Can Grand Theories of the State Help Us Envision a Grand Theory of Peace

7/30/2019 Can Grand Theories of the State Help Us Envision a Grand Theory of Peace

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N o t e sThe author consulted th e following sources in writing this chapter: UnitedNations Development Programme, Human Development Reports (zoo4 and .various issues); United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights;United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, UNESCOUniversal Declaration on Cultu ral Diversity; Whitney, The .Economics ofTrust; Yamamoto, R ole of Service-L earning; and Y amamoto, EstablishingCredibility under Globalization. I

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10 -. . - -. .Can Gra nd Theories of t he S tate Help Us Envision . - -.. . . - . - . .

- .- . ..a Grand Theory ofpeace?. - - . .- . .C . .

GR EGOR Y HOO KS. . . .

i . .. . .I Whitney, The Economics of Trust, 17.t

I Ithe introduction to this volume, the editors defend and clarify the

utility of a grand the ory in moving towa rd peace, security, and kyoseiand challenge other peace researchers to make contributions on this1 front. This conception of a grand the ory doe s not imply an om niscient andI rigidly abstract edifice. A grand th eory of peace must be intimately tied1 to the quest for a peaceful world a nd socia l justice. T he editors proposea grand theory that serves as an overlapping consensus, open to empiri-f cal and historical inquiry and concerned with future development$. Asthey and Johan Galtung make clear, a full realization of peace requires

active cooperation a cross polities, social justice within and amo ng ssciet-Iies (kyose i ) , nd "personal independence a nd the crearive tension."'

This chapter focuses on the state-the human organ ization that hasdisplayed an unrivaled capacity to wage war over the past five hundredyears.As Charle s Tilly observes, "war m ade the state, and the state nu dewar."'-There is little doubt tha t Tilly is correct: the stare is, quite liter-ally, defined by its war-making prowess. And in M ax K'eber's definition(the default definition of the state), the state is a compulsory poli.tica1organ iza tion tha t exer ts a monopo ly over the l eg i t imateuse .~ f ! fo ~ c~ : i na given territory. Since the sixteenth'century , states have emerged_a s.thedominant political organization, and during this period they$fai;Skkenfar more svccessful than other human organizations in waging war. Assuch, states are the biggest impediment to peace. In the introduction to,

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this volume, the editors call on us to create an "epic theory" of peace,- that is, a "theory which is inspired by the hope of achieving a great andmemorable deed thr ough the me dium of thought."' This chapter focuses

. . -. -- :- - on the state as an impediment to peace in order to better understand the- -. . - . . - . - - .;.. . - challenges confronted by peace theorists and to devise steps to overcome- . - - .. . ... - . ' . -. these challenges: . .

. . When striving to'constru ct an "epic theory," it is.importa nt to keep. the transforma tive goal in mind. For this reason, an im mane nt critique-'

a focus on the contradictions and failures of current social practices. . . .. .. .. . . .

- - . -relative to the ideal of positive peace-is the preferred m ode of analysis.Jurgen H abermas cal ls for an " ideal speech com n~unity," ~hich has aii . . . -great dea l in common with the ambit ious conception c ~ f eace advancedby Kawam ura, M urak ami, Chiba, and .Galtung. An ideal speech com-munity not only envisions meaningful material and political equality; italso cnvisions a society with broad and direct participation in debating

I and making key social decisions. Habermas recognizes that no extantI society has achieved (o r even approximates) an ideal speech community.I By conceiving of an ideal speech community and using this concept as

a benchm ark, he can m aintain a critical stance when a.nalyzing currentprocesses. T he gra nd theor y that the editors develop can likewise serve

1 as a benchmark and guidepost in our effort to conceive of and build amore pea ceful society. It is in the spirit of a n immanent. critique tha t thischapter reviews grand theories of the state and documents the state'sunma tched role in war making. T his stark appraisal of the state's historyand its organizational logic highlights the challenges we confront andpoints to possible ways of movingforw ard.

