CES/COS/CIS paradigms for compensation and … Enviromental...Meine van Noordwijk and Beria Leimona. 2010. CES/COS/CIS paradigms for compensation and rewards to enhance environmental

Southeast Asia

CES/COS/CIS paradigms for

compensation and rewards to enhance

environmental services

Meine van Noorwijk and Beria Leimona

ŀCES/COS/CIS paradigms for compensation and rewards to enhance

environmental services

Meine van Noordwijk and Beria Leimona

Working Paper nr 100

Correct citation: Meine van Noordwijk and Beria Leimona. 2010. CES/COS/CIS paradigms for compensation and rewards to enhance environmental services. Working paper nr 100. World Agroforestry Centre. Bogor, Indonesia. 30p Titles in the Working Paper Series aim to disseminate interim results on agroforestry research and practices and stimulate feedback from the scientific community. Other publication series from the World Agroforestry Centre include: Agroforestry Perspectives, Technical Manuals and Occasional Papers. Published by World Agroforestry Centre ICRAF Southeast Asia Regional Office PO Box 161, Bogor 16001, Indonesia Tel: +62 251 8625415 Fax: +62 251 8625416 Email: [email protected] http://www.worldagroforestrycentre.org/sea © World Agroforestry Centre 2010 Working Paper nr 100

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Abstract

The terminology of Payments for Environmental Services (PES) has rapidly gained popularity

with its focus on market-based mechanism for environmental service (ES) enhancement.

Current use of the term, however, covers a broad spectrum of interactions between ES-

suppliers and ES-beneficiaries. A broader class of mechanisms aims at ES enhancement

through compensation or rewards (CRES). Such mechanisms can be analyzed on the basis of

the way they meet four principles: Realistic, Conditional, Voluntary and Pro-poor. For each

principle a set of criteria is presented. Based on direct involvement in action research mode in

evolving practices in Asia in the RUPES program since 2002, we examine three paradigms:

‘Commoditized ES’, ‘Compensation for Opportunities Skipped’ and ‘Co-Investment in

Stewardship’, CES, COS and CIS, respectively. Among the RUPES action research sites in

Asia, there are several examples of CIS, co-investment in and shared responsibility for

stewardship, with a focus on ‘assets’ (natural + human + social capital) that can be expected

to provide future flows of environmental services. CES, equivalent to a strict definition of

PES, may represent an abstraction rather than a current reality. COS is a challenge when the

legality of opportunities to reduce environmental services is contested. The primary difference

between CES, COS and CIS is in the way ‘conditionality’ is achieved, with additional

variation in the scale (individual, household, community) at which the ‘voluntary’ principle

takes shape. CIS approaches have the biggest opportunity to be ‘pro-poor’, as both CES and

COS presuppose property rights that the rural poor often don’t have. CIS requires and

reinforces trust-building after initial conflicts over the impacts of resource use on

environmental services have been clarified and a ‘realistic’ joint appraisal is obtained. CIS

will often be part of a multi-scale approach to the regeneration and survival of natural capital,

alongside respect and appreciation for the guardians and stewards of landscapes

Keywords

Asia, boundary organizations, criteria and indicators, livelihood, payment for environmental

services, RUPES

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Acknowledgment

The ideas in this paper have gradually matured following discussions with partners,

consi¬de¬ration of the results from regional workshops, global overviews and a synthesis of

the Com¬pen¬sation and Rewards for Environmental Services (CRES) Scoping Study tasked

by the In¬ter¬national Development Research Centre (IDRC). We acknowledge Brent

Swallow, Lucy Emerton, Thomas P. Tomich, Sandra J. Velarde, Mikkel Kallesoe and

Madhushree Sekher for their ideas and fruitful input to earlier versions of this paper, and

William C. Clark, Elisabeth McNie, Nancy Dickens and Delia Catacutan for discussions of

concepts. The International Fund for Agriculture and Development (IFAD), the European

Union and a National Science Foundation grant, in cooperation with Harvard University

(“Boundary Organizations”), co-invested in the research presented here, but these institutions

are not responsible for the content.

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Contents

1. Introduction: Payments to Enhance Environmental Services ..................................... 1

2. Building blocks for this review .................................................................................... 5

2.1 Principles for comparing compensation and rewards for ES ............................... 5

2.2 Prototypes in relation to the principles and criteria .............................................. 8

2.3 RUPES action research at site and national level ................................................. 8

2.4 CES/COS/CIS paradigms for compensation and rewards to enhance of

environmental services ........................................................................................ 10

3. Linking Principles, Prototypes, Sites and Paradigms ................................................ 13

3.1 Realistic .............................................................................................................. 13

3.2 Voluntary ............................................................................................................ 13

3.3 Conditionality ..................................................................................................... 14

3.4 Pro-poor .............................................................................................................. 14

3.5 Principles, criteria and prototypes ...................................................................... 15

3.6 Sites, paradigms, and principles ......................................................................... 18

4. Discussion: process and institutional requirements for scaling out ........................... 20

4.1 Compatibility and possible synergy between paradigms ................................... 20

4.2 Process and boundary objects of shared knowledge .......................................... 20

4.3 Scale issues ......................................................................................................... 21

4.4 In conclusion ...................................................................................................... 24

References ........................................................................................................................ 25

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1. Introduction:

Payments to Enhance Environmental

Services

Payment for Environmental Services (PES)1 is widely seen as a way to ‘internalize

externalities’ and provide land managers with appropriate incentives to opt for land use

practices that maintain or enhance the level of environmental services that are expected, but

have not so far been appreciated, by ‘downstream’ beneficiaries (Asquith and Wunder, 2008;

Porras et al. 2008). In case of watershed services the term ‘downstream’ can be taken literally,

where biodiversity conservation, landscape beauty or reduction of net emissions of

greenhouse gasses is involved, the term is used as metaphor. Current and emerging

mechanisms that use the PES terminology cover a wide range of mechanisms, ranging from

subsidies for forest owners paid from levies on water or hydropower users, through trade in

certificates of rights to pollute (based on certified emission reduction elsewhere), moral

incentives to plant trees and ecotourism, to outcome-based contracts to reduce sediment loads

of streams and rivers. Although all these mechanisms differ from a pure ‘command-and-

control’ approach, there is a clear need for more careful descriptors of mechanisms as basis

for comparisons of effectiveness. Signs that ‘buyers’ get uneasy with lack of service delivery

are appearing (Kleijn et al., 2001; Landell-Mills and Porras, 2001). Swallow et al. (2009)

proposed the term CRES (‘Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services’) for a

broader set of approaches, that have enhancement of environmental services as common goal.

PES was defined by Wunder (2005) as “A payment for environmental services scheme is a

voluntary transaction in which a well defined environmental service (ES) is bought by at least

one ES buyer from a minimum of one ES provider, if and only if the provider continues to

supply that service (conditionality)”. Strict use of this definition implies that PES does not

currently exist in pure form, but partial matches are called ‘PES-like’ (Wunder, 2007). There

is a wide range of PES-like arrangements, which vary in the type of incentive (payment or use

of other currencies), the degree of voluntariness in buyers and sellers, the rights to sell and

rights to buy, the degree of negotiation of the transaction, the clarity on what environmental

services is provided and the way conditionality is operationalized. We derive three

‘principles’ from the PES definition: realistic, conditional and voluntary and find that there

are many ways to (partially) achieve these. The close interactions between ‘livelihoods’ and

ES has stimulated interest in ‘pro-poor’ forms of CRES (Swallow et al., 2009). Poverty

arguments are relevant for ‘efficiency’ of the measures, as well as for ‘fairness’. We include it

here as a fourth principle.

1 The term ecosystem services according to Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Carpenter et al., 2006) includes

both ‘provisioning’ services (including all of agriculture and forest industries), which tend to have existing

markets for goods, and regulating, supporting and cultural services that were previously labelled ‘environmental

services’; we stay with the latter term in this paper (van Noordwijk et al., 2004a)

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In the conceptual scheme of RUPES (van Noordwijk et al., 2004a), beyond ‘buyers’ and

‘sellers’ as in the Wunder (2005) definition, two other agents/stakeholders are included:

‘regulators’ and ‘intermediaries’ (Fig. 1).

Environ-mental Service

providers

Natural capital & properties that ‘come with the territory’

Absence Mitigation, increase in filtering

Dynamic

Control over territory

Efforts

Direct benefits


providers

Natural capital &

territory’

of threats

Dynamic landscape


Opportunity costs for

change in land use practice

functionsEnviron-mental Service

beneficiaries


beneficiaries

Alternative

service

providers

Costs for other

service providers

Water quantity, evenness of flow & quality

Biodiversity & landscape beauty

Terrestrial carbonstorage

implications




implications

Recognition & rewards

transaction costs

‘Interme-

diaries’

‘Regu-

lators’

‘Modifiers/Sellers’ ‘Beneficiaries/ Buyers’


providers

Natural capital & properties that ‘come with the territory’

Absence Mitigation, increase in filtering

Mitigation, increase in filtering

Dynamic


Efforts

Direct benefits


providers

Natural capital &

territory’

of threats

Dynamic landscape


Opportunity costs for

change in land use practice


beneficiaries


beneficiaries

Alternative

service

providers

Costs for other

service providers




implications




implications

Recognition & rewards

transaction costs

‘Interme-

diaries’

‘Regu-

lators’

‘Modifiers/Sellers’ ‘Beneficiaries/ Buyers’

Figure 1. The four categories of stakeholders ‘beneficiaries/buyers’, ‘modifiers/sellers’, ‘regu¬la¬tors’ and ‘intermediaries’ that are engaged in voluntary compensation and rewards for environmental services

PES in pure form may appear to link a financial flow to a flow of services derived from

natural capital. Apart from the current flows of ‘environmental services’, however, there is

interest in ‘investment in natural capital’ as basis for future ES (Wackernagel and Rees,

1997). The production function for environmental services (Tomich et al., 2004), however,

includes both social and human capital, alongside natural capital, assisted or contravened by

infrastructure (‘physical capital’), encompassing four of the five ‘capitals’ considered in

livelihood analysis (Chambers and Conway, 1992). Flows of ‘financial capital’ in the form of

payments need to be converted back into stocks, assets or capital form.

