AIR LAND SEA BULLETIN

Approved for public release; unlimited distribution.

Issue No. 2016-2 Summer 2016Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center

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ALSA Staff

Director Col Michael E. Kensick, USAF

Deputy Director COL David R. Applegate, USA

Bulletin EditorLTC John Walmsley, USA

EditorMs. Patricia Radcliffe, Civilian, USAF

Layout Artist/IllustratorMs. Laura Caswell, Civilian, USN

Publications OfficerMaj Darin Lupini, USAF

Purpose: The ALSA Center publishes the ALSB two times a year. ALSA is a multi-Service Department of Defense field agency sponsored by the US Army Train-ing and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), Navy War-fare Development Command (NWDC), and Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Educa-tion (LeMay Center). The ALSB is a vehicle to “spread the word” on recent developments in warfighting con-cepts, issues, and Service interoperability. The intent is to provide a cross-Service flow of information among readers around the globe. This periodical is governed by Army Regulation 25-30.

Disclaimer: The ALSB is an open forum. The ar-ticles, letters, and opinions expressed or implied herein should not be construed as the official posi-tion of TRADOC, MCCDC, NWDC, the LeMay Center, or ALSA Center.

Submissions: Get published—ALSA solicits articles and readers’ comments. Contributions of less than 5,000 words or less are ideal. Submit contributions, double-spaced in MS Word. Include the author’s name, title, complete unit address, telephone number, and email address. Graphics can appear in an article, but a separate computer file for each graphic and photo-graph (photos must be 300 dpi) must be provided. Send email submissions to alsadirector@us.af.mil. The ALSA Center reserves the right to edit content to meet space limitations and conform to the ALSB style and format.

Reprints: The ALSA Center grants permission to re-print articles. Please credit the author and the ALSB. Local reproduction of the ALSB is authorized and en-couraged.

A United States (US) Army AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopters escort two CH-47 Chinook heli-copters carrying US Marines with Task Force Spartan, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), over Taji, Iraq, as they head to Kara Soar for their mission in support of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE on 17 March 2016. Operation INHERENT RESOLVE is an international U.S. led coalition military operation created as part of a comprehensive strategy to degrade and defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Photo by Cpl. Andre Dakis, USMC

CONTENTSDirector’s Comments...........................................................3

FEATURE ARTICLES

Consider Adaptive Networks to Foster Understanding Relationships in Complex Operational Environments.................................................4

Joint Equities in Aerial Lodgment...................................14

Joint Entry in the Urban Littorals: Freedom of Access Does Not Equal Freedom of Action................................20

Ignoring the Inevitable: Urban Close Air Support Problems................................25

Female Service Members Model Gender Integration among Partner Nations.....................................................30

IN HOUSE

Current ALSA MTTP Publications.................................34Future Air Land Sea Bulletins..........................................37ALSA Organization and Joint Working Groups............38ALSA Mission and Voting JASC Members....................39Online Access to ALSA Products....................................39

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The Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA) meets the needs of the warfighter by providing timely, relevant, and compelling doctrine.

ALSA welcomes CDR Shannon Moore, to the multi-Service team and says farewell to LTC Blake Keil, who will command 2-8 Field Artillery in Fort Wainwright, Alaska and Lt Col Brian Gross, who will attend the Eisenhower School for National Secu-rity and Resource Strategy at Fort Lesley J. McNair, Virginia. They have been fantastic teammates and will be missed. ALSA con-gratulates former staffer LTC Dana Smith and current staffers Ms. Laura Caswell and Ms. Patricia Radcliffe who won the 2015 Secretary of the Army Award for Improving Publications. Ms. Radcliffe won the Army Editor of the Year Award, also.

This Air Land Sea Bulletin (ALSB) is an open forum offering a great mix of les-sons learned, current statuses, and future considerations for warfighters. It contains a diversity of articles that provide thought-provoking viewpoints and showcase the in-genuity and flexibility of United States (US) Service men and women.

The first article is, “Consider Adaptive Networks to Foster Understanding Rela-tionships in Complex Operational Environ-ments”, by Mr. Bryan Sopko, Mr. Matt Os-man, Maj Danica Slater, Mr. David Miles, Mr. Chris Worrett, and Mr. Randy Munch. This article discusses the importance of un-derstanding the operational environment when making network engagement deci-sions.

The second article, “Joint Equities in Aerial Lodgment”, is by Lt Col Dan Magrud-er, the Director of Operations for the 22nd Special Tactics Squadron. The article sug-gests further consideration is needed to maximize the long-term effects of airpower projection.

The third article is, “Joint Entry in the Urban Littorals: Freedom of Access Does Not Equal Freedom of Action”, by Mr. Scott Packard, a former infantry officer, who is currently assisting the Marine Corps Tac-

tics and Operations Group with urban opera-tions Service doctrine and concept develop-ment. His article discusses the challenges an urban environment presents to entry opera-tions, with or without opposition, and argues that seabased forces present the best option.

The fourth article is “Ignoring the Inevi-table: Urban Close Air Support Problems”, by SMSgt Eric Muller, superintendent of the 274th Air support Operations Squadron and former course manager and superinten-dent for the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) qualification course. He calls for a re-newed emphasis on JTAC training in urban settings and increased efforts to fully capture lessons learned from the past 15 years of con-flict.

The final article is “Female Service Mem-bers Model Gender Integration among Partner Nations”, by MAJ Tiffany Collins of US Special Operations Command Central. She discusses the successes enjoyed by US special opera-tions by integrating women into special op-erations forces teams and developing female partner force engagement teams to work with several Middle Eastern partner-nation allies that are also expanding roles for women.

I invite you to seize opportunities to rep-resent your Service and share your ideas, not only by being published in future ALSBs, but also by participating in joint working groups. As we tackle the challenges ahead, your ideas matter now more than ever. Your unique per-spective can spark innovation in current and future tactics, techniques, and procedures.

To help shape the discussion and be part of the solution, go to www.alsa.mil and pro-vide inputs through the “Contact Us” link.

Thank you for reading.

MICHAEL E. KENSICK, Colonel, USAFDirector

DIRECTOR’S COMMENTS

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... network analy-sis is conducted to provide the staff with deeper understanding of the structure and function of the network, which is used to engage and target other networks.

CONSIDER ADAPTIVE NETWORKS TO FOSTER UNDER-STANDING RELATIONSHIPS IN COMPLEX

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTSBy Bryan Sopko; Matt Osman; Maj Danica Slater, USMCR; Randy Munch; Chris Worrett; and David Miles.

INTRODUCTION Analysis of the operational envi-ronment (OE) is necessary to support planning efforts, regardless of the type of operation being conducted.1 The staff must collect and analyze large amounts of information from a variety of sources to develop a comprehensive understanding of the OE to provide the commander situational awareness. Additionally, the staff must focus on key factors that are identified as criti-cal variables which relate directly to achieving the commander’s desired end state. Refined analysis of the OE, with a focus on human networks, sup-ports identifying critical variables that relate directly to a network’s ability to form, function, and sustain itself in the OE. The staff’s ability to gain a greater understanding of these critical vari-ables provides insight that supports developing engagement plans to affect selected networks.

The staff must conduct an in-depth analysis of the selected network to understand its structure and func-tions. This provides insights and op-tions on ways to identify the network’s critical variables. Analysis of the OE is a part of intelligence preparation of the operational environment and is expanded by the staff during the plan-ning process. Simultaneously, net-work analysis is conducted to provide the staff with deeper understanding of the structure and function of the network, which is used to engage and target other networks. By deliberately expanding the analysis of the OE as it relates, specifically, to networks that the commander may desire to support, influence or neutralize, a staff may be

able to determine the critical variables that exist within the OE that facilitate the network’s formation, growth, and sustainment. Including these critical variables as inputs to the targeting process, the potential exists to produce lasting effects on selected networks.

NETWORK FORMATION AND SUSTAINMENT Networks are a series of direct and indirect ties from an actor to a collection of others (nodes) and are formed when the ties between two or more nodes develop from some type of common purpose. A catalyst, receptive audience, and accommodating envi-ronment, depicted in figure 1, are three fundamental conditions that must be fulfilled for network formation and sustainment within an OE.2

A catalyst for a network may be related to a single variable or multiple variables that represent conditions within the OE. Depending on the net-work, there may be a variable within the OE that is critical for supporting the initial formation of the network. For example, a critical variable that might be identified as a catalyst for Al-Qaeda is the ideology of the Sunni Muslim religion.3 Since the inception of Al-Qa-eda, other networks have formed and aligned with Al-Qaeda and have done so with variations on the basic ideol-ogy. To engage networks effectively, staffs must dedicate significant analyt-ical effort to understanding them, in-cluding the related catalysts and why the message or narrative resonates with the audience.

A receptive audience that sup-ports the formation and sustainment of a network is directly associated with the catalyst for that network. Current and future members of the network have made, or will make, some type

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The potential for a network to exist within an environment is limitless, but the ability of members of the network to take action in support of the catalyst re-lies solely on the conditions within that environ-ment.

Network Formation and Sustainment ConditionsCatalyst: A variable within the operating environment that motivates or binds a group of individuals together to take some type of action to fulfil a collective need.

Receptive Audience: A group of individuals that feel they have more to gain by engag-ing in activities of the network than by not participating.

Accomodating Environment: Conditions within the operating environment that facili-tate the organization and actions of a network.

of decision to join the network based on whether their individual needs may be met by an emerging network versus what is provided for them from current conditions within the OE. In essence, the conditions and catalyst for a net-work serve to influence and motivate a portion of the meta-network to func-tion as a receptive audience.4 A meta-network is a composition of a group of networks which are connected and interrelated by common nodes. The members of the receptive audience will, essentially, weigh the opportuni-ties and risks of joining the network and then decide to join the network. For example, in the spring of 2003 an insurgent network formed in the city of Fallujah, Iraq. Sunni Muslims and for-mer Ba’ath Party members identified themselves as being disenfranchised and marginalized with the defeat of the Iraqi regime. Members of this re-ceptive audience related to the cata-lyst for the insurgent group that would be later identified as Al-Qaeda of Iraq (AQI), and were motivated to join this network to fulfill their needs.

Over time, the receptive audi-ence’s perception of AQI changed, due to a series of AQI atrocities against the population. In the fall of 2006, Unit-ed States (US) forces recognized this change and supported an alternative catalyst for members of this recep-tive audience, resulting in the forma-tion of a series of local defense forces which were sanctioned and often sup-ported by tribal elders. These networks of forces were able to slowly recapture the Al-Anbar province of Iraq from AQI, which is commonly referred to as the

“Al-Anbar Awakening”.5

An accommodating environ-ment exists when conditions within the OE facilitate the actions of a network.6

The potential for a network to exist within an environment is limitless, but the ability of members of the network to take action in support of the catalyst relies solely on the conditions within that environment. There are variables associated with identifying the level of accommodation that can be identified, measured and affected. Eliminating the conditions related to variables that support an accommodating environ-ment is unlikely. The complexity that exists within an environment, com-prised of a multitude of inter-related networks, is a composite of numerous variables. Vast resources are required to adequately alter OE conditions that impact the level of accommodation. Examination of the recent actions of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) within Iraq demonstrates the environ-ment was less accommodating to ISIS influence when coalition forces were present.7 As coalition forces departed Iraq, Iraqi forces did not possess the same capabilities and; thus, provided ISIS members with an accommodating environment for them to take action in support of their goals.

Removing or altering certain conditions will require the network to adapt to ensure survival. The actions networks take to adapt may pose ad-ditional risk; and, if understood, could provide opportunity for further en-gagement of the network. A compre-hensive understanding of the OE and

Figure 1. Network Formation and Sustainment Conditions

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Network Structure and Function ConsiderationsStructure

Nodes • Function with network• Links to other nodes• Level of influence within the

network• Pattern of life

Composition• Nodes: People, Places, Things• Resources: Money, Equip-

ment, etc.

Links• Type: Family, Societal, Cul

tural, etc.• Strength: Strong/Weak• Internal

Between nodes• External

Association to other net-works

Function

Capability• Adaptability• regeneration• Recruitment• Resource• Train• Conduct operations• Communication

Intent• Catalyst for formation• Objectives• Ideological goals• Likely COAs/TTPs

Influence• On other networks• By other networks

Figure 2. Network Structure and Function Considerations (from Marine Corps Interim Publication 3–40.1, 74)

... consideration of any network’s structure and function is nec-essary as part of the planning process.

a detailed analysis of the networks are required to identify the conditions that support the network’s formation and sustainment. Accomplishing these re-quires gaining an understanding of the conditions within the OE that must be attained through refined analysis of the mission variables and an in-depth network analysis. Identifying and un-derstanding these conditions will pro-vide key information to support devel-opment of an engagement plan for any type of network that a commander may desire to support, influence, or neu-tralize.

