CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYWASHINGTON 25. D. C.

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Richard HelmsDeputy Director (Plans)

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1.3(a)(4)Enclosure

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director ofCentral Intelligence

SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT: "Some Questions in the FurtherDevelopment and Improvement of the Ground Troops",by Colonel-General of the Tank TroopsP. Poluboyarov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article whichappeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mys1") published by theMinistry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level ofArmy Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this materialshould be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office.Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization ofany partof this document in any other form should be addressedto the originating office.

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

.Special Assistant to the President forNational Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research,Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency .

The Director for Intelligence,The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,Department of the Army

The Director of Naval IntelligenceDepartment of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, IntelligenceU. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of IntelligenceAtomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and AstronauticsIntelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

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USSR

MILITARY THOUGHT: "Some Questions in theFurther Development and Improvement of theGround Troops", by Colonel-General of the-Tank Troops P. Poluboyarov

COUNTRY

SUBJECT

UNCLASSIFIED

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DATE OF INFO

APPRAISAL OFCONTENT

SOURCE

: July/1961

: Documentary

: A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled"Some Questions in the Further Development and Improvementof the Ground Troops", written by Colonel-General of theTank Troops P. Poluboyarov.

This article appeared in the 1961 Third Issue of aspecial version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is publishedirregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets.It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense downto the level of Army Commander.

The table of contents of the 1961 Third Issue is alsoincluded. This Issue was sent to press on 10 July 1961.

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THIRD ISSUE 1961

V. Baskakov

Yu. Panteleyev

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SPECIAL COLLECTION OF ARTICLES OF THE JOURNAL

MILITARY THOUGHT

P. Poluboyarov

A. Babadzhanyan

P. Koshevoy

-- Some Questions in the FurtherDevelopment and Improvement ofthe Ground Troops

-- Some Questions in the Preparationand Conduct of the InitialOffensive Operations

Utilization of. the Missile Troopsof a Front (Army) in an OffensiveOperation

V. Chizh

S. Mironov, M. Mukhin

- - Planning the Utilization ofNuclear/Missile Weapons in aFront Offensive Operation

-- The Fundamental Scheme of a FrontOffensive Operation

-- The Submarine Operation of theNavy - the Naval Operation of the,Future

Urgent Tasks for the Improvementof Aerial Reconnaissance UnderModern Conditions

V. Ilinykh, P. Kurochkin-- The Question of Increasing theStability of Troop Control

Ya. Shchepennikov

Support of the Strategic Concentra-tion and Deployment of the ArmedForces in Respect to Transport

AddressWiFiii7 V-100 (?), ul. Kropotkina 19; Telephone K 0-13-00,ext.53-66Technical Editor R. L. Solomonik Proofreader T.G. Likhacheva

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Some Questions in the Further Development

and

Improvement of the Ground Troops

by

Colonel-General of the Tank Troops P. Poluboyarov

The rapid development of nuclear/missile weapons andtheir broad introduction into the armed forces predetermin-ed the necessity for a review of previously formed viewson the nature, methods, and forms of conducting modernoperations and on the role and significance in them ofvarious means of armed combat and also of views on themeans of further development of types of armed forces andarms of troops. However, in this natural process, sometimes,under the guise of being something new, positions areexpressed which are poorly founded, or entirely unfoundedand already repudiated by reality itself.

Recently in our periodical press and in certain speeches,the opinion has been expressed concerning the advisabilityof repudiating tank armies and the necessity for creating,in place of tank and motorized rifle large units, unifieddivisions capable of performing varied missions under thecomplex conditions of a nuclear/missile war.

Taken by itself, this viewpoint is not new. It waseven put into practice in the structure of our ground troopsand the armies of a number of capitalist countries. Thus,for example, in the French Army which, on the eve of theinvasion of German-Fascist troops into France had asignificant number of tanks, there was not a single tankdivision or tank corps. At the beginning of the war, therewere only two mechanized divisions in France and a thirdwas in the state of formation. A large portion of thetanks of the French Army were dispersed by small subunits

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in infantry units and designated for joint operations withthe infantry. This could not help but have an effect onthe combat effectiveness of the French Army and to a largedegree facilitated its rapid destruction by the German-Fascist troops.

