No. 2 SQUADRON & RIVERINE OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM

SLIDE 1 – Cover slide

2 Sqn in Vn Apr 67 to Jun 71, self mid-term 1969-70,

60% of my missions were down to Mekong Delta, now looking closer at it.

Acknowledge many photos off web from US Riverine and unit Associations

SLIDE 2 – Air Bases

Phan Rang equidistant from DMZ and bottom IV Corps

South Vietnam equivalent in area to Sy-Ml by road, 40 miles either side.

Terrain varied – Tiger Mountains (literally) in I Corps, Mountains and plains in II Corps, Aussie-like country in II Corps.

Only 1 air base in IV Corps. Binh Thuy – no room for strike squadrons.

SLIDE 3 – IV Corp Map

During the presentation I’ll use Mekong Delta and IV Corps interchangeably but to be precise they were not the same region.

Full of rivers creeks etc running off the Mekong and Bassac as well as hundreds of years’ worth of carved out canals.

Extensive forests although civilisation has hacked much back as well as the war I presume

1/3rd South Vietnamese population and most of the VC lived in the Mekong Delta.

The rice bowl of the nation.

Basically controlled by VC, supported by NVA, definitely at night time.

SLIDE 4 – Terrain

Artillery firing – typical swampy country.

Warfare is defined by its environment – air, ground and sea warfare are easily understood – Riverine warfare quite simply means warfare where waterways are the primary method of movement. (Gen Shelton, 2nd Brigade Commander 9th Div 1967)

Quote: From “About Face” by warrior Colonel David Hackworth, former 9th Army battalion commander (3/49th), “I am convinced that no American soldier has ever suffered more than the infantryman who fought in the Mekong Delta during the Vietnam War, and that includes those at Valley Forge, the Bulge of Christmas ’44 and Korea the winter of ’50. It was a horrible place. An alluvial plain less than six feet above sea level wherever you were, your feet were always wet, and for a large majority of the time so was the rest of you. At low tide, the rice paddies were a foot deep, at least six inches of which was thick mud; you had little choice but to wade through them, though, because the dikes were generally booby trapped. When the tides were out, the myriads of

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crisscrossing canals were often mud up to your neck; you couldn’t avoid them and you’d emerge exhausted, with leeches clinging to your body.”

SLIDE 5 – Weather

Tropical wx, same latitude as Darwin, 10o North, reverse wet season (SW monsoon May-Oct).

Need to arrive on target early am to be effective in such conditions.

SLIDE 6 – Low cloud

Dry season – dust, mist, low cloud.

SLIDE 7 – US 9th Division

9th Division arrived in South Vietnam in 1967 after a joint service Riverine Warfare Doctrine was hastily cobbled together by US Navy and US Army staff officers at Coronado, California in 1966.

Even though they were defeated at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the French foreign legionnaires were the experts in many forms of warfare, including riverine operations. They left behind a large water-based infrastucture in the Mekong Delta which was not fully effective against the Communists for a number of reasons, including a failed corrupt politicised leadership. A few thousand token US advisers were sent to help the Vietnamese armed forces but the area remained very much dominated by the VC.

The great American “air mobile revolution” never really came to IV Corps. Instead only a few Aviation Companies were sent in to support the ARVN.

In 1961 a few Shawnee troop carrying helicopters arrived on board a US naval ship in Saigon with great fanfare and one was immediately shot down on their 1st mission, thus emphasising the need for armed airborne escort and the arrival of the ubiquitous UH-1 Huey gunship to do the job.

Absolutely amazing how the US screwed up their positioning of forces in Vietnam.

Quote: Another astute quote from David Hackworth who noted: “..the tactical absurdity of having the 9th Div in the Delta in the first place. The Marine Corps was the Defense Department’s amphibious arm. Yet throughout this period, when the Army was stumbling and splashing like ducks through the waterways of the Mekong Delta, the Marines, configured and trained, and equipped as amphibious shock troops (perfect for Delta combat) were fighting an infantry footslogging war up in I Corps, the most rugged terrain in Vietnam.”

