China Strategic Perspectives 2 (1)

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Civil-Military Relations in China:

Assessing the PLAs Role in Elite Politics

by Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders

CHINA STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 2

Center for Strategic Research

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University


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Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National

Defense Universitys (NDUs) dedicated research arm. INSS includes

the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Technology and National

Security Policy, Center for Complex Operations, and Center for

Strategic Conferencing. The military and civilian analysts and staff

who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by

performing research and analysis, publication, conferences, policy

support, and outreach.

The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary

of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified

Combatant Commands, to support the national strategic components of

the academic programs at NDU, and to perform outreach to other U.S.

Government agencies and to the broader national security community.

Cover: Chinese President Hu Jintao greets military members at the

Peoples Liberation Army logistics work conference in Beijing.

Photo courtesy of AP Photo/Xinhua, Wang Jianmin


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Civil-Military Relations in China:Assessing the PLAs Role in Elite Politics


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Institute or National Strategic StudiesChina Strategic Perspectives, No. 2

Series Editor: Phillip C. Saunders

National Deense University PressWashington, D.C.August 2010

by Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders

Civil-Military Relations in China:Assessing the PLAs Role in Elite Politics


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First printing, August 2010


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Contents

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Five Key rends in Civil-Military Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Teoretical Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Future Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41


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Civil-Military Relations in China

Executive Summary

Tis study reviews the last 20 years o academic literature on the role o the Peoples Lib-eration Army (PLA) in Chinese elite politics. It examines the PLAs willingness to support the

continued rule o the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and to obey directives rom top party

leaders, the PLAs influence on the selection o Chinas top civilian leaders, and the PLAs ability

to shape the domestic political environment. Over the last two decades the discussion o these

three issues has largely been shaped by five trends identified in the literature: increasing PLA

proessionalism, biurcation o civil and military elites, a reduced PLA role in political institu-

tions, reduced emphasis on political work within the PLA, and increased military budgets. o-

gether, these trends are largely responsible or the markedly reduced role o the PLA in Chinese

elite politics.Te theoretical models o Chinese civil-military relations that exist within the literature

during the period divide into three distinctive categories. raditional models including the

Factional, Symbiosis, Proessionalism, and Party Control models, dominate the literature rom

1989 to 1995. Scholars worked to integrate inormation becoming available as the PRC opened

to the world into these already existing models o Chinese civil-military relations. However,

evolving political dynamics within the PRC ollowing iananmen marginalized the utility o

the models. From 1995 to 1997 many scholars argued that these traditional models should not

be considered mutually exclusive but complementary. Tis concept o a combination model

was short lived as it became increasingly apparent that even a combination o traditional modelshad little predictive or even explanatory power in light o rapidly changing political dynamics.

wo new models, the Conditional Compliance and State Control models, emerged in the pe-

riod o 19972003. Both incorporated elements o the traditional models while attempting to

address the implications o new political and military dynamics in the PRC.

Examining the predictions o these models against our case studies involving major de-

velopments in civil-military relations, we ound that although each model had some descriptive

and explanatory power, none possessed strong predictive ability. Te traditional models help

explain the PLAs reaction to intensified Party control ollowing iananmen, but none was able

to predict how Chinese civil-military relations evolved subsequently. Civil-military models o-ered their most specific (and ultimately least accurate) predictions regarding the leadership

succession rom Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin. Most models predicted a strong role or the

PLA in the succession that did not materialize. Tis was the period when traditional civil-mili-

tary models began to run up against the reality o changing political dynamics within the PRC.


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China Strategic Perspectives, No. 2

When the PLA was orced to withdraw rom most commercial activities in the mid-1990s, the

models predicted a ar slower, more contentious, and less complete divestiture than ultimately

occurred. Most analysts correctly predicted that the PLA would have only limited involvementin the leadership transition rom Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao ollowing the 16thParty Congress in

2002, but subsequent explanations or why the transition went smoothly emphasize different

actors. Te models did agree in their emphasis on the importance o greater political institu-

tionalization in reducing PLA influence and highlighted the implicit role and uture potential

importance o the PLA in elite politics, especially i divisions among the civilian leadership

produce a political crisis in the uture.

