Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-141-Caliphate- Hybrid Warfare

By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-141-Caliphate- Hybrid Warfare

Hybrid warfare is a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare and cyber warfare.

Part-1 Synopsis A strategic concept of “hybrid wars” or “non-linear wars” has reshaped the new doctrine of the Russian Armed Forces. While its underlying principles are still imprecise small states should study such ideas with an eye to how it might impact their national defence in the future. IN FEBRUARY 2013, the current Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, and first Deputy Defence Minister, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, published an article in the Russian newspaper Military-Industrial Courier projecting the conceptual contours of future conflicts: the so-called "hybrid wars" or "non-linear wars."

To the question how far off is Al Qaida Strategy from what we call Modern Hybrid warfare?

Lately, a lot has been said and written down on hybrid war and hybrid warfare. The hybrid war thesis has been advocated to depict the new reality of contemporary warfare. Although the concept is not a new one, it has been proposed that today we are witnessing some new features in warfare.

The United States 1’ overwhelming conventional military superiority has forced its enemies for the foreseeable future to fight it unconventionally, mixing modern technology with the classic techniques of insurgency and terrorism. In response to the associated strategic challenges, a growing debate occurred and continues among military historians, strategists, and leaders about the proper principles necessary for contemporary irregular warfare, particularly against a potential transnational enemy. Indeed, history shows us that smaller, irregular forces – insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists – have for centuries found ways to harass and frustrate larger, regular armies and sow chaos….We can expect that asymmetric warfare will remain the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time.

--- Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, October 2007The United States’ overwhelming conventional military superiority has forced its enemies to fight unconventionally, mixing modern technology with the classic techniques of insurgency and terrorism (FM3-24, 2006:ix). Even the most cursory review of recent military history teaches these enemies to mimic the tactics of American foes in Vietnam or Somalia and avoid conflicts like the Gulf Wars.

Cees: Al Qaida and its affiliates to include the lately off shoot Daesh have shown to have used elements of what we consider Hybrid warfare. From setting conditions in the Ummah, spreading their Ideology, opening multiple fronts, dealing with other” groups, conducting deep operations, to include on our soil, gaining our trained moderates to cross over, multiple irregular tactics, deception, terror, cyber, propaganda, the internet and much more. The missing link fore now it the regular army. Additionally in their strategic planning, much ridiculed by western analyst, but so far 5 out of the 7 phases came to conclusion they foresee in the next sixth phase from 2016 onwards that there will a period of "total confrontation;" As soon as the caliphate has been declared the "Islamic army" it will instigate the "fight between the believers and the non-believers." With the re-establishing of the status of the Caliph and

1 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a488263.pdf EXAMINING U.S. IRREGULAR WARFARE DOCTRINE Graduate Research Project James M. Kimbrough IV, MAJ, USA AFIT/ILM/ENS/08-04

Cees:Intel to Rent Page 1 of 17 15/04/2023

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a488263.pdf


Islamic State by Daesh, inline with the phases and predictions in the plan, the building and forming of the Islamic Army could be next. Statements from the past have given the indication that it will be not so much building but luring standing regular Muslim forces over to their side. Moreover, as they have proven to study all type of warfare of the past, it would be foolish to ignore that they might be able to find ways to combine the two elements, an Army and Irregular they also may well develop strategies similar to what we call Hybrid Warfare. We in the West are lately discussing the Russian concept used in the Ukraine case, we should broaden our analysis. * The Western multinational expeditionary operations tradition — called also “military crisis management” in the European context — has developed towards a comprehensive approach during the post-Cold War era. Now, in Ukraine, the Russian application of comprehensive approach to traditional warfare — combining economic, informational and military means — is supposedly something totally new, worth the name hybrid war. For years it has been crystal clear within the West that military operations must be planned and executed within a broader framework, including political, economic and cultural factors. The introduction of the term “comprehensive approach” is a case in point.

But First: Russia’s Concept of Hybrid Wars: Implications for Small States

By Michael Raska and Richard A. Bitzinger No. 091/2015 dated 14 April 2015

Synopsis A strategic concept of “hybrid wars” or “non-linear wars” has reshaped the new doctrine of the Russian Armed Forces. While its underlying principles are still imprecise small states should study such ideas with an eye to how it might impact their national defence in the future.

Commentary IN FEBRUARY 2013, the current Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, and first Deputy Defence Minister, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, published an



article in the Russian newspaper Military-Industrial Courier projecting the conceptual contours of future conflicts: the so-called "hybrid wars" or "non-linear wars." Underscoring Gerasimov’s concepts of “hybrid wars” are three mutually-reinforcing principles. First and foremost, it is the idea of the “permanency of conflict,” which blurs the boundaries between wartime and peacetime, space and time, as well as actors involved. In essence, ascertaining whether a state of war exists becomes increasingly difficult, particularly for the one under an attack. According to Gerasimov, 21st century conflicts in Africa and the Middle East show that prosperous and stable regimes can, within a short period of time – perhaps even in the space of a few days – transform into arenas of intense conflicts. These events may not reflect an official state of war, but their social, economic, and political implications for individual countries and their societies are comparable with the consequences of real wars.

Multidimensional, unified conflict The second characteristic of emerging hybrid conflicts is “multidimensionality.” Specifically, achieving political and strategic objectives are no longer bound solely to traditional conventional military means; what is more important is the confluence of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military means that, in turn, achieve the desired strategic effects, while also reducing the necessity for deploying hard military power to the bare minimum. Hybrid warfare, therefore, compels the opponent’s military and civil population to support the attacker, to the detriment of their own government and country. The third defining principle is “unified effort” – simultaneous application of “mixed tactics” conducted across the enemy’s entire territory, and more importantly, within its “spheres of influence.” In Russian strategic thought, the main battlespace is inside the mind of the enemy. Therefore, hybrid warfare is as much about the primacy of “influence operations,” including elaborate internal communications, deception operations, psychological operations and well-defined external strategic communications in the cyber domain. These “invisible operations” subsequently pave the way for military victory on the battlefield.

