Cases Election Law Review 2012

8/10/2019 Cases Election Law Review 2012

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In Raul Lambino, et. al. vs. Comelec G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

the issue on initiative to propose amendments to the 1987 Constitution wasagain at issue. FACTS: Raul Lambino and Enrico Aumentado with other

groups, gathered signatures for an initiative to propose amendments to the

1987 Constitution. In August 2006, the Lambino group filed a petitionasking the Comelec to conduct a plebiscite for the ratification of the

amendments proposed in their initiative petition, in accordance with Section5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of RA 6735.

The petitioners claim that their initiative petition was supported by the

signatures of 6M+ individuals, constituting at least 12% of all registered

voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of theregistered voters. They further claimed that the provincial and city Comelec

officials had already verified the 6.3M signatures. However, the Comelec

denied the petition on the ground that there is no valid enabling lawgoverning initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, relying on Santiagovs. Comelec (336 SCRA 843 1997) which declared RA 6735 inadequate to

implement the initiative clause on proposal to amend the Constitution. The

advocates of the proposed amendments then filed with the SC a petition forcertiorari and mandamus (under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court) to set aside

the Comelec Resolution dismissing the petition and to order the Comelec to

give due course to their petition.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the initiative petition of the Lambino group

complied with the provisions of Section 2, Article XVII of theConstitution.

(2)

Whether the Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago vs.

Comelec declaring RA 6735 incomplete and inadequate or

wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the

initiative clause to amend the Constitution.

HELD: (1) the initiative petition failed to comply with the requirements of

the Constitution. For the petition to be valid, two essential requisites mustbe complied with, namely: (a) the people must author, and thus sign, the

entire proposal; no agent or representative can sign on their behalf; and (b)

as an initiative upon a petition, the proposed amendments must be embodiedin the petition itself.


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The rationale for the second requisite is that the signature requirement

would be rendered meaningless if the person affixing his signature has notfirst seen and understood what it is that he is signing. Further, and more

importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a

significant potential for fraud. On-compliance with the above mentionedrequirements is fatal to the initiative petition. For sure, the great majority of

the 6.3M people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text ofthe proposed changes before signing, as the proposed amendments were not

stated in the signature sheets. They were not apprised of the nature andeffect of the proposed amendments, among which are substantial changes as

follows:

1) the term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus

member of the Parliament may be re-elected indefinitely;

2)

The Interim Parliament whose membership comprised of presentmembers of Congress can decide when to call the parliamentaryelections. Thus, leaving them the absolute discretion to determine

their term limits.

3) That within 45 days from the ratification of proposed changes, theinterim Parliament may further propose revision or amendments to

the Constitution.

Furthermore, a peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies

only to an amendment to the Constitution and not revision. Article XVII of

the Constitution speaks of three modes of proposing amendments to theConstitution:

a. by direct congressional action (3/4 vote of all its members)b.

through a constitutional convention, and

c. through a peoples initiative. The first and second modes, as

provided in Section 1 of Article XVII, apply to both

amendment and revision, but the 3 rd mode applies only toamendments. The distinction between the first two modes and

the third was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the

Constitutional Commission where it was said: the committeemembers felt that this system of initiative should be limited to

amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the

revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from theoperation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment

or Revision xxx.


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There can be no dispute that a peoples initiative can only propose

amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiativesto amendments. There can be no deviation from the constitutionally

prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one

backed by 6.3M signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specificmodes prescribed in the Constitution itself. The Lambinos groups

proposed changes constituted not just an amendment but a revision, becauseof the change in the form of government from Presidential to Parliamentary,

and the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN REVISION AND AMENDMENT.Revision

broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, likealtering the principle of separation of power or the system of checks and

balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety

of the Constitution.

On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces,

deletes, without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally

affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generallyaffects only the specific provision being amended.

On the second pivotal issue of revisiting the ruling of the Court inSantiago vs. Comelec, an affirmation or reversal of the same will not change

the outcome of the case. The Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving

the constitutionality of a statue if the case before the Court can resolve onsome grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled

doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of the statute ifthe case can be resolved on some other grounds.

NOTE: In the resolution on the motion for reconsideration, however, the

Court noted that a majority of the justices voted to declare RA 6735sufficient law for a peoples initiative on the Constitution, effectively

abandoning Santiago v. Comelec.)

Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio Gonzales and OrlandoBalbon, Jr. 622 SCRA 744 (July 2010). In considering the residency issue,

the dwelling where a person permanently intends to return to and to remainhis or her capacity or inclination to decorate the place, or the lack of it, IS

IMMATERIAL. Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it determinedthe fitness of a dwelling as a persons residence based solely on very


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personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is repletewith standards that can be used. Comelec used wrong considerations inarriving at the conclusion that Mitras residence is not the residence

contemplated by law.

In this case, following the conversion of Puerto Princesa (Mitras

domicile of origin) from a component city to a highly urbanized city whoseresidents can no longer vote for provincial officials, Mitra abandoned his

domicile in Puerto Princesa and acquired a new one in Aborlan which iswithin the LGU where he intended to run. Mitra bought the old Maligaya

Feedmill and used the second floor as his residence.

