Bolivia: Origins and Policies of Movimiento al Socialismo

8/18/2019 Bolivia: Origins and Policies of Movimiento al Socialismo

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238 Case nalyses

14. EINacional www.el-nacional.eom/www/si:e/p_coni:enido.php.

15. EINacional January 2008.16. Ultimas Noticias January 13, 2008.17. The announcement of these measures was not covered in the portal of the Ministeri

del Poder Popular para la Information y la Comunicacion (MINCI). I have therefore resorteto periodical sources.

C H A P T E R T E N

BoliviaOrigins an d Policies of the M ovimiento al Socialismo

R A U L M A D R I D

I Bolivia, as in m uch of Latin America, the Left is resurgent. In 2005 Evo Morales,

the indigenous leader of a relatively new leftist party, the Mov imiento al Socialismo

(MAS), or the Movement toward Socialism, captured the presidency with a majority

if the popular vote, the first time any presidential candidate has won an electoral

majority since the return to democracy in 1982. Morales and the MAS followed up

iiti'. vit:lory with equally resoundin g triump hs in various other elections, including

ih r 1009 presidential and legislative elections.

What explains the resurgence of the Left in Bolivia? Why has the Left come back

h t o power, and what does this mean for public policy and democracy in Bolivia?

This chapter argues that the rise of the MAS been driven by some of the same

tors lhat have led to the ascension of the Left elsewhere in Latin America, namely,

King disenchantment with market-oriented policies and the parties that imple-

t Mini them.1 This does not mean that Bolivians became significantly more likely

ientily themselves as leftists. In Bolivia and most other L atin American countries,

percentage of people who identity as leftists has risen only modestly in recent

fn (Seligson 2007; Arno ld and Samuels in chapter 1 of this volume). Nevertheless,

I for market-oriented policies, especially privatization, declined significantlymi', the late 1990s and early 2000s, and disenchantment with the existing parties

the performance of democracy grew (Madrid 2010; Baker and Greene 2011). The

M we shall see, was able to capitalize on this dise ncha ntmen t.

hr MAS appealed to the growing pool of disaffected voters in part by devel-

I -1 ii.iiluiuii.il leftist agenda. Ii opposed trade liberalization, privatization, and

: i alibi rd polli lei and 1 ailed for income redistribution, agrarian reform, and

rirtiliiiiull/titlnii ol ri.itLiral resoim rv h also harshly criticized the traditional par-

? Mirrupt ah>l ni'-lt.-. ti . in-.i mn 1 til', ih.it win SIILM-I vitNH in l i.l.lhi..ii As. i I V- I: 1. • •••(. MIII •: I% making clear I ihflJl

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24 Case Analyses

have taken power in the past decade. But the MAS has eschewed exclusionary ethn

appeals in favor of a more inclusive approach. Thus, it has also actively pursued tl

support of nonindigenous as well as indigenous voters and has recruited many whitl

and mestizo leaders and organizations to the patty.

The Morales administration was elected on a relatively radical platform, and i

power it has moved rapidly to fulfil ma ny of its campa ign promises. It has created

new constitution, it has enacted an agrarian reform plan, and it has asserted great:

state control over the gas industry. Th e Morales adm inistration has also often engaj

in radical, even incendiary, rhetoric. It has frequently characterized itself as a revoli

tionary government intent on bringing sweeping changes to Bolivian society, it h;

distanced itself from the United States, and it has embraced the icons of the Latil

American Left, from Fidel Castro to Hugo Chavez. Nevertheless, in some ways th

Morales administration's record of governance has been more radical in rhetoric thai

in reality. Specifically, the economic and social policies of the Morales administratiol

have not represented a dramatic break with the past in large part because a variei

of political, ideological, economic, and administrative constraints have hindered rhg]

government from pursuing the more radical economic and social policies favored

its social movem ent base. Thu s, the Morales administration's eco nomic and socii

policy is most appropriately coded as heterodox, like the policies of Argentina ani

Ecuador, rather than statist, like Venezuela's.

The Morales administration's orientation toward democracy, meanwhile, is prf

dominantly plebiscftarian, although it contains elements of radical and liberal

proaches to democracy. Like a liberal democracy, the Morales administration

respected human rights and civil liberties and has carried out free and fair electio:

Like a radical democracy, the governme nt has encourage d social mobilization and

engaged in a continual dialogue with the leaders of social movement organizatio

Nevertheless, the administration also has sought to weaken horizontal accountab;

ity and concentrate power in the executive branch. It has used referenda, electioi

and mass mobilizations to overhaul the country's political institutions, weakenopposition, and push its policy agenda. Thus, the impact of the MAS on Bolivli

democracy has been decidedly mixed. Although the MAS has helped boost potli

participation and increase mass sarisfaction with democracy, particularly among

indigenous population, it has exacerbated political and regional polari/,ation and

dcrmincd democratic- checks and balances.

i >• i'i ii m i Evolution of the MASi Iv m • • "-• •• A - • • • wpriiiftg ,'• • e ih n ihi I f l bad tm i \ ri :'

Bolivia 24

\ (Ul )P) came to an end amid a severe economic crisis in 1985. The Movimiento de

*|uierda Revolucionaria (MIR) was the only left-wing patty that fared well in the

lis that followed, an d it did so in patt by shifting to the right. The MIR embraced

iiket-oriented policies and formed an alliance with Accion Democraticay Naciona-

1 (ADN), the party of the former dictator and long-time MIR opponen t General

pii^ii Banzer. No ne of the more radical left-wing parties, meanwh ile, managed to win

p p r r than a small fraction of the national vote.

Ai the outset, the MAS provided little indication that it would be any more suc-

ffcfiil than previous leftist parties. Indeed, the MAS and its precursors achieved

fefily modest results in the first few elections in wh ich they c omp eted. In the 1997

Ken ions, for example, the predecessor of the MAS, the Asamblea Soberania de los

ileblos (ASP), won only 3% of the national vote. The MAS finished a surprising

pond in the 2002 elections with 20.9% of the valid vote, however, and then built on

performance in subsequent elections. In the 2005 presidential elections, Morales

d die MAS won 53% of the valid vote, more than 25 percentage points ahead of the

mier-up, Jorge Quiroga of Poder Democratico y Social (PODEMOS). The MAS

illnwcd up this victory with decisive triumphs in the 2006 Constituent Assembly

tl die 2009 general elections, as well as in several referenda held during that period.b e d , in the 2009 general elections, Morales was reelected with an astonish ing 64%

(he valid vote.

it rose to prominence, the MAS underwent an internal transformation. As the

uductory chapter notes, the MAS is an example of the movement Left. It emerged

rural social movements, and these groups continue to form the backbone of the

S, but it has expanded to include a diverse array of social movements. The prede-

