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On the belief in avatars: what on earth have the aesthetics of the Byzantine

icons to do with the avatar in social technologies?Falk Heinricha

a Aalborg University, Denmark

Online publication date: 26 May 2010

To cite this Article Heinrich, Falk(2010) 'On the belief in avatars: what on earth have the aesthetics of the Byzantine iconsto do with the avatar in social technologies?', Digital Creativity, 21: 1, 4 10

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On the belief in avatars:

what on earth have the

aesthetics of the Byzantineicons to do with the avatar 

in social technologies?

Falk Heinrich

Aalborg University, Denmark

falk_h@hum.aau.dk

Abstract

This article looks at the digital portrait used in the form

of avatars in various online worlds and communication

networks. It describes an ongoing modal shift from an

ontological understanding of the portrait towards the

portrait as performative acting.

In accordance with the Western semiotic divide

between representational fiction and material reality

proper, the avatar-portrait is often still described as a 

representation that depicts the subject on the basis of a 

conceptual segregation between the living subject and

the portrait. But the avatar-portrait functions as embodi-

ment, thereby fulfilling a mainly performative purpose

that triggers the participant’s belief in the other’s avatar.

The paper looks at Eastern iconology, where the iconic

portrait is an energetic transmitter in which the depiction

and the depicted converge in the belief in the realness of 

the picture. Key concepts such as prototype, archetype

and inverse perspective are discussed and applied to the

art piece Can You See Me Now? by Blast Theory.

Keywords: avatar, icon, performativity, communi-

cation, belief 

1 The portrait picture as an avatar 

The subject of my investigation is the portrait 

avatar as used in various online worlds. My defi-

nition of portrait avatar is very simple: a digital

picture of, or by the user, used as an avatar in

social online domains (like, for example, Face-

book), various art pieces or some applications

for mobile phones.The method applied in this article will be a 

comparison between portrait avatars and some

distinctive features and aspects of the Byzantine

icons. The reason for this comparison lies in my

observation and hypothesis that the portrait is

shifting from a reflective to a performative func-

tion. I am very well aware that this seems to be

old news, at least since the notion of performa-

tivity has been discussed at length by post-

structuralism and performance studies. Thus, I

merely wish to contribute to this ongoing devel-

opment by concretising and differentiating the

notion of performativity and agency. I will do

so by looking closely at the portrait picture

used as an avatar. At the same time, I want to

point out the ongoing cultural and epistemic

displacement of the function and significance

of the portrait in general.

Digital Creativity

2010, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 4–10

ISSN 1462-6268# 2010 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/14626261003654236

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This ongoing displacement can and should be

seen as the result of technological advancements

(e.g. the internet and smart phones) and the

implementation of digital calm technology in

every domain of everyday life. However, although

clearly based upon technological and scientificepistemologies and methodologies, our use of 

those technologies seems to render a modified

belief system. I want to emphasise the term belief 

and discuss this assertion later. In a way this

changed belief system contradicts the very onto-

logical foundation of technology. In my paper for 

the DAC09 conference (Heinrich 2009), I discussed

the dissolution of the epistemic and ontological

reality–fiction divide brought about by our use of 

those aforementioned technologies. In this article,

I would like to discuss the notion of belief and

‘performative embodiment’ as one aspect of it.

Let me start by describing my main example,

which will be followed by a short introduction to

Byzantine icons. Subsequently I would like to

discuss the notions of index and prototype, agent 

and patient, as described by the anthropologist 

Alfred Gell.

1.2 Can You See Me Now? 

As my main example I will use Blast Theory’s art 

project from 2001: Can You See Me Now? I chose

this piece not because it is a game but because of 

its exemplary blending of virtual and urban

spaces. This blending lies, in my view, at the root 

of the functional significance of the avatar-portrait.

Can You See Me Now? is an urban gaming

project that effectively combines and juxtaposes

urban, material spaces and their virtual represen-

tation on screen. The game consists of twoparties, so-called runners and players. Runners are

flesh and blood persons located in well-defined

real urban districts chasing virtual avatars; they

are represented in the virtual space by avatars.

