Caesar 38 - The Military and the Succession Problem in the USSR

8/2/2019 Caesar 38 - The Military and the Succession Problem in the USSR

1/46


2/46

.


3/46

THE MILITARY AND TEfE SUCCESSION PROBLEM I N TIiE USSR

PREFACE

T h i s i s a w o rk in g p a p e r , a n i n f o r m a l e s s a y on t h er o l e of t h e S ov ie t m i l i t a ry i n p o l i t i c s . The f i r s t p a r tof t h e p a p e r s u r v e y s i n a gen era l way t h e a rmy-partyr e l a t i o n s h i p s i n c e S t a l i n ' s d e at h in 1953.c o n j e c t u r a l p a r t e x p l o r es t h e p o s s i b l e a c t i o n s of t h earmy i n a ny s t r u g g l e t o s e t t l e t h e p r e s e n t s u c c e s s i onproblem.The second,

I n p r e p ar i n g t h i s p ap e r , t h e wri te r received mucha d vi c e, n o t a l l of which he accepted , from c o l l e a g u e swho have 'far more- knowledg e of S ov ie t p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r st h a n h e . The w r i t e r a l o n e i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e p ap era s a whole , The D D / I Research Staff would welcome com-ment on t h e p a p e r , a d d re s s ed t o I rwin P. Halpern, whowro te i t , o r t o t h e Chief o r Deputy Chie f of t h e S t a f f .


4/46

C '

. .

THE MILITARY AND THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM I N TBE USSR

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PageSUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.............................oi

I . THE MILITARY I N SOVIET POLITICAL LIFE............A. Involvement i n P a s t Le ad e r s h ip S t r u g g l e s . ... 2B.C .

Role i n Pol i cy Formula t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12The Anatomy of P a r t y C o n t r o l Over t h eMilitary...................................l~4

11. THE MILITARY I N A NEW LEADERSHIP CRISIS. ........21A.B.C . The Army's C an di da te...........e.ee.........28D. Consequences f o r P o l i c y .....................32

The P o s s i b i l i t i e s . . ....................... *,. .21D i v i s i o n s W it hi n t h e M i l i t a r y . . .............26

C


5/46

THE MILITARY AND THE SUCCESSION PROBLE3.I I N "HE USSRS W A R P AFT3 CONCLUSIONS

The Khrushchevian e r a has ended. The mas terp o l i t i c i a n h as b een f o rc e d t o q u i t t h e S o v i e t p o l i t i c a ls c e n e . His h e i r s who ou ste d him have soug ht t o im presst h e w o rl d w i t h t h e o r d e r l y manner i n which they havea c h i e v e d c o n t i n u i t y of r u l e . Y e t , t h e p r e s e n t c o a l i -t i on -- or i n S o v i e t p a r l a n c e , c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p - - i sa t bes t a temporary and uneasy one. The cu r r en t pa r t yl e a d e r s h i p a p p e ar s t o be s p l i t n o t o n l y be tw een i n d i v i d u a l sb u t b e t w e e n b u r e a u c r a c i e s as w e l l -- n o ta b l y , t h e p r o f e s -s i o n a l p a r t y a p p a ra t u s and t h e vast planning and manage-ment a p p a ra t u s . T h i s r e l a t i v e d i f f u s i o n of supreme po l i -t i c a l p o w e r , we t h i n k , is a n i n h e r e n t l y u n s t a b l e a r r a n ge -ment which cannot long endure . Sooner o r l a t e r , t h ep a r t y l e a d e r s w i l l h av e t o come t o g r i p s w i t h c o n t ro v e r -s i a l i s s u e s , and t o d e te r mi n e where i n t h e b u r e a u c r a t i cs t r u c t u r e t h e l o c u s of supreme power is t o r e s i d e . I ti s t h e n t h a t K hr us hc h ev 's h e i r s , d r i v e n by p e r s o n a l a m b i -t i o n s , w i l l a c t iv e l y con tend among themse lyes t o con-s o l i d a t e t h e e no rm ou s po we rs g i v e n u p by him.

Among t h e "power" q ues t io ns t h a t may give impetust o p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g le a r e , who s h a l l d on t h e m a n t l e ofSupreme High Commander, t h a t i s , who s h a l l have h i s f i n g e ron t h e n u c l e a r t r i g g e r ; who s h a l l t a k e K hr us hc he v 's p l a c ea s c h ai r ma n of t h e Supreme Hi l i t a ry Counc i l , which Khru-shchev had made a per so na l ins t rum ent of c o n t r o l o v e rt h e army; and who s h a l l p r e s i d e o v e r t h e powerful RSFSRis f a c e d w i t h t h e immediate need t o make per son nel dec i -s i o n s w hic h are bound t o be c o n t r o v e r s i a l a nd r e p l e t ew i t h p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i on s . They m u s t , fo r example , fillt h e r e c e n t l y v a ca t ed p o s t s of c h i e f of t h e g e n e ra l s t a f fand head of t h e p o w e r fu l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r g a n s d e p a rt m e n tof t h e c e n t r a l c o mm it te e.

~

\ - B u r e a u . On a somewhat lowe r p l a n e , th e new leader sh ip


6/46

I 1

. . .

In s ho r t , t h e a r r angements made by th e new leade r -s h i p ha v e n o t s o l v e d t h e p ro bl em of Khrushchev 's succes-s i o n ; t h e y h a ve o n l y b ee n t h e ope nin g moves of t h e game.How l o n g i t w i l l t a ke t o s e t t l e t h e s u c c e s s i o n p r o bl emor wha t w i l l t r a n s p i r e i n t h e i n t e r i m is , of cour se , any-body ' s guess .p o s t - S t a l i n s u c c e s s i o n p ro bl e m. )t h e army hi g h command w i l l almost of n e c e s s i t y become in-vo lved i n any ac t i ve s t ru gg le fo r supreme power . Althoughw e a r e u n c e r t a i n as t o what r o l e t h e m i l i t a r y e l i t e w i l lp l a y , w e would s u r m i s e t h a t an i n t e r c e s s i o n by t h e m c o u l d ,u n d e r c e r t a i n c i r c um s t a n c es , h av e g r e a t c on s eq ue n ce s f o rbo th the ou tcome of t h e p o l i t i c a l c o nt e s t and t h e f u t u r ec o u r s e of S o v i e t p o l i c y .

The army i s n o s t r a n g e r t o p o l i t i c s , e ve n th ou ghi t h a s no l e g i t i m a t e p r er o g at i v es i n t h a t s p h e re .c i p a t i o n i n f o r m ul a t in g d e fe n se p o l i c i e s , w hic h be a r ona l l i m po rt an t s e c t o r s of S ov ie t p o l i t i c a l l i f e , i s a normalf u n c t i o n of t h e h igh command. B u t more t h a n t h a t , t h ehi gh command ha s become inv ol ve d a t c r i t i c a l t i m e s i n t h ep o l i t i c s of l e a d e r s h i p , n o t a b l y i n t h e s t r u g g l e s t o s e t t l eon S t a l i n ' s s u c c e s s o r b et we en 1 95 3-1 957 . R e g ar d in g t h em i l i t a r y ' s r o l e i n t h e o u s t e r of K hru sh ch ev , a l l t h a tw e c a n s a y a t t h i s p o i n t is t h a t t h e c o n s p i r a t o r s i n t h ep a r t y p r e s i d i u m had a p p a r e n t l y s e c u r e d i n a d v a n c e t h e as-s u r a n c e s of key m e m b e r s of t h e high command t h a t t h e ywould no t oppose the -p lanned coup, We t h i n k t h a t t h em i l i t a r y l e a d e rs (wi th some except ions) would have wishedt o see K hr us hc he v o u s t e d p r i n c i p a l l y b e ca u s e of his e f f o r t si n t h e p r e c e d i n g month t o push t h rough a new economic 'program t o t h e d e t r i m e n t 02 t h e d e f e n s e s e c t o r .

( I t t o o k some f o u r y e a r s t o s e t t l e t h eI t i s our t h e s i s t h a t

P a r t i -

There i s no e v i d e n c e t o s u gg e st t h a t t h e m i l i t a r yhave be en t h e i n i t i a t o r s of o r t h e main d r i v i n g f o r c eb eh in d s t r u g g l e s i n t h e p a r t y l e a d er s h ip . B u t , i n s i t u a -t i o n s of d e v e l o p i n g l e a d e r s h i p c r i s e s , t h e i r s u p p o r t a p -p a r e n t l y h a s been s o l i c i t e d t o add t o t h e f o r c e s of ap a r t i c u l a r f a c t i o n . Thu s, e v e n t ho u gh ,$he m i l i t a r y may n o thave had a dominant r o l e i n p r e c i p i t a t i n g l e a d e r s h i pc r i s e s , t h e i r s up po rt or n e u t r a l i t y , a s t h e case may be,a p p a r e n t l y h a s b e en v ie we d a s c r u c i a l t o t h e o utc om eof e a ch s t r u g g l e . Had t h e m i l i t a r y s i d e d w i t h B e r i a i n

t

I I


7/46

I I

1953, Malenkov in 1954-55, and th e "a nt i - pa r t y group" i n '1957, Khrushchev p rob ably would n o t have a t t a in ed supremepow er i n t h e USSR. By th e same toke n, had th e m i l i t a r yi n t h e most r e c e n t c r i s i s s i d e d w i t h Khrushchev, he prob-ab ly would no t have been topp led .

The n e x t s t a g e i n t h e l e a d e r s h i p s i t u a t i o n may seet h e p o l i t i c a l l e a d er s (and t h e i r r e s p e c ti v e b u re au c ra ci es )s t r u g g l i n g t o c o n s o l i d a t e s up re me power i n t h e i r own h an d s(and off c e s ) . I n any s uc h c o n t e s t , t h e r i v a l f a c t i o n sw i l l a g a i n f i n d t h e army far t o o po we rf ul a n i n s t i t u t i o nt o i g no re . The p o l i t i c a l r i v a l s a r e l i k e l y t o c on s id e rt h e a rm y' s s u p p or t c r i t i c a l i n t h e c o n t e s t and w i l l bea nx io us t o g a i n t h e i r b a c ki ng o r t o d eny it t o t h e o pp on en t.A t t h e same time, t h e m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s t h em s el v es maywish t o i n te r v en e t o p r o t e c t t h e i r s t a k e i n p ol i cy . Theymay a l s o w i s h t o h e l p b r i n g t h e s t r u g g l e t o a s pee dy con-c l u s io n f o r r e a so n s of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y o r s im pl y t o b ecounted on t h e bandwagon of t h e f r o n t r u n n e r . B u t eveni f t h e y were r e l u c t a n t t o become em br oi le d a t a l l , f o r c e sb ey on d t h e i r c o n t rp l - -s u c h a s a p p e a l s f o r s u p p o r t by t h ep o l i t i c a l c o n te s ta n ts o r a deadlock among them--would workt o draw t h e m i l i t a r y i n t o t h e p o l i t i c a l d is p u te i n ap a r t i s a n r o l e . On t h e o t h e r h an d, w e would regard i tas o n l y a r em ot e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e army c h i e f s i n s t e a dof doing t h e b i d d i n g of o ne of t h e c o n t en d i n g f a c t i o n swould ac t i nd ep en de nt ly , t o i n i t i a t e a new p o l i t i c a lcoup o r t o ca pt ur e supreme power f o r t hemse lves .

