Byzantine Land Forces - Basics

8/3/2019 Byzantine Land Forces - Basics

1/21

Handbook

of

Byzantine

Military Land Forces

By Justinian

Contents:

Section1. Introduction .......................1-1 1-8

2. Euipment ........................2-1 2-6

Infantry .........................2-1 2-3

Cavalry .........................2-3 2-6

3. Manpower .........................3-1 3-9

Theme ........................3-3 3-6

Tagmata ........................3-7

Hetaireia and Mercenaries .................3-8 3-9

4. Troop Organization ......................4-1 4-5

Cavalry .........................4-1 4-3

Infantry .........................4-4 4-5

5. Defense of the Realm ....................5-1 5-11

Strategy ........................5-1 5-3

Operations ......................5-3 5-6Tactics .........................5-6 5-11

6. Appendixes .......................6-1 6-4

Infantry Forces .....................6-1

Cavalry Forces .....................6-2Battle Formations ....................6-3 6-4

Infantry .....................6-3

Cavalry .......................6-4

7. Notes ..........................7-1 7-48. Bibliography .......................8-1 8-2


2/21

1-1

Introduction

Monday, the eleventh of May, 330 AD . This was the day that Constantine dedicated his new

capital. What had been a sleepy Greek trading town named Byzantium now became New Rome.

Later it would become known as Constantinople, after its re-founder, Flavius Valerius

Constantinus (Constantine the Great). This event signaled the end of the traditional Roman

Empire, from now on the Empire would have its capital no longer in Rome, but in

Constantinople. Rome would be relegated to the status of a provincial capital. Rome did however

continue to maintain its hold on the mind spirit of the Empire. The inhabitants of Constantinople

would continue to consider themselves Roman until almost the very end, in 1453 AD.

The city of Rome itself would remain a part of the Empire until its capitulation in 476 AD to

Odovar and his Ostrogoths. In fact, from 330 AD until 476 AD, the Empire co-existed as an

Eastern and a Western Empire. Then 476 AD, the western part of the realm slipped beneath the

waves of its own undoing. The last Emperor of the West, Romulus Augustulus, sent his diadem

and purple to Constantinople. Rome would rejoin the empire briefly in the future as conquest

raged back and forth across the Mediterranean world, but Rome itself was no longer of any

importance except as a symbol. Rome herself would shrug off the Empire and Imperial trappings

as a result of the great Schism of 1054 AD. Rome would then become the defacto capital of

western Christianity.

1-2

Rome itself was more than just an Empire on a map; it was also an idea . It was an idea that has

continued to captivate the imaginations of the western world for over a thousand years.

This idea of Rome permeates the governments, architecture, laws and militaries of the entire

western world. Rome even has its part to play in that greatest of all western sagas, the Bible.

What began as a small hillside town has since evolved into a fond memory of glory and

accomplishment.

What allowed Rome to grow and expand was a system of military might and luck. Rome was an

empire built on the backs of her legionnaires. Where the legionnaire had tread and conquered,

followed the civilization that was Rome. In the end these armies would not be enough to sustain

her culture or defend her frontiers. When the end came the armies themselves would play their

own role in the funeral of Rome.

These armies of Rome evolved as they did, because of geography and military need. The

topography in the area of her birth, and of Italy in general, is mountainous and devoid of great

open spaces. This constriction determined that the Roman armies would become infantry armies.

These armies began under a militia type system. The prerequisites for service were that a soldiermust be a land owning man who is a citizen of Rome. The individual warrior was responsible for

providing his own gear and equipment.

1-3

The state would select the leadership and fund logistics, as well as determine the call up and

military objectives of the campaign. Once the objectives had been met, the warrior returned to his

home and continued his farming. These farmers would get together every so often and train, but

that was the extent of the early Roman military system .


3/21

This militia system worked well enough for a while. Soon however, the campaigns became

longer, and the farmers were not always able to come back and tend to their fields. This caused

many soldier/farmers to enter into bankruptcy, and thus depleted the eligible pool of available

soldiery. This depletion coupled with the ever-larger area to defend was causing a manpower

shortage in the Roman military apparatus. To help counter this Rome began to increase the use ofher auxiliary troops. These auxiliary troops were noncitizens. They tended to provide the cavalry

and the light infantry forces . Their job was to scout and help force the enemy into a decisiveengagement with the heavy, Roman legionary, infantry.

It was the Roman Counsel, Gaius Marius, who in 107 BC, much to the dismay of the Senate,

opened the ranks of the legions to any citizen of Rome regardless of property qualifications.

Marius also reorganized the Legions, as well as issued new types of equipment and formulated

new tactical methods ... The significance of these reforms must be viewed in two contexts. The

first context was that Marius eliminated the militia system and helped to institute theprofessionalization of the Legions. No longer were soldiers let go after each campaign, now they

were full time professional fighting men.

1-4

Fighting men who were now tied to a contract, which stipulated rights, privileges and length ofservice. The other context is that the soldiers from then on began to call themselves Marius'

Mules. This is both a complement and a curse. Marius had eliminated most of the baggage train

and the soldiers had become more self-sufficient on the march

This new Roman army proved itself capable and deadly efficient in the battles for both Republicand Empire alike. The basic organization after the Marian reforms was an Infantry Legion of

some 5,500 heavy infantry supported by 3-4,000 auxiliary forces. The total number of troops in

the Roman establishment was near 150,000 legionnaires and about 100,000 auxiliaries . This

force would march ever-onward building Roman roads to mark their path, and to tether theirsupply line. The average daily march of a legion in hostile territory was about 12 miles a day,

after which it would completely entrench itself for the night. A legion could expect to double this

rate of march behind the frontier.

This system served Rome well for many score years, but eventually the distances became so greatthat Rome was unable to afford continued expansion and she passed over to the strategic defense.

