons, impact and preventions; Explosions and Vandalism in Islamic Countries; Assassinations; Suicide Operations; Going against Muslim Rulers; Hijacking of Airplanes.”

Sources: bin Laden docs conflict with Obama's talk of Al Qaeda demise; A trove of documents that could hold the key to Al Qaeda's future have been gathering dust, say critics who believe the Obama administration is ignoring them because they don’t say what the White House wants to hear. In fact, according to senior U.S. intelligence officials quoted in a Wall Street Journal op-ed published Thursday, the 1.5 million documents swept up in the Pakistan compound where Navy SEALs killed Usama bin Laden in May 2011 prove that bin Laden was still running Al Qaeda, and that the terror group was not in retreat, as the administration claimed just a year after the raid. To date, the public has seen only two dozen of the 1.5 million documents. The haul included hard drives, cell phones, thumb drives, handwritten materials, tapes, magazines, data cards, video tapes, audio, newspapers and DVDs. At the time, an interagency team led by the Central Intelligence Agency gave the cache a quick “scrub” looking for actionable intelligence, according to the op-ed, written by Weekly Standard senior writer and Fox News contributor Stephen Hayes, and Thomas Joscelyn of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. According to the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, that team produced 400 separate reports based on the documents. But then, the article claims, the documents remained untouched “for months – perhaps as long as a year.” In 2012, in comments based on what Hayes and Joscelyn said was an analysis of 17 “handpicked documents” that “reached the conclusion the Obama administration wanted,” Obama announced that the defeat of Al Qaeda “is now within our reach.” But that wasn’t the situation at all, according to the intelligence officials who spoke with the two writers, as well as a sliver of the documents recently divulged in the ongoing trial of Abid Naseer, who is accused of plotting an attack on the New York subway system. The unnamed sources in the Wall Street Journal op-ed said a small team of analysts were given brief access to the documents around the time the administration was saying Al Qaeda was on the run. They said the documents indicated that bin Laden was not only in control, but had expansion plans – he was giving direction to teams as far away as West Africa before he died. The Iranian-Al Qaeda connection is also described. “The DIA team began producing analyses reflecting what they were seeing in the documents,” wrote Hayes and Joscelyn. “That wasn’t what the Obama White House wanted to hear.” So the White House cut off access to the documents and put an end to any more analyses, according to their sources, they said. Lt. Gen. Mike Flynn, who served as Obama’s Defense Intelligence Agency director from 2012-2014, sat down for an interview with Fox News’ Bret Baier, which will be televised this weekend. He said the intelligence gleaned in those documents is “the opposite” of what the administration’s narrative has been about bin Laden and the strength of Al Qaeda. When reached by Fox News, DNI spokesman Jeffrey S. Anchukaitis denied there was any attempt to cut off access to the bin Laden documents, which some critics say should now be made completely available to the public. “The thousands of documents recovered from bin Ladin’s compound were carefully analyzed by an interagency task force that produced several hundred intelligence reports,” Anchukaitis said in a statement. “These reports and the raw holdings were subsequently made available in a timely manner to the Intelligence Community and military analysts who were cleared to review them. Any accusation that critical intelligence of analytic value was withheld from any agency with a need to know, is false.” Fox News' Lucas Tomlinson contributed to this report