The a r m y ' s involvement might be l i mi t ed t o p u b l i co r p r i v a t e d e m o n st r at i o ns on b e h a l f of a c a n d i d a t e ; o rit coul d even come t o t h e u s e o r t h r e a t e n e d u s e o f t r o o p s .Sh ould t h e m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s be d i v i d e d as t o w hich p o l i -t i c a l f i g u r e t o s u p po r t , t h e i r d i v i s i o n m igh t f o r e s t a l la m i l i t a r y i n t e r c e s s i o n , B u t w e t h i n k i t h i g h l y u n l i k e l yt h a t m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e w ould b r e a k down t o t h e e x t e n tt h a t s e n i o r o f f i c e r s w o u l d t r a n s l a t e t h e i r p r i v a t e d i f - .f e r e n c e s i n t o ac ti on -- sa y, b y s u p p o r t i n g r i v a l p a r t yf a c t i o n s w i t h t r o o p s . The m i l i t a r y c h a i n of command ' cant o l e r a t e c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s i n o u t l o o k among t h et o p m a r s h al s be ca us e t h e o p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l of t r o o p si s c e n t e r ed i n t h e h an ds of on ly one of them--the DefenseM i n i s t e r . The man who f i l l s t h a t p o s t may be t h e pawn


8/46

o f t h e g en e r al s t a f f or of a p a r t y f a c t i o n , b u t wh oev erowns him vi r t u a l l y owns t h e army.,

I t a p p e ar s t o u s , on t h e b a s i s of t h e s c a n t i n f o r -ma t ion a t o u r d i s p o s a l , t h a t n o n e of t h e p r e s e n t t o p p a r t yf i g u r e s now has a p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r o n g a dv an ta ge as f a ras g a i n i n g t h e b ac ki ng of t h e m i l i t a r y is concerned. Anumber of t h e p a r t y l e a d e r s h av e had c o n n e ct i o n s w i t h t h earmy i n t h e p a s t , an d some, notably Brezhnev and Podgorny,c o n t i n u e d t o hav e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n t h e de f e n se s e c t o ru p t o t h e t i m e o f K h ru sh c he v' s f a l l . N e v e r t h e l e s s , K h r u -s h c h ev had v i r t u a l l y made t h e m i l i t a r y h i s p e r s o n a l dom ainand h a d m e t h o d i c a l l y p r e v e n t e d h i s p r e s i d i u m c o l l e a g u e sf r o m d e v e lo p i n g s t r o n g t i e s w i t h t h e m i l i t a r y ,I r r e s p e c t i v e o f t h e k i n d of ro l e t he y may p l a y i na ny s u c c e s s i o n s t r u g g l e , t h e army c h i e f s w i l l t r y t o pro-t e c t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s and impose t h e i r common v i ewpo in t so n a new p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p . I n t h e m i l i t a r y s p he r e,t h e y c a n be expec t ed t o r e s i s t new c u t s i n d e f e n s e andm i g h t a t t e m p t t o r e c o v e r g ro un d l o s t under Khrushchev.I n domest ic m a t t e r s , t h e y w o u l d n o t w an t t o see e i t h e r

B r e t u r n t o t h e S t a l i n i s t er a- -u nd er which t h e y s u f f e r e d - -o r a r a d i c a l s w i n g t o l i b e r a l i s m . They can a l s o be ex-p e c t e d t o oppose t u r ns i n Sov i e t fo r e ig n and economicp o l i c y t h a t seem i n t h e i r e ye s p r e j u d i c ia l t o t h e m i l i t a ry 'e s t a b l i s h m e n t o r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . T h ei r s u c c e s s i ng e t t i n g t h e i r p o s i t i o n s ado pted w i l l d ep en d, i n p a r t , o nt h e v i ew s of t h e new l e a d e r s h i p ; i n p a r t , on t h e r o l et h e y p l a y i n an y power s t r u g g l e ; a nd , i n p a r t , on t h ep o l i t i c a l m e t t l e oi t h e m i l i t a r y c h i e fs .

I f t h e m i l i t a r y were t o make some major g a i n s a tt h e ex p en s e of p a r t y a u t h o r i t y , c h an c es are good, on t h eb a s i s of p a s t e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t t h e p en du lu m w ou ld swingb a c k a g a i n s t t hem soon a f t e r t h e n e w p o l i t i c a l l e a d e rs h i pc o n s o l i d a t e d i t s c o n t r o l .I


9/46

THE MILITARY AND TFIE SUCCESSION PROBLEM I N THE USSR~

"There are no forces i nt h e wor ld t h a t c a n s h a k et h e m o n o li t hi c u n i t y oft h e p a r t y , t h e p e op le ,and t h e i r A r m e d Forces ."C o l . Gen. M. Kala shn ik ,Main Pol i t c a l Adminis-t r a t i o n , RED STAR, 18June 1964

I . THE MILITARY IN SOVIET POLITICALIFEReaders of S ov ie t m i l i t a r y l i t e r a t u r e are f r e g u e n t l yr em in de d t h a t p a r t y r u l e ove r t he a rmy is an ? 'ob j ec t i veh i s t o r i c a l law."CPSU Prog ram ad op ted i n 1961, which dec la res t h a t " p a r t yl e a d e r s h i p of t h e armed f o r c e s , and t h e i n c r e a s i n g r o l eand i n f l u e n c e of t h e p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n t h e army a ndnavy, .are t h e bedrock of m i l i t a r y d ev el op me nt .I1 I n d i s p u t -a b l y , . t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t is s u b j e c t t op a r t y c o n t r o l , , .b ut t h a t c o n t r o l is n e i t h e r abso lu te n o r

T h i s l a w i s s a i d t o be r e f l e c t e d i n t h e

u n y i e l d i n g.I n t h e p a s t , p a r t y c o n t r o l h a s f l u c t u a t e d i n d eg re ea n d ' e f f e c t i v e n e s s . I t has never , however , i n t h e p o s t -

S t 3 l i n p e r i od been so o p p r e s s i v e a s t o t r a n s f o r m t h e m i l i -t a r y e s ta b l is h m e nt i n t o a t ho ro ug h ly s e r v i l e , v o i c e l e s sbehemoth i n S o v i e t s o c i e t y , w i t h o u t any w i l l , mind orp o l i t i c a l i n f lu e nc e of i t s own. On th e co nt ra ry , t h em i l i t a r y b u r e a u c r a c y h a s l e d w i t h i n t h e s y s te m o f p a r t yr u l e a n a c t i v e - - i f , f r o m our v a n t a g e p o i n t , a n i n c o n s p i c -uo'us--pol it c a l 1 f et h e f a c t s a nd d e d u c t i o n s t h a t are o u r measure of t h e p o l i -t i c a l v i a b i l i t y of t h e m i l i t a r y bureauc racy .t h e r e b y s e t t h e s t a g e f o r a c o n j e c t u r a l d is c u s s i on i n t h el a t t e r p a r t of t h e pape r on t h e v a r i o u s r o l e s t h e m i l i t a r y

I n t h e f i r s t p a r t of t h i s p a p e r , w e s h a l l l a y o u tW e s h a l l

-1-I -L


10/46

m ig ht p l a y i n a ny s t ru gg le among Khrushchev ' s su rv iv or st o succeed h i m a t t h e h e l m of supreme power i n t h e USSR.A. Involvement i n Pas t Le a d e r s h i p S t r u g g l e s

D e s p i t e i t s comple te l ack of i d e o l o g i c a l or c o n s t i -t u t i o n a l p r er o g at i ve s f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e p o l i t i c sof l e a d e r s h i p , t h e S o v i e t army c a n b o a s t of p r a c t i c a lexpe r i en ce i n th a t dangerous game. Ou r e v i d e n c e on t h esub jec t is l amen tab ly incomple te . Neve r the l ess , w e b e l i e v ew e are on f i rm g round i n s t a t i n g t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y havep a r t i c i p a t e d i n o ne way o r a n o t h e r i n the major p o l i t i c a lc r i s e s known t o have t aken p lace a t t h e c e n t e r of p a r t yr u l e between t h e t i m e of S t a l i n ' s d e a t h s i n 1953 and thes e t t l e m e n t of t h e p o s t - S t a l i n s u c c e s s i o n p ro bl em i n 1957.Th i s e x p e r i e n c e , w e would th ink , m u s t be given weighti n any c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e p r e s e n t s u c c e s s i o n p r ob le mi n t h e USSR.

The Ber ia Episode: On S t a l i n ' s d e a t h , a somewhatd a z e d group of s e n i o r p o l i t b ur o m e m b e r s acted i n c o n c e r tt o i n h i b i t m i l i t a r y i n t e rf e r e nc e i n t h e p o l i t i c a l realmfor a b r i e f i n t e r r egnum dur i ng which t h e r e l a t i v e powersof i n d i v i d u a l s a nd a p p a r a t u s e s w e r e c louded i n u n c e r t a i n t y .A temporary m o r a t o r i u m on s t r u g g l e i n t h e K re mli n wase s t a b l i s h e d , i n e f f e c t , d u r i n g which t i m e t h e army h i g hcommand r em ai ne d e n t i r e l y p a s s i v e . This may not havebeen a d i f f i c u l t a ch ie ve me nt a t t h e t i m e . T h e m i l i t a r y ,it w i l l be reca l l ed , no le ss t h a n t h e r e s t of t h e p o pu la -t i o n , had been cowed in t o a p o l i t i c a l l y s ub mi ss iv e ro leby S t a l i n . What ad d i t i on a l ly he lped t o p a c i f y t h e m i l i -t a r y c h i e fs were t h e d e c i s i o n s t a k e n b y t h e new, u n ea syc o a l i t i o n s h o r t l y a f t e r S t a l i n 9 s dea t h t o r e u n i f y t h ed e f e n s e e s t a b l i s h m e n t (w hich S t a l i n h ad d i v i d e d i n t os e p a r a te m i n i s t r i e s for the army and navy) .and t o r e c a l lt h e celebrated M ar sh al Zhukov f ro m r e l a t i v e o b s c u r i t y t o

-2-


11/46

t o s e r ve as F i r s t D eputy M i n i s t e r of Defense.*B u t as t h e u ne as y c o a l i t i o n b eg an t o c r u m b l e i nt h e weeks that f ol l ow e d S t a l i n ' s d e a t h , t h e m i l i t a r y c h i e f sfound themse lves con f ron ted wi th a s i t u a t i o n w hi ch n e ce s-s i t a t e d t h e i r i nv ol ve me nt i n t h e K r e m l i n s t r u g g l e . I t

w a s no l o n g e r a q u e s t i o n of t h ro w in g t h e i r s u p p o r t b e h in da u n i f i e d p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p ; t h e y now had t o choose betweenc o n t e n d i n g f a c t i o n s . When t h e showdown w i t h B e r i a f i n a l l ycame i n June 1953--Khrushchev r e c a l l s w i t h t r e p i d a t i o nt h a t i t was a "dangerous" per iod- - the m i l i t a r y e v i d e n t l yp l a y e d an a c t i v e , p e r h a p s e v en a c r i t i c a l , ro le in t h w a r t -i n g B e r i a ' s b i d f o r p ow er, A g r e a t dea l of mystery s t i l ls u rr o un d s t h i s e v e n t ; the re are a number of exc i t ing , b u tu n f o rt u n a t el y c o n f l i c t i n g , v e r s i o n s of what had ac tua l lyo c c u r r e d . All of t h e a c c o u nt s a v a i l a b l e to u s , w e wouldemphasize, ascr ibe to t h e m i l i t a r y a n i m p or t a nt r o l e i nt h e cr i s i s ,

The wi nn in g f a c t i o n i n t h e K r em l in rewarded t h earmy for i t s p a r t i s a n supp0r.d;. The ga in s , which were t or e s u l t i n t h e g r e a t l y i n c re a se d p r e s t i g e of t h e m i l i t a r y ,began t o appea r as e a r l y as Ju ly 1953 . T h e r i v a l MVDarmy was d i s s o l v e d ; t h e r e was a c e r t a i n r e l a xa t i o n ofs e c u r i t y w i t h in t h e armed forces ; new mi l i t a r y pe r sonne lp o l i c i e s were adopted which s t a b i l i z e d and s t anda rd izedinduc t ion me thods , te rm and c o n d i t i o n s of s e r v i c e , a n dd e m o b i l i z a t i o n measures ; awards and honors were heapedon t h e m i l i t a r y ( i n c l ud i n g t h e u n v e i l i n g o f a b u s t of

*Zhukov was t h e best known of t h e marshals ; h i s g r e a tp o p u la r i t y i n t h e USSR was p r ob a bl y t h e r e a s on f o r h i sdownfa l l i n 1947. H e was celebrated no t o n l y as an a b l es t r a t e g i s t and w a r t i m e h e r o b u t also a p r o f e s s i o n a l o f f i c e rwho r e s e n t e d p o l i t i c a l i n t e r f e r e n c e . Time w ould p ro v eh i s r e p u ta t i o n, for d u r i n g h i s t e n u r e as Defense Miq i s t e r ,he would help r a i s e p r o f e ss i o n a l is m t o a h i g h l e v e l andundercu t , t o t h e dismay of t he p ar t y , p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e si n t h e a rmed f o r c e s t o t h e extent t h a t he though t theyham pe re d m i l i t a r y e f f i c i e n e y

-3-

~ --____r___ - I__


12/46

5 .

