BURTONhegemonyandfrustrationeducationpolicymakinginchileundertheconcertacion19902010

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2012 39: 34 originally published online 14 March 2012Latin American Perspectives Guy Burton

2010−1990Hegemony and Frustration : Education Policy Making in Chile under the Concertación,

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Guy Burton is a research associate in the Latin America Programme at the Ideas Centre, LondonSchool of Economics. He thanks Alejandra Fallabella at the Centro de Investigación y Desarrollode la Educación (Education Research and Development Centre—CIDE), Universidad AlbertoHurtado, and Victor Figueroa-Clark in the International History Department at the London

School of Economics for their suggestions on early drafts of this paper and the reviewers fortheir comments.

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 185, Vol. 39 No. 4, July 2012 34-52DOI: 10.1177/0094582X12439048© 2012 Latin American Perspectives

Hegemony and Frustration

Education Policy Making in Chile underthe Concertación, 1990–2010

byGuy Burton

What is the nature of government policy making and its relations with social actorsin post-1990 Chile? A case study of the education sector shows a shift in the Concertación

government’s approach to participation from market (1980s) to weak representative (i.e.,involvement of organized groups) (1990–2006 and since 2007) and deliberative (2006)

forms. The reasons for this shift include the relative strength of (right-wing) politicalactors in representative institutions such as Congress and the weakness of (left-wing)

social actors in organizational and electoral terms.

¿Cuál es la esencia de la creación de políticas y su relación con los actores sociales enel Chile post-1990? Un estudio de caso sobre el sector educativo muestra un cambio enel enfoque del gobierno de Concertación, de uno que se centraba en el mercado (en ladécada de los ochenta) a uno con representación limitada y mayor amplitud dedeliberación (1990–2006) antes de volver a la representatividad restringida después de2007. Las razones de este cambio obedecen al relativo poder que actualmente esgrimenactores de la derecha política en instituciones representativas como el Congreso y ladebilidad de la izquierda en términos organizativos y electorales.

Keywords: Concertación, Education policy, Policy making, Participation, Social movements,Political parties

In April and May 2006 Chile’s democracy seemed to be on the verge ofchange. Social mobilization challenged the political status quo in a wayunseen since the final years of the military dictatorship (1973–1990). With anestimated 1 million mainly secondary-school-aged protesters demonstratingin the streets and occupying schools throughout the country, it seemed thatChilean democracy was becoming more participatory. The protests stemmed

from a growing separation between the government and the wider societyover both the educational system and politics more generally. TheConcertación government and its new president, Michelle Bachelet (2006–2010), were surprised by the strength and depth of the demonstrations andquickly responded by setting up a presidential advisory commission with awide remit and membership.








Burton / EDUCATION POLICY MAKING 35

What did the Concertación’s response say about the nature of government-society relations and the state of democracy and policy making in Chile untilthis point? Did the introduction of more participation prove lasting? Toaddress these questions, this article examines the development of the gov-ernment’s social relations in the educational sector since 1990. It considers

three ways in which democratic governments enable “participation” inthe education sector: representative (where government engage social con-stituencies that are organized), deliberative (where government-stakeholderengagement is organic and open-ended and is not limited to organizedgroups), or in terms of rational choice (where participation is based on themarket) (Anderson, 1999). The case of the Concertación in Chile demonstratesthe use of all three models. None of these uses, however, was complete or last-ing. While the Concertación has maintained the previous regime’s marketorientation in education since 1990 through the presence of influential privateinterests, its commitment to representative or deliberative forms has been

limited, largely because of the relative weakness of wider social actors and theConcertación’s emphasis on institutional representation, especially politicalparties in Congress. The result has been the sidelining of (mostly left-wing)social movements in favor of the right-wing opposition.

To account for the Concertación’s approach in this context, the articlemakes extensive use of the observations and reflections of many of the con-certacionistas (members of the Concertación) involved in the education policy-making process.1 While this has provided useful insight into the attitudes andpositions of key education figures on the question of participation within thegoverning left, these findings have been tested against archival material of the

period and secondary literature.The article is laid out in several sections. The first covers Chile’s society,

politics, and education from the 1970s to 1990, the period in which the market- based education system that the Concertación inherited was constructed. Thefollowing sections examine the Concertación government’s relations withsocial actors in the education system between 1990 and 2006 and the socialpressure of that year that prompted a shift from (extremely limited) represen-tative to deliberative participation. The article then considers events since2006 and the construction of a political-party-oriented agreement and legisla-tive package that effectively excluded the social constituencies. That thisoccurred illustrates the argument made throughout the article: that the Con-certación’s approach to policy making and participation is influenced by therelative weakness of Chilean social movements and the relative strength ofpolitical representation since 1990.

SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND EDUCATIONALCHANGES IN CHILE SINCE THE 1980s

Chile has experienced political and educational trends similar to those inmuch of Latin America, with rising levels of social liberalization alongsidegrowing dissatisfaction with the prevailing system and its inability to repre-sent those changes. Among Chilean scholars there is consensus in this regard:Funk (2006), Salcedo (2005), and Tironi (2005) have noted more liberal,







36 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

individualist, and consumerist attitudes and behavior since the 1980s (e.g., thedeclining role played by traditional actors such as the Church, the rise inunmarried cohabitation and children born out of wedlock), while others havemade reference to the low-intensity nature of Chilean democracy and therelative absence of social actors in the decision-making process (Águila, 2005;

Barrett, 2001; Fernandez, 2004; Moulian, 2002; Nef, 2003; Olavarría, 2003;Salcedo, 2005; Silva, 2003; Taylor, 2003).

Chile’s incomplete democratic transition has its roots in the military regimeprior to 1990. In 1973 a junta led by General Augusto Pinochet overthrew theSocialist government of Salvador Allende on the grounds of increasing social,political, and economic instability. In contrast to other military regimes in LatinAmerica in the period, the Chilean experience was especially repressive and

bloody, with Congress being shut down and political parties and social organiza-tions (especially those associated with the left, such as trade unions) banned. Bythe early 1980s the regime felt sufficiently confident of its position to begin mak-

ing changes, including plebiscites in 1980 for a new constitution and on Pinochet’scontinued rule and economic changes in favor of the market and privatization.

The economic measures occurred against the backdrop of the 1982 debtcrisis. The resulting austerity led to the first demonstrations since the early1970s, which involved activists from what would become the Concertación:the centrist Partido Democráta Cristiano (Christian Democrat Party—PDC)and the Partido Socialista (Socialist Party). That these two parties, opposed toeach other before 1973, were working together in opposition to the Pinochetregime revealed the political change that each had undergone. By contrast, theSocialists’ pre-1973 ally, the Partido Comunista de Chile (Chilean Communist

Party—PCCh), abandoned the Concertación’s moderation in favor of armedstruggle during the 1970s and 1980s (Garretón, 2003; Roberts, 1997). ThePCCh’s increasingly marginal position was compounded by the Concert-ación’s acceptance of the 1980 constitution and its binominal electoral systemafter 1989. The electoral system requires the most-voted election list (whichcan be either a single party or a coalition made up of several parties) to defeatthe second-most-voted election list by a margin of two to one if it is to win

both seats (the lower house and the Senate) in a constituency. If it does not doso, then the second seat goes to the second-largest list, which since 1990 has

been the right-wing Alianza coalition. The effect of the binominal electoralsystem has therefore not only polarized competition between the center-leftand the right but also produced an overrepresentation of the right at theexpense of smaller parties and lists that are not affiliated with either coalition.2

The changes in education implemented by the military regime in thisperiod introduced a market-oriented model. In contrast to the national, public,and participatory school proposed by the Allende government, the militarycreated one that was decentralized, privatized, and (ideally) depoliticized.Between 1981 and 1986 local government became responsible for schools andprivate participation in primary, secondary, and higher education was encour-aged. This resulted in a threefold division of the school system between pub-licly funded municipal schools, independent private schools (both of whichhad existed before 1973), and state-subsidized private schools.

The new subsidized private schools were able to select students even asthey drew on public money. They were funded by a state subsidy allocated








for each student. That the “voucher” went directly to the school disappointedsome in the regime, who would have preferred to see it given to parents to beredeemed at the school of their choice (Dittborn, interview, 2007). The subsi-dized private schools transformed the Chile’s school system fundamentally:

between 1981 and 1990 the number of students in municipal schools fell by

over a fifth while the number matriculated in subsidized private schools morethan doubled. The process continued during the 1990s and 2000s: althoughthe Concertación government has maintained the number of municipal schoolstudents, the number enrolled in subsidized private schools rose by more thanhalf between 1990 and 2005 (Figure 1) and since 2008 has exceeded the num-

ber enrolled in municipal ones (Elacqua, 2009).At the same time, the 1980s school system has led to greater social and aca-

demic segmentation (Table 1). Socially, students from poorer family back-grounds tend to end up in municipal public schools while those from thewealthier classes go to private schools (both independent and state-subsidized).

Academically, the results of the national Sistema de Medición de la Calidadde la Educación (Quality of Education Measurement System) tests in Spanish,math, and science for fourth and eighth grade students show that since theirintroduction in 1987 those from poorer backgrounds and municipal schoolshave achieved lower scores than those in private schools. Meanwhile there isa growing gap between the results of municipal and (independent) privateschools, and there has been little or no significant change in subsidized privateschools over time (Aedo, 1998; Matear, 2007).