The three times U.S. foreign policy helped to create the Islamic State

Hamilton Spectator 3 By Adam Taylor WASHINGTON You'd be forgiven for thinking that the Islamic State sprang out of nowhere last year. The extremist group's brutal tactics and surreal rhetoric seemed like a leap beyond most other extremist Islamist groups, if not wholly unprecedented. Yet research has shown time and again that much of the group's rise was slow and gradual, with many important seeds planted years ago, and only becoming apparent more recently. In a new paper for the Brookings Institution, Cole Bunzel, an expert on the Islamic State at Princeton University, shows how one of the most powerful and evocative concepts for the group — their self-proclaimed, Iraq-centered "caliphate" — stretched back more than a decade and was informed as much by the modern context within which 21{+s}t century jihadist groups operate as it was Islamic history. Crucially, Bunzel finds that three actions of recent United States foreign policy inadvertently helped create the conditions that would allow a self-proclaimed "caliphate" in the Middle East to come into existence. Here's how the Islamic State's caliphate went from a dim idea to a grim reality in a little over a decade. 1. The war in Afghanistan Bunzel's paper, titled "From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State," shows that as far back as late 2001 or early 2002, members of al-Qaida were discussing the idea of an Iraq-based "caliphate" with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born militant who founded al-Qaida in Iraq — a key precursor to the Islamic State. Al-Qaida military strategist Sayf-al'Adl claims to have discussed the idea while both he and Zarqawi were in Iran, where they had fled following the United States-led invasion of Afghanistan. "This [would be] our historic opportunity by the means of which perhaps we would be able to establish the Islamic State, which would have the main role in eradicating oppression and helping establish the Truth in the world, god willing," Adl wrote of Zarqawi's plan to relocate to Iraq. As the paper notes, at this point Zarqawi had not yet pledged allegiance to al-Qaida (his notable hatred for Shiite Muslims was a source of disagreement with the group), and it isn't clear whether the plan for an Iraq-based caliphate came from Zarqawi or al-Qaida itself. What is important, Bunzel explains in an e-mail, is that the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan shaped this plan: Until 2001, al-Qaida had viewed Afghanistan and Taliban leader Mullah Omar as the future of an Islamic caliphate. "With the loss of Afghanistan in 2001, [Adl] and others were looking for a new host for the caliphate project," Bunzel says. Al-Qaida members would later admit that the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan would force them to change their plans. "Had this emirate [the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] persisted, it would have been the beginning of the desired caliphal Islamic state for all the world's Muslims," Adl later wrote in a 2005 letter to Zarqawi. 2. The war in Iraq While the Afghanistan war sparked a new search for a potential caliphate, it was another war that made that candidate actually look realistic. "In 2001/2, the Iraq-based caliphate was just an ambition," Bunzel explains, "but after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, it appeared to al-Qaida to be a serious possibility now." After the Iraq war in March 2003, Zarqawi began to focus his attention on the country. In 2004, he pledged fealty to Osama bin Laden, renaming his group from Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad to Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn ("al-Qaida in Iraq"). In 2005, Bunzel's paper shows how three separate al-Qaida leaders wrote to Zarqawi in 2005, urging him to set up an Islamic state in Iraq. Notably, Ayman al-Zawahiri, then the al-Qaida's second in command, told Zarqawi that he hoped such a state would "reach the status of the caliphate."

3 http://www.thespec.com/opinion-story/5468757-the-three-times-u-s-foreign-policy-helped-to-create-the-islamic-state/

Despite the shared aim, from the start the relationship between al-Qaida's core and al-Qaida in Iraq had its problems. In one noteworthy exchange, after a series of beheadings were carried out by Zarqawi's group and released on videotape, Zawahiri wrote to him to urge him to stop the practice because other Muslims "will never find [the images] palatable." However, the rising power of the Shiite majority in post-war Iraq seems to have been a boon for Zarqawi's extreme sectarian viewpoint, and by 2006 al-Qaida in Iraq looked close to establishing its own Sunni state. Then, on June 7, a U.S. airstrike killed Zarqawi. Al-Qaida in Iraq soon stopped existing in any official strategy. Instead, a group of Sunni jihadist groups rebranded themselves under a new title: "The Islamic State of Iraq." Here, the idea of a Middle East-based caliphate proposed in 2001/2002 became a core idea. Abu 'Umar al-Baghdadi, a former Iraqi policeman whose real name was Hamid Dawud Khalil al-Zawi, was announced as its "Commander of the Faithful" — the title officially given to leaders of the caliphate in Islamic history and traced him to the lineage of the Islamic prophet Muhammad (this man in turn was killed in 2010, though the U.S. government had tried to cast doubt on whether he actually existed). Bunzel's report notes that while the founding of "The Islamic State of Iraq" was greeted as big news on jihadi online forums, it struggled to unite Sunni Islamist groups in Iraq, and had a fraught relationship with al-Qaida. For years after its founding in 2006, this "Islamic State" failed to materialize in any practical terms, instead turning into what Bunzel describes as a "paper state." But the foundations for the next stage of caliphate were being created at this point, often in American-run prisons like Camp Bucca, where extremist Islamists mixed with ex-members of Iraq's Baath party, combing their religious fervor with military know-how. 3. The death of Osama bin Laden One of the men held at Camp Bucca was Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri, who was held there in 2004 but later released as he was not seen as a high-level threat. After Abu 'Umar al-Baghdadi was killed in 2010, Badri was named the new leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, given the title of "commander of the faithful" and tied to Muhammad's bloodline. His new name was Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. For a while, this new Baghdadi didn't really do much. It took him two years to publish an audio address, and official statements didn't appear from the Islamic State of Iraq's new leaders until mid-2011. This wasn't because they were inept (in fact, Bunzel argues that they were clearly far more talented than the previous leaders). Instead, it looks a lot like they were waiting for a perfect opportunity. It was only in 2012 the group suddenly announced their return. And the next year, on April 9, 2013, Baghdadi announced the expansion of the Islamic State to Sham—the Arabic word for greater Syria. Baghdadi went so far as to say that Jabhat al-Nusra, the official al-Qaida branch in Syria's brutal civil war, was now part of the "Islamic State of Iraq and Sham," what soon become known as "ISIS." The leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, issued his own statement denying this and saying that his group remained under the authority of al-Qaida, while al-Qaida called on the Islamic State of Iraq to remain in Iraq. Regardless, thousands of Jabhat al-Nusra fighters joined ISIS and the two groups became rivals. Relations between ISIS and al-Qaida became poor until finally, on Feb. 2, 2014, al-Qaida issued a statement that officially disavowed any ties with ISIS. What made Baghdadi act so brashly? Bunzel suggests a key act of U.S. foreign policy: The killing of Osama bin Laden by U.S. forces. "The death of bin Laden in May 2011 created a vacuum of authority in the world of jihadism that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi managed to fill," Bunzel suggests. "When Zawahiri [then bin Laden's successor] told Baghdadi to retreat from Syria to Iraq in May 2013, Baghdadi outright defied him, and was able to because Zawahiri is a dweebish man with little charisma. " "Baghdadi would have had a much harder time defying bin Laden," Bunzel adds. "I doubt he would have even tried."