Initially based at Bearcat in III Corps, 9th moved Headquarters to Dong Tam in northern IV Corps on the Mekong River, sitting astride the back-doorway to Saigon.

RAAF FACs served at Dong Tam with 9th Div, including a very well-known one - Garry Cooper - who was nominated by Commander 9 Division for a US equivalent of the Victoria Cross and which was opposed by the Australian Government.

If you saw the movie “Forrest Gump” you may have observed that he too fought with the 9 th

Division in the 2nd/47th battalion which fought in the Rung Sat Secret Zone and elsewhere in northern IV Corps.

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But by the end of 1969 9th Division had pulled up stumps and gone home.

SLIDE 8 – 105mm howitzer post

Exemplifies how impossible it was for conventional Army forces to operate in Mekong

SLIDE 9 – Elmo Zumwalt

The US 7th Fleet ran the main Vietnam sea show. Included – TF-77 with Aircraft Carriers off Yankee station, sending strike aircraft into North Vietnam; supporting US Marine Corps 1st & 3rd Division landings in I Corps and undertaking Naval Gunfire Support along the entire coastline (Operation Sea Dragon). It also did Operation Market Time with P-2 Neptunes and then P-3 Orions seawards as the 3rd coastal surveillance barrier as destroyers and the US Coast Guard worked the inner barriers.

A separate Naval Force Commander for the rest of Vietnam was set up in 1966 specifically for the Mekong Delta, recognising the significance of water-borne traffic in this region and the need to reclaim the area from the Communists as well as stopping infiltration from Cambodia.

US Navy formed 3 Task Forces in the Delta – TF-115 (Coastal Surveillance Force) helping Operation Market Time as the inner barrier hugging the coast, TF-116 (River Patrol Force) and TF-117 (Mobile River Force) doing the assault work.

Until 1968 these functions were more of a defensive nature until RADM Elmo Zumwalt replaced RADM Norvell Ward as COMUSNAVFORV.

He was determined to take the initiative against the enemy and proclaimed the “SEA LORDS” Strategy, standing for Southeast Asia Lake, Ocean, River, and Delta Strategy.

SLIDE 10 – SEALORDS

SEALORDS was both a joint and combined strategy, bringing together naval and land forces of the US and Vietnam and starting with 4 barriers set up roughly paralleling the South Vietnam-Cambodian border aimed at stopping Communist infiltration.

To prosecute it, Adm Zumwalt created a joint service Task Force TF-194 by amalgamating the three disparate Navy Task Forces with what was ostensibly two brigades of the 9th Infantry Division.

In reality the 9th Division had 10 manoeuvre battalions but only 3 were riverine battalions and it these 3 who provided the troops to live on board with the Navy and be carried by US Navy boats on missions gradually penetrating more and more into traditional VC territory across the Mekong Delta’s rivers, creeks and canals.

Interestingly many US Army and US Navy histories don’t give the other side much credit and command and control was not easy.

Without the synergy that the USN and Marines had in spades, with different structures, ethos and procedures it’s a wonder that it worked at all.

Planning wise, Army had precedence as they outranked their Navy counterparts and most of the boats commanders were US Navy Lieutenants or below.

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SLIDE 11 – Swift boats

The PCF – Patrol Craft Fast - Swift boat was the mainstay of the Coastal Surveillance Force (TF-115) operating offshore and also served as part of River Patrol Force TF-116. Arrived from commercial US builders in mid-1965, 50’ long, 23 kts, 0.50 cal mg + 81mm mortar.

SLIDE 12 – PBRs

River Patrol Boat, mainly in TF-116, River Patrol Force, operating inland. Much smaller than Swifts at 32’ long, but good speed of 25kts, very good 18-30” draft and highly manoeuvrable, 2 x .50 cals forward, one aft + grenade launcher.

SLIDE 13 – Tangos

Armoured Troop Carriers (ATC) were bulk of the Mobile River Force (MRF) - each carried a platoon of 40 fully armed troops. Converted LCM-6 landing craft, heavily armoured and armed (20mm. 0.30 and 0.50 cal mgs). Some had helo deck fitted aft. Slow assault boats – 6 knots.