Based on this assessment, we conclude that existing models serve a useul role in identi-

ying key variables or analysis in the study o Chinese civil-military relations. However, most

o the literature has been descriptive and interpretive rather than predictive. Te widespreadpractice o using elements o multiple models to analyze civil-military relations makes it diffi-

cult to assess the validity o individual models or to generate alsifiable predictions, thus lim-

iting the predictive ability o current models. Although China is a much more open society

today, lack o reliable inormation continues to make the study o civil-military relations in

China difficult, orcing analysts to rely on indirect evidence and dubious sources to speculate

about the militarys influence on elite politics and about the relationships between top civilian

and military leaders.

Since 2003 the literature on Chinese civil-military relations has successully exploited new

sources o inormation to offer useul analysis o the PLAs relationship with the Chinese econ-omy and society at large.Yet there has been a notable lack o effort to develop, employ, or test

new theoretical models that could help produce a new unified theory o Chinese civil-military

relations. Future work may find ertile ground in exploring the nature o official and unofficial

interactions between the PRCs biurcated civilian and military elite, comparing how broader

trends in Chinas civilian government are implemented in the PLA, or conducting a more genu-

inely comparative analysis with the experiences o other one-party states, transitioning democ-

racies, or other Asian states.


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Introduction

Given its role in bringing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to power and its positionas a key base o power, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has always played an important

political role in the Peoples Republic o China (PRC). Chinese civilian leaders have placed great

emphasis on ensuring the militarys continued loyalty to the CCP. Te complexity and impor-

tance o the civil-military relationship, and the Chinese militarys changing role in elite politics

over time, have led scholars to devote considerable attention to this topic, producing a airly

large body o literature on civil-military relations in China. However, this paper only briefly ad-

dresses the issue o military influence on specific policy issues in the concluding section.1

Tis paper ocuses on the PLAs role in elite politics by reviewing the literature published

in this area in the last 20 years. In so doing we have concentrated on three questions central toan understanding o this topic. Te first involves the PLAs willingness to support the continued

rule o the Chinese Communist Party and to obey the directives o top Party leaders. Te ques-

tion o the militarys political loyalty and willingness to ollow civilian orders in periods o crisis

lies at the heart o civil-military relations. Te second question involves the PLAs influence on

the selection o Chinas top civilian leaders. Military officers sit on the key Communist Party

institutions that ormally elect Chinas civilian leaders, including representation in the National

Peoples Congress, periodic Party Congresses, the Central Committee, and the Politburo. Al-

though this gives military representatives votes in the ormal approval o Chinas top leaders,

in practice the selection o senior leaders occurs through inormal processes where militaryinfluence is much less clear. Te third question involves the PLAs ability to shape the political

environment in which top civilian leaders operate and compete or influence and promotion.

Even i the military is loyal and its influence on the selection o Chinas top leaders is limited, its

ability to shape the broader political environment could affect the political standing and deci-

sions o top leaders, with indirect effects on policy.

In approaching this topic, we have examined the analytical models that authors writing in

this area have employed in order to assess how well specific predictions correspond with subse-

quent developments. We have concentrated on the literature published in the last two decades,

with greater attention paid to assessing the predictions made in the earlier part o that period.Tis timerame makes analytical sense given the importance o the militarys role in suppress-

ing the 1989 student demonstrations in iananmen Square and the impact o this intervention

on civil-military relations. Although some earlier literature still has considerable value in ex-

plicating the ormal mechanisms that the CCP employs to exert political control over the PLA,


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iananmen marked a new era in civil-military relations in China. For this reason, our review o

the literature ocuses on analysis written afer 1989.

Te paper is organized into five sections. First, we identiy and assess key trends in civil-military relations over the last 20 years. Tis analysis seeks to identiy (in retrospect) key chang-

es in civil-military relations that affected (and mostly reduced) the militarys role in Chinese

elite politics. As part o this process, we discuss contemporaneous efforts to identiy, describe,

and analyze these trends as they were occurring. Tis section serves as a baseline or assessing

the literatures efforts to predict trends. Te second section contains a brie review o the main

approaches to civil-military relations that have been employed in the literature. In addition to

describing the main approaches, the section analyzes the evolution in analytical approaches

over time.