The Pacification of Warlords aqd the Rise of the StateIn Europe, th e state has been the dominant political organization of themodern era.5 From the decline of Charlemagne's empire: (circa boo) untilthe rise of proto-states in the fourteenth century, the fiefdom was thedominant political entity in Europe. The hegemony clf the aristocracywas based on m ilitary power. Each fiefdoH w2s largely autarkic: civilianand military resources were extracted and.controlled locally. Alliancesof aristocrats did make possible relative~~~a~~e'inilitaryampaigns, butlords on the victorious side were rewardedwith control over larger land

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. - holdings, reinforcing centrifugal tendkn~ies.~ro m 1000 to 1500, thereturn of long-distance trade and the increased use of currency tilted the

I68 GREGORY HOOKS Envisioning a Grand Theory of Peace 169

.,, I balance of power toward the crown. On the one hand, as titular kingsand queens became sovereigns in fact, they were able to e xtra ct resources

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from commercial activities concentrated in cities acro ss their rea lm. Aris-tocrats, on the other hand, were constrained by the limited geographicreach of their fiefdoms, ivnd their economic assets were c oncentrated in

.,.-.. . land, not in currency. States (controlled by sovereigns) outflanked thearistocracy because states exercised dominion over a much larger areaand w,ere able to tap m ore flexible funding sources tha n w ere their aris-tocratic rivals.'

The rise of the state sets the stage for the "civilizing processm-thetransformation of aristocratic mores and the diffusion of these moresthroughout European society. With France leading the way, emergentstates pacified the warlords of feudal Europe-and aristocrats became"civilized." In contrast to their autonomous status at the height of thefeudal era, \\rarlords became increasingly depend ent u pon th eir relation-ship to the crown a nd the delegation of royal authority t o them. As thepacification of the \varlords proceeded, the so-called courtly forms ofconduct were introduc ed; these nc;; forms of con dcc t eschew ed the overtviolence and intimidation of an earlier era, replacing this code of c onductwith an elaborate ser of customs and manners. In turn, courtly mannersand sensibilities diffused throughout society, influencing manners of eat-ing, sexualit!., household arrangem ents, and inte rper sona l interaction.'

In Power and Cicility: The Civilizing Process, sociologist Norbert .Elias does not acco unt merely for the rise of the state ; he is also concer nedwith the pacification of the aristocracy. By this, Elias is referring to morethan lay'ing down arms and n egotiating a negative peace ( as later definedby Galtung). He is concerned with the civilizing process. In his account,the central actors of medieval Europe, the warlord s and the Church from

I around 500 to I oo. were not transformed through internal processes.. . Similirly, this medieval history teaches that it is unlikely contemporarystates will achieve pacification by processes specific to them . Just as theCatholic church .was incapable of pacifying the aristocracy, it is unlikelythat the United Nations (an organization of which states a re mem bers) iscapable of pacifying contemporary states. However, with the Elias analy-I sis as a guide and in rhe spirit of an immanent critique, it is possible toidentify organizational forms with the capa city to pacify states.


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The Challenge of lo balk at ion.-

As noted, the rise of states did not ushei in a period of peace. Rather, thestate became the dominant political entity because-of:its siigular &I - ,. .ity to control the means of violence. In T illy's w or ds , " E ~ e - ~ i i ~ l l ~ ,he .

- - . . -personnel of states purveyed violence on a larger scale',-mefe.effectiiely, ,more efficiently, with wider assent of their subject pbpu~atiom;.:Gci ithreadier collaboration .from neighboring authorities than did personne(."'from other organizations."9 He further defines war ma king as.'.efforts.by states to eliminate or neutralize rival states "outside the;territ&ies

- .in which they have clear and continuous priori ty as ~rielde~;of.f~~ce.~.;~. .. . -The rise of Europ ean states led to a period of conquest an d subordina-

tion arou nd the globe-the European powers caused death anti destruc--tion while imposing their ow n form of.political, economic, and culturalorder. Moreover, the scale and lethality of wars gr ew exponentially overthe period.

