Caesar 37 - The Higher Military Council of the USSR

8/2/2019 Caesar 37 - The Higher Military Council of the USSR

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APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: JUN 2007

20 J u l y 1964

THE HIGHER MILITARY COUNCIL OF TAE USSR

HR 7 - 4(U)

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DD/I STAFF STUDY

C I A / R S S

REFERENCE TI TL E: CAESAR XXIV


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CAESAR XXIVOff. Ser ' . N o . 18

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HE HIGHER MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE USSR

T h i s is a w ork ing p ap e r , t h e f i r s t i n a pl an ne ds e r i e s OY r e p o r t s on S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p o li cy - ma k in g .

W emphasize a t t h e o u t s e t t h e p a u c i t y of informa-t i o n on t h e Sov ie t dec is ion -mak ing p rocess --a l a ck o fe v id en c e t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s a n im p or ta nt ga p i n i n t e l l i sgence . I t is hoped t h a t t h i s p ap e r w i l l underscore tHeneed for more i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t i n g t o S o v i e t p o l i c yf o r m u l a t i o n .

W examine he re t h e Higher M i l i t a r y Counc i l ando f f e r t e n t a t i v e c o n c lu s io n s ab ou t t h e u s e of t h i s i n s t i -t u t i o n by Khrushchev and t h e m i l i t a r y f o r t h e i r v a r i o u spurposes .

A s e co n d s t u d y o n m i l i t a r y d ec is io n -m a ki ng w i l l d i s -. c u s s t h e r o l e s of i n d l u l d u a l p r es i di u m members and l ead-

ing p a r t y, g ove rn men t and d i l i t a r y p e r s o nn e l in t h epolicy-making process. A t h i r d s t u dy w i l l reexamine t h er o l e of t h e m i l i t a r y ' s main p l a n n in g i n s t i t u t i o n , t h eGenerial S t a f f .

Although th& s paper ha s n o t been co ord ina t ed wi tho t h e r o f f i c e s , t h e a u tho r has b en e f i t ed much f rom df s -c u s s i o n of t h e t o p i c w i th co l leagues in o t h e r o f f i c e sof t h e Agency. The au th or al on e is r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h ep a p e r ' s c o n c l u s i b n s , ,

. The DDI/RS w o u l d welcome comment on t h i s p ap er ,addressed t o Leonard Parkinsod, who wrote t h e p a pe r ,

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THE HIGHER MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE USSR

CONTENTS

SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS. .............................. PART ONE: THE COUNCIL TODAY.......................... 1 .

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I n t r o d u c t i o n . . . ..................................... H i e r a r c h i c a l S t a t u s . . . . . . . . . . . ...................... 2 Membership..... ..................................... 4 Procedlllre. ..........................................Decision-Making Role ................................ 7 Advisory Role... . . . . . . . . . ........................... The Mil i ta ry Inf luence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 10 .ghrushchev ' s U s e of Mil i t a ry Adv ice . . ............. 12 The Lower Leve l M i l i t a r y Councils..................l4The C o u n c i l and the U.S. National S e c u r i t y

C o u n c i l . .......................................... 1 7

PART TWO: THE EVOLUTION O F THE COUNCIL.......... .... 0 The Origin of t h e M i l i t a r y C ou nc il As

A C o n s u l t a t i v e Body.. ...................... 2 1 The M i l i t a r y Pu rg e and S t a l i n ' sAssumption of D i r e c t Cont ro l of

t h e M i l i t a r y C o u n c i l . . ............... 22 R o l e of M il i t a r y Counc i l s Assumed by S t a t e

Defen se Committee and St av ka DuringWorld War 11.................................25

Counci l . ................................... 9Powers.....0..............................30

C o n t i n u e s............................. 33 System.... ......................... 35

1934:

1937-1938:

1941:

1946: Es tabl i shment of a S i n g l e M a i n M i l i t a r y

1950: Council Sys tem S t r ipped of Former

1953-1957: Diminished R o l e of Council System

1957-Present: Khrushchev R e v i t a l i z e s Counci l


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TIIX HIGIIJR MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE USSR

Sumrnarv a n d Conclusions

The hi@hest-leMel body formally charged w i t h provid-in g de fe ns e recommendations t o t h e decision-making aQthor-i t y i n t h e Soviet Union i s c a l l e d t h e "Higher M i l i t a r yCouncil1' (Vysshyy Voyenny So vet *). T h i s body i s shrouded

i n s e c r e c y a nd i s r a r e l y men tion ed i n u n c l a s s i f i e d S o v i e twr i t in gs . However, by examining t h e occas ional l un cl as s i -f i e d r e f e r e nc e s t o m i l i t a r y d ec is io n -m a ki ng 1

Higher M i l t a ry Counc i l :

shchev t o main ta in d i r e c t o p e r a t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v ec o n t r o l o v er t h e e n t i r e S o v ie t m i l i t a r y e s t a bl i sh m e nt ;

e en a w e TO 111 uminate t n e r o i l o w i n g r e a t u r e s of th e

(1 ) i t i s an i n s t i t u t i o n crea ted and used by Khru-

(2 ) i t prov ides t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y , who a r en o t r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e r u l i n g p a r t y p r es id iu m , w i t h d i r e c taccess to Khrushchev and h i s " inne r-p res id ium" mi l i t a ry

team, and, hence , an opp or t un i ty t o i n f l u e n c e d e c i s i o n sa t a n e a r l y s t a g e i n t h e pbl icy-making process ;

wi th a w i d e range of s t r a t e g i c and admin i s t r a t ive ques -t i o n s , b u t a p p a r e n t l y has some decision-making a u th o r it y( f o r example, "req uirem ents" of an unknown kin d a re i s s u e di n t h e name of t h e C o u n c i l) ;

(3) i t i s pr imar i ly a i ' consu l t a t fve body, *which d e a l s

*The H i g h e r M i lit a r y Council--"Vysshyy Voyenny Sovet"--was recorded i n t h e IRONBARK r e p o r t s as the Supreme M i l i -t a r y Co un ci l. S o v ie t m i l i t a r y d i c t i o n a r i e s g e n e r a l l y g i v e

t w o English meanings f o r "vysshyy;" t h e pre fe r red one - -and the one u s e d i n t h i s s tudy-- is and t h e secondmeaning ds "supreme." \

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(4) Khrushchev is not bound t o a c t on t h e recommenda-t i o n s of t h e m i l i t a r y members of t h e Co un ci l (some of whoxirep or t ed ly opposed h i s 1960 t roo p c u t p l a n ) , b u t on somematters h e h a s r e p o r t e d l y f o l l o w e d t h e m i l i t a r y ' s adviceo r y ie l d e d t o t h e i r p r e s s u r e ( e .g . , t h e 1 96 1 r es um pt io nof n u c l e a r t e s t i n g ) ;

(5) t h e compos it ion and fu nc t i on o f th e Counc il s u g -g e s t s t h a t i t i s one device u s e d by Khrushchev t o bypasst h e r u l i n g p a r t y p r e s i d i u m as a whole on c e r t a i n m i li ta r y-p o l i t i c a l mat te rs . Khrushchev him self convokes th e Coun-c i l , s e r v e s as i t s chairman, and dominates i t . Dependingon. t h e matter a t h a n d , p a r t i c i p a n t s in Council meetingshave included pres id ium members who appear t o be Khsushchev'spr in ci pa l mi l i ta ry ad vis or s (Bsezhnev, Mikoyan, and Kozlovare t h e o n l y on es s p e c i f i c a l l y i d e n t i f i e d in r e p o r t s onC ou nc il m e et in gs ), t h e p r i n c i p a l S o v i e t m i l i t a r y f i g u r e s(Mal inovsky, h i s deput i e s , and o t h e r s e n i o r m i l i t a r y

o f f i c e r s and adv i so r s ) and h igh- l eve l pa r t y and govern-ment i n d i v i d u a l s i n vo lv ed i n d e f e n s e - r e l a t e d m a t t e r s ;

(6) th e Coun cil ' s high-powered membership and l o f t yp o s i t i o n i n t h e S o v i e t h i e r a r c h i c a l schem e--the C o un ci lstands outside and above the Defense Ministry--make i ta unique i n s t i t u t i o n i n t h e Sovie t sys tem today;

( 7 ) n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e C o un c il ha s a n t e c e d e n t s i nt h e S o v ie t p a s t , and bears some funct ional s i m i l a r i t y( b u t r e m a i n s d i s t i n c t i n b o t h usage and composition) t ot h e N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l of t h e Un it ed S t a t e s .

- S t a l i n , t o o , e s t a b li s h e d i n s t i t u t i o n s l i k e t h eHigher Mi l i t a r y Counc il t o ensure h i s dominance in t h erealm of deci sion-making and po l i c y execu t ion . S ta l i n ' sr e t e n t i o n of t h e m i l i t a r y p o l i c y p re r og a ti v e i n t h e p o s twar years, however, d i d not depend upon t h e maintenanceof an a c t i v e and powerful council system, which he gradu-a l l y cu r t a i le d . Khrushchev, a f t e r Marshal Zhukov's fa1.1,r e v i t a l i z e d t h e e n t i r e c ou n ci l system and formed the HigherMi l i t a ry Counci l t o ensure f o r h imse l f t h e powers whichS t a l i n h ad w i e l d e d i n t h e m i l i t a r y s ph er e. B u t , u n l i k eS t a l i n ' s i n s t i t u t i o n s , K hsu sh che v' s c o u n c i l s ys te m ismore than a r e p r e s s i v e d e v i c e to r e t a i n personal dominance


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l o v e r t h e m i l i t a r y ; i t : p r o v i d e s t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l s o l d i e rw i t h a h i g h - l e v e l l o b b y i n g f o r u m t o recommend po l i c yre la t ing : : : t o the complex ques t ions of modern war t o t h epresidium decis ion-makers .

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PART ONE: TEE COUNCIL TODAY

I n t r o d u c t i o n

I t has been c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of K h r u s h c h e v ' s s t y l e ofr u l e , s i n c e he took f i r m ho ld of t h e helm of s t a t e i n1957, t o place h imse l f a t t h e head of t h e major pa r tyand government departments w h i l e m e t h o d i c a l l y d i v i d i n gr e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s among h i s assoc ia tes in order t o p r e v e n t

any of them from acquiring enough power--or a bureaucrat icb a s i s f o r a c h i e v i n g power--to r i v a l h i s . N o t c o n t e n t w i t hh i s d i r e c t , p e r s on a l c o n t r o l o v e r t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l p a r t ya p p a r a t u s , t h e USSR Counci l of Mini s t e r s , and t h e import-a n t RSFSR Buro, Ehrushchev a l s o assumed p e r s o n a l c o n t r o love r t h e m i l i t a r y . I t i s n ot s u r p r i s i n g t he n t h a t h i sv o i c e is the dominant one on m i l i t a r y q u e st i o n s i n t h er u l i n g pr e s i di u m , a nd , w i t h r a re e x c e p t i o n s , t h e o n l yp a r t y v o i c e heard on t h a t s u b j e c t o u t s i d e t h e Kremlinwal l s . The m o s t important developments in m i l i t a r y d o c -

. t r i n e and advanced weapons i n r ec en t y ea r s have been a t -t r i b u t e d t o h i s p e r s o n a l i n i t i a t i v e .

