Baruch Spinoza on God's existence.pdf

Spinoza’s Arguments for theExistence of God*

martin lin

Rutgers University

It is often thought that, although Spinoza develops a bold and distinctive concep-

tion of God (the unique substance, or Natura Naturans, in which all else inheres

and which possesses infinitely many attributes, including extension), the arguments

that he offers which purport to prove God’s existence contribute nothing new to

natural theology. Rather, he is seen as just another participant in the seventeenth

century revival of the ontological argument initiated by Descartes and taken up by

Malebranche and Leibniz among others. That this is the case is both puzzling and

unfortunate. It is puzzling because although Spinoza does offer an ontological

proof for the existence of God, he also offers three other non-ontological proofs.

It is unfortunate because these other non-ontological proofs are both more con-

vincing and more interesting than his ontological proof. In this paper, I offer

reconstructions and assessments of all of Spinoza’s arguments and argue that Spi-

noza’s metaphysical rationalism and his commitment to something like a Principle

of Sufficient Reason are the driving force behind Spinoza’s non-ontological

arguments.

Spinoza holds a number of highly controversial theses concerning God.

According to him, God is the unique substance, or Natura naturans, in

which all else inheres, who possesses infinitely many attributes, includ-

ing extension, and who is an impersonal being who does not order his

creation according to any providential plan. Perhaps none of these

views of God is entirely without precedent, but Spinoza’s treatment of

them is remarkable in its systematicity and force. Yet, despite the

widely acknowledged boldness of Spinoza’s thinking concerning the

nature of God, it is often thought that the arguments that he offers for

the existence of God merely recapitulate the ontological argument

* I would like to thank Michael Della Rocca, Donald Ainslie, Marleen Rozemond,

and Charlie Huenemann for their detailed comments on drafts of this paper. I am

also indebted to Ed Curley, Phil Kremer, Imogen Dickie, and Eric Watkins for

helpful discussion of the ideas contained in this paper.

Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVol. LXXV No. 2, September 2007� 2007 International Phenomenological Society

SPINOZA’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 269

given by Descartes in the fifth Meditation and hence contribute nothing

new to natural theology.1

What does it mean to classify an argument as ‘‘ontological’’? There

are more or less fine-grained conceptions of ontological arguments.

According to the most coarse-grained conception, an argument for the

existence of God is ontological just in case its premises are known

a priori.2 But if a philosopher’s arguments are ontological only in this

sense, then it is unfair to criticize their originality on that basis. Com-

mentators who describe Spinoza as an ontological arguer, however,

typically have something more specific in mind, taking Descartes’ onto-

logical argument as their paradigm. Descartes’ ontological argument

works by analyzing the concept of God and purporting to show that

the very nature of that concept entails that it must be satisfied. That is,

it purports to show that the existence of God is a conceptual truth. In

what follows, I shall accordingly understand by ‘ontological argument’

an argument of that form.

It is puzzling that so many commentators see Spinoza as primarily

offering an ontological argument. Spinoza does indeed offer something

like an ontological argument, but that argument is only one of four,

the rest of which are not ontological. Commentators, nevertheless, typi-

cally either ignore all but the ontological argument,3 or, even more

commonly, argue that, appearances to the contrary, all four of

Spinoza’s arguments are, at bottom, ontological.4

This is an unfortunate state of affairs because Spinoza’s ontological

argument is the least interesting, the least original, and the least con-

vincing of the four arguments that he gives. The other three proceed,

I shall argue, on a basis entirely different from that of the ontological

argument. They do not proceed exclusively on the basis of an analysis of

the concept of God. Rather, they all rely, either explicitly or implicitly,

on a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR hereafter). In

1 For example, Jonathan Bennett characterizes Spinoza’s argument for the existence

of God as essentially the same ‘‘sterile and boring’’ argument as Descartes’ in his

Learning From Six Philosophers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), vol. 1,

p. 122. See also, Harry Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, vol. I, (Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1934), pp. 158-213; William A. Earl, ‘‘The Ontological

Argument in Spinoza,’’ and ‘‘The Ontological Argument in Spinoza: Twenty Years

Later,’’ in Marjorie Green ed., Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, (Notre

Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), and Harold H. Joachim, A Study of

the Ethics of Spinoza, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1902), pp. 51-52.2 Kant, who helped introduce the term ‘ontological argument’ into the philosophical

vocabulary, understands the term in this way.3 Cf. Bennett, Learning from Six Philosophers.4 This is the position of Joachim and Earl. Wolfson thinks that all but the third argu-

ment are ontological.

270 MARTIN LIN

this respect my interpretation is similar and indebted to Don Garrett’s.5

There is, however, an important difference between our respective inter-

pretations. Garrett claims that Spinoza holds that something exists nec-

essarily just in case it is self-caused. Spinoza’s strategy in each of his

arguments, according to Garrett, is to show that God is self-caused and

then conclude from this and the equivalence of necessary existence and

self-causation that God exists. This, however, cannot be right, for such

an equivalence would conflict with Spinoza’s necessitarianism. No being,

other than God, is self-caused, according to Spinoza. Yet many (and

arguably all) beings other than God exist necessarily.6 Necessary exis-

tence and self-causation thus cannot be equivalent for Spinoza.

Perhaps Garrett could amend his interpretation by replacing the

equivalence of self-causation and necessary existence with an equiva-

lence between self-causation and necessary existence in virtue of one’s

own nature. This would preserve the validity of Garrett’s reconstructions

without the unwanted consequence of rampant self-causation. More-

over, Spinoza clearly believes such an equivalence. He distinguishes

between things whose existence is necessary in virtue of their own nature

and those whose existence is virtue of the nature of another. The only

thing whose existence is necessary in virtue of its essence is God.7 God

is also the only being who is self-caused.8 So it is indeed true for Spi-

noza that a being is self-caused just in case it exists necessarily in virtue

of its own nature. But the possibility of such an emendation is of little

5 ‘‘Spinoza’s ‘Ontological’ Arguments,’’ Philosophical Review 88 (1979), pp. 198-223.6 There is a good deal of controversy as to how Spinoza’s commitment to necessitari-

anism should be interpreted. Adherent’s of a moderate interpretation hold that only

God’s existence and facts about the laws of nature are really necessary (see, for

example, E.M. Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, (Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, 1967), chap. 3. and Edwin Curley and Greg Walski, ‘‘Spinoza’s Necessitarian-

ism Reconsidered’’ in Gennaro and Huenemann eds., New Essays on the Rational-

ists, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)). Those who favor a strong

interpretation think that, for Spinoza, all things are necessary (see, for example,

Don Garrett, ‘‘Spinoza’s Necessitarianism,’’ in Yovel ed., God and Nature (Leiden:

J. Brill, 1991). What is relevant here is that however Spinoza’s necessitarianism is

interpreted, he thinks that some non-self-caused beings exist necessarily. Spinoza

says that if the existence of a thing follows necessarily from its cause, then given

that cause, that thing necessarily exists (1p33s). For Spinoza all effects follow neces-

sarily from their causes (1a3). Thus, relative to their external causes, all individuals

necessarily exist. That is, a thing exists in very possible world in which its cause

exists. Now, if the external cause itself exists necessarily, it follows that the thing

itself necessarily exists, i.e., exists in every possible world. What is uncontroversial is

that, for Spinoza, at least some things are caused immediately by God and only by

God and thus their existence is necessary too. The immediate infinite modes are an

example of such things. So, although immediate infinite modes exist necessarily, they

are not self-caused. They are, rather, caused by God.7 1p33s1.8 1p14.


moment. Whether or not Garrett’s equivalence can be patched so as to

avoid a conflict with Spinoza’s necessitarianism, none of Spinoza’s argu-

ments for the existence of God relies upon any such equivalence. Once

we fully appreciate the strength of the PSR and how adeptly Spinoza

exploits that strength in his arguments, we shall see that there is no need

to add the powerful equivalence of self-causation and necessary exis-

tence (in virtue of one’s own nature or otherwise) in order to derive the

existence of God from Spinoza’s premises. Moreover, correctly appreci-

ating the role of the PSR in Spinoza’s arguments allows us to see how

Spinoza can appeal to the PSR in supporting some of his other central

metaphysical claims. Or so I shall argue.