10 r of the MA S, the ASP, was first created in 1995 at the instigation of several largely

lllgenous, rural social movement organizations, including the principal confedera-

itl highlands peasant unions, the Confederacion Sindical Unica deTrabajadores

ipesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB)- The main force behind this decision came from

powerful coca growers' unions in the Department of Cochabamba, which hadd control of the CS UT CB in the early 1990s. Th e coca growers' unions domi-

A1 - tl the leadership of the party duting its early years, and their members provided

t ul the party's initial base of support. Beginning in the 2000s, however, the MAS

lied OUI EO other social movements throughout Bolivia, including many urban,

ii/ii-dninin,iU'd group s. A wide variety of unions, neig hborh ood associations,

n.idr UIQI i.muii',. Mhli u organizations of teachers, truckers, street vendors,

,J 1,,. h>n wflfkit 'li Jo ined the puny and helped it win support in urban, mestizo-

miftiti 'i "• u whi n tl h*d Ebrm< fly buuti weak,

ii.• iipueiufi ,.i r . - - ..Km .h : •[ v . tlso ehfmgad svtr tim§. During Iti «rly

nit hurt 1 •• tihlfl ihi r '- •• -

iii|ii Bid Hfumg 1 • f ii j nl Ii -


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242 Case Analyses

founding, the ASP was headed by Alejo Veliz, who was the party's presidential candi

date in the 1997 elections, and Morales occupied the sec ond-mo st-imp ortant positio

in th e party. Personal disa greemen ts betwee n Morales an d Veliz l ed the ASP to spill

up i n 1998, and Morales and his supporters founded a new party, borrowing the reg-

istration of a defunct left-wing party, Movimi ento al Socialismo. In the past decad

Morales has gradually consolidated control of the party, emerging as its unquestionej

leader. H e exercises a great deal of influence over all aspects o f the party, from chous"

ing its candidates to deciding its policy agenda.

Morales's control over the MAS is made possible i n part by its weakly institution

alized nature: th e party lacks t he rules an d bureaucracy of older parties. 2 Moreovcij

Morales's personal popularity strengthens his authority: Morales routinely wins r

votes than any of the party's other candidates i n elections. He has become so populfl

that some analysts now speak of a cult of Evismo that is similar to the personality cull

surroun ding other Latin American populist leaders, such as Juan Peron in Argentina

or Victor Raul Haya de la Torre in Peru ("En ia emancipacion . . . " 2006; Madt'ia

200S, 492).

In its increasing personalization of power, th e Morales administration has c

to resemble th e governments of Rafael Correa in Ecuador an d Hugo Chavez

Venezuela (see chapters 9 and 11). Nevertheless, as Levitsky an d Roberts argue 1

the introduction, the MAS differs from these governments in chat social movement

have considerably more influence in Bolivia than they d o in Ecuador or Venezuela

Social movement leaders make u p almost the entirety o f the party's National Lcad@l

ship (Direccion Nacional), whi ch helps define th e party's policies. Morales also c

suits regularly with a broader group of social movement representatives thr ough t

National Coordinator for Change (CONALCAM) as well as in assemblies (amp,

dos) an d biannual congresses. According to the leaders o f the MAS, all of the

major policy decisions i n recent years have been discussed first with the party's s

movement base (Carlsen 2007, 5) .3 Thus, alt hough Morales has consolidated his c

trol of the party, authority is still more diffused in the MAS than it is in the CiChavez administrations. As th e MAS senator and former vice-presidential ca ndU|

Antoni o Peredo told me, "Morales is very strong, but he is not all powerful ." 4

xplaining the Rise of the M S

The success o f the MAS stems in part from growing disau h.mimrni wiili i irn lj| if| H

policies and the parties that implemented them.' 1 Nenllbeml pulli lr* were In .1 Imjljj

merited in Bolivia In igls In mpnnrir LU thi uwn wtmon tub rhm rn^ulln] Hcountry uJlH| thi UQP idinlnbfn H l \ Mevimii Rio Nad li 11 ' : OIUBH

RMIO(M1 I fli • •• • • i 1 • 1 In i-n- \ \ \M\\ [l in govi mmi ni r ndtM

1 off workers, closed m any of the mines, an d opened up the economy to foreign

n d e an d investment. Th ese measures succeeded in bringing down inflation, which

It'll Irom more than 11,000% in 1985 to 11 in 1987 and remained low in the years that

HJo\ved . They also helped restore economic vigor, although G DP growth remained

llutively modest, increasing by 3.5% annually in real terms be tween 1986 a nd 1997

PN UD 2002, 83). The three parties—the MNR, the ADN, and the MIR—that pre-

l over this economic growth and stability were initially rewarded with the support

1 the majority of the electorate. I n 1989, for example, these three parties won 72.4%• h e total vote nationwide.

Over time, however, disenchantment with these three parties, known as th e tradi-

iOhu] parties, a nd their policies began to emerge. By 2004, only 23.4% o f the popu -

Iljon reported that they ha d confidence in parties, making them th e least trust ed

iBtitution in Bolivia that year (Seligson, Moreno Morales, an d Blum 2004, 102).

duiiy people came to view th e traditio nal parties as corrupt an d self-serving or-

i4in/,uions. Th e economic difficulties th at Bolivia encountered beginning in the

|l p 1990s contributed to this disenchantment . Between 1998 an d 2003, the Bolivian

enomy stagnated. According to the Inter-American Development Bank (2006a),

pllvia's gross domestic product per capita was lower in 2005 than i t had been i n 1998.

Iflly as a result, support for market policies evaporated an d social protests acceler-

tl. The percentage of people who agreed or strongly agreed with the statement thatVati/ation had been beneficial to the coun try declined from 55 in 1998 to 25% i nHi (I .atinobarom etro 2005, 76). Social protests, me anwhile, rose from an average of

onth during the first administration of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (1993-97)

§1 per month during the government of Hugo Banzer (1998-2001) and a high of 52

|J liomh during th e administration of Carlos Mesa (2003-5) (Laserna 2007,1 09).

>M ni these protests focused specifically on neoliberal policies. This was true of the

BUI Water Wars of 2000, which opposed efforts to privatize th e water supply in

I etty ul Cocha bamba, and the Gas Wars of 2003, which sought to block the export

B a t u m i gas through Chile.

pThe discontentment with th e government and its market-or iented policies was

M< ul,nly noticeable in indigenous areas. T he indigenous population ha d always

I worse off than the nonindigenous population in Bolivia, but in the late 1990s

lily .Minns, ilic socioecono mic situ ation o f rural indi genou s people actually grew

Mb The percen tage o f rural indigenous people living in extreme poverty rose from

I ' i ' j / to 72% in ZQQl. although the poverty rate declined slightly amo ng the

Iniijgneui population (llall and P&trlnos 2,00(5). T he failure of the leading

P N to bri ng §eo nil DI ••>» > < pro pi il to the indigenous a rms led their share of

(,lt> i nf-hi • ii • ••-• W et i Utii iti -tdih if .1..l .id :....•, i In mid) die MNR, the ADN,

•• i H I [IP '•• •• •>•• 1 1 -•• ol ihi JW "" in pw I I H ffh • i rnrtjurhy §


4/11

44 Case nalyses

the populatio n reported g rowing up in a hom e in which an indigen ous language was

spoken, but in 1997 these three parties accounted for only 49.5% of the vote in these

provinces, and by 2002 their share had fallen to 31.5%.