NETWORK STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION Understanding a network re-quires identifying characteristics that define the network’s structure and function. Network structure is the or-

ganization and relationship between the nodes of a network, whereas the network’s function is identified as ac-tivities or purposes of the network or one of its components. Regardless of the type of capability being employed to effect a network, consideration of any network’s structure and function is necessary as part of the planning process.

Network analysis is conducted using various techniques and can pro-vide the commander with a variety of information.8 The information should be organized in a manner that facili-tates understanding of how the net-work is structured and how it func-tions to support achieving goals as is demonstrated in figure 2.

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Common network analysis tech-niques (such as network mapping, link analysis and social network analysis (SNA)) provide data that help a user define the network structure and func-tion. Analysts apply multiple network analysis techniques that result in layered products for use by the com-mander and staff. These products are not static, but are continuously updat-ed (as new information is collected and analyzed) to provide timely and accu-rate situational understanding in sup-port of planning and targeting.

Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judg-ment to relevant information to deter-mine the relationships among the opera-tional and mission variables to facilitate decision-making. Building and main-taining situational understanding is es-sential for establishing the situation’s context, developing effective plans, as-sessing operations, and making qual-ity decisions throughout the operations process.

Army Doctrinal Publication 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012, Page 5 The characteristics associated with the structure and function of a network are focal points for additional exploration by US forces in support of engagement planning and targeting. Understanding structure and func-tion of the network enables the abil-ity to identify key nodes through ap-plying SNA and a variety of network analysis techniques. It is important to understand a network’s functions as they relate to critical OE variables. For example, a critical OE variable might be that an illegal drug network is gen-erating so much illicit economic activ-ity it is interfering with a host nation’s ability to further develop licit economic activity. A commander providing secu-rity force assistance to the host nation might determine the desired end state will include neutralizing the drug net-work to enable licit economic growth. To achieve this, it would be essential to significantly decrease the function-ality of the drug network. To maximize

network neutralization, analysts would need to understand critical network functions and key nodes related to those functions. Key nodes are those that possess certain characteristics by virtue of their position and intercon-nectivity with other nodes. These char-acteristics make key nodes targets for achieving desired effects when they are engaged in specific ways.

A common practice in target-ing networks is to identify the network nodes that are high in “betweenness centrality.” Betweenness centrality is determined when a node serves as a connection between small clusters (cliques or cells) or individual nodes and the larger network.9 In the ex-ample of the network prior to target-ing (figure 3), the node Bob, possesses the highest betweeness centrality. Al-though SNA techniques are used to identify this characteristic, SNA is not applied independently. SNA is used, optimally, with other network analy-sis techniques. For this example, the analyst has determined that targeting Bob, Andy, and Jim would provide the commander with the greatest ability to achieve the desired end-state, which is to maximize network fragmentation. These nodes are highest in between-ness centrality and, in essence, hold the network together by virtue of their positions and relationships.

NETWORK AFTER TARGETING To ensure SNA is conducted on a current understanding of the net-work, the SNA analyst should incor-porate as much data as possible and consult with analysts from as many in-telligence disciplines as are available. Once the commander decides to tar-get key nodes within the network, as a part of the continuous implementation of the collection plan, analysts possess the ability to update the understand-ing of the structure and function of the targeted network by producing updat-ed network analysis products. In figure 4, Bob, Andy, and Jim were removed from the network, but more important-ly, the section of the network that was

Understanding structure and function of the network en-ables the ability to identify key nodes through applying SNA and a variety of network analysis techniques.

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The structure and functions associ-ated with networks are codependent in nature ...

responsible for finance has been sepa-rated from the rest of the network and fragmented into smaller cells. Frag-menting a network may be desirable in situations where a section of the net-work is isolated for further targeting actions and can have an effect on the functionality of the network. In this ex-ample, for the network to maintain or return to a pretargeting capability lev-el, it will be required to regenerate and replace the functions provided by the nodes that were removed. Due to the complex adaptive nature of networks, targeting that results in some type of effect on the structure or function of a network will not produce significant long-term effects as long as conditions within the OE support the sustainment of that network.

The structure and functions as-sociated with networks are codepen-dent in nature, which also should be understood to maximize planning and engagement efforts. The structure of a network exists in its current state to support the facilitation of network ac-tions or the function of that network. Likewise, the desired or necessary func-tions of a network are supported by the overall structure of the network. These network attributes are interrelated and codependent. Engagement strategies for networks focus on the structural aspects of the network since the key nodes within a network are identifi-able using available network analysis techniques. The complex and adaptive nature of networks, coupled with an ability to fully understand a network,

Figure 3. Network Prior to Targeting. (The authors developed this diagram using *ORA, a dynamic meta-network assessment and analysis tool developed by Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems at Carnegie Mellon University. It contains hundreds of social net-work, dynamic network, and trail metrics; procedures for grouping nodes; identifying local patterns; and comparing and contrasting networks, groups, and individuals from a dynamic meta-network perspective.)

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requires decisions on collection plan-ning and engagement to be made with the best information available at the time. Engagement plans for a network, regardless of the type of network being engaged or the desired effect intended for the network, target key nodes that produce a first-order effect on the node (direct impact on the structure), which is intended to produce a second-order effect on the network’s structure or function.

Engaging networks to produce desired effects on the structure and function of the network is fundamen-tal to current targeting methods. The duration of the effects of operations on networks depends on a number of vari-ables, which includes the network’s ability to adapt. However, this manner of engagement effort will not eliminate the existence of a network. The known structure and function of a network are often only the visible components that

network analysis helps us to identify. Threat or illicit networks are motivated to protect their network from attack by hiding nodes, links (structure), and function. These are often referred to as dark networks.

IDENTIFYING CRITICAL VARI-ABLES FOR NETWORKS Critical variables are resources or conditions that are present within the OE that have a direct impact on the commander’s objectives and may af-fect the formation and sustainment of networks.10 During the planning pro-cess, the staff must focus on determin-ing critical variables associated with the commander’s operation.11 The rel-evance of identifying critical variables in relation to the commander’s mission directly relates to gaining an under-standing of conditions that will support the commander’s desired end state. However, networks exist within the en-

Figure 4. A Network After Targeting

During the plan-ning process, the staff must focus on determining critical variables associated with the commander’s operation.

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vironment (due to the conditions that are available to them) which include a catalyst, receptive audience, and ac-commodating environment. Analysis of the OE and output from analysis of the network should be conducted con-tinuously to identify the specific condi-tions that exist to sustain the network. These identifiable conditions are the critical variables for the network.

A logic tree may be used to help highlight a way to determine the criti-cal variables for a network. Using the outputs from evaluating the OE and the network under analysis, the first decision point is to identify the vari-ables of the OE that comprise the cata-lyst for the network.

The staff must determine if the mission variable is a catalyst for a network from current and future per-spectives. The purpose of challenging the staff to answer this question is to identify any of the variables existing within the OE associated with a cata-lyst for the network, regardless of cur-rent conditions. This effort also consid-ers variables that potentially reinforce the catalyst as the network adapts to operations being conducted. Too often,

the analysis centers focus on current operations. This “here and now” line of effort presents potential risk by limit-ing the focus of effort to a portion of the conditions and often does not consider monitoring and shaping the desired fu-ture OE conditions.

The complex, adaptive nature of networks and individuals tends toward survival. Ensuring a relevant catalyst exists for a network is fundamental for the network to sustain itself within the environment. For example, a unit suc-cessfully identifies a variable within the OE that is important in establish-ing a catalyst for a network. Through various lethal and nonlethal engage-ments and operations, the commander is successful in affecting this variable, resulting in a weakening or undermin-ing effect on the catalyst. The network will, instinctively, seek an alternative or substitute (associated with struc-ture or function) to reinforce the cata-lyst to continue existing. These substi-tutes are now critical variables for the network that will need to be leveraged or acquired by the network to contin-ue its existence. The ability to identify potential substitutes as parts of the

The complex, adaptive nature of networks and individuals tends toward survival.

Figure 5. Critical Variable Logic Tree. This version of a logic tree considers the structure, functions, and conditions for network sustainment to help identify critical variables.

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initial analysis provides a potential opportunity to limit the availability of these substitutes as parallel efforts of network engagement.

An example of a network seek-ing substitutes is the way Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s network of jihadists in Iraq did not affiliate themselves with al-Qaeda until the fall of 2004. Prior to this, Zarqawi built his network from a combination of Iraqis and foreign fight-ers who were motivated by the actions of the network. At the time, Osama bin Laden (al-Qaeda’s founder) sought to “own” the jihad movement in Iraq. This was not initially embraced by Zarqawi. Critical resources were needed by Zar-qawi to continue his jihad effort, which had been constrained by coalition ef-forts. His decision to associate with bin Laden and al-Qaeda resulted in the formation of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and subsequent access to private donors and recruitment, logistics, and facili-tation networks.12 Although Zarqawi’s beliefs differed from bin Laden, the need to seek substitutes for limited re-sources was a driving factor in the of-ficial formation of AQI, which has now morphed into as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISIS).

Whether or not the mission vari-able supports the conditions for a re-ceptive audience should be applied from the perspective of identifying conditions that exist in support of the current receptive audience and the de-veloping potential audience members within the OE. A network’s ability to grow and regenerate structure, if loss-es are sustained, relies upon its acces-sibility to a receptive audience that can be motivated and influenced to join. Expansion of the receptive audience for ISIS is associated with a number of different conditions within the OE. One particular condition is the percep-tion of equality among various groups in Iraq. Similar to what occurred dur-ing the 2006 Anbar Awakening, groups identified with a perceived grievance within the OE that swayed them to be-come members of the receptive audi-

ence, which coalition forces were able to leverage. Now, some of the same members of the population have been swayed in the opposite direction, which has resulted in an expanded receptive audience for ISIS that has been mo-tivated to join that network. ISIS has successfully promoted its catalyst to this audience by exploiting this per-ception and currently possesses the capability to leverage violent means to further influence members of this au-dience. Identifying and affecting this variable has the potential to produce long-term effects on the ISIS network, but requires the synchronized applica-tion of a host of available capabilities.

A network generates members from the audience through some type of influence and is supported by the catalyst for the network. Understand-ing and relating this to the receptive audience will help support developing and implementing the commander’s engagement strategy for that network. In addition to focusing an analysis on identifying the conditions that support the receptive audience, a staff should consider the relationship of these members to other networks. A subset of mission variables contains the orga-nizations that exist within the OE. As part of comprehensive network analy-sis, these organizations may appear to be autonomous. By identifying the critical variables that exist in an OE, a commander may be able to identify connections, or bridges, between these network elements to engage specific organizations or nodes that can influ-ence the current receptive audience. This shaping of the OE should include specific, measurable activities or indi-cators to monitor progress toward the commander’s desired end state.

Analyzing critical variables from the perspectives of current and poten-tial conditions supports planning to engage networks and affect the current conditions for network sustainment and provides the staff an opportunity to consider including actions to facilitate future conditions for network sustain-

A network’s ability to grow and regener-ate structure ... relies upon its accessibility to a receptive audi-ence that can be motivated and in-fluenced to join.

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ment. The decision on what must be accomplished for the critical variables related to the receptive audience is de-termined based upon the commander’s desired end state. Efforts should result in planning that supports or opposes the condition depending upon the de-sired effect to support, influence, or neutralize the selected network.

Without an accommodating en-vironment, networks may exist, but their ability to take actions in support of achieving their goals will be limited. The staff must understand planning operations that are intended to limit a network’s ability to take action by identifying the critical variables that comprise the accommodating environ-ment for the network. Following the logic tree in figure 3, the primary con-cern to address to identify the critical variables for the accommodating envi-ronment is whether or not the mission variable supports the accommodating environment.

The initial analysis will focus on the current OE conditions. Staffs should study to understand conditions that may emerge within the OE as net-work engagement operations are con-ducted.