In the structure of our ground troops prior to theSecond World War there was a similar repudiation ofmajor large units of armored troops. An attempt was madeto rectify this serious error but not in time, due to thecommencement of war with Fascist Germany. Until the endof 1942 this error continued to have an effect on theoperations of our troops, even though we strove to equipcombined arms armies with as many tank regiments and

. brigades as possible. -nut such an action did not producethe needed effect, and during the course of the war wewere forced to create tank corps and tank armies which didplay an important role in the successful conduct of all thesuccessive operations of the Second World War.

After the war mechanized armies were created insteadof tank armies. Subsequently, it was necessary to abandonthese and once more return to tank armies.

Thus, as was proved by our experience and numerousexamples from the armies of other nations, measures forthe unification of tank and rifle (motorized rifle) largeunits have thus far not justified themselves. Are theresufficient bases to affirm that under the system whichhas arisen, of arming ground troops, thesemeasures will becorrect? In our opinion such bases do not yet exist.

It is well known that the decisive role in attainingthe aims of war and of individual operations belongs tonuclear/missile weapons. The efforts of ground troops aredirected toward the most complete and effective exploitationof the results of the application of these weapons with theaim of final defeat of basic enemy groupings and theseizure of his vitally important centers and areas forbasing weapons of armed combat, primarily nuclear/missileweapons. Ground troops complete the defeat of armed forceson ground fronts, seize and hold enemy territory and themost important installations.

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"One of the most basic missions of ground troops, oneof primary concern to the command and staffs", indicatedMinister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union . R. Ys.Malinovskiy, "must be the skilful exploitation of theresults of strikes by missile troops for the rapid advanceof armies and fronts".

On the basis of the nature of modern operations, it ispossible to say that in the composition of ground troopsthe most important role will be played by that arm oftroops which by its combat characteristics is able,to themaximum degree, to exploit the results of the effects ofnuclear weapons on the enemy, which loses its combateffectiveness to the least extent from nuclear strikes bythe enemy, which can successfully conduct active, highlymobile combat operations at high tempos, rapidly overcomebroad zones of radioactive contamination, and rout enemygroupings in meeting engagements and battles precipitately.

At the present time such an arm of troops is the tanktroops. This is explained by the specific characteristicsand combat capabilities of tanks. Tanks are more stablethan other weapons under the effects of nuclear weaponsagainst them, possess powerful armament, high mobility, andarmor protection, and can operate immediately after nuclearstrikes; at the same time their crews are quite dependablyprotected from the destructive factors of a nuclear burst.The high combat qualities of tanks allow tank troops toexploit effectively the results of nuclear strikes andconduct highly mobile combat operations, to deliver, incoordination with nuclear weapons and air drops, powerfuland deep strikes on the enemy during an offensive, and toguarantee the activity and stability of troops in defense.

The high combat qualities of tank troops have pre-determined the sharp proportional increase of them in thecomposition of ground troops and the significantequipping of combined arms large units and formations with'tanks. The organizational inclusion of tanks in the compositionof combined arms units, large units, and formations, aswell as their full motorization, have significantly raisedthe maneuverability, striking force, stability of groundtroops during enemy nuclear strikes, and their ability toconduct combat operations under conditions of the massutilization of nuclear weapons.

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The equipping of ground troops with nuclear/missileweapons and the broad introduction of tanks and otherarmored equipment into their composition have had adecisive influence on raising the combat capabilities ofcombined arms large units and formations. A moderncombined arms army is able not only to penetrate success-fully the tactical defense of the enemy but also to directits efforts rapidly to an operational depth and developan offensive at high speeds.

Thus, the combat and maneuvering capabilities ofcombined arms large units and formations have increasedsignificantly. However, is it possible, on the basis ofthis, to equate motorized rifle to tank divisions orcombined arms armies to tank armies, to assert that theformer can replace the latter, and on the basis of thisto conclude that tank armies are not needed? In ouropinion, this cannot be done because the large units andformations named differ from one another not only inquantity of tanks but also in basic combat characteristicsand operational-tactical capabilities.

The modern tank army is an entirely new operationalformation and by its combat qualities and capabilities issignificantly superior not only to the tank army of theSecond World War period but also to the postwar mechanizedarmy. It also differs in many aspects from the moderncombined arms army. Having in its composition fourtank divisions, the tank army is a powerful striking andhighly maneuverable tank formation, capable of exploitingthe results of the mass use of nuclear/missile weapons inthe best manner. The organizational structure and combatcharacteristics of tanks contain great capabilities fordelivering rapid and powerful tank strikes to a greatdepth, for executing a rapid and broad maneuver on thebattlefield, for preserving a significant degree ofstability during enemy nuclear strikes and for surmountingwide zones of radioactive contamination with high levelsof radiation. By its composition the tank army is homo-geneous and much more mobile than the combined arms army.