The interest in longer term ‘assets’ versus ‘current services’ varies among the ES and the

amount of place-based investment of ES beneficiaries. For a hydropower company or

drinking water reservoir the economic lifespan of the investment requires a direct matching in

the time over which ES are needed. A more mobile tanker-level drinking water supplier may

have more choices and less reason to invest for long time periods. Global concerns about

biodiversity are focussed on slowing the rate of anthropogenic biodiversity loss, with a long

term perspective. Postponing local extinctions by a few years is not interesting. Reducing net

emissions of greenhouse gasses may appear to be the least place-bound (as greenhouse gasses

have similar impact on the atmosphere wherever they are emitted or sequestered), Only a

small part of ES can be ‘packaged’ in quantities that can be traded in open markets, detached

from the place of origin of the commodity. Probably the closest approximation of full

‘commoditization’ of environmental services, but even here current contractual obligations

include aspects of ‘permanence’ or the complex and low-value ‘temporary emission reduction

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credits’ that were created for A/R-CDM in the Kyoto protocol but found little application so

far (van Noordwijk et al., 2008b).

Net C sequestration as an ES has followed separate institutional trajectories for the ‘avoided

emissions’ and the ‘restocking’ activities. Potentially the first handles much larger fluxes (a

ha of forest destroyed by bring some 200 t C into the atmosphere within a single year, Palm et

al 2005) than restocking (2-5 t C ha-1 year-1), while presence/absence of closed forest can be

more easily assessed than small annual increments in stock. However, these advantages on the

‘realistic’ and ‘conditional’ fronts are apparently off-set by challenges on the ‘voluntary’ side:

it is reasonable to compensate for effort in rehabilitation, while the attribution for not-(yet)-

implementing a potential threat to an ES is complex. If the threat was small, external

stakeholders may not need to pay (low ‘additionality’), if the threat was high it may well have

switched to another location (‘leakage’), or happen soon after the contract ends (‘lack of

permanence’). The bargaining position may be best at intermediate level of threat, and a

combination of threat and trust is needed to achieve agreements (van Noordwijk et al.,

2008d).

The rehabilitation versus avoided emissions comparison may illustrate a further point:

rehabilitation may require an initial investment, avoided degradation a recurrent offsetting of

opportunities forgone (but still existing). The institutions for investment in projects that

supposedly start a self-sustaining trajectory are more open to private sector engagement than

the long-term modification of incentives. The latter may be difficult without involvement of

public sector institutions. Recurrent payments versus one-off investment, and flows of

environmental services versus securing assets. The simple PES paradigm is in need for

revision or enrichment on both sides. Human and social capital are at least as important as the

natural capital aspects of ‘realistic’ services: the relations of services with land use options

need to be understood by all stakeholders in a similar manner before ‘voluntary’ agreements

can emerge, while the ‘fairness’ of agreements may well be as important as the ‘efficiency’

focus on mainstream economics (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009)..

Enhancing environmental services through forms of compensation, rewards or payments

requires linking knowledge and action, and as such may benefit from boundary organizations

(Cash et al., 2006). In a pure PES form markets may ultimately become the mechanism to

efficiently balance supply and demands for environmental services, but at this stage

information is restricted, asymmetrical (Ferraro, 2008) and incomplete. Brokers are needed to

provide access to knowledge and clarify bargaining positions. On the other side of the

spectrum a benevolent top-down governance system that tries to impose ‘fairness’ in actions

to enhance environmental services as ‘public goods’ will require detailed knowledge of how

environmental services are affected by the many options and realities in land use. In between

these two extreme positions, there is a need for public investment in the development of

‘boundary objects’ or knowledge products that can be accepted by the various stakeholders as

background for their negotiations of adjusting ‘action’.

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Based on direct involvement in action research mode in evolving practices in Asia under the

Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental Services they provide (RUPES)2 program, we

will examine the paradigms encountered. We start with a tentative set of principles and

criteria for realistic, conditional, voluntary and/or pro-poor enhance of environmental services

within CRES (Swallow et al., 2009) and a list of ‘prototypes’ of ES enhancement. We then

describe the lessons learnt in RUPES and compare three paradigms that between them capture

most of the current variation in approaches. By relating criteria, paradigms and emerging

experience at site level, we will review whether or not ‘PES’ and ‘PES-like’ are adequate

labels for the range of approaches that is currently evolving.

2 The Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental Services that they provide (RUPES) project Phase I was a project

coordinated by the World Agroforestry Centre (2002-2007). The goal of the project was to enhance the

livelihoods and reduce poverty of the upland poor while supporting environmental conservation through rewards

for ES. For further reference, see http://www.worldagroforestrycenter.org/sea/networks/rupes/index.asp.

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2. Building blocks for this review

2.1 Principles for comparing compensation and rewards for

ES

Swallow et al. (2009) introduced CRES as a term that encompasses PES, PES-like and other

approaches that have a shared objective of enhancement of Environmental Services. We will

follow this approach and compare with a set of principles (van Noordwijk et al. 2008d) that

align with partial correspondence to the Wunder (2005) definition of PES:

(1) Realistic: tangible and sustainable reduction or avoidance of threats and/or measurable recovery from past degradation of environmental services, at appropriate scale, in a ‘with CRES’ relative to a ‘without CRES’ comparison.

(2) Voluntary: engagement of both ES providers and ES beneficiaries in a negotiated scheme through free choice at individual level rather than on being the object of regulation (even if that implies a right to compensation). A weaker form of ‘voluntary’ refers to agreements at the scale of ‘collective action’ for providers and/or beneficiaries (as is common where electricity or water monopolists include a levy). Rules for ‘compensation’ may also apply where ES beneficiaries have a right to live in a pollution free world that exceeds the rights to pollute of others.

(3) Conditional: transparency of contracts that link tangible benefits for the ES providers to the actual enhanced delivery of ES (level I), and/or maintenance of agroecosystem in a desirable state (level II), and/or performance of agreed actions to enhance ES (level III), and/or development and implementation opf management plans to enhance ES (level IV) or respect for local sovereignty in managing the environment for local plus external benefits (level V)

Figure 2. Five levels at which agreements on ES Compensation and Reward schemes between local agents as ‘ES providers’ and external actors as ‘ES beneficiaries’ can be ‘conditional’: I. Consequences for the ES, II. Condition of the agroecosystem (e.g. tree cover), III.Input use and human activity (e.g. tree planting), IV. Management plans or V. Management objectives (modified from van Noordwijk et al., 2004b)

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These three principles refer to effectiveness, when measured for effect on ES, and

efficiency, when effectiveness is expressed per unit investment by ES beneficiaries. A

fourth principle refers to ‘fairness’:

(4) Pro-poor: CRES schemes acknowledge that they can have impacts that are differentiated

by wealth or gender among ES providers and ES beneficiaries and they aim for a

positive bias towards poor stakeholders in either group to comply with the Millennium

Development Goals and as a step towards long term sustainability.

By reviewing literature and discussions with many stakeholders van Noordwijk et al. (2007)

developed a tentative set of ‘criteria’ that can clarify the four principles, but that each will

require ‘indicators’ that may have to site and situation specific.

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Table 1. Criteria proposed for the four principles of CRES (van Noordwijk et al., 2007)

(Stage) Principle Criteria

A. Effectiveness, Efficiency and Sustainability

I. Realistic

(Scoping stage)

Effectively mitigates, reduces or avoids threats to ES for all parties involved

1. A broadly shared perception of cause-effect relations links threats to ES or to the ecosystem that provides ES, to potential activities to reduce or avoid these threats by identifiable actors at a relevant temporal and spatial scale

2. The value to ES-beneficiaries of reduction or avoidance of the threats, relative to alternative ways to meet their needs, is substantive (within the context of the key actors)

3. There are opportunity costs and/or resource access constraints for the potential ‘ES providers’ that can be off-set or overcome without major negative ‘external effects’ (leakage)

4. The threat to the ES and its reduction (or avoidance) by ES providers can be assessed and monitored in a transparent way, as a basis for conditional incentives

II. Voluntary

(Stake-holder

analysis)

Engagement involves choice rather than being the object of regulation

5. Legitimacy at individual level: representation is subject to checks and balances

6. Effective voice of all stakeholders is heard; free and prior informed consent principles apply

7. Adaptiveness of the mechanism includes a time frame for review on pre-agreed performance indicators and an exit strategy

III. Conditional

(Negotiation &

implementation)

Service and rewards or compensation are dynamically linked

8. ES-reward agreements strike a balance between outcome-based rewards, activity-centered incentives, support for community-scale resource management and establishment of trust

9. Sanctions exist to deal with non-compliance by contract partners, within the human and legal rights of both sides (linked to exit strategy in 7)

10. ES reward agreements acknowledge the potential of environmental variability and change, ‘third-party roles’ (incl. climate change) to affect the ecosystem and its ES provision

B. Equity, Fairness

IV. Pro-poor

(All stages)

Mechanisms selected are positively biased to-wards disadvantaged stakeholders

11. ES reward mechanisms support ‘sustainable development’ pathways out of poverty for achieving Millennium Development Goals, by addressing the priorities (and criteria…) of ‘poor’ stakeholders

12. ES reward mechanisms reduce asset insecurity (including access to land)

痐

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2.2 Prototypes in relation to the principles and criteria

Van Noordwijk (2005) proposed a set of twelve ‘prototypes’ of CRES that each combine a

typical landscape context, mechanism of influencing ES and relevance of these ES for

downstream (or out-of-landscape) beneficiaries.