Assitio vs. Aguirre 619 SCRA 518Residence as used in the law

prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, is

DOCTRINALLY SETTLED to mean domicile, importing not only anintention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a persons

acts, utterances and activities. Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully

effect a transfer, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change ofdomicile; (2) bonafide intention of abandoning the former place of residence

and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond to said purpose

Panlaqui v. Comelec 613 SCRA 573 Voters inclusion/exclusion

proceedings essentially involve the issue of whether a voter shall be included

in or excluded from the list of voters based on the qualifications required bylaw and the facts presented to show possession of these qualifications. As

distinguished from the procedure in certificate of candidacies (petition todeny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy) on the other hand, the

denial/cancellation proceedings involve the issue of whether there is a false

representation of a material fact (Sec. 78).

Panlaqui vs. Comelec 613 SCRA 573 - It is not within the province of

the RTC in a voters inclusion/exclusion proceedings to take cognizance

of and determine the presence of a false representation of a materialfact. It has no jurisdiction to try the issues of whether the misrepresentation

relates to material fact and whether there was an intension to deceive the

electorate in terms of ones qualifications for public office. The finding

that Velasco was not qualified to vote due to lack of residency

requirement does not translate into a finding of a deliberate attempt to


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mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render him

ineligible.

Canicosa v. Comelec 282 SCRA 512 (1997).The question of inclusion or

exclusion from the list of voters involves the right to vote which is notwithin the power and authority of the Comelec to rule upon. The

determination of whether one has the right to vote is a justiciable issueproperly cognizable by our regular courts.

Macalintal v. Comelec 405 SCRA 614 (2003) The execution of the

affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit

required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrantor permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines,

but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in

fact abandoned his domicile of origin. The affidavit is required ofimmigrants and permanent residents abroad because by their status in

the host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their intent

to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of

abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.

Right of Suffrage of Duals (Overseas Absentee Voters) under

RA 9189. - Loida Nicolas-Lewis, et. al. vs. Comelec G.R. No. 162759,

August 6, 2006. - Petitioners are dual citizens having retained or reacquired

Philippine Citizenship under RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and

Reacquisition Act of 2003. As such, they sought registration andcertification as overseas absentee voters under RA 9189 or the Overseas

Absentee Voting Act of 2003, in order to vote in the May 2004 elections.However, the Philippine embassy in the US advised them that per Comelec

letter dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no residence requirement as

prescribed by the Constitution. Petitioners sought a clarification from the

Comelec which thereafter, expressed the opinion that dual citizens

under RA 9225 cannot exercise the right of suffrage under the Overseas

Absentee Voting Law because said law was not enacted for them, hence,

they are considered regular voters who have to meet requirements ofresidency, among others.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhileretained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 may

vote as absentee voter under RA 9189.


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HELD: Section 1 of Article V of the Philippine Constitution prescribed

residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote.On the other hand, Section 2 thereof, authorizes congress to devise a system

wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as anexception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed

to vote.

There is no provision in the dual citizenship law (RA 9225), requiringduals to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines

first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, RA 9225,

in implicit acknowledgement that duals are most likely non-residents,grants under Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as granted to an

absentee voter under RA 9189 which aims to enfranchise as much as

possible all overseas Filipinos, who, save for the residency requirementexacted of an ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote as ruled in

Makalintal vs. Comelec 405 SCRA 614

Cordora v. Commission on Elections 580 SCRA 12 (2009) Cordoraconcluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement because

of Tambuntings naturalization as an American. Cordoras reasoning fails

because Tambunting is not a naturalized American. Residency, for thepurpose of elections laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing

in a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently, and is not

dependent upon citizenship.

Liberal Party vs. Commission on Elections 620 SCRA 393 (May 6,

2010), the SC distinguished REGISTRATION and ACCREDITATION

of a political party. The root of this petition before the SC is the Nationalista

Party-Nationalista Party Coalition (NP-NPC) petition before the COMELEC

for registrationas a coalition and accreditation as the dominant minorityparty. While the Comelec En Banc claimed jurisdiction over the registration

of coalitions and has in fact decreed NP-NPCs registration, the Comelec

however did NOT rule on the accreditation aspect. The registration of acoalition and the accreditation of a dominant minority party are two

separate matters that are substantively distinct from each other.

Section 2(5), Article IX-C and Rule 32 of the CRP regulate theregistration of political parties, organizations or coalition of

political parties. Accreditation as a dominant party is governed by


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Comelec Resolution No. 8752, Section 1 of which states that the

petition for accreditation shall be filed with the Clerk of theCommission who shall docket it as an SPP (DM) case. This was the

manner the NP-NPC was docketed.

Registration of political parties is a special proceeding assigned toa Division for handling under the CRP. No similar clear cut rules isavailable to a petition for accreditation as a dominant party.

Registration must first take place before a request for accreditation

can be made. Accreditation is the next natural step to follow afterregistration.

