Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2017 Part 7-4-India-17- Cold Start

CdW Intelligence to Rent; Strategic Intelligence Adviser [email protected]

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2017 Part 7-4-India-17- Cold Start

“We invite the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent to join this fight.”

The textbook says two nuclear states cannot afford a war, but there is always uncertainty.”Recent remarks by India’s new army chief General Bipin Rawat have raised questions if the country has revived its controversial ‘Cold Start’ doctrine for any future standoff with Pakistan we have a well-defined strategy. What the PM said is right; wars will be intense and short because there’ll always be international pressure in wars between two nations. We have to be aware of that; whatever action we take, therefore, has to be quick; forces have to be ready and have to achieve success.” The Indian Army is set to deploy over 460 new T-90SM main battle tanks (MBTs) along India’s border with Pakistan,

This doctrine, which as The Diplomat reported has never been officially

acknowledged until recently, calls for swift and decisive conventional offensive operations into Pakistani territory before the international community can intercede, and before Pakistan would feel compelled to launch tactical nuclear retaliatory strikes in the event of an invasion.

The presence of al-Qaeda, Taliban elements, including the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Daesh, indigenous sectarian groups, and other terrorist organisations, pose a danger to US citizens in the region. While US is yet to hold Pakistan totally responsible for cross border terrorism targeting India, the Sino-Pak axis, already elevated to the level of a military alliance, is encouraging Pakistan to sustain and harbour terrorists wanted in legal cases in India. Today, the prime external threats to India’s national security are the cross border terrorism emanating from Pakistan and the anti-India bearings of Sino-Pak axis.- D.C. Pathak is a former Director, Intelligence Bureau (2016)

“Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win”― Sun Tzu, The Art of War

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NEW DELHI: Recent remarks by India’s new army chief General Bipin Rawat have raised questions if the country has revived its controversial ‘Cold Start’ doctrine for any future standoff with Pakistan, leading analysts wrote in The Hindu on Thursday.Gen Rawat had told India Today last week that the doctrine — instituted after a terrorist attack on Indian parliament in December 2001 — still existed. “The Cold Start doctrine exists for conventional military operations. Whether we have to conduct conventional operations for such strikes is a decision well-thought through, involving the government and the Cabinet Committee on Security,” he said in the interview.Prime Minister Narendra Modi had, in the combined commanders’ conference in 2015, said that future conflicts would become shorter, and wars would become rare. Did Gen Rawat have any strategy for short, intense wars? “In our case, we prepare for short, intense conflicts, and at the same time have to be prepared for wars becoming long-drawn. Based on that, we have a well-defined strategy. What the PM said is right; wars will be intense and short because there’ll always be international pressure in wars between two nations. We have to be aware of that; whatever action we take, therefore, has to be quick; forces have to be ready and have to achieve success.”In their analysis, Walter C. Ladwig III, lecturer in international relations at the Department of War Studies, King’s College, London, and Vipin Narang, an associate professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said the reference to ‘Cold Start’ raised vital questions. What did Gen Rawat mean by the phrase and was he “authorised to speak on the matter by the government?”Many defence analysts presumed the army had abandoned this limited war concept altogether, or narrowly focussed on streamlining mobilisation while still maintaining the fundamental Strike Corps organisation and doctrinal concept, the analysts said.“Either Gen Rawat has dispensed with 15 years of semantic gymnastics and simply referred to these “proactive strategy options” by their more common nomenclature, Cold Start, or, the Indian Army has been quietly reorganising its limited war concept along more aggressive, and offensive, lines with little fanfare.”The Hindu’s analysis said the government should clarify Gen Rawat’s statements. “Ambiguity surrounding Cold Start, which incurred real diplomatic and security costs for India without delivering deterrence benefits, did not advance the country’s interests when it was first announced, and such uncertainty is unhelpful today.”

Published in Dawn, January 13th, 2017

Cold Start: India to Deploy Massive Tank Army Along Border With PakistanThe Indian Army plans to deploy almost 500 main battle tanks along the India-Pakistan border.