Players, who can participate in the game from a per-

sonal computer, do so by controlling their own

virtual avatars, which are chased by the runners

(Figure 1).

The communication between those ontologi-

cally different realms is done by conventional PCs

on the side of the players. On the runners’ side,

communication is made possible by PDAs, with

GPS navigation systems and auditory transmission

devices. The PC and PDA give access to the virtual

data representation of the very same urban space,

depicting in the older versions a cartographic.

Depiction in newer versions includes a 3-D image

that consists of both the player’s and the runner’s

avatar in the form of a simple icon of a running

man (the interface for the players look different,

using anthropomorphic silhouettes).

One can criticise my conflation of portrait 

photos and pictograms/silhouettes: no mimetic

personalised form connects the player with his

avatar. However, the runners in the urban space

Figure 1. Blast Theory’s Can You See Me Now? Reproduced with permission of Blast Theory.

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are chasing absent, yet distinct players. Further-

more, the rules and structure of the staged game

assign a well-defined function to the avatar.

These rules enable concrete action, which gives

the avatar a performative, embodied status

(which can be difficult to see when looking at photographic portrait).

2 The concept of the Byzantine icon

Clearly, the culturally determined perception of 

portraits is changing. Portraits used as avatars

on interactive online sites do not invite contempla-

tion but reaction. Maybe a look at Byzantine icons

can help us to disclose some of the hidden impli-

cations in this cultural shift.

The Byzantine icon is originally a ceremonial

and performative part of the Christian liturgy.

Painted mostly on wooden tiles or as frescos,

these icons depict holy subjects such as the

saints, Mary or Christ himself. It is simultaneously

‘a scenic representation and presentation’ (Bek 

2003). This duplicity is at the core of Eastern ico-

nology since it contains two functions at the same

time: it is both a visual representation (of the

depicted venerated person) and a concrete materi-

alisation (of the depicted and their supranatural,

eternal forces). Liturgical veneration as ‘dramatic

enactment’ (Bek 2003) reveals and, more impor-

tantly, operationalises a ‘likeness in essence’

between the depicted (presentation) and the

depiction (representation), making the icon an

energetic transmitter for the believer more than a 

reflection in a Platonic sense. Consequently, the

icon is a kind of material carriage, transmitting

the believer’s veneration to the depicted and vice

versa. In this way, the icon materialises the saint;

hence s/he becomes part of this earthly world.

In the orthodox worldview ‘man must always

relate to the spiritual through the physical’(Auxentios 1987). Auxentios writes that this

‘physical spirituality’ allows ‘that [the icon] con-

stitutes a real image of that which it depicts. The

image is in some way a “true” form of the proto-

type, participating in it and integrally bound to

it’ (Auxentios 1987). A prototype (or archetype)

is the energetic essence of the depicted and the

icon thus the material medium for it. As Hans

Belting expresses it: ‘The difference between the

image and what is represented seemed to be abol-

ished in [the icons]; the image was the person it 

represented, at least this person’s active, miracle-

working presence’ (Belting 1994). The imageand the depicted person conflate in the archetype,

in one presence.

This is hard to grasp for a Western mind like

mine, since our cultural mindset seems to be

moulded by Alberti’s and the Renaissance’s

window metaphor (Alberti 1977), which stresses a 

divide between reality and mediated representations

of it. Veltmann writes that modern art has to be seen

‘as a means of separating subject and object and

hence creating aesthetic distance’ whereas he con-

siders orthodox (oriental) ‘art as a means of brid-

ging the subject and object’ (Veltmann 2001). The

Western divide positions the onlooker in a very

distinct way, namely in front of the picture, while

the linear perspective tracks the onlooker into the

picture. By constructing a division between rep-

resentation and material world, the onlooker’s

view establishes a virtual counterpart of the onloo-

ker in the represented world of the picture. Pictures

are utopian realms, non-places.