*R. G S t r a t e g y i n t h e N u c l e a r Age,1958, p. 6 2 ,

Marshal Zhukov); t h e number of o f f i c e r s i n gov ernm entand p a r t y p o s i t i o n s w a s i n c r e a s e d t o some extent ; anumber of d i sg r ac e d o f f i c e r s were r e h a b i l i t a t e d ; and thev i r t u a l f r e e z e which h ad e x i s t e d on o f f i c e r p r o mo ti on sw a s l i f t e d .

A p a r a l l e l s t e p , p er ha ps a p a r t of t h e reward, w a st o remote t h e g a g fr om t h e m ouths o f t h e m i l i t a r y t h e o r e t -i c i a ns who f o r ye a r s had t o l i v e w i th t h e s t a gn a t i ng m i l i -t a r y d o ct r in e which had been d i c a t e d by S t a l i n d u ri n g t h ew a r . (From 1947-1953, as one e x p e r t o b s e r v e r p u t it," thought w a s reduced t o s i l e n c e , and g e n i u s reduced t oS ta l i n" . ) * The new m i l i t a r y t h i nk i ng a nd w r i t i ng l e de v e n t u a l l y t o a bas i c r e s t r u c t u r i n g a n d r e e q u i p p i n g o ft h e S o v i e t armed f o r c e s ' w i t h modernized weapons.The Khrushchev-Malenkov S tr ug g le : The m i l i t a r ya l s o s u ? f e r e d some losses s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e Ber ia episode--most notably, c u t s i n t h e m i l i t a r y b ud ge t and i n p er so n-nel--owing t o Ma le nkov ' s e f f o r t s t o f inance h i s consumergoods program. These se tb ac k s were obvi ous ly not apprec i -ated by t h e m i l i t a r y , w ho s a w an o p p o r t u n i ty t o makep l a i n t h e i r gr i e va nc e i n t h e m i d s t of t h e Khrushchev-Malenkov s t ruggle for power that ensued in 1954 and 1955.I n t h i s s t r u g g l e t h e m i l i t a r y came down squarely on t h es i d e of Khrushchev, who chose t o f i g h t Malenkov's economicl i n e w i t h a program i n sympathy w i t h t h e m i l i t a r y ' s i n t er -e s t s

of m i l i t a r y p r e par e dne ss a nd f ound e xpr e s s io n i n a runningdebate on t h e p r i o r i t y of h e a v y o v e r l i g h t i n d u s t r y .Speeches made by pres idium m e m b e r s d u r i n g t h e ye a r i nd i -c a t ed t h a t t h ey were d iv id e d i n to tw o g r oups on t h e q u e s -t i o n of a l l o c a t i o n of resources to t h e armed f o r c e s : K hru-shchev, Bulganin and Kaganovich emphasized Western aggres-s i ve ne s s a nd t h e need f o r c o nt in u ed p r i o r i t y f a r h eavy

The power s t ruggle i n 1954 h inged on t h e q u e st i on

-4-


13/46

. .

i n d u s t r y i n order t o m a i nt a in t h e d e f e n s i v e s t r e n g t h oft h e co un tr y; Malenkov, Saburov and Perv ukh in w e r e i n c l i n e dt o c o n s i d e r t h e f i n a n c i a l n ee ds of o t h e r sec tor s o f t h eeconomy a t t h e expense of t h e m i l i t a r y . I n t h i s d e b a t e ,t h e m i l i t a r y leaders were a l s o v o c a l and p a r t i s a n , s up -p o r t i n g t h e camp aign f o r renewed emphasis on h e a v y i n d u s t r yb e f o r e as w e l l as a f t e r Y alen ko ves p o l i t i c a l d e f e a t .

I t is q u i t e p o s s i b l e , a lt ho ug h w e d o n o t h a v e f i r me v i d e n c e, t h a t E h ru s hc h ev D s o l l o w e r s a c t i v e l y s o u g ht t h et h a t t h e s e two d i s s a t i s f i e d g ro up s ( i . e . , S h e m i l i t a r ya nd K hr ushc he vPs f o l l o w e r s ) were b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r , w i t h -o u t t h e n e ed o f much wooing on e i t h e r s i d e , by s i m i l a rv i e w p o i n t s on t h e f a i l u r e of Malenkovvs p o l i c y an d t h ef e l t n e c e s s i t y o f i n c re a se d m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h . I t was,i n s h o r t , an i d e a l s ym bi ot ic r e l a t i m s h i p t h a t br ough ti m p o r t a n t g a i n s t o b o t h p a r t i e s .

. s u p p o r t of t h e m i l i t a r y leaders . B u t it would appear

I t is d i f f i c u l t - - i f n o t im p o s si b l e, g i ve n t h e p r e -s e n t p a u c i t y o f e v id e nc e- - to e v a l u a t e t h e e f f e c t of t h em i l i t a r y ' s r o l e on t h e outcome of t h e Khrushchev-Yalenkovpower s t r u g g l e , M i n i m a l l y , i t c ou ld be s a i d , t h e m i l i -t a r y c h i e f t a i n s c o n t r i b u te d t o t h e defea t of Malenkov.Undoubtedly, Khrushchev cou l d have won t h e day had them i l i t a r y been e n t i r e l y i n d i f f e r e n t t o t h e p o l i t i c a ls t r u g g l e a nd t h e g r e a t deba t e t h a t w a s i t s e x p r e s s i o n .However, t h e o u t c o m e of t h e power s t r u g g l e m igh t ha veb ee n v e ry d i f f e r e n t had Malenkov and t h e m i l i t a r y fo un dcommon cause aga ins t Khrushchev .

There is a l s o an i n t e r e s t i n g p o s t s c r i p t t o t h eKhrushchev-Malenkov s t ru g g l e . Immedia te ly a f t e r Malen-k o v ' s f i r s t d ef e a t was a s s u r e d , t h e m i l i t a r y o nce a g a i nr e c e i v e d a t i d y r eward for t h e i r s u p p o r t f o r K hru sh ch ev .These eve nt s happened i n Februa ry 1955: t h e 1955 budge tr e v e a l e d t h a t t h e Sovie t gove rnment in tended t o r e t u r nt o t h e 1952-53 leve l of a p p r o p r i a t i o n s f o r d e f en s e , b r i n g --- i n g . i t t o a post-war h igh ; ne w a t t e n t i on w a s g i v e n t oarmamen ts; and Zhukov moved i n t o t h e p o s t o f M i n i s t e rof Defense wi th Bulganin ' s r i s e to pr e m ie r , I n March,s i x o f f i c e r s w e r e promoted t o Marshal of t h e Sovie t Uniona n d f i v e t o t h e r a n k of c h i e f marshal o r m a rs h al of a

-5-I I


14/46

s p e c i a l s e r v i c e- - i n t h e l a r g e s t s i m u lt a n eo u s p ro mo ti ont o t h e s e h i g h r a n k s e v e r made i n t h e USSR,

N e v e r t h e le s s , t h e m i l i t a r y bo nu s w a s k e p t w i t h i nwe l l -de f ined l i m i t s . No r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e p r o f e s -s i o n a l m i l i t a r y class were yet promoted t o t h e r u l i n gp a r ty o rgan , t h e p re s id ium, a l t hough Zhukov was e l e v a t e dt o can d id a t e membersh ip (non-vo ting) in t h a t body i n t h efo l l o wing yea r . Moreove r, as the new Khrushchev-8ulganinf o r e i g n p o l i c y b egan t o u n f ol d i n l a t e s p r i n g and sum m er ,1955, t h e m i l i t a r y f ou nd t h e m se lv e s t h e ob jec t s of bar-g a in i n g i n t h e regimeOs campaign t o re lax i n t e r n a t i o n a lt e ns io ns . Mi l i t a ncy gave way t o c o n c i l i a t i o n ; t h e S o v ie tm i l i t a r y o c cu p at io n o f A u s t r i a wa s ended; and i n t h e f a l l ,t h e S o v i e t s a nno un ced t h a t as a r e s u l t of t h e " r e l a x a t i o n so f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s o ns " f o l l ow i n g t h e Geneva conference ,t h e S o v i e t armed f o r c e s would be reduced i n s ize by 640,000men. ( I t is po ss ib l e t h a t t he 1955 announcement of a t r o o pc u t was an e f f o r t t o take b e l a t e d < . c r e d i t f o r c u t s whichh ad a c t u a l l y t a k e n p l a c e u nd er M al en ko v' s a e g i s i n t h et w o prec ed ing yea r s . ) Thus, a s be fo re , t h e pendulum whichh ad f i r s t swung i n f a v o r of t h e m i l i t a r y seems t o haveswung a g a i n s t them s h o r t l y a f t e r w a r d s .

The An ti- Par ty Group: In June 1957, when a newc o a l i t i o n i n t h e p r e si d iu m made a n a b o r t i v e a t t e m p t t oforce Khrushchev f r o m th e commanding p os i t io n , th e Minis -t e r of Defense , Marshal Zhukov, pla ye d an impor t an t r o l ei n de fen d ing Khrushchev aga in s t t h e " a r i t h m e t i c a l m a j o r i t y "i n t h e pre s id ium.ques t ion. However , w e have a somewhat muddled p i c t u r eof w h a t h e a c t u a l l y d i d . For example, w e have on ly anunconf i rmed rumor tha t he w a s d i r e c t l y r e s po n s ib l e f o rh a vi n g s u p p l ie d s p e c i a l p l a n e s for t r a n s p o r t i n g p ro vi n-c i a l c e n t r a l committee m e m b e r s t o t h e Kreml in i n an e f f o r tt o m u s t e r supp or t f o r Khrushchev.* W do not know whether

T h a t Zhukov came t o IIhrushchevOs defense is beyond

I*See CAESAR XV, "Khrushchev and th e Ant -Pa r ty Group , "27 Apri l 1962.