Without the magnetic leadership of bin Laden, Baghadi felt comfortable resisting Zawahiri and the rest of al-Qaida. His plan for a new Islamic State, and, in turn, an Islamic caliphate (self-proclaimed on June 29, 2014), captured the imagination of younger jihadists. And without al-Qaida's intervention, his group's ambition and sectarian zeal no longer had outside limits. Neither did their brutality: The videos of beheadings that had occurred almost a decade before soon became prominent. In the end, the caliphate discussed by Zarqawi and al-Qaida in 2001/2002 had come to pass, but with neither of their involvement. Zarqawi was, of course, long dead, and, as Bunzel's report points out, al-Qaida's hopeful plan for a "caliphate" has now returned to its original locale of Afghanistan. U.S. military intervention inadvertently helped create this situation, but at this point it's unclear what other option there is going forward. Bunzel himself suggests that the total military destruction of the Islamic State's structure and its charismatic leader would cripple the caliphate. "A withering statelet with an unremarkable leader ... makes for poor propaganda," his report ends. But ultimately Bunzel argues that the U.S. should step back from military intervention, and let regional Sunni powers take the lead. Given the history of the Islamic State, it's an understandable suggestion. Washington Post

Osama bin Laden’s Files: The Pakistani government wanted to negotiateBY THOMAS JOSCELYN | March 9th, 2015 | tjoscelyn@gmail.com | @thomasjoscelyn

Recently released files recovered in Osama bin Laden’s compound show that parts of the Pakistani government made attempts to negotiate with al Qaeda in 2010. The letters were released as evidence in the trial of Abid Naseer, who was convicted on terrorism charges by a Brooklyn jury earlier this month.One of the files is a letter written by Atiyah Abd al Rahman (“Mahmud”), who was then the general manager of al Qaeda, to Osama bin Laden (identified as Sheikh Abu Abdallah) in July 2010. The letter reveals a complicated game involving al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, the brother of Pakistan’s current prime minister, and Pakistan’s intelligence service.“Regarding the negotiations, dear Sheikh, I will give you an overview, may God support me in this,” Rahman wrote. “The Pakistani enemy has been corresponding with us and with Tahreek-i-Taliban (Hakeemullah) for a very short time, since the days of Hafiz, may God have mercy on him.” Hakeemullah Mehsud was the head of the Pakistani Taliban at the time. The “Hafiz” mentioned is Mustafa Abu Yazid (Sheikh Saeed al Masri), who served as al Qaeda’s general manager prior to his death in May 2010. Rahman succeeded Yazid in that role.“We discussed the matter internally, then we talked with Abu-Muhammad later once we were able to resume correspondence with him,” Rahman explained. “Abu-Muhammad” is the nom de guerre of Ayman al Zawahiri. As a result of these discussions, al Qaeda was willing to broker a deal in which the jihadists’ would ease off the Pakistanis so long as the military and intelligence services stopped fighting al Qaeda and its allies.“Our decision was this: We are prepared to leave you be. Our battle is primarily against the Americans. You became part of the battle when you sided with the Americans,” Rahman wrote, explaining al Qaeda’s position towards the Pakistani government. “If you were to leave us and our affairs alone, we would leave you alone. If not, we are men, and you will be surprised by what you see; God is with us.”