For the staff, maintaining situ-ational awareness of the OE is chal-lenging and time consuming due to the complexity that exists in any envi-ronment. The OE constantly changes and can be affected by many networks or subnetwork elements. Some criti-cal variables may require monitoring and evaluation. For example, the staff should determine if the current condi-tion in the OE supports achieving the commander’s desired end state. It is common to focus efforts on conditions that must be shaped to meet a desired end state, since more effort will be re-quired to affect those conditions. The purpose of gaining a comprehensive understanding of the OE is to ensure all of the required conditions neces-sary to attain an end state are identi-fied and routinely monitored. A condi-tion in the OE that is beneficial can be

negatively affected by US’ operations or the actions of other networks. Identify-ing the potential impacts of operations on these conditions as part of the plan-ning process or realizing a condition of this nature is changing allows the commander to make necessary adjust-ments.

The potential exists for the criti-cal variables to be evaluated for a level of accommodation that could be in-cluded as part of a formal assessment of the engagement plan for the network. Since eliminating the critical variable is unlikely, the desired condition may be to lower the accommodation level to a degree that the network has diffi-culty in taking action, which will result in the need for the network to seek an alternative. Potential for identifying al-ternatives for the network to increase the level of accommodation in the envi-ronment exists. However, the analysis must focus on identifying these critical variables to consider them during the planning process. The network will ex-pend resources and accept some risk to gain or sustain the necessary level of accommodation.

Expanding analysis to gain an understanding of the critical variables for a network (as they relate to the sus-tainment of the network) will tend to result in engagement plans that pro-duce lasting effects on networks. The immediate need to engage networks from structure and function perspec-tives will still be necessary, but incor-porating analysis on future conditions for sustaining the network into plan-ning and targeting efforts will result in greater long-term effects from opera-tions.

Like the critical variables iden-tified to support operational assess-ments, the critical variables for the networks can be used in a similar fash-ion. The staff should explore develop-ing measures of effectiveness for these critical variables and identifying indi-cators that become part of the assess-ment of operations. Since assessments are resource intensive, the goal would

The OE constantly changes and can be affected by many networks or subnetwork ele-ments.

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be to maximize the efforts of the as-sessment process by finding measures that can be supported as part of rou-tine collection efforts.

CONCLUSION The key to successfully engag-ing a network revolves around gain-ing and maintaining a comprehen-sive understanding of the conditions within the OE. Also, it requires an in-depth understanding of variables that are critical to achieving a desired end state. Accomplishing this goes be-yond conducting routine analyses and maintaining situational awareness. It requires the staff to identify and relate operations to the critical variables that exist in the OE, which must be shaped to meet the commander’s desired end state and affected to a degree that miti-gates a threat network’s ability to sur-vive.

Although understanding the structure and function of a network directly supports current targeting methodology, these methods alone will never realize the optimal objectives when engaging networks. Regardless of the commander’s desired effect (sup-port, influence, or neutralize) on any network (friendly, neutral, or threat), the primary conditions existing within the OE that allow a network to form, grow, and survive must be considered as part of the planning and targeting processes. The disadvantages an adap-tive network possesses can only be overcome by making network engage-ment decisions based on an in-depth understanding of the OE as it relates to network goals, functions, behavior, and sustainability.

The authors are current and former military personnel with expertise in network engagement methodology. MAJ (Ret.) Sopko, SGM (Ret.) Osman, and Maj Slater work as contract sup-port to the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group. Mr. Miles, LCDR (Ret.) Worret, and COL (Ret.) Munch work with the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command.

END NOTES1 The views expressed in this article are the authors alone and do not represent the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group, the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, or the US military.2 Marine Corps Interim Publication (MCIP) 3-40.1, Network Engagement, September 2014, 47-48.3 Matthew Alan Hill, Democracy Promotion and Conflict-Based Reconstruction (Routledge, 2011), 156.4 Training and Doctrine Command’s Training Brain Operations Center-Advanced Network Analysis and Targeting Train-ing Course Material, ”When applying the concepts of social network analysis (SNA), normally by using SNA software, each group of two or more connected nodes is considered to be a network. A meta-network is formed when all related networks are merged into a single “master” network. Some analysts refer to this as a “master merge”.5 Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams and Lieuten-ant Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler, Al-Anbar Awakening Volume I: American Perspectives (Marine Corps University, 2009), 9-16. Accessed on August 11, 2014, http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/61/Docs/Al-AnbarAwakeningVolI[1].pdf6 MCIP 3-40.1, 48.7 Richard Spencer, “How US and Britain were warned of ISIS ad-vance in Iraq but turned a deaf ear”, The Telegraph (June 2014), Accessed August 11, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10918607/How-US-and-Britain-were-warned-of-Isis-advance-in-Iraq-but-turned-a-deaf-ear.html8 MCIP 3-40.1, 56.9 Ibid., 69.10 Ibid., 41.11 Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, III-12-15. 12 Aaron Y. Zelin, “The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement” (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 20, 2014), 2. Accessed on August 11, 2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Docu-ments/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf

... the primary conditions exist-ing within the OE that allow a network to form, grow, and survive must be consid-ered as part of the planning and targeting pro-cesses.

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by Lt Col Dan Magruder, USAF1 Over the last four decades, the United States (US) military utilized a joint force to secure airfields in Grena-da, Panama, Afghanistan, and Iraq in the face of armed opposition. While the examples of large-scale, forcible entry stand-out in history, a more frequent operation is the establishment of tem-porary lodgments for the purpose of follow-on actions.2 This is an under-de-veloped topic in multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures.3 Notably, some in the US Air Force view the capa-bility in terms of untethered operations (UTOs), which claim rapid mobility to forward bases can assure allies and deter would-be enemies.4 While the UTO concept is an accurate depiction of shaping and deterrence operations (phase 0 and 1), it is a framework that must be further developed for combat operations. Air-minded Services would be well served to review the concept of

JOINT EQUITIES IN AERIAL LODGMENT

aerial lodgment because it may pro-vide inroads to solutions for challenges posed by anti-access (A2)/area denial (AD) threats and lesser threat environ-ments.

The purpose of this article is to develop the conceptual utility of an aerial lodgment, address why it is im-portant, and examine potential follow-on implications. This article argues three main points. First, although aer-ial lodgment is focused on fixed-wing landing zones, air-minded Services have shown a limited investment in ground-centric operations that support the projection of airpower.5 Second, in an effort to improve conceptual un-derstanding of aerial lodgments, this article offers classifications based on the threat in the operational environ-ment, frequency of execution, and risk. Third, this article argues the concep-tual application of aerial lodgments in any environment has the potential to

A C-17 Globemaster III rehearses forced entry operations at the Nevada Test and Training Range in Tonopah, Nevada, 23 May 2012. Photo by SSgt Ciara Wymbs, USAF

... air-minded Ser-vices have shown a limited invest-ment in ground-centric operations that support the projection of air-power.

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mitigate threats posed by operational access challenges which could enable airpower projection.

A main operational gap is pro-jecting airpower into denied areas us-ing ground-based forces. For example, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Recon-naissance (ISR), Major General Lin-da Urrutia-Varhall said the Air Force knows counterterrorism, but when it comes to A2/AD, “[n]ot so much. We found that out when we went up against the competition in Syria.”6 Op-eration INHERENT RESOLVE in Iraq and Syria is exactly the type of opera-tion that would be well served by an aerial campaign supported by ground elements.7

There are at least two ways Air-men on the ground could better facili-tate the projection of airpower to achieve operational campaign objectives in Iraq and Syria. First, air power is already projected via dynamic targeting from strike cells and ISR assets with little-to-no American boots on the ground. In this example, airpower is the most lethal element of national power, but is coming up short in achieving long-lasting effects. The main impediment to progress is the lack of synchroniza-tion between aerial strikes and friendly ground maneuver elements at and be-hind the forward line of troops (FLOT). Therefore, to capitalize on airpower, the coalition needs to conduct simulta-neous, offensive ground advances with the intent to hold terrain. If there is a coalition force willing to hold terrain, the FLOT could change in the coali-tion’s favor. In critical ways, the politi-cal situation hinders any decisive mili-tary outcome.

Second, there is an opportunity to employ temporary aerial lodgments behind enemy lines if American policy evolves to allow its forces to operate beyond the FLOT. This would yield a serious positional advantage to coali-tion forces because they could disrupt enemy operations by conducting deep-strike, which could relieve pressure on

the front lines allowing a coalition to break through and advance.

Ground forces are required to conduct clearing operations, but most of the time, draw on support from all the core airpower missions.8 Interest-ingly, Air Force Service doctrine sug-gests the joint force air component commander should be the supported commander when “airpower presents the joint force commander with the preponderance of counter-surface ef-fects”.9 While this article used the Iraq-Syria example to examine the concept in concrete terms, dissecting aerial lodgment into component parts will as-sist in highlighting doctrinal gaps and elaborate on conceptual utility as it ap-plies to other scenarios.

While joint concepts for op-erational access and doctrine exist at the broadest levels, conceptual clarity is gained by categorizing operational threat environment conditions (per-missive, uncertain, hostile) associated with an aerial lodgment.10 Joint doc-trine addresses the broadest concept of forcible entry in three joint publica-tions.11 Even if doctrine primarily fo-cuses on seizing an enemy’s terrain in the face of armed opposition, this is far too conceptually and operationally con-strictive. Broadly, an aerial lodgment is a secured and held landing zone which facilitates the entry of follow-on forces and attains “maneuver space for sub-sequent operations”.12 These types of operations can be conducted in any range of threat environments. However, the nature of the environment and as-sociated risk to mission and force dic-tate the mix of ground forces required and the manner in which they must be employed to enable airfield operations. In most threat environments, the man-ner of ground force employment is most likely joint and may resemble the Army’s wide area security construct. Ground force employment in permis-sive environments depends heavily on Department of State support in gaining political access to airfield facilities and airspace.

A main opera-tional gap is pro-jecting airpower into denied areas using ground-based forces.

ALSB 2016-1 16

Theoretically, it is also useful to categorize potential aerial lodgments operations using two criteria: the oper-ational environment and the likelihood of execution.13 While an uncertain environment implies a high threat to strategic aircraft and friendly ground forces, they are uncommon and only executed when serious national securi-ty interests are at stake. These are the high-risk operations addressed by joint forcible entry doctrine.14 However, a more common option is establishing an airfield miles from an objective.15 Once a ground force is inserted at an offset landing zone, it can move to shape the environment at the primary objective by reducing air and ground threats.16 For example, this scheme of maneu-ver was used to secure Kandahar and Baghdad International Airports at the outset of invasions in 2001 and 2003, respectively.

Far more common are opera-tions in uncertain environments where the likelihood of engaging a threat is possible because the host nation does not have complete control over the ter-

rain or population.17 For example, as coalition forces withdrew from Iraq and Afghanistan, a number of airbases were transitioned to host nation secu-rity forces. Later, the same airbases were used occasionally, but required forces to clear and hold terrain before reopening them for airfield operations. Furthermore, austere airfields can be assessed and established anywhere the terrain is suitable. Generally, op-erations conducted in permissive en-vironments are routine and conducted when the host nation exhibits control and a willingness to assist friendly ef-forts.18

Because the highest risk mis-sions are also the most complex, the joint force should focus on contingen-cies. The highest risk missions, such as joint forcible entry and aerial lodg-ment behind enemy lines, have the highest potential return on invest-ment. Therefore, training should focus on scenarios that develop competency in these areas. Subsequently, all other scenarios are less challenging in plan-ning and execution.

Paratroopers assigned to the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, US Army Alaska, practice a forced-entry parachute assault on Malemute drop zone at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, 18 March 2015, as part of a larger tactical field exer-cise. Photo by Justin Connaher

Because the high-est risk missions are also the most complex, the joint force should focus on contingencies.

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Planning and training should focus on scenarios that will mitigate the risks associated with establishing aerial lodgments across operational environments. Successfully executing high-risk operations is “due in no small part to the habitual relationships and practices developed during deliberate joint training …”19 This emphasizes the fact that tactical forces must plan and rehearse prior to conducting opera-tions because the complexity increases commensurate with threat levels and lack of interoperability experience. In the current environment, many factors combine to raise the prospects of con-ducting these types of high-risk opera-tions. For example, the erosion of op-erational access is driven by political choices made by allies to limit US ac-cess to bases, US drawdown of forces, proliferation of A2/AD threats, and the tyranny of distance problem. Regard-less of risk mitigation measures, a bar-rier to airpower projection remains.