\

-6-


15/46

. . . . - - _ - " . . . . .

i n t h e p i t c h of t h e cr i s i s Zhukov acted independent ly orin c o n s o r t w i t h t h e res t of t h e marsha l s .h a s w r i t t e n on t h e bas i s of one acco unt (which w e havenot been able t o t r a c k down) t h a t a decis ive p o i n t i n t h ecr i s i s may have been re ac he d when Zhukov announced t o anemergency session o f t h e c e n t r a l committee t h a t t h e S o vi eta rmed forces would not pe rmi t anyone t o b i d f o r power.*

' W e do know f r o m a n o f f i c i a l S o v i et s ta t em e n t, t h a t t h ea n t i - p a r t y g r o u p made a n a b o r t i v e attempt t o g e t t h e m i l i -t a r y t o do t h e i r b id di ng .* * A cc or din g t o another uncon-f i rmed accou nt , however, Zhukov al l eg ed ly spoke up onlytowards t h e e n d of the plenum, a f t e r t h e t i d e had c l e a r l yt u r n e d , This would suggest that Zhukov h e l d back u n t i lit became c lea r t o him t h a t Khruebchev wa s going t o win.However, if Zhukov, as repor t ed e l sewhe re , ha d in f a c thelped t o round up BhrushchevOs sup po rt er s i n t h e prov incesfor t h e c e n t r a l committee meeting, it would mean t h a t hehad made h i s commitment e a r l i e r , a t a t i m e when t h e oddswere aga ins t Khrushchev,

Robert Conquest

1 In any case, it i s o bv io us ly d i f f i c u l t t o ju dgewhether Zhukov's sup po rt was c r i t i c a l t o Xhrushchev vic-to ry , .c o u l d have overcome his formidable oppos i t ion had ZhukovW e can on ly guess .whe the r t h e p a r t y f i -rs t s e c r e t a r y

*Robert Conquest , "The So vie t S ucces sion Problem, I'p. 101,**Bulganin , ac t ing on beha l f of t h e " a n t i - p a r t y group, 'had given a f u t i l e o r d e r t o t r oo p s i n t h e K rem lin t o iso-l a t e t h e p r e si d iu m m e m b e r s i n o r d er t o c a r r y t h ro u gh t h ep l a n t o un se at Khrushchev. Hence, th e Chairman of t h eCounci l of M i n i s t e r s was powerl e s s t o act wi thou t t hec o o p e r a t io n of h i s s u b o r d i n at e , t h e M i n i s t e r of Defense.That all of t h e key commanders in t h e Moscow area s toodf i r m d u r i n g t h e a n t i - p a r t y g ro up cr is is and r e f u s e d t oa c t except on Zhukov's orders is revea led by, t h e f a c t t h a t* t h e y r e t a i n e d t h e i r i mp or ta nt jobs afterwards. H a d anyof them balked a t ZhukovOs authori ty and yielded to ap-p e a l s f o r s u p p o r t by t h e a nt i- Kh ru sh ch ev f a c t i o n , i n t h epa r t y p re s id ium, eve n t s migh t have t a k e n a v e r y d i f f e r e n tt u r n .

'

I

-7-


16/46

no t r emained loya l t o Khrushchev and l e n t h i s name t o t h e" a n t i - p a r t y g r o u p . " Our g u e s s is t h a t Khrushchev wouldhave l o s t under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s .he wanted t o or n o t , ha d t o c h oo se b et we en t h e c o n t e n d i n gf a c t i o n s . H e w a s p r i v y t o t h e m e et in g s o f t h e p r e s id i um ,s i n c e h e was t h e n a c a n d i d a t e m e m b e r of t h a t body , andwas und oubtedly pr op os it i on ed by members of t h e anti-Khru-shchev f ac t ion . . In t h o s e c r i t i c a l June days , "pa r ty con-t ro ls" and "dominance" over t h e army became i r r e l e v a n tt o t h e i s s u e a t h an d. The r e l e v a n t f a c t s were Zhukov'se f f e c t i v e le a d e r s hi p of t h e army; t h e l o y a l t y of h i s s u b -o r d i n a t e s i n t h e army high command t o himsel f and t oKhrushchev (many of t h e t o p l e a d e r s owed t h e i r p o s i t i o n st o Khrushchev) ; and Zhukov 's d ec is io n t o s i d e w i t h K h r u -s h c h e v d e s p i t e t h e m a j o r i t y v o t e of t h e p r e s i d i u m t o un-s e a t h i m . The re a so ns why Zhukov backed Khrushchev aren ot e n t i r e l y c lea r t o u s , a l t h o u g h w e would s u r m i s e t h a tt h e ma r s h al b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e army ha d more t o ga in f romKhrushchev under whom it had f a r e d w e l l , t han f rom a newl e a d e r s h i p und er Malenkov (who had t r i e d t o c u t b ac k t h earmy) or Molotov and Kaganovich (who per ha ps th re at en eda r e t u r n t o t h e S t a l i n i s t era).

In any even t , it does seem clear t h a t Zhukov, whether

The t r i b u t e which Khrushchev pai d t o t h e army w a sprobably commensurate with t h e impor tance of t h e s u p p o r tZhukov had r e n d e r e d t h e f i r s t s e c r e t a r y . For t h e f i r s tt i m e i n t h e h i s t o r y of t h e USSR, a p r o f e ss i o n a l m i l i t a r yo f f i c e r w a s t a ke n i n t o t h e r u l i n g i n n er s a n c t u m , t h epres id ium, a s a vo ti ng member. Zhukov would t h u s s ha rein some of t he powers of t h e man whose p o l i t i c a l l i f e h ehad he lped t o s a v e . B u t ZhukovOs r i c h r eward would a l sobe his undoing. The prominent d i sp la y of h i s un i fo rm i nt h e r u l i n g p a r t y p r e si d iu m th r e a t e ne d t h e s a c r o s a n c tp r i n c i p l e of s t r i c t par ty dominance over t h e m i l i t a r y ;and h i s pres t ige and haugh ty manner , a t l e a s t in K h r u -s h c h e v ' s e y e s , t h r e a t e n e d t h e p a r t y c h i e f ' s image as t o pman, i f n ot h i s ac tua l power.

Hence, t h e pendulum which had l i f t e d Zhukov t o al o f t y p o s i t i o n i n J u n e 1957, swung i n t h e o p p o s i t e direc-t i o n f o u r m onths l a t e r , and f in i s he d boZh h i s m i l i t a r yand p o l i t i c a l career i n t h e same s t r o k e .

-8 -

I I


17/46

The Speckre of Bonapar t i sm: There is an impor t an tp o s t s c r i p t t o t h e Zhukov a f f a i r t h a t m e r i t s a t t e n t i o n h e re .Th e case r e p r e s e n t s one of t h e rare o c c as i o n s i n S 6 v i e t 'h i s t o r y when t h e m i l i t a r y e l i t e d u r i n g a p e r i o d of r e l a -t i v e l y s t a b l e p a t y l e ad e rs h ip , t h re a t en e d or were t h o u g h tt o h av e t h r e a t e n e d t h e p r i n c i p l e of pa r t y dominance . ( An o t a b l e p r e c e d e n t was t h e case of S t a l i n ' s b lo od p u rg e oft h e S o vi et o f f i c e r c or ps on t h e eve of World War 11.)

A c o n c l u s i o n t o be drawn from t h i s , i t seems, ist h a t t h e t h r e a t o f Bonapar t i sm, whether r e a l o r n o t , h a sin t h e p a s t alarmed t h e p a r t $ c h i e f s . (The p a r t y condemnedZhukov, among o t h e r reaso ns , f o r havi ng mani fe s ted I'Bona-p a r t i s t t e n d e n c i e s . " ) V a r i o u s p a r t y l e a d e r s may c o n t i n u et o re ga rd t h e army hig h command as a source, and perhapst h e o n ly one, o f p o t e h th a . 1 o p p o s i t i o n ,Do pa r ty supremacy ,(The Chinese Communists had on s e v e r a l o c c as i o n s a p p e al e dt o t h e S o v i e t a r m y t o over th row Khrushchev on t h e g r o u n d st h a t h e w a s s e l l i n g ou t t h e a rmy, coun$ry and wor ld Corn-munist movement s ) Khrushchev himself took p r o p h y l a c t i cmeasures a g a i n s t a p o s s i b l e B o n a p a r t i s t c o u p by r e v i t a l i z -i n g t h e s ys te m of p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l s and by s ur r o u nd i n gh i ms e lf w i t h m i l i t a r y men who had se rv ed wi t h him du r i ngt h e w a r and owed t h e i r high r a n k s t o him. While Khrush-chev may have f e l t secure i n t h e t ho u gh t t h a t t h e h i g hcommand--even t hough t hey r e s i s t e d him on ce r t a in p o l i c ymatters--would not r ise a g a i n s t h i m , w i l l t h e new p a r t yl e a d e r s h i p h a ve t h a t c o n fi d en c e?

The Overthrow of Khrushchev: What r o l e So vi etm i l i t a r y l e ade r s p la ye d i n t h e o u s t e r of Khrushchev frompower is s t i l l l a r g e l y a mystery for us. Although w ehave no p o s i t i v e e vi d en c e t h a t t h e y p l ay e d a d i r e c t r o l ei n br ing ing Khrushchev ' s r u l e t o an end , it does appea r. t h a t k ey f i g u r e s in t h e h igh command, in c l ud in g Malinovsky,had been adv i sed i n advance abou t t h e impending coup , andh ad g i v e n t h e i r a s s u ra n c e t h a t t h e y would n o t a c t on Khru-s h c h e v ' s b e h a l f .Commander against a p o w er f ul o p p o s i t i o n i n t h e party,t h e m i l i t a r y c h i e f s t h u s c o n tr i b ut e d i n a major, i f n e g a -t i v e , w a y t o h i s o v e r t h r o w . For had t h ey i n t e r f e r e d ,t h ey migh t have p reven t ed any such d r a s t i c moves aga ins tKhrushchev by h i s pa r t y co l l e a gu es . Indeed, had t h e con-s p i r a t o r s e ve n t ho ug h t t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y , l e a r n in g of t h e

By r e f u s i n g to defend the Supreme High

-9 -I


18/46

p l a n t o depose Khrushchev, w o u l d h av e come t o h i s s u p p o r t ,i t is d o u b t f u l t h a t t h e y would h a ve r i s k e d a showdown i nt h e 6 e n t r a l committee on t h e 1 4 t h ,on t h e d e f e n si v e a g a i n s t t h e s t r o n g - w i l l e d leader whoh a d h i s own i d e a s about peacet ime and w a r t i m e r e q u i r e m e n t sf o r S o v i e t n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , and t r i e d , w i t h uneven suc-cess , t o impose them on th e m i l i t a r y l eaders . They i nt u r n made no secre t about t h e i r d is ma y o v e r , or sometimeso p p o s it i o n t o , h i s ideas about modern warfare; h i s schemesf o r making sweep ing c u t s in t h e def en se budget and m i l i -t a r y manpower; h i s p a s si o n f o r s t r a t e g i c weapons t o t h ed e t r i m e n t of con ven t ion a l weapons ; and h i s hand l ing oft h e Cuban m i s s i l e v e n t u r e . Su ch g r i e v a n c e s are rumoredt o have been among t h o s e h u r l e d a t him a t t h e c e n t r a lcommittee plenum which f e l l e d h im.undoubted ly he lped t o p u t t h e m i l i t a r y c h i e f s i n a frameo f m i n d r e c e p t i v e to t h e s u g g e s t i o n o f o u s t i n g K hr us hc he v.Bu t t h e m i l i t a r y p ro b ab ly a l s o had an immediate reasonf o r w i s h i n g t o see Khrushchev put o u t t o p a s t u r e . If,as i t now seems, Khrushchev had t r i e d ( a n d f a i l e d ) l a s tSeptember t o p u s h t h r o u g h a new long-range economic pro-g r a m o r i e n t e d t o w a r d t h e consumer sec to r , t h e d e f e n s e a l -l o c a t i o n would have b e e n s e v e r e l y r educed , and t h e panoplyof weapons and forces de s i r e d by t h e m i l i t a r y f o r t h el a t t e r p a r t of t h i s decade and t h e b e gi n ni n g of t h e n ex tw o u l d have been placed i n j eo p a rd y . As l a t e as 1 2 OctoberPravda ca r r i ed an e d i t o r i a l w hich made it c l e a r t h a t Khru-shchev w a s unswerving i n h i s d e te r mi n at io n t o have h i sway w i t h r e s p e c t t o a new economic program. H e n c e , byt h a t t i m e , t h e c h oi ce mig h t have been cu t -and-dr i ed f o rt h e m i l i t a r y , as w e l l as f o r t h e c i v i l i a n o pp on en ts ofKhru shchev