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The combat capabilities of a tank army allow it toovercome the enemy defense after mass nuclear strikes morequickly than a combined arms army, to reach an operationalexpanse rapidly, and there to develop bold, decisive, andhighly mobile combat operations, directed in conjunctionwith missile units, airborne landing forces, and aircrafttoward the destruction of the enemy's deep reserves andthe achievement of operational aims at the highest possiblespeeds.

The high maneuverability of large units of a tank army,their great antiatomic stability, and strike-penetrationforce allow the army to conduct combat operationssuccessfully at a significant distance from the remainingforces of the front and to perform in conjunction withother forces and means the most important missions in thedefeat of enemy troops. The role and significance of tankarmies in modern operations was defined very exactly bythe Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union, R.Ya. Malinovskiy, who stated that tank armies were buudlesof arrows released from a-tightly bound bow string for theswift achievement of the final goals of an operation.

Certain comrades do not see the fundamental differencebetween tank and combined arms armies and propose doingaway with tank armies. In our opinion, this proposalstems from an incorrect understanding of the significanceof tank troops in general and tank armies specifically in

' a nuclear/missile war and from an underestimation of theircombat capabilities.

Recognizing the important role of tank armies, we arein no measure trying to belittle the significance and combatcapabilities of combined arms armies. Yielding to tankarmies in antiatomic stability, mobility, and ability toconduct highly maneuverable combat operations, at the sametime combined arms armies possess a number* of advantageswhich allow them to perform many combat missions success-fully. The same may be said of tank and motorized rifledivisions.

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We consider that under modern conditions the necessityfor tank armies and tank divisions has in no way diminishedin comparison with the Second World War but, on the contrary,it has increased. Speaking of the superfluousness of tankarmies, some comrades refer to the complexity of committingthem to battle, and the difficulty of securing their flanksand supplying them with various materiel. But thesedeductions, in our opinion, are not sufficiently confirmed.With the existence of massive, multi-million man armies,the huge spatial scope of a future war and the large varietyof missions which ground troops will perform, tank troopsand motorized infantry will, for the time being, remainindependent arms of troops, and the negation of one or theother of them is premature. A repetition of mistakescommitted in the past may now lead to even worse results.We hold the opinion that even with the presence among groundtroops of nuclear/missile weapons permitting the destructionof enemy groupings of any composition, the necessitycontinues to exist for a strike force, for tank troops andtheir basic large units and formations which are tankdivisions and tank armies, and their long-range developmentand improvement should be given due attention also in thefuture.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that thepresence of tank troops which are more advanced in technicalequipment, organizational structure, and methods of operations,also, to a significant degree, in turn stimulates thedevelopment of the infantry which must carry out highlymaneuverable combat operations in conjunction with tanks.The attempt of certain comrades to reverse the directionof this process is in obvious contradiction with the realcourse of development of the means and methods of armedconflict, as well as with the position that preferentialdevelopment must be given to the most modern arms of troops.

The currently accepted organizational structure oflarge units and formations of ground troops basicallycorresponds to the modern conditions of conducting combatoperations. However, the constant development of weaponsof armed combat and methods for their use governs thenecessity for its further improvement.

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The improvement of the organizational structure oftank and motorized rifle large units must proceed, in ouropinion, along the line of an even greater decrease inpersonnel, unprotected by armor, increase in antiatomicstability and viability, strike-penetration force andmaneuverability of large units, and also an increase intheir ease of control and capability for conductingindependent combat operations to a great depth and at highspeeds.

In our opinion it is advisable to have tank divisionsand tank armies of the same composition. A tank army couldconsist of 4 to 5 tank divisions, and a tank division of4 tank regiments of medium tanks. In a tank army as wellas in tank divisions it is necessary to have organicnuclear/missile weapons. Instead of a motorized rifleregiment in a tank division it is advisable to have amotorized rifle battalion in each of its tank regiments.It is more advisable to have heavy tank regiments and .divisions under army or front subordination and to turnthem over in case of necessity to large units and formationsduring the course of an operation.

Together with improving the organizational forms oftroops, great significance is acquired by the question ofthe means of long-range development of tanks and otherarmored equipment.