By Franz-Stefan Gady January 20, 2017The Indian Army is set to deploy over 460 new T-90SM main battle tanks (MBTs) along India’s border with Pakistan, senior Indian defense officials told IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly on January 19.The new T-90SM MBT (other designations T-90AM or T-90MS) is the latest and most modern version of the T-90 (which in turn is a modernized variant of the T-72 MBT), and has specifically been designed for export by Russia.According to IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, the newly ordered MBTs will supplement 850-





900 license-built T-90S Bhishma tanks, divided into 18 regiments, and currently deployed in the Indian states of Rajasthan and Punjab. It is unclear how many T-90S and T-90SM in total are currently in service with the Indian Army. (Estimates vary from 800 to 1,200 MBTs in various stages of operational readiness.)The new MBTs will be equipped with new thermal imagining sights and will be divided up into ten new regiments.India has been mulling the purchase of 464 T-90SM MBTs for the past year. According to an Indian media report from November 2016, the contract “will include a Make-in-India element for integration at the Heavy Vehicles Factory in Avadi near Chennai.” However, the purchase has not yet been cleared by the Defense Acquisition Council, headed by Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar.The Indian Army already maintains a sizeable tank force along the India-Pakistan border. However, the recent news that New Delhi intends to modernize its tanks formations along the border could indicate that India continues to methodically implement its so-called Cold Start Doctrine of limited conventional war with Pakistan.This doctrine, which as The Diplomat reported has never been officially acknowledged until recently, calls for swift and decisive conventional offensive operations into Pakistani territory before the international community can intercede, and before Pakistan would feel compelled to launch tactical nuclear retaliatory strikes in the event of an invasion.Tanks play a pivotal role in Cold Start as they are the key offensive assets to launch limited but rapid armored thrusts into Pakistani territory supported by mechanized infantry formations and air power within 48-72 hours at the outset of a military confrontation with Islamabad.A number of military maneuvers over the past decade has shown that the Indian Army’s reliance on its so-called three Strike Corps (each consisting of two armored and one infantry division with approximately 450 MBTs per corps) to conduct Cold Start offensives took away the surprise element–the key ingredient in such Blitzkrieg-style operations–given that they were slow to mobilize and stationed too far in the interior of India.As a result, the Indian Army decided to implement structural and organizational changes.

First, it decided to prop up its defensive corps (so-called Pivot Corps) stationed along the border with Pakistan with new offensive elements: division-sized integrated battle groups (IBG) consisting of artillery, armor, and aviation elements capable of limited offensive operations.

Second, the Indian Army also decided to disaggregate the three strike corps into division-sized IBGs and station them closer to the border. These IBGs, equipped with artillery, armored personnel carriers, MBTs, and infantry fighting vehicles, would be capable of launching limited strikes (50-80 kilometers deep) into enemy territory supported by air power.

To date, these changes have only partially been implemented due to a number of reasons including logistical problems and shortages of key equipment (e.g., self-propelled artillery). It is likely that the newly ordered T-90SM MBTs will be used for the IBGs. However, the MBTs alone will not suffice to put the Cold Start Doctrine from what up till now primarily appears to be a concept into actual reality.

A Slip of the Tongue on India's Once-Hyped 'Cold Start' Doctrine?Is this India finally acknowledging Cold Start as sanctioned and ready for use, or something else altogether?





By Ankit Panda January 07, 2017 India’s new chief of army staff, General Bipin Rawat, spoke to India Today this week. The interview offers interesting insight into the man in charge of leading India’s armed forces as tensions remain uneasy along the Line of Control in Kashmir. Notably, Rawat, in the interview, acknowledges the “Cold Start doctrine” — a formally unofficial and politically unsanctioned doctrine of limited war developed by the Indian army in the mid-2000s to allow for conventional action against Pakistan without risking nuclear retaliation.Rawat specifically says that the “Cold Start doctrine exists for conventional military operations.” That statement in itself makes him the first actively serving Indian official — military or civilian — to acknowledge the existence of the doctrine, vindicating Pakistani concern about Indian plans to use rapid-mobilization limited war operations in a future conflict with Pakistan.It’s unclear, though, that Rawat’s remark is meant as an acknowledgement that Cold Start stands today as both official and politically sanctioned. For instance, the doctrine is first mentioned by the interviewer in the question, leading the Indian general to simply repeat it in his answer. Further, the caveat that the doctrine “exists for conventional military operations” is odd phrasing and would be somewhat tautological in this context. Rawat may have simply repeated the interviewer’s reference to Cold Start to emphasize that certain aspects of the concept still applied to Indian conventional planning, but that the mid-2000s conception may not necessarily apply today.