T hr ou gh ou t K h ru s hc h ev 's r e i g n , t h e m i l i t a r y w e r e

L o n g - s t a n d i n g d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h Khrushchev, then,

-10-

One of t h e first ac t s o f t h e new l e a d e r s h i p w a st o make it p l a i n t h a t the re w o u l d be n o change i n economicp r i o r i t i e s , no s h i f t in r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n s away fromt h e d e f e n s e sector . The new l ea d er s h ip would promote con-s u m e r w e l f a r e , t o be s u r e , b u t n o t a t t h e expense of t h em i l i t a r y ' s purse, as Khrushchev had wanted t o do, The

II "


19/46

m i l i t a r y w ould c o n t i n u e t o g e t t h e i r share of investment- -a payment f o r t h e i r n e u t r a l i t y i n t h e p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s ,

T h i s is not t o sugges t , however , t h a t t h e m i l i t a r yc h i e f s were n e c e s s a r i l y of one mind tha t Khrushchev shobldbe deposed . A n u m b e r of s e n i o r m i l i t a ry o f f i c e r s , i t w i l lbe remembered, were in sympathy w i t h some of Khrushchev 'sviews on w a r , d o c t r i n e and f o r c e r e q u i r e m e n t s . Such p e o p l ewould probab ly have been loa the to see Khrushchev removed,n o t o n l y because of t h e e f f e c t of t h a t a c t io n on t h e is-s u e s , b u t a l s o because of t h e i r f e a r of l o s i n g t h e i r j o b s .Marshal B ir yu zo v, t h e l a t e c h i e f of t h e g e n e r a l s t a f f , mayhave been one s u c h per son . Had he not bee n k i l l e d i n ana i r p l a n e c r a s h on 19 October, he might w e l l have been re-moved fro m o f f i c e f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons. A long- t imes t r a t e g i c weapons commander, Biryuzov owed h i s rise i nt h e m i l i t a r y h i e ra r c hy t o Khrushchev. And on t h e v e r yday t h a t t h e c e n t r a l c om mi tt ee was v o t i n g t o remove Khru-shchev from power--14 October--Red S t a r ca r r i ed an a r t i c l es igned by Biryuzov which heaped p r a i s e on Khrushchev f o rh i s ro l e i n t h e l i b e r a t i o n of the Ukraine . By c on tr as t ,P r a v d a o n t h e same day ca r r i ed an a r t i c l e , s i g n e d by MarshalKonev (who had once f e l t t h e e nd of Khrushchevas boo t ) ,t h a t a l s o d e a l t w i t h t h e l i b e r a t i o n of t he Ukra ine b u tnoQhere a l l u d e d t o Khrushchev. If Biryuzov had been amongt h e m i l i t a r y l eaders t i p p e d off about the impendingp o l i t i c a l cr i s i s , h i s a r t i c l e might have been in tendedt o p re ve nt t h e defaming of Khrushchev.-.Some Conclusions: W e cannot, of course, d r a w anyd e f i n i t i v e c o nc l us i on s from our woefu l ly incomple te in-f o r m a t i o n on t h e S o v ie t p o l i t i c a l s t r ug g l e s of t h e period1953-1957 and t h e r e c e n t d e p o s i n g of Khrushchev. W e would,h ow ev er , l i k e t o s e t f o r t h for c o n s i d e r a t i o n some t e n t a -t i v e g e n e r a l iz a t i o n s a bo ut t h e n a t u r e of S o v i e t m i l i t a r yi nv ol ve me nt i n t h e s e s t r u g g l e s g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s w hi chmay have some relevance for t h e p r e s e n t s u c c e s s i o n pr ob le m.t h a t i n t e n s i v e p o l i t i c a l i n f i g h t i n g i n t h e K rem lin t en de dt o make p r e c a r i o u s t h e no rm al a m y - p a r ty r e l a t i o n s h i p .T h e f r a g m e n t a t i ~ n f p a r t y a u t h o r i t y a t the t o p causedt h e army t o emerge t e mpo ra r i ly as a m o r e p o w e r f u l p o l i t i c a l

The case h i s t o r i e s which w e have r ev iewed sugges t

-11-


20/46

I

f o r c e i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e p a r t y i t s e l f . T hes e d i s r u p t iv ed ev e lo p me n ts i n t h e a r my -p ar ty r e l a t i o n s h i p were tempered,ho we ver, by t h e r e s t r. a i n ed p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s and a c t i o n sof t h e army hig h command (e. g. , th ey have ne ve r t o o u rknowledge made a b i d f o r s up re me p ow er) The h i g h c o m n d ,e i t h e r i n t h e p e r so n of t he Defense Min i s t e r o r h i s' s e n i o ra s s o c i a t e s , is t h e e l e m e n t of t h e m i l i t a r y t h a t h a s be-come involved i n p a r ty p o l i t i c s .

In t h e Kr em li n s t r u g g l e s , m o re o ve r, c o n t e n d i n g f i g -u r e s h a v e had t o t ake new measures e i t h e r t o n e u t r a l i z ethe a rmy POl i tAda l ly o r t o g a i n its a c t i v e backing., Whilet h e army c h i e f s had n e v e r g i v e n e v i d e n c e of d i v i d i n g t he m -.s e l v e s among r i v a l f a c t i o n s c on te nd in g f o r S t a l i n ' s m a nt le ,t h e y m ig h t h a ve had d i f f e r e n c e s o f o p i n i o n a bo u t t h e w i s -dom of de pr i v ip g Khrushchev of t h a t mant le . And, perhap sp r o p h e t i c a l l y , t h e m i l i t a r y ha v e n e v e r t u r n e d up on t h el o s i n g s i d e . Also t h e y were rewarded f o r t h e i r s e r v i ce sor n e u t r a l i t y in each c r i s i s . B u t , up u n t i l t h e p re s e n tc r i s i s , t h e y were e v e n t u a l l y d e p r i v e d of some of t h e i rg a i n s o r -- i n t h e case of Zhukov--severely c u t b ac k t os i z e by th e fo rmer pa r t y a l l y who became j e a l o u s of h i sp o l i t i c a l p r e r o g a t iv e s and a n x io us t o secure t he submis -s i o n of t he a rmy to h i s own a u t h o r i t y .

B . R o l e i n P o l i c y F o rm u l at i on

I f t h e army's r o l e i n p o l i t i e s has been l i m i t e d ,g e n e r a l l y , t o t i m e s when t h e party l e a d e r s a re d i v i d e d ,t h e a rm y' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n in p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n ha s b e ena c o n t i n u i n g p r o c e s s .*

*The r o l e of t h e army i n t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f p o l i c y i sa r e c u r r i n g theme i n our CAESAR r e p o r t s and ha s a l s o re-c e n t l y b ee n d i s c u s s e d in u n c l a s s i f i e d forums The May/June1964 issue of Problems of Communism, f o r exam ple, c o n t a i n stwo i l l u m i n a t i n g a r t i c l e s a d d r e s s e d t o t h i s s u b j e ct : Mr,Ga l l ag he r ' s "M il i t ar y ManpoweP: A Case Study, v and T.W o l fe ' s " S h i f t s i n S o v i e t S t c a t e g i c Tho ug ht H en ce , o u rt r e a t m e n t o f t h e s u b j e c t in t h i s essay w i l l b e b r i e f .

-12-


21/46

L i k e a ny b u re au cr ac y, t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h -ment tends t o deve lop i t s own p r o f e s s i o n a l i n t e r e s t swhich a t t i m e s g i v e r i s e t o v i ew s a n d p o s i t i o n s w hi chd i v e r g e fr om t h o s e of t h e r u l i n g p a r t y e l i t e , There isf r a g m e n t a r y e v i d e n c et h a t t h e m i l i t d r y nave voiced inaependent v iewsLLJ a l l o c a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s and f o r e i g n p o l i cy - -n o ta b lyo n t h e c r i t i c a l Ber l in and Cuban ques t ions - - as w e l l ast h e more t e c h n i c a l m i l i t a r y q u e s t i o n s o f f o r c e s i z e , com-p o s i t i o n , d o c t r i n e and n u c l e ar t e s t i n g .

In t h e i r c a p ac i ty of a d v i s e r s to t he supreme l ead-e r s h i p , s e n i o r S o v i e t o f f i c e r s h av e o f t e n fo und t h em s el ve sd e e p l y i n v o l v e d i n matters of g e n e r a l p o l i c y . On t h e i n -v i t a t i o n o f K h ru sh ch ev OP h i s p a r ty associa tes or upon -t h e i r own i n i t i a t i v e , t h e m i l i t a r y c h i e f s used s e c r e tf oru ms l i k e t h e H ig he r M i l i t a r y C o u n c i l t o make t h e i rv iewp oin t s known t o th e po l i cy -maker s , The H i g h e r M i l i -t a r y C o u n c il , whe re s e n i o r o f f i c e r s came i n t o d i r e c tc o n t a c t w i t h K hr us hc he v an d o t h e r p r e s i d i u m m e m b e r s , prob-ab ly became t h e most i m p or t an t c h a nn e l f o r b r i n g in g t h em i l i t a r y i n f l u e n c e to b e a r on p o l i c y s i n c e t h e e x p u l s i onof Marshal Zhukov from t h e p a r t y p r e s id i u m i n 1 95 7. I nm e et in g s of t h e C o u nc il , t h e o f f i c e r s e v i d e n t l y o f t e ncrossed t h e t h i n divide between ad vic e and s p e c i a l p l e a d -i n g.* W he th er t h e C o u n c i l , i n t h e a bs e n ce of Khrushchev,w i l l c o n t i n u e to b e s u c h an i m p o r t a n t c h a n n e l p o r e v e nt o f u n c t i o n a t a l l , r em ai ns t o b e s e e n .

O ver t h e p a s t d e c ad e , t h e i n f l u e n c e of t h e h ig hcommand i n ge ne ra l po l i c y has g rown, l a rg e l y because oft h e c r i t i c a l impor tance of t h e m i l i t a r y f a c t o r i n f o r e i g nand economic p o l i c y d e c i s io n s The p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r sh av e r e v e al e d t h e i r a n x i e t i e s ab ou t t h i s t r e n d i n m i l i t a r yi n f l u e n c e i n some a c u t e l y d e f e n si v e r e a c t i o n s in t h es p e c i a l i z e d m i l i t a r y p r e s s The y h a ve p e r i o d i c a l l y r e b u ke d

* Fo r a n e x a m l n a t io n i n d e p t h o f t h i s - i n s t i t u t i o n , seeo ur CAESAR X X I V , The Higher M i l i t a r y Counc il of t h e USSR,d a t e d 20 July 1964.