Today's rapid globalization of economic and cultural processesmakes possible th e eclipse of the state as th e world's unrivaleci politicalorganization. In fact, the ex tent and the pace of globalizatiofi'have led anumber of scholars t o question the state's centrality and viability." Forexample, many economic transactions are no longer physically locatedin one place but are instea d enmeshed in a global financial and economicnetwork, outside of one state 's co n tr ~ l . '~f course, states have neverbeen able to simply dictate terms to major econom ic and financial orga-nizations, but the rapid shift toward a global, networked, and informa-tion-based econom y has diluted their ability to translate their capabilityto coerce and administer into de facto economic power. Today's nation-states can no longer conta in their ow n economies, and .they are bothconstrained by and dependen t updon a g lobal economy. ~ l t h o u ~ hradi-tional nation-states will survive, sfates will lose power if they are unableto control political, economic, and cultural processes.'3 In Democracyani! the Global Order, David Held spells out the dilelnmaslfor politiesunder these circumstances. Democracy allows the enfranchised to eser-cise a measure of co ntrol over political decisions. However, a$ giobaliza-tion spreads, many impo rtant issues areibeyond the control of any state,for example, environmental problems.~createdbeyond a nation-state'sb or de rs a nd glo ba l e co no mic p r o c e s s e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ? ' : ~ : . -

.:. 1:?; We often take for granted tha t political and m ilitary powers are con-trolled by a state and that this power coincides with the nation-state'sfrontiers. This assumption of Westphalian sovereignty is often takenfor granted, and "[tlhe conventional view holds that in the period since=648 European, and s&sequently wortd, politics can be characterizedas an anarchical system comprising the interactions of like units (states),in turn selected and socialized in accordance with Westphalian sover-eigity."'s However, Stephen Krasner demonstrates th at the assumptionsbehind the conventional view are misplaced. Th ere is and has been shar pvariation in the sovereignty and autonomy of states. Because the morepowerful states establish the contours of the international order andintervene (directly and indirectly) in the dom estic affairs of less powerfulstates, he refers to the pretense of Westphalian sovereignty as "organizedI hypocrisy."'6Recognizing the inequality among states and coming to terms withI the organized hypocrisy that obscures this inequality are essential stepsin clarifying the challenges and envisioning the possibilities for creatinga more peaceful world. With an emphasis on the ineq uality among them,Donnelly identifies three types of states: great powers, semi-sovereign

, states, and outlaw states."

I Great PowersFor a number of centuries, the states commanding the most powerfulmilitaiy force and the greatest economic resources have routinely wieldeddisproportionate power. These states have set limits on internationaltreaties and have enjoyed the option of violating treaties an d conventionsimposed on less powerful states. This has certainly been true in the post-Worid -war I1 era. The victors of World War II established the UnitedNations. In one respect, the UN c har ier is emphatic ab& the formalequality of member states; however, the fun ding structu re and the'specialrole reserved for the permanent members of the Security council- reateboth de facto an d de jure inequalities amo ng states.

Earlier in this chapter, we briefly examined how the sthes..~f.:early

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modern Europe successfully pacified the warlords by outfla~lkin~nd . . . These semi-sovereign arrangements "involve legally sanctioned differ-overpowering them and secured a monopoly on legitimate violence. ..... % . ences in rights,. libeities and obligations, ariiing from a transfer of cer-..However, it is hard to envision a comparable process leading to the .,:i:' tain' sovereign rights fr om on e (a lmos t always weaker) state to an other.+:.~a cif ica tio n f the great powers of the twenty-first century. Th e United ..*Ithough row ed in hequil i t ies . of-po&er;;,thcy-are no mo re reducible to

. .States and China will be especially powerful, but the great powers of power than 'are class. and sta tus hequ abtig- \?lithin 'most states. A t the- . .. - -the early twenty-first century would also include England, France, Ger- ,< very-least, they transform th i cha ra& e.o f,iG i uridirlying7 inequalit ies,. . . .. . - . ._many, India, Japan, and Russia. Individually, these grt:at powers have the dramat i~al ly ." '~, .. .. -economic resources or m ilitary prowess (or both) to resist oversight and

contr ol by an international orga nization. Moreover, these states sit therules for international cooperation and debate. Together and individu-ally, they would impede the emergence of an international state capableof outflanking o r overpowering them.