In the armament of our ground troops there are T-55medium tanks and T-10M heavy tanks which more than othercombat vehicles guarantee protection of the crew from theinfluence of the destructive factors of a nuclear burstand are best suited for operations under conditions of themass utilization of nuclear weapons/ and by their basiccombat characteristics are significantly superior to foreigntanks of corresponding types and years of manufacture. How-ever, it would be a mistake to suppose that these tanks donot need improvement. New conditions of conducting combatoperations make radical improvements in the combat qualitiesof tanks essential and force the working out of new directionsin their development) becausethe possibilities of furtherImprovement of tanks by old methods are, in practice, almostcompletely exhausted. In this connection, the questionarises as to along which directions our tank constructionmust develop, and which types of tanks is it more advisableto have in the armament of ground troops?

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In recent years the question of the future of tankshas been broadly discussed in our military press, onthe pages of which are expressed the most varied proposalsand opinions, some of which even cast doubt generally onthe possibility of successful tank operations on the fieldof combat with modern antitank weapons.

It is well known that the appearance of tanks broughtforth the need for weapons to combat them. Such a weaponwas first of all artillery: initially conventional, field;later antitank, special. All subsequent development oftanks was carried out in a competition between theprotective characteristics of their armor and thedestructive capabilities of armor-piercing shells. Towardthe end of the last war it had already become evidentthat the superiority in this competition was with shells.By this time, capabilities for increasing the thicknessof tank armor and its antishell stability had approachedtheir limits, but the destructive capabilities of shellsradically increased in connection with the use of high-explosive charges.

The increase in the proportion of tank troops and theirrole in performing combat missions under conditions of theutilization of nuclear weapons has given new impetus tosearches for more effective antitank weapons. In recentyears for arming the armies of NATO countries recoillessweapons and antitank guided missiles have been adopted,the destructive capabilities of which almost doublyexceed the protective characteristics of tank armor.Work to improve these weapons continues. At the same timeattempts to create a qualitatively new armor have not asyet reached any appreciable results in practice.

Thus, at the present time, as in the period of theSecond World War, a significant gap exists between theprotective capabilities of tank armor and the destructivecapabilities of antitank weapons. Basing their reasoningon this fact, a number of foreign authors arrive at theconclusion that tanks are weapons of the past and not ofa modern war, and they propose doing away with the heavyarmor of tanks because the armor is pierced by antitank

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weapons anyway, and changing to lightly armored, butmore mobile and maneuverable, vehicles. This viewpointfinds support among a certain segment of our generals andofficers, who propose the creation of a light tank andhaving it in the armament of ground troops as the basicand only combat vehicle. We cannot agree with this fora number of reasons.

In the first place, a change to tanks with light armorincreases the possibility of their destruction not only byantitank but also by other weapons.

Secondly, the chief weapon of destruction undermodern conditions is not antitank, but nuclear weapons,and for this reason it'is first of all necessary to proceedfrom a consideration of the impact of the latter. Duringthe conduct of highly maneuverable combat operations underconditions of the broad use of nuclear weapons, the mosteffective means, capable of protecting a person from theeffects of the destructive factors of a nuclear burst, isstill the armor of tanks. If it is weakened, tanks loseone of their most important qualities.

Thirdly, with . a change to light, thinly armoredvehicles, the qualitative superiority in tanks willimmediately shift to the side of our probable enemies,in whose armies medium tanks continue to be basic.

Fourthly, data concerning the destructive capabilitiesof modern antitank weapons reflect at present only theresults of firing range trials in the absence of the effectsof firing against these weapons, and consequently, withoutconsidering the difference between firing conditions onthe firing range and in combat. Under equal conditions ofthe effects of nuclear weapons and other means of destructionon tanks and on antitank weapons, tanks will be in a morefavorable situation and will be able to carry out combatoperations successfully, even with the existence of effectiveantitank weapons.

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Based on the nature of modern operations and theconditions of tank construction in our country and in themajor capitalist countries, we consider that until...hewmodels are developed for the armament of our army; threetypes of tanks must remain: heavy, medium, and specialamphibious. When tanks with higher performance criteriaare created, it is possible that we will do away withheavy tanks and have in our armament, in addition to lighttanks, one basic type of tank. , but with various armamentsystems. It seems to us that it does make sense to createlight tanks for airborne troops and reconnaissance unitsand subunits.