Operational conduct Assessing the operational conduct by the Russian armed forces in Ukraine shows at least eight distinct phases of hybrid conflict. According to writings by Tchekinov & Bogdanov, the first phase is a non-military asymmetric warfare encompassing information, moral, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures as part of a plan to establish favourable political, economic, and military conditions. This is followed by special information operations to mislead political and military leadership carried out by diplomatic channels, media, and top government and military agencies by leaking false data, orders, directives, and instructions. The resulting destabilising propaganda aims at increasing discontent among the population, creating conditions for the arrival of paramilitary forces which could further escalate subversion. In the overt phases or “commencement of military action,” no-fly zones are established over the country to be attacked, followed by large-scale reconnaissance and subversive missions. These are characterised by a combination of targeted information, electronic warfare, and aerospace operations, and continuous air force harassment, combined with the use of high-precision weapons launched from various platforms. In the final phase, special forces, reconnaissance units, and ground troops conduct roll-over operations of the remaining points of resistance in order to destroy any surviving enemy units.

Implications for small states Emerging concepts of hybrid warfare, particularly its diffusion and adaptation in East Asia’s strategic context, have potentially grave implications for small states like Singapore. In the first place, such states may not be adequately prepared to deal



with hybrid or nonlinear operations arrayed against them. The “permanency of conflict” is a difficult environment in which to operate on a daily basis; individuals and most nations (Israel may be the exception) are not normally accustomed to operating in such a milieu, psychologically, politically, economically, or militarily. Small states’s abiding sense of vulnerability, due to its small size and lack of strategic space, can help contribute significantly to a function of watchfulness, but it might not be enough. It is difficult for a country , in which day-to-day normalcy is the goal, to remain constantly “on guard”. More importantly, hybrid warfare is generally about situations where conflict may be ambiguous – such as in the context of territorial disputes. Armed fighting may not yet have occurred, but the war is already raging psychologically, politically, and economically. The battle may be so subtle and incremental, and the propaganda war so abstruse, that a state may not know it is even challenged.

Hybrid Warfare: Where’s the Beef?Jyri Raitasalo April 23, 2015 · in Commentary

“Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.”— Sun Tzu, The Art of War

“The backbone of surprise is fusing speed with secrecy.”— Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege Lately, a lot has been said and written down on hybrid war and hybrid warfare. The hybrid war thesis has been advocated to depict the new reality of contemporary warfare. Although the concept is not a new one, it has been proposed that today we are witnessing some new features in warfare. Russia’s capture of the Crimean peninsula and its support to the separatists in Eastern Ukraine have been presented as the contemporary pinnacle of hybrid warfare. For many analysts of contemporary security and defense issues, the hubris around this buzzword seems to neglect the very basic principles of war that have been discussed and theorized for centuries. Namely, war is not — and has actually never been — a “pure” military matter that is executed only by military forces. When looking closely at the various attributes of Russian and separatist warfare in Ukraine that together are said to constitute hybrid warfare, it becomes clear that none of this is new or unique to a special kind of warfare known as hybrid.

War is War It is true that the essence of war is related to the use of large-scale violence — military force. But to analyze war without its political context and the many spheres of human interactions that lie outside the military sphere, represents strategic myopia — a tendency to see war from a simplistic and mechanistic perspective. This way of conceptualizing war has been long dominant within the Western security community.The technocratic Western understanding of war — looking at high-quantity violence through the prism of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), military transformation and network-centric warfare — has been challenged time and again in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and a number of other theaters where Western military superiority has not translated into politically defined goals. The introduction of the Effects-Based (Approach to) Operations is indicative of what has been wrong in the post-Cold War Western understanding of war: Political goals (effects) should always dictate the execution of the operation. Military success on the battlefield does not automatically lead to desired (political) outcome. The old expression, “Winning the battles but losing the war,” highlights the need to devise a strategy, which takes into account what needs to be accomplished and then infers courses of action, which will lead to the desired outcome.Many Western statesmen and strategic analysts have during the last 25 years become accustomed to the situation where no one challenges — or is capable of challenging — the


http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA364037

http://warontherocks.com/category/commentary/


principles of Western security and defense policy. During this time the West has redefined war on its own terms moving from large-scale mechanized war (and threats) to defend state and alliance territory towards expeditionary operations, with high-tech focus in operations that are only indirectly connected to the national security interests of the Western states. Because of the Western way to conceptualize war has been limited in its scope — relying too much on the “silver bullet” of high-technology — many statesmen and strategic analysts have become surprised by the crisis over Ukraine and the fact that not all states or other agents capable of generating military force will abide to the rules of war defined by the West (read: the United States).In order to grasp what we are seeing in the behavior of Russia and the crisis over Ukraine today, we need a better understanding of the traditional concept of war rather than the concept of hybrid warfare.

The capture of Crimea If one accepts the hybrid war thesis — that Russia has outsmarted the West in Ukraine with new means for which there have been no available countermeasures — one should be able to show what hybrid warfare elements have been used and how effective they have been. To date, this has not materialized to any serious degree. First, the use of Russian Spetsnaz or “commandos” without clear insignia is not the reason why Russia was able to grab the Crimean peninsula. Russia already had some 20,000 soldiers in the military bases in Crimea. When the unidentified troops made their move against Ukrainian state authorities and military bases in Crimea in early 2014, there were no existing Ukrainian military forces that could have ousted these “green men” from the territory of Ukraine. Had there been even a rudimentary military capability in the hands of the Ukrainian authorities, some resistance to the masked Russian invasion forces would have made sense. So, it was not a question of the Russian forces being without insignia. It was a question of Ukraine having no tools to resist military force. The fact was — and still is — that in the twenty plus years of the post-Cold War era, Ukraine has not been able to build or maintain credible military forces against external military threats. Ukraine’s culture of corruption produced a failed state. In retrospect, it is easy to understand why Ukraine failed to hold on to Crimea and it had little to do with anything specific to hybrid warfare.