Hence, when the Comelec En Banc, resolved the registration of the NP-

NPC the case is terminated and ripe for review by the SC via a Petition for

Certiorari. The issue with respect to accreditation is a separate issue which

is treated in a separate proceedings. As ruled, a Motion for Reconsiderationof a Resolution of the Comelec En Banc is a prohibited pleading (Sec. 1(d)

Rule 13). The remedy available to a party is a petition for certiorari with the

SC pursuant to Article IX-A, Sec. 7 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Atienza, Jr. et. Al. vs Comelec 612 SCRA 761 Authority of Comelec

over intra- party disputes is limited. The Comelec may intervene in disputes

internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutionalfunctions. The validity or invalidity of Atienza et. Al.s expulsion was

purely a membership issue that had to be settled within the party. It is aninternal matter over which Comelec has no jurisdiction.

Damasen vs. Tumamao 613 SCRA 49 (2010)the discretion of acceptingmembers to a political party is a right and a privilege, a purely internal

matter, which the Court cannot meddle in. The reason behind the right givento a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy

occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by

the people in the election (Sec. 45 (b) of RA 7160 Rule on Succession and as

held in Navarro v. CA 672 SCRA 355 (2010). Damasen was not a bonafide

member. Tumamao was husband of the VM who died).

Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on elections 621 SCRA 385 (June 22, 2010),the SC ruled that Comelec cannot issue rules and regulations that provide a

ground for the substitution of a party-list nominee NOT written in R.A.7941.

Sec. 8 provides Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each

registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the Comelec


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not later than 45 days before the election a list of names, not less than

five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it

obtains the required number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only personswhohave given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall

not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost hisbid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. NO change

of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after

the same shall have been submitted to the Comelec except in cases (1)

where the nominee dies, or (2) withdraws in writing his nomination, (3)

becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee

shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the

HR who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered

resigned.

CIBAC (Citizens Battle Against Corruption) thru its President Emmanuel

Villanueva manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007

synchronized national and local elections and submitted their list of 5nominees (Villanueva, Lokin (herein petitioner), Cruz-Gonzales, Tugna and

Galang). The list was later published in the newspapers of general

circulation. Before the elections, Villanueva filed a certificate ofnomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees whereby it

withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted

Borje. The amended list included Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales and Borje.Subsequently, Villanueva transmitted to Comelec the signed petitions of

more than 81% if the CIBAC members in order to confirm the withdrawal ofthe nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang.

Based on the Party-List Canvas Report, it showed that CIBAC was entitled

to a second seat, hence, the counsel of CIBAC filed with the Comelec sittingas National Board of Canvassers, a request to proclaim Lokin as the 2nd

nominee which was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales. Since

Comelec failed to act on the filing of the certificate of nomination,substitution and amendment of the list of nominees and the petitions of the

more than 81% of CIBAC members, Villanueva filed a petition to confirm

the said certificate with the Comelec which was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054. In the meantime, Comelec as NBC partially proclaimed several party

lists as having won which included Cibac.


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The Secretary General of CIBAC informed the Secretary General of the HR

to formally swear Lokin into office but which was denied in view of thependency of E.M. No. 07-054 which approved the withdrawal of the

nominations of Lokin et. al. and the substitution of Borje. Cruz-Gonzales

was proclaimed as the official second nominee.

Lokin brought before the SC via Mandamus to compel respondent Comelecto proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Also, in another

petition, Lokin assailed Sec. 13 of Resolution No. 7804 (Rules andRegulations Governing the filing of Manifestation of Intent to Participate

and submission of Names of Nominees under the Party-List) and its

resolution in E.M. No. 07-054.

The Comelec asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse

in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as representative and herassumption of that office; that Lokins proper recourse was an electoralprotest filed in the HRET, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the

matter being raised by Lokin. CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum

shopping for filing a petition for mandamus and a petition for certiorari,considering that both petitions ultimately seek to have him proclaimed as the

second nominee of CIBAC.

ISSUES: a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy.

The Court has jurisdiction. The controversy involving Lokin is neither an

EP nor an action for QW, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in whichLokin is seeking to be seated as second nominee of CIBAC. Although an EP

may properly be available to one part-list organization seeking to unseatanother party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and

the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the

legal votes, Lokins case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-

list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same partylist. Neither does an action for QW lie, considering that the case does not

involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the RP, or some

other case of disqualification.

Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the

Comelec to seek the review of its resolution in accordance with Section 7 ofArticle IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and

assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is nowimplemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, which provides for


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the review of the judgments, final orders or resolution of the Comelec and

the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by apetition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the SC within

the limited period of 30 days. The Court has original and exclusive

jurisdiction over Lokins certiorari and for mandamus.

(b) Both actions, certiorari and mandamus did not violate the rule againstforum shopping even if the actions involved the same parties, because they

were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought weredifferent.

Comelec gravely abused its discretion in promulgating Section 13 of

Res. No. 7804 as it expanded the exceptions under Sec. 8 of RA 7941

Section 8 enumerates only 3 instances in which the party-list

organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee. Theenumeration is exclusive.

Abayhon vs. HRET et. al 612 SCRA 375/Palparan Jr. vs. HRET et. al.