3 The inverse or reverted perspective

The inverse or reverted perspective of the

Byzantine icon does quite the contrary. The

depicted person and architecture seem to come

out of the picture into the realm of the human wor-

shipper, who is situated in the vanishing point.

Icons do not create utopian, fictitious spaces, but 

transformations of material places. They, too,

represent something or someone, but they project 

the represented into the viewer’s space and not 

the other way round.One could argue that my description of paint-

ings as windows into a remote space and time

may be right concerning paintings of landscape,

urban scenery and depictions of concrete narra-

tive situations. However, when it come to

painted or photographed portraits, this virtualisa-

tion and transportation of the human viewer into

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the pictorial space seems to be wrong, since the

represented human figure often looks out at the

viewer, thereby establishing a direct communica-

tional space, which consequently is embedded in

the space of the onlooker’s material presence.

This objection, however, does not take context 

or settings into account. The museum or exhibitionhall setting diminish the direct interactional

encounter between the portrait and the viewer.

Here the viewer is asked to contemplate firstly

the painterly craftsmanship and the aesthetic sen-

sation and secondly the psychological content of 

the depiction, which lead to an act of interpret-

ation. The focus of art appreciationas I would

claimlies first of all on the content: who is or 

was this person? The exhibited portrait becomes

a kind of host or guardian in the fiction/reality

divide, enticing the viewer in a hermeneutic

process into the fictitious realm of representation.

On the contrary, the runners in Can You See MeNow? carry their PDA showing the cartographic

urban place, which is right in front of them. The

material realness of the urban place constitutes

the background for the image and avatars shown

on the little screen. The PDA screen is an intrinsic

part of the reality of the runner.

4 Performativity

At least since post-structuralism and its discussion

and accentuation of the concept of performativity,

the picture has been seen as an utterance with ‘real’

pragmatic effects. Pictures do something. I do not 

want to deny this at all. On the contrary, my argu-

ment is based on the concept of performativity. But 

I see a distinct difference between the concept of 

performativity presented by exponents of post-

structuralism, in which the performativity of pic-

tures and texts exerts a kind of long-term influence

on human bodies, mindsets, cultural identities

and behaviours. The portrait-avatar forms part of 

very concrete interactions, being reminiscent of 

Austin’s speech acts (1992); with the difference

that at least one human being is substituted or rep-

resented by an avatar. Both are ‘actors’ in a defined

performance setting. Here, I am following Richard

Schechner (1985, 2006), who sees the marked per-

formance space as one of the main properties of 

performativity. The Blast Theory runners run in a 

well-defined and transformed urban space, Face-

book users read and write within a very structured

interface, etc.

5 Art and agency

Also, the Byzantine icon has a precise function

in the religious ritual of veneration. The icon

effectuates intentionality, and ‘is effected’ by the

worshippers’ intentionality.

This is very much in line with Alfred Gell’s

anthropological theory on art and agency (Gell

Figure 2. Pantokrator, a sixth century encaustic icon from Saint 

Catherine’s Monastery, Mount Sinai.

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1998). He heavily draws on the significances and

functions of idols (cult images and objects) in

mainly non-Western cultures. He sees idols as

indexes (re-)presenting prototypes (the depicted).

The relationship between index and prototype is

established by an act of abduction by both theartist and the recipient. The artefact as index encom-

passes and reveals social intentionality. All four 

elements of this relationship (index, prototype,

artist, recipient) can have an active or a passive

attribute as either agent or patient, thereby creating

various types of artefacts and interactions (like

artists’ art, patrons’ art, sorcery, possession).

A full presentation of Gell’s very intriguing

theory is beyond the scope of this presentation,

but let me apply some of his main ideas to the

subject of my investigation: the avatar-portrait.

The avatar is clearly the index, presenting the

prototype, which in most cases is a living person

(e.g. the players and runners in Can You See Me

Now?). The sender (the runner) is the primary

agent, his/her index (avatar) the secondary agent.

The recipient (the player) is the primary patient,

the target of social intentionality. The player’s

avatar is the secondary patient. The runner 

relates to the avatar-patient by chasing it down.

The player’s avatar is a performative index of a 

non-non-existing entity in the urban space.