Either way, Rawat’s remarks will be read with interest in Pakistan. Readers of The Diplomat may recall my discussion in late-2015 of comments by Pakistani Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry outlining the conditions under which Pakistan would move to use its low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons (also known as tactical nuclear weapons). Chaudhry at the time outlined what many analysts had long known: Pakistan’s low-yield weapons were meant to lower the threshold for nuclear escalation to counter the perceived logic of “Cold Start.”As of now, Rawat’s off-the-cuff remark on Cold Start hasn’t picked up much attention in the Pakistani press. If it did, the reactions are predictable: a vindication of Indian intent and of Pakistan’s pursuit of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons, which has otherwise received sharp criticism from abroad.The Indian Army announced Cold Start as a concept in the spring of 2004, with the primary goal being to allow for Indian conventional strikes against Pakistan under the threshold of nuclear escalation (PDF). The concept sought to revise India’s sluggish mobilization times to enable smaller, more agile units to swiftly thrust into Pakistan-controlled territory and gain control.Part of the reason the concept failed to acquire sanction from the civilian leadership was its perceived incompatibility with intervention from the political leadership once an offensive was underway. In a matter of years, interest in the concept had faded among India’s civilian leaders; a 2010 U.S. assessment based on a leaked diplomatic cable described Cold Start as a “mixture of myth and reality.”

Rawat’s remarks may prove compatible with that view of Cold Start and its salience today in Indian planning. His comments suggest that some of the animating factors behind the concept — such as the quick mobilization of small units — persist to this day in Indian planning for a cross-border war, but others — such as the intent to seize swathes of territory with swift land movements — might not, especially given Pakistan’s development of tactical nuclear weapons.





India Orders 83 New Fighter Jets, 15 Helicopter Gunships, and 464 Tanks India’s defense ministry also signed off on the purchase of 598 mini drones for the Indian Army.By Franz-Stefan Gady November 09, 2016The Indian government this week has cleared the purchase of made-in-India military hardware including new military aircraft, unnamed aerial vehicles and tanks under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s so-called Make in India initiative, according to local media reports.The Indian Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) Defense Acquisition Council (DAC), headed by Indian Minister of Defense Manohar Parrikar, signed off on the procurement of 83 Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), 15 Light Combat Helicopters (LCH), 464 T-90 M Bhishma main battle tanks (MBT), and 598 unmanned aerial vehicles, on November 7.No contracts have been signed to date. The Indian Air Force (IAF) plans to induct a total of 120 Tejas LCA, a supersonic, single-seat, single-engine multi-role light fighter aircraft. As I reported elsewhere, the first twenty fighter jets are expected to enter service by 2018. In July, the IAF stood up its first Tejas LCA squadron, the Flying Tigers 45 LCA squadron, composed of two combat aircraft in Bengaluru. The LCA was specifically designed to replace the IAF’s aging fleet of MiG-21 and MiG-23 aircraft and has been under development by Aeronautical Development Agency in cooperation with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) since the 1980s.India’s LCH is another military aircraft currently under development by HAL. The armored attack helicopter has been specifically designed for high altitude operations and high altitude warfare, similar to combat operations during the 1999 Kargil War. Four LCH prototypes are currently undergoing weapons integration. The Indian Army’s Army Aviation Corps (AAC) has plans to purchase 114 helicopters, whereas the IAF plans to 65. As I reported previously, HAL has already kicked off serial production of the LCH, although no contract has been concluded so far.The T-90 M Bhishma is a licence-produced variant of the Russian T-90 MBT (in turn an upgraded variant of the older T-72 model). The Indian Army also operates an older T-90 export variant, the T-90S. India is operating 800-1,200 license-built T-90S Bhishma and T-90M MBTs divided up into about 13 tank regiments, depending on what sources are consulted. A May 2015 estimate by The Diplomat put the number closer to 500. India plans to field over 2,000 T-90 variants by 2020. The T-90 MBT will be manufactured by the state-owned Ordnance Factory Board and in the past been assembled at the Heavy Vehicle Factory (HVF), Avadi, in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu.It was not revealed what type of mini drone the Indian Army will procure.

Total acquisition cost will be roughly $10 billion, with $7.5 billion allocated for the Tejas LCA, $2.02 billion for the T-90s MBTs, and $436 million for the LCH. The cost for the mini UAVs was not publicized.

Pakistan vows nuclear retaliation if India attacks21 Jan 2017 Threat follows confirmation of Delhi’s military assault plans in times of crisis.