1. Wcons1: Total water yield for hydropower via storage lake

2. Wcons2: Regular water supply for hydro power via run-off-the-river

3. Wcons3: Drinking water provision (surface or groundwater)

4. Wcons4: Flood prevention

5. Wcons5: Landslide prevention

6. Wrehab : General watershed rehabilitation and erosion control

7. Bcons1 : Biodiversity conservation through bufferzones around protected area

8. Bcons2 : Biodiversity conservation through landscape corridors

9. Crehab : Carbon restocking of depleted landscapes

10. Ccons : Protecting soil and tree C stocks

11. Ecolabel: Guaranteeing production landscapes meet environmental standards

12. EcoTour: Providing guided access to landscapes of beauty/ heritage/ recreational value.

Porras et al. (2008) provided a global review of the current experience with such prototypes.

We will here compare them with the ways the 4 principles can be achieved.

2.3 RUPES action research at site and national level

The RUPES program has been in operation since 2002 and developed a set of six primary

‘action research sites’ in Indonesia, Philippines and Nepal3. Questions framed at the start of

RUPES were:

1. What are environmental services to whom and where?

2. How do all stakeholders know?

3. Which reward mechanisms and how do they work?

4. Which policies can support effective, efficient and equitable rewards and how?

These questions, in essence, where the basis for the exploration of the ‘realistic’, ‘voluntary’,

‘conditional’ and ‘pro-poor’ principles, respectively, as elaborated in the conceptual basis of

the program (Tomich et al. 2004; van Noordwijk et al. 2004a). The four ‘principles’ as

currently recognized (van Noordwijk et al. 2008a; Swallow et al. 2007a) became a major

vehicle for synthesizing the main lessons learnt from the ‘action research’ mode, where

researchers and project staff reflected together with local project partners on what had been

achieved. An overview of the RUPES and associated sites is provided in Table 2, with

characterization of the main environmental service issue, the type of conditionality and the

mechanism under development.

3 Publications in various forms are accessible through the website, with the national policy dialogues were

initiated in Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam. An international workshop for practitioners and scientists

reviewed and synthesized the results of the RUPES-I project.

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Table 2. Site level experience in the project Rewarding Upland Poor for the Environmental Services they provide (RUPES) in Asia

Site Focus of ES Conditionality applied

(compare Fig. 2)

Type of scheme and

current status

Indonesia

Bungo

http://www. worldagroforestrycentre. org/sea/Publications/files/ leaflet/LE0046-07.PDF

Jungle rubber for conservation of the diversity of local plant species and wildlife habitat

Level IV Management plan of rubber agroforestry in general, including specified agricultural technique No slash-and-burn Conserving buffer zone and ‘lubuk larangan’ No intensive and commercial wild-hunt and NTFP

• ‘Hutan desa’ recog-nition by central government for local forest management role within watershed protection forest

• Testing mini hydropower as intermediate reward for biodiversity conservation

• A private buyer (automotive wheel industry) showing interests for rubber for “green” vehicles

Cidanau

Water quality and regular flow for private water companies

Level II Planting and maintain-ing timber and fruit trees with the total minimum of 500 trees per hectare for 5 years

• A private water company is paying US 120/hectare for the contract

Singkarak (Watershed)

http://worldagroforestry. org/sea/ Publications/files/ leaflet/ LE0050-07.PDF

Water quality for hydropower, native fish conservation and ecotourism

Level IV Planting a 40-hectare grass land with timber and fruit trees

• Conservation fund from local government to revitalize organic coffee in the upstream watershed.

Singkarak (CDM)

http://worldagroforestry. org/sea/ Publications/files/ leaflet/ LE0050-07.PDF

Carbon sequestration for voluntary markets under CDM setting

Level I Planting and main-taining specified number of trees to achieve agreed amount of carbon sequestrated

• Carbon market negotiated with private buyer (consumer goods distributor)

Sumberjaya (Community

Forestry)

http://worldagroforestry. org/ sea/Publications/files/ leaflet/LE0068-07.PDF

Watershed rehabilitation for the District Forestry Service

Level II Planting and maintaining specified number of trees with certain composition of species

• Conditional tenure rewarded to farmer groups

Sumberjaya (River Care)

http://worldagroforestry. org/ sea/Publications/files/ leaflet/LE0068-07.PDF

Water quality for hydropower

Level I Conducting collective action in riparian rehabilitation and sedimentation reduction to achieve a specified percentage (above 30%) of erosion reduction

• Hydroelectric Power company (HEP) royalty agreements signed for River Care groups along the river

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The Philippines

Bakun

http://worldagroforestry.org/sea/Publications/files/leaflet/LE0049-07.PDF


Level III Setting up management plan to rehabilitate watershed, including sustainable horticulture practices.

• HEP royalty agreements signed

Kalahan

http://worldagroforestry.org/sea/Publications/files/leaflet/LE0047-07.PDF

Carbon sequestration under voluntary market

Level I Planting and maintaining specified number of trees to achieve agreed amount of carbon sequestrated

• Carbon market initial agreement with private buyer (automotive industry)

Lantapan

http://worldagroforestry.org/ sea/Publications/files/ leaflet/LE0081-08.PDF

Water amount for irrigation & amount + quality for hydropower

Under discussion

Under discussion

Nepal

Kulekhani

http://worldagroforestry. org/sea/Publications/files/ leaflet/LE0051-07.PDF


Level III Setting up management plan to rehabilitate watershed, including sustainable horticulture practices

• HEP royalty agreements signed

Throughout the RUPES project implementation the distinction between ‘rewards’ (which can

come in any currency derived from any of the 5 livelihood capitals) and ‘payments’ (which

are expected to be in monetary terms) was a recurrent topic of debate. On further reflection,

three paradigms were identified in this debate: CES, COS and CIS, as explained in the next

section.

2.4 CES/COS/CIS paradigms for compensation and rewards

to enhance of environmental services

In a landscape, the community deals with five other main groups (Figure 3):

1. Private sector entities who buy marketable commodities for further processing and

trade and/or use the landscape resources for added value (e.g. through hydropower or

the sale of drinking water),

2. Governments imposing rules on the private sector and their interaction with ES

3. Government agencies regulating what the community is allowed to do, how it has to

organize its administration and how it can be part of “development” processes

prioritized at higher levels,

4. Consumers who buy local goods and may be interested in supporting ES as well,

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5. Consumers elsewhere in the world who opt for competitively priced goods, but also

have concerns about the status of poverty indicators, natural resources and human

rights in the area.

Figure 3. Modified livelihoods framework that relates the provision of environmental services as well as marketable goods to the community-scale and private management of the 5 capital types, and relates the primary feedback that is obtained through ‘customers’ to the efforts by external stakeholders and governments to regulate and modify local decisions in a direction of sustainable development; the CES paradigm is focussed on interaction 4, or 1+5 and links directly links providers and beneficiaries of ES; the COS paradigm is focussed on relations 2 and 3; CIS can and generally will involve all 1…5

The community, and all households and individuals contained within, thus produces both

'marketable goods' and 'environmental services' by transforming its access to five capitals:

natural, human, social, physical and financial. Each of these capitals has a flow equivalent.

The community can derive income from the export of labour as a third way of using its

resources. The interactions with the private sector are primarily through the sale of

marketable goods, but may also involve investments in provision of agricultural inputs, land

clearing and technology as in 'outgrower schemes'.

The private sector transforms local marketable goods and environmental services (such as

regular supply of clean water) to marketable goods with added value. It prefers to have free

access to public environmental services, but will settle for a range of other options to secure

continued access to the resources it needs. Options that link financial outlays to greater

security and competitive edge in resource access are preferred. The private sector, however,

also needs to produce goods with competitive pricing for its consumers that match their

expectations of 'quality'. If the private sector needs to invest in local environmental services

and human welfare, this has to be reflected in the price of goods.

The government as regulators can use three types of methods (loosely identified as carrots,

sticks and sermons) to influence local resource management: financial incentives (balance

between taxation and investment into the area), spatially explicit regulation of resource access

and requirements for procedures and local institutional set-up, and moral persuasion. Where

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the income for the regulators primarily derives from the ‘private sector’ and the votes for

power-holders from the local community, a balancing act arises, that can be quite distinct

(and distant) from the concerns of the external consumers.