The attribution of passive and active, ‘agent’

and ‘patient’, is, however, not fixed, since it is

shifting all the time in an interactive process; in

our case the very physical actions of running,

chasing, hiding and escaping.

6 Beliefs

Our communicational experience patterns and

communication technology claim that this

action– reaction cycle occurs between humanactors by means of avatars. In the case of online

or mixed reality realms, this is not odd, since we

seem to know that the avatar is a virtual stand-in

for a living human being. In the case of religious

acts of veneration this seems very odd, since the

icon is supposed to ‘be’ a dead Saintand that 

is (for scientific minds) not possible.

There is only one explanation for this (that 

satisfies my Western mind): the existence of an

interaction system. This interaction system

cannot, however, consist of the worshipper and

the icon but of the communicational acts

between the worshipper and the icon itself. Thisneeds a script that controls the acts. If that is

valid, it can be concluded that it is the execution

of a script behind the ritual of veneration that trans-

forms the icon into a saint.

If we apply this explanation to the online avatar 

phenomenon, we can deduce that the interaction

occurs between the online user and the other’s

avatar, and not between the user and the other 

user, who is represented by his/her avatar. The

user and the other’s iconic avatar form part of an

artificial interaction system, which distributes the

agent and patient attributes.

This means that the game Can You See Me

Now? does not establish only one interaction

system, but two different systems: one, where the

runner is interacting with the avatar of the player;

and another, where the player behind the monitor 

is interacting with the runners’ avatars. It is only

our faith in the reliability of data transmission that 

makes us believe in the interconnectedness of 

these two interaction systems. No, my Western

mind says, there is no mysticism at all, just data 

transmission. Hmm. One thing is sure: in the

moment of (inter-)action we have to believe in the

realness of the avatarlike believers.

I do not want to claim that the religious icons

and avatar portraits demand the same kind of 

belief, surely there is a difference between believ-

ing in the other human being’s representation and

the deity’s being inside the material icon. Still,

while communicating in miscellaneous online

and mixed reality worlds, the user /participant has

to believe in the realness of the avatar, or more cor-

rectly, the very act of communication occasionsthis belief.

7 Embodiment or the creation of 

bodies

But how is this realness constructed? We know

that avatars are portraits, mere representations,

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nothing more. And we know that digital data 

transmission occurs on the basis of descriptions,

being a translation from the one ontology to

another. The crucial point is that the describing

machine (computer program) consists of the

same informational alphabet as the describedcontent (Finnemann 1998), which makes the

transmitted content extremely vulnerable. Com-

municative understanding is, seen from this

point of view, based upon extremely unsecure

data that not only detaches time and space but 

also the very content from the communicational

act (Luhmann 1997). This may be the reason

simulation and recreation of face-to-face inter-

action is still the objective of technology and

many online spaces.

Alfred Gell asserts that the worshippers of 

idols know very well that the idol-artefact is

just dead material, a stone or a piece of wood.

They do nevertheless engage in rituals, and

while doing so they believe in the power and real-

ness of the idol. The same could be said about the

Byzantine icon. The believers know that the icon

is a painted picture on a wooden tile. We, too,

know that the avatar portrait is just a visualisation

of digital data, even more intangible than the icon

or idols, yet connected to the materiality of the

digital device. Gell claims that the interactional

aspect of the ritual prompts the correlation

between the index and prototype. The ritualistic

predetermined interactions establish intersubjec-

tivity between the worshipper and the idol on

the basis of looking and being looked at. The

worshipper does not only look at the idol; in the

very act of looking at an anthropomorphic

statue or image, the viewer sees himself looking

through the eyes of the other. The idol looks

back, so to speak! Of course, this can be

doomed as psychological projection and primi-

tive animation, but it can also be seen as theeffect of an external system that is necessary

for intersubjectivity to happen. The interaction

with idols make Gods and spirits appear, like

the avatar makes the fellow person behind the

avatar appear.

Both the so-called primitives and we ‘know’

about the existence of ‘the other’!