These two cases were consolidated and jointly resolved as it both concernsthe authority of the HRET to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of

the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.

Abayhon is the 1stnominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list that won a seat in

the HR during the 2007 elections. Palparan on the other hand was the 1st

nominee of Bantay party-list. A petition for QW was filed with HRETagainst the party-list groups and its nominee claiming that it was not eligible

for a party-list since it did not represent the marginalized andunderrepresented sectors. Abayhon is the spouse of an incumbent

congressional district representative and likewise does not belong to the UR

and marginalized. Petitioners also claim that Abayhon lost her bid as party-

list rep called An Waray in the immediately preceding elections of May 10,2004. Palparan also was alleged to have committed various human rights

violations against the marginalized sectors (Bantay represents the victims of

communist rebels, CAFGU, security guards and former rebels.)

Abayhon and Palparan postures that the Comelec already confirmed the

status of the party list as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization, thatHRET had no jurisdiction over the petitioner for QW since the petitioners

collaterally attacked the registration of the party-list organization, a matterthat fell within the jurisdiction of the Comelec. That it was the party-list that


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was taking a seat in the HR and not them, being only its nominees. All

questions involving their eligibility as nominee, were internal concerns ofthe organization. The HRET dismissed the petition against party-list but

upheld its jurisdiction over nominees who both filed an MR which was

denied. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari alleging that the HRETgravely abused its discretion.

The Court made reference to Sec. 5(1) of Article VI (which identifies who

the members of that House are. The HR shall be composed of not morethan 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected

from legislative districtsapportioned among the provinces, cities, and the

Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respectiveinhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ration, and those

who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of

registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

Clearly the members of the HR are 2 kinds members who shall be

elected from legislative districts andthose who shall be elected through a

party-list system. From the point of view of the Constitution, it is theparty-list rep who are elected into office, NOT their parties or

organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that

peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congressby law established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or

parties to which such party-list reps belong.

Once elected, both the district reps and the party-list reps are treated in like

manners. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments.They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their

legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term

limitations of 3 years for a max of 3 consecutive terms. The party list

system act itself recognizes party list nominees as members of the HR (Sec.2, RA 7941 Declaration of PolicyThe State shall promote proportional

representation in the election of reps in the HR through a party-list system of

registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations orcoalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the

marginalized and UR sectors x x x x to become members of the HR .

The Court held that initially, the authority to determine the qualifications of

a party-list nominee belongs to the organization and to choose five fromamong the aspiring nominees to comply with the law. But where an


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allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a

disqualified nominee to become its party-list rep in the lower house andenjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the

dispute is taken out of its hand. Hence, pursuant to Section 17 of Article VI,

the HRET being the sole judge of all contests relating to, among otherthings, the qualifications of the members of the HR, the HRET has

jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. The HRET wascorrect in dismissing the QW and retaining authority to rule on the

qualifications.

Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Comelec 619 SCRA

585 (DELISTING) The Comelec may motu propio OR upon verifiedcomplaint of any interested party, remove, or cancel, after due notice and

hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,

organization or coalition IF It: (a) fails to participate in the last 2preceding elections; OR (b) fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes casts

under the party-list system in the 2 preceding elections for the

constituency in which it was registered (Section 6 RA 7941). The word

OR is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence ofone thing from the other things enumerated. A party list group or

organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and immediately

thereafter did not participate in the preceding election is something that isnot covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may ben

an unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter for Congress to address.

This case abandoned the Minero vs. Comelec G.R. No. 177548 May 10,2007.

Amores vs. HRET et. al 622 SCRA 593 (2010) Amores via a petition for

QW with the HRET questioned the legality of the assumption of office of

Emmanuel Joel Villanueva as rep of CIBAC. It was alleged among other

things, that Villanueva assumed office without a formal proclamation by theComelec, disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since at

the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was

already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 ofRA 7941 and that his change of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its

overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least 6

months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to representthe new sector under Section 15 of RA 7941.


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The HRET dismissed the petition as it found the petition to be filed beyond

the 10 days reglementary period, that the age qualification for youth sectoralnominees under Section 9 of RA 7941 applied only to those nominated as

such during the first 3 congressional terms after the ratification of the

Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registeredexclusively as representing the youth sector, which CIBAC, a multi sectoral

organization, is not. As regards the shift of affiliation, it was held thatSection 15 did not apply as there was no resultant change in party list

affiliation.

ISSUES: (1) whether the petition for QW was dismissible for having been

filed unseasonably; and (2) whether Section 9 and 15 of RA 7941 apply toVillanueva. As to the first issue, the SC found grave abuse of discretion on

the part of HRET. The Court overlooked the technicality of timeliness and

rules on the merits since the challenge goes into Villanuevas qualifications,it may be filed at anytime during his term. Also date of proclamation wasnot clear. As to the second and more substantial issue, the Court made

reference to Section 9 of RA 7941 which provides that in case of a

nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be 25 but not more than 30

years of age on the day of the election. The youth sectoral rep who

attains the age of 30 during his term shall be allowed to continue in

office until the expiration of his term.