Pakistani officials have threatened to use nuclear weapons should India invade, after India’s new army chief admitted to secret military plans for attacking its neighbour in the event of a crisis. Sample the FT’s top stories for a week You select the topic, we deliver the news. Select topic Enter email addressInvalid email Sign up By signing up you confirm that you have read and agree to the terms and conditions, cookie policy and





privacy policy. Three officials in Islamabad told the Financial Times that Pakistan would take all necessary measures to defend itself should India ever put into action long-rumoured “cold-start” plans to attack Pakistani territory following an event such as a major terrorist incident.

“If ever our national security is threatened by advancing foreign forces, Pakistan will use all of its weapons — and I mean all of our weapons — to defend our country,” one of the officials said. The comments come two weeks after Bipin Rawat, the newly appointed head of the Indian army, acknowledged the existence of “cold start”. The cold-start strategy is designed to enable an instant response to crises including attacks by militants launched from Pakistani soil, and would mean Indian troops entering Pakistan and occupying positions along the border before Islamabad could prepare or the international community could intervene.

Related article India and Pakistan’s dangerous war of words The arms build-up in the region has raised the nuclear stakes According to a 2010 diplomatic cable from the then US ambassador in New Delhi released by WikiLeaks, the plan is designed to enable a rapid response to a crisis without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state — or triggering a nuclear response.

Tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbours have remained high since last September’s attack on the Indian army base at Uri in Kashmir, which killed 19 soldiers. India responded with what it called “surgical strikes” across the de facto border with Pakistan. Since then there have been more minor assaults. India’s National Investigation Agency on Thursday said the militant Islamist group Lashkar-e-Taiba was to blame for the Uri attack. This month, meanwhile, Pakistan carried out its first test of a nuclear-capable missile from a submarine. The Uri attack has refocused Indian attention on how it responds to terror attacks that it believes originate from Pakistan, such as those in Mumbai in 2008 and at the Indian parliament in 2001.

Read more Pakistan fires its first submarine-based nuclear cruise missile Move escalates tensions as Islamabad seeks to keep up with India While India has never before acknowledged the cold-start retaliation doctrine, Pakistan has used rumours of its existence to justify keeping its defences high on the Indian border, even as its foreign partners have urged it to redeploy troops to fight Islamists elsewhere. “It is understandable in the wake of the surgical strikes that the Modi government would want to signal to Pakistan that all options are on the table in the event of another terror attack within India,” said Walter Ladwig, a lecturer in international relations at King’s College London. “However, reviving cold start — if that is what has happened — certainly escalates the rhetoric, and may raise unrealistic expectations domestically about India’s ability to respond to a new terror attack.” Mahmud Durrani, a former national security adviser to the Pakistani prime minister, said: “Pakistan already fears a rapid build-up of India’s conventional weapons. The danger is that with such warnings [of cold start], the escalatory ladder of going from conventional weapons to nuclear weapons for Pakistan will be shortened.” Western diplomats in Islamabad, however, doubt whether India would use the cold-start plan. “Right now, its more psychological,” said one. “But that’s not to say that we shouldn’t worry about this situation. India and Pakistan both have nuclear weapons. The textbook says two nuclear states cannot afford a war, but there is always uncertainty.”

Regards Cees***

Is a Pakistan-India war just one terrorist attack away?Toby Dalton | George Perkovich (20 Jan 2017)