To assure h imse l f of a dominant r o l e i n t h e m i l i t a r ydecision-making

process,Khrushchev assumed t w o ke y m i l i -

t a r y p o s t s which h a d a n t e c e d e n t s in S t a l i n ' s t i m e b u twhich were created anew in a form more s u i t a b l e t o Khru-s h c h ev ' s p a r t i c u l a r c i r cu m s ta n c e s and s t y l e of r u l e .Sometime a f t e r h i s showdown w i t h Marshal Zhukov, prob-

. a b l y in 1958, Khrushchev e s t a b l i s h e d (b y a sec re t p a r t ydecree, w e t h i n k ) a so-cal led Higher M i l i t a r y C o u n c i l ,c o n s i s t i n g of k ey m i l i t a r y and p a r t y p e r s o n n el , t o s e r v eas h i s personal Advisory group on m a t t e r s r e l a t i n g tod e f e n s e . Two or th r ee y e a r s l a t e r , e v i d e n t l y, he a l s odonned t h e l o f t y t i t l e of Supreme High Commander. Th i sl a t t e r o f f i c e combined, in e f f e c t , t h e h i g h e s t p o l i t i c a land mi l i t a ry au tho r i ty and gave Khrushchev pe r sona l ly.powers and s t a t u r e comparable t o those of t h e P r e s i d e n tof t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , or t o those e n jo y e d by S t a l i n d u r i n gt h e Second World War.

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By t i r t u e of h i s p o s i t i o n of Supreme High Commander,Khrushchev gained u l t i m a t e o p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l o v e r t h eSt r a t eg i c Rocket For ces , and, presumably, t h e power t or e a c t t o o r i n i t i a t e a n ul ce ar s t r i k e w ith ou t t h e p r i o ra p p ro v a l of t h e o t h e r p a r t y l eaders .* And by v i r t u e ofh i s p o s i t i o n of Chairman of t h e Highe r M i l i t a r y Counci lKhrushchev may byp a s s t h e P r e s i d i u m as a whole from t h ef i r s t s t ages of presumably any m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l v e nt ur e.

W do not know whether Khrushchev. con$idessA.h%mselff u l l y capable of making "final" m i l i t a r y d e c i s i o n s w i t h -out p r i o r consul ta t i 'on w i t h l e a d i n g p a r t y and m i l i t a r yf i g u r e s . We do know t h a t he a c t i v e l y seeks o u t t h e ad -

v i c e of others--pres idium colleagues, government s p e c i a l -i s t s and m i l i t a r y p r o f es s i o n al s i n t h e process of p o l i c yf o r m u l a t i o n , The p r i n c i p a l a d v i s o r y forum is t h e HigherM i l i t a r y C o u n c i l . B u t t h e Council , as we: s h a l l demon-s t r a t e , t m n s c e n d s i t s a d v is o r y r o l e an d a s s u m e s somee x e c u t i v e an d decision-making powers in i t s own r i g h t .Mor_pover, w h i l e Khrushchev u s e s t h e Counci l as a n i n s t r u -ment f o r e x e r c i s i n g h i s p e r s o n a l c o n t r o l o v e r t h e m i l i -t a r y , t h e same o rg an p r o v i d e s t h e m i l i t a r y w i t h an op-p o r t un i t y t o b r i ng p r e s s u r e (by fo rce of argumentat ion)d i r e c t l y t o bear on t h e p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p f o r p u r po s e s ofi n f l u e n c i n g p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s .

H i e r a r c h i c a l S t a t u s :

The Higher M i l i t a r y Council; as d i s t i n c t f r o m i t sp r e d e c e s s o r i n s t i t u t i o n with a s i m i l a r name o r o t he r

*For a s t u d y ' o n t h e s t r e a m l i n i n g o f t h e s t r a t e g i c com-mand machinery i n peace t ime, see CAESAR XVI of 3 Ju ly 1962 ,' 'S ov ie t S t r a t e g i c D o c t r i n e f o r t h e S k a r t o f War," pp. 35- 39 . Recent ly, Marshal Malinovsky, no ti ng Khrushchev'se x c l u si v e c o n t r o l of t h e SRF, s t a t e d i n RED STAR on 17A p r i l 1 96 4 t h a t l'on h i s i n i t i a t i v e , a n d u n d e r his d i r e c t

le ad er sh ip , a new ty pe of armed force --the s t r h g e g i crocket troops-was created . 'I ( O u r e m p h a s i s .)

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m i l i t a r y c o u nc i ls , is n o t a n o r g a n i c p a r t of t h e S o v i e td e f e n s e e s t a b l i s h m e n t . A t l e a s t since 1958, when it wasp r o ba b l y r e - e s t a b l i s h e d and t a i l w e d t o s u i t Khrushchev'spu rposes , t h e Counci l has s t o o d o u t s i d e and above EheMinistry of Defense. The Cou nci l i s , l i t e r a l l y , t h e meet-i n g p l a c e of t h e supreme p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i p s .I t seems t o be n e i t h e r a p r i m a r i l y governmental body nora par ty body, bu t a mixed one.

Council w a s made plain in one of t h e f e w r e f e r e n c e s t ot h a t body in t h e IBONBARK m a t e r i a l s . An a r t i c l e in t h e

' a u t h o r i t a t i v e INFORMATION BULLETIN OF TEE ROCKET TROOPS,J u l y 1961, p laced t h e Council between t h e p a r t y c e n t r a lcommittee and t h e M i n i s t e r of De&ense i n a h i e r a r c h i c a l1 s t n g .

The l o f t y h i e r a r c h i c a l s t a t u s of t h e Higher M i l i t a r y

remarked i n one report t h a tt h eMini s t ry of Defense. Th i s c ry p t i c s t a t emen t may l eavet h e impress ion in t h e minds of some readers t h a t t h e Coun-c i l i s a " p a r t of" t h e M i n i s t r y o f Defense. We r e j e c ta n y s u c h i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e renlajckand c i t e as evidenceof t h e s u b o r d i n a t i o n of t h e m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s W t o t h eHigher M i li t ar y Council ownd e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e Cou t i e s ,t h e l a t t e r o f t e n t r a n s c e n d i n g t h e competence of t h e o f-f icer corps .

11 is "attacneu t o " ' ( R u s s i a n n o t a v a i l a b l e ) t h e

*The p e r t i n e n t q u o t a t i o n reads as follows: "The e f -f o r t s of t h e commanding officer and p a r t y and Komsomolo r g a n i z a t i o n s m u s t be d i r e c t e d toward t h e maintenanceof a f i r m procedure, a c co r di n g t o r e g u l a t i o n s , f o r t h es t r i c t f u l f i l l m e h t of t h e requi rements of t h e C e n t r a lCommittee of t h e CPSU, of t h e Main M i l i t a r y Counc i l , oft h e Mini s t e r of Defense of t h e USSR and of t h e Commander-in-Chief of Missile Troops f o r a r a d i c a l improvementIn m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e ." ( O u r emphas i s .)

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Membership\

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On t h e m i l i t a r y s i d e , accord ing t oa l l commanders-in-chief of t h e v a r i o u s e s or se r-v i c e are a u t o m a t i c a l l y m e m b e r s of t h e Council , and ' t h eCouncil may have an attached a d v i s o r y grow c o n s i s t i n go f o t h e r h i g h - r a n k i n g m i l i t a r y a d v i s o r s .* In a d d i t i o n ,

T h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y p o s i t i o n of t h e C o u n c i l can bee x p l a i n e d by (and, i d . m a g s t e m from) i t s h ighpowered membership.

Iescr b e d

t h e Council as a n " o p e r a t i o n al " and " ve ry f l e x i k e " gr ou pof h igh- l eve l p a r t y, g ov ern me nt , and m i l i t a r y o f f i c i a l su n d e r thp j u r i s d i c t i o n of Commander-in-Chief Khrushchev.In add i t i on t o Khrushchev, who c h a i r s t h e meet ings of

residium m e m b e r s a t t e n dv eey c i v i l i a n memberswere Mikoyan and K

epending on t h e mat te r a t hand, mem-t h e Council d i d n o t d i s c l o s e t h e i r names. In

b e r s of t a c en r a c om mi tt ee , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s fro m t h ea d d i t o n ,S t a t e Committees f o r E l e c t r o n i c s or Defense Technology,o r s c i e n t i s t s from t h e Academy of Sc ien ces may be sum-moned t o a t t e n d C o u n c i l meet ings .

i""""""t

*According , Marshals Sokolovskyand Zhukov w e Y * U T * Y Y U a.u A U C C . A d t o p l a y t h e p a r t ofp r i n c i p a l m i l i t a r y a d v i s o r s a t t ached t o t h e Counci l . Al a t e r r e p o r t s t a t e d t h a t Sokolovsky accm e n t , b u t Zhukov had n o t y e t done so.cor robora t ed t h i s r e p o r t . The re were st i o n s t h a t Zhukov was being considered for l r r e h a b i l i t a -t i o n " p r ob a bl y i n e a r l y 1 96 3, b u t t h i s has never materi-

a l b e d .( f o o t n o t e c o n t in u e d on page 5 )

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a l s o r e l a t e d t h a t l e a d i n g m l l i z a r y men. . . . ..

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... ... .. .... .... .

( footnote cont inued f rom page 4)

p a l m i l i t a r y a d v i so a s 1: ef l y m en ti on edt h e e x i s t e n c e of a "s a t t ached .tot h e M i n i s t e r of Defense and cons i s t ing of " s e n i o r m a r s h a l sand genera ls ." Marshal Meretskov w a s named as head oft h e group and Marshal Moskalenko and General Tulyenevwere i d e n t i f i e d as members. Unfor tuna te ly, w e have nof u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e l vadv i so ry group f v While '*sen- 'i o r marsha l s tp are members of t h e Inspector General Groupwhich is headed by Moskalenko, t h e "spec ia l a d v i s o r ygroup" of which Moskalenko is a member would, t h u s , ap-p e a r t o be a s e p a r a t e body. Marshal Meretskov and GeneralTulyenev are c u r r e n t l y i d e n t i f i e d on l y as " i n t h e Minis-t r y of Defense, '' and have no t been iden t i f i ed as membersof Moskalenko's Inspector Genera l Group. If t h i s advi-s o r y group is i n f a c t d i s t i n c t f rom Moska lenko' s o rgan i -z a t on and is composed of " s e n i o r marsha l s and gene ra l s , '@it may not be v e r y d i s s i m i l a r f rom Vor oshi lov ' s 1934 M i l i -t a r y Counc i l and .Bu lga n ings pos t-war Mi l i t a ry C o u n c i l ( b o t hof which are examined i n Part Two).

I n a d d it i o n t o t unc il s p r n c i-

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.' .

. .. . . 3BSREL

. . . . . . ... . .

. . . _ . . . . I :, ... \

, . . . .. .. . .

h e e x p r e s s e d t h e view t h a t Khrushchev's p o l i t i c a l powerw a s s u c h t h a t he could be a member or head of any com-mittee, c o u n c i l , o r other o f f i c i a l body, a t any t i m e .

Procedure

e C o u n c i l , as e x p l a i n e dis e n t i r e l y un de r K h r u s chev ' s domination and '

t h i s d i s c r e t i o n . The C o u nc i l h o l d s r e g u -l a r l y s c h e d u l e d meet ings b u t a l s o meets f r eq ue n t ly when-e v e r t h e need arises--a s t a t e m e n t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a1958 m i l i t a r y d i c t io n a r y ' s d e f i n i t i o n of "Mil i ta ry Coun-c i l " as a "permanent, o r t em po ra r i ly convoked co nsu l t a -t i v e o rg an a t t ached t o t h e supreme s t a t e a u t h o r i t y. "C o u nc i l s e s s i o n s d o n o t r e q u i r e t h e assembl ing of a .quorum. A l l t h a t i s n e c e s s a r y f o r a s e s s i o n of t h eCounc i l is for Khrushchev t o meet w i t h s e v e r a l of h i sa d v i s o r s on m i l i t a r y q u e st i o ns . ( W e do not knoww h e t h e r a meet ing of t h e Counci l c o u l d be h e l d i n t h eabsence of i t s chairman, Khrushchev .)