Spinoza’s reliance on the PSR might be surprising to some since the

PSR is usually associated with Leibniz, and its role in Spinoza’s think-

ing sometimes fails to receive the proper emphasis.9 In fact, it consti-

tutes one of the most important of the commitments that shape

Spinoza’s metaphysics. By neglecting Spinoza’s non-ontological argu-

ments, commentators have contributed to this failure to fully appreci-

ate the importance of the PSR to Spinoza’s system. By showing how

Spinoza’s arguments rely on the PSR, I hope to demonstrate its cen-

trality to Spinoza’s thinking with respect to the important case of

God’s existence and, by extension, to all aspects of his system that pre-

suppose the existence of God.

I shall conclude by considering a well-known problem that Spinoza’s

argument for monism presents for his arguments for the existence of

God. Garrett has pointed out that Spinoza’s arguments of the existence

of God can be easily adapted to prove the existence of any other sub-

stance, say a substance with only one attribute. Spinoza tries to rule

out such alternative substances with his argument for monism. But

Spinoza can legitimately conclude from that argument no more than

that at most one substance with any particular attribute exists. Only on

the assumption that a substance with all the attributes exists does that

argument lead to the monism conclusion. Thus the variant on

Spinoza’s arguments which proves the existence of a single attribute

substance together with Spinoza’s argument for the claim that only one

substance of a particular attribute exists would prove the nonexistence

of God. Building upon the work of Michael Della Rocca, I shall argue

that, here too, understanding how the PSR figures into Spinoza’s

9 I do not mean to suggest that commentators have not noticed Spinoza’s commit-

ment to the PSR. Rather, my claim is that they have not made it out to be the driv-

ing force behind his metaphysics, as I believe it is. Notable exceptions to this are

Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1984), pp.

24ff; Garrett, ‘‘Spinoza’s ‘Ontological’ Arguments’’; and Michael Della Rocca,

‘‘A Rationalist Manifesto,’’ Philosophical Topics, 31.

272 MARTIN LIN

thinking on the subject shows how such an argument for the nonexis-

tence of God can be blocked.

1. The First Argument

The first argument is the only one of Spinoza’s four arguments

which might be accurately characterized as an ontological argument.

Spinoza begins by inviting us to conceive, if we can, that God does

not exist. If the nonexistence of God is conceivable, then his essence

does not involve existence (1a7). The essences of substances involve

their existence (1p7). God is a substance (1d6). Therefore, God’s

essence both does and does not involve his existence, which is

absurd. Q.E.D.

Obviously, the claim that the essence of a substance involves exis-

tence (1p7) provides a crucial premise for the first argument. The dem-

onstration of 1p7 proceeds as follows:

1. A substance cannot be produced by anything else. (1p6)

2. A substance is self-caused. (by 1)

3. Therefore, the essence of a substance necessarily involves exis-

tence. (by 2 and 1d1)

The conclusion of 1p7d, it is important to note, is not unambiguously

the claim that substances necessarily exist. What the conclusion states

is merely that substances have essences that involve their existence,

whatever that might mean. And while one possible interpretation of

what it means for an essence to involve existence is that such things

exist necessarily, the use to which 1p7 is put in the first argument does

not require such an interpretation.

Let us now look at the reasoning by means of which Spinoza

reaches his conclusion in 1p7. He seems to think that (2) follows

directly from (1), which, of course, it does not. It does, however, follow

from (1) and certain consequences derivable from 1a1, which says that

everything is either in itself or in anther. That is, modes inhere in sub-

stances and substances inhere in themselves. For Spinoza, inherence

implies causation.10 Hence:

10 The use of 1d3, 1d5, and 1a1 in 1p4d establish that inherence implies conception.

Since, as discussed above, conception implies causation, inherence must also imply

causation. See Don Garrett, ‘‘Conatus Argument,’’ in Koistinen and Biro eds., Spi-

noza: Metaphysical Themes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 136-137

for a useful discussion of these texts and the relationship between causation and

inherence.


1.1. Everything is either caused by itself or by another

Substances then must be self-caused because they are not caused by

another.

Let us now return to a fuller discussion of the first argument. What

follows is a reconstruction that fills in a number of suppressed premises:

4. God does not necessarily exist. (assumption for reductio)

5. If God does not necessarily exist, then it is conceivable that

God does not exist.

6. It is conceivable that God does not exist. (by 4 and 5)

7. If a thing can be conceived as not existing, then its essence does

not involve existence. (1a7)

8. God’s essence does not involve existence. (by 6 and 7)

9. God is a substance. (1d6)

10. If anything is a substance, then its existence involves essence.

(1p7)

11. God’s essence involves existence. (by 9 and 10)

12. God necessarily exists. (by 8 and 11)

An obvious potential problem with this argument is (9). In order to

assess the truth of (9), we need first to understand its meaning. This in

turn depends upon the correct semantics for an apparent singular term

like ‘God’. This is, unfortunately, an issue fraught with controversy.

There are two main options. The most popular is to assign an individual

as the semantic value of a singular term like ‘God’. But if we understand

the semantics of (9) in this way, the argument begs the question of

God’s existence since the sentence contained in (9) does not otherwise

express a proposition. If the semantic value of ‘God’ is an individual,

then it is semantically defective if there is no such individual. Sentences

containing semantically defective names do not express propositions.

Alternatively, we could treat ‘God’ as a quantifier expression. The

argument, however, fares no better if ‘God’ is construed in this way.11

The most natural way to construe ‘God’ as a quantifier expression in

the context of this argument is as a universal quantifier expression:

11 I am indebted on this point to Charlie Huenemann.

274 MARTIN LIN

13. If anything is God, then it does not exist necessarily.

14. If (if anything is God, then it does not exist necessarily), then

(if anything is God, then its nonexistence is conceivable).

15. If anything is God, then its nonexistence is conceivable.

16. If a thing can be conceived as not existing, then its essence

does not involve existence.

17. If anything is God, then its essence does not involve existence.

18. If anything is God, then it is a substance.

19. If anything is a substance, then its essence involves existence.

20. If anything is God, then its essence involves existence.

21. God necessarily exists.

This argument is invalid because (17) and (20) are not contradictory.

Furthermore, it is interesting to note that not only does the contradic-

tory of (17) not follow from Spinoza’s premises, but it begs the ques-

tion of the existence of God: there is something that is God and its

essence involves existence. So, the first argument is either invalid (when

‘God’ is construed as a quantifier expression) or question begging

(when ‘God’ is construed as a singular term).

My discussion of Spinoza’s first argument for the existence of God

has assumed that either ‘God’ is a singular term the semantic value of

which (if it has any value at all) is an object or ‘God’ is a disguised

quantifier expression. Spinoza’s argument may not be vulnerable to the

criticisms I have lodged if this assumption is incorrect. There are, how-

ever, no obvious alternative construals of ‘God’, certainly none,

of which I am aware, that are plausible in themselves and would save

Spinoza’s argument.12 In the absence of such an alternative, we must

provisionally conclude that Spinoza’s first argument fails.

12 Perhaps Spinoza’s reasoning could be saved by adopting a Meinongian semantics

for non-referring names. ‘God’, then, could take a nonexistent object as its seman-

tic value and (9) would beg no important questions. This move, however, quickly

leads to existentially quantifying over nonexistent objects. But if this possible, then

I have no idea what the existential quantifier means. For this reason, I reject

Meinongian semantics.