CES, COS and CIS are three ‘paradigms’, or ways to organize thinking about and analysis of,

compensation and rewards (including payments) for environmental services involving various

combinations of actors. There may well be other paradigms within this domain and further

sub-divisions are feasible. At this stage, however, the three represent different aspects of

within approaches to enhance environmental services (EES), primarily on the basis of the

type of conditionality.

Paradigm CES: commoditized environmental service procurement with conditionality at

level 1 based on actual service delivery and direct marketability. The price level for recurrent

monetary payments may be fully negotiable and provides new sources of income for those

who can control land and other resources necessary in 'production of ES'. Innovations can be

expected in how to cost-effectively enhance commoditized ES production. There is no

explicit poverty target.

Paradigm COS: "Compensating for opportunities skipped”, or paying land users for

accepting restrictions (either voluntary or mandatory) on their use of land. COS has

conditionality at level 2 or 3, depending on whether the objectively measurable condition of

the (agro)-ecosystem or the expended level of efforts (or restrictions in input use) is the basis

of contracts. This paradigm may involve recurrent monetary payments based on restrictions

imposed by local or national government and/or voluntarily accepted on privately-owned land

with possibility of collective action. The basis of financial compensation in this paradigm is

the opportunity costs of foregoing economically attractive and legally permissible land use

patterns that reduce environmental services. Poverty reduction targets can be added through

differentiation in pay where prices are externally set, ather than freely negotiated.

Paradigm CIS: " Co-investment in stewardship” of landscapes for enhancing ES. CIS

generally has conditionality at level 3 (or less often at levels 2 or 4). Such co-investment is

mostly on collectively owned or state-owned land and can include negotiated tenure

conditional on ES maintenance, reduction of land use conflicts and their collateral damage for

ES, investment in improved public services, employment that doesn't damage ES and feeder

roads under community control. The conditionality level 4 (“entrust the local resource

management”) is where the buyers have full trust that the management plan set-up by the

community will enhance the provision of ES without any clear activities taken stated in

contract, and with broad sanction and monitoring requirement.

Referring to the schematic representation of figure 3, the CES paradigm is focussed on

interaction 4, or 1+5, that directly links providers and beneficiaries of ES; it presupposes

individual property rights and status quo on governance between the ‘freedom pollute’ and

‘freedom to live in a pollution-free world’ poles; it involved natural and financial capital; the

COS paradigm is focussed on relations 2 and 3, within current ‘rights to pollute’; it adds

human capital (opportunity to reduce/enhance ES); CIS can and generally will involve all the

interactions labelled 1…5 in figure 3 and explicitly adds social capital to the mix; it addresses

the preconditions for COS and CES and may well have to be the foundation for all such

efforts.

-13-

3. Linking Principles, Prototypes, Sites and

Paradigms

3.1 Realistic

Although the popular perception in many parts of Asia (or the world) is that only forest can

provide the watershed functions required for effective use of hydropower and/or extraction of

drinking water, science does not support such proposition. Many examples exist of

watersheds with mosaics of forest patches, agroforestry zones and paddy rice fields that do

provide a regular flow of water of low sediment load, depending on the rainfall regime.

Watershed functions do not justify special treatment for ‘forest’, and user payments for

watershed services may need to be allocated beyond the forest management entities. (Agus et

al. 2004; Bruijnzeel and van Noordwijk, 2008; Calsder, 2001; van Noordwijk et al. 2001,

2007, 2008c). A recent turn in the global debate on ‘forests and floods’ supports a focus on

actual infiltration capacity of the soils rather than ‘forest’ as land use category (van Dijk et al.

2008).

There is considerably less scope for providing full biodiversity conservation functions along

with any extraction of goods or forms of agroforestry, although the ‘matrix’ of landscape

mosaics within protected areas does matter for the biodiversity that can be conserved (Pfund

et al. 2008; Michon et al., 2007; Schroth et al. 2004; Scherr and McNeeley, 2007). The most

logical option for biodiversity conservation is to decrease or slow down the rate of

biodiversity decrease by reducing its threat.

In the debate on global incentives for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest

degradation (REDD) the issue of ‘realistic’ depends on the negotiated ‘reference scenario’ for

national scale emissions, the specific cut-off point of the forest definition used and the local

opportunities for high carbon stock sustainable development (Swallow et al. 2007b, 2008).

3.2 Voluntary

Voluntary mechanisms require ‘free and prior informed consent’ (Colchester, 2004) as a

basis for agreements where both sides (ES providers and ES beneficiaries) can judge whether

or not there is a balance between their rights and obligations. The ‘informed’ part of this

refers back to the assessment of ‘realistic’, but there is a challenge in the efficiency of

delegation (not everybody has to be at every meeting) versus the risks of ‘elite capture’ and

self-declared representativeness on behalf of key stakeholders. Meeting the standards for

‘voluntary’ thus requires considerable effort in ‘social mobilization’ (Leimona et al. 2008a).

The domain for ‘voluntary’ enhancement of environmental services that can qualify for

rewards or payments is the complement of the mandatory protection of such services through

land use restrictions in sensitive areas and rules against pollution of air, water or soil

(Swallow et al., 2009). As in many Asian countries regulation is ahead of compliance in many

environmental laws, there is a need for national policy dialogues (Leimona et al. 2008b) to

revise legal frameworks.

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3.3 Conditionality

A key element to distinguish PES from taxes and subsidies is the degree to which there is a

‘performance’ basis for the rewards/payments rather than an entitlement based on nominal

entities such as ‘forest’, without specifying the actual services delivered by different forest

types in different landscape and climatic conditions. We can distinguish conditionality at the

level of input (did people spend the time to plant trees or guard the forest?), the condition of

the system (are the trees growing? is the forest still intact?), or the actual outcomes for

environmental services (clean water throughout the year). Shifting from ‘inputs’ to ‘condition

of the system’ implies respect for local managers in their ability to fine-tune decisions on

input use, but makes it more difficult to calculate a cost based on minimum wage multiplied

with a number of days of work. It calls for more subtle negotiations. It also calls for clear

rules for monitoring and evaluation.

Conditionality can be used for financial payments (as in most market-based delivery contracts

for goods), but also for land tenure in sensitive watershed areas (Suyanto et al. 2008), with

maintenance of healthy watersheds as condition for continuation of land use rights. Within the

RUPES experience conditionality was not strictly enforced and lack of performance was

interpreted as a ‘learning curve’ rather than contract failure.

3.4 Pro-poor

Rural poverty is increased by environmental degradation but may also contribute to its cause.

Environmental services issues cannot be sustainably secured without reduction in poverty, but

if payments focus on land owners, they may increase local inequity. The type of ‘reward’ may

need to be based on the local determinants of poverty and address key local concerns.

Leimona et al. (2009) analyzed the potential for PES to have a significant impact on poverty

reduction in the uplands of Asia. In terms of cash-flow, the potential is limited if expressed on

a per capita basis, as the potential number of beneficiaries is large. The potential total value of

financial EES transfers can be expressed relative to current income of poor ES providers.

Given a total value, either a small group can benefit substantially or a large group marginally,

but policy-relevant impact on rural poverty alleviation can only be expected if a large group

can benefit at a daily income level that helps in meeting the $1 per person per day threshold

(or its national poverty line equivalent). Leimona (2009) expressed the per capita benefits in

terms of a number of dimensionless ratios: area, population density, income, willingness to

pay by downstream beneficiaries, transaction costs and offset-fraction, deriving:

RPu = (Ad Au-1) (Рd Рu-1) ( Id Iu-1.) βd (1 – αu) . (1 – T) ………………………(1)

RPu = per capita PES benefits, expressed as fraction of the upstream income

Ad and Au = Area, downstream and upstream, respectively, (ha),

Pd and Pu = population density downstream and upstream, respectively, (ha-1),

Id and Iu = per capita income downstream and upstream, respectively, ($ day-1)

βd = fraction of income that is potentially available for such payments.

T = fraction of downstream payments that is needed to cover the transaction costs, and

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αu = fraction of what the upstream population receives that is offsetting the opportunity costs of alternative land uses that might generate more income but provide less environmental services.

Using available statistics for Indonesia, an across-the-board UB target of 5% increase in

disposable income in the uplands is only feasible in specific contexts, where area and

population ratios differ from the average and/or if the downstream population is willing and

able to pay at least 4 percent of their income as contribution to ES provision in the upstream

area. ‘Poverty traps’ (Barrett and Swallow, 2006) in other capital types, such as access to land

and community-wide health and education services.

3.5 Principles, criteria and prototypes

Issues with the four principles, realistic, conditional, voluntary and pro-poor, can be

summarized for the 12 CRES prototypes of van Noordwijk (2005). These prototypes also

relate to the CES,COS, CIS paradigms in different ways (Table 3).