CONCERTACIÓN HEGEMONY IN POLICY MAKINGAND WEAK SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, 1990–1995

It was into this political and educational context that the new Concertacióngovernment was projected in 1990. For the next decade and a half it would be

0

500,000

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Municipal

Subsidized Private

Private

Delegated Municipal

Figure 1. Numbers of students by school type, 1980–2008 (Ministério de Educación, 2005; 2008).









broadly the same set of academics and scholars, including Cristian Cox, José Joaquín Brunner, Ivan Nuñez Prieto, Carlos Eugenio Baker, and Juan EduardoGarcía-Huidobro, who would direct educational policy. All shared the experi-ence of having been activists during the late 1960s. Following the militarycoup several were detained and went into exile or studied abroad followingrelease. During the 1980s they were able to return to Chile, where they becameprofessionally and personally close through collaborative work in variousindependent research and education centers. Their shared experience enabledthem to transcend any ideological differences among them, which rangedfrom support for a more state-led form of education to greater use of the mar-ket (Cox, Brunner, Elacqua, Muñoz, interviews, 2007).

The dominance of these policy makers was in marked contrast to the roleof two of the most visible social movements in education on the left: teachersand students. Both organizations’ capacity to mobilize independently was

hampered by the close affinity of their leaders and members to the Concer-tación and by their relative weakness (Palmidessi, 2003). The economic auster-ity of the 1980s reduced the number of teachers and their salaries (which by1990 had only a quarter of their early 1970s value) while also making theirterms of employment more precarious (Centro de Estudios Nacionales deDesarrollo Alternativo, 2000; Escobar, 1987; La Opinión, 1987; Lomnitz andMelnick, 1991; Rojas, 1998; Soto, interview, 2007). Students found their move-ment limited by restrictions on student organizations in the growing privateuniversity sector and their concentration in the few traditional universities,the most prominent being the Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de

Chile (Federation of University of Chile Students—FECH) (Grau, interview,2007).Other than teachers and students, the most organized educational constitu-

ency was the private sector, whose numbers had grown since the 1980s. Theirobjectives centered around three main areas: school autonomy, the right tomake a profit, and the right to select the students they wanted (Velasco, Bosch,interviews, 2007). Like the teacher and student organizations, the private sec-tor was not especially active in the policy-making process, in part because ofthe Concertación’s acceptance of the 1980s school system. This acceptance, inturn, was partly due to vested interests: a number of the government’s

supporters in the PDC and center-left Partido por la Democracia (Party forDemocracy—PPD)3 were also managers of subsidized private schools (Bosch,interview, 2007).

If challenges to the Concertación from among social movements were few,the same could not be said of challenges from the right. Politically, Pinochet

TABLE 1

Social Class Segregation by School Type (Percentage), 2003

Quintile Municipal Subsidized Private Total

Low 79.4 20.6 0 10Lower middle 81.9 18.1 0 32

Middle 47.8 52.3 0 37Upper middle 13.0 81.6 5.4 14Upper 0 6.1 93.9 7

Source: Ministério de Educación (2006).









continued to be chief of the army, and the 1980 constitution granted the mili-tary the designation of several senators. In addition, right-wing parties wereoverrepresented in Congress through the binominal electoral system, and thismeant that Concertación policy makers had to take the right into account. Thiswas especially so in education, given the high threshold required to change

the outgoing military regime’s Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Enseñanza(Constitutional Statutory Law of Education), which guaranteed the market-oriented educational model (Bloque Social, 2006).4 Given the circumstances,the Concertación adopted a relatively narrow set of priorities that could beachieved by executive order rather than through the legislature (Scope, 1997);any attempt at reforming the education law would have to wait.

The Concertación’s limited policy arena meant that it would concentrate onrectifying years of state underinvestment in education and the teaching pro-fession after 1990—material concerns that were reflected in the teachers’ 1991strike and student complaints regarding insufficient financial support for

their tuition and living costs in 1992 (Arrate, 1993b; Nuñez, interview 1, 2007;Roco, 2005). Its response was to increase spending, expand the grants andcredit system for university students, and target greater resources to schoolsin poorer areas through the Programa de Mejoramiento de la Calidad yEquidad en Educación (Improvement of Education Quality and EqualityProgram—MECE) and P900 programs5 and to codify teachers’ working andfinancial conditions in a teachers’ statute (Aylwin, 1994a; 1994b). That theConcertación undertook these measures illustrated the change in policy mak-ing after 1990: in contrast to the previous authoritarian regime, the new gov-ernment was more democratic and responsive to social demands, especiallyfrom those constituencies that were organized, however weak. The years after1990 showed how policy making moved from being primarily concerned withthe market to being more representative.

However, this participation was extremely limited. The teachers’ statute,for example, was more the product of Ministry of Education policy makersthan of any collaboration between them and the teachers’ union, the Colegiode Profesores (Teachers’ College) (Soto, interview, 2007; Nuñez, interview 2,2007). While the Concertación took teachers’ concerns into account, the bulkof the discussion over its content occurred between the Finance and LaborMinistries, which wanted wage negotiations to be decentralized to the munic-ipal level, and the Ministry of Education, which wanted them at the nationallevel. It was the latter position that ultimately prevailed, its appeal being

based on its simplicity and the avoidance of conflict between hundreds ofmunicipalities and local teachers’ associations (Nuñez, interview 2, 2007).