The Court did not find any textual support on the interpretation of HRET

that Section 9 applied only to those nominated during the first 3congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998. A

cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and freefrom any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or

interpretation. Only room for application. The distinction is nowhere found

in the law. When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.

Respecting Section 15 of RA 7941, the Court likewise found no textual

support for HRETs ratiocination that the provision did not apply to

Villanuevas shift of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseasFilipino workers and their families sector as there was no resultant change in

party list affiliation. Section 15 reads Change of Affiliation: Effect

Any elected party list rep who changes his political party or sectoral

affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat; Provided, That

if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within 6 months


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before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list

rep under his new party or organization.

The wordings of Section 15 is clear as it covers changes in both political

party and sectoral affiliation and which may occur within the same partysince multi-sectoral party-list org are qualified to participate in the

Philippine party-list system. A nominee who changes his sectoral affiliationwithin the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new

sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least 6 months beforethe elections. Sec. 9 and 15 apply to Villanueva.

As regards the contention that Villanueva is the 1st nominee of CIBAC,whose victory was later upheld, is NO moment. A party-list orgs ranking of

its nominees is a mere indication of preference , their qualifications

according to law are a different matter.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Comelec 618 SCRA 32 Ladlad is an

organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as

lesbians, gays, bisexuals or transgendered individuals. They applied forregistration with Comelec in 2006 and its accreditation was denied on the

ground that the org had no substantial membership. Ladlad in 2009 again

filed a petition for registration which was dismissed by Comelec on moralgrounds.

The SC ruled that moral disapproval is not a sufficient governmental interestto justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation to the party list

system. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specificallyenumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the

requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. The SC found that Ladlad

has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for

accreditation.

Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 vs. G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007,

523 SCRA 1 - Petitioners reacting on an emerging public perception that theindividuals behind the party-list groups do not, as they should, actually

represent the poor and marginalized sectors. Petitioners, wrote a letter to the

Comelec requesting that the complete list of the nominees of all parties whohave been accredited pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 7804 prescribing

rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent toparticipate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list system


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of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections be

published. The Comelec vehemently did not accede to the request of thepetitioners, it based its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of

subject party-list groups on Section 7 of RA 7941 (more specifically the last

sentence which states: the names of the party-list nominees shall not beshown on the certified list..

The Comelec believe that the party list elections must not be

personality oriented. Abalos said under RA 7941, the people are to vote forsectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions not for their nominees.

ISSUE: whether or not the disclosure of the names of the nominees arecovered by the Right of Public to information.

HELD: The Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the

names of the nominees of the party list groups. No national security or likeconcerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of theparty-list groups in question. The last sentence of Section 7 is limited in

scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which

the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on electionday. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute nothing in RA

7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through

mediums other than the Certified list the names of the party-list nominees.The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the

provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007

elections. The need for voters to be informed about matters that have abearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind

voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec.

Banat et. al. vs. Comelec G.R. 178271/12972 2009which abandoned the

matter of computation held in the Veterans Party caseintention was to fill

the 20% and party list were ranked according to the votes cast for party-listand even those who did not reach the 2% were given seats in the second

round of the ranking. Those who garnered 2% automatically takes a seat in

the first round.

Panlaqui v. Comelec 613 SCRA 573 Voters inclusion/exclusionproceedings essentially involve the issue of whether a petition shall be

included in or excluded from the list of voters based on the qualificationsrequired by law and the facts presented to show possession of these


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qualifications. On the other hand, the COC denial/cancellation proceedings

involve the issue of whether there is a false representation of a material fact.The false representation must necessarily pertain not to a mere innocuous

mistake but to a material fact or those that refer to a candidates qualification

for elective office.

Loong c. Comelec 216 SCRA 760 (1992) If a person qualified to file a

petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the15-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons,

the election laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has anotherchance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for

QW within 10 days from the proclamation of the results of the election.

NOTE: In Fermin v. Comelec G.R. No. 179695 and G.R. No. 182369,

December 18, 2008,the SC clarified that Section 5(Procedure in cases ofNuisance candidates) and Section 7(Petition to Deny Due Course To orCancel a Certificate of Candidacy under RA 6646, did not in any way

amend the period for filing Section 78 petitions. While Section 7of the

said law makes reference to Section 5on the procedure in the conduct of

cases for the denial of due course to the COCs of nuisance candidates (thenchief Justice Davide in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Comelec, G.R.

No. 120265, September 18, 1995 248 SCRA 400, explains that theprocedure hereinabove provided mentioned in Section 7cannot be construed

to refer to Section 6 which does not provide for a procedure but to the

effects of disqualification cases, (but) can only refer to the procedure

provided in Section 5of the said Act on nuisance candidates, the same

cannot be taken to mean that the 25-day period for filing Section 78petitions is changed to 5 days counted from the last day for the filing of

COCs.

The clear language of Section 78cannot be amended or modified b y

a mere reference in a subsequent statute to the use of a procedurespecifically intended for another type of action. Cardinal is the rule in

statutory construction that repeals by implication are disfavored and will notbe so declared by the Court unless the intent of the legislators is manifest.