The army began to construct walls and frontier forts. These forts would then be garrisoned by

sub-elements of the legions. Many legions would spend 200 or more years in the same area. This

force stabilization coincided with an increase in Roman ranks of foreigners. These foreigners

began to take the place of the Romans because the Romans were less and less willing to stand in

the gap or walk a post.

1-5

There was also an increase in the amount of cavalry forces because they had more mobility and

were better able to reach threatened areas. Even with this increase, the Legions remained supreme

both in battle and in the imagination of the Roman mind. The garrison duty did take its toll on

combat capability as soldiers put down roots and became more interested in civilian pursuits than

in fighting wars. Discipline and training became lax, as some units would go years without

action. Other units vented their inactivity by becoming involved in political intrigue and

blackmail. This was the situation in 293 AD when the Roman emperor Diocletian decided that

the Empire had gotten too big for one man to govern. His solution was to split it into four parts.


4/21

He kept the eastern section for himself and parceled the rest out to Galerius, Maximian and

Constantinus Chlorus.

In 305 AD, after twenty years on the throne Diocletian did something that no Roman had done

since Cincinatus, he voluntarily vacated the throne. He took Maximian with him and left the

Empire to Constantine Chlorus and Galerius. Thus, the die was cast. On 25 July, 306 AD in York,

Britain, Constantinus Chlorus died. The legions then took his son, Constantine, clad him in apurple toga and raised him up on their shields, thus proclaiming him the new emperor of the

West. This situation proved volatile, but stable until April, 311 AD when Galerius died. There

followed a struggle for power between Constantine, Licinius, who had been appointed emperor of

the area of Illyria, Thrace and the Danube regions, Maximin Daia, the new Eastern Emperor, and

Maxentius in Rome. Licinius, who was quarreling with Maximin Daia, came to an agreement

with Constantine who then began to march on Rome as part of his agreement with Licinius.

1-6

The forces of Constantine and Maxentius met on 28 October, 312 AD at Saxa Rubra on the Via

Flaminia, about seven miles Northeast of Rome. What happened next would change the world.

Near late afternoon Constantine is said to have had a vision of a cross, and a voice telling him

that "by this sign you shall conquer!" Constantine took this as an omen and had the symbol, the

Chi-Rho, chalked onto the shield of his soldiers before they began their attack. Battle was then

joined, and the forces of Maxentius were driven and routed at the site of the old Milivan Bridge.

This victory helped to make Constantine the master of half of Europe. His vision had been

affirmed by victory. More importantly for world history, Constantine took it to heart and became

the first fully Christian Emperor. He immediately got busy constructing a Basilica with

Baptistery. This Basilica would be called St. John Lateran, and is still today the Cathedral Church

for the City of Rome. Constantine and Licinius then convened in Milan, in 313 AD. At this

conference they agreed to rule jointly and to allow the free practice of Christianity throughout the

Empire. In 314 AD, open civil war broke out as these two factions struggled to undo the

Diocletian split. The civil war raged on until 323 AD when Licinius was captured, his forces

destroyed, and then he himself was executed. Constantine was now supreme. Now he had to

defend his hard won Empire. The defensive system of the Romans remained in vogue for a while,

but eventually it had to change. The costs of maintaining so large an army were draining the

treasury.

1-7

The distances traversed in order to counter threats, was far to great for heavy infantry to manage.

These distances were compounded by new threats from the east. These eastern foes were mostly

horse soldiers. These horse soldiers were mobile and too difficult to bring to a decisive battle for

the Legions. These horse soldiers were able to use their superior tactical and operational mobility

to bypass Roman forces and then force their way further into the interior giving battle when they

were either trapped or chose to fight. The horse soldiers of the Eastern Approaches also preferred

to fight with the bow. This gave them both a mobility edge and the ability to decide the nature of

the clash.

Typically, the horse soldiers would sally up to the Romans and unleash a salvo of arrows andthen ride away, remaining outside the effective range of Roman weaponry.


5/21

They would do this over and over until they had worn the Romans down. Then the horse soldiers

had the option of cutting the Legions supplies or going at them with a lance and finishing the job.

The lance though, would not prove a viable option until the 500's when the stirrup appeared on

the scene. This invention would give the cavalry soldier a firm seat from which to shoot or for

using the lance without the jolt of contact knocking the charging rider off his horse.

The East Roman Empire, established by Constantine needed to reform and reorganize hermilitary system in order to survive these new threats and problems. This she did and what was

accomplished was a system of doctrine that would be first codified in the Strategikon of Maurice

and would then vary little until the death of the Empire in the Cannon blasts of the Osmani Turks

in 1453.

1-8

It was an empire that lasted for over a thousand years. I was an Empire that fought in deserts,

mountains, plains, snow, and cities. It fought against a greater differing number of foes than the

old empire ever did. It faced warriors bent on looting the riches of Byzantium, gaining new land

and eventually the ideological force of Islam.


6/21

2-1

Equipment

While the infantryman had been the mainstay of Greek and Roman warfare for almost a thousand

years the Byzantines would relegate the foot soldier to a position of second in importance to the

cavalry soldier. This did not mean that the footslogger was non-existent or poorly equipped.

Infantry did exist and were used to great effect when the need for it was warranted.

Infantry in the East Roman Empire were divided into two types. The two types of infantry werethe light infantry and the more traditional heavy infantry. Both were similarly equipped and

armed with only a few variants between them.