Te third section reviews cases where authors writing on the role o the Chinese mili-tary in elite politics made specific predictions that can be assessed against actual outcomes. Al-

though there are relatively ew specific predictions, the ones that do exist provide an additional

means or assessing the predictive value o analytical models. Te ourth section presents our

conclusions about the literatures ability to apply analytical models to specific cases and generate

firm predictions about the militarys role in elite politics. Although China is a much more open

society today than in the past, reliable inormation on this sensitive subject is still extremely

scarce. A serious lack o inormation continues to make the study o civil-military relations in

China difficult, orcing analysts to rely on indirect evidence and dubious sources to speculate

about the militarys influence on elite politics and about the relationships between top civilianand military leaders. We conclude that most o the literature has been descriptive and interpre-

tive rather than predictive. Te paper concludes with an assessment o the most recent literature

on civil-military relations, identification o some potential directions or uture research, and

speculation about the potential or PLA efforts to influence Chinas national security policy to

shape the domestic political environment in which elite politics takes place.

Five Key rends in Civil-Military Relations

Proessionalism

Te first major trend is an increased emphasis on proessionalism and proessional ex-

pertise within the PLA. Analysis o military proessionalism stems rom Samuel Huntingtons

seminal work on civil-military relations, which defines it in terms o expertise, responsibility,

and corporateness.2Huntingtons view o civil-military relations fits awkwardly with the PLAs


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role as a Party-army, but his ocus on the roles a proessional military plays is helpul in un-

derstanding increased proessionalism in the PLA.3

Increased emphasis on proessional expertise is evident in the PLAs efforts to upgradethe military and technical skills o soldiers in order to operate more sophisticated equipment

and conduct more complicated operations.4Science and technology are being stressed more at

Chinese military academies, coupled with efforts to recruit and retain graduates with specific

technical skills rom civilian universities. Te PLA now endorses proessional military educa-

tion (PME) as a requirement or promotion and assignment to senior positions. A 6-week train-

ing course on science and technology is required or promotion to general officer. Service in a

joint assignment is not currently a requirement, but one senior PLA officer commented that the

PLA is moving in that direction.5

Improving the quality o military personnel is coupled with promulgating revised doctri-nal and training materials that delineate a body o specialized knowledge military officers must

master to advance in their proession.6Te emphasis on proessional expertise and creden-

tials parallels broader developments in China, where the growing importance o proessional

knowledge and ormal educational credentials is evident in both government and society. Te

PLA has closely studied the doctrine and operational experience o other advanced militaries

and adapted many o their practices to fit the Chinese context. Tis is evident in an increased

emphasis on the importance o training as a basic means to raise its combat effectiveness in

peacetime, as well as an important method to oster and administer troops.7

Discussions with PLA officers and study o PLA writings indicate that a sense o the mili-tarys special responsibility or national security is widespread within the PLA. Tis is particu-

larly evident when discussing the militarys role in deterring aiwan independence and being

prepared to fight i necessary. Te extent to which PLA officers possess a strong sense o a sepa-

rate, corporate identity is harder to assess, but contacts with senior and mid-level officers in a

variety o settings certainly give that impression.

Biurcation o Elites

A second major trend is an increasing biurcation o civilian and military elites. Chinas

first generation o revolutionary leaders either served in the military as combat commandersor political commissars, or, as civilians, worked closely with military officers during the revo-

lutionary period. Tese shared experiences orged close and enduring ties between civilian

and military elites. Even as these elite leaders took on more specialized roles in government

and the military in the post-revolutionary period, civilian leaders still elt ree to intervene in


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military affairs when necessary, while at the same time many military leaders retained inde-

pendent political standing due to their role in the revolution and their longstanding ties to

senior civilians. Te Chinese militarys interventions into political affairs, most notably duringthe Cultural Revolution, gave senior military leaders political experience and a legitimate role

within Chinese elite politics. Tis produced a dual-role elite that obscured the line between

civilian and military leaders.8

With the passing o the revolutionary generation due to death or retirement, the situation

has changed undamentally. Chinas current top civilian leaders do not possess any substan-

tial military experience or knowledge and lack the extensive shared experiences and ties with

military leaders that characterized the revolutionary generation. For their part, Chinas military

leaders have succeeded within the military promotion system largely due to their proessional

skills. Although senior officers are all members o the Communist Party, they lack independentpolitical standing within the Party or the public, especially when speaking outside their proes-

sional domain.