O u t l a w S t a t es"States th at violate certain internationa l norms place themselves outsidethe law, in whole o r in part, and become liable to legitimate limitationson t he exercise or enjoym ent of their sovereign rights."Is T he sovereigntyof outlaw states has bsca circumscribed many times. For example, inthe ear ly ~ggos ,he sovereignty of Iraq was sharply curtailed after itsinvasion of Kuwait and its defeat on the battlefield. [n the post-WorldWar I1 period, states com mitting aggression against neighbors and masscrimes aga inst their ow n citizens have been deemed outlaw states. Theirsovereignty has been challenged in international settings, and, on occa-sion, anothe r state or the United Nations has intervened to constrain out-law states. In terms of envisioning and building a more peaceful world,recognition of an d response to outlaw states are crucial, an d, there has,in fact, been an encouraging trend toward widespread co ndem nat~on fcrimes against humanity. Establishing legal precedents and then buildingan international organizational capacity for curbing outlaw states areimpo rtant first steps toward creating a world that promotes kyosei.

Semi-Sovereignty. .. , .- . . . .Ther e are a numbe r of instances in whicb:states.cede a m easuie of sover-

. ..eignty to o thers, typically in treaties or other agreements between states.

Often the more powerful nation guarantees military protection, andthe less powerful nation cedes auton om y in idternational and militar yactivities. The variation in semi-sovereigntyhn.tange-. . from modest andspecific negotiations to a largely coercid ah a. alj-encornpassing security -arrangement (for example, relations between the Soviet Union.and theWarsaw Pact nations). Financial dependence an d trade'relationships maya1so:lead ro compromised sovereignty whe rein a weak er state cedes ameasure of control in exchange for financial support o r trade relation-ships. These agreements can range from negotiations among equals toarrangements based on coercion (like the krade concessions Europeanstates imposed on imperial China in the nineteenth c entury ). Thus, semi-sovereignty is no t inherently more pea ceful th an sovereignty.

If our thinking is constrained by Westphalian assumptions, we canenvision only a world in which each state retains absolute sovereigntyand this sovereignty is at the foundation of the state's viability. Underthese circumstances, it is all but impossible to envision a scenario inwhich states would collectively sacrifice their sovereignty and viability.As such, states would certainly reject transnatio nal oversight and,jnter- .national conventions that include robust enforcement mechanisms. G iventhe role of states in human rights violations, the prospects for peace ar enil wit'hour effective ~versight.'~ critical examination of current prac-tices and state structures reveals a numbe r of regional and tra nsnationalarrangements that foster peace without requiring complete re structuringof the international order.

A N e w V o r l d O r d er or a N e w Re g i o n a li s m?Assuming a Westphalian international order, in which individual statesare assum ed t o be equally sovereign, th e mo st plausible hop e +ofos'pacify-ing states is the emergence of a world government. And this world gov-

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ernment must have the will and strength to compel recalcitrant and bel-licose states. If the only actors under consideration are the states and aworld government, the prospects for peace are quite dim. Research intohuman rights treaties reveals that nations signing treaties are no morelikely than those who do not sign to respect hum an In fact, thereis some evidence that some nations that sign the treaties are even more

- - abusive." If international hum an rights treaties curb the sovereignty ofstates and these trea ties are a first (if admittedly tentative) step toward aglobal enforcement regime, these ar e very discouraging, outcomes. Giventhat states are recognized by the United Nations, it is extremely diffi-cult to envision states voluntarily underminin g their o w n sovereigntyand autonomy and transferring them to the United Nations. At the sametime, without the United N ations , there is no evidence of another globalpolitical org anization cap able of enforcing..its will on reca lcitrant (andabusive) states.