2. The Second Argument

The second argument appeals to the PSR. The basic idea is that a

cause or reason for the nonexistence of God is impossible and so he

must exist.

The first premise of the second argument is the PSR:

22. If something exists, there must be a cause of its existing and if

something does not exist, there must be a cause of its nonexis-

tence.

This is the first explicit statement of the PSR in the Ethics, although

it is plausible to think that it is foreshadowed by 1a3,13 which says

that:

From a given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily and con-

versely, if there is no determinate cause, it is impossible for an effectto follow.

To derive the psr from 1a3, it is necessary to interpret ‘‘effect’’ as

meaning any event, and not just that which is produced by some cause.

But such an interpretation is reasonable since otherwise 1d3 is so trivial

as to make one wonder why Spinoza would bother to state it. It is also

necessary to interpret ‘‘effect’’ as including events which involve

absences, e.g., the car’s having no gas. But given the fact that Spinoza

clearly believes that absence involving events require causes, it seems

plausible to think that 1a3 is meant to apply to such events as well.

Spinoza next claims that:

23. The cause or reason for the nonexistence of anything is either

internal (its nature involves a contradiction) or external (some

external cause prevents its existence).

Spinoza here assumes that if anything has an internal cause of its non-

existence, then its nature involves a contradiction. What does this mean

and is it true? Spinoza does not say explicitly what he means, but he

does provide an instructive example: the nature of a square circle. In

what sense does the nature of a square circle involve a contradiction?

Square circles are contradictory in that they possess the properties of

being closed figures every point on which is equidistant from its center

and of not being a closed figure every point of which is equidistant

13 My discussion of 1a3 and its relation to the PSR is indebted to Garrett’s ‘‘Argu-

ments,’’ p. 202.

276 MARTIN LIN

from its center. The nature of a square circle, however, possess no such

contradictory properties. (The nature of a circle is not a circle.) Never-

theless, if it were exemplified, then its exemplification would entail a

contradiction. This then is what it is for a nature to be contradictory.

The assumption that the only possible internal cause of nonexistence

is a contradictory nature might appear tendentious. Why cannot there

be a nature that cannot be externally produced and yet does not con-

tain the internal causal resources to produce itself? Such a nature

would seem to be an internal cause of the non-exemplification of itself.

If there could be such a nature, then Spinoza would first need to show

that God’s nature is not like that.

Recall the above characterization of contradictory natures: a nature

is contradictory just in case if it were exemplified, its exemplification

would entail a contradiction. Substances are ontologically independent.

Thus they cannot have external causes for their existence or for any-

thing else. So, being a substance and lacking self-causal power jointly

entail nonexistence. But if such a nature were exemplified it would

exist. It would thus both exist and not exist. That is, such a nature is

self-contradictory.

Given then that no internally coherent nature can prevent itself from

being exemplified,14 the PSR together with premise (23) dictates that

every nature is:

a. internally coherent, exemplified, and has an external cause or

b. internally coherent, unexemplified and has an external cause or

c. internally incoherent and unexemplified or

d. internally coherent, exemplified, and has an internal cause.

The PSR rules out the possibility that a nature is:

e. internally coherent, unexemplified, and does not have external

cause.

14 I here treat existence as a second-order property, viz., as that property that proper-

ties have if and only if they are exemplified. I do so because no part of Spinoza’s

argument requires that we treat existence as a first-order property (for example, his

argument does not rely on the idea that existence is a perfection and so is con-

tained in our concept of a perfect being) and since such a conception of existence is

vulnerable to well known objections, I see no reason to saddle Spinoza with that

problematic view.


(1) rules out alternative (a) with respect to substances. Since Spi-

noza’s argument concerns the existence of God, a substance, (a) is

ruled out.

From (13) it follows that:

24. If a cause or reason for the nonexistence of God is impossible,

then God’s existence is necessary.

Since, given the psr, the nonexistence of God is possible only if there is

a cause or reason for his nonexistence, if such a cause or reason

is impossible, then his nonexistence is impossible, i.e., his existence is

necessary.

In order to establish God’s necessary existence, all Spinoza needs to

do is to rule out alternatives (b) and (c). That is, all he needs to do is

establish the impossibility of a cause or reason for God’s nonexistence.

He argues as follows:

25. If God didn’t exist, there would be either an internal or exter-

nal cause or reason.

26. If it were internal then the nature of God would be incoherent.

27. The nature of God is not incoherent.

The only support for premise (27) that Spinoza offers is the assertion

that it would be absurd if the nature of a supremely perfect being were

incoherent. This is not obviously so. But as we shall see presently, the

third and fourth arguments provide some reason for Spinoza to claim

that an absolutely infinite being is coherent. In the meantime, let us

assume that God’s nature is internally coherent, and so Spinoza can

rule out alternative (c). He turns next toward ruling out (b) with the

following line of argument:

28. If God didn’t exist, then there would be an external cause.

29. No external cause can prevent or take away God’s existence.

Premise (29) is supported by the following considerations. Spinoza

believes that causation and conception are equivalent:

i. x causes y if and only if y is conceived through x.

278 MARTIN LIN

He also believes that:

ii. If y is conceived through x, then y and x are conceived through

the same attribute.

Now Spinoza believes that no two substances can be conceived through

the same attribute.15 Therefore, no two substances can causally interact.

On the assumption that an external cause of a substance must involve

another substance, we can thus conclude that no external cause can

prevent God’s existence.16,17

Premise (27) rules out alternative (c) and premise (29) rules out alter-

native (b). We have thus ruled out every possible cause or reason for

God’s nonexistence—i.e., a cause or reason for God’s nonexistence is

impossible.

Therefore:

30. God necessarily exists. (by 25, 26, 27, and 29)

3. The Third Argument

The third argument begins with the assumption that to be able to exist

is a power, and conversely, to be able to not exist is a lack of power.

Spinoza then goes on to argue that given that some finite things exist

(e.g., we exist), an infinite being must exist. His argument can be sum-

marized as follows:

31. To be able to exist is to have power and being able to not

exist is to lack power.

32. If a finite being exists, and an infinite being does not, then a

finite being is more powerful than an infinite being. (by 31)

15 1p5.16 That only causes involving substances can causally influence substances is a conse-

quence of a number of Spinoza’s metaphysical principles. First, every thing is either

a substance or a mode of a substance (1a1). Second, if one thing causes another,

then the latter can be conceived through the former (1a4). Modes are conceived

through substances (1d5). Substances are not conceived through modes (1p1).

Modes cannot, therefore, causally influence substances. So, only a substance can

causally influence a substance.17 The argument that I have given above accurately paraphrases 11pd, but Michael

Della Rocca has pointed out to me that Spinoza actually has available to him a

much more direct route to (29). If an external cause can prevent God’s existence,

then, if God exists, his existence would be dependent on something. But substances

are, by definition, conceptually and causally self-contained. Thus, the existence of

God (or any other substance) cannot depend upon something else.


This claim is problematic. A nonexistent thing cannot stand in any

relation to anything. ‘‘I’m taller than Goliath because Goliath, not

existing, has no height!’’ Perhaps the following is a more felicitous way

of putting Spinoza’s point:

32.* If the nature of a finite being is exemplified and the nature of

an absolutely infinite being is unexemplified then a finite

being possesses more power than the nature of an absolutely

infinite being.

That Spinoza would have found this an acceptable paraphrase can be

seen by the scholium to this argument. There he offers another argu-

ment which he claims has the same basis as the third. But in that text

he speaks of the power to exist of natures of things and not of things

themselves. The argument continues:

33. It is impossible that a finite being possesses more power than

the nature of an absolutely infinite being.