W have no informat ion as t o whether o r n o t t h emembers of t h e Counc i l have vo t ing r i g h t s , t o t h e e x t e n tt h a t d e c is i o ns are made a t meet ings of t h e Counc i l ori n i t s name.* The f l e x i b l e and va r i eg a t ed membership

of t h e Counci l , and t h e manner i n which i t s meet ings a r er e p o r t e d l y c o n d u c t e d , s u g g e s t t h a t t h e members d o n o tc a s t a f o r m a l v o t e b u t seek t o p e r s u a d e a s i n g l e a r b i t e r ,Khrushchev, by force of a rgumen ta t ion .

From the l i t t l e e v i d e n c e a t o u r d i s p o s a l , i t wouildseem t h a t t h e b r e ad t h of defense-related q u e s t i o n s t a k e n .up at meet ings of t h e Counc i l is c o n s i d e r a b l e . T h e 1958d i c t i o n a r y of m i l i t a r y t e r m s c i t e d e a r l i e r s t a t e d t h a t

*Members of command l e v e l mi l i t a ry co un c i l s do have

v o t i n g r i g h t s . D e c i si o n s a t t h i s l e v e l , h o w e v e r, p r i -m a r i l y conce rn day-to-day ad mi n i s t r a t i ve chores.

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XaEL..-. ...


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. .. ., . . ........

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t h e Counc i l w a s aa o rg a n Iffor t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,of import-

of war and m i l i t a r y m e a s u r e s . " Matters repor ted

o u n c u n v e i n c l u d e d S U C h q i e s t i o n s as nuc lea r, t e s t i n g ;promot ions and changes i n to p command po s i t io n s i n t h earmed f o r c e s ; f o r e i g n p o l i cy - - n o ta b l y t h e German question;m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y ; and t h e s t r u c t u r e an d s i z e of S o v i e tfo rces . The range of p e r m i s s i b l e q u e s t i o n s i s p r o b a b l y al i m i t e d o n l y by g h r u s hc h e v 's i n t e r e s t s .

Dec i s on-Making R o l e

a n t p ro bl em s c o n c er n i n g t h e p r e p a r a t i o n for and

d i s c u s s e d a t

Although it i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y a c o n s u l t a t i v e bodya t t h e d i s p o s a l of t h e supreme l e a d e r s h i p , t h e C o u n c i la l s o performs more d i r e c t f u n c t i o n s i n t h e policy-mak-i n g process , F o r i n s t a n c e , some of t h e r e p o r t s on t h ea c t i v i t i e s of t h e C o u n c i l sugges t t h a t Khrushchev oc-c a s i o n a l l y u s e s i t a s a f o r u m for t h e announcement ofh i s p e r s o n a l d e c i si o n s -- s u c h as c ha ng es i n t h e m i l i t a r yh i g h command--or for t h e p r e li m i n ar y a i r i n g of p r o p o s a l s ,p r i o r t o p r e s e n t i n g them t o t h e pres id ium or c e n t r a l com-mittee f o r f i n a l a pp ro va l.

The re is a l s o some e v i d e n c e which sugges t s t o u st h a t c e r t a i n types of d e c i s i o n s are a c t u a l l y made a tmeet ings of t h e Counci l or c i r c u l a t e d i n p r i v a t e c han-n e l s i n t h e name of t h e Counci l . Thus , a r e f e r e n c e in

o "requi rements" of t h Main M i l i t Yo D e F s t r i c t l y f u l f i l l e d 1 * y commanders a nd

p a r t y o r g a n i za t i on s i n t h e arm ed forces i n d i c a t e s t h a tt h e Counc i l pe r fo rms some p o l i c y f u n c t i o n s a nd i s suesd i r e c t i v e s i n t h e m i l i t a r y s p h e r e . The Ve q u i r e m e n t s l *are i m p o s s i b l e t o d e f i n e because of a lack of e v i d e n c e .We h a v e n o t t u r n e d u p any r e f er e n c es t o s p e c i f i c docu-men t s i s s u e d in t h e name of t h e Higher M i l i t a r y Council .*

*There is e v i d e n c e of i s s u a n c e s i n t h e name of lower-l e v e l m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s , b u t t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s a re as p e c i e s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e u n i q u e Higher M i l i t a r yC o u n c i l .

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16/42

, ._

/ .

' ,

. .. ... . . .

t h a t "no t eve r y th i ng depends on m e ; I work i n a collec-t i v e . " ) Authozi ' tbt i v e m i l i t a r y r e f e r e n c e s m en tio n o n l yt h e "off i cda l " decision-making b o d i e s i n t h e p a r t y, ands t o p s h o r t (as might be expected) of mentioning Khrushchev'sac tua l decision-making machinery.

scure t h e S o v i e t p o l i c y process under Khrushchev a re t w or e c e n t a r t i c l e s by M a r s h a l Malinovsky (in RED STAR) andMarshal Grechko ( i n IZVESTIYA) t h a t a ppe ared on t h e oc-c a s i o n of K hr us hc he v' s s e v e n t i e t h b i r t h d a y in Apri l 1964.Both M a r s h a l s pontrayed t h e dominance of Khrushchev andt h e p a r t y ( c e n t r a l committee and p r e s i d i u m ) , and por t rayed

t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y as t h e group which a d v i s e s a n dp r o v i d e s o t h e r forms of s u p p o r t i n t h e policy-making pro-cess. In a r a r e d e s c r i p t io n of ' 'conferences" (soveshchanyy)of pres id ium members and l e a d i n g m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s ,Marshal Grechko seemed t o be w r i t i n g a b o u t m e e t i n g s oft h e H Q h e r M i l i t a r y C o u nc i l:

Most notable among t h e a t t e m p t s t o i n t e n t i o n a l l y ob-

In t h e p a s t t e n y e a rs a l l t h e s e b a s i c changesi n t h e s t r u c t u r e of o u r armed f o r c e s h a v etaken place under t h e l e a d e r s h i p of t h e Lenin-i s t C e n t r a l Committee of o u r P a r t y a n d ofN.S. Khrushchev personal ly. In t h e s e y e a r s ,a t t h e i n i t i a t i v - e of N.S. Khrushchev, t h ePres id ium of t h CPSU Ce n t r a l Committee has

he ld a s e r i e s of c o n f e r e n c e s w i t h t h p a r t i c i -p a t i o n of l e a d i n g m i l i ta r y f i g u r e s a t whicht h e most im o r t a n t problems r e l a t i n g t o t h eaeveloDment of each tvDe of armed force an d-branch of t roops h a v e b e e n c a r e f u l l y s t u d i e d .N.S. Khrushchev h a s m o s t a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i -p a t e d i n t h e work of t h e s e confe i ences andg iven proof of a profound and s p e c i f i c know-l e d g e of m i l i t a r y matters . H e has been t h ei n i t i a t o r of many valuable under takings whichh a v e c o n s i d e r a b l y s t r e n g t h e n e d t h e d e f e n s ec a p a b i l i t y of o u r s t a t e . I t w a s a t h i s pro-p o s a l t h a t t h e s t r a t e g i c rocke t t r o o p s werec r e a t e d , which now form the backbone of t h e

m i l i t a r y power of t h e Soviet Union an d of t h ee n t r e s o c i a l is camp. ( O u r emphas is . )

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.. .

Grechko ' s r e fe rence t o t h e " t ea ;yea r" l e ng tb of t h e con-f e r e n c e s w i t h t h e "pres id iumtt seems to be c a l c u l a t e d t of i t t h e p w t y theme of c o l l e c t i v i t y . H e does not, ofc o u r s e , p r o v i d e h i s readers w i t h t h e da t e s t h a t Khrushchevwas able (1) t o dominate t h e *tcon ference sl ' and t h u s main-t a i n d i r e c t p e r s o n a l c o n t r o l m er t h e m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h -ment, an d s u b s e q u e n t l y (2) t o d ep ri ve h i s a s s o c i a t e s i nt h e r u l i n g p r e s i d i u m from a c q u i r i n g enough m i l i t a r y au thor-6*yl;fto c h a l l e n g e h i s . Malinovskygs b r i e f r e f e r e n c e t odec i s ion mak ing i s even l e s s s p e c i f i c t h an Grechkogs .In t h e con tex t o f p ra i s in g Khrushchev 's l e a d e r s h i p ands c o r i n g t h e " l i f e l e s s can0ns and dogmas widespread un-d e r S t a1 n , t Mal inovsky wrote t h a t

. .

. . . . .

. . ., (..

b e f o r e d e c i d i n g on any problem and adopt-i n g a p r a c t i c a l d e c i s i o n on i t , m e m b e r sof t h e p a r t y C e n t r a l Committee, m e m b e r sof t h e CPSU C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e P r e s i d u m ,make a d e t a i l e d ' s t u d y of t h e s t a t e ofa f f a i r s i n t h e Army and Navy, of t h e urgen tp rob lems i n conso l d a t i n g t h e c o u n t r y sd e f e n s e c a p a c i t y, of t h e urgent problemsof mi l i t a ry developmen t, and co ns u l t l e a d -i n g m i l i t a r y cadres . After t h i s a c o n c r e t ed e c i s i o n is reached

While redundant Malinovskyq s l a s t sentence emphar,

s i z e s h i s p o in t t h a t m i l i t a r y cadres are c o n s u l t e d onany problem before a " c o n c r e t e d e c i s i o n " is reached.PRAVDA's v e r m f Mal inovsky ' s a r t i c l e and a 17 A p r i lMoscow domestic service b r o l d c a s t on t h e a r t i c l e d e l e t e dt h i s s e n t e n c e , as i f to p l a y down t h e pol icy-maker ' sdependence on t h e m i l i t a r y . (PRAVDA, f o r r e a so n s un-known t o us, a l s o d e l e t e d M a l i n o v s k y ' s reference to Khru-shchev as "Supreme High Commander," and r e f e r r e d to Khru-shchev s imply as "comrade. '')

Th e M i l t ary I n f l u e n c e

This b r i n g s us to a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e impor t an ti n d i r e c t o r i nf or ma l ro l e which t h e m i l i t a r y p l ay s i n t h e

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f o r m u l a t i o n o f @ o l i c y in t h e USSR. W f r e q u e n t l y see r e f -e r e n c e s in our i n t e l l i g e n c e p u b l i c a t i o n s t o t h e successo r f a i l u r e of t h e $ S o v ie t m i l i t a r y i n c he ck in g t h i s o rt h a t p o l i c y which ghrushchev has pub l i c ly chapp ioned . -B u t w e seldom, i f e v e r , see a n e x p l a n a t i o n of how t h em i l i t a r y manage t b make t h e i r i n f l u e n c e on p o l i c y f e l t .C l e a r l y, t h e q u e s t i o n I s n o t a n e a s y o ne , e s p e c i a l l y Znview of t h e f a c t s t h a t no p r o fe s s io n a l m i l i t a r y man hass a t in t h e p a r ty p r e s i d i u m s i n c e 1957, and the m i l i t a r yr e p r e s e n t a t i o n In t h e p a r t y c e n t r a l committee c o n s t i t u t e sl e s s t h a n teq. p e r c e n t of .the t o t a l membership of t h a t body.