In our opinion, tanks of the future must, as in thepast, combine in themselves firepower, high mobility,and armor protection and must guarantee maximum possibleprotection to crews from the destructive factors of anuclear burst. The preferential development of one oranother quality at the expense of other characteristicsof tanks might lead to the drastic decrease of theiroverall combat effectiveness. In connection with thisthe basic guides in the work of building new tanks must be:

-a further significant increase of the firepower oftanks by improving the quality of rifled and smoothboreguns, and subsequently by installation in tanks of moremodern guided missile armament, providing the capabilityto destroy enemy tanks with certainty at such ranges andwith such accuracy as to exceed the capabilities of enemytanks;

-a sharp improvement in the protection of crews frompenetrating radiation as well as improvement in theprotection of tanks from high-explosive charges;

-a further decrease in the weight of tanks by newarrangements of parts, the use of light alloys, plasticsand other new materials;

-an increase in the maneuverability of tanks andraising their maximum speeds to 60 to 70 km per hourand average speeds to 40 to 45 km per hour;

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-a significant increase in the cruising rangeof tanks, an increase in the dependability of theiroperation, and a decrease in the amount of seYvicingduring the course of combat operations;

-a decrease in tank crews to 2 or 3 persons as aresult of complete automation of the combat operationsand servicing of tanks;

-the equipping of tanks with more modern instrumentsfor firing, sighting and navigational apparatus guarantee-ing the conduct of combat operations at night as well asduring the day;

-the maximum standardization of units and assembliesfor tanks;

-the creation of an improved system of driving tanksunder water;

-the creation of conditions for transport of tanksby air.

All these measures must guarantee in the future thesuperiority of our tanks over tanks of the armies ofcapitalist countries. Tank troops equipped with new tankswill be able even more successfully to carry out combatoperations under conditions of the mass use of nuclearweapons.

The interests of increasing the mobility of groundtroops also govern the necessity to seek means for increas-ing the combat and maneuvering capabilities of infantry.

Our infantry in actuality is not only unprotectedfrom the destructive factors of nuclear bursts but alsofrom modern small arms. Its mobility and maneuverabilityon the field of combat is also very low in comparison withtanks. Tank units and subunits are capable of attacking theenemy at combat speeds equal to 12 to 15 km per hour, andof developing an offensive at a speed Of 20 to 25 km perhour and more. On the other hand, the speed of movement

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of 'dismounted infantry on the field of combat is limitedby the capabilities of the human organism and does notexceed 3 to 4 km per hour. The armored carriers existingin the armament of ground troops do not fullS, guaranteeprotection of the infantry and its necessary maneuverabilityon the field of combat.

Thus, the infantry at present is the most vulnerableand least mobile element of the combat structure of theattacking echelon of ground troops. The great differencein the combat capabilities of tanks and infantry hampersthe effective exploitation of the results of using nuclearweapons and conducting offensives at high speeds.

With the aim of raising the combat and maneuveringcapabilities of the infantry it is advisable, in ouropinion, to create as inexpensively as possible aspecial mass combat vehicle for the infantry, which wouldpermit it to follow the tanks without lagging and to wagecombat jointly with them from these vehicles, dismountingonly in the most exceptional instances.

We cannot agree with the opinion of certain comradeswho propose, with the aim of raising the combat capabilitiesof the motorized rifle division, increasing the number oftanks in its composition to 300. It is completely obviousthat in this case the division will not be a motorizedrifle but a tank division. In our opinion, there is nonecessity for such an increase in the number of tanks ina motorized rifle division. A more important problem atthe moment is the matter of raising the combat capabilitiesof the infantry. One of the possible ways of solving thisproblem is the creation of an infantry combat vehicle.

An infantry combat vehicle must be, in our opinion,fully armored, tracked or half-tracked, capable of over-coming obstructions on the field of combat and difficultsectors of terrain on a par with tanks, amphibious,transportable by air, with high viability and antiatomicprotection for the crew and troops transported (desant).The maximum speed of the vehicle may be: on wheels up to70 to 80 km per hour, on tracks - up to 40 to 50 km perhour.

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The vehicle must have powerful, but compact and light-,Weight missile weapons, permitting the conduct of effectivecombat not only against personnel and various fire weaponsbut also against armored enemy targets.