Al Qaeda’s negotiating tactic was simple. Either the Pakistanis leave them alone, or they would suffer more terrorist attacks. Rahman’s letter reveals how bin Laden’s men sought to convey their message. They relied on Siraj Haqqani, the senior leader of the Haqqani Network, which has long been supported by the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment.Rahman summarized al Qaeda’s plan thusly: “We let slip (through Siraj Haqqani, with the help of the brothers in Mas’ud and others; through their communications) information indicating that al Qaeda and Tahreek-i-Taliban [the Pakistani Taliban] have big, earth shaking operations in Pakistan, but that their leaders had halted those operations in an attempt to calm things down and relieve the American pressure.”“But if Pakistan does any harm to the Mujahidin in Waziristan, the operations will go forward, including enormous operations ready in the heart of the country,” Rahman explained. This is the message al Qaeda “leaked out through several outlets.”

In response, “they, the intelligence people…started reaching out to” al Qaeda through Pakistani jihadist groups they “approve of.”One of Pakistani intelligence’s emissaries was Fazlur Rehman Khalil, the longtime leader of Harakat ul Mujahedin (HUM). Khalil is a well-known bin Laden ally, as he signed the al Qaeda chieftain’s infamous fatwa calling for jihad against the “Crusaders and Zionists” in 1998. Pakistani intelligence used Khalil’s HUM to send al Qaeda a letter.“We received a messenger from them bringing us a letter from the Intelligence leaders including Shuja’ Shah, and others,” Rahman wrote, according the US government’s translation. “They said they wanted to talk to us, to al Qaeda. We gave them the same message, nothing more.”Beyond his role as a leader in Pakistani intelligence, “Shuja’ Shah” is not further identified in the letter. Ahmad Shuja Pasha was the head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency at the time. Some have alleged that Pasha knew bin Laden was located in Abbottabad. Pasha has denied this. Rahman’s letter does not indicate that “Shuja’ Shah” or Pakistani intelligence knew of bin Laden’s whereabouts, but it does show that they knew how to get in touch with his top lieutenants. All they had to do was ring jihadists such as HUM’s Khalil, one of the many jihadists the Pakistanis “approve” of.Pakistani intelligence got in touch with al Qaeda again a “little later,” sending the “same man” who had acted as a messenger the first time. But now the messenger had back up, including a former head of the ISI with well-known jihadist sympathies.Rahman noted: “This time the surprise was that they brought Hamid Gul into the session, and Fazlur Rehman Khalil attended with them as an advisor!” Gul headed the ISI in the late 1980s. During that time and after, he cultivated and the maintained deep ties to Pakistan’s jihadists.Rahman summarized for bin Laden what the Pakistani intelligence liaisons had to say at the meeting. “Be patient with us for a little bit,” Rahman quoted them as saying, indicating that the Pakistanis had requested a cooling off period of up to two months. The Pakistani representatives continued: “We are trying to convince the Americans, we are putting pressure on them to negotiate with al Qaeda and we are trying to convince them that negotiating with the Taliban separate from al Qaeda is pointless. So please wait a little.”If “we can convince the Americans,” the Pakistanis said, then we “have no objection to negotiating with you and sitting with you,” meaning al Qaeda.Al Qaeda’s representatives agreed to pass the message onto to their leaders.