Tis biurcation is reinorced by the increasingly separate career paths that characterize

successul civilian and military leaders. Chinas civilian leaders make their careers on the basis

o ormal educational credentials, technical knowledge, management experience, political con-

nections, and/or political skills. Civilian leaders have relatively limited opportunities to interact

with military officers until they reach senior provincial or national level positions.9Te pre-

mium on proessional credentials and political networks based on school associations or proes-

sional interactions within Party or government structures urther limits interactions betweencivilian and military elites.10

Conversely, Chinas current top military leaders are educated almost exclusively in military

institutions, spend much o their early careers within a single military region, and have limited

opportunities to interact with top political leaders until they attain positions in Beijing or are

elected to positions in the Central Committee.11Coupled with an increasing sense o proes-

sional responsibility and a corporate identity as military officers, the result is an increasing

separation between civilian and military elites.

What is less clear is how the diverging backgrounds and experiences that characterize

Chinas civilian and military leaders affect the militarys role in elite politics (and in policy).Differing experiences and proessional responsibilities are likely to produce different perspec-

tives on national security issues. Te relatively limited exposure o civilian leaders to national

security issues until the late stages o their careers, which is paralleled by the militarys increas-

ing ocus on technical expertise and proessional responsibilities o army building, suggests the


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possibility that the two groups may differ significantly in their views on key issues. Moreover,

the relatively limited contact between civilian and military leaders (most o which occurs in

ormal settings) may restrict the amount o trust and mutual confidence. One senior militaryacademic privately admitted that the lack o military knowledge and experience among Chinas

civilian leaders is a significant problem.12

Reduced Role or PLA in Political Decisionmaking

A third major trend is a reduced PLA role in ormal political institutions. Tis is evident

rom analysis o the PLAs representation in key Communist Party organs. PLA watchers and

analysts o Chinese politics have long ocused on the degree o military representation in key

organs such as the Politburo Standing Committee, the Politburo, the Central Committee, and

the National Peoples Congress. Shifs in military representation have been regarded as an indi-cator o waxing or waning military influence. Tis has certainly been true at times; the militarys

role in restoring order during the Cultural Revolution was accompanied by greater military

representation in these bodies. However, military representation has been steady or slightly

declining in the post-iananmen period. For example, the military held 23 percent o the seats

in the Central Committee elected during the 14thParty Congress. By the 17thParty Congress

(in 2007), the percentage o military representatives had allen slightly to 20.5 percent present.13

Even more importantly, the PLA has not had a representative on the Politburo Standing Com-

mittee since 1997.

Te selection o PLA officers to serve in these bodies is increasingly tied to their ormalmilitary positions rather than to their independent political reputations or connections. (O

course, political reliability and connections remain important actors in promotions and assign-

ments to senior military positions.) For example, members o the Central Military Commission

(CMC) now appear to be selected on an ex officio basis, with the heads o the our military

departments and the service commanders now routinely becoming members o the CMC.14

A key actor in the reduced role o the military elite in politics has been the ability o civil-

ian leaders to avoid a major political crisis that might require intervention by the military.15o

date, Chinas civilian leaders have managed the difficult process o economic modernization

without repetition o major civil unrest on the scale o the 1989 student protest movement. De-spite a significant number o local protests and civil unrest, the combination o rapid economic

growth, suppression o independent political organizations, and relatively rapid responses to

grievances and protests has succeeded in maintaining order without the need or military inter-

vention. Increased effectiveness o public security orces and the ability o the Peoples Armed


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Police (PAP) to respond to larger scale disturbances have limited the need or military involve-

ment in maintaining order.16

Tis relative stability has been acilitated by the ability o civilian leaders to avoid ma-jor leadership splits that could not be resolved within Party channels. Despite periodic reports

about conflicts between political actions loyal to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao and about differ-

ences in policy lines, whatever tensions existed have remained manageable. Tis may reflect the

emergence o more institutionalized norms within elite politics that reduce the costs o losing

in high politics.17Te net result is that civilian leaders have not needed to call on the military to

resolve a political crisis. Tis has allowed military leaders to ocus on their proessional respon-

sibilities, but has probably also reduced their influence in elite politics.

Te Chinese Communist Party also appears to have developed a more institutionalized,

i still inormal, succession process that limits military influence to ratification o a uturecore leader and deputy chosen primarily by civilians.18Analysis o the succession process that

brought Hu Jintao to power and that appears likely (but not certain) to bring Xi Jinping to

power in 2012 suggests that military influence in this process is extremely limited. In both

cases, the uture core leader was clearly identified at least 6 to 7 years beore ascending to the

top position.19Te uture top leader and his uture deputy (who is designated to serve as prime

minister and head o government) are given a series o ormal positions and inormal policy as-

signments o increasing responsibility beore ascending to their ormal positions. In Hu Jintaos

case, this included an appointment as Vice Chairman o the Central Military Commission in

1999. Although it appears that the requirements or top leader status are becoming more stan-dardized (or example, top leader candidates need to have served as Party secretaries in two di-

erent provinces), there is little evidence o a significant military role in the selection process. 20

Military representatives, like other members o the Central Committee, do ratiy the incoming

leaders as they move through their various preparatory positions. While in theory this provides

an opportunity or dissent, in practice the military role appears to be ormal approval o deci-

sions that have already been made elsewhere.