The heavy infantryman, known as a Skutatoi, was quite well armored, often as well protected as

the typical cavalryman. This would change over time, until only the first two or three rows ofheavy infantry would be well protected, while the remaining rows would often posses a helmet

and bambakion, which was a padded cloth or leather armor. Unlike the typical heavy armor, the

bambakion possessed sleeves and hoods. The remainder of a soldiers clothing consisted of linen

tunic in the summer or a woolen tunic for winter, both reaching to mid-thigh, trousers and high

heavy boots provided the rest of the armor. Occasionally gauntlets or padded gloves are also seen

2-2

The front rank heavy infantryman would have worn the same armor as the back ranks with theaddition of a mail or lamellar (scale) corselet which was most often sleeveless and terminated at

the waist. In addition these soldiers would also have had iron grieves, gauntlets and either metal

or leather, neck guards attached to their helmets.

The light infantryman was usually with out armor though when possible a helmet and corselet

would have been provided, the corselet being the exception to the norm. The soldiers were alsoprovided with a large woolen or felt cloak. The cloak served as a blanket, coat and camouflage

cover for armor during night attacks and ambushes. The usual color for Byzantine uniforms

appear to have been shades of red, blue, green and mauve. The red color, sun bleaching to an

earthy brown and also showing up black at a distance or in low light.

The heavy infantry also typically carried a shield. The shield was a large oval shield, curved but

not convex. The shield would have been painted to delineate the users unit affiliation . In the later

1000's and early 1100's the oval shield was being replaced by a kite shaped shield. The lightinfantryman was equipped with a small round shield though these were often thrown away as an

encumbrance or in latter days omitted altogether.

Typical weaponry for a Byzantine infantryman depended on whether he was a heavy infantrymanor a light infantryman.

2-3

The heavy infantry fighter was often equipped with a short broad sword for close in hacking, a

mace for bludgeoning through armor, a sling, and a twelve to fourteen foot pike that was used to

ward of enemy cavalry. The soldier was also equipped with one or two heavy javelins; often the

javelin was a substitute for the pike in the rear ranks. The light infantry soldier was equipped with


7/21

a smallish composite bow and a quiver of 40-50 arrows. He would also have a sling and a small

battle or hand axe as a personal close in weapon.

Each group of 16 infantrymen was also provided with a cart of engineering equipment. In this

cart were the following tools: hand mill, bill hook, saw, two spades, a mallet, large wicker basket,

a scythe, two pick axes and a collection of corded caltrops .

In the old Roman Empire the infantryman had reigned supreme and the cavalryman had been

merely an auxiliary. This changed in the military establishment of the East Roman Empire. The

cavalryman because of his mobility and his shock effect would prove to reinforce the theory of

quality over quantity. Though man for man it costed far more to equip, train and maintain a

cavalry soldier than a grunt , it took far less men to defend the empire with cavalry than with lines

of infantry forts.

The cavalry came in three types, heavy, medium and light. The heavy cavalry were rarely seen

after the 1071 defeat Manzikert and light infantry became more and more the province of Asian

horse-archer mercenaries .

2-4

The medium cavalryman, the Kataphractos, was usually attired and armored in the following

manner. He wore a linen tunic in summer and a woolen one in winter. Over his tunic the soldier

wore a corselet of mail and on top of this a corselet of lamelle. Rounding out his protection were

grieves, vambraces, gauntlets and a mail hood attached to the helmet. The helmet was typically

the same model as the infantry soldier wore. On top of this was a waterproof, brownish felt cloak.

The horse of the medium cavalry soldier was unarmored. The medium cavalry soldier was

equipped officially with a small 12" shield though most drawings depict a 24" shield for those

using the lance and the 12" shield for the archers .

The heavy cavalry soldier, Klibanophoros, was equipped like the Kataphractos except that they

wore additional protective equipment. This equipment was a padded armor coat over the lamelle,

a two or three layered mail hood that left a slit to view out of, splint-armor vambraces, grieves,

gauntlets and iron overshoes. These cavalrymen were literally armored from head to toe . This

level of armored protection was also prevalent with their mounts. The horses were covered in a

lamelle blanket of hardened oxhide that covered the body to the knees, the head and neck . The

heavy cavalryman appears to have used the same shield types as were common with the

Kataphractos.

The light cavalry soldier was most often unarmored except for a hood of horn scales and a helmet

of either iron or reinforced felt. The horses of the light cavalrymen were identical to their riders in

that they were with out protection.

2-5

The protection they did have being their speed and agility. The light cavalry often carried a small

shield of wood or hardened hide for additional protection.

As most light cavalrymen were recruited mercenary troops the above is a generalization of the

typical light cavalryman that would have been found in the field. There were differences amongst

some of the various ethnic groups who by and large served under there own immediateleadership.


8/21

The weaponry of the various cavalry types was not as varied as their armor. All cavalry types

seem to have been equipped initially with a composite bow and a quiver of 40 to 50 arrows. Later

on lances would be added to the arsenal of the medium and heavy cavalry.

All cavalry seem to have been equipped with swords, javelins and a battle-axe. Th light cavalry

also seems to have additionally carried lassos and slings . Typically among the Klibanophoros

there would be about 1 in 5 of the soldiers equipped with bows while the remaining 4/5 relied onthe lance for a shock type of attack. The Kataphractos seemed to be equally at home using which

ever weapon the situation dictated .

The army contained in addition to the above type combats units various other specialized units

that one would expect to find. There were logistics troops, marines, sailors and an extensive

medical corps. Each basic unit or banda had attached to it a surgical doctor and a party of eight

stretcher-bearers.

2-6

So important to the Byzantines was the care of its wounded that the stretcher-bearers were paid a

bounty for wounded soldier that was brought in to the medical area. A higher bounty was paid for

recovering the wounded during a retreat .