-13-


22/46

t h e m i l i t a r y , e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e t h e Cuban d e b ac l e, f o rt h e i r p r e s u m pt i o n s i n t h e p o li cy -m a ki ng s p h e r e . Them i l i t a ry , f o r t h e i r p a r t , seem t o have r e t r e a t e d , i n t h ep a s t y e a r , t o s a f e r g ro und i n t h i s d i al o gu e . I n s te a d ofc l a i m i n g , as i n t h e p a st , a d i r e c t r o l e i n mold ing " m i l i -t a r y d o c t r i n e " (w hic h i n S o v i e t t e rm i n ol o gy is e q u i v a l e n t ,t o n a t i o n a l p o l i c y on d e f e n s e m a t t e r s ) , t h e y ha v e b ee ne mp ha si zi ng t h e i r t e c h n i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o m i l i t a r ydoc t r in e - - " rn i l i t a ry sc ience '*- -which on ly t h e o f f i c e rcorps can make.about m u c h t h e same t h i n g s as befo re under t h e r u b r i c" m i l i t a r y s c i e n c e " s u g g e s t s t o us t h a t t h e y h av e n o tr e l in q u i sh e d t h e i r p r e r o g at i v es in t h e p o l i c y s p h e r e , b u thave mere ly execu ted a t a c t ica3 maneuver

What ro l e t h e y may p l a y i n t h e p o l i c y s p h e r e u n de rt h e new lea de r s h i p and in t h e e v e n t of a s t r u g g l e by oneo f t h e l e a d e r s t o co ns o l i da te power i n h i s own hands w i l lbe d i s c u s s e d i n a l a t e r s e c t i o n o f t h i s paper.,

B ut t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y c on t in u e t o t a l k

C. The Anatomy of Party Control Over The Mili taryThe p a r t y h a s m a i n t a i n e d i t s dominance over t h earmy through a complex system of c o n t r o l s , b o t h i n s t i t u -t o n a l a n d p e r s o n a l eLo y a l t y . An impor tan6 ,and i n t h e case of t h e h i g h

command, t h e m o s t impor tant f a c t o r i s l o y a l t y . T h i s i st h e core , t h e s i n e qua n0n of p a r t y c o n t r o l . G e n e r al l ys p e a k i n g , t h e l o y a l t y o n h e o f f i c e r c o r ps t o t h e p a r t yh a s l o n g b ee n u n qu e st io n ed and v i r t u a l l y i n d i s t i n g u i s h -a b l e f ro m l o y a l t y t o c o u n t ry . The p e r i o d of g r a v e d i s t r u s tb y t h e p a r t y of t h e p r o fe s s i on a l m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s camet o an end du r i ng World War TWO.The p a r t y l e a d e r s h a ve s o u g ht t o i n s u re t h e l o y a l t yof t h e army by in fu s in g i t w i th t h e l i f e b l o o d of t h e p a r t yi t s e l f . Even b e f o re S t a l i n l e f t t h e s c e n e , o v e r 90 p e r-c e n t of t h e o f f i c e r c or ps were p a r t y o r K s m s o m o l a f f i l i a t e d .More units are now s a i d t o have some s o r t of party-Komsomol

I

-14-


23/46

organ.*been made o f f i c i a l s of l o c a l c i v i l i a n p a r t y o r g an i za t io n s ,w h i le t o p m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h av e b ee n ta k e n i n t o h i g h e rp a r t y o r g a n s. A t t h e l a s t pa r t y congre s s - - t he 22nd , whichwas h e l d i n O ct ob er 19 61 --th e m i l i t a r y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i nt h e c e n t r a l committee w a s increased somewhhtoover Lthep r e v i o u s c o n g r es s - - to almost t e n p e r ce n t- - bu t w a s s t i l lsmal le r as a p r o p o r t i o n of t h e t o t a l m em be rs hip t h a n t h em i l i t a r y g r o u p s e lec t ed a t t h e 1 8 t h a nd 1 9 t h c o n g r e s se s( i n 1939 and 1952) . (Marsha l Zhukovs s t a y i n t h e c h i e fpolicy-making body of t h e party--the presidium--was b r i e f ,an d h i s successor, t h e more amenable Malinovsky, w a s notb ro ug ht i n t o t h e r u l i n g p a r t y ci rc le . )t h e army l e a d e r s t o t h e p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p , when t h e p a r t yl e a d e r s h i p is b ro ke n i n t o r i v a l f a c t i o n s ? E xc ep t i n t h es e n s e of f o r e s t a l l i n g a bas ic change i n t h e e s t a b l i s h e ds y s t e m of r u l e , l o y a l t y to t h e p a r t y would, a s i n t h ep a s t , b e c o m e i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e problem of s u c c e s s i o n ; t h er e l e v a n t q u e s t i o n w ould b e , l o y a l t y t o which p a r t y leadero r f a c t io n ?

And g r e a t numbers of m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l h av e

But what becomes of rC%ya18yL.h e cement which binds

P a C t y d i s c i p l i n e . As m e m b e r s of p a r t y o r Komsomolo r g a n i z a t i o n s , t h e b u l k of t h e m i l i t a r y are a l s o s u b j e c tt o p a r t y d i s c i p l i n e and d i r e c t i v e . In t h e i n t e r e s t ofmaximizing mil t a r y e f f i c i e n c y , h o w e v e r , t h e p a s t y c e n t r a lcommittee has g iven t h e p a r t y o r g a ni z at i on s i n t h e armedfo r ce s c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s a u t h o r i t y t h a n t h a t g i v e n t h e i rc i v i l i a n c o u nt e rp a r ts . A t mee t ings of army and navy partyorganiza t ions , members have t h e r i g h t to c r i t i c i z e anymember QC c a n d i d a t e , r e g a r d l e s s of h i s p o s i t i o n . B ut t h e yare Sorbidden t o c r i t i c i z e t h e o r d e r s and i n s t r u c t i o n sof commanders and c h i e f s a t t h e meet ings . A l s o , u n l i k e

*In 1963, p a r t y o r g a n i z a k i o n s an d groups e x i s t e d i n93 p e r c e n t of companies and eq u iv a l e n t su bu n i t s a s comparedw i t h 40 p e r c e n t i n 19 5 8 . M. Kh. K a l a s h n i k , P o l i t i c a lOrgans and Pa r ty Organ i za t i o ns of t h e Soviet Army andNavy, Highe r Pa r t y School Pub l i sh ing House , MQSCQW, 1963.

-15-

I 1


24/46

. .

c i v i l i a n p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o ns , army p ri ma ry p a r t y o r ga n i-z a t i o n s d o n o t h ave t h e r i g h t t o check t h e a c t i v i t i e s ofa d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r command e le m e n t s . Nor ca n matters per -t a i n i n g t o misdemeanors of commanders o r t h e i r d e pu t i e sbe examined i n t h e p r im a ry o r g a n i z a t i o n of w h i c h t h e i n -d i v i d u a l is a member.* I n o t h e r wo rd s, by t h i s a r r a ng e -m ent, p a r t y d i s c i p l i n e h a s b ee n t a i l o r e d t o accommodatem i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e and is v i r t u a l l y s u b or d in a te t o i t .

The p a r t y d i s c i p l i n e t o which the army high com-mand itsglf i s s u b j e c t i s e x e r c i s e d b y t h e c e n t r a l com-m i t t e e , of which t h e l e a di n g m i l i t a r y f i g u r e s are m e m b e r s .In t i m e s of s t a b l e p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p , t h i s form of c o n t r o le v i d e n t l y o p e r a t e s v e r y e f f e c t i v e l y a nd s mo ot hl y.what becomes of t h i s form of d i s c i p l i n e when t -he c e n t r a lc o m m i t t e e i t s e l f is t u r n e d i n t o a n ar e n a of p o l i t i c a ls t r u g g l e ? C a n t h e m i l i t a r y m e m b e r s of t h e cen t r a l com-mit tee , under such c i lc ums tanc es , avoid becoming embroi ledi n f a c t i o n a l d i s p u t e s which p e r c o l a t e i n t o t h a t body?a s a form of c o n t r o l o v e r t h e m i l i t a r y w i l l n o t p r e v e n tt h e i r becoming involved i n a s t r u g g l e t o de c ide w h a t t h ecomplexion of a new p a r t y l e a d e rs h i p s h a l l be.

The Main Pol i t i c a l A d m i n i s t r a tion. The agencyr e s p s n s b l e f o r p ol i t i c a l i n d o c t r l n a t ion and f o r c o n t r o l -l i n g t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e p a ~ t y r g a ni z at i o ns in t h earmy is t h e Main P o l i t i c a l A d m i n i st r a ti o n ( W A ) . T h i so r g a n i z a t i o n h a s e v ol v ed f r om t h e p o l i t i c a l commissar

But

I t would seem t o u s , i n s h o r t , t h a t p a r ty d i s c i p l in e

*There has been some z igz agg ing i n r e sp ec t t o t h e l i n eon c r i t i c i s m of s e r v i ce a c t i v i t i e s of commanders. UnderZhukov ' s aeg i s as D ef en se M i n i s t e r , t h e s e r v i c e d u t i e sof t h e unit commanders, f o r example, were n o t p e r m i t t e dt o be c r i t i c i z e d by h i s s u b o r d i n a t e s a t p a r t y m e e ti n gs .I n t h e t i g h t e n i n g up of p a r t y c o n t r o l s h o r t l y a f t e r Zhu-k o v ' s r e m o v a l , this r u l i n g was r e v e r s e d , But i t was re-v e r s e d o n c e a g a i n , p e r h a p s as e a r l y as 1958.

-16-


25/46

I I

s y s t e m b u t is a f a r c r y f ro m i t s fo r ebe ar . Un t i l Zhukovw a s f i r e d , t h e c h i ef of t h e MPA was s u b o r d i n a t e in t h ec h a i n of command t o b o t h t h e M i n i s t e r of Defense and t h ec e n t r a l c o m m i t t e e . Now t h e o f f i c e of t h e c h i e f of t h eMPA is s u b o r d i n a t e only t o t h e c e n t r a l committee, and iss a i d t o f u n c t io n wi th t h e r i g h t s o f a c e n t r a l c o m m i t t e edepar tmen t .r e p o r t t o t h e M i n i s t e r of Defense on t h e s t a t e of p o l i t i c a la f f a i r s i n t h e army, b u t is e v i d e n t ly n ot s u b j e c t t o h i so r d e r s , a n d signs p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t i v es t o t h e t r o o p s i n -d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e M i n is t e r of Defense or j o i n t l y w i t hhim.

The chief of t h e WA is s t i l l r e q u i r e d t o

Under t h e o f f i c e of t h e c h i e f of t h e MPA, t h ep o l i t i c a l o rg an s are i n t e g r a t e d wi t h t h e m i l i t a r y .embers of t h e h i s t o r i c c o n f l i c t be tw ee n p r o f e s s i o n a l andp o l i t i c a l s o l d i e r s are s t ill smolder ing .much h a s been done s in ce 1957 t o improve r e l a t i o n s betweent h e t w o groups , most n o t a b l y t h e exchange of command andp o l i t i c a l p o s i t o n s a nd t h e i n c re a s ed r e qu i re m en ts f o rs p e c i a l i z e d t r a i n i n g of b o t h t y p e s of o f f i c e r s in t h eo t h e r ' s s p h e r e o f c o mp et en ce .

While i t is c e r t a i n l y a very impor tan t in s t rumen tof p a r t y c o n t r o l o v e r t h e army, the PdPA a l s o d oe s n o ts e e m t o u s t o have much relevance to t h e ques t ion of armyi nv ol ve me nt i n p a r t y p o l i t i c s . The three top army lead-er s , who a re t h e l i k e l y m i l i t a r y e le me nt t o become in-v o l v e d i n a p a r t y s u c c e s s i o n s t ru g g l e - - th e D ef en se M i n i s t e r ,t h e W a r s a w Pact Commander and the Chief of t h e GeneralS t a f f *--have h i g h e r r a n k i n t h e p o l i t i c a l h i e r a r c h y t h a nt h e C h i e f of t h e W A and are e v i d e n t l y n o t p e r s o n a l ly sub-j e c t t o h i s d i r e c t iv e s . Forc e component commanders, how-e v e r , are s u b j e c t t o MPA c o n t r o l to some e x t en t ; p o l i t i c a la d m i n i s t r a t i o n s h a ve b ee n s e t up i n e ac h of t h e f o r c e com -p o n e n t h e a d q u a r t e r s , i n c l u d i n g t h a t of t h e S t r a t e g i c R oc ke tF o r c e s .