Undervaluing concepts, such as aerial lodgment, sidesteps an op-portunity to address one of the main impediments to airpower projection. Most notably, aerial lodgment can fa-cilitate how a joint force projects air-power into an A2/AD environment.20

The use of temporary airheads is not a novel concept, but what is new is em-ploying them in support of a broader airpower campaign in pursuit of op-erational objectives. Aerial lodgments were established time and again dur-ing World War II’s Pacific campaign; which in today’s lexicon, would be cat-egorized as defeating an adversary’s A2/AD efforts.21 Interestingly, a search of Air Force Service doctrine yields no results for operational access, A2/AD, or joint forcible entry.22 Furthermore, airbase opening is marginalized to an annex in the Service publication cov-ering mobility operations.23 A notable, albeit limited, exception is the “Rapid Raptor” concept which employs a C-17 with munitions, fuel, and maintainers to an austere environment to support four F-22s. For their part, the Navy of-fers a unique perspective because car-

rier battle groups are floating airfields, but they would serve to gain access if land-based airfields are held. Also, Air Force doctrine states airpower “adds flanks” as important as the “horizontal battle” and some argue it is a maneu-ver element in its own right.24 However, the converse is equally true.

Joint land operations conducted to establish airheads can facilitate fol-low-on actions that uniquely contrib-ute to airpower projection. Establishing aerial lodgments in any threat environ-ment enables the joint force to project airpower. Most importantly, follow-on aerial operations could range from the launch and recovery of strike assets, forward staging of ISR platforms, or mobility missions for finishing forces. Successful execution of the concept requires mutually supportive airheads which can temporarily sustain opera-tions. Ultimately, extending the opera-tional reach of strike aircraft will allow them to hit the enemy and quickly ret-rograde to safety for refueling and re-arming. In any case, successful execu-tion of the concept requires mutually supportive airheads which can tem-porarily sustain operations. Further-more, if US forces plan to use multiple airfields for varied periods of time, it complicates the adversary’s response to the encroachment. Joint doctrine of-fers a solution to this problem in the form of entry forces (i.e., conventional or special operations forces.

Generally, conventional forces secure large, high-threat areas. How-ever, for a less overt signature, a SOF component can infiltrate an area, as-sess the terrain, and establish an airhead (if it is suitable). Crucially, if ground-based air threats exist (i.e., in-tegrated air defense system) they may be vulnerable to raids or finding and fixing, which would enable a strike. This requires the ground force to have sufficient weapon types, mobility, and communications to control the air-head line including some surrounding environs. Therefore, the projection of airpower in an operational campaign

... aerial lodg-ment can facili-tate how a joint force projects airpower into an A2/AD environ-ment.

ALSB 2016-1 18

hinges directly on the ground force’s ability to secure and run an airfield. Turning the current paradigm on its head, ground combatants (establishing an airhead via surprise and violence of action) may facilitate the projection of airpower in follow-on operations.

To be sure, implications sug-gested by this article might cause circumspection because it requires modifying current paradigms about the relationship between air and land power. To many, airpower is typically viewed as a supporting force to decisive tactical actions on the ground. Howev-er, turning the current paradigm on its head, ground-based Airmen could be a tool used to project airpower. Indeed, Special Tactics Airmen are already task-organized and employ personnel

and platforms to mobilize across great distances, with minimal logistical sup-port, and operate in dispersed ways.

The use of aerial lodgments in pursuit of operational and strate-gic campaign objectives is a frontier worthy of future study. Indeed, an air-ground maneuver concept can be designed to place airpower assets in positions to hold key adversary vulner-abilities at risk. Joint players should continue a high level of participation in joint forcible entry and operational access exercises to build institutional experience. Practicing complex aerial lodgments will enable the US military to revise operational access concepts that lead to joint force success. That is a goal any Soldier, Marine, Sailor, or Airman should find agreeable.

An unidentified US Air Force combat controller from 22nd Special Tactics Squadron communicates with a 357th Fighter Squadron A–10C Thunderbolt II pilot taxiing to a parking spot after landing on Bicycle Lake Army Airfield at the National Training Center Range, Fort Irwin, Cali-fornia, 22 September 2015. The pilots participated in austere landing training during Green Flag-West 15–10. Combat controllers survey and establish airfields in austere or hostile areas while providing air traffic control to land aircraft during combat and humanitarian missions. Photo by SrA Betty R. Chevalier, USAF

The use of aerial lodgments in pur-suit of operational and strategic cam-paign objectives is a frontier worthy of future study.

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Lt Col Dan Magruder is the Direc-tor of Operations, 22nd Special Tac-tics Squadron, Joint Base Lewis Mc-Chord, Washington. He has served in a variety of Special Operations de-ployed and staff positions and holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Chicago.

END NOTES1 The views expressed in this article do not represent the Air Force or Special Operations Command. All errors are the author’s alone.2 Joint Publication 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry, 27 Nov 2012, I-1. A “lodgment is a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations (a lodgment may be an airhead, a beachhead, or a combination thereof).”3 One exception is the Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airfield Opening (https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=66&pubId=610#). Another in the tactical realm is Major Ruston Traynham’s, “Forward Operating Location Opera-tions: A Checklist for the Weapons Officer,” United States Air Force Weapons School, 66 Weapons Squadron, Class 14A, 29 June 2014.4 Charles Brown, Brad Spacy, and Charles Glover. “Untethered Operations: Rapid Mobility and Forward Basing Are Keys to Air-power’s Success in the Anti-Access/Area-Denial Environment,” Air and Space Power Journal, May-June 2015, 17–26.5 Fixed-wing landing zones expand the tactical options for follow-on operations because they can support forward arming and refueling points; transload areas; and depending on the runway type, many types of aircraft (i.e., A-10s, F-22s, F-35s, C-130s, C-17s, CV-22s, and helicopters). This is reflected in Army concern about less training support to the global response force mission. http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/09/24/fort-bragg-air-force-insists-training-not-degraded.html. Before 2015, see General Carl Steiner and Lieutenant Colonel Dan Schroeder’s article, “The Army and Joint Forcible Entry”, Army, November 2009, 19–20.6 Eleni Ekmektsioglou , http://www.c4isrnet.com/story/military-tech/isr/2015/09/15/air-force-anti-access-anti-deni-al/72317652/ 7 In fact, as of 3 February 2016, the vast majority of kinetic ef-fects in Operation INHERENT RESOLVE are due to the applica-tion of coalition airpower. See http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve.8 Air and space superiority; intelligence, surveillance, and recon-naissance (ISR); mobility; strike; and command and control.9 Air Force Doctrine, Volume III, Command, 5 June 2013: “In cas-es where airpower presents the joint force commander with the preponderance of counter-surface effects, it may be appropri-ate for the joint force air component commander (JFACC) to be the supported commander for affecting enemy surface forces,

with friendly surface force commanders acting in a supporting role. This is often the case when the JFACC’s forces perform the theater-wide air interdiction and strategic attack functions.”10 General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operational Access Concept, version 1.0, 17 January 2012 and Joint Concept for Entry Operations, 7 April 2014. 11 See Joint Publication 3-17, Air Mobility Operations; Joint Pub-lication 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations; Joint Publication 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations.12 Joint Publication 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry, 27 Nov 2012, I-1.13 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 Nov 2010 defines an airhead as a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile opera-tional area that, when seized and held, ensures the continuous air landing of troops and material and provides the maneuver space necessary for projected operations.14 Joint Publication 3-35, Deployment and Re-Deployment Op-erations, 31 Jan 2013, page I-2. A hostile environment is an area “in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations that a unit intends to conduct.”15 Austere airfields are also known as dirt landing strips and, typically, are offset from an objective.16 This is possible due to organic capabilities of the ground ma-neuver element and/or augmentation from aerial ISR and fires assets. In this manner, situation dependent, the ground element can reduce risk to a follow-on force composed of mechanized infantry or air assault forces.17 Joint Publication 3-35, I-2. [An] uncertain environment is an area “in which [host nation] HN forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area.”18 Ibid., I-1. A permissive environment is an area “in which host nation military and law enforcement agencies have control, the intent, and the capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.”19 Steiner and Schroeder, “The Army and Joint Forcible Entry”, Army, November 2009, 19–20.20 In fact, enabling joint forces to close within striking distance without undue risk is the third imperative of operational access as outlined in the concept document. See Joint Operational Access Concept, 17. 21 For example, the Pacific, island-hopping campaign in 1942, Operation WATCHTOWER, emplaced Marines on the island of Guadalcanal to seize an airhead and set conditions to project airpower.22 See https://doctrine.af.mil/, accessed 6 Oct 2015.23 See https://doctrine.af.mil/DTM/dtmairmobilityops.htm, accessed 9 Oct 2015. However, the document recognizes that airfield seizure by Army, Marines or SOF precedes any sustained operations by an Air Force Contingency Response Wing or other joint elements.24 Givens, Robert. Turning the Vertical Flank: Airpower as a Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign (US Air War College, 2013). His argument begins a definition of maneuver warfare that brings to bear such concepts as surprise, shock, and com-pellence.

ALSB 2016-1 20

JOINT ENTRY IN THE URBAN LITTORALS: FREEDOM OF ACCESS DOES NOT EQUAL FREEDOM OF ACTION

by Scott Packard

The many challenges to freedom of access and action resultant from the proliferation of anti-access and area denial capabilities rightly receive con-siderable attention in the joint com-munity. Assuming the joint force is successful in gaining and maintaining sufficient access to an operational area to project forces into it, the ever-in-creasing lethality, range, and precision of systems, down to the lowest level, will push intermediate staging bases farther from the objective. This impacts joint entry operations, forcible or oth-erwise, independent of the operational environment. What has received con-siderably less scrutiny, however, are the challenges the urban environment alone presents to entry, even in the ab-sence of opposition. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) manu-al, Joint Concept for Entry Operations (JCEO), dances lightly over the chal-lenges imposed by the urban environ-ment, briefly mentioning “geographic

and infrastructure impediments”, an understatement on par with the notion that German forces entered Stalingrad absent formal invitation during World War II.1 In fact, given the challenges the joint force will face to enter the congested, contested, and connected urban environment, seabased forces are best suited for entry operations.

As United States’ (US) defense posture continues to change, entry op-erations will be necessary to support broader strategic goals. The JCEO lists five purposes for entry operations: 1) to defeat threats to the access and use of the global commons, 2) to find, con-trol, defeat, disable, and/or dispose of specific weapons of mass destruc-tion (WMD) threats, 3) to establish a lodgment, 4) to assist populations and groups, and 5) to conduct other limit-ed duration missions.2 The first three imply a degree of opposition, whether anti-access or area denial, and require forcible entry, but the last two will not automatically enjoy freedom of action

A US Navy landing craft air cushion comes ashore on a beach at Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California as part of an amphibious landing during Exercise DAWN BLITZ, 5 September 2015. Photo by LCpl David Staten, USMC

... the ever-in-creasing lethality, range, and preci-sion of systems, down to the lowest level, will push in-termediate staging bases farther from the objective.

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and the urban environment itself will be an obstacle to entry.3

Until recently, the joint staff, Services, and most military thinkers largely turned their attention away from the urban environment, though military action felt urban to those on the ground in Iraq and parts of Afghan-istan.4 This lack of high-level attention to the urban environment was not the case prior to those operations. In the mid-to-late 1990s, General Charles Krulak, the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, energized the Marine Corps’ thinking, experimentation, and training for urban operations. His “Three Block War Concept”, the con-current conduct of high intensity close combat, peacekeeping tasks, and hu-manitarian aid all within the space of three contiguous city blocks, outlined the complexity Marines would face op-erating on urban terrain and remains relevant today.5 With extensive experi-mentation and exercises, the Marine Corps developed and refined tactics, techniques and procedures for urban operations. However, other campaigns soon proved more urgent, demanding

Service focus, and attention given to the urban environs waned and doctrine development languished. Although the lessons learned in the preceding years were not completely forgotten and served the Marines well in Fallujah, other skills were more pressing.