34. Nothing exists or the nature of an absolutely infinite being is

exemplified. (by 32, and 33)

35. We exist.

36. Therefore, an absolutely infinite being, i.e., God, necessarily

exists. (by 34 and 35)

A number of things about this argument seem problematic. First, the

meanings of the curious notions ‘‘being able to exist’’ and ‘‘being able

to not exist’’ and their identification with having and lacking power

respectively are obscure. Second, it is not obvious that a finite thing

cannot be more powerful than the nature of an infinite thing, because

Spinoza hasn’t yet established any connection between infinity and

power. Moreover, even granting Spinoza’s assumptions, it does not fol-

low that God exists necessarily since that nothing exists is still possible,

although contingently false, from the point of view of this argument.

Taken on their own these difficulties with the third argument are

intractable; but, we shall see when we consider the fourth argument, it

is possible to fill in the gap between the notions of infinity and

power by connecting them both to Spinoza’s notion of reality and

applying the PSR, thus rendering the third argument much stronger in

retrospect.

280 MARTIN LIN

4. The Fourth Argument

Spinoza claims that the basis of the fourth argument is the same as the

third. It differs from it, however, in that it is a priori and includes a

premise which refers to the notion of ‘‘reality.’’ It can be summarized

as follows:

37. To be able to exist is a power.

38. The more reality the nature of a thing has, the more power to

exist it has.

39. The nature of an absolutely infinite being has an absolutely

infinite power of existing.

40. Therefore, the nature of an absolutely infinite being is exempli-

fied, i.e., an absolutely infinite being exists.

This argument, as it stands, is obviously invalid. We can, however,

make it valid by supplying the additional premise:

39.1. If a nature has an absolutely infinite power of existing, then

it is exemplified.

In order to find a use for (38) we must assume that (39) is supposed to

follow from (38) together with the following suppressed premise:

38.1. The nature of an absolutely infinite being has infinite reality.

Although the argument thus supplemented is valid, it remains mysteri-

ous. In particular, why should anyone believe premises (38)-(39.1)?

What is needed is some further explication of the relationship between

reality and power on the one hand, and reality and infinity on the

other.

The first question is how we should understand Spinoza’s notion of

reality. Premise (38) implies that reality is a variable quantity. It might

seem more natural to think that reality is either on or off. Existent

things are real and nonexistent things are not. Spinoza, however, clearly

thinks that reality is something that admits of degrees. Such a notion of

reality will be familiar to readers of Descartes from his argument for the

existence of God from our idea of an infinite being, which appears in

the third Meditation and Principles of Philosophy I, §§17-18. This is

an argument which Spinoza knows well and comments on in his


geometrical exposition of Descartes’ Principles.18 Commentators such as

Curley and Normore have argued that the notion of reality at work in

Descartes’ argument can be explained in terms of relative ontological

dependence.19 On this interpretation of reality, x is more real than y just

in case the existence of y depends on the existence of x. God is the most

real being because his existence does not depend upon anything else.

Minds and bodies are less real than God because they depend on God.

Modes of thought and extension are less real than minds and bodies

because they depend on minds and bodies. I believe that if we take

Spinoza to be relying upon this notion of reality in the fourth argument,

we can better understand why he believes (38.1). But to see how, we

need to turn first to Spinoza’s conception of finitude and infinitude.

In 1d2, Spinoza says that something is called finite if it can be lim-

ited by another of the same nature—an extended thing by an extended

thing, a thinking thing by a thinking thing. What kind of limitation

does Spinoza have in mind here? I think a number of considerations

suggest that the limitation in question is causal. First of all, the require-

ment that the limited thing have something in common with the limit-

ing thing is the same requirement which Spinoza uses to rule out causal

interaction between substances of different attributes. It is further sug-

gested by the fact that later on Spinoza describes being finite as the

result of a partial negation of the existence of some nature.20 The PSR

requires that the negation of the existence of some nature requires a

cause. If a total negation requires a cause, then it is natural to think

that there must be a cause for a partial negation as well. Something is

thus finite if it is limited by an external cause. Substances cannot be

limited by external causes and thus are infinite. Hence the infinitude of

a substance follows from its utter causal independence. Having identi-

fied reality with independence, we can conclude that anything infinite is

real to the highest degree, i.e., absolutely real.

Next, we need to establish a connection between power and reality.

Once again the PSR provides us with the key. Something is absolutely

real, as we have seen, if it is independent of external causes. If some-

thing is independent of external causes, then nothing external can exert

any causal influence on it. Preventing existence, it seems obvious, is a

form of causal influence. Therefore, nothing can prevent a possible nat-

ure with infinite reality from being exemplified. So if an absolutely real

18 DPP, G I ⁄ 159-160.19 E.M. Curley, Descartes Against the Skeptics, (Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, 1978), p. 130. Calvin Normore, ‘‘Meaning and Objective Being: Descartes

and His Sources,’’ in Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, Amelie Oksenberg Rorty

ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp. 226-227.20 1p8s.

282 MARTIN LIN

being did not exist, its nonexistence would have to be a brute fact and

hence violate the PSR. Therefore, there are no possible circumstances

in which an absolutely real nature is unexemplified. In other words, an

absolutely real being necessarily exists. If there are no possible circum-

stances in which a thing does not exist, then it would be natural to

describe that thing as possessing an absolutely infinite power of exist-

ing. To see this, let us represent the power of something as a function

from possible contexts to effects. Some x has the power to bring about

an effect e just in case there is a possible context which maps x onto e.

For instance, I have the power to lift one hundred pounds because

there are possible circumstances in which I lift one hundred pounds.

The greater the power to bring about e the greater the number of pos-

sible contexts which map onto e. For example, if there are only rela-

tively few possible circumstances in which I lift one hundred pounds

(perhaps I can do so only if I am well rested or have had a good

breakfast) then I have less power to lift one hundred pounds than if

there are relatively many possible circumstances in which I lift one hun-

dred pounds. God’s nature has an absolutely infinite power of existing

because every possible circumstance maps onto its exemplification. For

this very reason, God also exists necessarily. If there is no possible cir-

cumstance compatible with a thing’s nonexistence, then that thing

exists necessarily. In other words, if a nature has an absolutely infinite

power of existing, then it is exemplified. We now have a justification of

(39.1) above.

Before continuing, a word on the notion of a ‘‘possible circumstance’’

or a ‘‘possible context’’ is in order. Given Spinoza’s necessitarianism,

the only possible circumstances are the actual circumstances, and thus

my characterization of power might seem to imply that a thing only has

the power to do what it actually does. But there are, according to

Spinoza, two sources of necessity: the essence of a thing and its causes.21

Things from whose essences alone existence doesn’t follow still exist nec-

essarily but not in virtue of their own natures. Rather, they necessarily

exist in virtue of their causes. So while no non-actual situation is possi-

ble—since any non-actual situation will be incompatible with the ordo

naturae, which is itself entailed by the divine nature—we can still ask

whether or not two or more essences are compatible with each other.

Doing so can inform us about the natures of things. For example, while

a counterfactual situation in which I took a lethal dose of cyanide yet

lived is made impossible by the ordo naturae, it is also impossible given

my nature and the nature of cyanide. A counterfactual situation in

which I ate an apple and lived is also made impossible by the ordo

21 1p33s.


naturae, but it is not made impossible by my nature and the nature of

apples. In this sense, then, we can speak of a counterfactual situation

that is possible per se—i.e., not made impossible by the natures of the

involved individuals—without implying that such situations are possible

tout court. Moreover, claims about what is possible per se, may be per-

spicuous ways of making claims about essences. For example, that the

circumstance in which I ate an apple and lived is not impossible per se

tells us something about my nature and the nature of apples. So when I

speak of representing power of existing by a function from a nature and

a possible circumstance to the exemplification of that nature, I am

speaking a circumstances which, while perhaps made impossible by the

ordo naturae, are not made impossible by the essences of the individuals

that they involve.22

I claimed in the last section that a proper understanding of the

fourth proof would clarify ceratin puzzles concerning the third proof.