9/21

3-1

Manpower

The East Roman Army had its roots in the remains of the Imperial Roman Army. For about 146

years the two were synonymous. The Imperial Roman Army at the time of Constantine the Great

was not the same army in structure or make-up that the Imperial Roman Army had been under

Marius or Augustus. As early as the 260's AD the Roman Emperor Gallienus had begun to

change the form of the Roman military by strengthening the Cavalry . This was done to provide a

more mobile field-force that could better react to border incursions. Constantine himself had a

profound effect on the composition of the military. He did two things that changed the Army. His

act was to separate the military and civilian powers in the provinces. Previously the Governor

was military commander in chief of his province and chief civilian authority as well.

The other move that Constantine did was more reflective of the realities inherent in late Roman

military strategies. He effectively divided the army into two groupings of forces. The first

grouping was the frontier troops. These soldiers were mostly the heavy Infantry of the legions

that had been garrisoning the frontiers for decades. The other military grouping consisted mostly

of cavalry and a few regional legions held back from the frontier. These units would be the

mobile field army . This split was dictated by the strategy of a crust type defense, wherein Rome

would attempt to hold the foe at the border with the frontier troops until a mobile field army

could reach the trespass and destroy the would be invaders.

3-2

This state of affairs would continue as the policy for a little while longer. The biggest change in

the composition of the late Roman Army happened because of a disastrous defeat. On the ninth of

August in the year 378 AD the bulk of the Roman Infantry Legions were ridden down and

annihilated by a lance-armed heavy-cavalry force of Goths at the battle of Adrianople. In many

ways this sounded the death knell of the traditional Roman Legion. On the field that night lay

26,000 dead Roman legionnaires. The growing reliance of heavy cavalry for the mobile field

army was waxing, with the setting of the Mediterranean sun on the pools of blood, at Adrianople .

Another significant change would now occur under the emperor Zeno (474-491). Zeno

recognized that the Roman Army was not Roman in its composition anymore. The army was a

German army doing the will of Rome. In fact many have speculated that the Armies which

sacked Rome in 476 were not the barbarian hordes of myth and legend but rather the Roman

Armies themselves. The sad truth is that for many years Romans had been unwilling to serve their

empire and had relied increasingly on the Germanic tribes to provide the manpower to protecther. Zeno began a purge of the Germanic elements in the eastern half of the Empire and instead

began to recruit and draft native sons to fill her ranks . Far better to have soldiers defended their

own land than have defenders who want to conquer that which they are supposed to defend.

3-3

The Theme Armies

The structure then of the East Roman Empire was dependent on the strategic vision of a crust

defense. This called for a cavalry heavy mobile field-force to rush to the aid of a frontier force

that was threatened. The first significant change to this force structure occurred in the seventh

century with the establishment of the Theme system. This system would exist through many


10/21

changes in doctrine and opponent until 1071 AD when after the disaster at Manzikert the themes

of the East would be lost, submerged under a victorious Turkish tide.

The original concept of a theme was as geographical area to which a military unit was assigned.

This unit was a major independent military command. The theme forces were to consist of

cavalry and infantry, both first line troops and a second line troops. In the beginning there were

merely four themes. These theme armies were constructed out of the old legions of the centralarmy. Many of these units could boast of military histories going back into the fourth century . It

was this link to the past that would prove to be a most valuable asset to the empire. For by

maintaining these valuable links to the past the military kept with it a vast store of organizational

knowledge as it applied to engineering, logistics, training and the like. More importantly it

provided a rallying point for the individuals within the units. They were therefore able to channel

their pride into these units much as in the British Regimental tradition. Anyone who has marched

with the colors understands the vital importance that esprit de corps makes.

3-4

The theme system was based upon ownership of land. The emperor granted to an individual a

parcel of land significant enough to pay for the equipping of a medium cavalry soldier complete

with arms, armor and horses. The soldier would then farm his plot of land until his term forservice came. Then the soldier would serve for a year before going back to his farm . While he

was serving he would be provided with rations and a salary as well as numerous other financial

payments. The soldiers who were at home farming also received a significant yearly salary. The

soldier could expect to be activated about once every three to five years. Of course if an enemy

invaded or the empire was going on the warpath the soldier could be activated out side of that

normal schedule. A key point is that the soldiers were paid in enough gold to make it a good

source of income contribution for a family, especially when the economy suffered meltdowns.

The other key point of the theme arrangement was that the equipment and obligation belonged

not to the person or the family but rather to the estate. Should the family living on the estate fail

to provide, when called, a properly equipped cavalry soldier then that estate would revert to the

emperor for reassignment, and all military equipment and horses would remain with the estate. In

the beginning the acceptance of an estate in exchange for service was voluntary it was not untilthe edict of Nicephorus I (802-811) in 809-810 that military service would become both

hereditary and compulsory .

This change in the theme obligation was a method to deal with several problems that were

beginning to plague the military and financial sinews of the empire.

3-5

The first reason for the shift in policy was the decision in 778 to change the defensive strategy of

the empire from one of a defensive crust to one based on the concept of a mobile defense in

depth.

This change in strategy put greater stress on the ability and numbers of the theme system. No

longer would invasions be kept at the border, instead the transgressors would be allowed into the

empire and ran down by troops in the interior. The other cause for this edict was the decline in

numbers of small self-sufficient landholders capable of supporting a cavalry soldier. The larger

landholders and their families were buying up many of the small holders. This progression would

give rise in the eastern themes to powerful military families that would topple the crown on at

least one occasion.


11/21

Their growth would be some what abated in the period from 944 to 959 AD by the forced pooling

of land and estates to provide for the required number of cavalrymen.

This policy required the poorer estates to pool together their resources in order to provide for one

first class cavalry soldier. This policy also required the wealthier estates to support the raising,

among the smaller estates, of the required military forces . This is essentially only how cavalryforces were raised in the theme armies. The infantry forces were raised by conscription on an as

needed basis. Those that had lost their cavalry status by having their estates reverted back to thecrown were most often called up for infantry service in the first round and on a continual basis.