Noteworthy in Loong v. Comelec 216 SCRA 760 (1992), which upheld

the 25-day period for filing Section 78 petitions, was decided long after

the enactment of RA 6646. Hence, Section 23, Section 2 of the Comelec

Rules of Procedure is contrary to the unequivocal mandate of the law.

Following the ruling in Fermin, the Court declared that as the law stands,


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the petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC may be filed at

anytime not later than 25-days from the time of the filing of the COC.

In Salcedo v. Comelec 312 SCRA 447,it was ruled that a candidate who

used her husbands name even through their marriage was declared void wasnot guilty of misrepresentation concerning a material fact. In order to justify

the cancellation, it is essential that the false representation pertains tomaterial matter affecting substantive rights of a candidate the right to run

for elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. The materialmisrepresentation must refer to the qualifications for the office, such as

residence, citizenship, age. In addition to the requirement of materiality, the

false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate

ineligible.

In Justimbaste v. Comelec 572 SCRA 736 (2008) Materialmisrepresentation as a ground to deny due course or cancel a certificate of

candidacy refers to the falsity of a statement required to be entered therein as

enumerated in Section 74 of the OEC. Concurrent with materiality is adeliberate intention to deceive the electorate as to one qualification making

reference to Salcedo II that in order to justify the cancellation of the COC

under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentionedtherein pertained to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this

provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidatethe right to run

for the elective post for which he filed the COC. There is also no showingthat there was an intent to deceive the electorate as to the identity of the

private respondent, nor that by using his Filipino name the voting public wasthereby deceived.

In Lluz v. Comelec G.R. No. 172840 June 7, 2007 SC ruled that first, a

misrepresentation in a COC is material when it refers to a qualification forelective office and affects the candidates eligibility; second, when a

candidate commits a material misrepresentation & third, a misrepresentation

of a non-material fact, or non-material misrepresentation, is not a ground todeny due course to or cancel a COC under Sec. 78. In other words, for a

candidates certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or canceled by

the Comelec, the fact misrepresented must pertain to a qualification for theoffice sought by the candidate. Punong barangay said that he was a CPA

when in fact he is not).


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Aldovino Jr., vs. Comelec 609 SCRA 234 (2009) Article X, Section 8

both by structure and substancefixes an elective officials term of officeand limits his stay in office to 3 consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that

is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a

circumvention. The provision should be read in the context of interruption

of term, NOT in the context of interrupting the full continuity of theexercise of the power of the elective position. The voluntary renunciationit speaks of refers only to the elective officials involuntary relinquishment

of office and loss of title to this office. It does not speak of the temporary

cessation of the exercise of power or authority that may occur for

various reasons, with preventive suspension being only one of them.

Quoting Latasa the law contemplates a rest period during which the

local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power

or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a

particular government unit.

Penera v. Comelec 599 SCRA 609. The issue on premature campaigning was raised

as an issue in this case. Antecedent facts briefly show that Penera and Andanar were

mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica in the last May 14, 2007 elections. Andanar

filed before the Office of the Regional Election Director, Caraga Region, Region

XIII, a petition for disqualification against Penera for unlawfully engaging in

election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of

the campaign period.

The Petition alleged that on 29 March 2007, a day before the start of theauthorized campaign period on 30 March 2007, Penera and her partymates went

around the different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and

requesting the people to vote for them on the day of the elections. Penera alleged

that the charge was not true although having admitted that a motorcade did take

place which was simply in accordance with the usual practice in nearby cities and

provinces, where the filing of COC was preceded by a motorcade, which dispersed

soon after the completion of such filing. Penera in her defense cited Barroso v.

Ampig (385 Phil 2237; 328 SCRA 530) wherein the Court supposedly ruled that a

motorcade held by candidates during the filing of their COCs was not a form of

political campaigning. Pending the disqualification case, Penera was proclaimed as

winner and assumed office on July 2, 2002.

Comelec ruled on 24 July 2007 that Penera engaged in premature campaigning in

violation of Section 80 and disqualified Penera from continuing as a mayoralty

candidate. The SC ruled no abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec and held

that the conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political

activity which fall squarely under the ambit of Section 79 of the OEC.


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Penera moved for reconsiderationarguing that she was not yet a candidate at

the time of the supposed premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of RA 8436

(the law authorizing the Comelec to use an automated election system for the

process of voting, counting of votes, and canvasing/consolidating the results of the

national and local elections), as amended by RA 9369, is not officially a candidateuntil the start of the campaign period.

In granting Peneras MR, the SC En Banc held that Penera did not engage in

premature campaigning and should thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty

candidate. The Court said-

(a) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision (or the assailed Decision)

considered a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a candidate even

before the start of the campaign period. This is contrary to the clear intent andletter of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended, which stated that a person who files his

certificate of candidacy will only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign

period, and unlawful acts or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect onlyupon the start of such campaign period. In applying the said law

(1) The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawfulas to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start

of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only

for acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words,election offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start

of the campaign period. Before the start of the campaign period, such

election offenses cannot be committed.

Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to apply it. The forum

for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not the

Court but the Legislature.

(b) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15, of RA 8436, asamended, does not provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate before

the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the

campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a

candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful

upon the start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the

Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and

speech, would be void for vagueness.


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That Section 15 of RA 8436 does not expressly state that campaigning

before the start of the campaign period is lawful, as the assailed decision asserted, is

no moment. It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly

declared unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act

unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congressto declare in Section 15 of RA 8436 that partisan political activities before the start

of the campaign period is lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that any

unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the

start of the campaign period. The only inescapable and logical result is that the

same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.

(d) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot v.

Comelec (G>R> No. 164858, 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the ground

that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the

campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators whoexplained that the early deadline for filing COC under RA 8436 was set only to

afford time to prepare the machine readable ballots, and they intended to preserve

the existing election period, such that one who files his COC to meet the early

deadline will still not be considered as a candidate.

When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly

incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision in Section 15, of RA

8436 that a period who files his certificate of candidacy shall be considered a

candidate only at the start of the campaign period Congress wahted to insure that

no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by theautomated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan

political act done before the start of the campaign period. This provision cannot be

annulled by the Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The

assailed Decision, however, did not claim that his provision is unconstitutional. In

fact, the assailed Decision considered the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the

Decision was self-contradictory reversing Lanot but maintaining the

constitutionality of the said provision.

In Lanot vs. Comelec 507 SCRA 114, the Court ruled that there are two aspects of

a disqualification case:

1) Electoral aspectdetermines whether the offender should be disqualified from

being a candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are summary in

character and require only clear preponderance of evidence. An erring

candidate may be disqualified even without prior determination of probable

cause in a PI. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the

criminal aspect and vice-versa.


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2) Criminal aspect determines whether there is probable cause to charge a

candidate for an election offense. If there is probable cause, the Comelec

through its Law Department, files the criminal information before the

proper court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-blown

hearing and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminalconviction shall result in the disqualification of the offender, which may even

include disqualification from holding a future public office.

Typoco vs. Comelec 614 SCRA 391In Garay v. Comelec 261 SCRA 222(1996) the Court held that (a) certificate of votes does not constitute

sufficient evidence of the true and genuine results of the election; onlyelection returns are, pursuant to Sections 231, 233-236 and 238 of BP881.

Again in De Guzman v. Comelec 426 SCRA 698 (2004) the Court statedthat, in an election contest where the correctness of the number of votes is

involved, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves;where the ballots can nor be produced or are not available, the election

returns would be the best evidence.

Doromal vs. Biron/Comelec 613 SCRA 160 (2010) the certificate of

votes, which contains the number of votes obtained by each candidate, is

issued by the BEI upon the request of the duly accredited watcher pursuantto Section 16 of RA 6646. Relative to its evidentiary value, Section 17 of

RA 6646 provides that Sections 235 and 236 of BP 881 notwithstanding, the

Certificate of Votes shall be admissible in evidence to prove tampering,alteration, falsification or any anomaly committed in the preparation of the

election returns concerned, when duly authenticated by at least two

members of the BEI who issued the certificate. Failure to present the CVshall however not bar the presentation of other evidence to impugn the

authenticity of the ER. It cannot be a valid basis of canvass.

Purpose of requiring authentication of at least 2 members of the BOC tosafeguard the integrity of the certificate from the time it is issued by the BEI

to the watcher after the counting of votes at the precinct level up to the time

that it is presented to the board of canvassers to proved tampering.

Calo v. Comelec 610 SCRA 342/Pecson v. Comelec 575 SCRA 634

decisions of the courts in election protest cases, resulting as they do from ajudicial evaluation of the ballots and a full blown adversarial proceedings.

Should at least be given similar worth and recognition as decisions of the

board of canvassers. This is especially true when attended by other equally


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weighty circumstances of the case, such as the shortness of the term of the

contested elective office, of the case.

Mananzala vs. Comelec and Julie Monton 523 SCRA 31. - Decisions,

final orders or rulings of the Commission on Election contests involvingelective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory and not

appealable; All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by

the Commission en banc.

A decision of the RTC was raised on appeal which was heard by the 2 nd

division which reversed the decision of the RTC. In his MR petitionerargues that the MR filed with the former 2nd division has thrown the

whole case wide open for review as in a trial de novo in a criminal case

yet Comelec en banc failed to conduct a thorough review of the contestedballots. Election cases cannot be treated in a similar manner as criminalcases where, upon appeal from a conviction by the trial court, the whole case

is thrown open for review and the appellate court can resolve issues which

are not even set forth in the pleadings.

Pacanan, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 597 SCRA 189

Aguilar v. Comelec 591 SCRA 491 - Petitioner Pacanan, Jr. and privaterespondent Langi Sr., were candidates for mayor in the municipality of

Motiong, Samar during the May 14, 2007 elections. Petitioner was

proclaimed having garnered a total of 3,069 votes against privaterespondents 3,066 votes.