Here is how. We can take what we have learned about Spinoza’s

understanding of power, reality, and infinity and show why Spinoza

believes premise (33) of the third argument: It is impossible that a finite

being possess more power than an infinite being.

To get there, we must first note that Spinoza thinks that for any

given finite thing there is some external cause capable of preventing its

existence. As he writes in 4a1:

There is no singular thing [i.e. finite thing] in nature than which there is notanother more powerful and stronger. Whatever one is given, there is anothermore powerful by which the first can be destroyed.

One might reasonably wonder about the axiomatic status of this claim,

as it does not appear to be self-evident.23 But if we grant this assump-

tion, then it follows that there is at least one situation incompatible

with the existence of any finite thing.

We are now is a position to say why a finite thing cannot have more

power of existing than an infinite thing, as was asserted in premise (33)

of my reconstruction of the third argument. If a finite thing had more

22 C.f., Don Garrett, ‘‘Teleology in Spinoza and Early Modern Philosophy,’’ in

Gennaro and Huenemann, eds., New Essays on the Rationalists, (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1999), p. 316.23 While Spinoza does not attempt to demonstrate in the Ethics any of the axioms he

presents in that work, there is reason to believe that Spinoza believes that at least

some of the Ethics’ axioms can be demonstrated. Henry Oldenburg complained to

Spinoza (in Ep. 3) that some of Spinoza’s axioms aren’t ‘‘indemonstrable principles,

known by the light of Nature, and requiring no proof.’’ Spinoza responds (in

Ep. 4) that he doesn’t hold the axioms to be indemonstrable, and then proceeds to

try to give a proof of some of them. Spinoza never, however, attempts a proof of

4a1.

284 MARTIN LIN

power of existing than an infinite thing, then, by definition, there would

be fewer possible circumstances compatible with the nonexistence of a

finite thing than an infinite thing. But whereas no possible circum-

stances are compatible with the nonexistence of an infinite being, there

is at least one incompatible with the nonexistence with any finite being.

Therefore, it is impossible for a finite being to have a greater power of

acting than an infinite one. We can also dispense with the worry that

the nature of a finite being which actually exists may involve a greater

power of existing than the nature of an infinite being that is unexempli-

fied. There can be no circumstances in which the nature of an infinite

being is unexemplified. But this line of reasoning does not depend in

any way upon the a posteriori premise that some finite being exists.

Thus we see that force behind Spinoza’s third argument comes from an

entirely a priori source, which is just what we should expect given that

Spinoza describes the fourth argument as an a priori argument that has

the same basis as the third.

5. The PSR and 1p16d

I claimed above that my interpretation distinguishes itself from

Garrett’s by, among other things, the light it sheds on aspects of

Spinoza’s metaphysics not directly connected to his arguments for the

existence of God. In this section, I intend to substantiate this claim by

showing how the reasoning contained in Spinoza’s arguments for the

existence of God as I have interpreted them can also provide support

for Spinoza’s claim that God creates every possible mode. This is an

important result because, although this claim is very important to Spi-

noza’s system, Spinoza’s argument for it is vulnerable to a powerful

objection that stems from a widespread view of God’s creative power.

I conjecture that this objection did not worry Spinoza, because he was

aware that the reasoning that he uses to establish the existence of God

can be adapted to respond to this objection as well. In any event, that

my interpretation of Spinoza’s arguments for the existence of God

coheres well with other important aspects of Spinoza’s metaphysics is

evidence, although hardly decisive, in favor of it.

In 1p16 and 1p16d, Spinoza writes:

From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow [sequi] infi-nitely many things in infinitely many modes, (i.e., everything which

can fall under an infinite intellect.)

Dem.: This proposition must be plain to anyone, provided he attendsto the fact that the intellect infers from the given definition of any-thing a number of properties that really do follow necessarily from it


(i.e., from the very essence of the thing); and that it infers more prop-erties the more the definition of the thing expresses reality, i.e., themore reality the essence of the defined thing involves. Bust since thedivine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by d6), each of which

also expresses an essence infinite in its own kind, from its necessitythere must follow infinitely many things in infinite modes (i.e., every-thing which can fall under an infinite intellect), q.e.d.

1p16d tries to establish that an omnipotent God exercises all of his

power. This claim amounts to something like a principle of plentitude:

God creates every possible thing. This is not at first obvious because

Spinoza discusses the issue in terms of what ‘‘follows from’’ God’s nat-

ure and it is not obvious what kind of relation ‘‘following from’’ is. Is

it causal, logical, explanatory, or something else? If I am right and this

text concerns what God creates, then ‘‘following from’’ must have a

causal dimension. We can see that it does have a causal dimension

from the three corollaries that Spinoza alleges follow from 1p16, all of

which pertain to causal relations. A further difficulty for the plenitude

interpretation is that 1p16d concerns the question of what properties

follow from the definition of God. And that seems to pertain to the

ways that God is, not what he does. But, for Spinoza, everything other

than God is a mode of God and hence has an adjectival relation to

God. So, if there is no limit to the modes that follow causally from

God, then there is no limit to God’s power. And if every mode that

can follow from God’s nature does follow, then God exercises all of his

power.

Here then is how I understand 1p16d:

P1. If something is unconstrained by external causes (i.e., has

infinite reality), then it causes every conceivable thing.

P2. God is unconstrained by external causes.

C. So, God causes every conceivable thing.

There are many things here with which a philosopher might want to

take issue. I shall confine myself here to considering one objection that

stems from a widespread view of God that I shall call ‘‘the standard

view.’’ The standard view holds that while God has infinite power and

hence cannot be bound by external causes, that power need not be

exercised. This would entail a denial of premise (P1). How can Spinoza

defend (P1) against the standard view? I propose that Spinoza can

respond with an argument that is, in many respects, parallel to his

argument for the existence of God.

286 MARTIN LIN

Suppose that God didn’t exercise all of his power. Then there would

be a possible mode that God doesn’t create. There must be a cause or

reason for its nonexistence. This cause is either internal to the mode,

external to God, or God himself. It can’t be something external to

God, because then something external to a substance would causally

influence a substance, which is impossible. It can’t be internal to the

mode, because, ex hypothesi, it is a possible mode and only self-

contradictory things have internal causes for their nonexistence.24 So

the only candidate for causing the mode to not exist is God. In virtue

of what might God be the cause of the nonexistence of a possible

mode? It might be that, while the mode is possible per se, it is not

possible relative to God’s nature. That is, God’s nature doesn’t contain

the possibility of creating such a mode. But then God would not be

omnipotent, which the adherent of the standard view cannot accept. So

perhaps God chooses not the create the mode. This is how the standard

view typically characterizes God’s power. There is no possible mode

that he cannot create, but, for any possible mode, God may choose not

to create it.

That God contingently chooses not to create some possible mode,

however, conflicts with the PSR. Here is a proof. First, a few prelimi-

naries are in order. Let choice be the putative truth that God contin-

gently chooses not to create some possible mode. For each truth p let

d(p) be the sufficient explanation of p. (Note that every truth has

exactly one sufficient explanation. It has at least one by the PSR. It has

at most one by the principle of explanatory exclusion.)25 A class Y of

truths is the explanatory class of some truth p just in case Y is the

smallest class that contains p, and is closed under conjunction, and is

closed under the function d. Let W be the explanatory class of choice.

Let q be the conjunction of every truth in W.