The answer which w e o f f e r f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n is t h a tt h e Higher M i l i t a r y Counci l i s t h e m i l i t a r y ' s p r i n c i p a lforum f o r a p p l yi n g p r e s s u r e on t h e supreme l eade r sh ip t oac t on po l i cy. The m i l i t a r y c h i e f t a i n s aome t o meet ingsof t h e C o u n c i l as a d v i s o r s . B u t t h e l i n e be tween "adv ice"and s p e c i a l p l e a d i n g o r l obby ing is s l i g h t a n d e a s i l yt r a n s g r e s s e d . In t h e meet ings of t h e Counci l , t h e m i l i -t a r y a re a f f o r d e d d i r e c t access t o Khrushchev and otherkey presidium members and discuss w i t h them t h e mostu r g e n t defense - re l a t ed p rob lems of t h e day. Here t h em i l i t a r y c h i e f s have an opp or tu n i ty , p rov ided by t h eh i g h e s t l e v e l f o r u m t o which t hey have access , t o b r i n gt h e i r v i e w p o i n t s d i r e c t l y t o bear on p o l i c y makers a ta n e a r l y s t a g e hn t h e decis ion-making process .* Whilen o t s p e c i f i c a l l y me nt io ni ng t h e H i g h e r M i l i t a r y C o un ci l

as t h e "lobby ing*t 'forum, Khrushchev hi mse lf ( a t a lunch-eo n in New York as repor ted by TASS on 27 September 1960)commented on t h e i n f l u e n c e of t h e m i l i t a r y and weapons p e c i a l i s t s on d e t e r m i n i n g p o l i c y :

: . I. . . ..

*The force componen t mi l i t a ry counc i l s , which w e d i s -c u s s l a t e r , m i g h t p r o v i d e a s p e c i a l i z e d a l t e r n a t i v e f o r u m' f o r t h e branch commanders t o i n f l u e n c e , a t an e a r l y s t a g ei n p o l i c y f o r mu l a ti o n , i n d i v i d u a l c e n t r a l committee mem-bers who r e p o r t e d l y head s e c r e t m i l i t a r y s e c t i o n s w i t h int h e CC a p p a r a t u s . '

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. .

.-..

I .

. .. . .

. .

.%.. .;. ... . . ..

-The U.S. P r e s i d e n t 7 t o l d m e t h a t he iso f t e n asked by t h e - m i l i t a r y f o r money t omanufacture t h i s new ty pe of weapons o ranothe r. They t o l d him t h a t t h e Russ ianswould o u t s t r i p them i n armaments un le sshe gave t h e m&ey. The P r e s i d e n t askedm e how t h i s w& done i n o u r coun t ry. Ir e p l i e d t h a t approximate ly t h e same t h i n ghappens. M i l i t a r y men and s c i e n t i s t s ap -proach t h e government and ask for moneyt o m a n u f a c t u r e new rockets. We g i v e .them money. S i x months l a t e r t h e samemen come again and say: W have des igned

be t t e r r o c k e t s , g i v e u s money f o r theserockets . W t e l l them: B u t r e c e n t l y .w e a l loca ted funds f o r new ro c k e ts . Andt h e y r e p l y : Now w e have des igned s t i l lbet ter r o c k e t s , g i v e us money, otherwisethe Americans w i l l o u t s t r i p u s . So w ehave to a l l o ca te money aga in .

h o t p ro fe ss io na lm i l it a r y , w a s t h e i rr o l e i n t l e a r weaponst e s t i n g i n 1961 a f t e r a moratoeium of s e v e r a l y e a r s. Ac-

t h e matter w a s , d i s c u s s e d a t ameet ingording oG = & 2 r M i l i t a r y C o u n c i l a n d t h e d e c i s i o nemanated from t h a t d i s c u s s i o n . The m i l i t a r y , it w a srepor ted , e x e r t e d p r e s s u r e on Khrushchev ini3hBt meet-i n g t o resume t e s t i n g i n 1961, by arguin g con vinc ing lyt h a t " they cou ld n o t be f u l l y p r ep ar ed f o r w a r w i t h o u tt e s t i n g i n o r d e r t o know how d e l i v e r y v e h i c l e s w ouldperform w i t h n u c l e a r warheads. I*

Khrushchev's U s e o f P r o f e s s i o n a l M i l i t a r y Adv ice

Khrushchev (and h i s c l o s e a d v i s o r s i n t h e pres id ium)a r e , of course , not bound t o a c t on t h e a d v i c e t e n d e r e dby m e m b e r s of t h e H i g h e r M i l i t a r y C o u n c i l .h as i n t h e past acted c o n t ra r y t o t h e judgment of v a r i o u s&embers of t h e p r o f es s i o na l m i l i t a r y l eaders whose adviceh e had sough t .

Wrushchev

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. . . ... . ... ... . . .. . .

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A c l a s s i c . . case i n p o i n t w a s t h e u n i l a t e r a l t r o ' o p -c u t plan announced by Khrushchev i n h i s Supreme Sovietspeech on 14 Janua ry 1960.r e s p e c t t o t h e d e c i s i o n t a k e n t o reduce S o v i e t forces byo n e - t h i r d , t h a t '

Khrushchev declared, ' w i t h

W have s t u d i e d t h i s q u e s t i o n in d e t a i l frome v e r y a n g l e , c o n s u l t e d w i t h t h e m i l i t a r y a n dt h e g e n e r a l s t a f f , and u n h e s i t a t i n g l y r e p l y :O u r d e f e n s e w i l l b e f u l l y s u f f i c i e n t , and w ehave r e a l i s t i c a l l y t ak e n e ve ry t hi ng i n t oaccoun t . ( O u r emphasis.)

Khrushchev i m p l i e d t h a t t h e op in ion g iven by t h e " m i l i t a r yand t h e g e n e r a l s t a f f " w a s one of suppo-rt for t h e m e a s u r e .B u t it has s i n c e been r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e second and t h i r d -r a n ki n g m i l i t a r y leaders-- the .Chief of t h e Warsaw Pak tf o r c 6 s a n d - t h e , ChSef df t h e Genera l 'Staff-had opposed' mru-s h c h e v ' s scheme. conf i rming our ow ni n f e r e n c e , r e p o r t e m e of d e c i s i o n ont h e t r o o p c u t i s s u e , Marshal Sokolovsky, then t h e C h i e fof t h e Genera l S t a f f , pro tes ted t o Khrushchev t h a t , asa r e s u l t of Khrushchev's budgetary c u t s , he could notm a i n t a i n t h e S o v i e t fo rces a t t h e l e v e l which would ben e c e s s a r y t o defea t t h e grea t n u m b e r s a v a i l a b l e t o t h eenemy. ) Over r id ing t h e o p p o s i t i o n of Marshals Sokolovskyand Konev (then Warsaw P a c t c h i e f ) , Khrushchev ' p u s h e d . ,h i s t r o o p c u t program through and replaced t h e r e c a l c i t r a n to f f i c e r s w i t h some he t h o u g h t t o be more amenable in t h et o p army pos t s .*

*Other s e n i o r m i l i t a r y a d v is o rs a l so were opposed t ot h e t r o o p t c u t p l a n b u t were e v i d e n t 1 not as adamant asKonev and Sokolovsky. For example , = recen t lyr eca l l ed t h a t "when Marshal Grechkos t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e p a r t i a l d e m o b i l i z a t i o n p l a n sse ve ra l yea r s ago , Khrushchev t h r e w h i m o u t of t h e m e e t -

ing and Grechko went on an extended le av e. Grechko wassubsequen t ly restored t o g r a c e , of course."

. - ' 13 -


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. i

. .

The L o w e r M i l i t a r y Counc i l s

There are , of course, o t h e r Inems used' by t h e m i l i -t a r y t o e x pr es s t h e i r v iewpoin t s , t h e most n o t a b l e b e i n gt h e l a rge body of d o c t r i n a l w r i t in g s , b o t h c l a s s i f i e dand open. And t h e r e i s e v id e nc e s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e r emay be forums other t h a n t h e Higher Mi l i t a r y Counc i l u s e dby t h e m i l i t a r y t o convey t h e i r view s d i r e c t l y t o h i g h -

* , 9 l e v e l p o l i c y m a k e r s .I ,.. : :

O t h e r s u c h ad ivsory cen te r s may be found in ' t h em i l i t a r y c o u n c i ls on t h e l e v e l s of t h e major f i e l d com-mands and force component h e a d q u a r t e r s .

'Command Level Mili tary Counci1s:include those a tt h e g r o u p o f ' f o r c e s ; m i l i t a r y d i s t r i c t , army, PV O d i s -t r i c t , f l e e t and f l o t i l l a l e v e l . They g e n e r a l l y con-s i s t of a t l e a s t three formal members: (1) t h e commander(or commander-in-chief) of t h e command, (2 ) h i s deputyor s t a f f c h i e f , and (3) t h e ch ie f of t h e M a i n P o l i t i c a l

I Admin i s t r a t ion ( t h e t o p p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r i n t h e m i l i -t a r y subd iv i s ion . ) Members have r ep or t ed ly inc ludedother sen ior o f f i c e r s of t h e m i l i t a r y s u b d i v i s i o n , as-s ' i s t a n t s t o t h e MP A c h i e f , and , s i g n i f i c a n t l y, l e ad i n gr e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of l oca l p a r t y o rg an s .* I n a d d i t i o n t op r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y and p a r t y members, c i v i l i a n s en gag ed

* A 20 N vember 1 9 6 3 S o v ie t m i l i t a r y pamphlet e n t i t l e dl lPol t c a l Organs and Pa r ty Organ iza t ions of t h e S o v i e tA r m y and Navy," by Co l. Gen. Kalashnik , s t a t e s t h a t "i tis known t h a t a l l f i r s t s e c r e t a r i e s of c e n t r a l committeesof CLmmunist p a r t i e s i n u ni on r e p u b l i c s , f i r s t s e c r e t a r i e sof k r a y committees, and many f i r s t s e c r e t a r i e s of o b l a s tp a r t y committees are members of m i l i t a r y c o u n c il s of m i l i -t a r y d i s t r i c t s , f l e e t s , and PV O d i s t r i c t s . 9 1 The SMALLSOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA (1958) , i n d i s c us s i n g t h e m i l i t a r yc o u n c i l on d i s t r i c t , f l e e t and army level , s t a t e s t h a t" t h e c o u n c i l c a r r i e s o u t i t s work i n close c o n t a c t w i t ht h e l o c a l p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n .

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........... .. ,

. .. . .... ,. ... .'."

. . . .. ...... .

._..~. ==EL

i n e s s e n t i a l m i l i t a r y , s u p p o r t a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e l o c a l ehave been repor ted as h a v i n g a t t e n d e d m e e ti n gs of! m i l i -t a r y d i s t r i c t c o u n c i l s . ' .