But Westphalian assumptions have been and continue to he violated.It turns out that inequality in the sovereignty, au tonomy,and powerwielded by states is the norm, no t the exception. By examining and com-ing to terms with the rich variation amo ng states, it is possible t i dentifymultiple pathways tow ard the pacification of states and the establish-ment of a more peaceful order. W hen considering variatron am ong states,one quickly recognizes that a world government is nor the only optionfor a transnational political and institutional structure: that will pacifystates and enha nce peace. Stude nts of the new regionalism (discussed inthe next section) have identified the emergence of institutional frame-works that lead to the integration and coordination of staces. Typically,these frameworks a re organized amo ng states in geographic proximit!. toone another and can include regional trade agreements, regional humanrights regimes, and so forth." Thi s type of analysis does not offer a blue-

sprint for a peaceful future, but it does expan d horizons and offers someguidance regarding opportunities and pitfalls.

Reg ional Chaos and Coerced Reg ional In t eg ra t ion ' .., . :.-. ' :

Before discussing more promising regi~ndl 'd~namics,t is important tonote tha t these regional phenom ena are n9tiihherently more pacific thanstate-level dynamics. Gre at pow ers have routinely em ployed coercion to

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impose terms on w eaker state s within their sphere of influence. Dur ingth e- C ~l d ar era, the Soviet Union penetrated and coerced the s tates ofeastern and central Europe: "the relations among the states of easternEurope were incomprehensible f rom the perspective of the W estph alianmodel. . . Th e institutionalktructures, policies, and personnel of eas ternEuiopean states were often the result of coercion. . . The eastern Euro- .pean states were not auto&mous."'~ While its interventions were neitheras overt nor a s extensive as those of the Soviet Union, the United State salso played a powerful role in Latin America during the C old War.The weakest a nd m ost compromised states can also precipitate violenceand bloodshed on a regional scale. This has implications for our task ofbuilding new theories of peace. Kyosei (like Galtung's notion of positivepeace) requires far more than just the absenc e of war. Do mestically, societ-ies must be organize d so as to a ctively advance the physical and soc ial well-being of the citizenry. Failed states are not only failures in the sense thatthey do not provide benefits and protections to citizens; they often preyupon or are allied with others who exploit and murder the most vulner-able. There have been far too many examples of states being implicated inor perpetratin g the mass murd er of their own citizens.'s The ong oing andwidesp~ead laughter in Darfur is one of many examples.Still, Richard Falk observes, "statism, like democracy, is a norma-tive failure unless it is compared with likely alternatives! " Globalizationis "weakening state structures, especially in their capacity to promoteglobal public p o d s , their traditional function of enhancing the qualityof life within the boundaries of the state, and their most recent role*,ofassisting and protesting the vulnerable within their borders. Such tren ds,in turn , encourage disruptive ethnic an d exclusivist identities tha t subvertmodernisi,,secular and territorial commitments to tolerance and mod era-tion."I6 In terms of the pacification of warlords, the story has come fullcircle. Without a viable state to pacify and enforce compliance, manywarlords have carved up nation-states and undermined the workings ofineffective states. "The emergence of seemingly sustainable 'war econo-mies' serves to complicate any easy o r ready response. . . . [If] anythingis learned, it is that conflict is positive and profitable for some e ven,if itis disas trous an d debilitating for the majority."'? In a numbe r, of .Africancountries, failed states have collapsed into a system of warlqr diim, andthe resulting chaos, forced migrations,'and strife have often -5,Pi~ed-.htoneighboring nations.28

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Movem ent toward Mor e peaceful G overnance on a Regional Scale. -. ,

~ l t h o u ~ h ~ ' i n s t i t u t i o n a lrameworks on a regional scale are no panacea,. . .the dynamics- t work.on 'the regiqngl,.s_cale o offer the promise of a

. .solution. states. sometimes vo li ui ai il y~ & a measpre of sovereignty.-. -. -. - .-And under cei tain. 'coidi t io~s; ..i s tateceding. sovereignty contributes

to richer and more peaceful relatiorii ..witfiothei .nation-states grid- ;ogreater pro tection for its own citizenry. The mem bers of the Associationof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN-)provide an example of the interac-tion between domestic democratic refolms and a more peaceful regionalcontext. '9 This regional associat ion ~8 s. v ;r ~ &h a productof the ColdWar and the heavy-handedness with which the, United States dealt with