The MAS filled the void created by the decline of the traditional parties. It wooed

the support of disaffected voters with its steadfast opposition to the government's

policies and its strong nationalist and anti-establishment rhetoric. The leaders of the

MAS vigorously op posed the neoliberal m ode , criticizing privatization, free trade1

agreements, and the government's plans to export gas through Chile, Bolivia's histori-cal enemy. They argued that the government's policies had impoverished the country*

and u nder mine d B olivian sovereignty, and they vowed to create jobs, redistribute 1

land and wealth, and reassert state control over the country's natural resources.

The MAS also sought to activate ethnic loyalties. The MAS, as we have seenj

had roots in the country's indigenous organizations, and these organizations helped

the party campaign intensively in indigenous areas, providing activists, food, trans-1

portation, and venues. Unlike the traditional parties, the MAS recruited numerou,

indigenous leaders as candidates, which enhanced the party's appeal among t he indig'

enous population. Th e MAS also embraced tradit ional indigenous deman ds, such a

land reform, local autonomy, bilingual education, and the recognition of indigenou.

systems of justice. It campaigned particularly vigorously against the government^

coca eradication programs, arguing that the coca leaf played an imporrant role

indigenous culture. In addition, the leaders of the MAS made symbolic appeals I

the indigenous population, portraying the party as the legitimate representative <

the indigenous population and using indigenous languages, clothing, and symbol

in the campaign.

The MAS also made great efforts to be inclusive, howevet. Its leaders eschewM

exclusionary language and repeatedly emphasized that the party was open to I

people. Initially, the vast majority of the party's candidates for office were i lulls

enous people, but as time went on the MAS recruited many whites and mestizos J

candidates. Indeed, in 2002 and 2005, the party's vice-presidential candidates 1a majority of the party's senators were white ot mestizo. The MAS also estabilfl

close ties to numerous urban mestizo-dominated organizations. In the 2,005 ' £

dons, for example, the MAS forged an alliance with a mestizo-dominated party, I

Movimiento Sin Miedo, which was led by the mayor of l,:i I .iz. In addit ion, tlir MA«

developed a broad-based platform and policy agenda in order to appeal to peopl^

all ethnic backgrounds, rather than focusing strictly on rural, Indigenous Issuei,

The MAS's inclusive approach wai necessary In part beufltiie of the ti lurfl

rilniu idfliirirkation in Bolivtei Although ipproidmati ly hill «* tin Holh I m pepl

IdU.m HjiPril ... M,- -.K l i f l fy ip i ma i l o f ihi I 1 o f inriigeiwii

Bolivia

languages identify as mestizo father than indigenous, in large part because of social

discrimination against the indigenous population. In various surveys, less than 20%

11 the population has typically identified as indigenous. Moteover, those people who

do self-identify as indigenous are divided among Quechuas, Aymaras, and various

lowlands indigenous groups. To win support of people from these varied backgrounds

and identities, the MAS needed to adopt an inclusive approach.

Previous indigenou s-based parties in Bolivia fared poorly, largely because they had

failed to adopt an inclusive approach. Some of these parties, such as the Movimiento

uligena Pachacuti (MIP) of Felipe Quispe and other so-called Indianista parties,

ilienated not only whites and mestizos but also many indigenous people with their

Musionary rhetoric. Quispe, for example, was famous for denouncing whites and

n t i z o s and for proposing rhe creation of an Aymara nation. Other indigenous par-

, known as the Katarista parties, avoided exclusionary rhetoric, but these parties

I ply failed to recruit white, mestizo, or even Quechua leaders to their patties or to

tttahlish ties with organizations outside of Aymara-speaking areas. Not surprisingly,

gBsc parties fared poorly ourside of the Aymara hearrland.

The MAS's inclusive approach, by contrast, helped it win support from peoplei ill different kinds of ethnic backgrounds, according to my analysis of a 2006 sur-

f by the Latin American Public Opi nio n Project (Madrid 2008). Th e MAS fared

nn . nlarly well among people who self-identified as indigenous, winning 71.1% of

f votes, but self-identified indigeno us people represen ted only 28% of the MAS's

1 vole in the 2005 elections. It was the large mestizo vote that was crucial to the

I i victory in 2005. The MA S won 51% of the vote of people who self-identified as

fetlfo, and mesrizos represented 62% of the party's total vote in the 2005 elections.

I than two-thirds of the mestizos who reported voting for the MAS had grown

peaking an indigenous language. Indeed, these indigenous-language-speaking

jtl&js accounted for 43% of the MAS's total vote. Aymara-speakers were some-

IE liioiv likely to support the MAS than Quechua-speakets, but both groups over-

• • 11 M 1 supported rhe party in 2005.he MAS's leftist platform also helped it win high levels of support (Romero Bal-

s ="".,', i ji; Scligson et al. 2006, 89-90). According to my analysis of the 2006

- m, 11, m Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey, more than three-quarters

Mflpli win 1 identified (hemsclves as left-of-center reporred voting for the MAS

1 Mild left-of-center voters represented almost half of the MAS's vote that

I ••(•lr win* ,up|.mi.'d ilic nationalization of the gas industry, who supported

u .tn'iujH Film atliin, 01 who hail participated in protests against the Mesa

itiBB wgft ilf g Mj-iiith jiir ly moM lll «l y to support tlir MAS in ehf 1095

1 • 1.. 1 1 \f I ..dduiMU. ii„ M . V, i. 1 dlipraport lui mti I) #1II


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24 6 Case Analyses

among che poor, older people, highlands residents, and members of unions, peasant

organizations, and trade associations. Surprisingly, urban voters were just as likely to

support the MAS as rural voters once other factors were controlled for.

The MAS's rise to power thus has been fueled by a combination of inclusive ethnic

appeals and nationalist, antineoliberal, and anti-establishment rhetoric. The MAS

has won support not only among indigenous voters, but also among traditional

populist constituencies—that is, urban mestizos with left-of-center, nationalist, and

anti-establishment views. In power, the Morales administration has worked hard to

satisfy these varied constituencies.

The MAS in Power

Since taking office, the Morales administration has veered between radicalism and

moderation, with its most radical actions centered in the areas of foreign policy and

institutional reform. The government has dramatically altered the country's interna-

tional alignments, forging close alliances with the Venezuelan administra tion of Hug o

Chavez and other left-wing governments and distancing itself from the United States.

The Morales administration also has moved to radically ovethaul Bolivia's political Iinstitutions. In economic and social policy, however, the Morales administration's

record of governance has been more radical in rhetoric than in reality. The Morales

administration has certainly shifted Boiivian economic and social policy in a n

heterodox direction, but it has yet to carry out sweeping state intervention. As wfiB

shall see, in these areas, the radical impulses of the M orales adm inistration have been

tempered by a variety of constraints.