The command m i l i t a r y c ou nc il s .have powerful admin-i s t r a t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n a d di t i on t o s e r v i n g asc o n s u l t a t i v e o rg an s f o r t h e commander. According t o aS o v i e t Def en se M i n i s t r y boo k, FOUNDATIONS OF SOVIET ,MILI-TARY LAW ( 1 9 6 2 ) , m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s tvpossess< h e r i g h t -guaran teed by la w t o examine and d e c i d e a l l impor tan tmat te rs i n t r oo p l i f e a n d a c t i v i t i e s . " ( O u r emphasis . )The range of dec is on-making powers i s b r o a d l y d e s c r i b e di n S ov ie t m i l i t a r y a r t i c l e s as i n c l u d i n g " m i l i t a r y andp o l i t i c a l p r e p a r a t i o n , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and m o b i l i z a t i o n a lwork a n d t r a i n i n g of t r o o p s . It Decisions::ht t h i s l eve l - -which appear t o f a l l i n t o t h e ro u t in e day-to-day ca tego ry,i n c o n t ra s t t o t h e H i g h e r M i l i t a r y C o u n c i l ' s broaderscope- -a re r epor t ed ly s u b j e c t t o a m a j o r i t y v o t e by t h emembers of t h e command l e v e l m i l i t a r y cou nc i l s . Accord-i n g t o a pamphlet by Larkov and Fi l ippov, ent i t led "One-Man Command i n t h e S o v i e t Armed Forces and Methods ofF u r t h e r C o n s o l i d a t i o n " (Moscow 1960) ,

t h e r e s o l u t i o n s of m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s a repassed by a m a j o r i t y v o t e a f t e r d i s c u s - ,s i o n of each q u e s t i o n on t h e b a s i s ofb m i n e s s - l i k e c r i t i c i s m and a re brough ti n t o e f f e c t by o r d e r of t h e c o m a n d e r,(commander-in-chief) .

Thus t h e v o t i n g r i g h t r e p r e s e n t s a s i g n i f i c a n t check byt h e p a r t y o n t h e l o c a l commander's free dom of:.maneuver..*

*That t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s c on t i n ue t o a c t a s a l i m i -t a t i o n on t h e commander's freedom of maneuver is madec l e a r i n a 5 June 1964 RED STAR a r t i c l e by General Kurochkin.E vi nc in g s e n s i t i v i t y on t h i s po in t , Kurochk in a t t emptst o r e b u t t h e views he s a y s h e o c c a s i o n a l l y f i n d s ' * in o u rm i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . . . t h a t in t h e S o v i e t ArmedF o r c e s t h e r e i s . n o ' f u l l ' one-man command, s i n c e t h e r ea re c o l l e c t i v e l e a d i n g o rg an s, t h e m i l i t a r y c o u nc i ls . ItKurochkin makes t h e weak argument t h a t m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l sdo no t annu l t h e p r i n c i p l e of one-man command s i n c e '( f o o t n o t e c o n t i n u e d on page 16 )

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. .. .

The command-level m i l i t a r y co un ci ls , as i n d i c a t e din open pres s i tems, are s u b o r d i n a t e d t o b o t h t h e DefenseMin i s t ry and t h e c e n t r a l committee. They a re under t h eD e fe n se M i n i s t r y i n t h a t (1) t h e chai rman of t h e l o c a lm i l i t a r y c o u n c i l , t h e commander, is s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h eDefense XinisteF;, and (2 ) t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l ' s reso lu-t i o n s a r e e x e c u t e d by t h e order td t h e , commander. A t - t h esame t i m e , t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i ls a re r e s p o n s i b l e t o t h ep a r t y ' s c e n t r a l c om mi tt ee in t h a t t h e M a i n P o l i t i c a lAdmin i s t r a t i on ( an independen t c e n t r a l commi tt ee depa r t -ment) places l e a d i n g o f f i c i a l s on t h e c o u n c i l s as v o t i n gmembers.

Force Component M il i t a r y Co unc i ls appeared f o r t h ef i r s t t i m e in t h e m i l i t a r y pres s within a year a f t e r t h ef a l l of Zhukov. S ince the n , un fo r tun a te ly, on ly a s m a l lamount of i n f o rm a t io n r e g a r d i n g membership a n d f u n c t i o n sof t h e f i v e M i l i t a r y C o un ci ls has been uncovered fromb o t h open and c l a s s i f i e d m i l i t a r y sources.

. .... ... . .:.. .

. . , .. . ..

The composit ion of t h e f i v e c o un c i l s a t t h i s l e v e lh a s n ot been r e v e a l e d i n a v a i l a b l e mater ia l . B u t i f t h ecompos i t ion of force component c o u n c i l s c o n s i s t e n t l y f o l -lows t h e Na vy 's p a t t e r n ( an d t h e announced pe r so nne l i nt h e M i l i t a r y C o u n c i l s of t h e A i r D e f e n s e a n d S t r a t e g i cRocke t Fo rces l ends s u p p o r t t o t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y ) , t h e m a n -b e r s h i p w o u l d c o n s i s t of (1) t h e Commanders-in-Chief oft h e force components, who h ea d t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Co u nc i ls( S t r a t e g i c Rocket Fo rc es , Krylov ; Navy,. Gorehkov; A i rDefense Forces , Sude t s ; A r m y A i r Force , Ver sh in in ; GroundForces , Chuykov); (2 ) t h e i r d e p u t i e s a n d s t a f f c h i e f s ;and (3) h igh- rank ing Main Po l i t c a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c e r s .(Deputy C h i e f s of t h e MPA are known t o b%.members of t h e 'Navy and A i r Defense Counc i l s .)

( f o o t n o t e c o n t in u e d from page 15) (1) t h e d i s c u s s i o n of major problems i n t h e c o u n c i l s"only h e l p s t h e commander t o a v o i d e r r o r s an d t o f e e lmore convinced of t h e c o r r e c t n e s s of t h e d e c i s i o n made, "

and (2 ) t h e d e c i s i o n s of t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l a r e p u ti n t o p r a c t i c e by t h e commander.

- 1 6 --,

-seuz.


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, . .. . . . .

. ,

The f u n c t i o n s of t h e force component c o u n c i l s , as-r e f l e c t e d in t h e m i l i t a r y p r e s s, s e e m t o p a r a l l e l t h e , .d u t i e s of t h e command l e v e l m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s . ( d i s c u s se dabo ve) . And t h e membership of t h e t w o t y p e s of c o u e c i l sa pp ea rs t o f o l l o w t h e same p a t t e r n ( i . e . , t h e commander,h i s s t a f f c h i e f , and a high-ranking W A o f f i c e r ) . B u t .w e do n o t know how r i g i d l y t h i s p a r a l l e l i s . o l l o w e d . .F or example, w e know t h a t l e a d i n g l o c a l . p a r t y r e p r e s e n -t a t i v e s are m e m b e r s of t h e command level. m i l i t a r y coun-c i l s , b u t w e do no t know whe the r s en io r ce n t r a l commit-tee members are r e p r e s e n t e d in fo rc e componen t' m i l i t a r yc o u n c i l s . And w e do not know whether the members of .fo rc e component c ou nc i l s have vo t ing r i g h t s s i m i l a r t ot h e m a j o ri t y - vo t e p r i n c i p l e of t h e commanli l e v e l m i l i - .t a r y c o u n c i l s .

The Council and t h e U.S. N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Counci l

Although i t is a unique i n s t i t u t i o n i n S o v i et s o c i e t y ,t h e Higher M i l i t a r y Co un ci l, t o t h e degree t h a t i t s advi-sory f u n c t i o n s are known t o us, seems t o b e a r some resem-b l a n c e t o t h e us. N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u nc i l. In b o t hcases, t h e ch ie f of s t a t e h a s u l t i m a t e decision-makinga u t h o r i t y on s t r a t e g i c m i l i t a ry i s s u e s . And in b o t hcases, t h e d u t i e s of t h e two Counaila a r e t o a s s i s t tibech ie f of s t a t e in t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f a nd p r e p a r a t i o nfor n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y matters. A comparison of t h e "of-f i c i a l l y ' * d e fi n ed g e n e ra l t a s k s of t h e t w o c o u n c i l s a l s oshows a c e r t a i n s i m i l a r i t y :

._....... ._. . ..'..*I-, . , . ....... , . .... .... %.

N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o un c il

T h e d u t i e s of t h e Counci l a ret o assess and appra i se t h e ob-j e c t i v e s , commitments, andr i s k s of t h e United S t a t e s inr e l a t i o n t o i ts ac$ual and po-t e n t a l m i l it ary power, in t h ei n t e r e s t of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y ,for t h e purpose of making re-commendat ions t o t h e P r e s i d e n t ,

USSR M i l i t a r y C o un ci l

"A permanent, or t e m p o r a r i l yconvoked, c on su l t a t iv e o rganat tached t o t h e s u p r e m e s t a t ea u t h o r i t y f o r t h e c o n s i d e r a -t i o n of impor tant problemsconce rn ing t h e p r e p a r a t i o nfor and waging of war:andm i l i t a r y m e a s u r e s .? (Shor tD i c t i o n a r y of O p e r a t i o n a l ,

.. ,

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, . . : .. ...,.

, . . . .. . . . , .. . . . ,. .

. . . ., . .

and t o c o n s id e r p o l i c i e s on Tac t i ca l and Genera l M i l i -matters of,aommon n t e r e s t t a r y TBrmS, Mil i t a ry Pub-t o t h e depar tments and l i s h in g House of t h eagenc ies of t h e Government M in is tr y of Defe nse USSR,conceraed w i t h t h e na t io na l 1958 , . p. 7 0 . )s e c u r i t y , an d t o makelrecom-mendat io ns t o t h e P r e s i d e n t . '( A c t i v i t i e s of t h e Nat iona l ,Sec ur i t y Counc i l , Un it edSta t e s Government Organiza-t i o n Manual 1963-64, pp. 56-57 )

While t h e a d v i s o r y f u n c t i o n s a re apparently somewhats i m i l a r , t h e p a r a l l e l b r e a k s down regarding t h e c u r r e n t 'usage and composit ion of t h e two i n s t i t u t i o n s . R eg ar di ngusage, t h e NSC which m e t somewhat r e g u l a r l y i n t h e 1950 'sis, as a r e s u l t of d i f f e r e n t s t y l e s of l e a d e r s h i p , on lyo c c a s i o n a l l y ca l l ed toge ther today. Wrushchev, w h i l eus ipg t h e Higher Mil i tary Counci l as an advisory body,may not r e l y upon i t f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n c on ce rn in g a s e n s i -t i v e p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y matter (e.g.l d u r i n g the 1962 Cubanm i s s i l e c r i s i s , Khrushchev repor tedly r e l i e d upon a f e wexper ienced p r e s d d m members*--not on a formal c o n s u l t a t v ebody--for r e l a t ed adv ice ) . Regarding composi t ion , t h ec i v i l i a n U1.s. Secretary of Defense (a n NSC member) appearst o w i e l d more decision-making power than h i s Sovie t coun te r-

p a r t , t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y De fen se M i n i s t e r. In ad-d i t i o n w e have found no Higher M i l i t a r y Counc i l l i nk w i t ht h e Sovie t Fore ign Min i s t ry (which seems t o p l a y a minorpol icy-making ro le) , and t h u s a comparison w i t h t h e U.S.S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e (an NS C m e m b e r ) cannot be drawn.

* * * * *

*The p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e pres id ium and other h igh- level

p a r t y, s t a t e and m i l i t a r y i n d i v i d u a l s in m i l i t a r y p o l i cyfo rmula t ion w i l l be t h e s u b j e c t of our second s tudy onde ci s io n making.

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.... ..

