Border Security and Terrorism Defense Institute of International Legal Studies Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program

Border Security and Terrorism

Defense Institute of International Legal Studies

Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic

V. Exclusion, Removal and Asylum Laws

VI. Homeland Security

VII. Conclusion

2

Introduction:Module Objectives

• Participants will be able to list the tools for effective border control

• Participants will be able to list effective ways to impede terrorist travel

• Participants will be able to describe the regional efforts to combat terrorism in Africa

I. Introduction

• Global interconnectivity

• Terrorists target global infrastructure

• Primary goal: Prevent terrorism while respecting human rights and promoting economic development

3

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

I. Introduction

• Two key aspects

• Physical security of the borders

• Treatment of alien nationals

4

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

I. Introduction

UN Security Council Resolution 1373 requires that states “prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls”

5

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

II. An Interconnected World

• Total world merchandise exports in 2009 = $12.1 trillion

• 90% of world cargo moves by container

• Worldwide trade of 7.5 billion tons of goods by sea alone in 2006

• Terrorists exploit and target the connections

6

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

II. Port Security Initiatives

• Smart Borders: dedicated pre-clearance lanes and public-private partnerships

• Container Security Initiative: identification of high-risk containers, pre-screening, high-tech inspection and “Smart” containers

7

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

II. Prohibited Materials

• General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)(1947) – right of States to take any action considered necessary for protection of essential security interests or maintenance of international peace and security

8

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

II. Effective Border Control

• Convention on Marking Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Identification (1991)

• A Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was adopted by the General Assembly in April 2005

9

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

II. Hot Pursuit

• Art. 23 of the Convention on the High Seas (1958) and Art. 111 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) create a right of (uninterrupted) hot pursuit into international waters but not into foreign seas

• No similar arrangement exists on land except by treaty arrangement

10

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

II. No Safe Haven

• UN Security Council Resolution 1373 requires that states “deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts.”

11

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

II. Effective Border Control

• SCR 1373 also established the Counter-Terrorism Committee to promote best practice standards

12

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

IV. Treatment of Aliens

• Generally no obligation to admit aliens

• State obliged to protect human rights and provide equal protection with no unreasonable distinctions

13

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

IV. Dual-Check Admissions

• Dual-check admission system

• Consular review and visa issuance

• Separate Immigration Inspection at POE

• Special procedures for aliens from designated state sponsors ofterrorism

14

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

IV. Competing Processes

• Criminal prosecution

• Extradition

• Deportation

• Voluntary return

15

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

IV. Political Asylum

Under Articles 1(f) and 32 of the Refugee Convention States have no obligation to extend asylum to war criminals, those guilty of acts contrary to the UN Charter and individuals who would compromise national security or public order

16

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

IV. Non-Refoulement

• Non-refoulement - forbids the expulsion of a refugee to a country where he or she might be at risk

16

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

IV. National Security Exception

• From the 1951 Refugee Convention, its1967 Protocol and the 1984 Torture Convention

• Non-refoulement does not apply to a refugee who presents a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or has been, convicted of a particularly serious crime (Article 33)

18

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

• Many other countries provide a legal basis to exclude or remove suspected alien terrorists or others who threaten national security

• Exclude such aliens from refuge and asylum protections; however, non-refoulement may apply

• Precise rules vary

19

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

V. Exclusion, Removal, and Asylum Laws

• Terrorist exploit gaps in border security to facilitate attacks on domestic and foreign strategic targets

20

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

V. Exploiting Gaps in Border Security

Targets may be:

• Government

• Strategic sites

• Military installations

• Federal or State government buildings

• Civilian

• Public transportation

21

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion


Targets may be (continued):

• Airline

• Train

• National bus line

• Subway

• Large public facilities

• Sport stadiums or other large venues

• Houses of worship22

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion


The ability to move freely between international boundaries allows terrorists to:

• Recruit terrorist members who have expertise (technical / cultural)

• Fundraise

23

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. The Importance ofTerrorist Travel

• Perform logistical tasks:

• Rent safe house

• Open bank accounts

• Facilitate employment / educational cover

• Purchase automobile for transportation

• Purchase surveillance equipment

24

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion


• Identify potential targets

• Conduct reconnaissance of potential targets

• Practice dry runs

• Conduct the attack

25

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion


• Failure on the part of countries to share information about known and suspected terrorists

• Lack of an international database system with terrorist screening information.

26

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. Key Gaps in Preventing Terrorist Travel

…failure to share information (continued):

•No database with identifying or biographical information on people with known or suspected links to terrorism.