Table 3. Prototypes of ES rewards (van Noordwijk, 2005) and their stereotypes relation to the criteria realistic, conditional, voluntary and pro-poor

Prototype

Environmental

service

Principles

Realistic Voluntary Conditional Pro-poor

Wcons1: Total

water yield for

hydro power via

storage lake

Impacts on total water yield small; reservoir sedimentation issue may dominate the debate; option for sediment traps and landscape filters

Consumer satisfaction depends on continued functioning; high project investment costs, little subsequent management flexibility

Intercepting sediment flows rather than avoiding them is generally easier to accomplish; sediment flows out of well-managed upper catchments may still be high because of geological and geomorphological processes Interventions influencing the speed of drainage (linked to paths, roads and drains) have the most direct effect on buffering at larger scales

Rural poor may not have access to electricity and ‘in-kind’ rewards may be appropriate

Wcons2:

Regular water

supply for

hydro power via

run off the river

A change from soil quick flow (saturated forest soils) to overland flow will reduce flow-persistence and buffering of river flows, affecting hydropower operation time

Rural poor may not have access to electricity and ‘in-kind’ rewards may be appropria-te

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Wcons3:

Drinking water

provision (sur-

face or ground-

water)

Intensive agriculture and horticulture will cause rapid pollution of surface flows and slow but persistent pollution of groundwater flows with nitrogen and pesticides; people residing around streams cause pollution E.coli and diseases

Willingness to pay for drinking water depends on hygienic quality assurance, taste and 'branding'

Slow response of groundwater flows to changes in the pollutant status make ‘regulation’ a more effective solution than results based markets

Rural poor may not have access to clean drinking water and ‘in-kind’ rewards may be appropriate

Wcons4: Flood

preven-tion

Land use effects strongest for flow buffering of small-to-medium sized events, with saturation dominating the large events

Relevance of upland land use depends on location (‘flood-plains’) and engineering solutions (dykes, storage reservoirs)

Risk avoidance for the rare category of large events

Rural poor living in river beds and flood absorption sites may well be among the most vulnerable

Wcons5:

Landsli-de pre-

vention

Mortality of deep-rooted trees (‘an-chors’) causes temporary increase in landslide risk

Relevance depends strongly on location in the flow paths

Deep landslides are little affected by land cover

Location determines vulnerability

Wrehab:

General water-

shed rehabilita-

tion and erosion

control

Promoting tree cover and permanence of litter layer protecting the soil is a good precaution

‘Holistic’ per-ception of wa-tershed functions survives despite the lack of clear impacts on speci-fics

Communication gap with scientists who try to enhance clarity

Bcons1:

Biodiversity

bufferzones

around

protected area

Use value of buffer zones depend on hunting restrictions, presence of human-life threatening species

Flagship species still dominate the public perception of value

Push and pull factors in human land use; livelihoods operate at larger scales than most conservation plans acknowledge

Local use rights for forest products require careful consideration and thresholds of over-use

Bcons2:

Biodiver-sity

landscape

corridors

Still new concept in agriculture /forest land use mosaics in the tropics; use value of patches in the

Relevance depends on dispersion pro-perties of the species of main interest; some-

Ex ante impact assessment of effectivity is still difficult

-17-

‘stepping stones’ similar to the buffer zone case

times higher connectivity not desirable; relevance in-creases with climate change concerns

Crehab:

Carbon restock-

ing of depleted

landsca-pes

Options for profitable tree restocking primarily depend on policy reform

Demand is for Certified Emission Reduction (CER) rather than carbon

Forest definition and additionality issues in A/R-CDM; high transacttion cost REDD debate focus on partial solutions and partial C accounting

Ccons:

Protecting soil

and tree C

stocks

Road construction (accessibility) is main determinant of ‘opportunity costs’ for non-conversion

Ecolabel:

Guarantee-ing

pro-duction

landscapes meet

environmental

standards

Where the ‘eco-label’ process starts from the consumer side, there can be a substantial gap in communication and trust, leading to high transaction costs

Consumers with high sense of personal responsibility; gradually replaced by the introduction of standards and the raising of baselines of ‘acceptable’ behavior

Relevance of global standards in the face of variation in local conditions; transpa-rency of the standards and compliance monitoring; transaction costs

Enhanced local ES may be a major ‘co-benefit’ of specific relevance to rural poor

EcoTour:

Providing

guided access to

landscapes of

beauty/

heritage/

recreationnal

value

The local and international appreciation for landscape beauty depends on culture and time (fashion); rewards are for roles as guide and provider of accommodation, food, transport and handicrafts; gender aspects of provider roles may be prominent

The appreciation of landscape beauty and cultural traditions does not reduce the need to provide security and comfort to potential tourists

Global ecotourism is a highly volatile mar-ket where security and political concerns can interfere

Enhancement of skills needed for rural poor to have a chance to benefit

-18-

3.6 Sites, paradigms, and principles

Within the RUPES experience the carbon-based sub-projects have attained the clearest

relation between land use and ES. An interesting experiment with ‘river care’ or performance

based payments for reducing sediment load in streams met considerable challenges in

unravelling climatic variability and landscape condition on the performance parameter

(‘sediment concentration’), as well as in the collective action required at local level (Leimona

et al. 2008a).

Within the RUPES experience, collective rather than individual household decisions received

most attention, with reliance on existing local perceptions of rights and responsibilities.

Leimona et al. (2009) summarized evidence on the ‘pro-poor’ performance of the RUPES-I

sites, however, suggests that the rewards may address Such a scheme may require a

‘livelihood’ approach that considers the five capital types (human, social, physical, financial

and natural) in their interactions across scale. This CIS paradigm aligns well with the

robustness of social-ecological systems (Anderies et al., 2004). At the interface of

vulnerability to environmental hazards linked to climate change, land use options that serve

both mitigation and adaptation for rural poor deserve special attention (Verchot et al., 2007).

-19-

Table 4. Experience relevant to three contrasting EES paradigms across the RUPES sites (listed in Table 2)

Paradigm CES: ‘Commoditized ES’ or markets for commoditized environmental service procurement or land cover proxies

Paradigm COS: Compensating opportunities skipped for (legally) reducing ES or compensating/ paying land users for accepting mandatory/ voluntary restrictions on their use of land

Paradigm CIS: Co-investment in stewardship of assets and co-management of landscapes for reducing poverty and enhancing ES

Examples in global literature

Most of the voluntary carbon market

Proambiante program, Brazil (Southgate and Wunder 2009) Pimampiro, Ecuador (Echavarria et al 2003, Wunder and Alban 2008) PSA Program, Costa Rica Most of the payment schemes for (assumed) watershed functions in Latin America (Southgate and Wunder 2009)

Grain for Green project, China Andes, Bolivia (Asquith et al 2008)

Examples studies in RUPES

Sumberjaya (River Care) Singkarak (CDM) Kalahan (CDM)

Cidanau

Bungo Singkarak (Waterhed) Sumberjaya (Community Forestry) Bakun Kulekhani

Ways to meet EES principles:

Realistic

Yes, as long as ES is measurable

Only if correctly targeted

Mostly long-term

Voluntary

Yes, for those who are in a position to control and enhance ES

Yes, for those with rights and opportunity to reduce ES

Yes, depending on local ‘social capital’ and decisions

Conditionality type

I II – III II – V

Pro-poor

Maybe not: pre-supposes tenure security

Maybe yes, depending on allocation rules

Mostly yes, depending on local institutions

Primary strength

The output is based on the ES provision, ensuring the effec-tiveness of the project.

Relative easy to monitor with ‘tangible’ indicators at ‘system’ rather than outcome level

Trust-building and reciprocity redresses past inequalities

Primary challenge

Considerable risk to the ES providers if their efforts don’t pay off. The monitoring process requires technical capacity.

The conditionality might not directly link with the ES provision. Buyers have budget restriction for the financial payment

Need high trust between the seller and buyer

-20-

4. Discussion: process and institutional

requirements for scaling out

In considering the next steps to scale up from the site-level experience reviewed so far, we

will consider the compatibility and possible synergy between the 3 paradigms, discuss their

relation with the learning curve for the various actor groups and the possibilities for nesting

local in national and national in global arrangements, with possible shifts in paradigm at

subsystem boundaries.

4.1 Compatibility and possible synergy between paradigms

A strict interpretation of realistic, conditional and voluntary PES (Paradigm ‘Commoditized

ES’) appeared problematic in most sites and situations. The question ‘who deserves to be paid

for improving ES’ is not simple in the face of ‘legal pluralism’

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_pluralism; von Benda Beckman, 1981) and lack of clarity

on tenure rights (Giller et al., 2008). The question ‘who deserves pay for not destroying

natural capital?’ is morally suspect. What starts of as additional incentive may soon be seen as

an entitlement. When some get paid and others not, the results may be interpreted as ‘sub-

optimal level of preventing threat’ by those who did not get the prime attention. The net effect

of PES to overall level of environmental services may then decline. This ‘perverse’ effect is

talked about – and there are some early signs that it may be real in a number of situations.

Further analysis is needed. The ‘business’ language in which PES is often expressed may be

partly to blame (Wunder, 2006).

The simple conceptual scheme of ‘buyers’, ‘sellers’, ‘intermediaries’ and ‘regulators’ that was

used in RUPES-I may need to be modified to incorporate a more holistic ‘livelihoods’

perspective and the combined efforts through sermons, sticks and carrots to modify local

resource use decisions in the uplands. A language of ‘co-investment’ and ‘shared

responsibility’ (Paradigm ‘Co-investment in Assets’) may be more conducive to the type of

respect, mutual accountability and commitment to sustainable development that is needed.

Yet, there are opportunities for mixed strategies: after creating a basis of respect and

relationships through the paradigm of ‘Co-investment in Assets’ there may be more space for

specific follow-ups in the paradigm of ‘Commoditized ES’.