P1. The sufficient explanation of every contingent truth is a

contingent truth.

P2. No contingent truth is self-explanatory.

P3. If p 2 W, then d(p) „ p (because no contingent truth is

self-explanatory) and d (p) 2 W (because W is by definition

closed under d). (P1, P2)P4. q 2 W.

C1. So, d (q) „ q and d (q) 2 W. (P3, P4)

24 1p11d.25 Did Spinoza accept the principle of explanatory exclusion? I suspect he did, but for

present purposes, the answer to this question doesn’t matter. The assumption that

he did is not essential to the proof; it merely simplifies it. So, for the sake of expo-

sition, I shall here assume it.


P5. For any contingent conjunction p, the sufficient

explanation of p is not a conjunct of p.

C2. d(q) is not a conjunct of q. (P5)

P6. Every member of W is a conjunct of q.

C3. So, d(q) is a conjunct of q. (C1 and P6) This contradicts

C2. q.e.d.

We have now ruled out every candidate explanation of the nonexis-

tence of a possible mode: it cannot be explained by anything external

to God nor anything internal to God or the mode itself. Since these

alternatives are exhaustive, if there were a possible mode that did not

exist, then its nonexistence would be inexplicable. Hence, according to

the psr, the nonexistence of a possible mode is impossible.

We are now in a position to see the advantages of my interpretation

over Garrett’s. Recall that Garrett’s reconstruction of Spinoza’s argu-

ments include an equivalence between necessary existence and self-

causation. According to him, Spinoza uses the PSR to establish that

God is self-caused. That together with the equivalence of self-causation

and necessary existence allows Spinoza to conclude that God necessar-

ily exists.

As I argued above, this equivalence is either inconsistent with

Spinoza’s necessitarianism or it must be patched up. The most obvious

patch would be to replace the equivalence between self-causation and

necessary existence with an equivalence between self-causation and exis-

tence that is necessary in virtue of its own nature. But then the style of

reasoning that Spinoza employs in his arguments for the existence of

God would have no application in cases of existence that is necessary

in virtue of the nature of another. The existence of every possible mode

is necessary in virtue of the nature of another (viz., God), so the rea-

soning that supports the claim that God necessarily exists can have no

bearing on the necessary existence of the modes and Spinoza has no

defence against the standard view. Garrett’s mistake lies in underesti-

mating the power of Spinoza’s PSR and its centrality to his metaphys-

ics. There is no need for Spinoza to appeal to Garrett’s equivalence.

The psr together with Spinoza’s assumptions about substances and

causation suffice. Moreover, the very same style of reasoning allows

Spinoza to handle otherwise telling objections to some of his other

main metaphysical theses.

6. The Monism Argument Adapted to Prove the Nonexistence of God

There is a well-known problem with Spinoza’s arguments. Having

attempted to prove the existence of God, Spinoza goes on to try to

288 MARTIN LIN

prove, using the no-shared attribute theorem introduced in 1p5, that

there is no substance other than God. God has all the attributes. If

there were some substance other than God, then it would share an

attribute with God. But no two substances can share an attribute.

Therefore, there are no other substances. It would seem, however, that

some of Spinoza’s arguments for the existence of God would equally

well serve to prove the existence of some substance other than God.

Take for example the second argument. Replace every mention of God

in that argument with an expression referring to a substance other than

God, e.g., a merely extended substance (in other words, a substance

with exactly one attribute, extension). For everything there is a cause

or reason, as much for its nonexistence as for its existence. If a merely

extended substance did not exist, it would be because it was internally

incoherent or externally prevented. No external cause can influence a

substance. A merely extended substance isn’t incoherent. Therefore, a

merely extended substance exists. The argument thus transformed

seems to work just as well as the argument for the existence of God.

The problem is not just that this result contradicts the claim that there

is no other substance than God (1p14), but, along with the no-shared

attribute theorem, a merely extended substance would preclude the

existence of God. In this way, at least some of the arguments presented

for 1p11 would equally well serve as arguments for the nonexistence of

God.

Garrett has argued that Spinoza recognizes these difficulties and

designs the third and fourth arguments with an eye toward blocking

such alternative arguments.26 First of all, in the third argument he

defines power of existing so that if x exists and y does not, then, ipso

facto, x has a greater power of existing than y. Second, in the fourth

argument he claims that an absolutely infinite being, i.e., a being with

infinitely many attributes, has an absolutely infinite power of existing.

From these two premises it follows that it is not possible for a less than

absolutely infinite attribute to exist because that would imply, together

with the no-shared attribute theorem, that a substance with a greater

power of existing did not exist. But what it is for x to have a greater

power of acting than y is to be such that y cannot exist if x does not

exist.

Della Rocca has argued that this response begs the question against

someone, e.g., an orthodox Cartesian, who believes that substances

have one and only one attribute. He writes:

26 Garrett ‘‘‘Ontological’ Argument,’’ p. 211.


A Cartesian would deny (and, in Ep 8, de Vries does deny) that a sub-stance could have more than one attribute. For this reason, we cansee that a Cartesian would hold that a certain difference between God(as Spinoza defines God) and [a merely thinking substance] gives

[a merely thinking substance] more power to exist than God.Although [a merely thinking substance] and God both have thought,they differ in that God has other attributes besides thought, and [a

merely thinking substance] does not. This difference, a Cartesianwould say, is clearly to the detriment of God (as Spinoza definesGod) since the notion of a substance having more than one attribute

is simply incoherent, whereas the notion of a substance having justone attribute is perfectly legitimate. Thus, the Cartesian would say,God would be precluded from existing by God’s very concept, but [a

merely thinking substance] would not be precluded by [a merely think-ing substance’s] concept.27

Della Rocca’s worry harks back to the concern I expressed earlier in

connection with premise (27) of the second argument: The nature of

God is not incoherent. Spinoza offers no explicit argument for this and

given his definition of God as a substance with infinitely many attri-

butes, any philosopher who, like Descartes, denies that a substance can

have more than one attribute would challenge it. So in addition to

meeting the challenge that single attribute substances pose for the exis-

tence of God, part of the pay off of this section will be to offer some

support for (27).

Della Rocca has suggested a Spinozistic argument that might estab-

lish the correlation of attributes and power. The argument begins with

the claim that for every attribute A there is some substance that has A,

i.e., every attribute exists. This follows from the fact that, for Spinoza,

each attribute is conceptually self-contained. And we have already seen

from the second argument that Spinoza has reasons to believe that any-

thing conceptually self-contained necessarily exists.28 From Spinoza’s

belief that no two substances share an attribute and the claim that

every attribute exists, Della Rocca concludes that if A is an attribute

then one and only one substance has A. The important question is how

are these uniquely possessed attributes distributed among substances?

Here Della Rocca invokes the Principle of the Identity of Indiscern-

ibles: if x is not identical to y, then there is some difference between

x and y that explains their nonidentity. Thus, if the extended substance

is not identical to the thinking substance, then there is some difference

between them that explains their nonidentity. Perhaps we can explain

27 Della Rocca, ‘‘Spinoza’s Monism,’’ p. 26.28 Della Rocca thinks that Spinoza would here rely on 1p7 not the second argument.

But, as was shown previously, 1p7 does not contain any claim about necessary

existence.

290 MARTIN LIN

their nonidentity by appealing to their diverse attributes. So, for exam-

ple, the extended substance is not identical to the thinking substance

because it has extension and the thinking substance does not. That is,

the distinguishing feature is the attribute of extension only if the think-

ing substance lacks extension. But the PSR demands that for every fact

there is cause or reason which explains that fact. What fact could

explain the fact that the thinking substance lacks extension? Della

Rocca claims that nothing could account for this lack. To show this he

considers two unsuccessful attempts to explain it, and concludes that

all attempted explanations will share their flaws.