After 14 years of counterinsur-gency and stability operations, focus and attention to the urban challenge is renewing, not only for the Marine Corps, but across the other Services and the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-zation alliance, with the trends of ur-banization and littoralization noted in the 1970s progressing ahead of pre-dictions. Recent studies reported that 50 percent of the world population is in cities and growing; and that three-quarters of all large cities are located along coasts.6 It seems very likely that US forces and multinational and in-terorganizational partners are going to operate in the urban littorals. Pre-vious military thought held that cities were obstacles best bypassed. Military thinkers are beginning to understand that cities may be the key terrain and reasons for a military mission.

Marines with 2nd Assault Amphibious Battalion, 2nd Marine Division, make landfall in assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs) during amphibious training operations at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, 16 July 2015. The white smoke is used to conceal ground forces as they leave the AAVs, before moving inland. Photo by Cpl Sullivan Laramie, USMC

Recent studies reported that 50 percent of the world population is in cities and growing; and that three-quarters of all large cities are located along coasts.

ALSB 2016-1 22

Why do these trends make ur-ban operations more likely? As bank robbers are drawn to banks because that is where the money is found so, too, will the military be drawn into cit-ies because that is where the people are found. Also, the world has taken notice that the urban environment effectively mitigates many of the dramatic advan-tages that US and coalition forces oth-erwise enjoy.

Still, entry operations into a city do not have to be actively opposed by an enemy to face opposition, active or otherwise. For example, a city already facing crisis will be ill equipped to pro-vide the logistics support a large mili-tary force might require, and efforts to procure it from the city will only cause further problems. Even without an ac-tive threat, the urban environment will challenge entry operations and make seabasing options more attractive to joint planners.7

While there are a number of concepts for access and entry, cur-rently joint doctrine only exists for forcible entry, not the larger, more in-clusive entry operations.8 Regardless, amphibious forces are ideally suited to support joint entry operations. Of the forcible entry options (amphibious, air-borne, or air assault), seabased forces will be the most useful in a city, pro-viding the most flexibility, tactical agil-ity, sustainability, and protection. In the absence of an intermediate staging base (ISB) within range of the operat-ing area, air assault is impossible and airborne entry difficult. While inter-continental airborne entry is possible, sustainment is problematic, and egress demands external support. For an am-phibious force, the seabase serves as an ISB for surface and air insertion, with an available seaport adding op-tions to joint logistics over the shore. While amphibious based air assault comes with many unique operating conditions for Army or Marine Corps forces, it may be the main means of moving ashore until landing sites and beach exits are found or made.9 When

forward land bases are not available, seabasing provides forward staging for entry or follow-on forces, sustainment, fires, intelligence and reconnaissance, command and control, and force pro-tection. The recent fielding of new, ver-satile, maritime platforms, such as the expeditionary transfer dock (formerly mobile launch platform) and expedi-tionary mobile base (formerly afloat forward staging base), has only in-creased the utility of seabasing. While the Army serves as the principal US land force because of its forward pres-ence, the expeditionary Marine Corps, with the Navy, is likely to be frequently employed in cities around the globe.

CONTESTED The competition for control in cities, particularly in the peri-urban areas where population growth out-strips the state or city government’s ability to keep up with growing infra-structure needs, will involve US forces engaging with a variety of individuals, groups, and human networks.10 In the absence of effective government, armed nonstate actors often exercise coercive, persuasive, and administrative influ-ence over the populace. Local power brokers fill security, legal, water, food, and education vacuums where the city management cannot or will not.11 Tran-siting or operating within their territo-ry may require negotiations with infor-mal leaders outside normal diplomatic channels. In most operations, there will be insufficient time to establish trust relationships. The lowest thresh-old, understanding the dynamics and subtleties of the relationships between various individuals, groups, and net-works sufficient to effectively negotiate the maze of influencers, will demand sensing before a conflict. The forward presence of amphibious forces pro-vides more opportunities for collection than other entry options. Seabased forces can loiter before a crisis to learn as much as possible through cyber op-erations and traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

... the urban envi-ronment effective-ly mitigates many of the dramatic advantages that US and coalition forces otherwise enjoy.

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CONGESTED Entry operations in the litto-rals face increased crowds and clutter, constricted sea approaches, congested land approaches, crowded airspace, industrial hazards, coastal inundation, and overlapping network footprints. Agglomeration (one city expanding into the next) and in-fill (the addition of structures to empty spaces within a city) limit surface options, landing or drop zones, and staging areas. Traffic congestion may shut down main sup-ply routes during peak times. Air op-tions face similar congestion, with com-mercial aviation and increasing use of unmanned aircraft systems in the city presenting a risk to aviation operations and a potential weapon, if hacked. In the ungoverned spaces, increasingly

concentrated demographics in the cit-ies and expansion of the peri-urban zones filling the available contiguous space will make penetration difficult for an amphibious surface landing or airborne insert. Many urban slums sit astride the coastal zone, partially on land and partially over or on the water. Mobility in these areas will be the do-main of a maritime force, comfortable on land, river, sea, and air.

CONNECTED The concepts of urbanization and littoralization were noted as early as the 1970s. What is new, however, is the massive increase in electronic connectivity creating a networked pop-ulace with new abilities to access in-formation and be a source of informa-

Amphibious assault vehicles assigned to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit conduct an amphibious landing rehearsal from the amphibious transport dock USS Denver (LPD-9) as part of a combined US and Korean exercise near Pohang, Korea on 5 November 2008. Photo by Cpl Jason Spinella, USMC

Mobility in these areas will be the domain of a maritime force, comfortable on land, river, sea, and air.

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tion. A fourth block, the information block, can be added to Krulak’s “Three Block War” concept, that addresses the expansion of connectivity and so-cial media, increasing the scrutiny of US operations, providing opportunity and risk.12 On this block, any gap be-tween what is said and what is done is broadcast locally, and to the world, only adding to the difficulty of military operations on urban terrain. Govern-ments are more and more attuned to the importance of legitimacy with lo-cal and global audiences. Every person with a cell phone embedded camera or networked drone becomes a potential information operations or collection asset. Forces lying offshore, poised for employment and outside the view of civilians and range of commercial drones, gain “information sanctuary” and are more difficult to exploit for ei-ther propaganda or intelligence. Op-erational security and messaging are more easily controlled with a seabased force.

The joint force will find itself operating in cities, whether mitigat-ing human suffering or facing an en-trenched enemy. Seabased operations address many aspects of the conges-tion, competing interests, and strategic communications challenges US forces will face. With available entry forces, sustainability, and force protection, a joint force operating “from the sea” avoids the vulnerabilities of a land-based force. Less exposed to scrutiny, those forces insert and withdraw with greater stealth and optimize operation-al security. In the future urban oper-ating environment, the joint force will meet the challenge of entry with sea-basing.

Maj (Ret.) Packard served as a Ma-rine infantry officer and currently assists the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group with urban opera-tions Service doctrine and concept development. He has operational ex-perience in Asia, Africa, Central and South America, and the Middle East.

END NOTES1 CJSC, Joint Operational Access Concept, Version 1.0, 17 Jan 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/joac_2012.pdf. 2 Ibid., 1-2.3 The Department of Defense (DOD) definition of forcible entry (seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition) is too limited, focusing solely on seizing a lodg-ment. CJCS’s Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) offers a better one that comprises a variety of operations, inclusive of lodgment, against opposition. The distinction is important since, depending on the mission, forces might not seize a lodg-ment, but maneuver directly against the objective. JP 1–02, The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2013 (as amended through 15 March 2012), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary. Joint Operational Access Concept, Version 1.0, 17 Jan 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/joac_2012.pdf4 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains (Oxford Press, 2013), viii-ix.5 Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War”, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 83:1, January 1999, 18-23. 6 Supreme Allied Command, Transformation, Climate and Geographical Implications for Future Urban Operations, dated 5 Jan 2015, 6-12.7 Seabasing is the deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and reemployment of joint power from the sea without reliance on land bases within the operational area, JP 1–02.8 Joint Publication 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations, 27 Nov 2012 (currently under revision).9 Building a truly joint rapid aggregation capability means lower-ing the barriers to force interoperability; specifically, the joint force benefits from having Army air assault units capable of operating from Navy ships.10 Peri-urban refers to the immediate area surrounding a city, in this context it refers to the areas also known as slums, favelas, shanty towns.11 This is largely based on Dr. David Kilcullen’s “Competitive Control Theory”. For a more detailed explanation, see chapter 4 of David Kilcullen’s Out of the Mountains.12 Lieutenant General James N. Mattis, USMC, and Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman, USMCR (Ret.) “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” USNI Proceedings, November 2005, 18-19.

In the future urban operating environment, the joint force will meet the chal-lenge of entry with seabasing.

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IGNORING THE INEVITABLE: URBAN CLOSE AIR SUPPORT PROBLEMS

By SMSgt Eric D. Muller, USAF During the last fifteen years, the United States (US) and its coalition partners discovered, first hand, the dif-ficulties involved in fighting in urban areas. By 2050, the United Nations estimates, 70-percent of the world’s population will live in or around urban areas.1 This means, the future fight probably will be in urban settings.

The success of the Department of Defense’s ability to wage war in fu-ture engagements hinges on the US’ ability to operate successfully in an urban environment. This will require a renewed focus on urban scenarios and the associated challenges of conduct-ing a full range of military operations in an urban conflict. Because of this projected population change, the main focus of the joint terminal attack con-troller (JTAC) community should shift to honing its skills in a near-peer fight

in an urban environment. All the while, the community should maintain an aggressive emphasis on capturing the lessons learned from the past 15 years of urban warfare and hardships expe-rienced in Afghanistan and Iraq.

BACKGROUND CAS training prior to Opera-tions ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was insuf-ficient to prepare JTACs for what they would encounter in urban combat. The preponderance of JTAC training was focused on fixed location CAS scenar-ios using only one set of aircraft; with little fires integration; and attacking large, stationary targets that provid-ed a limited training benefit. With the JTAC static, the scenario did little to emphasize the challenges of control-ling multiple assets while on the move in an urban environment. The lack of urban CAS training scenarios forced

Smoke rises from bomb strikes from an F/A–18C Hornet fighter-attack aircraft on an insurgent target during a combat operation in Now Zad, Helmand Province, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 3 April 2009. Photo by LCpl Brian Jones, USMC

By 2050, the United Na-tions estimates, 70-percent of the world’s popula-tion will live in or around urban areas.

ALSB 2016-1 26

many JTACs to learn the fundamentals of urban CAS through trial-and-error, during combat. As OEF and OIF wore on, these skills were refined and honed to a high degree of execution. Unfor-tunately, as the Iraq and Afghanistan veterans gained rank, retired, and moved on, their experiences remained undocumented for the next genera-tion of JTACs. In short, urban combat veterans are leaving the Service with their lessons unrecorded. Their valu-able experiences and hard-earned les-sons and skillsets, developed to suc-cessfully operate in the dynamic and challenging urban environment, are being forgotten at the tactical level. To compound matters, no formal or infor-mal process is available to capture this critical skillset from senior controllers before it is no longer accessible.

Most JTAC instructors and commanders will take the initiative and ensure urban scenarios are being utilized, but many of the combat les-sons from urban scenarios continue to be lost. The urban fight was learned through trial and error; yet, our source for training JTACs has not evolved to meet the new urban training require-ments.

RECOMMENDATIONS Urban CAS is challenging. The goal is to capture as many of the is-sues as possible, including previously developed tactics, techniques, and pro-cedures (TTP) along with potential so-lutions to common problems. The fires community needs to train in various combat environments (such as jungle; mountain; or, most importantly, ur-ban) and with CAS scenarios in a joint theater. There are multiple TTP that could resolve many of the issues faced in urban combat. These will prevent the military from having to relearn the urban CAS lessons it has on hand.

Every operations conducting JTAC should be equipped with a chest mounted tablet that has digital imag-ery, and fitted with Precision Strike Suite for Special Operations Forces (PSS-SOF) for dismounted operations. The combination of PSS-SOF and high-fidelity imagery will allow US JTACs to access precise imagery, with accurate coordinates and elevation, to facilitate better targeting. The ability to access imagery at a moment’s notice means the JTAC can react better to changes to ingress and egress routes, blocking po-sitions, target locations, and other op-erational considerations that support a dynamic fight. Typically, The Army has lacked these dismounted capabilities and relied heavily on JTAC equipment. The PSS-SOF tool gives supporting air-craft the exact location of an operation and makes a bomb on coordinate at-tack possible. This capability allows for easier correlation and improves joint firepower with little prior coordi-nation. The aircraft can, simply, drop on an extremely accurate military grid

Joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) Air Force MSgt Chris Thomp-son communicates via a remotely operated video enhanced receiver (ROVER) 21 September 2015 in Southwest Asia. The ROVER, a small laptop with an external antenna, allows the JTAC to see from the eyes of a pilot, ensuring minimal collateral damage. Photo by SSgt Angelique Perez, USAF

... urban combat veterans are leav-ing the Service with their lessons unrecorded.