F O R E I G N P O L I C Y

The government's foreign policy represents a significant departure from past policies

because it has forged new alignments and traditional ones have frayed. The Morales 1

administration has established new alliances with the government of Hugo Chavez

in Venezuela and the regime of Fide and Raul Castro in Cuba and has received]

assistance from both countries. Cuba, for example, has sent considerable numbers I

of medical personnel to Bolivia, while in recent years, Venezuela has been providing

approximately $70 million in annual assistance, including military aid (Fcmande;

2010, 85). Bolivia also has joined several new regional organizations iliai (lhaVez \v&

promoted, such :is die Banco del Stir, .1 regional development hunk; I'etToAmirim

,iii oil and gu inltlwtlvr; and ilir hnlivarimi Altemuiive for the Amei'loui (ALBA),

rg | l 0 n i ' II " i ' - t . H . •- . r. l . lp IN. .MM l.j jM,.vl,t, .III l l h H M I I V. h ( M= u M K ., I , , U...I,

i M N i v i t h t h 1 ' - i i - - . M I . - . ' i - . , i > i . „ , , i 1 M i l d , , , . ••••• •:: § , , , I , , i d d U i o n t h i

[..; J 1 . . . . . . . . hi i i-.:i-L.- -i . 1 : i iifi - h i , isffli tradttienil I :

nu&Ufi

Bolivia 24/

1 lists, such as Iran, Russia, and th e People's Repub lic of Chin a.7 In 2007, for example,Morales and Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad met in La Paz and issued ajoint declaration establishing a 1.1 billion industrial cooperation plan (Fernandezinto, 90-91).

Relations with the United States, by contrast, have deteriorated. Morales has fre-

quently criticized the U.S. government and has accused it of being involved in plotsagainst him. The Morales administration, for example, has accused the United States

ill funding opposition groups and of trying to overthrow his government. In lateB 0 8 , Morales expelled the U.S. ambassador, Philip Goldberg, saying, "We do not

want peoplehere who conspire against democracy.1' The United States responded by•gelling the Bolivian ambassador to the United States. Even more importantly, in

laic' 2008 the George W. Bush administration announced that Bolivia was "failingI cooperate with the United States on imp ortan t efforts to fight drug trafficking"and suspended its access to trade preferences under the Andean Trade Promotioniiul Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) (Mathis 2009,1). This put at risk the jobs of

ftp proximately 40,0 00 Bolivians who work directly or indirectly in manu facturingHi ins that depend on exports to the United States (Fernandez 2010, 87). Th e Moralesadministration retaliated by expelling the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency from thefctiuniry.

Nevertheless, the Bolivian government under Morales has continued to fight nar-fioik's trafficking. The government recently announced that narcotics seizures have

j increased markedly und er the Morales adm inistration , althou gh this may partly re-

L higher levels of trafficking { Growing evidence" 2010, 5). Th e gove rnmen t also

1 increased the amo unt of voluntary coca eradication and has carried out som e

breed eradication, while at the same time expanding the amount of coca that farmers( allowed to grow legally.

Tlie Morales administration hoped that relations with the United States would

iipKive significantly once Obama took office, but as of late 2010 that had not oc-

Iffcd, in spite of some conciliatory statements by both sides. The Obama adminis-ailtm has continued to provide some assistance to Bolivia through the U.S. Agency

1 International Development for antinarcotics activities as well as aid for economicvrlnpineni and democracy-building programs. Nevertheless, the Obam a adminis-

pjen I us yet to restore trade preferences for Bolivia, and relations remain relativelytniy,

SGONOMIC POLICY

flntrasi fcpslp i« L .-. 1 in- M u ii 11 ulminlstiaUon s economic policy has udllb

g I U f p r l f t n | l i | ••iJjML.M,- u l i l l h p i | | V, Ifii ifvr i an.I I . 1...-, . . . , , . In.

tin pttverHmem h*i puniu riiHil nsmii polli • si mblll nl wi Wftwii


6/11

248 Case Analyses

and fiscal discipline, almost to order and as prescribed by the IMF . . . [and it] has

made no moves whatsoever . . . to challenge the existing structure of a neoliberalcapitalist state" {2007, 112-13). Web ber sim ilarly argues that "in the MA S's first yearin office deep patterns of continuity with the inherited neoliberal economic modelhave been discernible in terms of the implementation of key economic policies and

the class interests they serve" (2008, 82).

To be sure, the Morales administration has expanded state intervention in the

economy. It has increased its control over the natural resource sector, and it has na-tionalized some foreign-owned companies. Despite its periodic criticisms of capital-

ism, however, the government has not sought to carry out a transition to socialism or j

change the existing pattern of development, which is focused largely on the export ofnatural resources (Gray Molina 2010).8 Indeed, official government documents have

explicitly precluded a transition to socialism, and Alvaro Garcia Linera has arguedthat the country must proceed through various stages of industrial capitalism beforemoving toward socialism (Webber 2008, 82). Moreover, the government has largelyrespected private property and has sought to encourage private investment. Garcia

Linera, for example, has emphasized that "the government of president Morales re-

spects private property, respects religion, respects healthy business activity, gu ara ntee sprivate participation in education and health" (89-90).

The government's most important economic reform initiative to date has been Jthe partial nationalization of the Bolivian natural gas industry. The nationalizationIprogram obliged foreign gas companies that had been privatized in the 1990s to scfl

back to the Bolivian government enough shares to give the Bolivian state gas com-1pany majority ownership in their Bolivian operations. A couple of companies thanfailed to reach an agreement with the Bolivian government had 50% plus one of tin 11

shares taken over by decree in May 200 8. Th e Morales adm inistration also obligcM

all foreign-owned gas companies to negotiate new contracts that dramatically i r »creased the prices, royalties, fees, and taxes that these companies must pay to th|

Bolivian government. As a result of these changes, the amount of funds thai ihgBolivian government earns from gas revenues skyrocketed, reaching $967 million I2007 {Gray Molina 20to). Total government revenues, meanwhile, rose from 31.7%

GDP in 2005 to 48.4% in 2008 (Weisbrot, Ray, and Johnston 2009, 12).

T h e Motales administration has used these increased revenues to boost govfliment spending somewhat, but spending increases have not matched revenue r.nmil

As a result, the gov ernmen t ran large fiscal .surpluses between 1006 and IO08 (Wetbrot, Kay, and Johnston IQQ , ij), T h e go vnnr m m * I ± * 1 b©oil spending 1 onildi m

In ; 1. ItmdliiKuul gefti isf' ftfl sed d^6 liib ui^ iipo ll^ hilp «df liii BuJ-iv.,i,i fin KPftomii dewnttim thai Rfflkt«dfflu§kifthi wgiemhit) u

1 •• 1 h 1 i - l H i mn^i lilftR in \u inn Fnatisnil

Bolivia 24P

olicy. Th e Morales admin istration has imposed selective trade restrictions, such as a•mporary ban on the export of cooking oil, but by and large it has maintained open,ide policies. Its weighted average tariff rate was only 4.1% in 2008, although it diduintain some nontariff barriers (Heritage Foundation 2010). Bolivia has declined toi;n a free trade agreement with the United States, but the Morales administration hasmght to maintain access to U.S. markets and was upset when its trade preferencesirough ATPD EA were suspended.