The first attempted explanation begins with the assumption that

the thinking substance is distinct from the extended substance.

Distinct substances cannot share an attribute (1p5). Therefore, the

thinking substance does not share the attribute of extension with the

extended substance. But this begs the question since the nonidentity of

the thinking and the extended substances is the very thing we are trying

to establish, and the assumption on which this putative explanation is

based presumes that nonidentity.

Della Rocca next considers an attempted explanation which begins

with the assumption that thought and extension are mutually exclusive.

Thus, the fact that the thinking substance possesses thought explains

why it does not also possess extension. But this explains a fact involv-

ing extension—the fact that a certain substance does not have it—by a

fact involving thought. This would violate 1p10d, which says that attri-

butes are conceptually self-contained and hence no fact involving one

attribute can be explained by a fact involving another attribute. Clearly

this attempted explanation violates this explanatory barrier between the

attributes, by explaining an extension involving fact (that this substance

does not posses extension) by reference to a thought involving fact

(that this thinking substance possesses thought).

I believe that Della Rocca’s argument provides a genuinely Spinozis-

tic basis for the claim that a substance with fewer than all the attri-

butes is impossible. There is, however, a closely related argument that

also supports that claim—an argument which more perspicuously dis-

plays the connection between that claim and Spinoza’s metaphysical

rationalism. Whereas the main premises of Della Rocca’s argument are

the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and the explanatory bar-

rier between attributes, my variation proceeds from the PSR and the

causal barrier between the attributes. That our two arguments are very

closely related can be seen from the fact that the Principle of the Identity

of Indiscernibles is entailed by the PSR and the fact that, for Spinoza,

explanation and causation are coextensive. But since I take adherence

to the PSR to be the defining feature of Spinoza’s metaphysical


rationalism, I think my version of the argument has the benefit of high-

lighting the significance of the PSR to both Spinoza’s theism and mon-

ism.

In order to work our way up to the conclusion that any substance

must possess all the attributes, let us begin with a case where we are

trying to determine whether or not some substance possesses some

attribute, say attribute E. For every substance x, x either possesses

attribute E or not. Suppose that x, a substance with only one attribute,

does not posses E. There must be, according to the PSR, a cause for

substance x’s non-possession of E. Causes, for Spinoza must be con-

ceived through the same attribute as are their effects. That is:

iii. If x causes y, then (there is some attribute A such that x is

conceived through attribute A if and only if y is conceived

through attribute A).

Moreover, Spinoza believes that if something can be conceived through

an attribute, then that attribute is sufficient for conceiving of that

thing. That is:

iv. If x is conceived through attribute A, then A is sufficient for

conceiving of x.29

This rules out the possibility that some x is conceived through A and B

together but not through A alone.

Because the psr requires x’s non-possession of E is possible only if it

is the effect of some cause, and because causes and effects must be con-

ceived through the same attribute, we must now ask, through what

attribute is x’s non-possession of E conceived? The fact of x’s non-pos-

session of E cannot be conceived through some attribute other than E,

because in order to conceive of x’s not possessing E it is necessary to

conceive of E. And yet this fact cannot be conceived through E because

substance x cannot be conceived through E. This is because, for Spi-

noza, things are conceived through their essences,30 and attributes are

what an intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a substance.31

Thus, if x could be conceived through E, then x would possess E. But

x does not possess E and so cannot be conceived through it.

Perhaps, then, x’s non-possession of E is conceivable through a com-

bination of attributes E and some other attribute that x does possess,

29 1p10s.30 2d2.31 1d4.

292 MARTIN LIN

T. Then we would conceive of x through T, which x does possess, and

not-possessing-E would be conceived through E. But such a solution

would violate (iv), because neither E nor T would suffice for conceiving

of x’s non-possession of E.

It seems, then, that substance x’s non-possession of E is not conceiv-

able through any attribute. But then, according to (iii), there can be no

cause of x’s non-possession of E. And so, by the PSR, this non-posses-

sion is impossible. That is, for any substance x and for any attribute

E it is not the case that x does not possess E. Consequently, a sub-

stance with fewer than all possible attributes is impossible, and the

threat that single attribute substances would pose to the existence of

God is defeated.

We can also make some sense of Spinoza’s claim that the more reality

a thing has, the more attributes it has.32 As we have seen, reality, for

Spinoza, is equivalent to causal and conceptual independence. Because a

substance is absolutely causally and conceptually independent, nothing

could affect such a substance so as to bring about its non-possession of

an attribute. So any substance with infinite reality possesses every possi-

ble attribute. Any substance with fewer than every possible attribute

would violate the PSR and so is impossible. Even so, each fact of non-

possession of an attribute which is true of some less than infinite sub-

stance would be the result of a causal limitation. Each such limitation

reduces its degree of reality. That is, if some substance didn’t possess, per

impossibile, some one attribute, it would have to be because there was

something capable of preventing it from doing so, which would compro-

mise that substance’s causal and conceptual independence.33 Every attri-

bute lacked would introduce another limitation and further reduce its

causal and conceptual independence. Thus some impossible substances

are even less real than others.

32 1p9.33 It is often thought that counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents

(i.e., counterpossible conditionals) are vacuously true. Thus the claim that if some

substance didn’t possess, per impossibile, some one attribute, it would not have to

be because there was something capable of preventing it from doing so would also

be true. But the truth of that proposition would undercut Spinoza’s claim that the

more attributes a substance has, the more real it is. I think, however, that there is

good reason to reject the idea that conditionals with impossible antecedents are

vacuously true. As Daniel Nolan points out (‘‘Impossible Worlds: A Modest

Approach,’’ Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38: 4, Fall 1997, p. 504) the his-

torian of philosophy has especially good reason to reject such a principle. Presum-

ably some philosophers believe that both Plato’s metaphysics and Leibniz’s

metaphysics are false. And not because Forms and monads happen not to exist. If

they are false, they are necessarily so. But it would be absurd for the historian of

philosophy to conclude from this that Plato’s and Leibniz’s metaphysics are equiva-

lent and that different things don’t follow from them.


7. Assessment

I shall now turn briefly to assessing the persuasiveness of Spinoza’s

arguments. I believe that the second and fourth arguments, as I have

reconstructed them, are valid. The third is invalid because from its pre-

mises the most that can be legitimately concluded is that God exists,

not that God necessarily exists. The first argument is problematic

because, on plausible assumptions about the semantic value of ‘God’, it

either begs the question or is invalid, depending upon whether ‘God’ is

construed as a singular term or as a disguised quantifier expression.

Nevertheless, all of Spinoza’s arguments clearly avoid a number of the

most powerful criticisms lodged against more traditional ontological

and cosmological arguments. Unlike many traditional ontological argu-

ments, they do not suppose that existence is a property or a constituent

of the concept of any being. Unlike many traditional cosmological

arguments, they do not falsely assume that a necessary being must be

perfect. To this extent, at least, they are stronger than many traditional

arguments for the existence of God.

Spinoza’s arguments are not, nevertheless, unobjectionable. Aside

from various quibbles, I think there are two very serious problems with

them, both of which are pillars of nearly all rationalistic metaphysics

and relate in interesting ways to Spinoza’s necessitarianism.

First is Spinoza’s equivalence between conception and causation. The

icy conditions caused the car wreck, but the concept of the car wreck does

not involve the concept of the icy conditions. Smoking causes cancer, but

the concept of the latter does not involve the concept of the former.

The equivalence of conception and causation is, however, crucially

important in Spinoza’s arguments because it secures the inference from

a substance being conceptually self-contained to its being independent

of external causes, particularly in premise (29) of my reconstruction of

the second argument and in establishing the connection between reality

and infinity for the purposes of the fourth argument.