The teachers saw the statute as both limited and rigid; not only did it notinclude teachers in private schools but it lacked a teaching career path andestablished an extremely low minimum salary (Aedo, 1998; Colegio de Profe-sores, 2003; Cortes, 1994; CTERA et al., 2005; Ministério Secretaría General delGobierno, 1993). It was, however, in fact a gain for teachers, the unions, andthe left: the right in Congress had opposed it, claiming that it introduced spe-cific and unequal legislation for different groups while imposing financialcosts on municipalities and providing few incentives for teachers to improvetheir teaching (Larraín, 1997). The right’s position set it against some of its








allies in the private school associations, which supported greater financial andlabor security for teachers even as they criticized the greater amount of regu-lation to which subsidized private schools were supposedly subject (Bosch,interview, 2007).

The relatively low level of representative participation and the extent to

which it was skewed toward political rather than social actors in Concertaciónpolicy making was evident throughout the 1990s. First, like the teachers’ stat-ute, the 1992 changes to the primary school curriculum were led from withinthe Ministry of Education. Second, in 1994 an education commission was setup and chaired by José Joaquín Brunner, a former director of the FacultadLatinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (Latin American Faculty of Social Sci-ences) and an education researcher who was a key policy adviser in the Min-istry. The commission was the initiative of the new Concertación president,Eduardo Frei (1994–2000), who wanted to chart a new path for education. Itsmembership was largely restricted to the political, business, and education

elite. It did not deviate from the main priorities identified by the governmentin 1990 (Rivero, 1999); indeed, Brunner has acknowledged that the main pointof discussion was making the existing system work better by managing andfinancing its decentralized structure (interview, 2007).

Third, following the commission’s report, the Concertación focused atten-tion on finding cross-party agreement. In early 1995 it signed a frameworkagreement with the right-wing parties in Congress. The narrowness of itsremit was evident in its key points, which included acceptance of the decen-tralized school system and more municipal autonomy, greater flexibility forschools to hire and fire teachers, and increasing education spending from 5

percent to 7 percent of the gross domestic product, with contributions comingfrom private actors such as families, tax incentives, and business (Gobierno deChile, 1995).

CONCERTACIÓN POLICY MAKING AND CHANGESWITHIN THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, 1995–2000

While the Concertación maintained a very limited form of representativepolicy making that accommodated the right in the 1990s, the external environ-ment for social groups associated with the left began to shift in the second halfof the decade. Although they did not enjoy mass support or sufficient capacityto mobilize beyond their own limited membership base, in the education sec-tor there was a change in both their leaderships and their demands, fromissues of quantity to issues of quality (Cox, 2007; Diaz, interview, 2007). Thisshift was associated with the idea that while the 1990s had seen enrollmentsand financial resources increase, this had not been matched by an improve-ment in student performance and test results.

In 1995 the Colegio de Profesores and the FECH held elections that saw

defeat for their Concertación-aligned leaderships. In the Colegio de Profesoresa PCCh activist, Jorge Pavez, became president, while a crisis in the financialmanagement of the FECH prompted its disbanding between 1993 and 1994and contributed to a change of leadership by a nonparty social-movement-based








coalition with left-wing tendencies (Grau, interview, 2007). These politicalchanges occurred against the backdrop of a wider debate within the extrapar-liamentary left. On one side were Pavez and his supporters, who wanted thesocial movements and the PCCh to remain organizationally distinct andautonomous. On the other side was the PCCh leadership, which wanted to

enlist the social movements in the service of the party and its goals (Soto,interview, 2007). The two sides split, with Pavez and like-minded activists(mainly from the education sector) forming a network of social organizationscalled the Fuerza Social (Social Strength) in 2001. The Fuerza Social’sdemands for education reform concentrated on improving the system’s qual-ity as opposed to material and corporate interests such as higher teachers’salaries and resources for schools (Nuñez, interview 2, 2007). This becameapparent at the national education congress convened by the Colegio de Pro-fesores in 1997, the first time since the national debate in 1971 under theAllende government that education had been discussed in a formal setting by

civil society (CTERA et al., 2005). Despite the challenge that the Fuerza Socialappeared to represent to the PCCh, it struggled. It was both limited in size,with most of its leadership coming from the teaching union (and only partialsupport from other unions), and not ideologically distinct enough from thePCCh to have much impact across society.