It is worth highlighting that this extended succession process provides opportunities or

the incoming core leader to interact more extensively with the military in general and with

senior military officers in particular. Tis process probably includes increasing amiliarizationwith military issues (partly through participation in CMC meetings) and senior military per-

sonnel. Te core leaders eventual chairmanship o the Central Military Commission provides

opportunities or reinorcing his image as commander in chie and or public demonstrations

o military loyalty to the core leader in his capacity as General Secretary o the Chinese Com-


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munist Party. Tese symbolic occasions have political value in highlighting the core leaders top

status within a collective leadership. Te extended succession process also provides opportuni-

ties or a core leader to assess the talents o senior military leaders and to identiy those whomight be politically unreliable or oppose his intended uture political direction. Afer attaining

the position o CMC Chairman, a core leader is in the position to decide on or significantly

influence military promotions and assignments.

Reduced Emphasis on Political Work

A ourth major trend is less clearly documented but is nevertheless evident to observers

o the PLA. Tis is a reduced emphasis on political work and political education (relative to

the time spent on military duties). Tis partly reflects a general loss o confidence and belie

in communist ideology throughout Chinese society. op Chinese leaders have abandoned keytenets o Marxism while retaining key elements o Leninism such as the emphasis on the Partys

absolute leadership. Tese changes (including the eligibility o capitalists or Party member-

ship) have reduced the CCPs ability to draw upon Marxism as an ideological justification or its

rule. Te Communist Party insists on the importance o CCP leadership and strongly opposes

any potential challenges, but no longer insists on controlling what its citizens believe. Te shif

has also been evident within civil-military relations, where the Party continues to insist upon

the militarys absolute obedience to it, but spends less time indoctrinating military officers and

troops in the ideological details.

Some observers suggest that there has also been an increase in the procedural and unc-tional power o commanders relative to political commissars and Party committees.21 Many

also highlight indicators that at lower levels political officers and commissars are increasingly

playing the role o morale officer, akin to chaplains in Western militaries, rather than political

indoctrinator. Others suggest that this may depend on the personalities o the commander and

political commissar involved and vary considerably across the military. Finally, there are those

who point out that even i political officers and commissars are spending less time on politi-

cal indoctrination, they have always served in the role o morale officers, and Western analysts

should not overestimate the extent o change.22

Reduced emphasis on political ideology is a logical consequence o the trend toward pro-essionalization. Nevertheless, it is clear that the CCP can still impose its guidance on high-

priority issues. For example, over the last decade the army has undergone campaigns against

the Falun Gong movement, corruption, and talk o the PLA shifing to become a national army

rather than a Party army. PLA publications and speeches by top military leaders quickly adopt


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new political directions, concepts, and slogans introduced by top Party leaders (such as the

three represents and the importance o scientific approaches to solving problems). Te Party

is able to ensure promulgation and ormal compliance with its key ideological statements, butthe degree o actual belie within the military is much less clear.

Increased Military Budgets

A fifh trend has been sustained increases in military budgets over the last 15 years. In

particular, there have been double-digit real increases in Chinas official deense budgets every

year since 1997. Despite these very significant increases, it is worth noting that Chinas official

spending on deense is not increasing significantly as a percentage o gross domestic product or

as a percentage o central government spending. Rapid economic growth and growing central

government revenues have increased the resources available to Chinas top leaders. Te percento money being spent on the military, at least as measured by the official deense budget, is re-

maining relatively static.

Some suggest that Chinas civilian leadership is orced to spend more money on the military

as a means o buying its loyalty.23Significant military spending indicates that the civilian leader-

ship places a priority on the military. But in practice it is difficult to interpret the significance. In-

creased military spending can be thought o as delayed compensation or the 1980s, when deense

industries were starved, the size o the military was reduced, and the military ranked last out o

the our modernizations. Chinese civilian leaders may have a variety o motivations or increasing

military spending. It is difficult to determine whether this practice reflects a commitment to de-velopment o a strong military as an important national goal, a rational investment in improving

Chinas capability to deter aiwan independence and to prevent negative military developments

that might have political consequences, or an effort to buy support rom the military.