3-6

The situation described above would continue despite many of the best attempts by the central

authority to halt it. In 976 the total number of cavalrymen that the empire could expect from each

theme had fallen to 3,000 ... This was not the only problem in the theme armies. Starting in 963AD we see a greater number of mercenaries replacing natives. The situation among the light

cavalry was that almost all of them had now become paid Asian horse archers. By 1050 fully

50% of the total Byzantine military strength, to include the theme armies, would consist of

mercenaries . The empire had begun to allow theme soldiers to remit service in exchange for

cash. The natives also began to suffer in terms of ability and desire to participate in militaryservice. This was partially a result of the defensive policy change of 778 and partially a result of a

region wide economic downturn.

The mercenary units provided the empire with dedicated warriors but at a price. After the battle

of Manzikert in 1071 the themes would be allowed to drift into oblivion . They would however,

be raised again in a new guise. This guise was the granting of land to mercenaries, tax-free in

exchange for service. This too for economic reasons would not last long.

3-7

The Tagmata

Another military force available to the emperors was the Tagmata. These forces were stationed in

and about the capital city of Constantinople. The Tagamata had its earliest origins in the fifthcentury when they served as ceremonial guard units to the emperor . This would come to change

in 743 when the Tagmata would be reformed into the preeminent striking arm of the empires

arsenal. The Tagmata would begin with two units and slowly expand through the decades of

imperial power and politics until in the ninth century there were four cavalry units and one

infantry unit. In the early ninth century the total number of men in the Tagmata would peak at

about 4,000 full time soldiers.

The Tagmata were not with out their intrigue during the iconoclasm it was the Tagmata under

Leo III (717-741) that served as his main arm against the church . The Tagmata carried out thepersecution against the icons. So much so that when Irene (797-802) was able to gain the throne

she lured the Tagmata to Nicea on the pretext of a plot. She did this so that that she could man the

walls of Constantinople with Theme armies and restore the Icons. Eventually the Iconoclasm was

settled in favor of the iconophiles in 843 AD. But by then the Tagmata were no longer the guard

units of the Emperor. Theophilus (829-842) had replaced them by the Hetaireia .


12/21

3-8

The Hetaireia and Mercenaries

The Hetaireia were formed to serve as the new imperial guard troops for the emperor. They were

all foreign mercenaries. It was felt by the Emperor that the Tagmata had been too involved in past

political and religious intrigue. What was needed were a group of soldiers whose loyalty would

be only to their paymaster, the emperor. Membership in the Hetaireia was open to all including

Greeks. Though the records indicate that it was almost exclusively foreign. Membership in the

Hetaireia was by purchase. The prospective recruit had to ante up a certain amount to be allowed

into the retinue.

There were in the beginning three different units and the closer you worked to the emperor the

more you paid to get in. Of course your salary, donations and pick of the booty made your initial

expenditure worth it in the long run. The Hetaireia would do well in this role of imperial guard

and elite fighting force. The Hetaireia were joined in 988 AD by the Varangians.

The Varangians began as a promissory levy from Prince Vladimer of Kiev . They initially were

comprised of Nordic Vikings, but later on their composition would show Englishmen serving as

well . It is noted however that those, whose native language was the Old Danish, held primacy of

place in the unit .

3-9Later emperors prized the Varangians because they felt that the Hetaireia had become to

Hellenized. This Hellenization involved the proclivity toward luxury and political intrigue.


13/21

4-1

Troop Organization

We have already discussed the distribution of manpower. Now we will lay out how the units were

organized.

Cavalry

The organization of the cavalry was the same whether the troops served in a Theme Army or a

Tagma. We will describe the organization from the top down. We will provide the name of the

unit, the title of its' commander and any other applicable data to that echelon.

The supreme commander of the Armies was of course the Emperor. Often times in the history of

the East Roman Empire the Emperor would take to the field and command the army personally.

The next level of command below that of Emperor was a General. Typically a General controlled

a force of around 20,000 soldiers. The second in command was called the Lieutenant General

(LTG), a.k.a. Hypstratelate. The LTG was also the senior Merarch, a.k.a. Stratelate and as suchcommanded the center Meros on the battlefield . A Meros, a.k.a. division, f.k.a. Droungoi, was

the largest named tactical unit used in the Byzantine lexicon.

4-2

A Merarch, a.k.a. Stratelate, typically commanded the Meros. This unit numbered 6,000 - 7,000

soldiers. The unit was composed of three Morias of varying strength. The Meros, also had

attached to it eight to 12 dedicated scouts who served the reconnaissance needs of the commander

A Moirarch, a.k.a. Chiliarch, and f.k.a commanded the Morias, a.k.a. Chiliarch. Duke. This unit

had strength of around 2,000 - 3,000 troops. The unit was composed of around eight to ten

Tagmata .

The Tagma, a.k.a. Bandon, f.k.a. Arithmoi, was the primary tactical unit used by the Byzantines.

A Count, a.k.a. Tribune, f.k.a. Komes, commanded this unit. The second in command of the unit

was known as the Ilarch. The Ilarch was also the senior Hekatonarch. This unit varied in strength

from 300 - 400. It was a premise of Byzantine doctrine that the strengths of the units should not

be uniform, but rather vary. This was intended as a method of operational security (OpSec). This

way the enemy would be unsure of what they were facing. Other positions within the unit

consisted of the man responsible for commanding the guard force of the baggage train and the

rear area. This individual was titled the Tetrach. The remaining members of the staff consisted of;

two heralds, two standard bearers, and a surgeon with eight stretcher-bearers, and whatever

personal retinue the commander kept. This tactical unit was typically broken down into three or

four groups of a hundred each commanded by a Hekatonarch .

4-3

These units were known as the Hekatontarchia. A Hektontarch commanded the Hektontarchia.