The Concertación paid only limited attention to these changes and wasselective in the demands it addressed. Policy makers’ selectivity reflected theirview that the social movements were more concerned with material and cor-porate interests than with the overall education system (Cox, Brunner, inter-views, 2007). The Ministry of Education was therefore concerned with finding

ways to develop and improve teachers’ performance through more courses,incentives, and performance-related pay (Arrate, 1993a; Bitar, interview, 2007;Concertación, 1994). In addition, the Concertación questioned the representa-tiveness of the social movements (Cox, Brunner, interviews, 2007). By the late1990s government-commissioned polling suggested that nearly half (48 per-cent) of the teachers surveyed considered the government’s educationalchanges “very good” or “good” while almost the same number (45 percent)considered them “fair” and only 7 percent “bad.” Significantly, a third of themthought that the Ministry was more concerned with improving educationalquality than their own trade union (MORI, 1998). At the same time studentswere finding it difficult to organize: by 1998 efforts to improve coordinationof the 14 most established and traditional university student unions througha national Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile (Confederation of ChileanStudents—CONFECH) had largely broken down (Roco, 2005). In the largerprivate university sector, few student organizations were allowed to form,and those that were permitted proved relatively weak (Grau, 2005; Grau,interview, 2007).

If domestic social actors remained weak in the formation of these policies,those at the international level were more prominent. The World Bank pro-vided funds with conditions attached, among them the continuation of finan-cial support for subsidized private schools beyond the term of the loan and aconcentration on primary education (a condition that Concertación policymakers rejected) (Cox and Avalos, 1999).









CHANGES WITHIN THE CONCERTACIÓN ANDTHE WIDER EDUCATION COMMUNITY, 2000–2006

The Concertación continued to dominate even as new social actors, includ-ing nonteaching school staff, parents/guardians, and secondary school stu-

dents, began to organize in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Rodriguez, Cáceres,Velasco, Catalan, interviews, 2007). These groups would soon become identi-fied with the Fuerza Social and aligned with the extraparliamentary left. Theycontinued, however, to lack a critical mass either electorally or as a result ofwider social and political pressure. What action they pursued in the early2000s was limited and fragmented: while secondary students took to the streetagainst increased transport costs in 2002, they were unable to connect withother social groups. There were no strong social movements at the time, thegroups that existed (e.g., labor, Mapuche, and others) being both weakly orga-nized and fragmented across a range of disparate topics. As a result, there was

no opportunity to build a common cause. In addition, although the new non-teaching staff and parent/guardian organizations were growing, their distri-

bution and strength remained patchy. Their situation was not helped by theirrelative electoral weakness. Their alignment with the non-Concertación leftmeant greater identification with the PCCh, which failed to progress elector-ally. As we have seen, the binominal electoral system worked against partieslike the PCCh in Congress, and public support for their demands was gener-ally low: the extraparliamentary left’s share of the vote fell from 10.4 percentin 1997 to 6.3 percent in 2001.6 In between, the three left-wing non-Concertacióncandidates managed only 4.1 percent jointly in the 2000 presidential election.

In an increasingly consolidated democracy like Chile’s, the absence of anysignificant support therefore discouraged any pressure for change.

In the absence of any significant external pressure for a change in policydirection during the early 2000s, it was within the Concertación that the mostnotable development occurred. More specifically, this change was a genera-tional one as older policy makers were replaced by younger scholars andresearchers in the Ministry of Education and other state institutions involvedin the educational sector (e.g., regional agencies). For these younger concerta-cionistas, the lines of attachment to the government over the opposition were

blurred, being based more on issues of inequality than on acceptance or rejec-tion of the situation under Pinochet (Elacqua, interview, 2007). In addition, bythe 2000s the number of officials and institutions associated with educationpolicy had expanded beyond the Education and Finance Ministries to includethe regions and the development ministries (Muñoz, interview, 2007).

That the change was mainly cosmetic was evident in the persistence of theConcertación in policy. Michelle Bachelet’s 2005 presidential election mani-festo presented a direction broadly similar to that of previous governments.This included expanding pre-schooling and the Jornada Escolar Completa(Whole School Day—JEC) program,7 more targeted funding for importantsubjects such as math, science, information technology, and English, and peri-odic accreditation for universities receiving state support. The governingcoalition continued to see education in narrow terms reflected by its approachto citizenship, which it portrayed as something to be taught and directed








through state-sanctioned community action rather than as being claimed out-side the classroom (Bachelet, 2005: 14–19).

THE 2006 DEMONSTRATIONS AND THEIR AFTERMATH

By 2006 the nature of Concertación policy making appeared to be set, beingdirected from above even as some of the concerns of the social movements(e.g., the teachers’ statute, curricular reforms, more resources) appeared tohave been taken on board. While this increased attention to social concernssuggested a more representative than a purely market-based approach toeducation policy, the extent of participation remained extremely limited.