We arrived in New Delhi on September 26, 2016 — a week after the Uri attack had left at least 17 Indian soldiers dead. India attributed the attack to Pakistan-based militants who had crossed into Kashmir. The political class and media were in an uproar, demanding retribution. We were there to launch our new book, Not War, Not Peace?. Its purpose is precisely to analyse Indian options to motivate Pakistan for preventing such cross-border terrorism.One of us braved the Indian-television scene and appeared on several news and discussion shows with various Indian counterparts to discuss what India could – or should – do to respond to this latest attack. The discussions on these shows were desultory and loud. The question for most participants was not whether to carry out a military reprisal, but rather how hard to strike. Some went so far as to say India should not shy away from the threat of nuclear war in mounting military operations against Pakistan. When we presented the book’s analysis to a group of eminent generals and ambassadors – serving and retired – they also, generally, insisted that India must strike back to demonstrate resolve.On the afternoon of September 29, India’s director general for military operations, Lieutenant General Ranbir Singh, announced that the Indian army had carried out “surgical strikes” on “terrorist launch pads” on Pakistan’s side of the Line of Control (LoC). The official announcement was thin on details: nothing about the units involved, how far they had crossed into the other side, how many “launch pads” had been attacked or how many terrorists were killed. Operational details were later supplied by Indian media sources, but much of this coverage stretched credulity.It is most likely that Indian and Pakistani leaders will continue with the same policies and tactics.Details aside, the Indian operations were acclaimed as a tactical success. And they certainly were a public relations victory for the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration. Triumphal adulation poured in from across the political spectrum, especially from the right, praising the brave actions of the army commandos and the decisive leadership of the government (captured by the hashtag #ModiPunishesPak on Twitter).The Congress party’s vice president, Rahul Gandhi, gave Modi his “full support and that of the Congress party” and declared that “the entire nation is standing by him.” Ram Madhav, general secretary of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), threatened: “For one tooth, the complete jaw.” And prominent television talk-show host, Arnab Goswami, taunted on Twitter: “Dear terrorists, you don’t need to cross LoC for getting killed [sic]. Army has started home delivery … ”After having absorbed terrorism from Pakistan for years with no discernable military reaction, India’s “surgical strikes” seemed to produce a national catharsis. They were hailed as the end to the policy of strategic restraint that had informed India’s response to prior attacks, which had come to be seen as a sign of weakness rather than wise leadership. Some scholars argued that the strikes had redrawn deterrence redlines and that India had proven Pakistan’s nuclear threats to be empty.

In Pakistan, the reaction was the polar opposite. “What surgical strikes?” asked government officials, military spokesmen and media commentators alike. India had done nothing more than routine shelling, they suggested, causing minimal damage. In any case, the Uri attack was a false flag operation, orchestrated by India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), as a way of justifying Indian “retaliation” and the public relations triumph that would follow.Whether Pakistan’s response reflected reality (that the Indian operation killed few if any





soldiers and militants), or was a semantic dodge (that the Indian actions were not technically “surgical strikes”), Pakistan’s relative nonchalance avoided an immediate escalation of conflict.The ensuing weeks saw a significant increase in violence. Shelling and other actions along the LoC since then have claimed the lives of at least 115 soldiers by our count from news reports. Civilians on both sides have also been deliberately targeted and killed. An attack on another Indian army base at Nagrota resulted in the deaths of seven Indian soldiers. The cross-border ceasefire – often broken since it was agreed upon in 2003 – may now be truly dead and buried. But, as yet, no major escalation beyond these “normal” hostilities has occurred.

India is on a major military spending spree — procuring advanced air, land and naval weapons platforms.The lack of escalation is certainly good news. Still, the situation remains precarious. Whether or not the Pakistani security establishment can completely control all actors who have the determination and capability to conduct attacks in Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian heartland, there is sufficient evidence for Indian (and international) officials to conclude that Pakistan still has not done all it can to curtail infiltrations and attacks against India.If a new attack occurs and inflicts major casualties in India, especially among civilians in the heartland, the kudos the Modi government won at home for the response to Uri will compel it to act more forcefully. Pakistani military and civilian leaders, fearful of each other and of militant political forces, cannot let a substantial Indian military operation against targets on Pakistani soil go unanswered.In this context, the lack of any apparent strategy and political determination (in both India and Pakistan) to change the current dynamic and establish a peacemaking process is dangerous. Can serious people in either country believe this situation is sustainable over a long-term period, that violence can continue to be managed?

Reactions to Not War, Not Peace? illustrate the problem. The book analyses whether India’s army-based reprisal with armoured incursions into Pakistan – limited precision air strikes, covert operations, changes in nuclear doctrine or non-violent means of compelling Pakistan – would be likely to motivate the other side to prevent further cross-border terrorism — and with what risks of escalation? Each of these options has been debated in India. The book makes no recommendations, but rather seeks to assess the logic and capabilities India would need in each case, and to explore the potential implications if India actually undertook any of the actions mentioned above.As it turned out, India’s “surgical strikes” were less extensive than any of the military options we had considered in the book. But the attack on the army base at Uri was also less provocative than a major terrorist attack on civilian targets that we had postulated about.Before the Uri attack, early Indian reviews of the book praised it for, among other things, being “remarkably devoid of judgment,” and providing “sustained analysis [that] is rare in Indian strategic discussions.” But, after Uri, we were accused of a myriad sins, including “trying to scare and deter India from taking any action against Pakistan” and justifying Pakistan’s “terrorism-based strategy”.