TheN e v e r t h e l e s s ,

\

B u t e v en w i t h r e s p e c t t o force component commanders,

* T h a t , i s , whoever succeeds the l a t e Marshal Biryuzovi n t h a t o f f i c e ,

-17-


26/46

t h e W A does n o t a p p e a r t o h av e o v e r r i d i n g c o n t r o l o v e rt h e i r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . F or e xa mp le , K hr us hc he v' shand-picked ch ie f of t h e MPA, Yepishev, e i t h e r d i d n o twant t o o r cou ld no t p reve n t t h e g round f o r ce s commander,Marshal Chukov, f rom p ub l i c l y opposing Khrushchev 's t r oo pc u t p r o p o s a l o f l a s t December. There are a good numberof o t h e r cases i n which s e n i o r o f f i c e r s car r i ed t h e i rp o l i c y d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h K hrush chev t o t h e p u b l i c f o r u m .The M i l i t a r y C o u n c il s An import an t b u t f r e q u e n t l yover looked ( i n Wes te rn ana>yses) i n s t rumen t o f p a r t y con-t r o l i n t h e armed forces is t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s ys te m.Through t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s y st em t h e c e n t r a l a nd r e g i o n a lc i v i l i a n p a r t y c h i e fs a re b r o u g h t i n t o d i r e c t c o n t a c tw i t h t h e s en io r m i l i t a ry commanders and se rv e a s a check

on t h e i r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a u t h o r i t y . On t h e m i l i t a ry d i s -t r i c t and force component levels , t h e commander servesas chai rman of . the m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l , w hi ch h a s b o t h ad-v i s o r y and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . The l o c a lc h ie f p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r a l s o s e r v e s ,as a m e m b e r of t h em i l i t a r y c o u n c i l , Inasmuch as decis ions taken on admin-i s t r a t i v e as w e l l as p o l i t i c a l matters on t h i s l e v e l aresubjec t t o a m a j o r i t y v o t e , i t would s e e m t h a t t h i s s y s t e mh a s t h e e f f e c t of r e t a i n i n g some aspects of t h e o ld 'com-m i s s a r sys t em. (A r e c e n t a r t i c l e by a S o v i e t ge ne r a ls t r e s s i n g t h e impor tance of one-man command h as r e v e a l e ds e n s i t i v i t y among S ov i e t o f f i c e r s on t h i s v e r y p o i n t ,and may i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e y a r e t r y i n g t o have removedt h e s e r i o u s l i a b i l i t i e s cur ren t ly imposed by t h e m z l i t a r yc o u n c i l s y s t e m o n t h e f i e l d cQmmander,os b i l i t y t o makei n d e p e n d e n t d e c i s i o n s* * ) The m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s y s t e m ,s i g n i f i c a n t l y , does n ot i n t e r f e r e w i th m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e ;a m i l i t a r y c o u n c il e v i d e n t l y c a n no t o v e r r u l e an orderfrom a higher mi l i tary command,

Khrushchev. The remova l of Khrushchev f rm t h escene has compl ica ted t h e problem of p a r t y c o n t r o l ov er

*General of t h A s m y P, Kurochkin, "Contemporary Combatand One-Man Command," R e d S t a r , 5 June 1964.-__.

-18-

I I


27/46

t h e army. Th is is b e c am e of t h e c e n t r a l ro l e Khrnshchevh a d p l a y e d i n t h e c o n t r o l s y st em . H e o cc up ie d t h e p o s t sof Chairman of t h e Higher Mi l i ta ry Counci l and SupremeHigh Commander of t h e Armed Fo rc es of t h e S o v i e t U nio n,i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e pow e rf u l o f f i c e s o f Chai rman of t h eC o u nc i l o f M i n i s t e r s and F i r s t S e c r e t a r y of t h e P a r ty .As Supreme High Commander, Khrushchev had h i s f i n g e r ont h e n u c l e a r b u t t o n , h e had d i r e c t and e x c l u s i v e o p er a -t i o n a l c o n t r o l over the S t r a t e g i c R ocket F o rc e s. I n h i so t he r gover nm en tal po s t s , he e xe r c i s e d t h e im por ta n t pow er sof p ro mo ti ng , h i r i n g and f i r i n g m a r s h a l s , g e n e r a l s a nda d mi r al s . D e s p it e t h e f a c t t h a t h e s t a c k e d i t h e h i g h com-mand wi t h men who were c l o s e l y a s s o c ia t e d w i t h h i m d u r i n gWorld War 11, t h e m e m b e r s of t h e hi g h command were n o tcompl tk te ly do c i le on p ol ic y q ue s t io ns and advanced v iew-po in t s wh ic h d ive r ge d i n some im por t a n t r e s pe c t s f r omKhrushchevss own t h i n k i n g , And, m ~ r e m p o rt a nt , i n t h ef i n a l a n a l y s is , h i s S t a l i n g ra d comrades l e t h i m go downt h e d r a i n .Po l i ce E lements , The re are a l s o p o l i c e c o n t r o l swhich t h e p a r t y exerc ises t h r ough t h e A dm 'f n is t ra t iveOrgans (AO) d ep ar tm en t o f t h e c e n t r a l committee a nd s pe c i a ls e c t i o n s o f t h e KGB a s s ig n e d f o r t h a t p u r po s e. The A 0depar tment , t h e head of which was r e c e n t l y k i l l e d i n t h ea i r p l a c e c r a s h wi t h B ir y uz ov , e v i d e n t l y h a s o v e r a l l con-t r o l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n t h e c e n t r a l c o m m i t t e e f o r s e c u r i t y ,i n t e l l i g e n c e , and j u d i c i a r y m at :t er s, b o th w i t h i n t h e m i l i -t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t and o u t s i d e . The KGB p r o v id e s t h e

watchflogs who pe r form t h e expec ted c ou nt e r in te l l ig en ceand p o l i c e f u n c t i o n s i n t h e armed f o r c e s , i n a d d i t i o n t os uc h s p e c i a l d e t a i l s as guard in g nuc l ea r weapons depot s .The ope r a t i ve q ue s t i on , how ever , is whether andi n w hat w ays t he e s t a b l i s he d sys t e m of p o l i c e c o n t r o l swould func t ion t o f r u s t r a t e i n vo lv em en t by t h e m i l i t a r yi n a p o l i t i c a l l e ad e r sh i p s t r u g g l e . If u s e d a d r o i t l y byone of t h e r i v a l f a c t io n s , t h e secre t p o l i c e c o u l d p l a yan i mp or ta nt r o l e i n c o n t r o l l i n g t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e m i l i -t a r y hig h command (by p la ci n g them under house a r r es t ,f o r c i n g them t o issue ~ r d e r s , t e . ) . B u t i n any d i r e c tc o n f r o n t a t i o n b e tw een t h e sec r e t pol ice and army s ini tsu nd er o r d e r s t o a c t , in cl ud in g i n Moscow.where a show of

-19-

I I


28/46

f o r c e would b e c r u c i a l , t h e army u n i t s c o u l d q u i c k l y o v e r-whelm t h e KGB. The p a r t y i n r e c e n t y e a r s seems t o haves t r en g t h e n ed t h e s e c re t p o l i c e , b u t , e x c e p t f o r t h e t r a n s -f e r o f t h e p o l i c e of t h e b or d er t r o o p s , h a s s t op p e d s h o r tof b u i l d i n g u p . the KGB a s a n armed f o r c e wh ic h c ou ld r i v a lr e gu l a r a r m y un i t s ( a s i n B e r i a ' s t i me ) .headed by She lep in extended i t s t e n t a c l e s i n t o t h e armedfo r ce s , where "committees" and "groups of c oope r a t on"were e s t a b l i s h e d a t var ious command levels . The committees e r v e s as t h e p a r t y ' s i n s p ec t o r g en e r al w i t h a u t h o r i t yt o make s p o t check s of v i r t u a l l y any m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a -t i o n w i th ou t r eg ar d f o r t h e o f f i c i a l c h ai n of command.

I n e a r l y 1963, t he Pa r ty - S t a t e C on t r o l Comm it tee ,

* * *The p a r t y ' s c o n t r o l s o v e r t h e a rmy, i n s h o r t , a r ee x t e n s i v e and a p p a r en t l y v er y e f f e c t i v e , b u t t he y ha vei m po rt an t l i m i t a t i o n s : t h e y a re n o t s t r o n g en ou gh (ormay no t be i n t e nde d) t o p re c l ud e t h e m i l i t a r y f r o m hav-i n g an i n d e pe nd e nt and i n f l u e n t i a l v o i c e i n p o l i c y m a t -t e r s ; and they are n ot s u f f i c i e n t t o prevent the a rmyfro m p l ay i n g a n i mp or ta nt r o l e i n p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e s .Moreover, t h e v er y f a c t t h a t Khrush'chev concentrateds o much c o n t r o l o v e r t h e d e f e n s e e s t a b l i s h m e n t i n h i s

own hands, h a s l a i d a s e r i o u s p ro bl em i n t h e l a p s of t h ep r e s e n t p a r t y l e a d e r s . H i s e x i t h a s c r e a t e d a l a r g e powervacuum i n t h e m i l i t a r y co nt ro l mechanism which w i l l n o tbe e a s i l y f i l l e d , s h o r t of aggrandizement of t h e s e pow er sby a s t r o n g s u c c es s o r , o r a major change i n th e c o n t r o lm ac hi ne ry a t t h e t o p .

-20-, &RET ,


29/46

11. THE MILITARY AND A NEW LEADERSHIP ;CRISISA. T h e P o s s i b i l i t i e s

Many Western ob ser ver s (o ur se lv es incl ude d) - ;: thinkit v er y l i k e l y t h a t a s t r u g g l e f o r power w i l l sooner orl a t e r e r u p t among KhrushchevOs h e i r s . The present co l -l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p aa ran gem en t, it seems o t u s , is on lya temporary m o r a t o r i u m on s t r u g g l e , i f no t a smokescreenbehind which a power s t ruggle is a l r e a d y t a k i n g place .' The system, as nur ture d by Khrushchev- and S t a l i n bef ore

him, m i l i t a t e s toward c o n s o l i d a t i o n of supreme power byone man. Inde ed , as Leonard Schapi ro rec en t l y put it,t h e sys tem is probab ly unworkable i n i ts present formw i t h o u t one man a t t h e t o p . The i n h e r e n t i n s t a b i l i t yof t h e p r e se n t c o a l i t i o n is a pp ar en t i n t h e d i v i s i o n ofpower no t onl y between i nd ivi du als b u t be tw e e n i n s t i t u -t i o n s as w e l l . The Brezhnev-Kosygin team is a combina-t i o n of t w o bureaucr ac ies--par ty and s ta te --wi th a h i s t o r 3of c o n f l i c t . T h e r e is some question as t o whether Brezh-nev can preserve the supremacy of t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l p a r t ya ppa r a tus i n c on t r o l l i n g t he economy in vi ew of t h e in-creas ing power of t h e vast planning and management ap-pa r a t us , c a p t a ine d by RosyginAnother fa c t o r making fo r i n s t a b i l i t y a t t h e t o pis t h e a pp ar en t f a i l u r e t o date of any of t h e new l ead-e r s t o d e c i d e who among them should f i l l such powerfulposts vacated by Khrushchev as Supreme High Commander,chairman of t h e Highbr Mil i ta ry Counci l and chairman oft h e RSFSR B u r e a u . Who w i l l have h i s f i n g e r on t h e n u c l e a rt r ig g er , and how w i l l he g e t i t t h e r e , are q u e s t i o n s t h a fprobably w i l l h ave t o b e s e t t l e d before too lo ng . Hows u c h g u e s t i o d s are d e c i d e d w i l l go f a r t o answer t h eb a s i c q u e s t i o n , in whose hands w i l l supreme power i n t h eUSSR be he ld?Assuming t h a t our est imate of t h e l e a d e r s h ip s i t u a -t i o n is cor rec t , t h a t i n d i v i d u a l leaders w i l l s t r u g g l e

-21-


30/46

among t h e m s e l ve s t o c o n s o l i d a t e K h ru s hc h ev ' s d ro pp edpowers , what r e a c t io n might w e e x p e c t from t h e m i l i t a r y ?