27

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion


• Widespread use of fraudulent travel documents

• Passports are easily counterfeited or doctored

28

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion


• Corruption

• Issuance of official passports for fraudulent use

• Immigration officials allow terrorists to pass through checkpoints

29

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion


• Identify known or suspected terrorists

• Ensure broad data sharing within own government and with partner nations

• Detect and apprehend terrorists wherever they reside

30

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. Six Steps to Combat Terrorist Travel

• Dismantle infrastructures and networks that facilitate terrorist travel

• Strengthen travel and document security

• Effectively screen travelers at point of departure and arrival

31

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. Six Steps to Combat Terrorist Travel

Hani Hanjour c.2000 Visa Application

32

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. The U.S. Experience and 9/11

33

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. The U.S. Experience and 9/11

Abdulaziz Alomari c.2001 Visa Application

34

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. The U.S. Experience Post 9/11

• Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab

• A Story of Human and Systemic Failures

Facts leading up to the flight:

• Umar traveled to Yemen to meet with al-Awlaki & pledged support to jihad. British intelligence notify U.S. intelligence of a “Umar Farouk”

35

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion


• Umar’s father warned U.S. Embassy officials of his son’s suspicious behavior and extreme religious views.

• Name is not added to the U.S. No-Fly List

36

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion


• State Department does not withdraw Umar’s U.S. visa citing U.S. intelligence request

• U.S. Intelligence concerned about compromising ongoing investigation

37

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion


• British officials previously denied visa application citing concerns about immigration fraud – not passed to U.S. because denial was not based on national security grounds

38

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion


• Was able to board a Northwest Airlines flight in Amsterdam without a passport by claiming he was a Sudanese refugee

39

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion


• Intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination

• Accomplishes this via:

• Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force

40

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. Current U.S. Domestic Initiatives to Curb Terrorist Travel

• Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism

• National Counterterrorism Center

• Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center

41

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion


• Terrorist screening and information sharing with foreign partners

• Terrorist Interdiction Program

• Watchlisting

• Technical Support Working Group

42

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion


• Assist international partners with capacity building

• Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership

• The Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism43

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion


Unlike the United States, many countries do not have a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) but instead rely on various government offices to perform specific homeland security functions

44

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. International Approaches to Homeland Security and Terrorism

Functions include funding, intelligence, civil defense, law enforcement, counterterrorism measures, domestic crisis management, emergency response, border control, transport security and countering CBRNthreats45

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. International Approaches to Homeland Security and Terrorism

Comprehensive counterterrorism legislation

• DRC has no comprehensive counterterrorism legislation

46

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. Democratic Republic of the Congo

Countering terrorist financing

• DRC does have legislation criminalizing money laundering and terrorist financing

47

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion


• Has a Financial Intelligence Unit

• As of 18 Aug 2011, has not completed any money laundering prosecutions or convictions

48

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion


Regional and international cooperation

• 2010 ratified the International Convention for Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

49

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion



• January 2011, Niger passed a law implementing the International Convention on the Suppression of Financing Terrorism

50

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. Niger

July 2011, Niger created the National Coordinating Committee on the Fight against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

Member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa – a financial action task force-style regional body

51

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. Niger

Member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa – a financial action task force-style regional body

52

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. Niger


• Cooperated with U.S. counterterrorism efforts and is a Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership country

53

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. Niger

• Entered partnership to establish and conduct operations with Mali, Algeria, and Mauritania

• Agreed to permit French forces to conduct surveillance operations in Niamey following a kidnapping in Arlit

54

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. Niger

Legislation and law enforcement

•Revised counterterrorism legislation has been stalled since 2008

•Lack of capacity hindered the ability of the National Police Force to respond to security and terrorist threats

55

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. Nigeria


•Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act covers money collected to carry out terrorist acts but does not cover money collected to aid terrorist organizations or individuals

56

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. Nigeria


•Cooperated closely with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the International Civil Aviation Organization to strengthen Nigerian safety and security systems at 4 major international airports

•Member of the Trans-Sahara

Counterterrorism Partnership57

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. Nigeria

• Signed the Beijing Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation

• Signed the Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft

58

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. Nigeria

Legislation and law enforcement

• The Malian judiciary prosecuted one terrorist case – convicted four AQIM operatives for misdemeanor arms possession; released with time served

59

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. Mali

Countering terrorist finance

• November 2010 Malian National Assembly adopted legislation to strengthen the authority of the National Financial Information Processing Unit, Mali Financial Intelligence Unit

60

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. Mali

• National Assembly brought Malian code into conformity with regional standards and the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism

• …BUT the legislation was not signed by the President

61

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. Mali


• Participated in training programs to increase the capacity of its security and military forces

62

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. Mali

• Member of the Inter Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa

• Ratified the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

63

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

VI. Mali

VI. Homeland Security and Terrorism

• Is a Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Country

64

I. Introduction

II. Border Control

III. [Not used.]

IV. Human Traffic



VII. Conclusion

Border Security and Terrorism

Defense Institute of International Legal Studies

Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program

Documents

Border Security and Terrorism Defense Institute of International Legal Studies Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program