Information Campaigns and Cyber-attacks Second, it has been argued that information campaigns and cyber tools at the disposal of Russia have had a significant influence on the crisis in Ukraine. So far no one has convincingly shown the real tangible effects of Russian information warfare, its army of internet trolls and the use of other cyber-attacks. In fact, the reputation of Russia has plummeted during the Ukrainian crisis. No amount of information operations, political propaganda, cyber trolls, or anything like them is able to change the fact, which is obvious to all statesmen and political leaders around the world: Russia is supporting the separatists in Eastern Ukraine with men, material and military know-how. Publicly presented lies, half-truths and twisted facts do not destabilize the situational awareness among key strategic actors in world affairs. They may affect the way individual citizens view the world, the Ukrainian crisis or Russia. But this has no effect on the policies of Western states — or other actors, for that matter.Trying to change the prevailing strategic narrative is not easy — and even when one is successful, it does not automatically change state or alliance policy. It is a question of how widely the alternative narrative is accepted, how many strategic decision-makers accept the new narrative and how willing they are to change state or alliance policy in accordance with the alternative narrative. Thus, being successful in information warfare requires much more than being capable of creating an accepted alternative narrative of events.Much of Russia’s information campaign is directed towards Russians. There is no free press or true independent media in Russia. Putin’s regime controls much of what average Russians


http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/europe/2015/03/18/nato-allies-brace-for-russias-hybrid-warfare/24979545/




see or hear about different events and world affairs. This is authoritarianism, not hybrid warfare. There is nothing revolutionary about this.In tandem, the concepts of cyber-attacks and hybrid warfare have become two of the most used buzzwords of the “military strategic industry.” Even before the latest rise of the hybrid war concept, cyber-attacks and cyber threats had made their way into the everyday parlance of statesmen and strategic analysts. Even though there is a lot of potential for change in the cyber domain, the “revolutionary” cyber-attacks that we have so far witnessed do not amount to much. In the case of Ukraine, there is even less to report.

The Economic Weapon and Using Proxies It has been asserted that Russia has used economic weapons in order to achieve its strategic goals as a part of its hybrid warfare strategy. But this too does not indicate anything unique to hybrid warfare. Economic sanctions, embargos, economic extortion and bribes have been routine means used by a multitude of states in conflicts all around the world. Examples from history and present day international politics are easy to come by. If the combining of military operations and economic sanctions equals hybrid warfare, the West has been waging hybrid war for the majority of the post-Cold War era, if not since Prince Henry the Navigator first sent expeditions to the East to gain an advantage over other powers.Fourth, the Russian use of proxies (read: the separatists) in Eastern Ukraine is an old technique. Proxy wars might be as old as war itself. Russian support to the East Ukrainian separatists does not make the war in Ukraine hybrid. This fact becomes apparent when looking at images from Eastern Ukraine’s battlefields — for example Donetsk. Large-scale, high-quantity violence has produced vast destruction and has caused thousands of casualties. It is clear that what we are witnessing in Ukraine is very traditional.

The Futile Hybrid War Concept The hybrid war thesis has been advocated to depict the new reality of contemporary warfare — exemplified by the actions of Russia in Ukraine. Although the concept is not a new one, it has been proposed that today we are witnessing some new features in warfare. What the proponents of the hybrid war thesis are saying actually resonates with what in strategic studies has traditionally been conceptualized through the concept of war: using all means available — including large-scale violence by military forces — in order to achieve desired outcomes.The post-Cold War era Western understanding of war and the use of military force has been based on the notion that there are no states capable of challenging the American “unipolar moment” and the associated military operations that the West has been conducting actively under U.S. lead. Although there has been a lot of discussion about the rise of China during the last decade, the war in Ukraine is the first large-scale war where Western definitions of co-operative security and the use of military force have become contested — by Russia. The five-day war in Georgia (2008) was a smaller-scale prelude to the Ukrainian crisis.The Western multinational expeditionary operations tradition — called also “military crisis management” in the European context — has developed towards a comprehensive approach during the post-Cold War era. Now, in Ukraine, the Russian application of comprehensive approach to traditional warfare — combining economic, informational and military means — is supposedly something totally new, worth the name hybrid war. For years it has been crystal clear within the West that military operations must be planned and executed within a broader framework, including political, economic and cultural factors. The introduction of the term “comprehensive approach” is a case in point.From a military perspective, a comprehensive approach is founded on not only a shared situational understanding, but also recognition that sometimes non-military actors may support the military and conversely on other occasions the military’s role will be supporting



those actors … The importance of including from the outset those elements — diplomatic, civil, and economic — that are to be enabled by military success must not be underestimated. Failure to do so will at best lose the strategic initiative; at worst, it will result in strategic failure. This is the basic premise of a comprehensive approach, which NATO applies to its operations.— AJP-01(D) ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE, December 2010

Reverting to the concept of hybrid war in the West is understandable as a reaction to the surprise that Russia’s actions in Ukraine have caused. Seeing the world through the lenses of the traditional great power politics, Russia has contested the Western post-Cold War era tenets of security and defense policy. International politics is not only positive-sum outcomes in the globalized world. Nor is security policy only the management of common threats. Russia behaves like great powers have for centuries — using all means necessary in pursuance of the its national interest — however it is defined. This perspective is rather familiar to the number one great power of the world — the United States.More than a new concept — hybrid war — we need better understanding of the traditional, centuries-old concept of war. Military analysts have understood war from a broad perspective for at least 2,500 years. Many Western statesmen and strategic analysts have during the last 25 years become accustomed to the situation where no-one challenges — or is capable of challenging — the principles of Western security and defense policy. At the same time, the traditional concept of war has been fading into the background. We have seen numerous “crisis management operations,” “campaigns” and other instances of the “use of military force,” but “war proper” has been on the decline. Now that Russia has stepped up and challenged the West by its actions in Ukraine, it is time to reinvigorate the discussion and debate on state-based threats and state-based war. Focus on hybrid war is a logical reaction by the Western analysts and statesmen. But it is also a telling example of the overwhelming surprise that Russia has managed to cause within the Western security community. States still wage war for desired outcomes. Lt. Col. (GS), Dr.Pol.Sc. Jyri Raitasalo is Docent of Strategy and Security Policy at the Finnish National Defence University. Previously he has served as research officer, lecturer and head lecturer at the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies at the Finnish National Defence University.

C: How far is the Al Qaida strategy away from the modern day Hybrid war?We need to look back 2..