Te act that a significant chunk o recent deense budget increases has gone or higher

salaries, better housing, and improved military acilities suggests a ocus on winning support

rom military officers. However, these types o investments also make logical sense given the

PLAs need to attract and retain better educated personnel in order to build a more capable,

modern military. I deense budgets varied based on the relative political standing or the bal-

ance o need between civilian and military leaders, one would expect to see more variation overtime and some correlation with the relative standing o civilian and military leaders. At present,

there is insufficient inormation to draw firm conclusions. I slower growth orces Chinese lead-

ers to make tough decisions about how to allocate limited resources, more inormation about

leadership priorities may become available.


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Teoretical Models

Our survey o the civil-military literature ocuses on the post-iananmen period. Tetheoretical models employed during this period proceed through three airly distinct phases:

traditional, combination, and contemporary.24Te first phase (19891995) is represented by

our traditional models: Factional, Symbiosis, Proessionalism, and Party Control.25Te sec-

ond phase (19951997) witnessed a short-lived attempt to combine these traditional models

into one comprehensive ramework. In the third phase (19982003), scholars used aspects o

the previous models to construct a new group o contemporary models that attempt to ad-

dress many o the trends described above. Scholars have continued to work on civil-military

issues, but much o the latest work ocuses on the PLAs relationship to the broader Chinese

economy and society and has not produced new analytical models that seek to explain Party-army relations.

Te traditional models initially developed as distinct and competing ones. Each empha-

sizes a different dominant actor or dynamic to explain civil-military relations. Tey were con-

ceived in and applied to a political environment defined by two key variables: a relatively co-

herent revolutionary elite and political volatility. Both actors began to wane in the mid-1980s

as the revolutionary generation retired (and eventually passed away) and stronger political in-

stitutions and norms o elite behavior reduced political volatility. At the same time, increased

access to inormation and field work conducted in the 1980s produced a new round o research

on the PLA political work system and other aspects o the PLAs proessional development. Fora period in the early 1990s, scholars integrated this new inormation with traditional models

even as those models lost utility as predictive and even explanatory tools. By 1995, scholars

recognized the discord between traditional models and developing trends and began to move

beyond traditional models. Nevertheless, these models serve as the point o origin or more

contemporary models developed in the later part o this period and remain important to our

review o the literature.

Factional Model

Te Factional model is somewhat distinct because it is derived rom the general literatureon Chinese elite politics rather than the civil-military relations literature.26Te model ocuses

on political actions among the PRC elite and how leaders and members o these actions

interact and compete. Te basis o actions varies, but may include personal, generational,

proessional, geographic, or institutional associations.27During the period we surveyed three


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Factional models used within the civil-military context: Pekingology, the Field Army model,

and biographical analysis.

In the early part o the period, analysts typically employed Pekingology or the Field Armymodel. Analysts and journalists using Pekingology rely on press reports or sources within the

Party or PLA hierarchy or inormation on elite interactions and conflicts. Tis approach em-

phasizes personal dynamics and shifing political positions o individual leaders within PRC

hierarchies. One o the most prominent practitioners is Willy Wo-Lap Lam.28Pekingology is

not a rigorous theory, but ocuses on obtaining and analyzing inside inormation about the in-

ternal workings o the PRC elite. Analysts using this method have sometimes provided valuable

insights into elite interactions. However, the reliance on unnamed sources, unique and unverifi-

able inormation, and rumors makes it difficult to separate the nuggets o valuable inormation

rom the reams o inormed (and sometimes uninormed) speculation.Te Field Army model is based on the premise that revolutionary leaders developed en-

during personal and proessional bonds during their service in one o the original five field

armies o the revolutionary period. It traces these connections into the development o actions

that cut across institutional lines, including the Party and PLA. Advocates assert that these ac-

tional relationships best explain civil-military interactions.