The crew of the vehicle may consist of two persons.The passenger complement is a rifle squad. The constructionof the vehicle must permit the transported troops to conductcombat without dismounting, as well as provide for theconvenient accommodation, boarding, and debarkation of thetransported troops under various conditions of the combatsituation. The weight of the vehicle must be as littleas possible.

With the adoption of such a combat vehicle, thenecessity might arise for certain changes in the organization-al TO&E structure of tank and motorized infantry largeunits and units. We are not examining this matter in thisarticle, considering that it can be decided only after thevehicle is created. At present we should only like toindicate very briefly what such a combat vehicle mightdo for ground troops.

An infantry combat vehicle will provide first of allthe possibility for significantly increasing the mobilityand maneuverability of motorized rifle units and subunits,which then will be capable of successfully advancingbehind tanks under the most complex conditions of combatsituations and terrain. Operating from these vehicles,the infantry will not lag behind tanks and always willbe able to perform various combat missions together withthem.

The high cross-country ability and complete armorof the combat vehicles will permit the infantry to carryout broad maneuver on the field of battle and conductcombat operations under complex and rapidly changingsituational conditions both together with tanks andindependently.

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I.3(a)(4)In equipping the infantry with the new combat vehicle,

the viability and stability of motorized rifle units andsubunits during enemy nuclear attacks and their capabilityto exploit the results of our nuclear strikes and drosszones of radioactive contamination will be raised.

The presence on the combat vehicle of machine gunsand missile mounts capable of engaging in combat witharmored and openly positioned enemy targets will sharplyraise the firepower of the infantry. Conducting combatoperations on these vehicles, the infantry will be ableto combat successfully the enemy's fire weapons andpersonnel and offer more effective support to tanks onthe field of combat.

All the properties which the infantry will acquirewith the adoption of the combat vehicle will lead not onlyto raising the combat capabilities of motorized rifleunits and subunits but also to increasing the mobilityof tank and motorized rifle large units as a whole. Thanksto this, the combat qualities of tank and motorized rifledivisions will correspond more closely to the requirementsof a nuclear/missile war.

The high mobility, great strike force, and armorprotection of all personnel of the combat subunits of tankand motorized rifle divisions will favor more effectiveexploitation of the results of the use of nuclear weaponsand the delivery of even deeper and more rapid strikesagainst the enemy. The capabilities of troops for carryingout broad and rapid maneuver from the zone of interior aswell as directly on the immediate field of combat willincrease significantly.

The presence in the composition of tank and motorizedrifle divisions of easily controlled tank and motorizedrifle units with equal mobility and maneuverability willprovide the capability for rapidly creating such combatformations for combat as to satisfy the various conditionsand requirements of a sharply changing situation. Thesequalities of tank and motorized rifle units will permit,

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in addition, the avoidance of a prior dangerous concentra-tion of considerable forces and weapons in a limited areaon the axis of a major strike and will more fully instillinto the practice of combat operations the principle ofdispersal of troops and their operations along separateaxes. This principle corresponds to the nature of modernoperations to the greatest degree.

The advance of large units and units in dispersedformations on a broad front and along axes undoubtedlywill decrease troop losses from enemy nuclear strikes,will make it more difficult for him to utilize weaponsof mass destruction, and at the same time will permit ourtroops to carry out a broader and more flexible maneuverof forces and weapons with the aim of reaching the enemy'sdeep rear area and destroying his troops by units in shortperiods of time.

In conducting combat operations in dispersed formationsand along separate axes, tank and motorized rifle largeunits will accomplish the destruction of the enemy usuallyin mobile forms of combat in conjunction with missile units,airborne forces, and aviation. The necessity for amethodical breakthrough of the enemy's defenses no longerarises. The latter will be overcome after nuclear strikesalong axes, providing rapid penetration to an operationaldepth and development of an offensive at maximum possiblespeed. At the same time, the advance of infantry on combatvehicles following nuclear strikes also must become a regularoccurrence in overcoming the defense. Only under thiscondition can the speed of an offensive be sharply increasedand the results of nuclear strikes against the enemy beexploited to the maximum.

In overcoming the defense, the motorized rifle sub-units and units will be able to attack the enemy from themarch, not dismounting at a line of deployment as has beendone up to now. Moving out from the zone of interior aftertank subunits, as they approach the main line of resistance,they will carry out necessary reformations while on themarch and in conjunction with tanks will overcome theenemy's defense on vehicles in combat or approach march

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formations. Operating on combat vehicles, motorized rifleunits and subunits will be able to maneuver more on thefield of combat, more quickly change . the structure ofcombat formations and change if necessary from combatformations to approach march formations or the reverse.