2 ? Read the history books well and use them to forecast the future. Among many others a starting point reading their strategy: Architect of the New Al Qaeda; Al-Qaeda Military Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri's



“Liberating the Muslim nation,” wrote Ayman Muhammad Rabi al-Zawahiri in Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet. "This wave of Jihad that originated in Afghanistan and has spread to Iraq, the Levant and North Africa is also the ultimate hope of the Muslims of the Subcontinent," Yusuf writes. "It was Jihad that brought Islam to the Indian Subcontinent, and it will be Jihad again that will overturn the legacy of imperialism from Pakistan to Bangladesh and beyond." Ayman al Zawahiri and other al Qaeda leaders have repeatedly tried to position the terrorist organization as the vanguard of Muslims throughout the region. And al-Suri’s book: The Call for Global Islamic Resistance by Abu-Mus‘ab al-Suri, ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim, Oct 2006 is most likely still used for seeking strategic direction, CeesAyman al-Zawahiri himself. In his book Knights under the Banner of the Prophet, he states: Making the masses of the Islamic nation understand al-walā’ wal-barā’ will require a long time, and our enemies will not give us that time. Therefore, we must use jihad in Palestine as a means of making the Islamic nation understand al-walā’ wal-barā’

Zawahiri acknowledges another major front of the war is fought in the media: “we are in a battle and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma.”

Most Americans and westerners did not pay any attention to this statement of al Qaeda’s objectives and grand strategic vision. We begin with the starting points, that is the

(born Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Nasar ) Teachings on Fourth-Generation Warfare (4GW), Individual Jihad and the Future of Al-Qaeda. Nasar's best known work is the 1600-page book The Global Islamic Resistance Call (Da'wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-'alamiyyah) which appeared on the Internet in December 2004 or January 2005 Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s 1984 book, Islamic Education and Hasan al-Bana, is to get an Islamic education. Nobody should be allowed to talk about Islam or political Islamism without having read this or similar texts. Most of his teachings, whether it was Islam and Capitalism, Social Justice [in Islam], or another book that was a landmark for most of the Islamic movements that followed was called Signposts [more commonly known as Milestones] orMa’alim fi’l Tariq [in Arabic] — signpost teachings for Muslims, how to follow the road of Sayyid Qutb in terms of pushing or expanding the world of Islam to protect Muslims against the infectious, the decadent, the bad values of the West. So it is very central to the thinking of bin Laden and the jihadists and Al Qaeda in terms of whether it was Ayman al-Zawahiri — Ayman al-Zawahiri is directly linked to Sayyid Qutb, most of his writings and teachings and so on, and some family connections bring him to the world of Sayyid Qutb. In 2001, Al-Zawahiri published Knights under the Prophet's Banner (Fursan Taht Rayah Al-Nabi) even as the empire he built with Bin-Laden, and Taliban leader Mullah Omar crumbled under the weight of U.S. air, special operations forces, as well as the Northern Alliance assaults. (1) Initially serialized in the Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper in 12 installments beginning in early December 2001, Knights under the Prophet's Banner can now be found in the back alleys of any major Arab city. (2) The word "knights" in the title refers to the members of the jihadist movement while evoking the image of the knights of the crusades. The book begins with Al-Zawahiri saying: "I have written this book ... to fulfill the duty entrusted to me towards our generation and future generations. Perhaps I will be unable to write afterwards in the midst of these circumstances and changing conditions." According to Al-Zawahiri, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks were just an opening salvo against the Christian and Jewish "infidels." And The Bitter Harvest published in 1991. The Islamic pattern-of-war: planning & training (1968), and On war the Islamic policy: grand strategy & diplomacy (1967). By Akbar Khan, Mohammed, 1895-1984, Karachi, Islamic Military Science Association, Muhammed Akbar Khan was the first Muslim from the South Asia to become a General in British Army. At the time of independence of Pakistan, he was the most senior Muslim General. After Independence, Khan was allotted the number one by the Pakistan Army after Independence, However, he declined the post. Khan was Director of the ISI form 1966 till 1971. Khan wrote many books on military strategy and Art of War by pen name of Akbar Khan Rangroot (recruit). Or Join the caravan from abu Hamza…


http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_eOThecFRKFQ/SxIZFgXFDzI/AAAAAAAAEzo/2AvFyOy5QcQ/s1600/Ayman+al-Zawahiri.jpg%00%E5%A1%B9%EF%92%81%E1%B4%BB%E4%A1%BF%E2%B2%AF%E5%B6%82%E8%97%84%E6%8C%A7%00%00%EA%AE%A5


opponent’s ideology as well as their assumptions about themselves and the people they consider to be their enemies. Al Qaeda’s basic ideological vision is something that they have been more than willing to share with the world from the time the group was founded. One of the first statements issued by Osama bin Laden, in 1996, provides a detailed explication of al Qaeda’s ideological vision and, in fact, its grand strategy as a whole. The statement is a very thick document called “Declaration of Jihad on the United States.” Most Americans know about the 1998 Declaration of Jihad, but the 1996 one was ignored, at least for a long time.

Architect of the New Al Qaeda; Al-Qaeda Military Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri's (born Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Nasar3 ) Teachings4 on Fourth-Generation Warfare (4GW), Individual Jihad and the Future of Al-Qaeda5

Insight is given by a book - The Management of Savagery6: The Most Critical StageThrough Which the Umma Will Pass - of a man named Abu Bakr Naji, al Qaeda begins its ideological vision by stating that the main objective of the organization is to create the “caliphate7” or an Islamic state8 in order to practice its version of Islam correctly. In their vision of the so called 2020 plan9 they foresaw this in the time line 2013 – 201610.