The Morales administration's heterodox economic policies have generated mostlynskive results so far. In the past four years, the Bolivian economy has grown morelan at any rime in the last three decades, and in 2009 Bolivian economic growth.is projected to be the highest in the region (Weisbrot, Ray, and Johnston 2009,

Foreign investment has risen somewhat in recent years, although it is still muchivver than it was in the 1990s and early 2000s, and Bolivia has benefired from hav-1̂ a significant portio n of its foreign d ebts forgiven by the World Bank an d th eun-American Development Bank (Weisbrot and Sandoval 2007, 1). The Morales(ministration has successfully diversified its trade partners, and its dependence on

ir I Jnited States has declined considerably. Brazil is now the coun try's largest expottirtrket, followed by South Korea (Weisbrot, Ray, and John ston 2009 , 25). Bolivia alsoin run a large trade surplus in recent years, owing in part to its increased exports of

Btocarbons. In 2008, for example, the trade surplus totaled 13.3% of GD P (13). Th e»dr surplus, along with the increased foreign investment and debt forgiveness mea-ii -., have bolstered Bolivia's current-account position and enabled it to accumulateI.i.iiiiial international reserves. Bolivia's strong current-account position enabledr Morales administration to opt not to renew its Standby Agreement with the In-fh'itional Monetary F und wh en it expired in 2006 (Webber 2008, 82).

Noi all economic indicators have been positive, however. The economic growthgt Molivia has experienced in recent years has yet to make a significant impact onu mployinent or poverty. Moreover, inflation has increased significantly during the

ft few years of the Morales administration, reaching double digits in 2007 andl£, ill hough ir declined in 2009 a nd is still quite low by historical standards in

li In Some observers question the long-term sustainability of the Morales admin -• (lion's econo mic p olicies, particularly given the country's dep endenc e on natural

• iports and its difficulty fulfilling pr odu ctio n quo tas (see chap ters 3 and 4). Nev-

fldens, on balance the performance of the Bolivian economy under Morales has

1 |sed 10 far.

IQGIAJ POl n v

1 I . - . I. - I . u\u ,l\\::.U Ml .... Lll poljl 1 |S \ If I.I. MM lip. InSI fftd Oil J M ] ?

nj HF hfi.,,,1. iting polities thil • •• • . ^ •• M- pftviaus fptwnmwii E hfii jf


7/11

2 o Case Analyses Buhvii

nificantly increased social spending, but many of its social programs, such as the

Bono Juancito Pinto and the Bono Juana Azurduy, are relatively inexpensive and a

targeted rather than universalistic. Thus, in social policy as well, the Morales admin-

istration is most a ppropriately classified as heterodox.

The Morales administrations land reform initiative, which it enacted in 2006I

after a protracted struggle in the Senate, is largely in keeping with the land reform I

principles laid down in the Sanchez de Lozada administration's 1996 land reform

measure (Hertzler 2007; Kohl and Farthing 2008). Only unproductive large estatesare subject to expropriation, and the productivity requirements are relatively low. I

Moreover, landowners whose property is expropriated are eligible for compensation

from the government (Kohl and Farthing 2008, 10). In announcing the reform, t h «

Morales administration promised to redistribute 20 million hectares, or 13% of Bo-]

livia's land, over five years (Hertzler 2007). However, the land reform measure hai

progressed more slowly than planned, and much of the land that has been redistrib^ ]

uted to date has belonged to the state (Veltmeyer and Petras 2007,111-12). As of earl^

2008, the government had redistributed only 1.3 million acres (Kearns 20 08). Thj

Morales administration seems determined to proceed with its land reform initiative,

however, and in early 2009 voters approved a referendum that limited purchases on

private land to 5,000 hectares.

Other important social policy initiatives of the Morales administration, such 1

the Bono juancito Pinto program, have also been well within the parameters of pre-

vious social policies. The Bono Juancito Pinto program, which is modeled on exisi

ing programs in El Alto, Bolivia, as well as elsewhere in Latin America, provides .

small month ly cash payme nt of 200 bolivianos {approximately $29) to families whosd

children regularly attend school. It was initially directed only at children of primar]

school age, but it was recently expanded to cover students through the eighth grade,

which will enable it to reach almost 1.8 million children (OEI 2008). The Morale

administration believes that the Bono Juancito Pinto, along with other governmen

programs, will help reduce the poverty rate from 59.9% (currently) to 42.4% in 20t |("La nueva renta" 2008). Som e observers, however, have criticized the B ono Juancigj

Pinto as a populist political measure that fails to address the structural origins I

poverty (Kohl and Farthing 2008, 9-10).

The Morales administration has enacted some important reforms to the \n-n

sion system, but these measures also have fallen short of being radii fll 1 hanges, H

example, t he govern men is Kc-nia Dig nidad program, which provides u tioncontr]|fl

lory pension to Bolivian eitlitnj ova age fiOi is merely an expansion ol \\» l a n g a

program th« waa Jmpltouncwi during tha first Sfahi d U ujfl ulmlnUtnclHilchougfa ihi • '••• d idmlntaMtlen In n i - 1 A I • %\ tin \- B M "" | lewsa

the minimum age at which one became eligible for it from 65 to 60 (Miiller 2009).

I he Morales governm ent has also announce d reforms to the private pension system; created duting the Sanchez de Lozada administration ( El Gobierno Sacara" 2008).

Fl be governmen t does not inten d to return to the pub lic pay-as-you-go pension sys-tem that was in force before 1996, however. Rather it plans to maintain the exist-ing pension system, in which workers contribute to individual retirement accounts,fecept that the government instead of the private sector will manage the accounts.

The Morales administration has not yet carried out major reforms to either the

health care or the educational system, but it has undertaken a number of initiatives in

•these areas. For example, the government has expanded literacy programs, enrolling

hundreds of thousands of Bolivians. It also has proposed an expansion of the teaching

of indigenous languag es, history, and religious beliefs, although this initiative bogged

own in the face of opposition ftom the Catholic Church and others. In the health

Ifttor, the government has opened new hospitals, increased the availability of eye11 j'.cry for cataracts and o ther serious diseases, and established a program to elim inate

Ilild malnutrit ion (Weisbrot and Sandoval 2007). It is also working to incorporatetraditional indigenous medical practices. Perhaps most importantly, in 2009 the gov-ernment announced the introduction of the Bono Juana Azurduy program, which

1 provide smail payments to uninsured mothers who m ake prenatal and postnatal•I le a l visits. Th e governm ent also has proposed an ambitious universal health care

Fitem for all women, children, and the elderly, but this measure has yet to come

) fruition. Thus, although the Morales administration has implemented significant•form s, it has yet to radically transform Bolivian social policy.