W hi le t h e Hi gh er M i l i t a r y Counci l bears some compari-son w i th t h e Nat iona l S e c u r i t y C o un c il , w e f e e l t h a t t h efo rmer m u s t be e x a m i n e d w i t h i n t h e S o v i e t s y s t e m In o r d e rt o draw i t s p r es e nt - da y m i s s i o n i n t o s h a r p e r f o c u s . T hu sw e h av e s e ar c he d o u t t h e h i g h l i g h t s of t h e c o u n c i l s ys t emover t h e l a s t t h i r t y y e a r s and p r e s e n t o w i n d i n g s i nt h e f o ll o wi n g p a r t i n an a t t e m p t to increase o u r under-s t a n d i n g of t h e p r oc e ss e s o f m i l i t a r y c o n s u l t a t i o n a n d-p o l c y r e c o r n e n d a t Io n i n t h e Sovie t Union. I . .

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PART TWO: THE EVOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL

. .. . , .. . .. , . ,. .. I .

... ...... . . . .

. , . ... .. . .

In t h i s p o r t io n of t h e s t u dy , w e s h a l l t r y t o p l a c et h e H igher M i l i t a r y C o un ci l i n h i s t o r i c a l p e r sp e c ti v e .Th e m i l i t a r y c o un c il s y s t e m , i n b r i e f o u t l i n e , has evolvedi n t h e f o l l o w i n g way:

was formed i n 1934 as a h i g h - l e v e l c o n s u l t a t i v e organand was subsequent ly abol ished, presumably between the

end of 1937 and th e begin ning of World War 11;

created a n d g i v e n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f u n c t i o n s (a r o l ed i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o t h e m i l i t a r y p ur ge ) as w e l l as ad-v i s o r y r o l e s ;

(3) i n 1938, S t a l i n e s t a b l i s h e d t w o Main Mil i ta ryCouncils ('lG1avnyy Voyenny Sovet") to r u n t h e Army andNavy;

were assumed by the S t a t e Defense Committee and Stavkaduring World War 11, and l o w e r - l e v e l m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s

were s u b o r d i n a t e d t o t h e S t a v k a ;(5) d h o r t l y a f t e r t h e war, 8 s i n g l e a h l a i n M i l i t a r y

Council (presumably combining the r o l e of th e t w o 1938Main M il i t a r y Counci ls ) and a M i l i t a r y C o u ' r r c i l under t h eDefense Minister (somewhat s i m i l a r t o t ha t fo rmed in1934) were r e c r e a t e d ;

e n c e s t o S t a l i n ' s p os tw ar Main M i l i t a r y Co un ci l d i s a p -pea red f r o m view and t h e command-level m i l i t a r y co un ci lsa p p a r e n t l y were s t r i p p e d of t h e i r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d u t i e s ;

(7 ) i n t h e 1953-1957 " c o l l e c t i v e p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p "

p e r i o d , t h e h i g h -l e v el m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l was Ignored andthe work of Eower l e v e l m i l i t a r y c o u n ci ls w a s ( a c c o r d i n gt o a n t -Zhukov a r t i c l e s ) c u r t a i l e d ;

(1) a Mi l i t a ry Counc il unde r th e Defense Commissar

(2 ) i n 1937, s u b o rd i n a te m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s were

(4) the powers of t h e t w o Main Mi l i t a ry Counc i l s

(6) a f t e r t h e 1950 m i l i t a r y r e o rg a n i za t i on , r e f e r -

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. ... . . ...

. (8 ) f i n a l l y , w i t h t h e f a l l of Zhukov and t h e con-s o l i d a t i o n of supreme power by Khrushchev, lowe r-leve lm i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s were r e v i t a l i z e d w i t h a d m i n i s t r a t i v e -a n d c o n s u l t a t i v e t a k k s ; force component mi l i tary coun-c i l s were in t roduced; and a Higher Mil i t ar y Counci l w a sformed t o accommodate Khrushchev's s t y l e of r u l e .

1934: The Or ig in of t h e M i l i t a r y C o u n c i l As A C o n s u l t a t i v eBody

The o r ig ins o f t h e Higher Mil i tary dounci l may be

t raced back t o a June 1934 decree of t h e p a r t y ' s c e n t r a lexe cut ive commit tee which f o r m a l l y abloa1shedLBhe Revolu-t i ona ry M i l i t a r y Counci l (Bewoensovet) and es ta bl is he dt h e more ce nt ra l i ze d Peop le ' s Commissariat of Defense.*The decree a l s o s e t up a '*M ili t ary Council" under t h e newPeo ple 's Commissariat of Defense, i n t h e c a p a c i t y of a"consu l t a t ive o rgan .1c T h i s organ, w e t h ink , was a proto-t y p e of t h e p r e s e n t "Higher M i l i t a r y C o u n c i l .' I

U n l i k e t h e p r e s e n t H i g h e r M i li t ary Counc 3.1, however,(1) t h e e a r l i e r vers ion was subord ina ted t o t h e Commis-s a r i a t of Defense, of which i t was an o rgan ic pa r t ; and(2 ) t h e membership of t h e e a r l i e r v er si on was l i m i t e d to

. .. .

*The Revvoensovet (RV S) w a s t h e governing body of t h eM i l i t a r y Commissariat from t h e e a r l y d ay s of t h e CivtP1War-, 'and t h e RVS possessed u l t i m a t e executive and adminis-t r a t i v e c o n t r o l o ve r t h e S o v i e t armed fo rces . The RVSas t h e "ne rve cen te r " of t h e command w a s composed ofm i l i t a r y men acceptable t o t h e cen t ra l commi t t ee and w a sd i r e c t l y s u b o r d in a t e t o t h i s body. The 1934 reo rg an iea -t i o n which abo l i shed t h e RV S w a s a imed, f i r s t , a t s t r e n g t h -e n in g S t a l i n ' s c o n t r o l ov e r t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h -m e n t , and, second, a t promoting t h e more e f f i c i e n t con-t r o l o f t h e m i l i t a r y o ve r t h e opera t iona l , admikn i s t r a t ivea n d t e c h n i c a l a s p e c t s of t h e q u e s t i o n s w i t h which t h e y

were involved. (See Er ickson ' s THE SOVIET HIGH COMblAND,London, 1962, Cha pte r Seve n).

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. . .

. .. .. ..

. . ..

'-1

t h e o f f i c i a l head of t h e m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t , t h e Com-m i s s a r of Defense, and h i s dep u t i e s .* Thus; t h e M i l i t a r yCounci l of t h e l a t e ' t h i r t i e s m e t and worked under the1command of Vor osh ilov ( t h e Peapike's Commissar for Defense ) ;a pp oi ht me nt s t o t h e C o un ci l were made by t h e Sovnarkom(Council of People 's Commissars) on Vo r o s h i l o v ' s recom-mendation; and t h e Counci l ' s decisions and recommendationswere p u t i n t o e f f e c t by Vor o sh i lo v who r e p o r t e d d i r e c t l yt o S t a l i n .

1937-1938: The M il i t ar y Purge and S t a l i n ' s Assumptionof D i r e c t C o n t r o l of t h M i l i t a r y C ou nc il

-_While Vorosh i lov ' s 1934 M il i t a r y Counci l was com:p Qs ed e x c l u s i v e l y of m i l i t a r y. p e ts q nn e l I (ar6gnd- 8a membetg) ,s e n i o r . p a r t y o f f i c i a l s a p pa r en t ly had d i r e c t access tot h e . m i n u t e s of t h e s e s s i o n s . And when p a r t y o f f i c i a l s

! o c c a s i o n a l l y a t t e n d e d m e et i ng s of t h e C o u n c i l, t h e ydominated i t .

The C o u n c i l was J i i c tua l ly dec ima ted by t h e m i l i t a r ypurge of 1937-1938. From 1 t o 4 June of 1937 , an ex t r a -o r d i n a r y s e s s i o n of t h e Counc il was he ld i n which t h ehead of t h e NKVD, Pezhov, s u b m i t t e d a r e p o r t on an a l l eged" c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n ar y an d t r e a s o n a b l e o rg a n i z a t i o n " i nt h e Red Army. Within 18 months of Yezhov's announcement,75 o f t h e 80 m e m b e r s of t h e Counc il were purged, accord-i n g to S o v i e t s o u r c e s . As a r e s h l t o f t h e p u rg e, t h er o l e o f t h e M i l i t a r y C ou nc il w a s g r a d u a l l y d e c re a s e d andi t was a b o l i s h e d , e v d d e n t l y l a t e i n 1938 or no t l onga f t e r w a r d s . I

I n t h e mea ntime, S t a l i n made t w o p r i n c i p a l m o v e sw i t h t h e aim of t i g h t e n i n g p o l i c i a l c o n t r o l s o ve r t h earmy, a t t h e e xp en se of t h e a u t h o r i t y and p r e s t i g e o f

TSKOE m A T I V N O E PRAVO, Moscow, 1950. p. 239.

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t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l o f f i c e r c o r p s . F i r s t l y, i n May 1 93 7,s u b o r d i n a t e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s , c o m p o s e d of a commanderand two other members, were i n t r o d u c e d i n t o t h e m i l i -t a r y d i s t r i c t s , f l e e t s and grmies. In eachcbf thesecommands, th e new m i l i t a r y council , a c c o rd i n g t o t h ebook MILITARY STRATEGY, was made t h e "h ighes t o rganof a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I t had " c o m p l e t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y "b o t h f o r t h e m o r a l e - p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n of t h e t r o o p sand f o r t h e i r " c o n s t a n t combat and mobilization pre-paredness ." The f a c t t h a t a po l i t i ca l commissa r wasmade a m e m b e r of each c o u n c i l g a v e h i m t h e power t oi n t e r v e n e in t h e c o n t r o l and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e

major operational commands. T h u s , on t h e ma jor commandl e v e l , S t a l i n w a s able t o annul t h e p r i n c i p l e of u n i t yof command th a t had been i n f o rc e s i nc e 1924 in t h e .s p h e r e s of comba t, supp ly and admin i s t r a t ion . Lateri n 1 937, S t a l i n f o r m al l y abo l i shed t h e one-man commands y s t e m a n d r e s t o r e d t h e e q u a l i t y of t h e commissars w i t hcommanding pe rs on ne l on a l l l e v e l s i n t h e armed f o r c e s .Secondly, in 1 9 3 8 , S t a l i n s e t u p h i s own s m a l l , advi-s o r y g ro up s of p a r t y and m i l i t q y men l o y a l t o h i m s e l f ,and n om in al ly r e s p o n s i b l e t o t h e p a r t y c e n t r a l c om mi tt ee ,t o supervise t h e r u n n i n g of t he Red Army and Navy.These groups were o f f i c i a l l y c a l l e d " t h e Main Mil i ta ryCounci l 61 t h e R e d Army ... nd t h e Main M i l i t a r y Councilof t h e Navy." (LARGE SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA, November 1951,

p. 486). I n terms of t h e i r s t a t u r e , a u t h o r i t y, a n df u n c t i o n s , , t h e s e c o u n c i l s more c l o s e l y resembled t h ep r e s en t - d ay H ig he r M i l i t a r y C ou n ci l t h a n d i d t h e M i l i -t a r y C ou nc il which had been s e t up under t h e DefenseCommissar i n 1 93 4.

.. . .. . .

. . . .

The Army's M a i n M k l i t a r y C o u n c i l c o n s i s t e d on as t a f f of e l e v e n members; Voroshi lov was Chairman of t h egroup, which inc luded S t a l i n h ims el f , Blyukher, Budenny,M e k h l i s , Shaposhnikov, and Shchadenko. The A r m y ' s MainM i l i t a r y C o un ci l bo r e some s i m i l a r i t y t o t h e S t a vk a oft h e Supreme High Command of World Wa r 11, p a r t i c u l a r l yi n i t s p r a c t i c e of sending members t o m i l i t a r y " f r o n t . "(A case i n p o in t is Bl yu kh er 's command i n t h e Lake Khasano p e r a t i o n s of July-Bugust 1938). Longer-range w a r plan-ning, p robab ly wi th a h igh d e g r e e of c o o r d i n a t i o n Witht h e Defense Committee (Komitet Oborony) of t h e p o l i t b u r o ,

- 23 -

5 K R E r . ' '


31/42

.. ....