The senior Hektontarch was also called the Ilarch and served as the second in command of the

Bandon. The Hektontarch was composed of two Allaghia. A Pentekontarch commanded the

Allaghia. These units were composed of fifty soldiers each, organized into five Dekarchiai of ten

soldiers each ... A Dekarch commanded the Dekarchiai. A Pentarch, a Tetrarch and an Ouragh

supported the Dekarch in his command. Each of these NCOs was equipped primarily as lancers


14/21

along with two other squad members. The remaining four squad members were equipped with

bows and positioned in the middle of the squad.

4-4

Infantry

The organization of the infantry was similar to the organization of the cavalry. The infantry units

had two different types of infantry, light and heavy. These two infantry types were organized

along similar lines except for manning at the squad level. Heavy Infantry units being 75% heavy

infantry and 25% light infantry. The light infantry units were light infantry pure, being 100%

light infantry . It is also speculated in some sources that the light infantry units may have had only

eight men per squad instead of the 16 soldiers per squad in the heavy infantry units. We will

describe the organization of the Empire's infantry units from the largest down to the smallest. We

will include the title of the unit, the title of the commander, unit strength and any other relevant

information applicable to that echelon.

Infantry were not typically organized in units larger than Meros, a.k.a. Turmai. A Merarch, a.k.a.

Turmarch, commanded this echelon. A Meros was composed of three Moiriai. A Moirarch, a.k.a.

Dhoungarokometes, commanded the Moira, a.k.a. Dhoungoi. The Moira was composed of two to

five Bandon .

The Bandon, a.k.a. Tagma, f.k.a. Arithmos was the basic tactical infantry unit used by the

Byzantines. This unit would have been commanded by a Count, a.k.a. Komes, and f.k.a. Tribune.

The second in command of a Bandon was the Ilarch. The Ilarch was the senior Lochaghos.

4-5

Like cavalry units, infantry units varied in size as a matter of OpSec. Further positions of

responsibility at the Bandon echelon were Heralds, Drill Masters, Standard Bearers, Trumpeters,

Armorers, Weapon Makers, Bow Makers and Fletchers. A Tetrach who commanded the rearguard and the baggage train also assisted the commander. The unit had attached to it a surgeonand eight stretcher-bearers. The Bandon was broken down into four Al laghion. The Allaghion

were known on the field as Left, Left-Center, Right -Center and Right. Each Allaghion was

composed of four Lochaghiai each .

A Lochaghos commanded the Lochaghiai. The Lochagos was assisted in his mission by hissecond in command the Dekarchos. The remainder of the NCOs in the squad were the

Pentarchos, Tetrarchos and an Ouraghos. These five NCOs led the remaining 11 soldiers from the

front except for the Ouraghhos who served as the file closer .


15/21

5-1

Defense of the Realm

In discussing the defense of the realm we will focus on the three levels of military art. These three

levels are Strategy, Operations and Tactics. Strategy focuses on the Empire wide defense

ideology that was used by the East Roman Empire. The Operational level discussion will discuss

the movements of troops with in a theatre of operations. Finally, the Tactical level will focus on

the unit level operations on the battlefield .

Strategy

The initial strategy of the East Roman Empire was the strategy that it had inherited from the

Imperial Roman Empire. This defensive strategy was based on the concept of a frontier crust

defense. The premise of a frontier crust defense is that you stop the invader at the border and stallthem long enough for the mobile field armies to arrive and destroy the enemy at the border. To

accomplish this concept the Imperial Roman Empire had begun a defensive building program.

This program was responsible for the construction of the various long Roman walls, frontier forts

and improvements in the Roman military road networks. In this time Justinian conducted

operations which at the outset seem contradictory to the overall policy of defense. This is easily

understood when one realizes that what Justinian was trying to do was to reconquer those areas

that had been lost since the collapse of the Roman Empire in the west.

5-2To Justinian these campaigns were merely the defense of the Empire, as he understood it. The

Empire was determined to keep itself inviolate. This had been the military policy of the Imperial

Roman Empire since the reign of Hadrian and would remain the strategy of the East Roman

Empire until 778 AD.

In 778 AD the East Roman Empire shifted its defense strategy to a strategy of mobile defense indepth. This new strategy was predicated on a finical decline in the fortunes of the Empire. The

Empire was unable to pay for the large amounts of troops needed to maintain the frontier forces

that the previous crust defense mandated. The irony of the situation was that it was the wealth of

the Empire, which attracted the foreign incursions, and there fore due to money problems drove

the Empire to adopt the mobile defense in depth. By shifting to a mobile defense in depth the

Empire was able to save on cash by reducing overall troops numbers. This defensive strategy

would serve the Empire well and would be phased out in 860 in favor of an offensive strategy.

The offensive strategy stemmed from the first decisive victory over a major enemy raiding force.

This force was led by the Emir Umar of the Melitenes and was engaged and destroyed in the year

863. The action took place North of Ankara near the Halys River. The offensive would continue

under the inspired leadership of several militarily gifted Emperors. This phase however wouldend in the disastrous defeat at Manzikert in 1071, when the Emperor Romanus IV Diogenes

disregarded the sage advice that had been laid down as Byzantine doctrine in the military treatises

of his forebears.

5-3

The Empire would then begin a slide into the history books that resulted in the final capitulation

and destruction of the Empire with the capture of Constantinople in 1453.