3 http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Documents/AbuMusabalSuriArchitectoftheNewAlQaeda.pdf4 Nasar's best known work is the 1600-page book The Global Islamic Resistance Call (Da'wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-'alamiyyah) which appeared on the Internet in December 2004 or January 2005.5 http://www.memri.org/report/en/print5395.htm http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1658701/posts 6 http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/abu-bakr-naji-the-management-of-savagery-the-most-critical-stage-through-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf7 The former known Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isis), - a break away group of AQ, currently known as the Islamic State late June 2014 declared: Islamist militants have declared an Islamic "caliphate" in an area straddling Iraq and Syria, trumpeting the declaration in several videos."This is not the first border we will break, we will break other borders," a jihadist from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isis) warned in the video called End of Sykes-Picot, a reference to the agreement between France and Britain that divided up the Ottoman empire territories after the first world war.Later the fighter pledges that jihadists will free Palestine. "We are not here to replace an Arab cahoot with a western cahoot. Rather our jihad is more lofty and higher. We are fighting to make the word of Allah the highest," the spokesman said. Mid july, the statement, Isis said Christians who wanted to remain in the "caliphate" declared earlier this month in parts of Iraq and Syria must agree to abide by terms of a "dhimma" contract – a historic practice under which non-Muslims were protected in Muslim lands in return for a special levy known as "jizya". "We offer them three choices: Islam; the dhimma contract – involving payment of jizya; if they refuse this they will have nothing but the sword," the announcement said.


http://www.theguardian.com/world/syria

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sykes%E2%80%93Picot_Agreement

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sykes%E2%80%93Picot_Agreement

http://www.theguardian.com/world/isis

http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/jun/17/isis-what-is-sunni-islamic-state-mission-video

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/29/uk-syria-crisis-iraq-idUKKBN0F40SD20140629

http://www.theguardian.com/world/isis

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1658701/posts

http://www.memri.org/report/en/print5395.htm


'It seems we still have a hard time to understand11 their ideology12 , our enemy view and interpretations of the Quran and Hadiths; Ideology;

The jihadists Art of War.

Just a few decades ago many of us were serving in their respective armies and studied the than enemy: the Soviet Union and their forces. We followed classes in on their tactics, formations doctrines and political motivation. Today we are confronted with an enemy that is not operating in military

formations and most of their doctrine is based upon Ideology. So far we have a hard time to understanding this. Ayman al-Zawahiri himself, in his book Knights under the Banner of the Prophet, states: Making the masses of the Islamic nation understand al-walā’ wal-barā’ will require a long time, and our enemies will not give us that time. Therefore, we must use jihad in Palestine as a means of making the Islamic nation understand al-walā’ wal-barā’ (‘Loyalty and Renunciation’). Today we have two similar plans, but different visions, ideology and timelines: Al Qaida v.s. Islamic State caliphate, but both envision completion of retaken dar al-Islam by 2020 and move then into dar al-Harb. So far we still are the unknowing. While the Islamic State caliphate was declared early July 2014 has the global attention our real focus needs to remain with Al Qaida, their Intent, Plans, Ideology, Training, Looting military hardware form overrun bases, Strategic thinkers and their publications, the Books published, declarations and words said and written.

8 For The latest article on ISIS' 'Management of Savagery' in Iraq see: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/iraq-isis-alqaeda_b_5542575.html9 http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/1843710 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2005/08/the_seven_phase.php11 “To know your Enemy, you must become your Enemy.” ― Sun Tzu12 7 Aug 2014, exclusive exit interview with Breaking Defense contributor James Kitfield, the outgoing chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, Flynn had challenged the Obama administration narrative that al-Qaeda’s brand of nihilistic extremism had died with Osama bin Laden in 2011. JK: You also said recently that terrorist leaders like Osama bin Laden represent the leadership of al-Qaeda, but that “core al-Qaeda” is its ideology of perpetual jihad. Flynn: I know that’s a scary thought, but in 2004, there were 21 total Islamic terrorist groups spread out in 18 countries. Today, there are 41 Islamic terrorist groups spread out in 24 countries. A lot of these groups have the intention to attack Western interests, to include Western embassies and in some cases Western countries. Some have both the intention and some capability to attack the United States homeland. Flynn: Yes, and unfortunately the core ideology and belief system is spreading, not shrinking. These are people who have a very deeply-rooted belief system that is just difficult for Americans to comprehend . Just think about the mindset of a suicide bomber. These various groups have learned from fighting the U.S. military for a decade, and they have created adaptive organizations as a means to survive. They write about and share ‘Lessons Learned’ all the time. That was something Bin Laden taught them before he died. These proliferating Islamic terrorist groups have also for years been developing connective tissue to each other and back to al-Qaeda senior leadership in Pakistan’s tribal regions. Some of those connections are pretty strong. We’re not talking bits and pieces or nascent connections. http://breakingdefense.com/2014/08/flynns-last-interview-intel-iconoclast-departs-dia-with-a-warning/


http://www.goodreads.com/author/show/1771.Sun_Tzu


Mid 2014, “My belief—so this is Mike Flynn, departing DIA director—core al Qaeda is the ideology,” said. On 3 May 2014, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Martin Dempsey; “But the al Qaeda ideology has adapted and has decentralised,” Demsey warned that instability in the Middle East and North Africa had allowed the al Qaeda to take advantage of it with an “arc” running across the region starting from Pakistan. “Now you find these groups are spread across an arc that runs roughly from Pakistan across the Arabian Peninsula, across the Middle East and North Africa and all the way down into Nigeria with Boko Haram,” Dempsey said. Earlier the Obama Administration Always Scoffed At Idea A Caliphate Could Rise From Al-Qaida ; “Our strategy is also shaped by a deeper understanding of al-Qa’ida’s goals, strategy, and tactics. I’m not talking about al-Qa’ida’s grandiose vision of global domination through a violent Islamic caliphate. That vision is absurd13,……they said

Let’s remember: In May 2000, British police raided the Manchester home of reputed al-Qaeda operative Nazih Abdul Hamed al-Raghie, better known by his nom de guerre Abu Anas al-Libi. Among the possessions seized from Libi’s Manchester home in May 2000, investigators discovered a 180-page handwritten document the so-called “Al-Qaeda Manual” as a supposed al-Qaeda training manual: the famous “Manchester Manual.” The ideological part of the document is arguably more relevant than ever. The document calls for the overthrow of the “apostate” Arab regimes; ("Unbelief is still the same. It pushed Abou Jahl — may Allah curse him — and Kureish’s valiant infidels to battle the prophet — God bless and keep him — and to torture his companions — may Allah’s grace be on them. It is the same unbelief that drove [former Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat, [former Egyptian President] Hosni Mubarak, Gadhafi, [former Syrian President] Hafez Assad, [deposed Yemeni President Ali Abdullah] Saleh, [late Saudi King] Fahd — Allah's curse be upon the non-believing leaders — and all the apostate Arab rulers to torture, kill, imprison and torment Muslims." )