The Punjab government also wanted to negotiate

The very next paragraph of Rahman’s letter to bin Laden recounts a separate negotiation. This one, according to the letter, was initiated by Shah Baz Sharif of “the Punjab government.” Shah Baz Sharif is the brother of Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan’s current prime minister.Rahman informed Hakeemullah Mehsud and Qari Husayn of the Pakistani Taliban that Shah Baz Sharif had “sent them a message indicating they [the government] wanted to negotiate with them, and they were ready to reestablish normal relations as long as they do no conduct operations in Punjab.” Rahman clarified that the proposed deal was restricted to the “governmental jurisdiction” of Punjab and didn’t include other areas such as Islamabad.“The government said they were ready to pay any price…and so on,” Rahman wrote. “They told us the negotiations were under way.” Rahman then made it clear that the Pakistani Taliban was to keep al Qaeda’s leadership in the loop at all times. “We stressed that they [Pakistani Taliban] needed to consult us on everything, and they promised they would.” Rahman noted that he had discussed the talks in his “last meeting” with Hakeemullah Mehsud, and the Pakistani Taliban leader told him “there was nothing new” and Mehsud agreed to “report anything new to” bin Laden.“I let him know what has been happening with us, and advised him to be careful of them,” meaning the Pakistanis, Rahman wrote. Mehsud believed that al Qaeda “should not appear in the picture” and “should not sit” with the Pakistanis during the negotiations. Al Qaeda was evidently content to have the Pakistani Taliban handle the direct talks. “I agreed with him on this in principle,” Rahman wrote, stressing that al Qaeda’s “leadership” would be consulted and bin Laden’s “consent” was needed before any decisions were made.Rahman’s summary of Shah Baz Sharif’s position is entirely consistent with Sharif’s public rhetoric at the time. On Mar. 15, 2010, the Pakistani newspaper Dawn published an article discussing Sharif’s desire for the Pakistani Taliban to halt its attacks in the Punjab. Sharif blamed the escalation of violence in Pakistan on Pervez Musharraf, the former president. Sharif stated that the Taliban and his political party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), were both opposed Musharraf.Sharif was therefore “surprised that this common stance has failed to stop the Taliban from carrying out terror attacks in Punjab.” Sharif harshly criticized American policy, portraying Musharraf as a puppet for outside powers.“Gen Musharraf planned a bloodbath of innocent Muslims at the behest of others only to prolong his rule, but we in the PML-N opposed his policies and rejected dictation from abroad and if the Taliban are also fighting for the same cause then they should not carry out acts of terror in Punjab (where the PML-N is ruling),” Dawn quoted Sharif as saying.

Al Qaeda was cautious, but willing to make a dealRahman’s July 2010 letter to bin Laden reveals that al Qaeda was cautious, but willing to make a deal with the Pakistani negotiators. Rahman wrote: “Are the Pakistanis serious, or are they playing around and dissembling?” Rahman believed, “Caution is mandatory, as is preparedness, awareness, and staying focused on the mission and resolve.”Rahman also cited an opinion that bin Laden had previously expressed. “O Sheikh, we see it the way you said it: We will make use of any opportunity for a truce with the Pakistanis in order so we can focus on the Americans. That is clear.” Bin Laden’s subordinate noted “there will be some trouble for many of our Pakistani brothers, and do not forget the brothers in Swat, the brothers in Mas’ud,” but “we will clarify things and help them understand the issue and how important it is, and that it is the best possible result, with God’s support.”A previously released letter from bin Laden to Rahman, authored in May 2010, shows that bin Laden had requested information on the negotiations. Rahman’s July 2010 letter was, therefore, part a running conversation on the topic within al Qaeda.

In May 2010, Bin Laden ordered Rahman to ask the Pakistani Taliban “about the truth in the news…about [the] beginnings of negotiations and truce talks between them and the Pakistani government.” Bin Laden wanted to know what the Pakistani Taliban’s opinion of the talks was and also Rahman’s take. The al Qaeda boss told Rahman that “much of what I have said about Yemen can be applied to the situation on your side.” At the time, bin Laden was trying to keep al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) out of a full-scale fight with the Yemeni government, preferring to keep al Qaeda focused on American targets. His advisors, including Ayman al Zawahiri, pushed back, noting that the Yemeni government was already taking the fight to AQAP. The documents reveal that al Qaeda had an extensive discussion on the proper war strategy for Yemen.Bin Laden clearly wanted the jihadists to come to an accommodation with the Pakistani government if possible. Another letter from bin Laden to Rahman, dated August 2010, was introduced in the Brooklyn trial. “In regards to the truce with the Pakistani government, continuing the negotiations in the way you described is in the interest of the Mujahideen at this time,” bin Laden wrote, thereby offering his endorsement of Rahman’s negotiation plan.

A tip from the “Pakistanis”In November 2010, Rahman wrote to bin Laden again. There were “renewed concerns and rumors about a possible campaign that will be waged by the [Pakistani] army on northern Waziristan, under pressure from the Americans, of course,” Rahman wrote. The “pressures” seemed to have “eased” after President Obama visited India without stopping in Pakistan. But Rahman reported that the Americans were using intercepts as leverage to urge the Pakistanis to fight the jihadists.“The Pakistanis told some of the students here in the north that unless communications from Miram Shah and Mir Ali stop, the campaign is a possibility,” Rahman wrote. “They are referring to the pressure the Americans are putting on them because of the intercepted communications.”Thus, someone in the Pakistani establishment tipped off the jihadists in northern Pakistan. Rahman assured bin Laden that the intercepts weren’t owed to a flaw in al Qaeda’s operational security, but instead due to undisciplined foreign fighters.“The problem is not with us (the organization) and the disciplined, but rather in those loitering in the markets of Miram Shah and Mir Ali, who are not disciplined, and do not listen to anyone,” Rahman wrote. “They are Arabs, Turks, Azeris, even Germans, and many more mixtures. We always try to advise the group leaders and those who are wise, and we communicate with them to mitigate the bad, and make them understand public interest.”Al Qaeda was taking steps to rein in the unruly jihadists. Rahman explained that al Qaeda was “currently in the process of establishing a Coordination Council for Turkish speaking groups (Turks, Turkmen, and Uzbeks, some of them are not part of the Taher Jan group, Azeris, and Bulgarians, probably.)”**The “Taher Jan group” is a reference to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which was headed by Tahir Yuldashev (also known as Taher Jan) before his demise in 2009. As Rahman saw it, part of the problem was caused by Uzbeks who were not affiliated with the IMU.