O R I E N TA T I O N T O WA R D D E M O C R A C Y

olivia under the Morales administration most closely corresponds to what Lev-

1 iind Roberts refer to in the introductory chapter as a plebiscitarian democracy,

hough it contains elements of other democratic types as well. Like Hugo Chavez

i Venezuela and Rafael Correa in Ecuador, M orales has used repeated elections, ref-• 111 l.i, and social mobilization to concentrate power, advance his policy agenda, and

pfijrm Bolivia's political institutions.

When the Morales administration first came to power in 2006, the opposition

Biilnillrd both the Senate and a majority of the departmental government. The

| | ilr-. administration successfully undermined the opposition through avariety of

)gm Pel example Morales carried out a tax reform that deprived the depart-

1 Rttl gevi m m . m . MI ,I significant portion of their tax revenue. He also sponsored

H • 'i " '• ri ndiim thut led to the removal ©f th i oppo sition prefects (governors) of

i= .i-.M.i. m I I '.• '•;•• .. umiai.d. pimlnal sh»r§fi against mimiroui appeal


8/11

Case nalyses

tion figures, including M anfred Reyes Villa, the former prefect of Cochaba mba; La

onel Fernandez, the former prefect of Pando; and five forfner p residents.9 Various oil

servers have argued that at least some of these prosecutions are politically inspired. |

The government also has used protests and other forms of social mobilization

to intimidate the opposition. The coca growers' unions and other social movemei

actors who form the core of the MAS have a long tradition of using social protej

to achieve their aims, and these protests have continued since the MAS took pow

Indeed, Laserna reports that the number of social conflicts per month was higheithe first year of the Morales administration than in any recent Bolivian governmea

except that of Carlos Mesa (2007,109). Social movements have demonstrated in fro 11

of the Congress to put pressure on the legislators to approve national referenda on t

new constitution and on agrarian reform. Groups tied to the MAS also pressured en

prefects of Cochabamba and La Paz, both of whom were members of the opposition

to resign or ar least acquiesce to the Morales adm inistration's policies. MAS supporj

ers even set fire to the governor's palace in Cocha bam ba, cau sing the prefect, ManfnJ

Reyes Villa, to flee.

The Morales administration also has taken other steps that undermine horizon

accountability. Morales has frequently criticized the National Electoral Cour t and h

put pressure on some of its members to resign. He also has appointed his support?

to traditionally independent institutions, such as the Comptroller General's Off

In addition, the Morales administration has sought to gain control over the traditio

ally conservative judiciary through various measure including lowering judicial so]

ries. These efforts led to numerous resignations, but the Morales administration a

the legislature were initially unable to come to an agreement on their replacement

In early 2010, however, the MAS used i ts newfound dominance of the legislatj

to push throu gh a law authorizing Morales to appoin t 5 Suprem e Cou rt justices,]

Consti tutional Tribunal judges, and 3 members of the Judicial Council.

Th e Morales administration 's most sweeping political reform to date was the ovi

haul of the constitution. One of the new government's first acts was to call elcciitifor a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution . In these elections, the 1

and its allies won a majority of seats in the assembly, but they fell short ol the t

thirds margin necessary to make constitutional am endm ents. The MAS then passd

a law stipulating that the Constituent Assembly had founding powers, which wflH

have enabled it to enact the new constitution by a majority vote. This movil

vigorously resisted by the opposition, however and \W result was a shutdo wn of f

( iMiiunit A-.-.t iiifiv during Its firn iln monthi of operation, Thin dmdloi 1 leef

1,, bi i


9/11

254 Case Analyses Bolivia 255

and turnout, and partly as a result, voter turnout has increased in recent years, par-

ticularly in indigenous areas.11 In addition, the government has generally respected

human rights and civil liberties, including freedom of speech and association and

freedom of the press. According to a U.S. Department of State report, "the number of

media outlets, including printed press, television, and radio, was extensive, and airing

of various viewpoints, many expressing opposition to the government, continued"

(2010). Morales has not been shy about criticizing the media in often harsh terms,

however, and the state-owned media outlets have devoted disproportionate coverageto the MAS's candidates.

The Morales administration also has followed some of the tenets of radical demo c- I

racy. As discussed previously, the government has consulted regularly with its soda]

movement bases through assemblies and congresses, and it has even created somet]

new channels for such consultation to take place. For example, shortly after taking

office, the Morales administration created an organization, the National Coordina-

tor for Change (CON ALC AM), to bring together the heads of the social movement

organizations with the president, his ministers, and congressional leaders in order ttf

discuss govern ment policies. Th e Morales administr ation also has perm itted consid

erable autonomous social mobilization. Many of the groups mobilizing on the Lelj

have only loose ties to the MAS, and the government is not able entirely to contro

their actions. Moreover, the opposition also has frequently used social mobilization

to make their demands. The violent protests in Cochabamba, for example, involved

both right-wing groups and left-wing groups who acted independently from the ~h

and at times against its wishes (Webber 2008). Opponents of the MAS, as well i

supporters of it, also carried out protests—at times violent—in Sucre during the ffl

bate over whether to move the capital there. The eastern departments also have sec]

numerous protests, especially by opponents of the MAS. For example, various groupi

including truckers, carried out demonstrations in Santa Cruz in early 2008 over t

government's ban on the export of cooking oils and other agricultural products.

Perhaps the most positive democratic development under the Morales administition has been the increase in support for democracy and democratic institutions I

Bolivia. Bolivians are now mo re likely to feel pride or trust in their cou ntry's politi^i

institutions, they are more likely to express satisfaction with Bolivian democracy, ilfj

they are more likely to reject military coups and to prefer democracy to othci loin

of government. According to the Lati nob aro metro surveys, the proportion of pstifl

who were satisfied or very satisfied with democracy in Bolivia lose from 14% in QS

in |i in iOQ7ancl5o In 1 009 U o o j , 2007,1QQ§), Similarly, lurv^yi 1 wrlid in I

the Uiln Ainrii, JII i'i,i,h, 1 Ipinlan Project feuntl dun . •• f Bollvtuu m\

thai ehi • 1 ••>> I I I i • Ith itn • • ihti -i. u | fum ileni I

The level of satisfaction with democracy increased by a greater margin among

self-identified in digenou s people than amo ng whites and mestizos. In 2006 , 63% of

I teople who self-identified as indigenous re ported being satisfied ot very satisfied with

democracy, as opposed to 60% of mestizos and 58% of whites. In 2004, by contrast,

only 48.9% of indigenous people reported being satisfied with democracy, roughly

die same level of satisfaction with democracy expressed by mestizos and whites. The

percentage of Bolivians who believe that their country is democratic also rose con-

viderably in the wake of Morales's election. According to L APO P surveys, 68.5% ofBolivians stated that Bolivia was somewhat or very democratic in 2006, up from

I 58.7% in 2004. Again, self-identified indigeno us peo ple experienced a greater increase

than did whites or mestizos in their evaluations of Bolivian democracy.