Once they had disgorged their troops, the Navy sailors would gather their weapons and sail into blocking position to engage the enemy as they evaded the infantry troops.

Some ATCs were converted as “battleships” and called “monitors” with history in mind no doubt. 105mm howitzer fwd, 81mm mortars, 40mm cannon, automatic grenade launchers.

SLIDE 14 – Command and Control

ATC with joint Battalion and River Squadron command posts on board.

SLIDES 15 & 16 – MRF landings

Tangos about to disgorge troops

SLIDE 17 - Zippo

Tango with flame thrower

SLIDE 18 – Mobile Riverine Base (Barracks Ship - USS Colleton, APB-36)

Initially 11 different ships (LSTs as well as this barracks ship) were used for 2 mobile riverine force (MRF) bases.

These ships moved up and down the major rivers of the Delta as the operational situation dictated in order to serve as floating support bases from which the force launched operations.

Battalions of the US Army 9th Division’s 2nd Brigade lived on board MRF ships, starting in-country training in the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) close to Saigon.

Navy boat crews, staff and support personnel were also quartered on board the ships.

SLIDE 19 – MOBILE RIVERINE BASE

View from the mother ship.

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SLIDE 20 – FLOATING MOBILE ADVANCED TACTICAL SUPPORT BASE (MATSB) “SEA FLOAT”

In mid-1969, the emphasis turned to internal operations in the Delta and Operation Sea Float was initiated.

Sea Float was a floating Mobile Advanced Tactical Support Base (MATSB) bordering on the U Minh Forest on the Ca Mau peninsula,

It was constructed in Nha Be, near Saigon and towed south by sea to be anchored on the Song Cau Lon in the south. Anchor buoys were set by LCM-8 landing craft and a combat salvage boat while fighting up to 10 knot tidal flows.

Made from 11 90’ x 30’ pontoon barges coupled together, it was a floating fortress hosting Swift boats, Riverine units, US Navy SEAL teams and underwater demolition teams (UDTs).

It was protected by Water Borne Guard Posts (WBGPs), a US Navy Patrol Gunboat (PG), a World War 2-vintage Vietnamese Landing Ship Support Large (LSSL), by remote sensors to monitor safe zones and detect enemy activities in the canals, streams and forests nearby.

To defend the MATSB from enemy swimmer zapper attacks, concussion grenades were thrown into the surrounding water from 4 watch stations every 30 seconds, 24 hours a day, ultimately causing cracks to open up in the pontoons which then required pumping out daily.

(On the slide – Beach Jumpers were psywar warriors and Duffel Bag was the code name for seism ic and motion people sensors.)

SLIDE 21 – Map – Sea Float, Breezy Cove

SLIDE 22 – Breezy Cove

The allies further threatened the Communist "rear" area in Sep 1969 when they set up patrols on the western side of the Ca Mau peninsula on the Song Ong Doc on the other side of the dense and isolated U Minh forest region.

US and Vietnamese PBRs struck out from Operation Breezy Cove’s Advanced Tactical Support Base (ATSB) repeatedly intercepting and destroying enemy supply parties crossing the waterways, thus extending the allies’ offensive presence on the southernmost tip of South Vietnam.

The aim was to promote resettlement, grow crops and eliminate the tax collecting activities of the VC.

SLIDE 23 – Organic Navy Air

US Navy Sea Wolves of HAL-4 were headquartered at Binh Thuy but mainly operated from these dispersed support bases under the SEALORDS strategy with slicks to carry troops and gunships to escort them.

SLIDE 24 – Black Pony OV-10s

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A US Navy OV-10 squadron (callsign Black Pony) arrived in country in Mar 1969, with one detachment at Vung Tau to operate in the Rung Sat Special Zone and the other from Binh Thuy covering further south to support SEALORDS.

SLIDE 25 – Ubiquitous Huey

Around 10,000 Hueys in Vietnam but not that many in IV corps. This one here is being flown by pilots of the Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight Vietnam (RANHFV).

Both air and ground crews supplemented the short supply of US helo operators, being integrated with the 135th US Army Assault Helicopter Company (AHC) as an Experimental Mobile Unit (EMU). 4 detachments altogether. 1st mission flying 9th Division troops into battle 3 Nov 1967. Returned to Australia about same time as 2 Squadron – mid 1971.