It was in this context that the Concertación approach was put to the testwith a series of initially spontaneous social protests and demonstrations thatwere the largest the country had seen since the 1980s. From April to June 2006

between 600,000 and 1 million secondary school students took to the streets,along with teachers, parents and guardians, and university students (Gutiérrezand Caviedes, 2006). The origin of the protests had been primarily material,with students disgruntled at the gap between policy aims and reality (e.g., thedeficiencies of the JEC program) and the rising cost of university entranceexams and transport fares. As the protests escalated, the demands changed toa broader criticism of the education system as a whole (García-Huidobro,interview, 2007; Nuñez, interview 1, 2007). This reflected growing concernthat the system was not only failing to deliver improvements (as expressedthrough rising domestic and international test scores by Chilean students) but

also in the increasing social segregation as a result of the segmented schoolsystem.

Just as the Concertación had undergone a generational shift, the 2006 dem-onstrations constituted one for wider Chilean politics. The leaders of the “pen-guin” revolution (“penguin” being a slang term for secondary school students

based on the look of their uniforms) included people too young to rememberthe military regime. This was significant, since in contrast to those protestingagainst the military regime in the 1980s, the 2006 demonstrators operated inan environment that was less politically risky and repressive and subject togreater media scrutiny (Pancani, interview, 2007): police violence promptedBachelet to fire the chief of the riot police (BBC News Online, 2006). However,it should not be assumed that protest was a risk-free activity; many studentactivists faced suspension and expulsion from their schools as a result of theiractions.

The strength of public pressure led to a shift in Concertación policy makingfrom a representative to a deliberative process. In an effort to regain the initia-tive, President Bachelet convened a presidential advisory committee under

Juan Eduardo García-Huidobro, an adviser in the Ministry of Education from1990 to 2000. It was broader in its remit and its membership than the 1994commission, including a large number of teachers and secondary school stu-dents who were members of the Bloque Social (Social Block), an education-oriented social movement associated with the Fuerza Social. Their presencecountered the position of the commission’s other, more “technocratic” mem-

bers, including university professors, economists, and civil servants from theMinistry and the municipalities. This meant that the commission was more








participatory than the other two commissions set up by Bachelet during herfirst year, on social security and health, in which civil servants and profession-als in these sectors predominated (Aguilera, 2007). While the commission waswelcomed by many of the participants within and outside the government,not all sections of the Concertación approved: some felt that the commissionwould undermine representative political institutions such as Congress byintroducing a new space in which policies would be debated and negotiated(Elacqua, interview, 2007).

Although the commission’s membership was diverse, three main positionswere identifiable: the Concertación, the right-wing political party opposition,and the social-movement left (Table 2). This last group was dominated by theBloque Social (Bloque Social, 2006). The right supported for-profit schools andgreater school autonomy and questioned the extent to which the “structure”of the educational system was being discussed. It saw critics of the educationsystem as primarily motivated by political or ideological concerns while ques-tioning what the government’s goals were beyond greater infrastructureinvestment and improvements in an unspecified “quality” (Dittborn, Velasco,interviews, 2007). The Bloque Social rejected for-profit schools and soughtgreater central control of schools. It viewed the military regime’s decentraliza-tion of education responsibility to hundreds of municipal-level governmentsas weakening both the state’s duty to provide adequate schooling and its abil-ity to halt social segregation. It believed that parental choice was unviable,especially for poorer families, and defended subsidized private schools’ability to select (Bloque Social, 2006). The Concertación’s position meanwhileincluded individuals whose opinions ranged between the Bloque Social andthe right, although they were generally less concerned with profit and munic-ipalization (García-Huidobro, Cox, interviews, 2007).

The commission’s chair acknowledged the difficulty of accommodating thepositions of the three groups in the final report. In a search for commonground, García-Huidobro suggested a consensus on the following recommen-dations in December 2006: the use of both public and private education;greater participation by students and their families in school management;measures to encourage teachers and school directors to remain in their posts;changes to the education law to guarantee the right to education; an increasein state funds; new educational standards; an end to arbitrary forms of

TABLE 2

Key Educational Positions within the García-Huidobro Commission

Bloque Social(Extraparliamentary left)

Concertación (Centerand center-left) Alianza (Right)

Oppose for-profit schools, school

feesFavor reform of education law

Advocate stronger state role/lessmunicipalized system

Oppose schools’ ability to selectstudents

Hold differing internal

positions on for-profit schoolsHold differing internal

positions on education lawreform

Advocate stronger state role/maintain municipalizedsystem

Advocate regulating selection

Defend for-profit schools

Propose altering education law

Advocate weaker state role/municipalized system andgreater school autonomy

Defend selection









discrimination; and changes to the state’s supervisory institutions for educa-tion (Consejo Asesor Presidencial para la Calidad de la Educación, 2006).