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reference system (MGRS) coordinate rather than search and acquire the tar-get and friendly forces that extend the kill chain. Time-sensitive targeting and the ability to expend ordnance at a mo-ment’s notice are essential in fixing and destroying enemies before they move and create more targets and increase the chances of collateral damage.

Graphic production was es-sential in the urban fight. It was used to take multiple images and number buildings listed on each image. This was given to US Army leadership and supporting aircraft for battle tracking. It allowed the JTAC and Army forces to reference buildings and target locations without using a MGRS grid method. However, graphic production was very time consuming. Imagery that would recognize buildings and numerically identify them would be a significant im-provement, contrasted with the current practice of dragging and dropping hun-dreds of numbers over buildings listed on imagery, and sending that informa-tion to supporting assets and partnered Soldiers. This method of battle track-ing by utilizing graphics, as opposed to grids, is of significant benefit (i.e., easy to use and efficient). Although, should aircraft show up unexpectedly, all the graphics used by ground forces and JTACS must also have grids listed on them as references for imagery and for generating coordinates.

The joint fires community re-quires an initiative to begin integrat-ing assets that focus on cross-Service training between JTACs and Army rotary wing (RW) assets. The direc-tive should ensure proper integration training prior to the next major ur-ban engagement. The first time most JTACs worked with Army aviation was in combat, which is less than ideal. Army aviation personnel were unfamil-iar with JTAC terminology and capa-bilities. This was mostly due to the lack of controls inherent in the current Air Force Instruction 13-112, Volume 1 Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) Training Program. The instruction ties

the commander’s hands by allowing a limited number of controls from un-manned aerial vehicles (UAVs), RW as-sets, bombers, and simulators. There is little incentive to work with these platforms because JTACs are unable to maintain their required currency us-ing them. Prior to OEF and OIF, and in most cases, JTACs never worked with bombers, Army RW assets, or any oth-er Service platforms, and there was an extreme learning curve for them and aircrews.

TTP Dynamic CAS scenarios (CAS conducted while moving in a convoy, on foot, or in reactive types of mission sets) should be established in training prior to combat operations. On-the-fly operations, with little planning and high stress, are essential in produc-ing the type of JTAC the Army needs. There are very few training operations that simulate urban CAS challenges (e.g., improvised explosive device (IED) threats; airspace issues; electronic warfare asset threats; and moving con-voys using vehicle, ground-based jam-mers with counter IEDs). Several units with veterans who learned on the fly in Iraq and Afghanistan have simulated these types of missions, but there is no driving force behind this. The ground-based vehicle jammers were espe-cially difficult to operate around and complicated the CAS and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance co-ordination. A communication fix was switching to a very high frequency-frequency modulation (FM) frequency. This enabled two-way communication while vehicle jammers were engaged. However, the consequence was dimin-ished frequency range. Using an FM frequency was beneficial (depending on the asset). But when working with the assigned ultra-high frequency-amplitude modulation JTAC tactical air direction network, the only option was to pass information to aircraft in the blind. Then, prior to reaching the target, disengaging the jammers and getting target or area updates from

There are very few training oper-ations that simu-late urban CAS challenges ...

ALSB 2016-1 28

the aircraft. The JTAC can transmit when jammers are engaged and the aircrew can hear the transmission. However, the JTAC is unable to hear the aircraft’s transmission. When on the target objective, JTAC line-of-sight communications with supporting air-craft was paramount. This mostly en-tailed roof-top operations to maximize two-way communications and video downlink (VDL), also known as Rover feed. Another issue was a lack of line-of-sight communications with the air-craft when surrounded by buildings. Many JTACs resorted to adding a 20-Watt amplifier to their 5-Watt radio in an effort to improve communications between supporting aircraft, which helped punch through urban barriers.

There are other uncaptured ur-ban CAS related TTP. Other TTP were preplanned CAS stacks and game plans at check in, such as: “If en route to the target, our convoy is hit. Expect this sequence of events using these weap-ons and tactics”. There needs to be a strengthening of cross talk among the units’ liaison officers (LNOs), who are the battlespace owners. LNOs are the conduits to the security check points, partner force check points, quick reac-tion forces, UAVs, and current opera-tions, etc.

Another urban CAS TTP that merits further discussion is: during aircraft check in, JTACs should pass the ground force commander’s call-sign and frequency in the event of in-jury or an inability to communicate. This is especially important because there is, typically, only one JTAC per unit, which is a single point of failure. It would allow the aircrew to push an internal frequency to the platoon, com-pany, or team and partnered Army forces to communicate directly with the aircrew in emergency situations.

Using imagery in an urban envi-ronment is a necessity. The 50-year-old technology, using 30 maps for a single area, is outdated and not a practical so-lution for the new, digital aged technol-ogy. Maps still have a role in the joint

fight, for strategic-level planning (they provide a large view of the battlefield). But at the tactical level, they provide little data required by ground com-manders and JTACs. Using a tablet or external hard drive enables the ground force commander and JTAC to access hundreds of maps and high-fidelity imagery at their fingertips. The solu-tion seems fairly simple, but current policies and red tape restrict the use of standalone systems, which means a lack of digital imagery or tablet avail-ability to facilitate peace and wartime training. A headquarters directed ini-tiative and overarching waiver should mandate acquiring an imagery data-base and personal tablets for stand-alone systems for JTAC operations. In short, the fires community needs to begin training like it fights and provide JTACs the essential imagery required for targeting and fires planning to pre-pare for the next urban engagement.

Another issue with urban CAS is urban cultural lighting issues from street lights and buildings. These com-plicated night operations when using night vision devices (NVDs) and infra-red (IR) pointers due to the high amount of ambient light. Typically, cultural lights degraded NVDs’ effectiveness for air and ground crews. Cultural lighting mitigated the night operations advan-tages of US forces by allowing enemy personnel to view US movements and track areas during night operations. Using the variable divergence sniper laser illuminator module (VSLIM) IR pointer, with higher power outputs than regular NVDs, would benefit the aircrew and ground forces. The L-3 VS-LIM is much more powerful than any-thing Army personnel use and easily distinguishes the JTAC location versus other IR devices.

The use of vehicle-mounted weapons, tracers, and smoke to point out targets or friendly locations was very beneficial in an urban environ-ment. Combine that with dismounted PSS-SOF capability, proper graphics of the target area, and VDL, and the JTAC

There needs to be a strengthening of cross talk among the units’ liaison officers (LNOs), who are the bat-tlespace owners.

ALSB 2016-129

was fully capable for urban missions (in the context of limited rules of en-gagement). Often, JTACs were directed to make a limited response to enemy attacks using shows of force from high-er headquarters. When shows of force proved ineffective, the next step was escalation of force to aircraft gun runs. Using 20-millimeter guns against an entrenched, fortified enemy resulted in little to no progress. Sometimes, the en-emy would break contact and survive. The commanders, JTACs, and aircrews were handcuffed by policy. Due to the last 15 years, both US and North At-lantic Treaty Organization JTACs have become too risk adverse, and current TTP are counterproductive in urban combat. The current practice of esca-lation of force is counterproductive by maintaining a zero casualty mentality.

In summary, the nature of war-fare is changing from the open ranges and spaces envisioned during the Cold War with a US and former Union of So-viet Socialist Republics fight of East-ern Europe to that of an urban centric, close-in campaign as seen in Syria and Ukraine. As such, urban CAS consider-ations and training need to be repriori-tized by the JTAC community to reflect this potential, future operating environ-ment. There should be a more mission focused mentality and a prioritization of tasks, beginning with an emphasis on combat skills training (which should be our number one priority), without adding requirements that restrict a commander’s ability to train. The key is to acquire necessary equipment and a training focus to better prepare our joint forces for urban combat.

Primary methods the commu-nity can use to better prepare for this eventuality are to:

1. Swiftly implement more simulator controls that use urban CAS sce-narios.

2. Reduce emphasis on live-range re-quirements.

3. Increase emphasis in an urban-style conflict using joint fires.

It is essential to implement a va-riety of scenarios based on the difficul-ty of the scenario rather than restrict the type of aircraft that can be used. Realistically, the type of aircraft work-ing in a CAS mission is almost irrele-vant to the JTAC because the targeting process, CAS procedures, and consid-erations remain the same regardless of the type of aircraft used. Addition-ally, the memorandum of agreement formalizing the Joint Close Air Support Executive Steering Committee’s 2005 action plan put zero emphasis on ur-ban CAS training or requirements for JTACs and the MOA signatories.2

All JTACs should be fitted with a chest mounted or a hand-held tablet that can store imagery, run PSS-SOF data, and receive VDL feeds and begin to train like we fight. Due to the nature of urban CAS, digital communications will become a vital means by which JTACs will accomplish their mission.

The focus should be on the qual-ity of controls versus the type of assets being used. This allows commanders the flexibility to dictate effective ur-ban training versus hunting down CAS training focused on nonurban range operations.

SMSgt Muller is the superintendent of the 274th Air Support Operations Squadron and previously served as course manager and superinten-dent for the Joint Terminal Attack Controller qualification course. He has participated in multiple deploy-ments to Afghanistan and Iraq.

END NOTES1 Associated Press, UN Predicts Urban Populations will Double by 2050. Dec 2013 (accessed 22 Dec). http://www.huffington-post.com/2013/12/10/un-predicts-near-doubling_n_4415290.html.2 Memorandum of Agreement between the US Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 and the US Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations and the United States Special Operations Command, Director, Operations Support Group for Joint Fires Observer, November 15,2005, http://sill-www.army.mil/ftc/documents/JFO%20MOA-Signed%2014%20Nov%2005.pdf

... JTACs have become too risk adverse, and current TTP are counterproduc-tive in urban combat.

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FEMALE SERVICE MEMBERS MODEL GENDERINTEGRATION AMONG PARTNER NATIONS

By MAJ Tiffany Collins, USA Women’s equality in the work-force has long been a topic of debate in the United States (US). Since the 1960s, societies in western culture have par-ticipated in the evolution of today’s lib-erated woman and have seen the female population chart career paths similar, or equal, to those of their male counter-parts.

Narrow the scope of that topic to focus on the Department of Defense (DOD) and a woman’s role during com-bat operations summarizes the Women in Service Review. The review states, essentially, women have seen com-bat throughout the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; serving, fighting, and in some cases sacrificing their lives along-side their brothers in arms. Based on those facts, former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta lifted the official ban on women in combat on January 1, 2013.

For the first time in US military history women will be able to contrib-

ute to the DOD mission without limi-tations. Even though each of the mili-tary Services continue to develop the individual processes necessary for the materialization of this monumental de-cision, Secretary of Defense Ash Cart-er announced in December 2015 that all military occupations and positions would be accessible to women, without exception. This began January 2016. To this, GEN Joseph Votel, Commander, United States Special Operations Com-mand (USSOCOM) immediately went on the record to support an all gender-integrated force. “As USSOCOM moves forward with integration, the command will absolutely not lower, raise, or cre-ate multiple sets of standards for spe-cial operations. If candidates meet time-tested and scientifically validated standards and, if they have proven that they have the physical, intellectual, professional, and character attributes that are so critical to special operations, they will be welcomed into the special operations forces,” Votel stated. 1

US Marine Corps Cpl Leslie Souza, right, assigned to the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, reviews a target during live-fire training with an unidentified member of the Kuwait Ministry of the Interior Personal Protection Unit, Female Division during a training event from 31 January to 11 February 2016 in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Photo by Capt Lindsay Pirek, USMC

Secretary of De-fense Ash Carter announced in December 2015 that all military occupations and positions would be accessible to women, without exception.

ALSB 2016-131

This is not much of a surprise to anyone following special operations forces’ (SOF’s) history of integrating women. For over 25 years, SOF have incorporated women within their air-crews and through capabilities such as civil affairs and military information support operations. Since 2011, cultur-al support teams (CST) distinguished themselves as a reputable force under the SOF umbrella by building rapport and trust among the civilian populace, mostly through their interaction with women and children. In the process, they improved counterinsurgency ob-jectives.