16/21

Operations

The operational methods of the Empire were driven by the overall strategy that the Empire had

adopted. During the first phase of the East Roman Empire this called for operations that

supported a frontier crust defense that attempted to destroy the foe at the borders. This was

achieved by a deft use of diplomacy and soldiering. The Byzantines preferred not to fight if this

was an option. This is brilliantly laid out by the Emperor Leo VI, the Wise, in his 903 AD book

Tactica " One must not without a pressing reason, go into a battle and risk defeat through too

great a desire to vanquish. To seek a victory where the danger is obvious is an unpardonable

temerity which even success cannot justify." The Byzantines therefore tailored their diplomacy to

this end. They offered cash, titles and honorifics. If possible they would sign a treaty of non-

aggression and then while publicly honoring it, attempt to covertly undermine their cosigner by

funding and equipping that nations enemy. The Byzantines also attempted to play the tribes off

against each other and thereby save their own troops from the fighting by letting the infidels

destroy each other.

When diplomacy failed and the time to fight came, the frontier forces would attempt to draw the

foe into battle.

5-4

They would try and fight from behind prepared defensive positions and force their opponent to

conduct a siege. This would give time for the mobile field armies to muster and ride into the area

and then destroy the besiegers. If this failed or the enemy was successful it was hoped that the

frontier forces would have bought enough time for the mobile field armies to reach the enemy

and destroy them before they had gotten to deep into the Empires rear areas.

This system worked well enough but the cost of maintaining the huge numbers needed to man the

frontier proved to be to great a train on the imperial coffers. This caused a shift in 778 AD to a

mobile defense in depth. The mobile defense in depth would place greater stress on the Theme

armies and eventually turn much of Anatolia into a barren wasteland . The concept was centered

on frontier outposts manned by small local sentries. These out posts were positioned along the

most likely avenues of approach and served as warning stations instead of forts. Once an

opponent was spotted coming over the horizon the out post would notify the Theme headquarters,

the central army headquarters in Constantinople and then with the local theme troops begin to

shadow the invading host.

The shadowing forces would continually harass the enemy column and send reports to

headquarters. The small-fortified towns, farmhouses and forts that were positioned hither and yon

through out the area assisted the shadow forces. These small places served as points of supply and

refuge for the shadowing forces.

5-5

The other mission that the small forts and the shadowing forces had to accomplish was to prevent

the enemy from sending out foraging parties and to conduct scorched earth tactics on the flanks

and in front of the interloper. The other theme armies would then mobilize and head for the

border where they would set up blocking positions to prevent the enemy column from leaving the

Empire.


17/21

Soon the tired, harassed, and booty-laden enemy would turn for home.

Once they neared the border they would find their way blocked by the Theme armies and

hemmed in from the rear by a combination of Theme troops and Tagmata from Constantinople.

Therein would begin the real battle. The net result of these operations was that the Empire was

able to successfully weather almost every foreign invasion but at the price of a devastated

interior. This did not bother the Empire much, as they were able in this way to protect the vitalareas near the coastlines and around Constantinople. So successful were these operations that in

860 the Byzantines were able to switch to the offensive and actually expand the Empire.

The Empire found itself in the 860's on a strong enough footing to begin offensive operations in

earnest. These offensive operations coincided with the reign of several militarily gifted Emperors.

The Byzantines used as the base for the offensive operations the long distance raid, which struck

deep into the enemies rear areas. The Byzantines would most often not attack directly the target

of their campaign but instead attempt to get around behind it and cut it off.

5-6

Once they had isolated the objective they would begin to devastate the surrounding area as well

in order to prevent any relief attempt from gathering provisions or support. The Byzantines would

then settle in to what typically turned out to be a short siege. Most often the Byzantine raiding

force would consist of predominantly Tagmata. It was not uncommon for the Byzantines to use

Theme troops to launch cross border local attacks as part of a deception to cover the raiding

forces as they left the line of departure elsewhere. These forces would often travel on a wide

turning movement through difficult terrain in order to maximize their surprise. It was not unheardof for the raiding forces to strike at objectives up to 500 km from the nearest imperial frontier.

Manzikert in 1071 spelled the end of imperial conquest and the armies of the Empire would be

reformed and committed to a long defensive campaign that would result in 1453, with the end of

the empire.

Tactics

The tactics that the East Roman Empire inherited were the tactics of the late Imperial Roman

Army. These tactics had been involved in a slow evolution since the defeat at Adrianople in 378

AD. This defeat was the first time that the Roman Legions had not showed the discipline,

inclination or the ability to stand and fight against cavalry. The result was their destruction. The

tactics of the East Roman Empire would evolve to accommodate this and focus on the actions of

the cavalry. The Byzantines were very precise in their application of lessons learned on the

battlefield.

5-7

They continued the Roman tradition of learning and adopting what which worked from the foes

you had fought . The apogee of Byzantine tactics was to force the enemy into position where theywould surrender with out a fight. Often this could be done by surprise and maneuver. Many times

thought the troops had to go in and fight the close in fight.

Infantry

Traditional the infantry had bee the masters of the close in fight. In the annuls of Byzantium the

infantry had been forced into a secondary and supporting role for most military operations. The


18/21

Byzantines were avid students of their opponents and adopted and codified their tactics to allow

them to easily defeat their opponents .

The Byzantines took in to consideration who they were fighting and that peoples strengths and

weaknesses as well as that nations performance and methods in past encounters. The Empire was

aided in this by two methods. The first method was the Office of Barbarians. The Office of

Barbarians was a type of foreign intelligence service . They would go out and provide constantreports on potential foes. Many of the agents traveled with Orthodox missionaries and others

were recruited from frontier tribes. The other method used by the East Romans was by hiring as

mercenaries various frontier and nomadic peoples. These people would then share what they

knew of other tribes and nations beyond the borders of the Empire. The other consideration for

imperial planners was the type of terrain that the battle would be contested on.

5-8

The Byzantines always tried to use terrain as an ally in their battles. This meant tying a flank into

an impassable or difficult segment of terrain, or such using maneuver methods as masking your

approach by the terrain.