Another year would pass before a legislative agreement was reached between the government, the Concertación, and the Alianza in November2007. It included the repeal of the education law in favor of a new general

education law establishing new supervisory agencies focusing on standardsand educational quality, identifing the duties and responsibilities of students,parents and guardians, teachers, school directors, and managers, and increas-ing the number of years of required schooling to 12 (a measure that policymakers noted was common both in the developed world and in higher-performing educational systems). In addition, schools would have greaterfinancial and administrative accountability, have more time to experimentwith their own curricula, and see their public subsidy per student increased

by 15 percent. Finally, in addition to guaranteeing the mixed system of publicand private education, both the Concertación and the Alianza would end

selection in pre-school and primary schools (Gobierno de Chile, Alianza, andConcertación, 2007).

The agreement did not receive universal support from the groups and orga-nizations associated with the Bloque Social, which claimed that it had beenreached among the existing system’s supporters. In particular they arguedthat the agreement would not prevent schools from being profit-oriented andfailed to provide a greater role for the state in supplying public education(Observatorio Chileno de Políticas Educativas, 2007). This separation betweenthe social-movement left on the one side and the government and oppositionon the other not only showed how the three commission groups continued to

be divided but signaled an end to the Concertación’s deliberative approachand a return to representative policy making, with greater weight given topolitical (i.e., Alianza) over social (i.e., Bloque Social) actors.

Moreover, seen from the end of the Bachelet presidency, the largest socialprotests seen in Chile between the 1980s and the end of the Concertación’srule ultimately failed to achieve lasting change to forms of government-society relations. First, despite the generational change within the Concer-tación, it had not altered concertacionistas’ preference for representation overdeliberation. Second, any educational changes would require legislativeapproval, which meant that political parties represented in Congress wouldneed to be accommodated and, in turn, that the Concertación’s primary inter-locutors would be the right-wing political parties rather than social organiza-tions. Indeed, during the debate over the new education law the right hadthreatened to vote against it if certain provisions, among them those dealingwith selection and access to public funds by subsidized private schools, werenot watered down (Kubal, 2009). Third, the extraparliamentary left remainedrelatively weak, at least in the final years of the Bachelet presidency. Socially,teachers and secondary school students continued to protest against the edu-cational model after 2007 to little effect (Elacqua, 2009). However, when in2011 university students engaged in the most visible and volatile street pro-tests in defense of public education and against the now right-wing govern-ment of Sebastián Piñera this appeared open to change. The students’ influ-ence was sufficiently felt to discourage the Concertación from voting for the










meant that its perspective and priorities differed from those of former alliessuch as teachers and students, two important social groups that were rela-tively weak organizationally because of the legacy of military repression andcompromised by the overlap between their leaderships and that of the Con-certación in the 1980s–1990s. Although social movements constituted a broad

opposition movement to the Pinochet regime, in the final years of the dictator-ship the pro-democracy movement was steered by the political parties of theConcertación. That legitimacy and the deliberate policy of social demobiliza-tion after Aylwin’s victory meant that the government effectively neutralizedany pressure from the left in the first years after it took power.

At the same time, the Concertación had to accommodate a wider section ofsociety than those in the center and on the left, including the demands of subsi-dized private schools (now a substantial component of the school system) andthe political right (which retained influence in Congress, especially in relation toconstitutional issues such as the education law). Consolidating the new democ-

racy meant contact with the right and reducing the potential for political conflict.By the early 2000s the Concertación approach appeared to be under chal-

lenge. Civil society was beginning to reassert itself—albeit weakly—for thefirst time since the 1980s. Something similar was taking place elsewhere inLatin America, where many social actors on the left were taking to the streetsin protest of the apparent inability of representative democracy and marketsto achieve substantial change and growing pressure for more participatoryand social forms (Petras, 1999). However, the extent to which it made a differ-ence varied. In less consolidated democracies the impact was significant, lead-ing to presidential resignations and government collapse (e.g., in Venezuela,

Bolivia, Ecuador, and Argentina), but in more consolidated democracies, suchas those of Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, social pressure was insufficient initself; it had to be coupled with electoral representation to be sustained.

The penguin revolution in Chile in 2006 and subsequent events reinforcethis point. Following the publication of the 2006 commission report, the capac-ity for social pressure to achieve change largely disappeared as the Concert-ación government resorted to engagement with the elected political opposi-tion rather than with the social organizations of the left. Given the course ofpolicy making in Chile after 1990, it would not be too contentious to suggestthat this process is likely to continue into Chilean democracy’s third decade.Certainly the signs in the education sector are of policy continuity and domi-nance by the political-bureaucratic core within the Education Ministry. Thisappears so despite the end of Concertación rule and its replacement by a newright-wing government under Sebastián Piñera, whose priorities for schoolsincluded more direct resources and greater involvement by principals andfamilies in the school system (Ministério de Educación, 2010). Indeed, theConcertación’s approach in opposition since 2010 suggests that it is not yetable to overcome its commitment to representative institutions. This is mostapparent in its response to the university student protests in 2011, when itsproposals for change were broadly in line with the government’s in its com-mitment to maintaining a mixed public-private education system with changeslimited to administrative and financial measures (Libertad y Desarrollo,2011a; 2011b) and challenging the government within Congress during thedebate over the 2012 budget.