Small subset from a much larger cache of documentsThere was widespread outrage after the location of Osama bin Laden’s compound was revealed in early May 2011. He wasn’t living in the remote regions of northern Pakistan, where the drones had killed other al Qaeda leaders, but instead in a city not far from Islamabad. Abbottabad houses an elite Pakistani military academy and other elements of the

Pakistani military and intelligence establishment. It is difficult to believe that no one in the Pakistani establishment knew of bin Laden’s location.The bin Laden files released thus far are not sufficient to draw firm conclusions concerning the extent of the al Qaeda master’s support network in Pakistan. But the documents indicate that some key Pakistanis were at least willing to cut a deal with al Qaeda. Both Shah Baz Sharif and Pakistani intelligence leaders were willing to negotiate to put an end to the jihadists’ attacks. However, this does not mean that these same officials were collaborating with al Qaeda. And al Qaeda clearly disapproved of some of the Pakistani Taliban’s operations, even as the two groups were communicating at the senior leadership level.More files need to be released to tell the whole story. Just two dozen documents out of the more than one million captured during the bin Laden raid have been made public.Still, there are hints of even more nefarious connections in the small set of documents released thus far.The letters introduced as evidence in Naseer’s trial confirm that the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment considers prominent al Qaeda-allied jihadists, such as HUM leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil, to be acceptable partners. And the Pakistanis knew that to get in touch with al Qaeda’s senior leadership all they needed to do was reach out to men such as Khalil. Indeed, previous accounts indicate that a cellphone recovered from bin Laden’s courier revealed contacts with HUM commanders. [See LWJ report, Bin Laden’s courier tied to Pakistani-backed terror group.] Some of Pakistan’s jihadist proxies are also al Qaeda’s closest allies. **The US government’s translation of this letter identifies some of the jihadists as “Bulgarians,” but the letter may actually be referencing Bulgars, another ethnicity/nationality.

Accepting Al Qaeda? The Enemy of the United States' Enemy 4

Since 9/11, Washington has considered al Qaeda the greatest threat to the United States, one that must be eliminated regardless of cost or time. After Washington killed Osama bin Laden in 2011, it made Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s new leader, its next number one target. But the instability in the Middle East following the Arab revolutions and the meteoric rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) require that Washington rethink its policy toward al Qaeda, particularly its targeting of Zawahiri. Destabilizing al Qaeda at this time may in fact work against U.S. efforts to defeat ISIS.

There is no doubt that relentless U.S. strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan weakened al Qaeda by taking out the group’s central command and making it extremely difficult for it to plot attacks in the West. Pulverizing al Qaeda central also exacerbated difficulties it was already having in communicating with and supervising its various outposts. As a result, these branches either diverged from the parent organization’s strategy by fighting local regimes or overreached by targeting Muslim civilians, particularly Shiites. For example, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, formerly the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, carried out an unapproved attack in November 2005 that killed numerous civilians in Amman, which was also outside his area of responsibility.

These distractions prevented the various branches from contributing much to al Qaeda’s overarching goal of fighting the West, or the “far enemy.” With the exception of its Yemeni subsidiary, al Qaeda’s franchises were largely limited to targeting the “near enemy” in their designated zones. And so, notwithstanding their contribution to the spread of al-Qaeda, its franchises were more of a liability than an asset to the brand name.

But today, al Qaeda, although still a grave threat, is only one of several emanating from the Middle East. Washington must not only contain Iran’s hegemonic aspirations, which

4 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143238/barak-mendelsohn/accepting-al-qaeda

threaten U.S. allies, but also fight ISIS’ expansion. Washington’s failure to balance these diverging interests became apparent when it made the mistake of coupling the bombing of ISIS targets in Syria with attacks on al Qaeda’s Khorasan group—operational cells affiliated with Jabhat al-Nusra (al Qaeda in Syria) that are planning attacks in the West. The double assault reinforced the jihadist narrative that Washington is hostile to Sunni Muslims and ready to bargain with the murderous Alawite regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Not only did the strikes give al-Nusra a boost in popularity—the Sunnis saw how a group focused primarily on fighting Assad was attacked by the United States—they also made it harder for Washington to persuade Sunni rebels to fight the Islamic State and prompted al-Nusra to attack U.S.-backed rebel factions in northern Syria.