SLIDE 26 – 2 Sqn in IV Corps

40% of all missions, peaked in 1969 with 68% in IV Corps that year

Although flying in IV Corps had its hazards, worst time for 2 Sqn was in I Corps in final year 1970-71

SLIDE 27 – CANBERRA 228

Canberra was an enigma in Vietnam – hi altitude nuclear bomber posing as a tactical fighter.

[Air missions – Close Air Support, Interdiction (others FAC, Recce, Escort, Combat Support, Air assault, Air re-supply)]

Quite a few pros and cons. Pros included range & endurance, ability to fly under cloud, its level bombing technique, accuracy, surprise. Cons included lack of quick reaction, bombing system weaknesses, limited weapon range.

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A major factor was endurance. With a full load of fuel and bombs, 45 minutes to target area in IV Corps, loiter for at least an hour.

SLIDE 28 – F-100

Strike fighters heading for IV Corps needed KC-135 lined up in Cab Ranks off the coast or “feet wet” as we called it.

SLIDE 29 – Bomb sight

Canberra was the only level bomber based in Vietnam, B-52s came from Andersen AFB (Guam), U Tapao (Thailand) and Kadena (Okinawa) and admittedly some fighters dropped their high drag Mk 82 bombs flying very fast across the target at scaringly low levels.

Relying on visual target acquisition, it was really only a day bomber, but so were most other tactical fighters.

Night-time missions mid-way through the conflict were the exception rather than the rule. For example, in 1969 7 of the 8 Magpie missions were day visual while one night-time CSS was carried out. In the early days, before settling on an appropriate visual bombing pattern, 2 Sqn crews did a lot of late night Combat Proof or Sky Spot missions directed by ground-based radar controllers. 228 with Mike Herbert and Bob Carver on board was lost during a CSS mission at night.

Level bombing at lower altitudes by Canberras, with us flying only 2.5% of US tactical missions, was a rare sight for many and there were the inevitable conflicts with diving fighters and a number of near misses. We were lucky not to have a mid-air collision in Vietnam.

SLIDE 30 – Bombing pattern

Wg Cdr Vance Drummond was the 1st FAC assigned to South Vietnam and his successor, Wg Cdr Tony Powell, was a pioneering FAC in Vietnam. He and No 2 Squadron’s Executive Officer Wg Cdr Vin Hill in mid-1967 together figured out a bombing profile for the Canberra to suit the conditions.

Plusses for crews – gave time to establish and go through an elaborate bombing routine.

Negatives for others – FACs, troops etc. More on that later.

SLIDE 31 – Accuracy

Accuracy in IV Corps far exceeded that in other Corps.

First of all terrain was flat and there was no trouble in estimating target height compared with the remote rugged mountains in I Corps.

Secondly targets were alongside canals and rivers, mainly long and narrow, thus easy to line up on.

Dropping sticks of 6 were popular as were multiple Canberra strikes on same target – good for pre-strikes, mine field clearance and breaking up base camps where VC were hunkered down.

SLIDE 32 – Inaccuracy

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BDA: “Beaucoup VC fish”.

Crew coordination in bombing runs was critical and bombing was a challenge for both pilot and nav-bomb aimer.

It was all manual flying – no autopilot and bombing accuracy demanded steady attitude even though opening the bomb bays created a whole lot of drag which needed to be countered, constant speed at 270 knots indicated, especially if bombing fixed sight head relying on manually set angle based on ground speed and offsetting the sight for drift left or right.

No last minute corrections otherwise this happened.

Experienced bomb aimers finding the aircraft still unaligned late on the run in would, without telling the pilot so he wouldn’t become confused, order a turn away from the target aiming to use the centripetal force to throw the bombs outwards towards the target. It did work!

SLIDE 33 – Green Satin – T-4 Computer

Visual bombing depended on good g/s and drift.

The only radar in RAAF Canberra bombers was a small Brit system known given c ode name by the RAF of Green Satin.