The cheerleading in India surrounding the “surgical strikes” has not given way to more sober analysis of long-term strategy.





Readers in Pakistan called us, among other colourful characterisations, “Indian lobbyists in Washington spewing disinformation and hatred against Pakistan,” and alleged that we had crafted “a devil’s cookbook”, with recipes for how India can coerce Pakistan. Based on the analysis presented in Not War, Not Peace? and related articles, some American colleagues accused us of soft-peddling on Pakistan, with one suggesting we did so in order to get visas to travel there.If it is difficult for some in South Asia (and in the United States) to seriously engage with the kind of dispassionate analysis we present in Not War, Not Peace?, then it is no surprise that the political and media classes in both societies, with some notable exceptions, are unwilling to stick their necks out to urge both governments to change course and pursue mutual accommodation. We recognise that, as Americans, we provoke special responses. We must be either pro-Pakistan/anti-India (in India), or pro-India/anti-Pakistan (in Pakistan). Or we are seen as agents of the American government, advocating a policy intended to weaken one state or the other.But when the messenger – whether American, Pakistani, Indian or other – becomes the focus of debate, rather than the merits or demerits of the message, it is difficult for anyone to develop and promote analyses and ideas that can challenge prevailing narratives and divert actors from a dangerous course. (We are painfully aware that this phenomenon has now bedevilled American discourse and politics too, endangering not only our governance, but also the interests of people around the world who are affected by what American leaders say and do.)

At the risk of inviting further charges of bias for attempting balanced analysis, we are concerned that the continued violence across the LoC, the lack of progress in redressing the suffering and the interests of Kashmiri Muslims and the absence of sustained serious diplomacy between India and Pakistan, leave the two countries one high-casualty terrorist attack away from war.We are not naïve. It is most likely that Indian and Pakistani leaders will continue with the same policies and tactics, seeking to score points internationally, letting the militaries punish each other around the LoC and using covert or sub-conventional means to destabilise the other side and sow violence where possible.The cheerleading in India surrounding the “surgical strikes” has not given way to more sober analysis of long-term strategy, let alone the kind of statesmanship that could lead both states away from violence. In Pakistan, the smooth transition to new leadership in the army is a welcome sign. But the continued political and civil-military gamesmanship has drowned out the few voices raising alarms about the absence of an alternative national security vision for the country.

Informed Pakistanis and Indians are already aware of what needs to be done to deal with the Kashmir problem and its relationship to terrorism emanating from Pakistan.All of this suggests a depressing, unstable equilibrium in India-Pakistan affairs. The equilibrium is based on strategic circumstances that do not allow either country to exploit the weaknesses of the other in ways that would bring about some fundamental change. Pakistan’s continued use or tolerance of terrorist proxies, its growing stockpile of nuclear weapons and its campaign to highlight Indian human rights abuses in Kashmir will not force India to negotiate the future of the Kashmir valley. And India’s recent diplomatic efforts to isolate Pakistan as an exporter of terrorism –and threats of military reprisal to future attacks – will be insufficient to compel fundamental change in Pakistan’s behaviour





toward India, absent progress in and on Kashmir.During and after our September visit to Delhi, several Indians with long, high-level governmental experience seemed resigned that this dynamic will not change. As Shivshankar Menon, the cerebral former national security adviser put it, “we may need to adopt the Israeli approach of ‘mowing the grass,’ recognise that you can’t change Pakistan’s behaviour and stop the terrorist grass from growing — you will just need to keep mowing it with reprisals and diplomatic pressure.”But, as Menon acknowledged, this is not a permanent solution. Nor is it a stable situation. Israelis do not feel particularly secure for all the lawn mowing. They have no prospect of normal relations with the Palestinians living within and adjacent to Israeli territory. And in India’s case, unlike Israel’s, the fields to be mowed may contain nuclear landmines, as well as improvised-explosive devices. Stability, on the other hand, will require serious, analytically sound and politically courageous efforts to address five thorny challenges cooperatively: Kashmir, Pakistan’s control of terrorist groups (or lack thereof), Afghanistan, the advancement of military technology and divergent perceptions about escalation.