The infantry would be used as a primary force in difficult terrain. Light infantry archers would

often serve as the main support for heavy cavalry when the Byzantines fought against the

Persians. The Persians were in fact considered by the Byzantines to be their most skilled and

dangerous foe and that no commander should fight them with out a combined arms approach.

Infantry would be arrayed on the battlefield in files sixteen deep and armed with pikes and other

equipment. The primary purpose of infantry in most Byzantine battles was to serve as the anchorand pivot point for the cavalry ... The infantry also served as a shield, which the cavalry could

regroup behind, in comparative safety. If the situation dictated the Byzantines were known to

dismount some of their cavalry soldiers to augment the ranks of the ground pounders . The

infantry then would usually be drawn up in the center of the line with cavalry to the flanks. Theinfantry would form up into four units abreast. The units were noted as Left, Center Left, Center

Right and Right . The Byzantines, though regulating infantry to a secondary role, were protective

and considerate of the problems faced by the common foot soldier. The Emperor Maurice, in hissixth century military manual, Strategikon, warned commanders about fatiguing their infantry by

having them where their full armor on approach marches of over two miles .

5-9

Cavalry

Cavalry was the primary arm of decision for the Byzantine forces. The Cavalry would typicallybe formed up on the field of battle as follows. The first Byzantine troops out are the scouts. There

were eight -12 scouts per Meros. The scouts would position themselves about three hundred

meters in front of the Byzantine position. They were to occupy a position that allowed them to

view both their own forces and the forces of the opponent. The next line of troops would consistof the Promachos, or first line of battle. The first line of battle equaled 2/3 of the total strength of

the field army. The unit would consist of three bodies of troops on line and about three hundred

meters apart. Each of these units would have 2/3 of its troops designated as defenders and 1/3

designated as assault troops .

The defenders would be in the middle of that unit's formation and would follow the assault troops

in good order and serve to beat back counter attacks. Behind the defenders traveled the medical

corpsmen. The assault troops would usually have been bow-armed troops who would rush after a


19/21

retreating enemy. The assault troops were positioned on the flanks of their defenders. The

Byzantines would often place a bandon in the gap between units until the battle started so as to

confuse enemy scouts and make them believe that they faced a solid wall of imperial troops.

Remember the Byzantines preferred to fight from the defensive and force their opponents to

attack them.

5-10About three hundred meters to the left of the line were positioned two to three bandon whose job

was to serve as a flank guard to the main force. Three hundred meters to the right of the line were

two or three more bandon who were called outflankers. Their job was to conduct an envelopment

of the enemy forces. There were also another two or three bandon composed mostly of archers

who were known as ambushers. Their job was to go deep and then turn the enemy's flank and

pummel them with arrows.

Behind this formation at a distance of about 1,200 meters sat the second line of troops. These

troops constituted of the total commitment. They were drawn up into four units abreast with

three hundred-meter intervals. The gaps corresponded to the position of the troops in the first line.

These troops were oriented for 360 defense. They were assisted in this by the positioning of a

bandon about three hundred meters to the rear outside corner of the left and right limit of theformation .

Additional march related duties and units consisted of some that would seem very familiar to a

modern military. These were a quartering party whose mission was to scout out the routes and

location of the next encampment or remain over night position. Once the quartering party hadlocated and secured the are the surveying party would come and establish the limits and positions

with in the site. The main body would then follow them.

5-11

When the Byzantines elected to launch a full-blown cavalry charge the troops were drawn up into

a type of wedge formation. Up until Manzikert the first wave of the three-wave attack would be

made up of the heavy cavalry, Klibanphoroi. The second and third waves would be made up of

Kataphractoi and their mixture of bows and lances . The ten men Dekarchiai was formed up in to

files of five side by side. The first two ranks and the last rank would typically be using lances andthe middle four soldiers would use their bows.


20/21

8-1

Bibliography_____________________________________________

...

Evans, Robert F.. Legions of Imperial Rome, An Informal Order of Battle

Study. New York City: Vantage Press, 1980.

Grant, Michael. From Rome to Byzantium, The Fifth Century AD. New York City:Routledge, 1998.

Heath, Ian. Byzantine Armies 886 - 1118. London: Osprey Publishing Ltd.,

1998.

Holmes, Richard and Keegan, John. Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle. New

York City: Viking, 1985.

Hook, Richard and Windrow, Martin. The Horse Soldier. New York City: Oxford

University Press, 1986.

Jones, Archer. The Art of War in the Western World. New York City: OxfordUniversity Press, 1987.

Keegan, John. A Short History of Warfare. New York City: Vintage Books,

1993.

Keppie, Lawrence. The Making of the Roman Army. New York City: Barnes and

Noble, 1984.

Laffont, Robert. The Art of Ancient Warfare. Greenwich, CT: Time-Life Books,

1966.

Liddel Hart, B.H.., Strategy, New York City: Meridian, 1991.

Maurice. Trans. George T. Dennis. Strategikon. Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania Press, 1984.

Nickerson, Hoffman and Spaulding, Oliver Lyman. Ancient and Medieval

Warfare. New York City: Barnes and Noble, 1993. 8-2

Norwich, John Julius. A Short History of Byzantium. New York City: Alfred A.

Knopf, 1997.

Parker, H.M.D.. The Roman Legions. New York City: Dorset Press, 1992

Sherrard, Philip. Byzantium. New York City: Time-Life Books, 1966.

United States Department of the Army, FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations

and Tactics. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1984.


21/21

Watson, G.R.. The Roman Soldier. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,

1969.

Webster, Graham. The Imperial Roman Army. Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble,

1985.

Whittow, Mark. The Making of Byzantium, 600 - 1025. Los Angeles: Universityof California Press, 1996.

Wilkes, John. The Roman Army. New York City: Cambridge University Press,

1977.

Documents

Byzantine Land Forces - Basics