Senior Jihadi Writer Proposes Strategic Plan For Al-Qaeda To Gain Stronghold in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Start War For Liberation of Palestine In a paper titled "Strategy for the Regional War in the Land of Al-Sham," which was first published in August 2012 and rereleased on February 5,2013, 'Abdallah bin Muhammad, a senior jihadi writer, presented a comprehensive strategic plan for Al-Qaeda to gain a stronghold in Syria and later in Lebanon and Jordan, to play a major role in any sectarian war in the region, and to eventually start the war for the liberation of Palestine

Remember, North Africa: Al-Zawahiri Unveils Maghreb Strategy. By Jemal Oumar, 18 September 2013. Nouakchott — The latest message from al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri specifically targets Algeria, Tout sur l'Algerie reported Tuesday (September 17th), citing the SITE Intelligence Group. In the document released last week, Al-Zawahiri called

13 Scroll to the 15:35 time marker https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLhCCYzZ3Ds


http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/saudi-succession-plan-king-abdullah.html

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/saudi-succession-plan-king-abdullah.html

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLhCCYzZ3Ds


for followers to implant themselves in Algeria and spread al-Qaeda ideology throughout the Maghreb and West Africa.

Remember, 13 September 2013 Al-Qaeda calls for fresh wave of terror attacks inside U.S. to ‘bleed America economically’ Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has urged Muslims to launch attacks on 'American soil' to lead up to a 'war on its own land'. 'As we defeated it in the gang warfare in Somalia, Yemen, Iraq and Afghanistan, so we should follow it with ...war on its own land. These disparate strikes can be done by one brother or a few of the brothers.

New al Qaeda document sheds light on Europe, U.S. attack plans By Paul Cruickshank, Tim Lister and Nic Robertson, CNN March 20, 2013 A previously secret document found at Osama bin Laden's compound in Pakistan sets out a detailed al Qaeda strategy for attacking targets in Europe and the United States. The document -- a letter written to bin Laden in March 2010 by a senior operational figure in the terror group -- reveals that tunnels, bridges, dams, undersea pipelines and internet cables were among the targets. It was written by Younis al-Mauretani, a senior al Qaeda planner thought to have been behind an ambitious plan to hit "soft" targets in Europe in the fall of 2010.

Do we Remember: Al-Zawahiri's Article on 'Principles of War; Al-Zawahiri's Article on 'Principles of War Highlighted by Raids' GMP20120911061001 Ansar al-Mujahidin Network in Arabic 11 Sep 12 [Article attributed to Al-Qa'ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, posted by "Mukhabarat al-Qa'idah," user number 21057; place and date not given: "'Principles of War Highlighted by Raids' by Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri"] [Description of Source: Ansar al-Mujahidin Network in Arabic -- Prominent Salafi-jihadist web forum whose discussions focus on global jihad while also being supportive of Sunni insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan; online since 2008, site correspondents reliably post Al-Qa'ida and affiliate propaganda messaging copied from Al-Qa'ida accredited forums; URL: www.as-ansar.com/vb] Zawahiri has set down a vision for an al Qaeda of the future, which he says would survive even after Bin Laden. For Zawahiri, patience is the prime virtue for al Qaeda, since he argues that it is engaging America in a war of the flea, which will be a retracted campaign and


http://www.as-ansar.com/vb


militants must be patient; he does not foresee success or defeat in his own lifetime. He has also started stressing upon al Qaeda activists to start winning popular sympathy for the movement's arguments and grievances. He exhorts al Qaeda to be at the vanguard of this movement to oust what he sees as the corrupt and moribund regimes. For this, he directs al Qaeda to be alive to changing realities on ground, and also be ever prepared to take advantage of them. Zawahiri has also stressed upon expanding the skill-set of movement activists, widening the recruitment base of potential new participants, promoting education and awareness, and emphasizing global connectedness.

Al Qaeda's Six Core, Subordinate Strategies. Al-Qaeda’s core strategy 14 aims at distracting and exhausting adversaries, creating divisions between counter-terrorism allies, forging close ties and assisting local affiliates, planning major international or global attacks and monitoring our Western security and defence systems. In service to its global strategy, al Qaeda today pursues six separate lines of operation or subordinate strategies:1. Attrition. Al Qaeda seeks to overwhelm, distract, and exhaust its adversaries. Given both the U.S. and the world's profound economic travails and attendant financial upheaval, al Qaeda likely perceives the imminent success of this strategy of attrition as more tangible than at any previous time.2. Division. In tandem with the above, al Qaeda also actively seeks to create, foster, and encourage fissures and divisions within the global alliance arrayed against it. This entails the selective targeting of coalition partners in the U.S.-led war on terrorism both in operational theatres like Afghanistan and at home—through attacks on mass transit and other "soft" targets in the national capitals and major cities of European countries allied with the U.S.3. Failing states. Meanwhile, al Qaeda continues to conduct local campaigns of subversion and destabilization in critical operational theaters where failed or failing states provide new opportunities for al Qaeda to extend its reach and consolidate its presence. Countries and regions such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Algeria, the Sahel, East Africa, and Somalia fall within this category.4. Force Multiplier. Al Qaeda also actively provides guidance, assistance, and other help to local affiliates and associated terrorist movements. Al Qaeda thus works behind the scenes in these theaters "plussing-up" the capabilities of indigenous terrorist groups both in terms of kinetic as well as essential non-kinetic operations—including information operations, propaganda, and psychological warfare.5. Converts and "Clean Skins." Al Qaeda continues to seek out citizens of enemy countries, especially converts to Islam, who possess "clean" passports and thus can be more easily deployed for attacks in Western countries without necessarily arousing suspicion.6. Opportunism. Al Qaeda continues to be as opportunistic as it is instrumental: seeking to identify defensive gaps that can be quickly and effectively exploited for attacks. In sum, al Qaeda stubbornly continues to pursue strategies that, however unrealistic or fruitless, extend its longevity, and sustain its potential to cause death, destruction, and global disruption. About the Author: Bruce Hoffman is the Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service. https://globalecco.org/en_GB/ctx-v1n1/alqaeda-strategy