On May 25, 2007, private respondent filed an election protest with the

RTC which rendered a Decision on January 7, 2008 RTC declaring private

respondent as winner with a plurality of 6 votes. 3 days after or on January

10, 2008 petitioner filed a notice of appeal and paid 3K appeal fee before theRTC and also appealed the RTC decision to the Comelec. Out of the 3K

appeal fee required under Sec. 3, Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of

Procedure, petitioner only paid 1K plus 200 to cover the legalresearch/bailiff fees. On March 17, 2008 Comelec 1st division issued on

Order dismissing the appeal on the ground that petitioner failed to pay the

correct appeal fee within the 5-days reglementary period which is a groundfor the dismissal of the appeal under Section 9(a), Rule 22 of the CRP. On

March 28, 2008 petitioner filed a MR with the Comelec En Banc whichdenied the resolution declaring that the appeal was not perfected on time for


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non-payment of the complete amount of appeal and for late payment as well,

hence, did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal.

Before the SC is a petition for Certiorari raising that 1) Comelec

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction in holding that the correct appeal fee was not paid on time; 2) In

failing to consider, that assuming that the correct appeal fee was not paid ontime, the alleged non-payment is not in anyway attributable to petitioner; 3)

that assuming the correct appeal fee was not paid on time, there are highlyjustifiable and compelling reasons to resolve the subject case on the merit in

the interest of justice and public interest.

The SC noted that two (2) different tribunals earlier require the

payment of two different appeal fees for the perfection of the appeals of

election cases.

Sec. 3, Rule 22 of the CRP ( Appeals form decisions of Courts in

election Protest Cases), mandates that the notice of appeal must be filed

with 5-days after the promulgation of the decision. On the other hand,Section 3 & 4 Rule 40 of the CRP amended the amount of the appeal fees

to 3.2K which should be paid with the cash division of the Comelec.

On the other hand, Section 8 & 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15 SC

(Rules of procedure in Election Contests before the Court Involving

Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials effective May 15, 2007) alsoprovide the procedure of instituting an appeal and the required appeal fees to

be paid for the appeal to be given due course.

This requirement in the payment of appeal fees had caused much

confusion, which the Comelec addressed through the issuance of Comelec

Res. No. 8486 on July 15, 2008. The salient featureof the said resolutionprovide that the appeal to the Comelec of the trial courts decision in

election contests involving municipal and barangay officials is perfected

upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the 1K appeal feeto the court that rendered the decision within the 5-day reglementaryperiod. The non-payment or the insufficient payment of the addition appeal

fee of 3.2K to the Comelec Cash Division in accordance with Rule 40,

Section 3 of the CRP, as amended, does not affect the perfection of the

appeal and does not result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of the

appeal.


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Comelec 1stdivision gravely abused its discretion in issuing the orderdismissing the appeal taking notice that the notice of appeal and the 1K

appeal fee were, respectively filed and paid with the MTC on April 21, 2008

which date the appeal was perfected. Comelec Res. 8486 clarifying the ruleon the payment of appeal fees was issued only on July 15, 2008, or almost 3-

months after the appeal was perfected. Yet on July 31, 2008 or barely twoweeks after the issuance of Comelec Res. 8486, the Comelec 1 st division

dismissed the appeal for non-payment of the 3.2K appeal fee.

Considering that petitioner filed his appeal months before the

clarificatory resolution on appeal fees, the appeal should not be unjustly

prejudiced by Comelec Res. No. 8486. Fairness and prudence dictate the

1stdivision should have first directed petitioner to pay the additional appeal

fee in accordance with the clarificatory resolution. Instead it hastilydismissed the appeal on the strength of the clarificatory resolution which hadtaken effect only a few days earlier. (This unseemly haste is an invitation to

outrage.) Court further stressed the liberal construction policy.

Saludaga vs. Comelec 617 SCRA 601The discretion to allow execution

pending reconsideration belongs to the division that rendered the assailed

decision, order or resolution, or the Comelec en banc, as the case may be not to the presiding Commissioner. A writ of execution pending resolution

of the MR of a decision of the division is not granted as a matter of right

such that its issuance becomes a ministerial duty that may be dispensed evenjust by the Presiding Commission.

Calo v. Comelec 610 SCRA 342The relevant rule provides that a motion

for execution pending appeal filed by the prevailing party shall contain a 3-

day notice to the adverse party and execution pending appeal shall not issue

without prior notice and hearing. The purpose of these requirements is toavoid surprises that may sprung upon the adverse party who must be given

time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by

the court. Where a party had the opportunity to be heard, then the purposehas been served and the requirement substantially complied with. In this

case, even the Comelec admitted that respondent was heard and afforded his

day in court; hence, it should not have annulled the RTC special order onsaid ground.


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San Miguel vs. Comelec 609 SCRA 424 The law provides that the court

may issue execution pending appeal. Evident from the usage of the wordmay, the language of the subject provision denotes that it is merely

directory, not mandatory, for the trial court to issue the special order before

the expiration of the period to appeal. The trial court may still thereafterresolve a motion for execution pending appeal, provided: (i) the motion is

filed within the 5-day reglementary period; and (ii) the special order isissued prior to the transmittal of the records of the Comelec.

Documents

Cases Election Law Review 2012