Earlier this month, Harakat Hazm, one of the main moderate rebel groups in Syria supported by the United States, announced it was disbanding after suffering defeats from al-Nusra. Washington’s reluctance to deploy combat forces against ISIS has limited its options to airpower and a reliance on allies’ ground forces. There are some merits to this strategy and signs that it is indeed bearing fruit: ISIS’ astounding advance has been rolled back in some locations, such as in Sinjar, Iraq, and Kobani, Syria. But the unwillingness to invest greater American resources comes with a price: the United States is settling for limited and gradual progress, which is not enough to destroy ISIS.

Consequently, ISIS has adjusted to the U.S. air campaign by expanding beyond the Iraqi and Syrian theaters. It recently announced the creation of new wilayat (governorates) in Afghanistan, Algeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen and introduced a new slogan: “Remaining and Expanding.” A series of attacks by its agents in the Sinai Peninsula and in Libya gave credibility to its drive to grow and helped soften the blows from air strikes in Iraq and Syria.In order for U.S. President Barack Obama to fulfill his promise to “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIS, he must weaken ISIS’ control of Mosul, Raqqa, and other large population centers, as well as stop its expansion. Inadvertently, the administration’s cautious approach to military intervention makes al Qaeda—which views ISIS as a renegade offshoot—an important player in curtailing ISIS’ growth.This advantage may not last long. ISIS’ surprising territorial gains and its ability to recruit an estimated 20,000 fighters (more than any terrorist organization since the 1980s, according to the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence) are putting pressure on al Qaeda, particularly its various branches, to defect and jump on the ISIS bandwagon.

By announcing himself as caliph, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has revealed that his ambitions extend beyond capturing Iraq and Syria. He has essentially demanded that all other jihadist groups pledge their allegiance to him. If Baghdadi were to succeed, he would command a much more powerful force, with assets throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe. The pressure for all terrorist groups to unite under one camp only increased after the United States joined the fight against ISIS in August, when leading jihadists—such as Abdallah Muhammad al-Muhaysini in Syria, as well as Abu Qatada al-Filistini and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi in Jordan—called for all factions to overcome their differences and unify against American “aggression.”Although al Qaeda agrees that jihadists should collaborate against their shared enemy the United States, it nevertheless refuses to join ISIS by following Baghdadi. Notwithstanding the fact that Zawahiri is less influential than his predecessor, he has so far been able to keep all of al Qaeda’s branches on his side. Although all the branches renewed their pledges to al Qaeda after Baghdadi announced his plans to create a caliphate, there was a leadership change in al Shabab (al Qaeda’s Somali branch), which made it more susceptible to defecting. However, Ahmed Umar, who in September 2014 succeeded Ahmed Godane, chose to renew

his pledge to al Qaeda. As long as Zawahiri is alive, the leaders of al Qaeda’s branches who are beholden to him by personal oath are less likely to shift allegiances and join ISIS.

But if and when Washington succeeds in killing Zawahiri, the leaders of al Qaeda’s branches would have the opportunity to reassess whether to remain with al Qaeda or join Baghdadi’s caliphate. It is possible that Zawahiri’s successor will be able to hold al Qaeda together, particularly if it is Nasir al-Wuhayshi, al Qaeda’s so-called general manager and the head of its Yemeni branch. But it is more likely that in Zawahiri’s absence, al Qaeda would drift into ISIS’ camp, offering it manpower, resources, and access to arenas such as Algeria and Yemen where al Qaeda’s dominance has so far hindered ISIS’ expansion.

More so than during the bin Laden era, al Qaeda’s cohesiveness depends on the ability of its leadership to hold the various franchises together, and it is unclear whether al Qaeda can endure another succession since al Qaeda’s veteran leaders have dwindled considerably in recent years, making it more dependent on old guard figures such as Zawahiri to maintain unity. As such, the group’s fate may depend on Zawahiri’s personal survival. It is certainly ironic that at this point, when the United States is the closest it has ever been to destroying al Qaeda, its interests would be better served by keeping the terrorist organization afloat and Zawahiri alive.