Can You See Me Now? simultaneously con-

structs two different avatar–player relationships:

a usual one, where the player in front of a 

monitor controls his/her avatar’s whereabouts in

a digital simulation; and an inverted one, where

human ‘runners’ situated in a material reality aredepicted as primitive avatars on the portable

screen. The inverted setting augments the physical

realm with a data-space.

The important thing, though, is not the

relationship between the person and his/her 

avatar, but the predetermined rule-bound relation-

ship between the runner and the avatars of the

other players. This makes the runners run. It 

motivates the runners’ belief in the chased

player’s existence, but not the certainty of the

player’s existence. Now, the avatar of the chased

other is real. The very action of running constitutes

the communicational interface. The runners

know that they are chasing but mere ghosts; never-

theless the runners chase them as if they are real

individuals. While running, the avatars have real

bodies (despite the fact that they cannot be sure

about the existence of the player; the players’

avatars could be ‘run’ by a computer).

It is therefore not the certainty of the other’s

existence but the specific intentionality rep-

resented and effectuated by the avatar that 

slowly changes our perception of portraits.

8 Conclusion

In Byzantine iconology, ‘the icon touches on the

reality of God’ (Auxentios 1987); in Blast 

Theory’s piece, the players’ avatar-portraits palp-

ably touch on the reality of the runners, thereby

conflating reality and virtuality. It is in and

through the player’s actions that the avatar portrait 

emerges as a prototype, thereby dissolving the dis-

tinction between subject and its representation andbetween material and virtual reality. The avatar-

portrait as archetype surpasses our understanding

of a technological medium, since the iconic

picture constructs a direct material and sensory

relationship between people in the act of com-

munication, despite the fact that communication

technology only transmits measurable data based

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on physical laws (e.g. measurable parameters of 

the voice).

The digital iconic avatar seems to undermine the

Western epistemic distinction between the human

subject and pictorial representation, questioning

the notion of the body as a mainly biologicallydefined entity. This subsequently calls for a revision

of the humanistic concept of identity, which hasI

would claimits foundation in the material

human body as enclosed entity. On the contrary,

the (technologically extended) performative body

transcends those biological limits due to an act of 

belief within predetermined structures.

References

Alberti, L.B., 1977. On Painting . New Haven, CT: Yale

University Press.

Austin, J.L., 1992. How to do things with words.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Auxentios, H., 1987. The Iconic and Symbolic in Ortho-

dox iconography [online]. Available from: http://

www.orthodoxinfo.com/general/orth_icon.aspx

[Accessed January 2010].

Belting, H., 1994. Likeness and presence. Chicago, IL:

Chicago Press.

Bek, L., 2003. Reality in the mirror of art . Arhus:

Aarhus University Press.

Blast Theory, 2001. Can you see me now? [online].Available from: http://www.canyouseemenow.co.uk 

[Accessed January 2010].

Finnemann, N.O., 1998. ComputerenEt medie for en

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Aalborg: Aalborg Universitetsforlag, 43 – 68.

Heinrich, F., 2009. The performative portrait, Proceed-

ings of the Digital Art and Culture Conference,

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search?entity¼ace dac09 plenaries.

Gell, A., 1998. Art and agency. Oxford: Oxford Univer-

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Luhmann, N., 1997. Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft .

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Schechner, R., 1985. Between theater and anthropol-

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Falk Heinrich, PhD, is Associate Professor at 

Aalborg University, Denmark. There he is

affiliated with the research group and educational

programme ‘Art and Technology’. He teaches

digital aesthetics and artistic methodology. He

has worked as an actor and theatre director, and

his theoretical investigation continues to

develop in close relation to practical, artistic

work (interactive installations). His current 

research interest is ‘performative aesthetics’ and

his workfocusing on notions of affect, pres-

ence, beauty and communicationattempts toform bridges among certain discourses in the

human sciences, sociology, engineering and

neuro-science. He is the author of the book Inter-

aktiv digital installationskunst  teori og analyse

(Copenhagen: Multivers, 2008).

Heinrich

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