Perhaps Spinoza could argue that the equivalence of conception and

causation is required by the PSR. It cannot be simply a brute fact that a

causal relation obtains between two things. There must be something in

virtue of which it obtains, which explains why it obtains. And this

explanatory factor must either be itself self-explanatory or be part of an

explanatory chain that eventually terminates in something self-explana-

tory. Bennett and Della Rocca have argued that by claiming that causa-

tion is equivalent to conception, Spinoza’s account of causality satisfies

the PSR.34 The explanation of why one thing is causally related to

another is that it is part of the concept of the former that it is so related

34 Bennett, Study, pp. 31-31 and Michael Della Rocca, ‘‘A Rationalist Manifesto.’’

294 MARTIN LIN

to the later. Conceptual relations are self-explanatory in the sense that

there can be no further question why bachelors, for example, are unmar-

ried men, once we have analyzed the concept BACHELOR into the con-

stituents UNMARRIED and MAN. Similarly there can be no further

question about why one thing causes another after it has been estab-

lished that the concept of the former implies that it causes the latter.

This response puts Spinoza in the awkward position of having to

maintain that the concept of the car wreck does indeed contain the

concept of the icy conditions. This awkwardness, however, is mitigated

by the fact that Spinoza thinks that we never have adequate ideas of

external particulars like car wrecks or icy conditions.35 Thus if we fail

to discern the conceptual connection between the two, it is open to

Spinoza to claim that this is only because our grasp of these concepts

is incomplete or inadequate. This response is not entirely implausible.

As Tyler Burge has pointed out, most, if not all, people possess con-

cepts that they incompletely grasp.36 For example, one might possess

the concept of a mortgage without knowing exactly what distinguishes

one from any other kind of debt, or one might possess the concept of a

contract without recognizing that some verbal agreements are con-

tracts. On Burge’s account, possession of incompletely grasped con-

cepts depends upon the complete grasp of experts and a disposition on

the part the one who incompletely grasps them to defer to expert judg-

ment. On Spinoza’s account of concepts, however, no finite mind com-

pletely grasps the concept, and so it is beyond finite minds to discover

causal connections between particulars by conceptual analysis.

There is, however, a more serious objection to Spinoza’s claim that a

thing’s causal profile is contained in its concept: whether or not various

causal connections obtain is never, on this view, a contingent matter. If

it is part of the concept of Caesar that Brutus murdered him, then it is

necessary truth that Brutus murdered Caesar. It is thus impossible, on

Spinoza’s view, that Caesar died of old age or in battle. Spinoza, of

course, would not be bothered by the consequence that all causal rela-

tions are necessary since he is arguably committed to the view that all

truths are necessary. Philosophers who do not share Spinoza’s convic-

tion that there are no contingent facts concerning causation, however,

will do well to reject the equivalence of conception and causation.

This brings us to the second problem, the PSR itself. This principle

expresses Spinoza’s basic rationalist orientation. No element or feature

35 The only things we can have adequate ideas of are common notions, the eternal

and infinite essence of God, and the formal essences of singular things (which are

eternal truths). See 2p40s.36 Tyler Burge, ‘‘Individualism and the Mental,’’ in Midwest Studies in Philosophy IV

(1979).


of the world is inaccessible to rational understanding. Whether or not a

given individual exists, and if it exists, whether or not it exemplifies a

given property or stands in a given relationship has a complete explana-

tion. All but the first of Spinoza’s arguments presuppose that the PSR

is, and is known to be, true. Moreover, it cannot simply be a brute fact

that the PSR is true. If it were, then the PSR would violate itself. Hence,

the truth of the PSR must be self-explanatory. How could the truth of

such a principle be self-explanatory? It would be reasonable to regard it

as such if it were true logically or analytically. It seems, however, quite

clear that it is not a theorem of logic. Perhaps Spinoza would claim that

it is analytically true. For example, Spinoza might claim that the con-

cept of a thing is a complex concept consisting of the concept of the

most general category of being such that if something is not a thing,

then it does not exist, and the concept of something with a cause or

reason. If such an analysis of the concept of a thing were correct, then

the PSR would be a conceptual truth. It would also be, unfortunately

for the adherent of the PSR, a triviality. For the opponent of the PSR

could characterize a different concept, THING*, such that something is

a thing* just in case it exists. Then the anti-rationalist is in a position to

ask whether of not there are any things* that aren’t things—i.e. don’t

have complete causes or reasons—without denying the PSR is true as

concerns things. Any attempt to claim that the PSR is an analytic truth

will be subject to such evasions. Since such evasions deprive the PSR of

the force that its rationalist adherents ascribe to it, the PSR must not be

an analytic truth.

Some philosophers have thought that the PSR is presupposed by all

rational inquiry, and thus its truth can never be rationally challenged.

But, as Russell points out, if rational inquiry presupposes the PSR, it is

only in the sense that prospecting presupposes the existence of gold.

That is, rational inquiry hopes to find causes and reasons, but should

not assume that such things can be found everywhere.

If there is no explanation of the truth of the PSR, then the PSR is

incoherent. I can think of nothing that would explain the truth of the

PSR, but I know of no argument to show that such an explanation is

impossible. Nevertheless, I think it is fair to say that the burden of

proof rests with the rationalist. Until an explanation of the truth of

PSR is given, the threat of incoherence looms.

If the PSR is not known to be true, is it known to be false? The

PSR entails that all truths are necessary.37 This can be demonstrated by

37 This has been shown by William Rowe in his Cosmological Arguments, (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1975), Peter van Inwagen in his Metaphysics, pp.119-

122, and Jonathan Bennett in his Study, p. 115.

296 MARTIN LIN

the following argument. If there are contingent truths, then there is the

set of all contingent truths. If the PSR is true, then there must be an

answer to the question, what is the cause or reason why this set is the

set of contingent truths and not some other set? It cannot be a contin-

gent truth not contained in the set, because it is, ex hypothesi, the set

of all contingent truths. It cannot be a necessary truth. Any necessary

truth is compatible with every possibility, and so cannot answer the

question, why is this set of possibilities actual and not some other?

That is, the necessary truths are the same in all possible worlds so none

of them can explain why one of those possible worlds is the actual

world. It cannot, moreover, be a subset of the set. If it were, then some

subset of contingent truths could determine the entire set of contingent

truths. But this is impossible. To see why, take a seemingly plausible

candidate for being such an explanatory subset, for example, a com-

plete specification of the state of affairs that obtained just after the big

bang and the laws of nature. If the universe were deterministic, this

would suffice to explain why any other contingent fact obtains. It

would not, however, explain itself. Contingent truths are not self-

explanatory. There would be then, at least one brute fact, which vio-

lates the PSR. In sum, the explanation of the entire set of contingent

facts cannot be a necessary truth, nor can it be a contingent truth. All

truths, however, are either contingent or necessary. Hence, if there were

contingent truths, the set of them would have no explanation. And by

the PSR, we can conclude that contingent truths are impossible. In

other words, all truths are necessary truths.

So, the following statements are inconsistent and no one may ratio-

nally believe both:

There is a cause or reason for everything.

That Bush won the election is a contingent truth.

For my own part, I have more confidence in Bush’s victory being con-

tingent than I have in the PSR. Thus I must, on pain of irrationality,

reject the PSR. Such a rejection cuts to the heart of Spinoza’s meta-

physics. As we have seen, at nearly every turn in arguing for the exis-

tence of an absolutely infinite substance, i.e., God, Spinoza appeals to

the PSR. Without God, the metaphysical foundations of nearly all of

his philosophy—the parallelism, the conatus doctrine, necessitarianism,

his accounts of virtue and political legitimacy—are undercut. That is,

however important God is to Spinoza’s system, so too is the PSR.


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Baruch Spinoza on God's existence.pdf