. . . .Asian nati0 ns.3~ n other words, for many years, ASEA:N was a stalwartanti-Communist association with an agenda focused on defeating andcontaining Vietnamese ini tiatives. ~ u r. in ihe Cold War, authoritarianregimes gained power across the region. ASEAN adopted a Westphalianview on h uman rights abuses within participaGng nations and respectedthe auton omy and sovereignty of authoritarian regimes. Conversely, thespace for civil society was constrained within these authoritarian regimesand across the ASEAN region.As Cold W ar tensions eased in the 1980s and rg90s, S outheast Asiannations moved tow ard dem ocracy (the Philippines in 1986, Tha iland in1991-92, Cam bodia in 1993, and Indonesia in 1998). Democracy pro-pelled three important changes. First, Thailand's democ:ratically electedgovernment reestablished trade and diplomatic relations with V ietnam(despite this being a violation of ASE AN agreements). Second,, greaterdomestic transparency and openness facilitated arms rtductions acrossthe region. "D emocratic reforms in Thailand and Indonesia have allowedgreater information on Thai defense spending and exposed the corrup-tion in arm s procureme nt that dr&e defense expenditures in Indonesiaunder S uharto. Democratization in the Philippines has led to a defenseprocurement and spending system which is subject to legislatiye scrii-tiny." Third, democ ratization induced domestic reforms in the directionof open and rule-based governance, and these same.tendencies are evidentin new regional accords and governance struftpr~~.ntil the cold War

. , . .ended and democratization movements swep:t the:region, "the engage-. . , .ment of civil society in ASEAN has been.mjqipa.1. Traditionally, therehas been far greater co-operation between ASE AN intelligence agen-cies than ASEAN social movements." The greater openness afforded

by democratic regimes allows N G O s to play a much lar ger role in eachcountry and to coordinate efforts across the region. "N G O campa igns inthe area of hum an rights and sustainable development have increasinglybeen pursued at a regional level."3'

Notwithstanding this positive movement in Southeast Asia, ASEANdoes not provide an dfective structure for transnational governance.Indeed, several of its hemb er states ( for example, Burma, V ietnam,and Cambodia) continue to be authoritarian. ASEAN remains dividedon its governance role and does not intervene with such states to pro-mote democracy or rights reforms. Thus, the ASEAN case highlightsan opportunity and the intersection between domestic politics (in this -case, democratization) and a n expanded space for civil society across theregion.''

The European Union and related European governance institutionsare an example of regional governance tha t makes a demonstra ble con-tribution to the pacification of states. The European Union has gonewell beyond a collection of agreements that chip away at the sovereigntyof member states. B adopting a common currency (th e euro), memberstates are obliged to coordinate mo netary, and fiscal policies. Loweredbarriers for movement across the borders of EU nations has me ant that .'"members must also develop compatible employment, soc ial welfare, andother related policies. And the Eu ropea n Co urt of Justice has the powerto choose cases'and renders judgments that have force. "The EuropeanCommission and European Court of Justice are supranational authoritystructures. National courts accept the rulings of the European Cob rt, anarrangement that was not part of the 1957 Treaty of Rome th at createdthe Eyropean Economic Community."33

For-nation-states seeking entry into the EU, the trade-offs are clear.Some sovereignty must be relinquished for an applicant state to be eligiblefor membership. Given that recent (.and prospectii-e) entrants to the EUtend to be less, economically developed, there is a nearly irresistible incen-tive to cede a measure of sovereignty and auto nomy in ex change fo r accessto the ~ u r o ~ e a narket and related institutions. One result has been anotable of Euro pean states. At present, it seem s unthinka blethat the largest EU member state s would ever wage w ar w ith on&&


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EU membership criteria 'require that the candidate country must haveachieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,human rights and respect for an d protection of minorities; the existenceof a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope withcompetitive pressure and market forces within the U nion; the ability totake on the obligations of mem bership including adherence to the rimsof political, economic 81 monetary union."35 Nations that have recentlyjoined the EU (for example, the Baltic Republics, Ilungary, PoIand,Romania, and the Slovak Republic) and those with applications pend-ing (such as Albania, Croatia, Serbia, and Ukraine) all have checkeredrecords on democracy and human rights, so it is notable that they arevoluntarily seeking admission. The EU is not invading the states of cen-tral and souther n Europe with the intention of enforcing democracy andhuman rights, but its structures can advance the develc~pment f democ-ratization movements within these nation-states.