Regards Cees

How Arab Spring Opened the Door to Terrorism’s Ugly March

Sharyl Attkisson / @SharylAttkisson / March 12, 2015 It’s not your imagination. Global terrorism, dominated by Muslim extremist groups, is by far the worst it’s been in modern times. In the past six years, the United States has added 21 names to its list of foreign terrorist organizations: all but one of them radical Muslim groups. That’s more than the previous 10 years combined. At the same time, the number of terrorist acts has shattered previous records. Experts predict data for 2014, which is still being compiled, will likely reflect more than 15,000 terrorist attacks: a vast increase over 2013—which was already the deadliest year for global terrorism since data was first collected in 1970. The Institute for Economics and Peace reported 10,000 terrorist incidents killed

18,000 people in 2013. Nine countries were added to the list of nations where more than 50 lives were lost to terrorist attacks in a single year.

Arab Spring Devolves Into Terrorist Winter Eleven terrorist groups have been added to the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations since the Arab Spring. “Arab Spring” is the popular name given to the democratic wave of civil unrest in the Arab world that began in December 2010 and lasted through mid-2012. It turns out the revolutionary movement created an ideal environment for terrorism to grow and thrive. “Terrorists realized they could exploit the confusion and vacuum in power created by the uprisings,” says a U.S. intelligence officer stationed in Libya during the Arab Spring movement. He says terrorists used social media to stoke civil unrest and take advantage of the chaos. In the Arab Spring’s wake, Egypt and Tunisia disbanded the security structures that had helped keep jihadists in check, and freed many Islamist and jihadist political prisoners. In Libya, parts of the country fell entirely outside government control, providing openings for violent terrorist movements. “Many of the regimes weakened or deposed by the Arab Spring were among Washington’s most effective counterterrorism partners,” noted Juan Zarate in an analysis written in June 2011.A senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Zarate said the political upheaval created “new space” for al-Qaeda and associated terrorist movements to operate where none existed before.

Predictions Fulfilled The idea that revolutionary uprisings might open the door to terrorists was well-recognized by analysts such as Zarate at the time. “The chaos and disappointment that follow revolutions will inevitably provide many opportunities for al-Qaeda to spread its influence,” Zarate predicted in an April 17, 2011, analysis. “Al-Qaeda’s leaders … know that this is a strategic moment. They are banking on the disillusionment that inevitably follows revolutions to reassert their prominence in the region.” Two years later, on Aug. 5, 2013, Zarate warned, “we are now at risk of failing to imagine how the terrorist threat may be changing—well beyond the exclusive al-Qaeda prism.”

Al-Qaeda-Linked Groups: “The Most Lethal” In the first nine months of 2014, nearly 13,000 terrorist attacks killed more than 31,000 people, according to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland.

Far from fading away, al-Qaeda’s legacy has only grown, says START Executive Director William Braniff. “It is clear that groups generally associated with al-Qaeda remain the most lethal groups in the world, and it is their violence that has driven global increases in activity and lethality,” Braniff reported in congressional testimony Feb. 13. About half of the terrorist attacks and fatalities occurred in just three countries: Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda spinoff ISIS was responsible for more terrorist activity than any other single group.

Today’s Landscape

Zarate, author of “Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare,” says ISIS is “piggy-backing” off the work of al-Qaeda and beginning to advance the global agenda of Sharia rule. Sharia calls for harsh punishments, such as stoning, amputation or execution, for offenses such as wine drinking and infidelity. ISIS has declared itself a “Caliphate,” which refers to an Islamic form of government led by an authoritative power considered a successor to the Muslim prophet Muhammad. Braniff says ISIS sees the growth of its Caliphate as “the means to the end of a final, decisive military confrontation with the West.” “In countries where terrorism crowds out nonviolent activism, civilians often have little choice but to align with extremist organizations out of concerns for self-preservation,” Braniff says. “This is one mechanism in which extremist ideologies and groups can gain sway over larger swathes of society.”

Most Muslim countries do not strictly employ these classic punishments, but the United Nations estimates thousands of women are killed each year in Sharia-justified “honor killings”: victims murdered for bringing “dishonor” to one’s family. ISIS has become known for employing other Sharia

measures such as genital cutting, child marriage, stoning and execution by crucifixion. ISIS fighters holding the Al-Qaeda flag with “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” written on it.

(Photo: Medyan Dairieh/Newscom) “I worry about what the strategic implications are if groups like ISIS have physical space, leadership and innovation to bring their wild imaginings to fruition,” says Zarate, a former deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism.

“Anytime we allow terrorist organizations with smart, committed and dedicated groups of individuals to adapt and think strategically about how to pursue their agenda to include attacking the U.S.—that’s a dangerous position to be in.”