Although the majority of the population has supported the Morales administra-

tion and appeals to be pleased with the progress of democracy In Bolivia in recent

I years, a significant minority has vigorously opposed the regime. Bolivia has thus be-

come increasingly polarized. Polarization has taken place partly along regional lines.

The eastern departments, where the opposition to the Morales administration is cen-

| HTed, all voted for autonomy in 2006 and 2008 referenda, and a majority in these

[ Bbftrtm'ents have typically voted against Morales and the MAS. Some people fear

thai 1 he eastern depa rtme nts mig ht even try to secede, leading to a violent confronta-

\ lion. Indeed, the worst incident of violence in Bolivia to date occurred in the eastern

^fc r tment of Pando where 13 people died in a clash between supporters an d op po-

flpni.s of Morales. Nevertheless, secession appears u nlikely at present, in pa rt becausethe military would oppose such a move and the main opposition leaders have rejectedhe 1 alls for secession by more radical leaders and movements. The MAS, moreover,

i numerous supporters in the eastern departments—Morales w on 51% of the vote

ft laiija, 45% in Pand o, 41% in Santa Cruz, and 38% in Beni in the 2009 elections—

I this would complicate any efforts by these departments to secede. Nevertheless,

fenal and p olitical polarization has clearly worsened over time and represents a

fious threat to stability.

Explaining the MAS s Policy Choices

Hi iplalns the MAS's policy approach? Wh y has the Morales administration radi-

U| -Till id dit-1 oiini i y


10/11

^ Case Analyses Boliv

Morales, spent years in the coca growers' unions fighting U .S.-led efforts to eradicate

the coca plantations that were their livelihood. Other leaders of the MAS came from

social movements, such as neighborhood groups and unions, which had protested

economic adjustment policies sponsored by the United States. In addition, since I

2002, the MAS has experienced an influx of left-wing intellectuals, such as Alvaro

Garcia Linera and A ntonio Peredo, who have equally critical views of U.S. hegemony.

Thus, much of the leadership of the MAS came to power seeking to distance Bolivia

from the United States and to adopt a more independent foreign policy.The origins of the MAS also help to explain the Morales administration's effort

to transform Bolivia's political institutions. The MAS is a new party composed <

political outsiders with few links to the political establishment. Thus, it has had little

stake in the existing political institutions that it has sought to overhaul. Moreover,

many of the social movements that form part of the MAS have traditionally had a

hostile attitude toward the Bolivian state, and their members have benefited kttld

from existing state institutions. Indeed, th e coca growers' union s have fought, at tima

violently, against the state. As a result, it is not surprising that the leaders of thesJ

movements would want to transform state institutions.

The Morales administration's efforts to overhaul existing political institutions als>

stem from strategic calculation. Like the governments of Correa in Ecuador am

Chavez in Venezuela, the Morales administration has moved to overhaul existml

political institutions in order to expand and prolong the party's hold on power. Tl

leaders of the MAS believe that the transformations it intends to carry out will take i

long time and will run into significant opposition. Thus, the government has de

erately designed the reforms so as to strengthen the authority of the executive ;

undermine the opposit ion.

The absence of radicalism in economic and social policy, meanwhile, is partly

reflection of the ideological climate in the region. The ideational environment

Latin America has shifted considerably in the past couple of decades. Th e down fill

communist regimes in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as the econoriproblems experienced by Cuba, has und ermined sup port for socialism. Although

MAS and other leftist parties have vigorously denounced the market-oriented mfl

that has dominated the region for the past two decades, they have failed to tome

with a coherent alternative. Leaders of the MAS have promoted Andean cap it is

and the idea of living well, but these are vague and Idealistic notions dial provl

few guidelines lor trade or finaiuial policy or lor dt-iri mining ihr appropriate Ir

of .staif Intervention In the economy, T he MAS's failure to eemplitsly abandon tl

mwkei "t.r-ni, d n • •., i. I nut- lUe ittm In pari from polltli il l iun ing , n i mi l a

.kij>i. i -}i mg | L. i frnlnl] t I illi d polii li ntl d>, I i iPpivi mmeni aftki

ttjiei i, i . i J. i ,. .... . ;i.: - . . mifkfi urii •"• I i • i i - klihoH^ i

I las vigorously criticized these mark et-oriented policies, it has not wan ted to return to

die failed policies of the past either. Indeed , the MA S's emphasis on fiscal responsibil-

ity and its effort to ma intain access to foreign marke ts and attract foreign investment

,ue presumab ly at least partly due to a desire to avoid a repeat of the disastrous U DP

administration.

The MAS's heterodox economic and social policy is also the product of certain

t(mstraints, which hav e hindered its ability to carry out sweeping eco nom ic and social

reforms but which have not affected foreign policy to the same degree. As Weylandnotes in chapter 3, during Morales's first term, he could not simply legislate whatever

policies he desired because the MAS did not have a majority of the seats in the Sen-

ate, nor did it control two-th irds of the Con stitue nt Assembly. The op position also

Used its control of most of the departmental governments, the judiciary, and the state

Bureaucracy to stymie the governments policy agenda (Kohl and Farthing 2008). As

•suit) in many instances the government had to im plement measures that fell short

Igr its preferred policies.

I In additio n, the MAS has faced imp ortan t econom ic constraints. Bolivia is one of

J the poorest countries in Latin America, and it continues to depend on foreign coun-

iri(=s and in stitutions for finance as well as export markets. Thu s, the Morales a dmin -

istration cannot afford to antagonize foreign investors, creditors, and governments.

1^1 though the country's incteasingly valuable natural gas reserves have reduced rhese

onoiuic constraints, they have not eliminated them by any means. This depen-

flfc on foreign markets and investors became apparent during the negoriations over

1 nationalization of the gas industry when Bolivia was forced to back down from

I original deman ds in the face of objections from foreign firms and gov ernmen ts

Luotna and Gordon 2006).

finally, the low technical and administrative capacity of the Bolivian government

made it difficult to carry out sweeping reforms. As Kohl and Farthing note , Bo-

I has a limited stock of trained professionals with the managerial and technical

« Rgcessary for effectively run ning th e country {2008,18). Altho ugh th e MAS hasi M influx of intellectuals in recent years, the party has a shortage of cadres with

i/nh i\ '.kills, and it continues to be domin ated by social movem ent leaders who

illi have little formal education. This has complicated the task of governing. The

. limn in'.', Ln It of administrative capacity became apparent during the gas reform

j|l idmlnistrailon committed numerous errors in drafting the reform contracts.