This chapter has drawn on lessons from grand theories of the stateas a way to envision a more peaceful future. Stated in these terms, thequestion is whether an effective governance structure that operates atthe transnational level can pacify states; that is, the state (as an organi-zational form ) has been and continues to be the most effective humanorganization for waging war. As Elias detailed, the vrarlords of earlymodern Europe were pacified only by states that operated on a largergeographic scale and deployed a far more effective military f0rce.3~ ssuch, by recognizing and learning from widespread violations of West-phalian assumptions, and e xploring the emergence of novel (and effec-tive) regional governance structures, we can obtain val~~ablensights onpeace, security, and kyosei. Using this frame of reference, the EU is paci-fying European states and also con tributing to a wave of democratizationon the periphery of W estern Europe. T he ASE AN dynam ic is moving ina similar direction-but effective governance structures comparable tothose of the EU have not been put in place in this region of the world.

Again, regional t ransnat ional governance structures are not ~ nh er cn t l ~peaceful. These structures may be built on coercion and may represent aforced alliance imposed o n vulnerable states by a more pow erful one. Asseen in Africa, t ransnat ional dynamics do k t iecessarily contribute toviable governance structures. Instead, the flow of displ;lced people andarms- as well as movem ents of contrabhn'd but lucrative comm oditiessuch as narcotics, guns, and diam onds-all contribute to the collapseof states and a shift of power to warlords. But in terms of the call for a

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,' g a n d theory of peace stated in the introduction, regional dynamics andregional gov ernifice structures offer unique opportunities for pacifying.-... .. .states and building human societies committed to kyosei, both dom esti-. .. .- - cally and. intgpa tionally.

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In the tradition ofimmanent critique, states should be analyzed andunder stoodin tk&s 6f the social world we strive to create. Recall that weare :no t s imply~ t~ fer r ing. to a.cessation of war, or negative peace, but areseeking an exi.ansive conception of peace. Seen in this light, states (andthe Westphalian system of states) are incompatible with peace. Peace,security, and kyosei are possible only if states a re prevented from wag-ing war a nd societies are organized to promote social justice and foster.creative independence. G iven the centrality of war and w ar making tothe organizationa l logic and history of states, securing negative peace (letalone the expansive conception of peace proposed by the editors of thisvolume and by Galtung) would require a profound organizational trans-formation of the state or the emergence of a suprana tional organizationcapable of controlling and containing their bellicosity.

This chapter has evaluated grand theories of the state with the goal ofcontributing to a gra nd theo ry of peace. As noted here, grand theories ofthe state have too often been premised on the Westphalian assumption,that states a re equally sovereign and autonomous. Over the past decade,.scholars have recognized and emphasized the variation among kt e s .Empirical research into states suggests that uneven and proble ~natic ov-ereigity is and has been quite common and t hat a variety of national andtransnational governance structures have existed for centuries.!?

The variation in sovereignty among states and among transnationalgovernance structures poses challenges and creates opportunities. If weuncritically build our work on Westphalia~l i iiiiiip ti~ns , t will be dit-ficult to ma intain optimism. States became the do mina nt political orga-nization on the planet because of their unmatched war-making prowess.And the fact that states have taken on educational, social welfare, andinfrastructural responsibilities must not obscure the violent io~~ndation(the monopo ly of legitimate violence) upon which state.power-tests.West-phalian assumptions can cause us to overlook or downplay the impor-tance of regional dynamics and governance structures like the United

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Nat ions an d NG Os . Th e United Nations is made up of s tates-includingthose that wage wars in defiance of UN mandates and those that preyupon a nd violate the h uma n rights of their ci tizens. Th e U N has spon-sored visible treaties that denounce torture and promote a broad arrayof human rights, but enforcement mechanisms have been anemic. Even ifone assume s a ro bust global civil society and assertive N G O s that pro-mote h um an righ ts goals , i t is very difficult to envision a fut ure in whichthe U N or a successor organization can take on he role of a world govern-men t capable of policing an d pacifying states.Focusing o n the variabil i ty of sovereignty and on regional dynam icsis consistent with th e call for a grand theory of peace. T hat is , payingmore a ttention to regional dynamics will help peace researchers arrive ata theo ry th at provides an overlapping consensus but also remains open toempirical an d historical inquiry. And developing a viable grand theory ofpeace will be a n impo rtant analytical tool for helping us l ind new pathsto peace, security, and kyosei.