. .. . .

, . .. .... . ., . . . .. .

was a l s o a n a c t i v i t y of t h e Main M i l i t a r y Counc i l s in t h eperiod preceding World W a r 11.

manship of p o l i t b u r o m e m b e r Zhdanov--but in r e a l i t y , b o t hc o u n c i l s were under t h e c o n t r o l of S t a l i n t o whom Zhdanovand Voroshi lov re po r t ed . The Main M i l i t a r y C o u n c i l s t o o kover a l l t h e a d m i n i s t r a t iv e f u n c t i on s of t h e d e b i l i t a t e dM i l i t a r y Counci l ( a l s o under. Voroshilov ) which is s a i dto h av e c o nt i nu e d t o f u n c t i o n as a c o n s u l t a t i v e o rg a n u n -t i l it wa s e v e n t u a l l y a b o l i s h e d .November, 1951, p. 486)

The second ed i t i on of MILITARY STRATEGY expanded ont h e o r i g i n a l i n r e l a t i n g t h a t " t h e Main Mil i ta ry Counci lsexamined t h e b a s i c problems of t h e s t r u c t u r e pf t h e Armyand Navy, and d i r e c t e d a l l of t h e i r a c t i v i t y i n t o t h et ho r ou g h p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e Army and Navy f o r t h e impend-ing war." As an example , both vers ions of t h e book toldof an April 1940 meeting of t h e Army's Main M i l i t a r y Coun-c i l in which t h e " l e s s o n s of t h e war w i t h Finland" were

. .d iscussed and a decree i n t roduced on reorganizing "manya d m i n i s t r a t ions of t h e People p s C o d s s a r i a t for Defense.(one of t h e i m p o r t a n t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c h a n g e s s p e c i f i c a l l y

mentioned involved t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e S o v i e t a i rd ef en se d i r e c t o r a t e i n t o a m a i n d i r e c t o r a t e .)

The Navy's Main M i l it a r y Cou ncil was under t h e chair-

( ENCYCLOPEIDA,

I t may be of i n t e r e s t t o n ot e t h a t S ov ie t h i s t o r i c a laccounts of t h e f a i l u r e of S o v i e t d e f e n s e p o l i c y on t h eeve of World War I1 blame S t a l i n p e r s o n a l l y (and t o amuch l e s s e r degree Marshals Timoshenko and Zhukov), b u tnowhere t o ou r knowledge c r i t i c i z e t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i lsys tem. In t h e c u r r e n t h i s t o r i c a l fare, S t a l i n is accusedof hav ing ignored t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p - -i . . , by i m p l i c a t i o n , h e i gnored h i s m i l i t a ry adv i so r s - -

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3 E M L


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and of having drawn thel.wrong conclusions f o r t h e s t r a t e g i cp r e p a r a t i o n of t h e coun t ry.*

1941: Role of M i l i t a r y Counc i l s Assumed by S t a t e DefenseCommittee and S t avka During World War I 1

The USSR was a t w a r o n l y a week or so when a r a d i c a l. .. r e o rg a n i z a t i o n o f t h e m i l i t a r y , t h e government, and t h e .

p a r t y w a s undertaken. On 30 June 1941, S t a l i n e s t ab l is h e dt h e S t a t e Defense Committee (Gosudarstvennyy Komitet Oborony:OKO) as t h e "h ig he st agency of command f o r t h e c o u n t r y

and armed fo rces . " In t h e GKO, government and party

. . .. .

.. .. ... .. .... ........ .. ..

. .. .. ..

*The Commander-in-Chief of t h e S t r a t e g i c Rocket Forces, 'Marshal Krylov, de l ive red s u c h a commentary e a r l i e r t h i syear : " I t m u s t be a d m i t t e d t h a t u n d e r t h e c o n d i t i o n s ofS t a1 in 6 p e r s o n a l i t y c u l t , t h e p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of t h e coun-t r y and i t s armed f o r c e s w e r e not f u l l y e x pl o it e d f o re x e c u t i n g a c r us h in g r e p u l s e t o s u c h a s t r o n g a n d -d a ng e r-ous enemy as t h e German f a s c i s t agg ress ors i n 1941. Con-c e n t r a t i n g grea t power i n h i s own hands and m i s u s i n g t h ec o n f i d e n c e ' o f t h e p a r t y and p eo pl e, S t a l i n u n i l a t e r a l l y

d e c i d e d on t h e most important s t a t e problems and grosslyi gn or ed Le n in ' s p r i n c i p l e s of c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p . .The r e p r i s a l s a g a i n s t a g rea t number of o u t s t a n d i n g m i l i -t a r y l e a d e r s who were f a i t h f u l and loyal commanders t ot h e p a r t y c o n s t i t u t e d one of t h e most ser ious consequencesof h i s a c t t v l t y . Before t h e outbreak of t h e war S t a l i nwas f a m i l i a r w i t h d a t a on t h e c o n c e n tr a t io n and deploy-m e n t of German f a s c i s t d i v i s i o n s on t h e Western bordersof t h e USSR. But 'he,:considerdd',this,..only provoca t ion .As a r e s u l t , t h e country and t h e army found themselvesin a d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n in t h e i n i t i a l per iod of t h e w a r .I t w a s on ly t h e u n f l i n c h i n g w i l l of t h e par ty and t h ecourage of t h e Sovie t peop le which made it p o s s ib l e t os u r v iv e t h a t p e r i o d , t o e f f e c t a break th rough , and t o

win v ic to ry . " (IZVESTIYA in te rv ie w , on t h e occas ion ofArmgd Forces Day, 23 February 1964.)

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...._ ..... . ..

f u n c t i o n s were f u s e d . * The GK0.almost overnight becamet h e c e n t e r of adminis t ra t ive and opera t ional commandove r gove rnmenta l, m i l i t a ry and admin i s t r a t i ve o rgansi n t h e S o v i e t Union.** P r e s i d e d over by S t a l i n , t h e GKOc o n s i s t e d of f i v e t o e i g h t p o l i t b u r o members, i n c l u d i n gor ig ina l ly, Molotov, Voroshi lov, Malenkov, and Ber ia .L a t e r , Mikoyan, Kaganovich, and Voznesensky joined t h egroup, and i n 1944 Bulganin repla ced Voroshi lov.

Th e i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r s of t h e GKO were g iven d i r e c tr e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r t h e p r i n c i p a l b r a n c h e s o f t h e coun-t r y ' s war mate r ie l production-Molotov f o r t a n k s , Ber iaf o r armaments and munitions, Malenkov f o r a i r c r a f t , andMikoyan f o r food and f u e l . (Mikoyan is t h e only formerState Defense Committee m e m b e r s t i l l a c t i v e i n S o v ie tp o l i t i c a l l i f e and, as w e have a l r ead y po in t ed ou t , h e

I

*The f u s i o n w a s a l s o p e r s o n i f i e d by S t a l i n , who, d u r -i n g t h e war, a s s u m e d t h e p o s t s o f leader of t h e p a r t y,head of t h e government, Chairman of t h e S t a t e DefenseCommittee, Chairman of t h e Stavka, People's Commissar ofDefense and Supreme Commander-in-Chief .v i e t s t r a t e g i c l e a d e r s h i p , acco rd ing to . bo th 1962 and1963 e d i t i o n s of t h e Defense Ministry's book MILITARYSTRATEGY, would be delegated t h e same powers the S t a t eDefense Committee h e l d during World War 11. This organ i -z a t i o n , a "h igh er agency of commandt1 (vy ssh iy org anrukovodstva), would be under t h e l e ade r sh5p of t h e f i r s ts e c r e t a r y of t h e CPSU cent ra l commit tee and head of gov-ernment, " to whom t h e f u n c t i o n s o f Supreme Commander-in-C h i e f of a l l t h e A r m e d Forces1' may be as si gn ed . Addi-t i o n a l l y , t h e Defense Ministry books s u g g e s t t h a t t h eWa r s a w Pac t Po l i t i c a l Consu l t a t i ve Commi t t ee wou ld ac tas a h i g h p o l i t i c a l orga n f o r t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n Of t h eS a t e l l i t e and S o v ie t f o r c e s . The l e a d e r s h i p o f j o i n tope ra t ions wou ld be s u p p l i e d by t h e S o v i e t Supreme HighCommand, i n which the supreme commands of t h e s a t e l l i t e

armies would be represented .

**The "poss ib le" ' fu tu re w a r t i m e o rg a n i z a t i o n of t h e So-

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... I

. .. ..

. . . . . .

r e p o r t e d l y a t t e n d s m e e t i n g s of t he p resen t -day HigherM i li t ary Counci l . )

o r d i n a t i n g t h e o v e r a l l w a r e f f o r t , a n o t h e r a g e n c y, t h eh e a d q u a rt e r s o r S t a v k a of t h e Supreme High Command, w a scharged w i t h t h e day-to-day presecution of t h e war andw i t h developing t h e o v e r a l l s t r a t e g i c p l an s f o r t h e m i l i -t a r y f o r c e s . C r e a t e d by t h e GKO a s a s o r t of j o i n t c h i e f sof s t a f f , t h e Stavka c o n s i s t e d of between twelve and f o u r -t e e n t o p m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s who a d vi se d S t a1 n, chairmanof t h e Stavka and t h e Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Inad d i t io n t o Zhukov, t h e e f f e c t i v e m i l i t a r y head of t h e

Stavka dur ing most of i t s e x i s t e n c e , o t h e r c h i e f m e m b e r swere Mar sha ls V as il ev sk y, Budenny, Timoshenko, Voronov,and Shaposhnikov. D i r e c t l y s u b o r d in a t e t o t h e Stavkawas t h e Genera l S ta ff ( t h e C h i e f of w h i c h a l s o s a t ont h e Stavka) which acted a s a sou rce of p lanning and d a t aon o r d e r o f b a t t l e .

While t h e GKO w a s r e s p on s i b le f o r d i r e c t i n g an d co-

Unfor tunate ly, w e do not have informat ion on t h ed i s p o s i t i o n of t h e t w o Main Mil i tary Counci ls dur ing t h ew a r . W would deduce from t h e above accounts, however,t h a t t h e y were d i s s o l v e d soon a f t e r t h e w a r began andt h e i r f u n c t i o n s were taken over by t h e GKO and Stavka.In any case, w e have neve r enoounte red r e fe re nce s t o t h ee x i s t e n c e of t h e s e c o u n c i l s d u r i n g t h e w a r . (The o l d e r

M i l i t a r y C o u n c i l i n t h e Defense Commissariat had e v i d e n t l ybeen abolished by t h e time H i t l e r launched o p e r a t i o nBarbarossa . )

On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c il s of t h e d i s -t r i c t s , f l e e t s and a r m i e s t h a t had been s e t up in 1987,played a key r o l e d u r i n g t h e war. According t o t h e LARGESOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA e n t r y of 19 51 , t h e y co n ti nu ed t o main-t a in "comple te m i l i t a r y a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a u t h o r i t y int h e f ront or army zone of o p e r a t i o n s , " a l t h o u g h t h e ywere s t r i c t l y s ub or di na te d t o t h e Stavka. Th e m i l i t a r yc o u n c i l s of f r o n t s ( t h e w a r t i m e e q u i v a l e n t o f m i l i t a r yd i s t r i c t s ) were headed by t h e mil i t a ry f ron t commanderand were manned by senior par ty personnel- - the m o s t cele-b r a t e d of whom was Khrushchev--who insu red t i g h t p o l i t i c a lcontrol over major opera t ional commands throughout t h e

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..