I

We are i n c l i n e d t o t h i nk t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y w i l li n some manner become involved i n any s t r u g g l e t o de c idewho Khrushchev 's successor a t t h e helm of power is t o be.What kind of r o l e t h e y p l a y w i l l pro ba bl y depend, amongo t he r t h i n g s , on t h e i n t e n s i t y and d u r a t i o n of t h e p o P i -t i c a l s t r u g g l e i t s e l fThe m i l i t a r y p r o b a b l y r e a l i z e s t h a t t h e p r e s e n tl e a d e r s h i p a rr a ng e me n t is only a temporary and i n h e r e n t l yun st ab le compromise . They are p r o b a b l y a l s o c o nc e rn e dt h a t t h e absence of a s i n g l e commander- in -ch ief , w i t hh i s f i n g e r on t h e n u c l e a r bu t t o n, t e n d s t o degrade bo th

t h e S o v i e t d e t e r r e n t and t h e a c t u a l a b i l i t y of t h e S o v ie tm i l i t a r y e s t a b l is h m e n t t o re spo nd d e c i s i v e l y in an emer-gency. They w o u l d t h e r e f o r e p r ob a b ly be a n x io u s t o seesupreme power c on so l id a t ed i n t h e hands of a s i n g l e lead-e r i n order t o r e s t o r e t h e s t r a t e g i c m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o nof t h e c o u n t r y t o its former s t a t e .I f , a s w e t h i n k i s l i k e l y t o happen, a p e r i o d o fa c t i v e s t r u g g l e fo l lows a h o l d in g a c t i o n by collective?r u l e , t h e m i l i t a r y (as an i n s t i t u t i o n or i n t h e per sonof t h e Defense Min i s t e r ) w i l l v er y l i k e l y e n t e r o r bedrawn i n t o t h e d i s p u t e in a p a r t i s a n r o l e . I n t h e f i r s tp l a c e , t h e m i l i t a r y c h i e f t a i n s might become involved byt h e i r own choice. I t m i g h t a p pe a r t o them t h a t t h e

s e c u r i t y of t h e S o v i e t U n i o n i s gra ve ly endangered bya d e e p l y d i v i d e d p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p and t h e y m i g ht , i nc o ns e qu e nc e , i n t e r v e n e i n a n e f f o r t t o h a s t e n t h e s e t t l e -ment of t h e s u c c e ss i o n s t r u g g l e . The p b s s i b i l i t y of av o l u n t a r y m i l i t a r y i nv o lv e me n t would be gr e a t e r s h o u l dt h e c o n t e s t i n vo l ve issues b e a r i n g on t h e f u t u r e of theS o v i e t m i l i t a r y e s t a bl i s h m en tT h i s i s n o t t o s u g g e s t , of c o u r s e , t h a t Soviet armyl e a d e r s are e a g e r t o become i n v o l v e d i n t h e l e a d e r s h i pproblem. Being a c o n s e r v a t i v e , c a u t i o u s se gm en t of S o v i e ts o c i e t y , t h e m i l i t a r y a s a grou p may have t ak en t o h e a r tt h e m ea ni ng of t h e Zhukov o u s t e r , and, hence, w i l l prob-

' a b l y be v e r y c a r e f u l about g e t t i n g e mb ro il ed v o l u n t a r i l y

-22-


31/46

. ,

I I

i n p a r ty p o l i t i c s , B u t w e w o u l d n o t r e g a r d t h e i r p en ch an tf o r c a u t i on as a f a c t o r p r e c lu d i n g a s e l f - i n i t i a t e d i n t e r -v e n t i o n i n a l e a d e r s h ip s t r u g g l e .

What makes a m i l i t a r y i n vo lv em en t i n a ny s u c c e s s i o ns t r u g g l e seem t o us a lmos t unavo idab l e is n o t so much t h eabove-mentioned cont ingency of w i l l f u l i n v o l v e m e n t as t h ee x t e r n a l . forces t h a t w i l l work i to d raw ammy leaders i n t ot h e d i s p u t e , I n t h e S o v ie t e nv ir o nm e nt , t h e army is s i m p l yt o o p o we rf u l to be i gn or ed by t h e f a c t i o n s o r i n d i v i d u a l scontending for supreme power. They w i l l t r y t o g a i n t h ebacking of t h e army; hi gh command f o r the ms elv es o r a t l e a s t' t o deny i t t o t h e i r opponen t s . In t h e f a c t i o n a l s t r u g g l e st h a t f o l l o w e d S t a l i n ' s d e a t h , t h e m i l i t a r y a l w a y s t u r n e dup on t h e w i n n in g s i d e , and h i s t o r i c a l l y - m i n d e d p a r t y

c h i e f s are l i k e l y t o c o n si de r t h e s u p p o r t of t h e m i l i t a r ye s s e n t i a l t o t h e a t t a i n m e n t of supreme power. Should t h ec e n t r a l committee become a n a r e n a of s t r u g g l e , t h e t o pm i l i t a r y l eade r s who s i t i n t h a t body would i ne sca pa blybe p e l t e d w i th e n t r e a t i e s f o r s u p p o rt from t h e r i v a l f a c-t i o n s ; t h e y would be f o r c e d to choose s i d e s (as on 1 4Oc tobe r ) shou ld a m otio n a f f e c t i n g t h e l e a d e r s h i p s t r u g g l ebe p u t u p f o r a v o t e .Not only rnighe t h e army l eader s be forced i n t o ap a r t i s a n role by c i rcumstances beyond t h e i r c o n t r o l ; t h e ym i g h t a l s o f i n d t h e m s e l v e s c a s t i n t h e ro l e of a r e l u c t a n ta r b i t e r , p r o v i d e d t h e y were a b l e t o ac t as a bloc. Thel a t t e r ro l e , which o f ;he rwi se s e e s remote, would becomea good p o s s i b i l i t y s h o u ld t h e c o n t e s t a n t s fo r t h e p a r t yl e ad e r sh ip become locked i n a stalemate.Furthermore , a p o s s i b l e b r eak do wn i n p a r t y d i s c i -. pl ine--caused by a p e r n i c i o u s , d raw n-o ut s t r u g g l e a t t h etop--could cause such d i s a r r a y among t h e p a ~ t y ank-and-f i l e as t o p a ra l yz e t h e p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h ep a r t y as a whole. And i f a t the same t i m e t h e a rmy ch i e f swere t o m a i n t a i n s t r i c t m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e , t h e y w o u l dh av e c o n s i d e r a b ly g r e a t e r p o l it c a l l everage and maneuver-a b i l i t y t h a n t h e r i v a l p a r t y c h i e f s , and would o cc up y a

outcome of t h e s u cc e ss io n s t r a g g l e' more advan t ageous pos i t i o n f rom which %O i n f l u e n c e t h e

-23-

S E ~ E T \\


32/46

W c a n , of course, o n l y s p e c u l a t e about t h e f o r mwhich a m i l i t a r y i n v o l v e m e n t migh t t a k e . I t might, f o rexample, be l i m i t e d t o p u b l i c or p r i v a t e p r o t e s t a t i o n son beha l f of t h e f o r t u n a t e c o n te n d e r and t h e p a r r o t t i n gof h i s s t a t e m e n t s on p o l i c y and i d e o l o g i c a l matters (asin t h e f i r s t K hru sh che v-M ale nko v s t r u g g l e ) e O r i t mighte ve n i n v o l v e t h e use or t h c e a t e n e d u s e of arms (as i n t h ecase of t h e showdown wi th B e r i a ) .A d e c i s i o n t o move a rmy t r o o p s i n t o t h e s t r e e t si n Moscow c o u l d be t a k e n at t h e i n i t i a t i v e o f a p a r t yl e a d e r , b u t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l order would have t o comefrom a s e n i o r m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r , notably t h e d e f e n s em i n i s t e r . ( B ul g an i n, t h e n c h ai rm a n of t h e c o u n c i l ofm i n i s t e r s , a p p a r e n t l y t r i e d and f a i l e d t o move t roopson beha l f of t h e a n t i - p a r t y g r ou p d u r i n g t h e c r i s i s ofJ u n e 1957.) As f a r a s w e c an t e l l , t h e o n l y armed person-n e l a t t h e d i s p o s al of any of t h e t o p p a r t y c h i e f s aret h e s m a l l KGB u n i t s a s s i g n e d t o p r o t e c t them. (Somepa r t y ch ie f s , Brezhnev and She le p in , migh t through as-s o c i a t i o n s wi th t h e KGB be able t o m a r s h a l 1 t h e s u p p o r to f v a r i o u s o t h e r KGB elements ' , ) We can imagine a s i t u a -t i o n in which a p a r t y l e ade r o r f a c t io n , e i t h e r f a c e dw i t h t h e m a r s h a l l i n g by t h e o p p o s i t i o n of secre t p o l i c eu n i t s o r d e s p er a te t o make a f i n a l b i d for supreme power,might urge t h e Defense Minister t o move f o r c e s i n t o o raround t h e Kremlin and t o apprehend oppos i t ion e l emen t s .We t h i n k i t l . i ke l y t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y w i l l s imply

do t h e b i d d i n g of one of t h e c o n t e n d i n g f a c t i o n s ; y e t w ewould not r u l e o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of s e l f - i n i t i a t e da c t i o n s on t h e i r own beh a l f , They migh t , a l though w et h i n k i t i mp ro ba bl e, b l a t a n t l y p l a y t h e ro l e of kingmaker,p i c k i n g t h e i r own c a n d i d a t e and f o i s t i n g him on t h e p a r t y .I An even more d r a s t i c s t e p would be for t he a rmy c h i e f st o t r y t o capture supreme power f o r t h e m s e l v e s .

One can adtrance a number of r e a s o n s f o r e s t i m a t i n gt h a t a m i l i t a r y t a k e o v e r is n ot l i k e l y t o happen. TheS o v ie t o f f i c e r c o rp s ha s a s t r o n g i n t e r e s t i n p re s e rv i n gt h e e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l order , which even a temporary m i l i -t a r y t a ke o ve r w o u l d v i r t u a l l y d es t ro y . ( I t would be ex-t re me ly d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e p a r t y t o r ecover f rom s u c h a

-24-

SEb?T


33/46

I

f a i l u r e . ) The army leaders are i n de b te d t o t h e s y st emf o r t h e l o f t y p o s i t i o n s t h e y o ccupy and t h e p l a c e t h earmy as an i n s t i t u t i o n o c cu p ie s i n t h e i r s o c i e t y . Theywould have no g u ar a nt e e t h a t t h e y could f a r e as w e l l o rb e t t e r u nd er an a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i t i c a l sy st em ; i nd e ed ,th ey may no t even be a b l e to env i sa ge wha t an a l t e rna-t i v e s ys te 'm mi gh t o r ought t o be. And t h e i r upbr ing ingand sense of t r k i d i t i o n w o u l d probab ly make them f e e l ve ryuncomfort ab le i n t h e ro l e of p o l i t i c a l ru le rs Whilet h e y have e x p r e s s e d d i v e r g e n t vi e ws o n v a r i o u s p a r t ypo l i c i e s and have s o u g h t - g r e a t e r i n de p en d en c e f o r t h earmy in r e g a r d t o i t s i n t e r n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , t h e y ha ven e v e r r e v e a l e d a n y desire t o become a f u l l y i n d e p e n d e n tp o l i t i c a l f o r c e which would r i v a l t h e p a r t y i t s e l f .

N e v e r t h e l e s s , w e c an no t e xc lu de t h e p o s s i b i l i t yof a m i l i t a r y t akeov er . C i r cumstances might ar i se d u r i n gl e a d e r s h i p s t r u g g l e s t h a t would g ive impe tus t o a m i l i -t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n on i t s own behalf

Documents

Caesar 38 - The Military and the Succession Problem in the USSR