In the spiri t of immanent cri t ique, this new type of historical andempirical re search should focus on those variations in sta.te sovereigntyand a utonomy tha t advance or impede peace. It is true that this chapterhas been quite pessimistic ab out the potential of the United Nations-~c,b r ing abou t peace if i t acts as the only or central transnational enti ty ,Future s tudy of sovereignty and regional governance structures must alsoexamine the manner in which the United Nations and regional gover-nance s truc tures w ork synergistically to pacify states and 'advance peace.Perhaps in the future, the United Nations will Iive up to the dream ofbringing about an d sustaining peace-not as a world go~rern&ent hatcentralizes powe r bu t as a catalyst that capitalizes on existing opportuni-t ies in the world 's current and futu re sovereignties, regional governancestructures, an d civil societies.

Notes, ...

I Galtung, "Toward a Grand Theory"; Kawamura, Murakaml, and Chiba,"Introduction," 8, n this volume. . .,. . -... . .

r Tilly, "Reflections," 42 .3 Kawamura, Murakami, and ~ hi ba ,"Introduction," 9, in this volume.

.., .

,. . .4 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action; Antonio, "After Post--.modernism.". .Giddens, The Nation State a nd V iolence. - . .

. ...

6 Elias, Power an d Civility, 17. . --. .. . .. .. ..7 Ibid.; Mann, A History of Power; Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European -

- - . -.tates. - _8 Elias, Power and Civilit?9 Tilly, 'War Making and$tate Making," 173.10 Ibid., 181. . ..11 Dunne and Wheeler, Human Rights in G lobal Politics; Hirst and Thomp-son, Globalization in Question; Sassen, Globalization an d Its Discoritents.12 Castells, The Power of Identity, 245;Held, Models of Democracy, 343.13 Castells, The Power of Identity.14 Held, Models of Democracy; Held, Democracy and the Global Order.1 5 Hobson and Sharman, "The Endu ring Place of Hierarchy," 63-64.16 Krasner, Sovereignty.17 Donnelly, 'Sovereign I nequal ities and Hierarchy in Anarchy," 145-53.18 Ibid., 146.19 Ibid., 149.20 Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy.21 Cole, 'Sovereignty Relinquished?"; Frank, H ironaka, and Schofer, "TheNation-State and the Natura l Environment."zz Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, "Human Rights in a Globalizing World."23 Hettne and Soderbaum, "Theorising the Rise of Regionness."24 Krasner, Sovereigtrty, 216-17.2s Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy.26 Falk, 'The Challenge of Genocide," 181.27 Timothy Shaw, "New Regionalism in Africa," 406-7.28 Timot hy Shaw, 'New Region alism in Africa."29 Katzenstein, "Regionalism a nd Asia."30 Chalmers Johnson, Blowback.31 Achary, "Democratisation," 381-82, 383-84.32 Grugel, "New Regionalism and modes of G overnance"; Krasner, SOU-ereignty. A similar dynamic is at work in Latin A merica. At the regionallevel, the Organization of American States is deman ding respect for

human rights and space for civil society. Although there is n o suprana-tional regional entity capable of enforcing its will, these regional dynam icsenhance the climate for human rights and peaceful relations.33 Krasner, Souereigtzty,235.34 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "World and ~ e ~ i o n a lhlilitary Expenditure Estimates."35 European Commission, "Accession Criteria." . .36 Elias, Power and Civility. . . .. .37 Krasner, Sovereignty; Krasner, Proble matic Souercigtrty.

180 GREGORY HOOKS I envision in^ a G rand Theory of Peace 181

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