, ..

.... ... .. . . . . ..n . ".

...>..:.. .. . ..,.,... . .

.. . .

w a r . (On l ower- l eve l s of command, t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o lsys tem underwent se v er a l changes . The p o l i t i c a l commis- ,sar system, which had been a b o l i s h e d a f t e r t h e F i n n i s hdebacle, w a s res to red f o l l o w i n g t h e d i s a s t r o u s f i r s t dayso f t h e war w i t h Germany, b u t aga in gave way t o t h e s y s t e mof one-man command when t h e m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n i m p r o v e di n October 1942.)

t h e w a r and t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o p o l i c y fo rmula t ion havesince become a p o l i t i c a l l y cha rged i s s u e w i t h i n t h e S o v i e tUnion, where h i s t o r i c a l w r i t i n g is s t i l l made t o s e r v et h e purposes of t h e c u r r e n t p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p o r t o a i rt h e gr i evances of d i s s e n t e r s f rom c u r r e n t or proposedp o l i c i e s . T h u s p r i n c i p a l C r e d i t f o r t h e planning of t h es u c c e s s f u l S t a l i n g ra d o p e r at i o n i n t h e f a l l of 1942 hasa l t e r n a t e l y p as se d fr om S t a l i n t o t h e Stavka (no tab lyZhukov), t o t h e f r o n t command--where Khrushchev ser ve das a m e m b e r of t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l . By our own accountof t h e mach5nery of m i l i t a r y p o l i c y f o r m u la t i on d u r i n gt h e war, there seems to have evolved ( a f t e r a n i n i t i a lp e r i o d o f d e s p e r a t e i n n o v a t u n ) an e f f i c i e n t " S t a v k a -f r o n t t t e s y s t e m , c o n s i s t i n g of an exchange of combat i n t e l -l igence between t h e f r o n t s and S t a l i n ' s S t av k a and t h et r a n s m i s s i o n of d i r e c t i v e s fr om t h e "Supreme Higb' Com-mand" t o t h e f i e l d commanders. Th e Stavka/General S t a f fd i r e c t i v e s * p r o v i d e d t h e gene ra l concep t of o p e r a t i o n sdetermined t h e f o r c e s t o be committed and concen t r a t edi n I ts execu t ion , and s e t t h e d a t e f o r commencing t h eop er at on. Fron t cormpanders enjo yed. some l a t i t u d e i napplying t h e i r own s p e c i f i c r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n

The methods of s t r a t e g i c command and control during

*In making v i t a l d e c i s i o n s , t h e S t a vk a a p p a r e n t l y r e l i e dh e a v i l y on f o r e i g n i n t e l l i g e n c e sources as w e l l as on t h et a c t i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n s u p p l i e d from t h e S o v i e t f r o n t s . SeeEr ickson , TEE S O V I E T HIGH COMMAND, f o r an e x c e l l e n t d e s c r i p -t i o n of t h e r o l e of e s p i o n ag e n e t s on m i l i t a r y p o l i cy mak-i ng - - spec i f i ca l lg t h e v i t a l d e c is io n s based on r e p o r t sfrom Sorge in Japan, Rote Kapel le in Germany, and Rossleri n Switzer land (pp. 637-639).

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. . .......,,,

.:..i5-.;' . ..

. . .. . .. .

. . . .

o f t h e S t a vk a o r d e r , b u t r i g i d a d h er en ce t o t h e f r o n td i r e c t i v e was t h e keynote of o p e r a t i o n s a t t he a rmy l eve land below. In a d d i t i o n t o S ta vk a d i r e c t i v e s , i n d i v id u a lmembers of t h e Supreme High Command were f r e q u e n t l y s e n tt o t he area of ope ra t i ons (Zhukov t o S t a l i n g ra d f o r anexample) , and f r o n t commanders and t h e i r rep re se nt a t v e swere frequently summoned t o t h e S t a v k a .

1946: E s t a b l i s h m e n t Of A Single Main M i l i t a r y Council

With th e end of t h e w a r , S t a l i n ab o li sh e d t h e S t a t eDefense Committee (September 1945) and t h e Sta vka ( i n

. 1946). He a l s o r e l i n q u i s h e d h i s own t i t l e of SupremeHigh Commander, according t o o f f i c i a l S o vi et h i s t o r i e s ,b u t rem ained t h e o f f i c i a l as w e l l as a c t u a l head of t h em i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t u n t i l March 1947, when he gave upt h e p o s t of Mini s t e r of t h e Armed F o r ce s t o a p o l i t i c a lmarshal; Bulganin.

on t h e m i l i t a r y a d G i s o r y b o d i e s i n t h e e a r l y p o s t w a r p e - ' 1r i o d . One S o v i e t source, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE USSR(19461, s t a t e s w i t h o u t e l a b o r a t i o n :

Again, lamentably, w e have hard ly any informat ion

To t h e c e n t r a l o rgans of t h e m i l i t a r y ad-m i n i s t r a t i o n b el on g: t h e Main M i l i t a r yCounci l n l a v n y y Voyenyy Sovet7 , t h e Min-i s t r y of-the; Armed Forces of The USSR,a nd t h e M i l i t a r y C oun cil -a c o n s u l t a t i v eorgan of t h e M i n is t er of Armed Forces oft h e USSR.

While w e have found no i nf or ma ti on s t a t i n g t h a t t h etwo Main Mil i t a ry Coucn i l s fo rmed in 1938 were e ve r f o r ma l l y a b ol is h ed , w e are l e d t o c o nc lu de t h a t a new s i n g l eMain M il i t ar y Council , combining t h e r o l e s of t h o s e s e tup i n 1938, was formed by Sta l in in February 1946, when

. t h e Navy and Defense Commissariats were merged. (fa March1946, t h e un i f i ed de fense commissa r ia t w a s named t h e Min-i s t r y of t h e Armed F orc es 09 . t h e U S S R . )TIVE LAW BOOK of 1 946 , w h il e f a i l i n g t o su p p ly i n f o r ma t i on

The ADMINISTRA-

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on the funct ions and membership of t h e new Main Mi zi ta ryCounci l , r e v ea l ed t h e s u p r a m i l i t a r y s t a t u s of t h a t o rg anby l i s t i n g it b e f o r e t h e D e fe n se M i n fs t r y. ( O u r n e x te x p l i c i t r e f e re n c e t o t h e Main Mi l i t a ry Counc i l, some15 y e a r s l a t e r i n - th e J u l y , 1961,

a1 t n e c;ouncii

of ad mi ni s t ra t i ve agen cies . ) The membership of t h eM i l i t a r y C o un ci l u nd er t h e M i n i s t r y of Defense has n o tbeen d i s cus sed bu t p re sumably i t i n -c luded a t l e a s uerense Minis e r (who probablyr e p o r te d d i q e c t l y t o S t a l i n ) , t h e d e p u t y d e f e n s e m in is -t e r s , a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e Ge ne ra l S t a f f .

1950: Counci l Sys tem S t r ip pe d of Former Powers

I, se M i n i s t r y in a h i e r a rc h i c a l l i s t i n g

, ...... . ,. . .. .

The Main M il i t a r y Counci l no ted i n 1 94 6 w a s ignoredi n o f f i c i a l S o vi et p u b l i ca t i o n s f o ll o w in g t h e F eb ru ar y1 95 0 r e o rg a n i z a t i o n ( i n wh ic h t h e USSR M i n i s t r y of t h eArmed Forces was renamed @'War M i n i s t r y of t h e USSR" andt h e c o n t r o l of t he Nava l Forces w a s c o n c e n t r a t e d i n t h e"Min i s t ry of t h e Navy of t h e USSR"). W have found noev idence t o i n d i ca t e t h a t t h e 1950 r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h eS o v ie t m i l i t a r y e s t ab l is h m en t i n t o t h e t w o m i n i s t r i e si n v o l v e d t h e r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t w o Main Military Coun-c i l s f o r - t h e t w o m i l i t a r y m i n i s t r i e s (as i n 1 93 8) . I tis p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e pos t-war Main Mi l i t a ry Counc i l w a saboltthhed a t t h a t time. Some twenty months a f t e r t h e1950 r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e d e f e n s e e s t a b li s h m e n t, t h eLARGE SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA ig no red t h e Main M i l i t a r y Coun-c i l b u t spoke of a "Mil i ta ry Counci l ' ' -which w a s similart o t h e p os t- wa r a d v i s o r y organ under the Defense Min i s t e r :

The Mi l i t a ry Counci l is a c o l l e g i a l , u s -u a l l y c o n s u l t a t i v e , o r g an u nd er t h e warMinister f i h o is t h e 7 commander of a l lArmed ForEes of t h e s t ate:

S t a l i n may n o t h a ve f e l t c o mp e ll ed t o make much use ofh i s pos t-war Main Mi l i t a r y Counc i l in t h e f i r s t p l ac e .The Main Mi l i t a r y Counc i l , l i k e so many of h i s formal

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. . . . .. ., ... . ,. ..

. . . .. . ..

. . . . . ..... ... . .. .. ....

organizat ions , may not have been a b o l i s h e d an d may havec o n ti n ue d t o e x i s t as a paper o r gan iza t ion which se ldomm e t . ( I n t h e e a r l y p o st w ar p e ri o d , f o r' e x am p l e, S t a l i nc a l l e d o n ly i r r e g u l a r m e et in gs of t h e p o l i t b u ro . )i n v ie w of t h e g e n e r a l s t a g n a t i o n i n S o vi et m i l i t a r yd o c t r i n e i n t h a t p e ri o d, it would appea r tha t S ta l inr u l e d o v e r t h e armed f o r c e s w i t h a heavy hand and adeaf ear t o h i s g e n e r a l s and m a r s h a l s u n t i l h i s d e a t h i n '1953. (Marshal Grechko r e c e n t l y d e c l a r e d - - i n I Z V E S T I YAon 17 A p r i l 1 96 4- -t ha t S t a l i n a d op te d i n c o r r e c t p o si -t i o n s on organ iza t iona l p rob lems whi l e " remain ing a t t h e 1head of t h e armed f o r c e s a f t e r k h e w a r. " )

In a d d i t i o n, t h e 19 50 r e o rg a n i z a t i o n a p p a r e n t l ys t r i pp ed the command-level m i l i t a r y cou nc i l s of t h epowers which they had wielded during and immediatelya f t e r t h e w a r . The change i n power and s t a t u s from t h em i l i t a r y c o u n c i l t o t h e la: a1 commander i s s t r i k i n g l ye v i d e n t i n a comparison of t h e 1946 Evtikhiev-Vlasov book,ADMINISTRATIVE LAW USSR wi t h t h e 1950 Eutik hiev -Vlas ov-Studeniken book, SOVIET ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:

And

1946 Admints t ra t ive Law U S S R 1950 Sovie t Admin i s t r a t ive Law*

S t a t u s

"The m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l of

a m i l i t a r y d i s t r i c t (army,f l e e t ) is t h e h i g h e st . r e p r e -s e n t a t i v e of m i l i t a r y

Documents

Caesar 37 - The Higher Military Council of the USSR