CST evolved during the Global War on Terrorism when SOF leaders realized their inability to engage the fe-male population in Iraq and Afghani-stan was a hindrance to their opera-tions. They recognized that dismissing the female population would allow the enemy to exploit a major security gap. This new-found capability (i.e., employ-

ing female Service members) allowed SOF to access over 60 percent of the population with whom they originally did not have the ability to connect due to cultural sensitivities.

While the US has had overt dis-cussions about women’s roles and how to better harness the skills of female Service members, partner-nation allies are having similar discussions among themselves. Published in December 2011, the US National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) un-der the United Nations Security Coun-cil Resolution 1325, was established “to empower half the world’s popula-tion as equal partners in preventing conflict and building peace in coun-tries threatened and affected by war, violence, and insecurity.” 2

In 2014, US SOF counterparts opened a dialogue with Special Opera-tions Command Central (SOCCENT), the Theater Special Operations Com-mand charged with conducting SOF

Two unidentified US Marines, left, with the Female Partner Force Engagement Team, demonstrate martial arts techniques during a subject matter expert exchange with the Qatari Internal Security Forces Female Personal Protection Unit in Qatar on 18 August 2015. Photo by Cpl Anna Albrecht, USMC

For over 25 years, SOF have incorporated women within their aircrews and through ca-pabilities such as civil affairs and military infor-mation support operations.

ALSB 2016-1 32

operations in the US Central Com-mand area of responsibility. The initial request for an all-female engagement came from the host nation of Qatar. Qatar leaders wanted a subject matter expert exchange on tactical matters, such as weapons handling, hand-to-hand combat, protective security detail procedures, and integration with male counterparts. As a result of that re-quest, US Army Staff Sergeant Melinda Relethford, 20th Special Forces Group (Airborne) began developing a program of instruction (POI) and building a team of highly qualified female Service mem-bers to support the requirement. Simi-lar to recognizing the need for female assets in Iraq and Afghanistan, Rele-thford said “the development of CSTs, female engagement teams (FETs), and the like, have been a result of the real-ization for their necessity.” In her ex-perience, “these programs are usually temporary and dissolve once the per-ceived need dissipates.”3

Once SOCCENT fulfilled this initial requirement, the requests kept coming and the need launched an in-novative concept, the female partner force engagement team. Cultural sup-port teams bridged cultural and gender specific gaps during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This ideology is being used to continue forging SOF relations with partner nation forces in the Middle East. Relethford said, “if … elite part-ner nation forces have a contingent of females that request equal quality SOF exchanges in the same manner as the men, then we should provide the same level of exchange, and the same caliber of Soldier, Sailor, Airmen, or Marine to participate in that exchange.” In her opinion, “we do not currently have that capacity, or dedicated capability within the SOF community.”4

Even with the forecasted change for an all-gender inclusion among US SOF, the fact remains that a substan-

Unidentified US Service members, center, with the Female Partner Force Engagement Team demonstrate how to apply field expedient tourni-quets during a subject matter expert exchange with the Qatari Internal Security Forces Female Personal Protection Unit in Qatar on 16 August 2015. Photo by MAJ Tiffany Collins, USA

Cultural support teams bridged cultural and gen-der specific gaps during the wars in Iraq and Afghani-stan.

ALSB 2016-133

tial, capable pipeline for female SOF operators is not in the DOD’s immedi-ate future, as SOF cannot be mass pro-duced in a limited span of time.

Since this initial engagement in the late summer of 2014, SOCCENT continues to support requests from several countries within the US Cen-tral Command area of responsibility. The POI has evolved as US counter-parts determine what is best suited for each of their specific needs. Even though the command is incapable of providing organic SOF assets at this time, the support SOCCENT receives from a continuous rotation of trained external assets through joint opera-tions with Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) currently makes meeting this expectation possible.

The 15th MEU’s FET executed the second iteration of this type of ex-change with the Qatari Internal Secu-rity Forces, or Lekhwiya Personal Pro-tection Unit, in August of 2015. During 2016, the 26th MEU’s FET conducted an exchange of information with the Kuwait Ministry of Interior Personal Protection Unit, Female Division.

“I was introduced to the Per-sonal Protection Unit when they asked the US Embassy to introduce self-de-fense tactics [in] their ongoing training of new female police officers [in] their female division,” stated US Air Force Lt Col Melody Mitchell, program lead, Office of Military Cooperation-Kuwait, US Embassy, Kuwait City, Kuwait. “We conducted two bilateral exchange ef-forts in 2014 and 2015. This subject matter expert exchange is the next lev-el and showcases the importance of the

[FETs] and how they enhance capabili-ties and interoperability on a tactical level, but also serve the greater strate-gic goal posed by our WPS Presidential Directive.”5

“These women [Personal Pro-tection Unit, Female Division] are all trailblazers, they are the role models for the young girls of Kuwait. They play a critical role because terrorists in the Middle East have capitalized on cul-tural norms and use women to gain an advantage. We must do the same to match and overcome their efforts,” she said. 6

As DOD leverages the expertise of female Service members to encour-age and model gender integration in partner nations, SOF operations inside US Central Command’s area of respon-sibility remain at the tip of the sphere by writing a new chapter on the role of female Service members and the next generation of SOF operators.

END NOTES1 General Joseph Votel. “USSOCOM Statement on Women in Service Review Decision.” www.socom.mil, US Special Operations Command, 3 December 2015. Web. 9 March 2016. http://www.socom.mil/News/pages/womeninservicereview.aspx. 2 The White House, The Office of the Press Secretary. “FACT SHEET: The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security.” www.theWhiteHouse.gov. The Office of the Press Secretary, 19 December 2011. Web. 9 March 2016. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/19/fact-sheet-united-states-national-action-plan-women-peace-and-security3 Relethford, Melinda. “Female Engagement Teams.” Personal interview with author. 25 October 2015.4 Ibid.5 Capt Pirek, Lindsey. “26th MEU Female Engagement Team Trains with Kuwaiti Police.” www.marines.mil. USMC, 4 March 2016. Web. 9 March 2016. http://www.marines.mil/mobile/News/View/tabid/16335/Article/686139/26th-meu-female-engagement-team-trains-with-kuwaiti-police.aspx.6 Ibid.

“These women ... are all trailblaz-ers, they are the role models for the young girls of Kuwait.

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CURRENT ALSA MTTP PUBLICATIONSAIR/SEA BRANCH – POC alsaA@us.af.mil

TITLE DATE PUB # DESCRIPTION/STATUS

AOMSWMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Proce-dures for Air Operations in Maritime Surface WarfareDistribution Restricted

15 FEB 16

ATP 3-04.18MCRP 3-25J NTTP 3-20.8AFTTP 3-2.74

Description: This publication consolidates Service doctrine, TTP, and lessons-learned from current operations and exer-cises to maximize the effectiveness of air attacks on enemy surface vessels.Status: Current

AVIATION URBAN OPERATIONSMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Proce-dures for Aviation Urban OperationsDistribution Restricted

27 APR 16

ATP 3-06.1MCRP 3-35.3ANTTP 3-01.04AFTTP 3-2.29

Description: This publication provides MTTP for tactical-lev-el planning and execution of fixed- and rotary-wing aviation urban operations.Status: Current

DYNAMIC TARGETINGMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Proce-dures for Dynamic TargetingDistribution Restricted

10 SEP 15

ATP 3-60.1MCRP 3-16DNTTP 3-60.1AFTTP 3-2.3

Description: This publication provides the JFC, operational staff, and components MTTP to coordinate, de-conflict, syn-chronize, and prosecute dynamic targets in any AOR. It in-cludes lessons learned, and multinational and other govern-ment agency considerations.Status: Current

IADS Change 1Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Proce-dures for an Integrated Air Defense SystemDistribution Restricted

9 SEP 14Change 1 incorpo-rated 5 NOV 15

ATP 3-01.15MCRP 3-25ENTTP 3-01.8AFTTP 3-2.31

Description: This publication provides joint planners with a consolidated reference on Service air defense systems, processes, and structures to include integration procedures. Status: Current

JFIREMulti-Service Procedures for the Joint Ap-plication of Firepower Distribution Restricted

21 JAN 16

ATP 3-09.32MCRP 3-16.6ANTTP 3-09.2AFTTP 3-2.6

Description: This is a pocket sized guide of procedures for calls for fire, CAS, and naval gunfire. It provides tactics for joint operations between attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft performing integrated battlefield operations.Status: Current

JSEADMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses in a Joint EnvironmentDistribution Restricted

15 DEC 15

ATP 3-01.4MCRP 3-22.2ANTTP 3-01.42AFTTP 3-2.28

Description: This publication contributes to Service interop-erability by providing the JTF and subordinate commanders, their staffs, and SEAD operators a single reference.Status: Current

KILL BOXMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Proce-dures for Kill Box EmploymentDistribution Restricted

16 APR 14

ATP 3-09.34MCRP 3-25HNTTP 3-09.2.1AFTTP 3-2.59

Description: This MTTP publication outlines multi-Service kill box planning procedures, coordination requirements, em-ployment methods, and C2 responsibilities.Status: Revision

SCAR Change 1Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Pro-cedures for Strike Coordination and Recon-naissance Distribution Restricted

10 JAN 14Change 1 incorpo-rated 31 MAR 14

ATP 3-60.2MCRP 3-23CNTTP 3-03.4.3AFTTP 3-2.72

Description: This publication provides strike coordination and reconnaissance MTTP to the military Services for con-ducting air interdiction against targets of opportunity.Status: Revision

SURVIVAL, EVASION, AND RECOVERYMulti-Service Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and RecoveryDistribution Restricted

11 SEP 12

ATP 3-50.3 MCRP 3-02H NTTP 3-50.3AFTTP 3-2.26

Description: This is a weather-proof, pocket-sized, quick ref-erence guide of basic information to assist Service members in a survival situation regardless of geographic location.Status: Current

UASMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Proce-dures for Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft SystemsDistribution Restricted

22 JAN 15

ATP 3-04.64MCRP 3-42.1ANTTP 3-55.14AFTTP 3-2.64

Description: This publication establishes MTTP for UAS by addressing tactical and operational considerations, system capabilities, payloads, mission planning, logistics, and multi-Service execution.Status: Current

LAND BRANCH – POC alsaB@us.af.milTITLE DATE PUB # DESCRIPTION/STATUS

ADVISINGMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Proce-dures for Advising Foreign ForcesDistribution Restricted

01 NOV 14ATP 3-07.10MCRP 3-33.8ANTTP 3-07.5AFTTP 3-2.76

Description: This publication discusses how advising fits into security assistance/security cooperation and provides defini-tions for specific terms as well as listing several examples to facilitate the advising process.Status: Project Assessment

ALSB 2016-135

LAND BRANCH – POC alsaB@us.af.milTITLE DATE PUB # DESCRIPTION/STATUS

AIRFIELD OPENINGMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airfield Opening Distribution Restricted

18 JUN 15

ATP 3-17.2MCRP 3-21.1BNTTP 3-02.18AFTTP 3-2.68

Description: This publication provides guidance for operational com-manders and staffs on opening and transferring an airfield. It contains information on service capabilities, planning considerations, airfield assessment, and establishing operations in all operational environ-ments.Status: Current

BIOMETRICSMulti-Service Tactics, techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Employment of Biometrics in Support of OperationsApproved for Public Release

6 MAY 16

ATP 2-22.85MCRP 3-33.1JNTTP 3-07.16AFTTP 3-2.85CGTTP 3-93.6

Description: Fundamental TTP for biometrics collection planning, integration, and employment at the tactical level in support of opera-tions is provided in this publication.Status: Revision

CF-SOFMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and InteroperabilityDistribution Restricted

13 MAR 14

FM 6-05MCWP 3-36.1NTTP 3-05.19AFTTP 3-2.73USSOCOM Pub 3-33

Description: This is a comprehensive reference for commanders and staffs at the operational and tactical levels with standardized tech-niques and procedures to assist in planning and executing operations requiring synchronization between CF and SOF occupying the same area of operation.Status: Revision

CORDON AND SEARCHMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations Distribution Restricted

10 MAY 13

ATP 3-06.20MCRP 3-31.4BNTTP 3-05.8AFTTP 3-2.62

Description: This is a comprehensive reference to assist ground com-manders, subordinates, and aviation personnel in planning, training, and conducting tactical cordon and search operations.Status: Revision