4.2 Process and boundary objects of shared knowledge

The interface of Knowledge (K) and Action (A) in different stages of development of a

locally negotiated form of rewards for environmental services that meets the criteria of

‘realistic’, ‘voluntary’ and ‘conditional’ can be conceived as in Figure 4.

-21-

Figure 4. Steps in linking knowledge (K) with action (A) in multi-stakeholder processes that lead to enhancement of environmental services (EES) wile meeting the principles of ‘realistic’, ‘voluntary’, ‘conditional’ and ‘pro-poor’

To achieve these criteria, a new type of ‘integrative science’ (Tomich et al. 2007; Cash et al.,

2006) of the forest margins and derived tropical landscapes is needed, that links public/policy

discourse, local ecological knowledge and the best of bio-economic/ ecological modelling of

landscape mosaics (Joshi et al. 2004; Jeanes et al., 2006; Kuncoro et al., 2006)..

4.3 Scale issues

Within any of the CES/COS/CIS paradigms the financial rewards obtained by voluntary

enhancement of environmental services must at least offset the real ‘opportunity cost’ of

modified land use (and opportunities foregone), after paying for the transaction costs. Levels

of reward higher than this will provide real benefit, but the benefits may also be thought to

derive from local spinoffs through enhanced local environmental services. In Paradigm C this

cost-benefit approach is considerably broadened. The function of total capital value -

f(Natural, Human, Social, Physical, Financial) – supplied to ES-providers through various

forms of investment and rewards must match their opportunity cost in terms of f(Natural,

Human, Social, Physical, Financial) plus transaction costs. Transaction costs may themselves

have a positive aspect of relation-building and external communication that can be valued.

This broader approach involves tradeoffs between capital types, as well as tradeoffs between

land use practices that vary in their provision of goods and services. It may defy quantitative

analysis.

With global concerns over climate change past the ‘tipping point’ (Rockstrom et al., 2009),

the global architecture of incentives to reduce emissions from land use and land use change

(including forestry) is under debate. Proposals at the negotiation table for REDD (Reducing

Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) deal with part of the broader issue, and may

need to be embedded in REALU (Reducing emissions from any land use) to have measurable

impact on reducing net emissions (van Noordwijk et al., 2008b; Verchot et al. 2008). For

current negotiations and bargaining positions the paradigm of ‘ES Opportunity Costs’ is

important in the international arena and potentially in the sub-national financial arrangements

and considerations of a ‘fair price’. The COS paradigm may thus be the primary PES concept

1A. Scoping: K�� K

Realistic

1B. Stakeholder identification:

A��A

Voluntary

2. Negotiation: (K �� K) �� (A��A), aiming for (unified K �� unified A)

Conditional

3. Implementation, Monitoring and Learning: unified K �� unified A

(or reverting to (K �� K) �� (A��A)

-22-

in the discussion of REDD, but that does not exclude expectations of CES (‘C markets’) or

CIS (focus on asset protection).

The criteria of realistic, voluntary, conditional and pro-poor apply at the global scale of

interactions between countries, as much as they apply at the local scale of RES/PES, but there

is considerable scope for ‘nested’ systems that allow countries to exchange greenhouse gas

emissions for financial incentives at the national border, but use this for an array of local

incentives for forms of sustainable development that are compatible with ‘high carbon stock

livelihoods’ (van Noordwijk et al. 2008b; Swallow et al. 2007b, 2008). The existing legal

framework for forest management may need to be adjusted to get the ‘conditionality’

appropriately regulated (Galudra et al. 2008). At the local level a number of barriers to farmer

tree planting and community based forest management have been identified, such as lack of

land use rights, good planting material, know-how on tree management and access to markets

for tree products (van Noordwijk et al. 2008e; Roshetko et al. 2008).

Figure 5. Multiple scale links in the transactions between flows derived from natural (N), human (H), Social (S), physical (P) and financial (F) capital between household and global scales; at every scale transition legitimacy, currency, language and time-zone may shift, but all have to meet criteria of being realistic (representing underlying values), conditional (linked to performance) and voluntary (based on free and prior informed consent)

Any border crossing may involve a change in currency, language, legal status (passport and

visa) and/or time zone (Figure 5). The multiple scale relations for an effective system that

provides incentives for local resource management that matches global concerns, may

similarly change language, currency, legality and time frame at the various sub-system

boundaries. The type of exchange influences ‘transaction costs’. Where the financial

incentives at country scale may relate to achievement of emission reduction goals for

-23-

greenhouse gasses, a major way to achieve this may be agreements on land use rights for local

communities – the financial transactions do not need to scale down to this level, as long as the

‘real’ constraints are addressed at each scale interface. The value chain for REDD is rather

complex and requires net benefits for all key stakeholders, as each level as an effective ‘veto’.

A multi-scale approach may use Paradigm A in the relationship between countries,

exchanging financial capital for verifiable and agreed emission reduction, while the

government uses the funds so obtained (or the loans that can be repaid in such a way) for

mechanisms that are based on the ‘ES Opportunity Cost’ paradigm and/or a ‘Co-investment in

Assets’ paradigm, providing co-investment in generic environmental services that happen to

have carbon co-benefits, rather than targeting emission reduction as their primary goal.

Figure 6. Tentative relationship between the CES, COS and CIS paradigms and the overriding principles of ‘fairness’ and ‘efficiency’

-24-

Figure 7. Tentative decision tree to choose among the CES, COS and CIS paradigms as starting point for local action to enhance environmental services

4.4 In conclusion

Building on earlier exploration of the conceptual basis of ‘rewards’ for environmental

services, we explored the juxtaposition and possibility for synergy between ‘fairness’ and

‘efficiency’ in the broad arena of efforts to enhance the global, national and local supply of

‘environmental services’. We introduced three paradigms, CES or commoditized

environmental services, COS or compensation for opportunities skipped and CIS or co-

investment in stewardship, that jointly cover the emerging practice labeled as ‘payments for

environmental services’ (PES). The CES concept matches the widely used definition of PES,

but is not easily applied as the basic assumptions of clarity of land ownership (or tenure) and

the legality of current activities threatening ES are not usually met. The COS concept

primarily relates to publicly funded schemes at a broad ‘land use’ level, often with a weak

relationship to actual ES; the REDD discussion may be largely framed within this subconcept

of PES. The CIS concept appears to describe most of current reality, at least as encountered in

Asia. It probably is the ‘entry level’ approach.

-25-

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A., and O’Connor, T., 2006. Rapid Agrobiodiversity Appraisal (RABA) in the context

of environmental service rewards: protocols for data collection and case studies in

rubber agroforest in Bungo district, Jambi, Indonesia and fragmented forest in north

Thailand. Worldagroforestry Centre, ICRAF-Bogor (Indonesia) 106 pp.

http://icrafnt2:88/Publications/currentpub.asp?publishid=1496

Kusters, K., de Foresta, H., Ekadinata, A. and van Noordwijk, M., 2007. Towards solutions

for state vs. local community conflicts over forestland: the impact of formal recognition

of user rights in Krui, Sumatra, Indonesia. Human Ecology 10.1007/s10745-006-9103-

4

Landell-Mills, N. and I. Porras, 2001, Silver Bullet or Fools' Gold: A global review of

markets for forest environmental services and their impact on the poor, International

Institute for Environment and Development, London

Leimona B, van Noordwijk M, Villamor GB, Fauzi A, Upadhyaya S and Farida . 2008a.

Social Mobilization and Local Awareness of Rights and Opportunities for

Environmental Services Market. Bogor, Indonesia. World Agroforestry Centre -

ICRAF, SEA Regional Office.

http://www.worldagroforestry.org/sea/Publications/searchpub.asp?publishid=1930

-27-

Leimona B, van Noordwijk M, Villamor GB and Galudra G. 2008b. National Policy

Dialogue on Environmental Services Supply through Regulation, Voluntary

Agreements and Markets. Bogor, Indonesia. World Agroforestry Centre - ICRAF, SEA

Regional Office.


Leimona, B., Joshi, L. and van Noordwijk, M., 2009. Can rewards for environmental

services benefit the poor? Lessons from Asia. International Journal of the Commons 3:

82-107. [online] URL:

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Michon G, De Foresta H, Levang P and Verdeaux F, 2007. Domestic forests: a new

paradigm for integrating local communities’ forestry into tropical forest science.

Ecology and Society 12(2): 1. [online] URL:


Pfund, J.L, Koponen, P. , O’Connor, T., Boffa, J.M., van Noordwijk, M. and Sorg, J.P.,

2008. Biodiversity conservation and sustainable livelihoods in tropical forest

landscapes; In: Lafortezza, R.; Chen, J.; Sanesi, G.; Crow, Th.R. (Eds.) Patterns and

Processes in Forest Landscapes: Multiple Use and Sustainable Management. Springer,

Berlin.

Palm, C.A., Van Noordwijk, M., Woomer, P.L., Alegre, J., Arevalo, L., Castilla, C.,

Cordeiro, D.G., Hairiah, K., Kotto-same, J., Moukam, A., Parton, W.J., Ricse, A.,

Rodrigues, V. and Sitompul, S.M., 2005 Carbon losses and sequestration following

land use change in the humid tropics. In: C.A.Palm, S.A. Vosti, P.A. Sanchez and P.J.

