Ilizastigui, P.F.; Ilizastigui, A.I.

INTRODUCTION

IAEA-IEM 9-15

SAFETY REPORT PRODUCTION PROCESS

ilieva@orasen.co.cu

National Centre for Nuclear Safety IAEA – CN-236/05

Historically, the majority of nuclear safety reports have been produced and applied under prescriptive legislative regimes, with emphasis placed on demonstrations of the robustness of

the facility’s design against technical standards and rules set by the Regulatory Body. As a result, they are often “inaccessible” to key “users” (those who actually exercise direct control

of the hazards and risks at the plant as well as the managers who hold specific accountabilities and responsibilities for ensuring safe facility’s operation). This situation has a detrimental

effect on the safety of the facility particularly during operations, when the Safety Report is intended to be actively used by those key users as an effective tool to support informed

decision making in relation to the day-to-day management of operational risks. This paper explores the strengths of the Bowtie risk management methodology in producing fit-for-

purpose, accessible and usable Safety Reports that will support current efforts undertaken by the nuclear industry to ensure “Right First Time Safety Cases”.

RESULTS

HA

ZID

● Check HAZID for completeness

● Identification of potential accident scenarios

Ris

k Es

tim

atio

n

● Estimation of risk of accident scenarios

● Selection of accident scenarios for risk reduction with Bowtie

Bo

wti

e R

evie

w

Wo

rksh

op

● Preparation of “Draft” Bowties

● Facilitation of Bowtie Workshops with facility personnel

● Barrier Effectiveness rating

● Assignment of responsibilities for barriers

● Identification of Safety Critical Tasks (SCTs)

Bo

wti

e A

LAR

P

Wo

rksh

op

● ALARP definition (Qualitative)

● Conduction of Bowtie/ALARP Workshops

● Compilation of Plan of Remedial Actions

Man

age

me

nt

of

Safe

ty

Cri

tica

l Sys

tem

s (S

CS)

● Register of SCSs from the final Bowtie diagrams

● Review of SCS adequacy

● Confirmation of SCTs

● Development of Performance Standards

● Development of Summary of Operational Boundaries (SOOB) Matrices

● Development of Key Performance Indicators

BOWTIE IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP

CONCLUSIONS

“I am concerned that the

exponential growth of ‘the

Safety Case industry’ has led

to a culture of ‘paper safety’ at

the expense of real safety”

C. Haddon-Cave

• The implementation steps described in the paper can serve as a practical “roadmap” for the production of safety reports that can be “actively embraced” by the

non-nuclear sectors, particularly by the emerging technologies in the industrial and medical sectors. These modern technologies “deserve” modern safety

reports that incorporate state-of-the-art risk management methodologies that not only ensure compliance with existing regulatory requirements but produce

usable, accessible and easy-to-understand and update Safety Reports. This will undoubtedly have a major effect in the reduction of risks from radiation sources

used in those industries.

• So far, the IAEA Safety Case concept has successfully integrated the safety assessment with the Safety Report. The next logical step would be to integrate the

safety assessment with the safety management system and make this integration “visible” within the Safety Report. This will significantly contribute to the

demonstration that the existing safety management is indeed effective in supporting engineering controls upon which the safety of the facility is based. The

Bowtie methodology will be the advisable option to show the manner in which safety critical tasks forming part of SMS ensure the ongoing integrity of those

engineering controls and monitor their performance.

UK Nuclear Safety Case Forum