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Defense Suport of Civil AuthoritiesApproved for Public Release

25 SEP 15

ATP 3-28.1MCWP 3-36.2NTTP 3-57.2AFTTP 3-2.67

Description: DSCA sets forth MTTP at the tactical level to assist the military planner, commander, and individual Service forces in the em-ployment of military resources in response to domestic emergencies in accordance with US law.Status: Current

EOMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Unexploded Explosive Ordnance OperationsDistribution Restricted

15 JUL 15

ATTP 4-32.2MCRP 3-17.2BNTTP 3-02.4.1AFTTP 3-2.12

Description: This publication provides commanders and their units guidelines and strategies for planning and operating in an explosive ordnance environment while minimizing the impact of explosive ord-nance on friendly operations. Status: Current

EODMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal in a Joint EnvironmentDistribution Restricted

6 MAY 15

ATP 4-32.16MCRP 3-17.2CNTTP 3-02.5AFTTP 3-2.32

Description: This publication identifies standard MTTP for planning, integrating, and executing EOD operations in a joint environment.Status: Current

JATCMulti-Service Procedures for Joint Air Traffic ControlDistribution Restricted

18 APR 14

ATP 3-52.3MCRP 3-25ANTTP 3-56.3AFTTP 3-2.23

Description: This is a single source, descriptive reference guide to ensure standard procedures, employment, and Service relationships are used during all phases of ATC operations. It also outlines how to synchronize and integrate JATC capabilities.Status: Revision

MILITARY DIVING OPERATIONS (MDO)Multi-Service Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military Diving OperationsDistribution Restricted

13 FEB 15

ATP 3-34.84MCRP 3-35.9ANTTP 3-07.7AFTTP 3-2.75CGTTP 3-95.17

Description: This publication is a single source, descriptive reference guide to ensure effective planning and integration of multi-Service diving operations. It provides combatant command, joint force, joint task force, and operational staffs with a comprehensive resource for planning military diving operations, including considerations for each Service’s capabilities, limitations, and employment.Status: Current

NLWMulti-Service Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal WeaponsDistribution Restricted

13 FEB 15

ATP 3-22.40MCWP 3-15.8NTTP 3-07.3.2AFTTP 3-2.45CGTTP 3-93.2

Description: This publication provides a single-source, consolidated reference on employing nonlethal weapons. Its intent is to make com-manders and subordinates aware of using nonlethal weapons in a range of scenarios including security, stability, crowd control, determination of intent, and situations requiring the use of force just short of lethal.Status: Current

OP ASSESSMENTMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operation AssesmentApproved for Public Release

18 AUG 15

ATP 5-0.3MCRP 5-1CNTTP 5-01.3AFTTP 3-2.87

Description: This publication serves as a commander and staff guide for integrating assessments into the planning and operations process-es for operations conducted at any point along the range of military operations.Status: Current

PEACE OPSMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace OperationsApproved for Public Release

1 NOV 14ATP 3-07.31MCP 3-33.8AFTTP 3-2.40

Description: This publication offers a basic understanding of joint and multinational PO, an overview of the nature and fundamentals of PO, and detailed discussion of selected military tasks associated with PO. Status: Current

TACTICAL CONVOY OPERATIONSMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy OperationsDistribution Restricted

18 APR 14

ATP 4-01.45MCRP 4-11.3HNTTP 4-01.3AFTTP 3-2.58

Description: This is a quick-reference guide for convoy commanders operating in support of units tasked with sustainment operations. It includes TTP for troop leading procedures, gun truck employment, IEDs, and battle drills.Status: Revision

ALSB 2016-1 36

COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2), CYBER AND SPACE BRANCH - POC: alsaC@us.af.milTITLE DATE PUB # DESCRIPTION/STATUS

AIRSPACE CONTROLMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Proce-dures for Airspace ControlDistribution Restricted

09 APR 15

ATP 3-52.1MCWP 3-25.13NTTP 3-56.4AFTTP 3-2.78

Description: This MTTP publication is a tactical-level docu-ment which synchronizes and integrates airspace C2 func-tions and serves as a single-source reference for planners and commanders at all levels.Status: Current

AIR-TO-SURFACE RADAR SYSTEM EM-PLOYMENTMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air-to-Surface Radar System EmploymentDistribution Restricted

10 NOV 15

ATP 3-55.6MCRP 2-24A NTTP 3-55.13AFTTP 3-2.2

Description: This publication covers theater-level, air-to-surface radar systems and discusses system capabilities and limitations performing airborne command and control; wide area surveillance for near-real-time targeting and target development; and processing, exploiting, and disseminating collected target dataStatus: Current

BREVITYMulti-Service Brevity CodesDistribution Restricted

23 OCT 14

ATP 1-02.1MCRP 3-25BNTTP 6-02.1AFTTP 3-2.5

Description: This publication defines multi-Service brevity which standardizes air-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-to-air, and surface-to-surface brevity code words in multi-Service operations.Status: Revision

EW REPROGRAMMINGMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Pro-cedures for the Reprogramming of Electronic Warfare and Target Sensing SystemsDistribution Restricted

17 JUN 14ATP 3-13.10 NTTP 3-51.2AFTTP 3-2.7

Description: This publication describes MTTP for EW repro-gramming; the EW reprogramming process, requirements, and procedures for coordinating reprogramming during joint and multi-Service operations, Services’ reprogramming pro-cesses, organizational points of contact, and reprogramming databases and tools.Status: Current

ISR OptimizationMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance OptimizationDistribution Restricted

14 APR 15

ATP 3-55.3MCRP 2-2ANTTP 2-01.3AFTTP 3-2.88

Description: This publication provides a comprehensive re-source for planning, executing, and assessing surveillance, reconnaissance, and processing, exploitation, and dissemi-nation operations. Status: Current

TACTICAL CHATMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Proce-dures for Internet Tactical Chat in Support of OperationsDistribution Restricted

24 JAN 14

ATP 6-02.73MCRP 3-40.2BNTTP 6-02.8AFTTP 3-2.77

Description: This publication provides commanders and their units guidelines to facilitate coordinating and integrating tactical chat when conducting multi-Service and joint force operations.Status: Current

TACTICAL RADIOSMulti-Service Communications Procedures for Tactical Radios in a Joint Environment Approved for Public Release

5 NOV 13

ATP 6-02.72 MCRP 3-40.3ANTTP 6-02.2AFTTP 3-2.18

Description: This is a consolidated reference for TTP in em-ploying, configuring, and creating radio nets for voice and data tactical radios. Status: Revision

TAGSMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Proce-dures for the Theater Air-Ground SystemDistribution Restricted

30 JUN 14

ATP 3-52.2MCRP 3-25FNTTP 3-56.2AFTTP 3-2.17

Description: This publication promotes Service awareness regarding the role of airpower in support of the JFC’s cam-paign plan, increases understanding of the air-ground sys-tem, and provides planning considerations for conducting air-ground ops.Status: Current

UHF SATCOMMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Proce-dures Package for Ultra High Frequency Mili-tary Satellite CommunicationsDistribution Restricted

9 AUG 13

ATP 6-02.90MCRP 3-40.3GNTTP 6-02.9AFTTP 3-2.53

Description: Operations at the JTF level have demonstrated difficulties in managing a limited number of UHF SATCOM frequencies. This publication documents TTP that will im-prove efficiency at the planner and user levels. Status: Project Assessment

ALSB 2016-137

Got a story? Want to tell it?

Help us help you!The Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center

develops multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) with the goal of meeting the immediate needs of the warfighter. In addition to developing MTTP, ALSA provides the ALSB fo-rum to facilitate tactically and operationally rel-evant information exchanges among warfighters of all Services.

There is no better resource for information than the people doing the jobs. Personal experi-ences, studies, and individual research lead to inspirational and educational articles. There-fore, we invite our readers to share their experi-ences and, possibly, have them published in an upcoming ALSB.

We want to take your expertise and lessons learned from recent operations or any other multi-Service or multi-nation missions in which you have been involved, and spread that knowl-edge to others. Get published by sharing your experiences and expertise.

The ALSB is an open warfighter forum where warfighters have the opportunity to discuss top-ics of their choosing. This is an excellent oppor-tunity for you to share your insights, on topics that may not be covered in doctrine or address an operational gap that highlights emerging needs for supporting multi-Service publications.

Please keep submissions unclassified and in accordance with the instructions in the require-ments box on this page.

Air Land Sea BulletinArticle

Requirements and Deadlines

Submissions must:

• Be unclassified• Be 5,000 words or less• Be publicly releasable• Be double spaced• Be in MS Word format• Include the author’s name, unit address, telephone numbers, and email address • Include current, high-resolution, 300 dpi (minimum), original photographs and graphics. Pub- lic affairs offices can be good sources for photographs or graphic support.

Article and photo submission deadlines are below. Early submissions are highly encouraged and appreciated.

FUTURE AIR LAND SEA BULLETINS (ALSB)

Issue Deadline Point of Contact

Winter 2017

1 October2016

alsaC@us.af.mil(757) 225-0904

Summer 2017

1 April2017

alsaA@us.af.mil(757) 225-0967

Winter 2018

1 October 2017

alsaB@us.af.mil(757) 225-0851

ALSB 2016-1 38

Joint Actions Steering Committee

DirectorCol Michael E. Kensick, USAF

DeputyCOL David R. Applegate, USA

Support StaffCheryl Parris, Admin Support AsstSonya Robinson, Budget AnalystLeila Joyce, Office Automation Asst

Publishing StaffPatricia Radcliffe, EditorLaura Caswell, IllustratorMaj Darin Lupini, Publications Officer

NCOICSrA Justin Kromrie, USAF

LandLTC Randy Weisner, USA LTC John Walmsley, USALt Col Ian Boyd, USAFMAJ Shawn Herrick, USA

C2/Cyber/SpaceMaj Darin Lupini, USAF MAJ (P) James Edwards, USAMaj Ryan Batchelor, USAF

Air and SeaCDR Shane Moore, USNMAJ Jeffrey Hazard, USA Maj Mark Peckham, USMCMaj Ryan Graf, USAF

ALSA ORGANIZATION

ALSA JOINT WORKING GROUPSDate Publication Location Point of Contact

11-15 Jul 16 Fighter Integration Nellis AFB Air/Sea BranchalsaA@us.af.mil

19-21 Jul 16 Kill Box and SCAR Nellis AFB Air/Sea BranchalsaA@us.af.mil

25-29 Jul 16 Advising Joint Base Langley-Eustis

Land BranchalsaB@us.af.mil

8-12 Aug CF-SOF Joint Base Langley-Eustis

Land BranchalsaB@us.af.mil

8-12 Aug 16 IADS Nellis AFB Air/Sea BranchalsaA@us.af.mil

8-12 Aug 16 Fighter Integration NAS Fallon Air/Sea BranchalsaA@us.af.mil

15-19 Aug 16 Kill Box and SCAR Joint Base Langley-Eustis

Air/Sea BranchalsaA@us.af.mil

22-26 Aug 16 Personnel Recovery Joint Base Langley-Eustis

Air/Sea BranchalsaA@us.af.mil

All Dates are Tentative

ALSB 2016-139

ALSA’s mission is to rapidly and responsively de-velop multi-Service tactics, techniques and procedures, studies, and other like solutions across the entire military spectrum to meet the immediate needs of the war-fighter.

ALSA is a joint organization governed by a Joint Actions Steering Committee chartered by a memorandum of agree-ment under the authority of the Commanders of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, USMC Combat Develop-ment Command, Navy Warfare Development Command, and Headquarters, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education.

ALSA Public Websitehttp://www.alsa.mil

ALSA SIPR Sitehttps://intelshare.intelink.sgov.gov/sites/alsa

JEL+https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=84

ALSA MISSION

VOTING JASC MEMBERS

ONLINE ACCESS TO ALSA PRODUCTS

Maj Gen Timothy L. Leahy

Commander, Curtis E. LeMay Center for

Doctrine Development and Education

CAPT T.K. Kiss

Acting Commander, Navy Warfare Development

Command

Mr. Thomas M. Jordan

Deputy Director, Mission Command Center of

Excellence

BGen (Sel) R.B.Turner Jr

Director, Capabilities Development

Directorate, Marine Corps Combat

Development Command

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