Of course, under varied situational conditions thepossibility of the infantry operating in dismounted.combat formations is also not excluded when the Jointoperations of tanks and infantry on combat vehicles arefor some reason impeded. However, even in these instancesthe infantry will be in more favorable circumstances thannow. After the infantry has dismounted, the combatvehicles will not be removed to cover, as is done witharmored carriers, but will support the combat of the infantrywith their fire, advancing after the combat formations oftheir subunits. During this, the combat vehicles will bekept in constant readiness to load the infantry and provideit with a rapid means of advancing after the tanks.

The fullest high maneuvering capabilities of tanksand motorized rifle large units will come about afterovercoming the enemy's defenses. Tank units and largeunits, in reaching an operational expanse, will breakthrough more boldly and deeply into the depth of theenemy's defenses, knowing that the infantry on combatvehicles will not lag behind them and when needed can unitetheir efforts with them for delivering coordinated andsudden strikes against the enemy. All this will increaseeven more the capabilities of tank large units in conductingindependent highly maneuverable combat operations at speedsof 100 or more kilometers in a 24-hour period.

Equipping the infantry with the combat vehicle createsnew conditions, differing in principle from the past, fortroop forcing of water barriers.

First of all, after the infantry combat vehicle hasbecome part of our armament, the requirements of troopsfor various landing and ferrying means is decreasedconsiderably and operations of the infantry in the forcingof water barriers will no longer del3end on troops' havingthese means.

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combat vehicles, will be able to force water barrierswhile on the march, in the literal sense of the word.Possessing high cross-country and amphibious qualities,the combat vehicles will ensure that troops reach awater barrier rapidly on a broad front, and ensure theirrapid deployment and quick forcing of the barrier incombat or approach march formations. Thus, in the majorityof cases, motorized rifle subunits and units will be ableto surmount water barriers from the march simultaneouslywith amphibious tanks along the entire forcing sector with-out carrying out preparatory engineering work for preparingcrossings (except for mine clearing).

Having infantry combat vehicles will increase thepossibilities for carrying out maneuver with forces andweapons while forcing water barriers and for transferringthe efforts of advancing troops from one direction toanother. The execution of a subsequent forcing of waterbarriers from the march will likewise be made significantlyeasier. Not being tied down by crossing equipment,motorized rifle units and subunits together with amphibioustanks as well as tanks equipped for movement under water,after forcing one water barrier will race toward the nextwater barrier and force it from the march.

• The equipping of motorized rifle units and subunitswith an infantry combat vehicle will have a great influenceon the nature of troop operations under conditions ofstrong radioactive contamination of the terrain. Possessinghigh mobility, motorized rifle units and subunits on combatvehicles will be able not only to rapidly bypass zones ofcontamination, but also to cross them successfully indirections with the lowest level of radiation. The combatvehicles will provide in this a higher degree of protectionfor personnel from penetrating radiation and radioactivedust than armored carriers, much less motor vehicles.

Under modern conditions, together with the maneuveringof troops on the ground, great significance is acquiredby troop maneuver in the air. On the basis of this,troops,together with their weapons and combat equipment,must be capable of being transported by air.

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The mass movement of troops by air, as is well known,is impeded because of the absence of light transportablecombat equipment and means with a larger load-capacityfor transporting airborne forces. With the creation of arelatively lightweight infantry combat vehicle, an importantstep toward solving this important problem will have beenmade. The transportability of the infantry combat vehicleby air will permit the transfer by air of motorized rifleunits and large units in future operations in mass formationover considerable distances and in short periods of time.

Naturally, in the future the question will arise ofwhether all motorized rifle units of tank and motorizedrifle divisions should be equipped with the infantry combatvehicle. The solution of this question is directly dependenton the designated operational missions of the large unitsand the economic capabilities of the country. It seems tous that first of all it would be advisable to equip withthese vehicles those motorized rifle units which make upthe complement of tank armies and tank divisions of combinedarms armies. Subsequently, other large units located inthe most. important theaters of military operations could be •so equipped.

It should be noted that in equipping the infantrywith the combat vehicle, the question of raising the mobilityof tank and motorized rifle divisions is still not completelysolved because there will remain in their composition arelatively large number of subunits and units of other armsof troops which are not protected by armor and have lessmaneuverability.