Informed Pakistanis and Indians are already aware of what needs to be done to deal with the Kashmir problem and its relationship to terrorism emanating from Pakistan. It is fashionable in dominant discourse in both countries and elsewhere to deny the linkage between these issues as some false equivalence. Yet, privately, current and former officials in both countries acknowledge the linkages and the necessity of diplomacy.Stability is unlikely to result from negotiations themselves. Rather, it would derive from both sides demonstrating an understanding of the interests of the other and signalling the willingness to establish conditions for sustained diplomacy to succeed. For instance, Pakistan will need to be prepared to not only discuss terrorism, but also to facilitate intelligence sharing, which demonstrates a commitment to preventing attacks in India. By the same token, the Indian government will have to exhibit – as the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government appeared to do in the early 2000s – an interest in a serious political dialogue in Jammu and Kashmir.So, too, regarding Afghanistan. The governments of Pakistan, India and Afghanistan know that stabilisation cannot occur without, at a minimum, greater cooperation in demobilising the militants who operate against Afghanistan and Pakistan on both sides of the border. But, perhaps, more important in the long-term is mutual reassurance between Pakistan and India that each country’s reasonable interests in Afghanistan will be respected and accommodated. The primary problem is the absence of political will in all three states to take steps to build each other’s confidence that their cooperation will be rewarded.

After having absorbed terrorism from Pakistan for years with no discernable military reaction, India’s “surgical strikes” seemed to produce a national catharsis.The Heart of Asia Conference in Amritsar this past December displayed how the three governments are far from being ready to solve problems. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani found it easy to join Modi in blasting Pakistan for its continued complicity with militants (Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed) that project violence into Afghanistan and India. Indeed, both leaders see that Pakistan is so back-footed by its association with terrorism that they feel no compulsion to let it save face.The Pakistani government’s publication of President-elect Donald Trump’s fawning (and uninformed) telephone conversation with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif further incensed the Indian government which then took revenge at Amritsar by physically preventing the





prime minister’s foreign affairs adviser, Sartaj Aziz, from addressing the press. Afghanistan may fall into further violent disorder but the greatest concern of the powers that be in Rawalpindi and New Delhi is to keep each other from appearing to gain any advantage.If the stakes in Afghanistan are well known, there is less awareness of the challenges posed by new military technologies and their potential use by India and Pakistan if violence widens from the LoC in Kashmir. India is on a major military spending spree — procuring advanced air, land and naval weapons platforms. Over time, these new capabilities should enable India’s armed services to better combine forces to project military power with greater precision and lethality.

Some of these capabilities – cruise missiles and other air-to-ground missiles in particular – could permit India to carry out precise airstrikes against targets in Pakistan from rather long distances, avoiding the risk of sending commandos or other forces into hostile territory. Indian strategists may calculate that using such capabilities, especially against terrorist targets, will achieve retaliation aims without provoking escalation. The temptation is obvious.But the potential consequences of using new kinds of military capability raise hard questions. Indian leaders may order a missile strike, for instance, believing it will have a very tailored impact but the damages or casualties could be far larger than predicted or the army in Pakistan could decide for institutional reasons that a reply was needed to restore deterrence.Or India could utilise such a capability with the intention of having a shocking, even strategic effect (say, a strike against a target in Punjab) but if the strike does not produce the desired response in Pakistan, what then? Would India have to double down with greater force? The point is not to overpredict the possibility of escalation following any given action but to highlight that the combination of new lethal technologies and increased propensity to use them for punitive operations creates greater uncertainty about managing conflict.

To achieve their fundamental long-term interests, there is no plausible alternative for the two countries except direct talks and negotiations.Here arises the challenge of reading signals amidst divergent perceptions about escalation.Government officials tend to believe that the signals they send are received and interpreted correctly. Yet, most scholarship on this subject finds precisely the opposite: the recipient of signals interprets them very differently than the sender expects. Pakistani officials and politicians have so regularly “played the nuclear card” that the signalling value of such statements has diminished in India. And India’s hype around its “pro-active strategy” is both discounted as bluster and used to justify the development of tactical nuclear weapons in Pakistan. Deterrence requires communication of a credible willingness to use force but when both sides discount the signals as well as the credibility of threats, there is plenty of room for error.Finally, there is the question of Pakistan’s capacity to control the groups that conduct attacks on India. India’s apparent lack of worry over the current level of violence and absence of a peace process could be understandable if New Delhi believed that Pakistani leaders firmly control all of the groups that could conduct strikes in India. Indian leaders then could believe that their military power and the increasing international dissatisfaction with Pakistan will compel Pakistani leaders to prevent militants from conducting major attacks on India.