(lull tl problems, pi ilarly the governments lack of data on land ownership,

(Jio hi d. •. id


11/11

258 Case Analyses Bolivia

t i o n a l r e f o r m s . M a j o r c h a n g e s i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y, u n l i k e s w e e p i n g s o c i a l o r e c o n o m i c

r e f o r m s , d o n o t t y p i c a l l y r e q u i r e a p p r o v a l o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . N o r d o m o s t m a j o r f o r - j

e i g n p o l ic y c h a n g e s i n v o lv e s ig n i f i ca n t e c o n o m i c c o m m i t m e n t s o r r e q u i r e s i g n i f i c a n t

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c a p a c i t y t o i m p l e m e n t . M a n y o f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s d o n o t r e -

q u i r e s i g n if i c a nt e c o n o m i c c o m m i t m e n t s o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c a p a c i t y t o i m p l e m e n t

e i t h e r , a l t h o u g h p o l i t ic a l o b s t a c l e s c e r t a i n l y h a v e i m p e d e d t h e i r e n a c t m e n t .

Conclusion

T h e M o r a l e s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a s b e e n i n p o w e r o n l y f o u r y e a r s , b u t i t a l r e a d y has I

m a d e a m a j o r m a r k o n B o l i v i a n p o l i t i c s . I t h a s r e o r i e n t e d t h e c o u n t r y ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l

a l i g n m e n t s , r e w r i t t e n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n , i n c r e a s e d s t a t e c o n t r o l o f t h e n a t u r a l i

s o u r c e s s e c t o r , a n d c r e a t e d s o m e i m p o r t a n t n e w s o c i a l p r o g r a m s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , thesf

measures h a v e n o t g o n e fa r e n o u g h for s o m e o f t h e M A S ' s s u p p o r t e r s o n t h e Lefti

m a n y o f w h o m h a v e c a l l e d f o r m o r e r a d i c a l s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s .

I t s e e m s u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e M o r a l e s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i l l r a d i c a l i z e i t s e c o n o m i c a n d

socia l pol ic ies i n it s s e c o n d t e r m , h o w e v e r . A l t h o u g h t h e M A S ' s o v e r w h e l m i n g v i c-

t o r y i n t h e 2 0 0 9 e l e c t i o n s h a s r e m o v e d s o m e o f t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t f o r m e r ^

b o u n d i t , t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o n t i n u e s t o face s igni f i cant f inancial , bur eau cra t ic , ;

t e c h n o l o g i c a l o b s t a c l e s t o c a r r y i n g o u t s w e e p i n g e c o n o m i c a n d s o c i al r e f o r m s . M o r s

o v e r, t h e r e a re n u m e r o u s i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t io n is w e l l a w a r e o f t i n

d a n g e r s o f u n r e s t r a i n e d s p e n d i n g a n d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f f o r e i g n t r a d e a n d i n v e s t m e n i

t o t h e B o l i v i a n e c o n o m y .

W h a t s e e m s m o r e l i k e ly is t h a t t h e M o r a l e s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i l l c o n t i n u e t o c h l l

a w a y a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s o f h o r i z o n t a l a c c o u n t a b i l i t y i n o r d e r t o c o n s o l i d a t e i t s h o J

o n p o w e r. A l t h o u g h B o l i v i a u n d e r M o r a l e s c e r t a i n l y h a s m a d e p r o g r e s s i n t e r m s (

b o o s t i n g p o p u l a r s u p p o r t fo r d e m o c r a c y a n d d e m o c r a t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s , it h as u n d e r

m i n e d t h o s e s a m e i n s t i t u t i o n s b y c o m p r o m i s i n g t h e i r p o l i ti c a l i n d e p e n d e n c e ,

w h i l e t h e M o r a l e s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a s i n c r e a s e d p o p u l a r p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d i n a c f lr a t e d m a rg i n a l i z e d s e c t o r s , s u c h as t h e i n d i g e n o u s p o p u l a t i o n , t h i s h a s come ;ii r

c o s t o f g r e a t e r p o l i t i c a l a n d r e g i o n a l p o l a r i z a t i o n . T h e L e f t i n B o l i v i a h a s s h o w n

i t is c a p a b l e o f g e n e r a t i n g e c o n o m i c g r o w t h a n d s t a b i l i t y a t l e a s t i n th e s h o r t t e r m , .

i t h a s y e t t o s h o w t h a t i t c a n b r i n g a b o u t p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y o r s y s t e m a t i c a l l y .stri ' i i^thi

B o l i v i a n d e m o c r a c y.

2. The MAS's leaders made a decision early on no t to convert it in to a full-fledged p arry

because of the negative attributes they associate with parties. These leaders typically refer to it

li a pol i t ical ins t ru ment ra ther than a party.

3. Th e ability of the social mov eme nts to exercise policy influence is limite d somew hat by

their lack o f trained profess ionals. Relatively few of Morales's ministers and to p polic ymake rs

i have come f rom the soc ia l movem ents , and those who have been movem ent leaders have typi -

I Cillv not lasted long in cheir positions, owing in part to their lack of training.

4. Anton io Peredo, in terv iew by author, La Paz , Ju ly 22 , 2004.

5. Fo r a mor e detailed analysis of the MAS's rise, see Ma drid 2008 .(>. By cont ras t , the MAS w on die support of less than half of the people who self-identified

centrist and approximately one-third of the people who classified themselves as on the Right.\A significant percentage of the interviewees (24.5%) in th i s survey d id not know how to p lace

•hemselves on the le f t - r ight ideologica l cont inuum or d id not respond.

7. To the surprise of many, the Morale s adminis tratio n also has improved relatio ns with

I iulivia's t rad i t ional nemesis Chi le .

8. For example, in August 2008 Morale s stated that a nongove rnmenta l survey had found

ltb.il most Bolivians wanted socialism and that if the people ask us for socialism, we are going

ft> ilirpen socialism in the count ry. See Morales anuncia 2008.

). Reyes Vi lla ended up be ing Morales ' s pr inc ipa l oppon ent in the 2009 pres ident ia l e lec-

Drins, and he chose Fernandez as his running mate.

in. Morales seemed to back away f rom th is comm itme nt in statem ents he ma de after hisRctn iy in the 2009 presidential elections.

. Th e Morales admin istra tion lowere d the votin g age, for example, and put pressure on

I Nat ional Elec tora l Cour t to remove bar r ie rs to voter reg is t ra t ion and to open more vot ing

in rural areas.

f 11 . The da ta presented here represent the authors own analyses of LAPOP survey da ta .

Th e M Ti InltliJ rise was IkllltiHed by tbr IU«N l§ 8i Kenofflii do> In \

i, nl u [hi t\m ' i ' •• • ••• l Bliifii in • til) •••- •- sh i I s l l v b n i r e f i e m ) h i d • • '•

Bali i I, i- r : • • |W ih I ' i - i - ' - - I I in d •••••-•
http://ltb.il/http://ltb.il/http://ltb.il/

Documents

Bolivia: Origins and Policies of Movimiento al Socialismo