Under modern conditions, in the composition of all tankdivisions including those in tank armies, it would beadvisable to have not trailer but self-propelled mounts,mainly with atomic armament, which are capable of moreeffectively executing various fire missions during theconduct by tank troops of highly maneuverable fast movingcombat operations.

Subunits and units of special arms of troops which areincluded in the composition of tank and Motorized riflelarge units and conduct combat as an attacking echelon must

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also possess increased mobility and greater protectionfrom the destructive factors of nuclear weapons. This bringsout the necessity of also developing appropriate means ofarmament and movement for them.

• In the near future, apparently, vehicles can be createdfor ground troops utilizing for movement the so-calledprinciple of the "air cushion". The adoption of suchvehicles will permit a sharper increase in the mobility ofinfantry and their maneuverability to a level correspondingto modern requirements. The cross-country ability of suchvehicles will provide troops with the capability toexecute rapid maneuver, to cover large expanses,includingsignificant zones of radioactive contamination and widewater barriers in short periods of time, and to deliversudden strikes against the enemy from the flanks and rear.

Units and subunits equipped with these vehicles willfind the most widespread use as reconnaissance units andforward detachments of attacking troops. By exploiting!freaks and unoccupied sectors in the enemy's defense,they will be able to reach the deep rear ofthe enemy veryquickly and execute not only missions assigned to forwarddetachments but also a portion of the missions which arecarried out by tactical airborne landing forces.

For ground troops it is advisable, in our opinion, tobuild vehicles which would have an average speed of 100 to120 km per hour and a cruising range of 400 to 500 km, withnot less than 30 to 40 per cent of this by air.

The question arises as to whether or not the increase inthe combat capabilities of the infantry will reach the pointwhere it will be capable of performing all combat missionswith the same success as tanks. It seems to us that thiswill not occur for this reason. No matter how good theinfantry combat vehicles will be, on the basis of itscharacteristics it will be far from comparable to our basictank. And because this is so, tank large units and unitsunder other equal conditions will potentially have greatercombat capabilities at their disposal than motorized riflelarge units and units on these vehicles.

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The basic advantages of tanks over other combat vehicleswill remain: the best protection of the crew from nuclear.destruction, more powerful armament, and greater penetratingstrike force. The influence of the first factor indicatesthat under conditions of equal effects by any of the enemy'sweapons of destruction losses in tanks will be less thanlosses in other combat vehicles. Thus, tank troops will,better retain a capability for executing combat missions.During operations along separate axes or isolated from themain forces, this will have a decisive significance.More powerful armament will permit the infliction of greatlosses on the enemy and facilitate the possibility forcompleting his destruction by a powerful strike by the tanksthemselves. All these advantages taken together willprovide tank troops with the opportunity to advance at ahigher speed and to a great depth. It should also be keptin mind that the development of tanks, even though itencounters certain difficulties, proceeds relativelyrapidly in our country. By the time the infantry receivesthe combat vehicle in its armament, tank troops can receivea new and even more improved and powerful tank.

It should be noted that the development of the infantryin the postwar period proceeded along lines of increasingits strike force and maneuverability, i.e., properties morecharacteristic of tank troops.

Our present motorized rifle divisions and combined armsarmies, on the basis of these characteristics (withouttaking nuclear/missile weapons into consideration), approachthe level of the large units and formations of armored andmechanized troops of the Second World War. Tank troopsalso have advanced a great deal during this period intechnical equipment and organizational forms and have becomedifferent. They are constantly reinforced with new modelsof combat equipment and armament, have a more improvedorganization, and are capable of carrying out highlymaneuverable combat operations at a speed of up to 100and more kilometers per 24-hour period at a significantdistance from the basic forces of a front (army). However,these high combat qualities of tank troops have not yet been

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fully realized during several training exercises, sometimesefforts are in evidence to utilize tank divisions and tankarmies on a par with motorized rifle divisions and combinedaims armies, and often they are drawn into long and fruit-less combat instead of being utilized for carrying outactive and rapid offensive operations to a great depth.For this reason, together with the further improvement ofcombat equipment, armament, and the organizational structureof troops, it is essential to search for and master inpractice such methods of their use as to full,' correspondto the changing conditions of conducting combat operationsand to permit the maximum exploitation of the results ofnuclear strikes against the enemy.