With antennas in each wing, transmitter and receiver in the tail, using the Doppler principle applied to reflected radar beams, it assessed the aircraft’s path over the ground, feeding signals to the T-4 computer to derive ground speed and drift which was fed to the bomb sight.

Here is the T Mk1 – one of the UK electro-mechanical marvels, the predecessor of T-4 in RAAF Canberras.

While the Green Satin/T-4 combination was fine for high altitude RAF bombing when it came to low level over the paddy fields of the Mekong Delta the radar signals could bounce off the water with much less power returning to the aircraft. Not only this, the returning signal would also arrive back much faster than envisaged for high altitude flight and thus the computer had problems as well.

Together this meant trouble and there’s nothing like a malfunctioning bomb sight to piss off your pilot, the FAC and the rest of the combatants waiting for you to resolve the problem.

Late in 1969 the Variable Ratio Gear Box (VRGB) was introduced to dampen errors and maintain automatic inputs into the bomb sight, but this had teething problems as well.

So us bomb aimers became adept at disconnecting the electronics and reverting back to good old fashioned dead reckoning, using a Fixed Sight Head technique where ground speed and drift were calculated by observing the local wind from smoke on the ground, or better still asking the guy before you who bomber what his ground speed and drift were, and then fed manually into the sight. Of course if he missed the target you’d apply your own correction as well.

SLIDE 34 – Prayer Wheel

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In IV Corps the enemy would snuggle away in daytime in their bunkers by the river’s edge over quite long distances and I’ve found a reference to one battle in 9th Division’s AO in northern IV Corps where riverine forces were constantly under attack from an ambush along one canal or river from enemy firing along a 1.5 km stretch!

Thus it was critical for us to get the drift right in this territory.

Range errors would still get you in the ballpark.

Anecdote: RAAF FAC Garry Cooper tells a good story about one Magpie mission he controlled not far from Dong Tam, 9th Division’s HQ, when the Canberra crew, probably new and still working up on their proficiency, had dropped poorly. Their last bombs overshot his smoke by hundreds of metres. As he was bidding them goodbye without any BDA, he saw a bunch of VC scattering from the vicinity as the bombs had landed on bunkers further along that he wasn’t aware of. Until then the VC may have been amused by the ineffective bombing but not so after as a major battle ensued as the Canberra departed for Phan Rang.

SLIDE 35 – Working with FACs

Major limitation - 2 Sqn mainly daylight bombing in IV Corps when real warriors asleep.

Unable to participate in night fighting unless by Combat Sky Spot – more common in early days 1967-8.

FAC work load – one armed paper hanger, USAF FACs worked alone in their Bird Dogs.

Problems from FAC perspective: Canberra slow and steady compared to frantic dive bombers, difficult getting friendlies to hold fire while it set up,

SLIDE 36 – Snoopy’s Nose

Visual rendezvous points from air.

SLIDE 37 - Testicles

SLIDE 38 – Wagon Wheel

Where Hackworth’s 3/49th was based

SLIDE 39 – Infiltration routes

Via Ho Chi Minh trail

Cut off from sea approaches by Market Time forces.

SLIDE 40 – 2 Squadron operations

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SLIDE 41 – SEALORDS Overview again

SLIDE 42 – Speaker’s own missions

100 known missions in III & IV Corps out of 260 missions

Significant clusters around 3 Sisters, U Minh forest and Tay Ninh (III Corps)

SLIDE 43 – Seven Sisters or Mountains

Near Cambodian border. Only 1 mission – FAC lamented that 2 Squadron didn’t show up more often, stated that very “juicy targets” just across the border.

SLIDE 44 – Operation Giant Slingshot

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Operation Giant Slingshot lasted over 15 months (515 days) ending in Apr 1971.

RAAF FACs were heavily involved here out of Lai Khe. Including Graham Neil of course. Others up there included Peter Larard, Dick Kellaway, Ken Semmler, Ray Butler and Huck Ennis for a while. Chris Langton was further north at Dau Tieng.

SLIDE 45 – U Minh forest landing

Plenty of 2 Sqn missions here

SLIDE 46 – Secondary

Out of IV Corps, evidence of arms cache – comforting given some back-of-the-mind concerns re target legitimacy.