In sum, then, if the policy-making process is to become more responsive tothe needs of Chile’s less privileged student majority and the teachers whoprovide their education, the social organizations and their political party alliesthat seek to change features of Chile’s democracy, institutions, and forms ofparticipation need to develop the sustained ability to exercise independent

pressure on the government from the outside as the penguin movement didat its height. This is a challenge that confronts not only the education reformmovement but labor, environmental organizations, and other social groupsthat throughout the Concertación era were unable to recreate the kinds ofmass mobilization that brought down the dictatorship.

NOTES

1. The interviewees, their positions, and the dates of the interviews are as follows: SergioBitar, education minister 2003–2005 (August 21, 2007); Rodrigo Bosch, president of the ColegiosParticulares de Chile (Private Schools of Chile) since 2006 (November 27, 2007); José JoaquinBrunner, chair of the 1994 national education commission, 1994 (August 28, 2007); VictoriaCáceres, a leader of the Confederación Nacional de Asociaciones de Funcionarios de EducaciónMunicipalizada de Chile (National Confederation of Chilean Associations of Municipal Educa-tion Workers—CONFEMUCH) (November 20, 2007); Eduardo Catalan, a leader of the Santiagometropolitan parents’ association (November 15, 2007); Cristian Cox, ministerial adviser in theMinistry of Education from 1990 to 2006 (August 28, 2007); Francisco Diaz, head of PresidentBachelet’s policy unit (August 16, 2007); Paulina Dittborn, chief of staff (1981–1988) and under-secretary of education (1989) in the Ministry of Education (November 19, 2007); GregoryElacqua, ministerial aide in the Ministry of Education from 2003 to 2005 (September 12, 2007),

Juan Eduardo García-Huidobro, ministerial adviser in the Ministry of Education from 1990 to2002) and chair of presidential advisory committee on education (2006) (August 20, 2007);Nicolas Grau, president of the Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile (Universityof Chile Students’ Union) in 2006 (November 22, 2007); Mauricio Muñoz, President Bachelet’seducation adviser (November 9, 2007); Ivan Nuñez, ministerial adviser at the Ministry of Educa-tion (November 15 and 21, 2007), Dino Pancani, secondary school student leader during the1980s (November 20, 2007); Carlos Rodriguez, a leader of CONFEMUCH (November 20, 2007);Clodile Soto, a leader of the Santiago section of the national teachers’ union, the Colegio deProfesores (August 24, 2007); and Carolina Velasco, education researcher at the Libertad yDesarrollo (Liberty and Development) think tank (November 14, 2007).

2. The Concertación and the right have dominated congressional elections since 1989. Betweenthem they have accounted for over 85 percent of the vote for the lower house, with 85.6 percent

in 1989, 92.1 percent in 1993, 86.8 percent in 1997, 92.2 percent in 2001, 90.5 percent in 2005, and87.9 percent in 2009. In contrast, between 1993 and 2009 the non-Concertación left achieved between 5.2 percent (2001) and 7.8 percent (1997) of the vote for the lower house. Although MarcoEnriquez-Ominami’s outsider status won him a fifth of the vote in the first round of the 2009presidential election, that popularity was not transferred to the congressional vote, where hisalliance received 4.6 percent. http://www.elecciones.gov.cl/ (accessed December 4, 2010)

3. Although the military regime lifted the ban on political parties in 1987, it kept it in placefor the Socialists and the PCCh. To get around this, members of the Socialist Party formed thePPD to be able to participate in elections. Members of the Socialist Party were entitled to be members of the PPD until 1992.

4. The education law was the military regime’s way of securing its education changes duringthe 1980s on its last day in office (March 10, 1990). In contrast to an ordinary law, which can be

enacted through a simple majority, an organic law (which is designed to complement the consti-tution) requires a four-sevenths vote of all legislators in support of any proposal to change,repeal, or enact it. This is one step above an ordinary law and one below any change to theconstitution, which requires a three-fifths vote.









5. Both these programs were targeted at the schools considered the neediest. The MECE pro-gram was begun in 1992 and involved directing funds, primarily from the World Bank, to pre-school and primary and secondary schools. The 900 Program or P900 was targeted at the poorestschools in the country in terms of levels of funding, the socioeconomic context, and school testresults. The proportion allocated through these two programs dwarfed the general resourcesallocated by the Treasury for educational improvements.

6. These figures include the combined totals for the PCCh and the Humanist Party.7. The JEC program was designed to extend the number of hours students spent at school

each day and to provide those who could not afford them with school meals. The assumption behind it was that a longer school day would mean that students would have more time in classand would therefore learn more.

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