Key elements of al-Qaeda’s continued strategyFirst, al-Qaeda sought to overwhelm, distract and exhaust its adversaries, especially at a time

14 Bruce Hoffman and Fernando ReinaresARI 37/2013 - 10/9/2013


https://globalecco.org/en_GB/ctx-v1n1/alqaeda-strategy


of growing global economic travail. Al-Qaeda asserts that its ultimate victory will not be achieved militarily, with the use of physical weapons and arms, but rather by undermining the economies of its opponents, exhausting their finances and wearing out their militaries. The notion of this strategy of attrition has been tightly woven into the al-Qaeda narrative. In a bin Laden videotape message, released just days before the US presidential election in 2004, he claimed credit for having spent the comparatively modest sum of half a million dollars to implement the September 11 attacks. By comparison, bin Laden argued, the US had had to spend trillions of dollars on domestic security arrangements and foreign military expeditions. He therefore claimed credit for America’s economic travails and the fiscal developments that led to the fall of the US financial juggernaut. Such assertions were of course completely divorced from reality. However, propaganda does not have to be true to be believed, it just has to be effectively communicated so that it is believed. Al-Qaeda’s message in this respect acquired greater resonance than ever in light of the US and the West’s very real and continuing economic troubles. Secondly, throughout this period al-Qaeda actively sought to create, foster and encourage fissures and divisions within the global alliance arrayed against it. This accounted for its focus on either encouraging or itself mounting attacks within the territory of close US allies in Western Europe, such as the UK, Spain, the Netherlands and Germany, for instance. This entailed the selective targeting of coalition partners in the American-led war on terrorism both in the actual theatres of these operations (eg, attacks directed specifically against perceived ‘weaker’ NATO partners committed to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan such as the British, Canadian, Dutch, German and Italian contingents) and at home –through attacks on mass transit and other ‘soft’ targets in the national capitals and major cities of European countries allied with the US (eg, the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings and the terrorist plots with links back to Pakistan foiled in 2007 in Germany and in 2008 in Spain). Third, al-Qaeda continued to prosecute local campaigns of subversion and destabilisation where failed or failing states provided new opportunities for the movement to extend its reach and consolidate its presence and/or forge close relations with local jihadist organisations. Countries and regions such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and other areas of East Africa, North Africa and, especially, Yemen fell within this category. Fourth, al-Qaeda also actively continued to provide guidance, assistance and other help to local affiliates and associated terrorist movements. This support enhanced local and regional terrorist attack capabilities and strengthened the resilience of these groups, thus presenting more formidable challenges to national and local police, military forces and intelligence agencies. Al-Qaeda thus actively worked behind the scenes in these theatres as a ‘force multiplier’ of indigenous terrorist capacity both in terms of kinetic as well as essential non-kinetic operations –including information operations, propaganda and psychological warfare–. Fifth, al-Qaeda continued to seek out citizens or legal permanent residents of enemy



countries, especially converts to Islam, who possessed ‘clean’ passports that could deploy for attacks in Western countries without necessarily arousing suspicion. In other words, persons whose birth names remained in their passports rather than their adopted religious name, were intended to provide al-Qaeda with the ultimate fifth column –individuals whose appearance and names would not arouse the same scrutiny from immigration officials, border security officers, national police and security and intelligence services that persons from Muslim countries with distinctly Muslim names might–. Finally, al-Qaeda remained as opportunistic as it was instrumental. In this respect, while its leaders planned and encouraged international terrorist attacks, they also continued to monitor al-Qaeda’s enemies’ defences, identifying gaps and vulnerabilities that could be transformed into opportunities and quickly exploited for attack.

Remember, The Zawahiri Letter and the Strategy of al-Qaeda by Shmuel Bar, Yair Minzili Published on Thursday, February 16, 2006 On July 9, 2005 a 6,500-word letter from Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s second in command, to Zarqawi, the “emir” of the organization in Iraq, was intercepted. It was later published on October 6 Zawahiri likens the area to “a bird whose wings are Egypt and Syria, and whose heart is Palestine.” Most of the letter, presents a sophisticated, logical analysis of the goals of the jihad in Iraq and the strategies for achieving those goals. The short-term goal of the jihad, according to the letter, is the expulsion of the Americans from Iraq and the establishment of an emirate—an Islamic political entity commanded by an emir—that will eventually become the nucleus of a Caliphate. The long-term goal is the toppling of the secular goverments

The “heart of the Islamic world.” This area includes “al-Sham [greater Syria], Egypt, and the neighboring states of the [Arabian] Peninsula and Iraq,” and Zawahiri likens the area to “a bird whose wings are Egypt and Syria, and whose heart is Palestine.”1 It is where “the greatest battles in the history of Islam” have been fought.

The fledgling emirate must also expect to be in a constant state of war with an enemy who is trying to prevent the stability necessary for the emirate to become a Caliphate.

The third stage of the struggle is extending the jihad to the secular (‘almaniya) countries neighboring Iraq. And the fourth stage, which could be launched simultaneously or later, is the clash with Israel. Although Zawahiri focuses on these short- and medium-term goals, two long-term aims can be deduced from the letter as well. The first objective entails “homogenizing” Islam by “correcting mistakes of ideology” among Muslims— that is, the “re-conversion” of all Muslims not simply to Sunni Islam, but also to the Wahhabi school and the elimination of the ‘Ashari-Matridi school and others. This goal cannot be achieved by force or in a short time; It is not the role of the mujahidin, but calls rather for generations of prosthelytizing (dawa) and education.

The second objective is the expansion of the Islamic Caliphate throughout the whole of Iraq, al-Sham—Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine—Egypt, and the Arabian peninsula. Even these are not final borders, however, as the Caliphate is eventually supposed to spread its domain over the entire Land of Islam (Dar al-Islam) from North Africa to Southeastern Asia, and ultimately, over the entire world. The government should adhere tothe Islamic principles of shura (consultation) and of “commanding good and forbidding evil” (amr bil–ma’aruf wa–nahi ‘an al–munkar). It should also be based on the ahl al-al wal-aqd ahl ar-ray (those who allow and bind) and the ulama who are experts in Sharia.

In Zawahiri’s assessment, the enemies of Islam in this great struggle are both the external enemy—“idolatrous infidels” (al-kufr al-mushrikin)—and the enemies within Islam.