Can’t figure out why David FACs out of Binh Thuy hardly get mentioned on the web or in “Cleared Hot” – was it because they were embedded with ARVN and did questionable things?

SLIDE 47 – NVA ship

100’ long enemy steel-hulled trawlers were capable of carrying 250 tons of arms and supplies.

This one was sunk at Nha Trang.

One 2 Sqn heavy told me that he was specifically fragged by 7th Air Force to sink a ship, probably like this.

Regrettably as his althzeimers sets in, recall of details seems unlikely, e.g. date, location, etc.

SLIDE 48 – 35th TFA BDA

2 Sqn punched above its weight which made 35th TFA commanders happy. Key reason for high BDA was IV Corps missions.

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SLIDE 49 – End

Summary:

The Riverine War in the Mekong Delta, was a specialised war within the South Vietnam war. The 7th Air Force tasked No 2 Squadron according to tactical priorities at the time and

seemed to match the capabilities of the Canberra jet bomber with targets fairly well. Peaking during 1969, Magpie support for riverine operations in the Mekong Delta was a

primary role for No 2 Squadron, irrespective of whether it was defined as close air support or interdiction.

The Magpies undoubtedly participated in most major operations run by Commander US Naval Forces Vietnam, Adm Zumwalt, in the southern and central parts of the Mekong Delta, as well as further north in IV Corps and the southern parts of III Corps in support of the more conventional land forces of the 9th Division US Army.

As to combat effectiveness, assuming that 35th TFW results were not too different from the other tactical fighter wings that conducted air-to-ground attacks in IV Corps, bomb damage assessment comparisons rated 2 Sqn very highly.

A combination of good BDA results with firm evidence of accurate bombing suggests that No 2 Squadron Canberras and their crews achieved their best performance in IV Corps and were uniquely suited to supporting riverine operations in the Mekong Delta.

Before taking questions, if time remaining, be happy to show a few actual bombing shots over the Delta recorded by cameras fitted into bomb-bay if interested.

SLIDE 49 – Bombing Photo

SLIDE 50 – Bombing Photo

SLIDE 51 – Bombing Photo

SLIDE 52 – Bombing Photo

SLIDE 53 – Bombing Photo

SLIDE 54 – Bombing Photo

SLIDE 55 – Bombing Photo

SLIDE 56 – Bombing Photo

SLIDE 57 – Bombing Photo

SLIDE 58 – Bombing Photo

SLIDE 59 – Bombing Photo

SLIDE 60 – Bombing Photo

SLIDE 61 – Bombing Photo

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Post-Presentation Discussion, Q & A

Gp Capt Milt Cottee Retd: On RAF test pilot’s course in UK he tested RAF Canberra and back at the RAAF’s Aircraft Research & Development Unit (ARDU) at Laverton, Victoria he also tested out a simplified fixed angle bomb-sight for RAAF Canberra use.

Air Cdre Graham Dyke Retd: He understood that the bomb fragments that hit 2 Sqn Canberras on low level strikes in Vietnam came from the instant fuse located in the nose of the bombs.

Sqn Ldr Kerry Bos Retd: Was involved in rewiring 2 Sqn’s Canberras to take wing-tip bombs. One problem experienced initially was that when the bomb-bay doors were closed the circuit was inactive which meant that bombs couldn’t be jettisoned unless the bomb-bay doors were open.

Gp Capt Lance Halvorsen Retd: USAF B-57 Canberra bombers had no problems with variable-time (VT) fusing as they were fitted with arming wires that remained with the aircraft upon weapon release whereas 2 Sqn’s didn’t. It was believed that radio interference caused by the still attached arming wires may have prematurely exploded 2 Sqn VT fuses before they descended to an appropriate height where they were due to start the explosion.

POST-MORTEM

As a result of the good acceptance of this presentation by an interested Aviation Club audience, I decided to investigate the matter further with the intention of writing more about this subject. A draft was submitted to the RAAF’s Air Power Development Centre in 2014, and in 2016 my book - “Dreadful Lady Over the Mekong Delta” - was printed by the RAAF.

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