Ericksen (Eds.) Slash and Burn: The Search for Alternatives. Columbia University

Press, New York (USA) pp 41-63

Porras, I., Grieg-Gran, M. and Neves, N., 2008. All that glitters: A review of payments for

watershed services in developing countries. International Institute for Environment and

Development,London (UK)

Rockström, J., W. Steffen, K. Noone, Å. Persson, F. S. Chapin, III, E. Lambin, T. M.

Lenton, M. Scheffer, C. Folke, H. Schellnhuber, B. Nykvist, C. A. De Wit, T. Hughes,

S. van der Leeuw, H. Rodhe, S. Sörlin, P. K. Snyder, R. Costanza, U. Svedin, M.

Falkenmark, L. Karlberg, R. W. Corell, V. J. Fabry, J. Hansen, B. Walker, D.

Liverman, K. Richardson, P. Crutzen, and J. Foley. 2009. Planetary

boundaries:exploring the safe operating space for humanity. Ecology and Society 14(2):

32. [online] URL: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art32/

Roshetko, J.M. , Snelder, D.J., Lasco R.D. and Van Noordwijk, M., 2008. Future Challenge:

A Paradigm Shift in the Forestry Sector. In: Denyse J. Snelder and Rodel D. Lasco

(Eds.) Smallholder Tree Growing for Rural Development and Environmental Services:

Lessons from Asia. Advances in Agroforestry Volume 5, Springer, Berlin. pp 451- 483

Scherr, S.J. and McNeely, J.A. (eds.). 2007. Farming with Nature: The Science and Practice

of Ecoagriculture. Island Press, Washington DC

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Schroth, G., da Fonseca, G.A.B., Harvey, C.A. Gascon, C., Vasconcelos, H.L. and Izac,

A.N. (Editors) 2007. Agroforestry and Biodiversity Conservation in Tropical

Landscapes

Southgate, D. and Wunder, S., 2009 Paying for watershed services in Latin America: a

review of current initiatives Journal of Sustainable Forestry, 28:497–524

Suyanto S, Leimona B, van Noordwijk M and Galudra G. 2008. Conditional Tenure as a

Reward for Environmental Services. Bogor, Indonesia. World Agroforestry Centre -

ICRAF, SEA Regional Office.


Suyanto S, Permana RP, Khususiyah N and Joshi L. 2004. Land tenure agroforestry adoption

and reduction of fire hazard in a forest: a case study from Lampung, Sumatra Indonesia.

Agroforestry Systems. 65(1):P. 1-11

Swallow, B., Kallesoe, M., Iftikhar, U., van Noordwijk, M., Bracer, C., Scherr, S., Raju,

K.V., Poats, S., Duraiappah, A., Ochieng, B., Mallee, H. and Rumley, R., 2007a.

Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services in the Developing World:

Framing Pan-Tropical Analysis and Comparison. Working Paper 32. Nairobi: World

Agroforestry Centre.

Swallow BM, van Noordwijk M, Dewi S, Murdiyarso D, White D, Gockowski J, Hyman G,

Budidarsono S, Robiglio V, Meadu V, Eka Dinata A, Agus F, Hairiah K, Mbile P,

Sonwa DJ and Weise S. 2007b. Opportunities for Avoided Deforestation with

Sustainable Benefits: An interim report of the ASB partnership for the Tropical Forest

Margins. Nairobi, Kenya. ASB Partnership for the Tropical Forest Margins. 42


Swallow, B., Noordwijk, M. van. 2008. Restoring the functions of watersheds: agroforestry

systems that are intermediate between natural forests and intensive foodcrop

agriculture can restore can restore most if not all watershed functions attributed to

natural forests. ASB Policy Briefs 09. Nairobi: ASB Partnerships for the Tropical

Forest Margins, 4p. Intranet Full Text:

http://intranet/downloads/publications/PDFs/BR08143. PDF Website:

http://www.asb.cgiar.org/publications/view.asp?Pub_ID=1003

Swallow, B. M., M. F. Kallesoe, U. A. Iftikhar, M. Van Noordwijk, C. Bracer, S. J. Scherr,

K. V. Raju, S. V. Poats, A. Kumar Duraiappah, B. O.Ochieng, H. Mallee and R.

Rumley. 2009. Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services in the

Developing World: Framing Pan-Tropical Analysis and Comparison. Ecology and

Society 14 (2): 26. [online] URL: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art26/

Tomich T.P., D.E. Thomas, and M. van Noordwijk. 2004. Environmental services and land

use change in Southeast Asia: from recognition to regulation or reward? Agriculture,

Ecosystems and Environment 104: 229-244.

-29-

Tomich, T.P., Timmer, D.W., Velarde, S.J., Alegre, J., Areskoug, V., Cash, D.W., Cattaneo,

A., Cornelius, J., Ericksen, P., Joshi, L., Kasyoki, J., Legg, C., Locatelli, M.,

Murdiyarso, D., Palm, C., Porro, R., Perazzo, A.R., Salazar-Vega, A, van Noordwijk,

M., Weise, S., and White, D.. 2007. Integrative science in practice: process perspectives

from ASB, the Partnership for the Tropical Forest Margins. Agriculture Ecosystems and

Environment, 9: 269-286

van Dijk, A.I.J.M., van Noordwijk, M., Calder, I.R., Bruijnzeel, L.A., Schellekens, Chappell,

J.N.A., 2008. Forest-flood relation still tenuous – comment on ‘Global evidence that

deforestation amplifies flood risk and severity in the developing world’ by C.J.A.

Bradshaw, N.S. Sodi, K. S-H. Peh and B.W. Brook. Global Change Biology

http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/119881750/issue

van Noordwijk M., T.P. Tomich, and B. Verbist. 2001. Negotiation Support Models for

Integrated Natural Resource Management in Tropical Forest Margins. Conservation

Ecology 5(2). URL: http://www.consecol.org/ vol5/iss2/art21.

van Noordwijk, M., Chandler, F. and Tomich, T.P., 2004a. An introduction to the conceptual

basis of RUPES: rewarding upland poor for the environmental services they provide.

ICRAF-Southeast Asia, Bogor. 41 pp

van Noordwijk, M., J. Poulsen, and P. Ericksen. 2004b. Filters, flows and fallacies:

Quantifying off-site effects of land use change. Agriculture, Ecosystems and

Environment, 104: 19-34.

van Noordwijk, M. 2005. RUPES typology of environmental service worthy of reward.

RUPES working paper, ICRAF-Southeast Asia, Bogor. 53 pp.

van Noordwijk, M., Agus, F., Verbist, B., Hairiah, K. and Tomich, T.P. 2007. Managing

Watershed Services in Ecoagriculture Landscapes. In: Sara J. Scherr and Jeffrey A.

McNeely (eds.). Farming with Nature: The Science and Practice of Ecoagriculture.

Island Press, Washington DC. pp 191 - 212.

van Noordwijk, M., Leimona, B., Emerton, L., Tomich, T.P., Velarde, S., Kallesoe, M.,

Sekher, M. and Swallow, B., 2007. Criteria and indicators for ecosystem service

reward and compensation mecha-nisms: realistic, voluntary, conditional and pro-poor.

Working Paper 37. Nairobi: World Agroforestry Centre.

van Noordwijk, M., Leimona, B., Hoang, M.H., Villamor, G.B. and Yatich,T., 2008a.

Payments for environmental services. ETFRN NEWS 49, 95-100

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Environmental Services negotiations can start?. Bogor, Indonesia. World Agroforestry

Centre - ICRAF, SEA Regional Office.


van Noordwijk, M., Purnomo, H., Peskett, L. and Setiono,B., 2008c. Reducing emissions

from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) in Indonesia: options and challenges

for fair and efficient payment distribution mechanisms. ICRAF working paper 81.

Working Paper nr 81. World Agroforestry Centre

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Agroforestry Volume 5, Springer, Berlin. pp 427-449

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and Victor M, eds. Sustainable Sloping Lands and Watershed Management Conference

Linking research to strengthen upland policies and practices, 12-15 Dec 2006. Lao

PDR, Laos. National Agriculture and Forestry Research Institute

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WORKING PAPERS IN THIS SERIES

2005

1. Agroforestry in the drylands of eastern Africa: a call to action

2. Biodiversity conservation through agroforestry: managing tree species diversity within a network of community-based, nongovernmental, governmental and research organizations in western Kenya.

3. Invasion of prosopis juliflora and local livelihoods: Case study from the Lake Baringo area of Kenya

4. Leadership for change in farmers organizations: Training report: Ridar Hotel, Kampala, 29th March to 2nd April 2005.

5. Domestication des espèces agroforestières au Sahel : situation actuelle et perspectives

6. Relevé des données de biodiversité ligneuse: Manuel du projet biodiversité des parcs agroforestiers au Sahel

7. Improved land management in the Lake Victoria Basin: TransVic Project’s draft report.

8. Livelihood capital, strategies and outcomes in the Taita hills of Kenya

9. Les espèces ligneuses et leurs usages: Les préférences des paysans dans le Cercle de Ségou, au Mali

10. La biodiversité des espèces ligneuses: Diversité arborée et unités de gestion du terroir dans le Cercle de Ségou, au Mali

2006

11. Bird diversity and land use on the slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro and the adjacent plains, Tanzania

12. Water, women and local social organization in the Western Kenya Highlands

13. Highlights of ongoing research of the World Agroforestry Centre in Indonesia

14. Prospects of adoption of tree-based systems in a rural landscape and its likely impacts on carbon stocks and farmers’ welfare: The FALLOW Model Application in Muara Sungkai, Lampung, Sumatra, in a ‘Clean Development Mechanism’ context

15. Equipping integrated natural resource managers for healthy agroforestry landscapes.

16. Are they competing or compensating on farm? Status of indigenous and exotic tree species in a wide range of agro-ecological zones of Eastern and Central Kenya, surrounding Mt. Kenya.