Radical Islamic doctrine seems to many outside observers to lack a strategic plan for implementing either its vision of an Islamic state or a set of rules for according any one



theater of jihad precedence over another. Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan are all seen as equal victims of the “crusader” attack on Dar al-Islam and of the Crusaders’ Muslim collaborators. Each arena, therefore, is to be dealt with equally by whomever happens to be there.

During the struggle against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the jihadist Shaykh Abdullah Azzam ruled that the arena for jihad was to be chosen on the basis of political and military considerations, rather than emotion: It is our opinion that we should begin with Afghanistan before Palestine, not because Afghanistan is more important than Palestine … but there are some pressing reasons that make Afghanistan the [preferable] starting point. These reasons are: (1) The battles in Afghanistan are still raging and have reached a level of intensity, thelikes of which have not been witnessed … (2) The raising of the Islamic flag in Afghanistan is clear, and (3) the aim is clear: ‘To make Allah’s words uppermost.’ Bin Laden himself employed a similar logic when he explained why he chose to focus on eliminating American influence within the Arabian peninsula before trying to liberate Palestine: “the occupation of the two holy places is nearer than the occupation of al-Aqsa Mosque, and this made it more important, given its role as the direction of prayer of all Muslims.”

The importance of Iraq is amplified by its having been the seat of the Abbasid Caliphate. A victory in Iraq would be perceived as a quantum leap for the jihad movement; it would provide a base inside the Arab world and in the immediate vicinity of al-Qaeda’s traditional targets—Saudi Arabia (balad alharamayn, the land of the two holy cities); the al-Aqsa Mosque; and the land of al-Sham, or the fertile crescent. Muslim armies would be on the border of the land of ribat (the border between dar al-Islam and dar al–Harb); control of Iraqi oil would fund the jihadi movement’s activities; and a “domino effect” in neighboring countries would lead to the eventual establishment of a Caliphate in the entire Arab world.

Zawahiri’s letter is consistent with the thinking attributed to the radical Islamic leaders surrounding him, and the stages of action he lays out are consistent with their strategic game plan, which includes seven stages leading to the ultimate victory of Islam over the West in 2020. These stages are: (1) The “awakening,” which refers to the attacks of 9/11, designed to make the Islamic movement a central player on the global scene; (2) “opening the eyes,” the period from 2003 to 2006 that will transform al-Qaeda into a “mass movement”; (3) “arising and standing up,” the period from 2007 to 2010 that will focus on terrorist destabilization of existing Muslim regimes; (4) the toppling of the moderate regimes of Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and other Muslim states from 2010 to 2013; (5) the formation of a new world order between 2013 and 2016, based on an Islamic Caliphate as a world power and the weakening of the United States and Israel; (6) a total confrontation between Islam Source: The Zawahiri Letter and the Strategy of Al-Qaeda SHMUEL BAR & YAIR MINZILI

“The Changing Face of War.” After him (UBL) what: A strategic shift ordered by al-Zawahiri, based upon Abu Musab al Suri’s ‘Call for a Global Islamic Resistance’????


http://rapidis.blogactiv.eu/files/2013/10/alqaeda2.jpg%00%E5%A1%B9%EF%92%81%E1%B4%BB%E4%A1%BF%E2%B2%AF%E5%B6%82%E8%97%84%E6%8C%A7%00%00%EA%AE%A5


Spreading tentacles It is vital to underscore al-Qaeda’s focus on a number of states and regions that accumulate common geopolitical features: access to the sea; racial and religious strife; strive for natural resources. From Maghreb to Middle East, and from Afghanistan to Yemen, al-Qaeda’s positioning is always in accordance with the previous features. Because, at the end of the day, al-Qaeda is nothing less than a well-developed and hierarchical organization, with concrete interests, goals and planning, aiming at increasing both influence and gains from a series of religious, political, and economic wars. Sources from the US intelligence services were constantly stressing out that the successor of bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, does not possess the same intellectual and strategic leverage as his predecessor did, but in practice what we discern is more of a strategic shift from al-Zawahiri rather than a retreat against the odds. A strategic shift that is more focused on intrusive and less complex attacks considering the scale of attacks of al-Qaeda. In this respect, the organization has developed strong ties with many jihadist affiliates across Africa and Southeastern Asia by engulfing dynamic parts of youth, well-educated and with experience in crisis management in the business world, a fact that turns al-Qaeda more adaptable to modern politics and more appealing to the masses. Furthermore, the lowering of fanaticism in the ranks of leaders is also an essential feature that the organization has developed in order to be more professional and efficient. The atrocities on Nairobi’s Westgate shopping mall with the hostage crisis and the death of tens of people cannot be considered as a single event, but it has to be encompassed in a wider chain of violence and terrorism that al-Qaeda is exerting through the development of its affiliates in Africa, Southeastern Asia and Middle East. Through that prism, al-Qaeda is said to be a very resilient and adaptable organization that can efficiently deploy its scopes on field around the globe.

Ambassador Bola Dada Whatever the strategy they made that time, there is a link to what is happening now. When Sudan came under pressure during the US Bill Clinton era, they sent Bin Laden away. Osama Bin Laden had established himself there. In fact, one of his wives was the daughter of the Speaker. So when Sudan was under pressure to send Osama Bin Laden away, he decided to divide his Al-Qaeda army into three; he took the first team to Afghanistan and kept the second team in Sudan; the third group he sent out to be disturbing the whole world, including Magreb which is close to Mali, Chad and Niger. I raised an alarm in 2001 that Al-Qaeda was in Nigeria – that Al-Qaeda had penetrated Nigeria through Chad. Then when I got wind of the distribution of Osama Bin Laden Al-Qaeda groups, I reported. I told them to check our borders between Mali, Niger, and Chad – that Al-Qaeda was on the move. They call it Afikaya, a doctrine that all African states must be governed by Muslims. . I got wind of it in one document. I read it with my eyes that all African countries must be governed by Muslims and any country that is mistakenly being ruled by a Christian, they should make life difficult for him. They said it’s the injunction of the Quran. I read it.

Etc, etc Cees

See also my Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2014 Part 19-50-Caliphate-Ideology