This “optimistic” scenario still leaves open the prospect of unending low-intensity exchanges like those that have been going on near the LoC for months. But, what if the Pakistani establishment cannot effectively prevent future major attacks? Then India must rely on its own defences and, perhaps, luck. Either way, if a new high-casualty terrorist attack occurs in India, especially in the heartland, a Modi government will be pressed to retaliate more dramatically than before. This, in turn, will put enormous pressure on Rawalpindi to escalate in kind. Our analysis in Not War, Not Peace? raises many doubts about whether and how either state could “win” such a war, and no reviewer has challenged this analysis.Indian and Pakistani leaders may continue to be lucky but, as all gamblers know, luck can depart without warning. Continuing to rely on luck to prevent escalation, rather than seeking to stabilise the existing equilibrium and to pursue actual means and structures to guide relations, is a strategic risk for both states.To achieve their fundamental long-term interests, there is no plausible alternative for the two countries except direct talks and negotiations. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc) process may provide some thin political cover but the talks will not go anywhere if leaders in India and Pakistan are so unresolved or weak that they feel the need for such cover. Nor can China, any more than the US, compel or cajole either India or Pakistan to make the hard compromises necessary for mutual accommodation.China wants stability in South Asia. It will quietly press Pakistan to curtail terrorism and is unlikely to participate in military adventurism against India. But Beijing will also not reward Indian bullying by pressing Pakistan to give in on Kashmir. Meanwhile, the American policy under the incoming Trump administration is likely to depart from past conventions but in unpredictable directions. One day the administration may offer to negotiate Kashmir but the next, it could join efforts to isolate Pakistan internationally.

Pakistan will need to be prepared to not only discuss terrorism, but also to facilitate intelligence sharing, which demonstrates a commitment to preventing attacks in India.No one will do the hard work for Pakistani and Indian leaders. They must decide if and when their people deserve more than reliance on luck and business-as-usual to avoid a devastating war. When they do decide to seek stability and the prospect of peace, they will probably organise (or reorganise) a secret dialogue between national security advisers and/or emissaries known to represent the centres of power in each country. They will be wise to exchange commitments not to be the first to break off talks if a new crisis erupts. As long as diplomacy stalls, every time there is an attack or insult, the opponents of peace will provoke and prevail.Again, all of this is rather well known at the top of the two governments and civil societies. Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, the highly experienced former Pakistani diplomat, wrote recently in daily Dawn that “for Pakistan to be simultaneously locked in a zero-sum relationship with two of its most immediate neighbours [India and Afghanistan] is pure folly. Pakistan can never be stable in such a situation.” Qazi continued, “Pakistan must address India’s core concerns and move towards a principled compromise settlement acceptable to the Kashmiris.”In India, shortly after Modi came to power, an exceptionally experienced former defence official offered a complementary insight. “The bigger state has to be willing to give more,” he told us. “It’s counter-intuitive: if we are bigger, we can force them to give in and do what we want. But, the psychology of it is the opposite. The only way forward with Pakistan is that we have to be seen conceding more than we are getting. The reality is that we would be getting enormously more by normalising relations and ending their story of





conflict etc. We would gain greatly overall.”These voices matter and should be amplified. If they were listened to, some sense of a better future could be created. At the very least, it will spare readers in South Asia more analysis and advice from white guys from Washington.

This was originally published in Herald's January 2017 issue. The writers are experts on nonproliferation and nuclear energy. George Perkovich

is the vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace while Toby Dalton is co-director of the think-tank’s Nuclear Policy Program.

Separating noise from reality on the subcontinent can be especially difficult. Thus the latest rhetorical hostility between India and Pakistan could be just that — another spat

between nuclear-armed neighbours who hesitate to match words with weapons because of the dangers of mutual annihilation.

As a reminder, officials in Islamabad warned on Thursday 21 Jan 2017 that they would not hesitate to deploy the full range of their weapons should India invade. That salvo was a response to confirmation from India’s new army chief of the existence of “cold-start”

plans. This was an explicit acknowledgment from Delhi of long-rumoured efforts to develop a swift cross-border response that would pre-empt diplomatic intervention in the

event, for example, of a major terrorist incident like that in Mumbai in 2008.

Since the partition of British India in 1947 and creation of modern States of India and Pakistan, the two South Asian countries have been involved in four wars, including one

undeclared war, and many border skirmishes and military stand-offs




Documents

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2017 Part 7-4-India-17- Cold Start