17. Agro-biodiversity and CGIAR tree and forest science: approaches and examples from Sumatra.

18. Improving land management in eastern and southern Africa: A review of polices.

19. Farm and household economic study of Kecamatan Nanggung, Kabupaten Bogor, Indonesia: A socio-economic base line study of agroforestry innovations and livelihood enhancement.

20. Lessons from eastern Africa’s unsustainable charcoal business.

21. Evolution of RELMA’s approaches to land management: Lessons from two decades of research and development in eastern and southern Africa

22. Participatory watershed management: Lessons from RELMA’s work with farmers in eastern Africa.

23. Strengthening farmers’ organizations: The experience of RELMA and ULAMP.

24. Promoting rainwater harvesting in eastern and southern Africa.

25. The role of livestock in integrated land management.

26. Status of carbon sequestration projects in Africa: Potential benefits and challenges to scaling up.

27. Social and Environmental Trade-Offs in Tree Species Selection: A Methodology for Identifying Niche Incompatibilities in Agroforestry [Appears as AHI Working Paper no. 9]

28. Managing tradeoffs in agroforestry: From conflict to collaboration in natural resource management. [Appears as AHI Working Paper no. 10]

29. Essai d'analyse de la prise en compte des systemes agroforestiers pa les legislations forestieres au Sahel: Cas du Burkina Faso, du Mali, du Niger et du Senegal.

30. Etat de la recherche agroforestière au Rwanda etude bibliographique, période 1987-2003

2007

31. Science and technological innovations for improving soil fertility and management in Africa: A report for NEPAD’s Science and Technology Forum.

32. Compensation and rewards for environmental services.

33. Latin American regional workshop report compensation.

34 Asia regional workshop on compensation ecosystem services.

35 Report of African regional workshop on compensation ecosystem services.

36 Exploring the inter-linkages among and between compensation and rewards for ecosystem services CRES and human well-being

37 Criteria and indicators for environmental service compensation and reward mechanisms: realistic, voluntary, conditional and pro-poor

38 The conditions for effective mechanisms of compensation and rewards for environmental services.

39 Organization and governance for fostering Pro-Poor Compensation for Environmental Services.

40 How important are different types of compensation and reward mechanisms shaping poverty and ecosystem services across Africa, Asia & Latin America over the Next two decades?

41. Risk mitigation in contract farming: The case of poultry, cotton, woodfuel and cereals in East Africa.

42. The RELMA savings and credit experiences: Sowing the seed of sustainability

43. Yatich J., Policy and institutional context for NRM in Kenya: Challenges and opportunities for Landcare.

44. Nina-Nina Adoung Nasional di So! Field test of rapid land tenure assessment (RATA) in the Batang Toru Watershed, North Sumatera.

45. Is Hutan Tanaman Rakyat a new paradigm in community based tree planting in Indonesia?

46. Socio-Economic aspects of brackish water aquaculture (Tambak) production in Nanggroe Aceh Darrusalam.

47. Farmer livelihoods in the humid forest and moist savannah zones of Cameroon.

48. Domestication, genre et vulnérabilité : Participation des femmes, des Jeunes et des catégories les plus pauvres à la domestication des arbres agroforestiers au Cameroun.

49. Land tenure and management in the districts around Mt Elgon: An assessment presented to the Mt Elgon ecosystem conservation programme.

50. The production and marketing of leaf meal from fodder shrubs in Tanga, Tanzania: A pro-poor enterprise for improving livestock productivity.

51. Buyers Perspective on Environmental Services (ES) and Commoditization as an approach to liberate ES markets in the Philippines.

52. Towards Towards community-driven conservation in southwest China: Reconciling state and local perceptions.

53. Biofuels in China: An Analysis of the Opportunities and Challenges of Jatropha curcas in Southwest China.

54. Jatropha curcas biodiesel production in Kenya: Economics and potential value chain development for smallholder farmers

55. Livelihoods and Forest Resources in Aceh and Nias for a Sustainable Forest Resource Management and Economic Progress.

56. Agroforestry on the interface of Orangutan Conservation and Sustainable Livelihoods in Batang Toru, North Sumatra.

2008

57. Assessing Hydrological Situation of Kapuas Hulu Basin, Kapuas Hulu Regency, West Kalimantan.

58. Assessing the Hydrological Situation of Talau Watershed, Belu Regency, East Nusa Tenggara.

59. Kajian Kondisi Hidrologis DAS Talau, Kabupaten Belu, Nusa Tenggara Timur.

60. Kajian Kondisi Hidrologis DAS Kapuas Hulu, Kabupaten Kapuas Hulu, Kalimantan Barat.

61. Lessons learned from community capacity building activities to support agroforest as sustainable economic alternatives in Batang Toru orang utan habitat conservation program (Martini, Endri et al.)

62. Mainstreaming Climate Change in the Philippines.

63. A Conjoint Analysis of Farmer Preferences for Community Forestry Contracts in the Sumber Jaya Watershed, Indonesia.

64. The Highlands: A shower water tower in a changing climate and changing Asia.

65. Eco-Certification: Can It Deliver Conservation and Development in the Tropics?

66. Designing ecological and biodiversity sampling strategies. Towards mainstreaming climate change in grassland management.

67. Participatory Poverty and Livelihood Assessment Report, Kalahan, Nueva Vizcaya, the Philippines

68. An Assessment of the Potential for Carbon Finance in Rangelands

69. ECA Trade-offs Among Ecosystem Services in the Lake Victoria Basin.

70. Le business plan d’une petite entreprise rurale de production et de commercialisation des plants des arbres locaux. Cas de quatre pépinières rurales au Cameroun.

71. Les unités de transformation des produits forestiers non ligneux alimentaires au Cameroun. Diagnostic technique et stratégie de développement Honoré Tabuna et Ingratia Kayitavu.

72. Les exportateurs camerounais de safou (Dacryodes edulis) sur le marché sous régional et international. Profil, fonctionnement et stratégies de développement.

73. Impact of the Southeast Asian Network for Agroforestry Education (SEANAFE) on agroforestry education capacity.

74. Setting landscape conservation targets and promoting them through compatible land use in the Philippines.

75. Review of methods for researching multistrata systems.

76. Study on economical viability of Jatropha curcas L. plantations in Northern Tanzania Assessing farmers’ prospects via cost-benefit analysis

77. Cooperation in Agroforestry between Ministry of Forestry of Indonesia and International Center for Research in Agroforestry

78. "China's bioenergy future. an analysis through the Lens if Yunnan Province

79. Land tenure and agricultural productivity in Africa: A comparative analysis of the economics literature and recent policy strategies and reforms

80. Boundary organizations, objects and agents: linking knowledge with action in agroforestry watersheds

81. Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) in Indonesia: options and challenges for fair and efficient payment distribution mechanisms

2009

82. Mainstreaming Climate Change into Agricultural Education: Challenges and Perspectives.

83. Challenging Conventional mindsets and disconnects in Conservation: the emerging role of eco-agriculture in Kenya’s Landscape Mosaics.

84. Lesson learned RATA garut dan bengkunat: suatu upaya membedah kebijakan pelepasan kawasan hutan dan redistribusi tanah bekas kawasan hutan.

85. The emergence of forest land redistribution in Indonesia.

86. Commercial opportunities for fruit in Malawi.

87. Status of fruit production processing and marketing in Malawi.

88. Fraud in tree science.

89. Trees on farm: analysis of global extent and geographical patterns of agroforestry

90. The springs of Nyando: water, social organization and livelihoods in Western Kenya.

91. Building cpacity toward region-wide curriculum and teaching materials development in agroforestry education in Southeast Asia.

92. Overview of Biomass Energy Technology in Rural Yunnan.

93. A Pro-Growth Pathway for Reducing Net GHG Emissions in China

94. Analysis of local livelihoods from past to present in the central Kalimantan Ex-

Mega Rice Project area

95. Constraints and options to enhancing production of high quality feeds in dairy

production in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda

96. Agroforestry education in the Philippines: status report from the Southeast Asian

Network for Agroforestry Education (SEANAFE)

2010

97. Economic viability of Jatropha curcas L. plantations in Northern Tanzania- assessing

farmers’ prospects via cost-benefit analysis.

98. Hot spot of emission and confusion: land tenure insecurity, contested policies and

competing claims in the central Kalimantan Ex-Mega Rice Project area

99. Agroforestry competences and human resources needs in the Philippines

The World Agroforestry Centre is an autonomous, non-profit

research organization whose vision is a rural transformation

in the developing world where smallholder households

strategically increase their use of trees in agricultural

landscapes to improve their food security, nutrition, income,

health, shelter, energy resources and environmental

sustainability. The Centre generates science-base knowledge

about the diverse role that trees play in agricultural

landscapes, and uses its research to advance policies and

practices that benefit the poor and the environment.

Documents

CES/COS/CIS paradigms for compensation and … Enviromental...Meine van Noordwijk and Beria Leimona. 2010. CES/COS/CIS paradigms for compensation and rewards to enhance environmental