Te literature utilizing the Field Army model is extensive,29but it is rarely used in contem-

porary studies. Michael Swaine conducted the last comprehensive study using the Field Army

model in 1992.30His study illustrates both its strengths and weaknesses, especially in the post-

iananmen period. Swaine presents very detailed inormation on the personal backgroundsand complex relationships o the elite. Te inormation and analysis are very accurate. Swaines

study (and Factional models in general) encounters obstacles, however, when attempting to

generate definitive predictions and conclusions. Factional boundaries are ofen ambiguous and

overlapping, and the model requires making inerences based on personal relationships and in-

terests that are only partially observable. Factional models also have difficulty predicting when

actional interests will outweigh policy preerences, other personal actors, institutional inter-

ests, broader Party interests,31or the bureaucratic interests o the PLA.32Despite these weak-

nesses, the Field Army approach had some explanatory value so long as the first generation o

revolutionary leaders made up the political and military elite.By the late 1980s and 1990s, however, a new generation o leaders and increased elite

biurcation along with reorms within the PLA obviated the traditional Field Army model.33

A year afer the release o Swaines analysis, Li Cheng and Lynn White, conducting the first

o a series o analyses o the PRC elite, argued that rapid military proessionalization, not


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just requent regional reshuffles, has tended to bring military actions based on the field army

systems to an end.34In analyzing the top 200 civilian and military leaders with positions in

the Politburo and Central Committee, Li and White find evidence that educational and pro-essional backgrounds now serve as the basis o a new generation o coalitions and actions.35

Tey go as ar as to say that biographical analysis is not an opposite or mere complement

to analysis that seeks immediate motives. It provides an indispensablesometimes a su-

ficientaccount o these incentives.36Biographical analysis has contributed a great deal to

the fields knowledge o the composition and characteristics o the PRC elite. However, this

approach suffers rom the same weaknesses o previous actional approaches: overlapping

and ill-defined actional boundaries and uncertainty about actional preerences limit its pre-

dictive or explanatory value.

Symbiosis

Te term Symbiosishas a long history in the study o Communist systems, especially the

Soviet system.37It is defined as a relationship with low levels o differentiation between military

and nonmilitary elites where circulation o elites between military and nonmilitary posts is

the norm.38Te term was originally applied to Communist systems born out o guerrilla armies

where the usion o political and military unctions was inevitable. Symbiosis contrasts with

coalitional models, which connote increasingly differentiated Party-army relations.39In a coali-

tional relationship, the Party and military work more independently and can be separated into

ully distinct institutions. As Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande argue, Communistguerrilla movements like those o China and Cuba tend to begin as symbiotic ones. Over time,

as the guerrilla movement becomes established, the Party and military become more special-

ized and institutionalized, reducing circulation o political and military elites. Symbiotic rela-

tions thereore tend to evolve into coalitional relations.

Perlmutter and LeoGrande argued that despite some movement toward becoming a coali-

tional relationship in the 1950s, the Party-military relationship has remained essentially symbi-

otic since 1927. Tese early uses o the term symbiotic in the Chinese civil-military literature

were largely lifed rom the Soviet literature and roughly applied to Chinas own unique dual-

role elite and interlocking directorate.40In the post-iananmen literature, however, it wasDavid Shambaugh who ully developed and pioneered a Symbiotic model specifically tailored

to the Chinese case. Building on Perlmutter and LeoGrandes initial ideas, Shambaugh goes on

to explain how, unlike the Soviet case, politicization and military proessionalism are not mu-

tually exclusive in the Chinese case due to the unique history o the CCP and PLA.41


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Eberhard Sandschneider and Jeremy Paltiel put orward similar arguments or a unique

Chinese Party-army relationship. Sandschneider rejected the notion that the PLA acts as a

separate institution, laying out a military-participation approach where the military elite arepart o the overall PRC leadership and PLA participation in politics is ully legitimate. Rather

than ocusing on conflictual aspects o the Party-army relationship, he emphasized their ull

and complex relationship.42Jeremy Paltiel saw a Party-army relationship that was evolving but

whose ull separation has been inhibited by institutional and constitutional obstacles. He stated

his belie that so long as the PLA is connected to, and gains its privileges rom, the Communist

Party and its role in political institutions remains ambiguous, the PLA will not withdraw rom

its privileged role in the political system.43

Shambaugh, however, does not see the symbiotic nature o Chinas Party-army relation-

ship as a constant. While recognizing the historical significance o Symbiosis, he argues thattrends in civil-military relations and the stress iananmen placed on the Partys command o

the gun began to undamentally alter the relationship. In the post-iananmen environment he

argues that the relationship is evolving rom Symbiosis to Party Control (discussed below). 44

Ellis Joffe also criticizes symbiosis as too static, noting that numerous changes since the revolu-

tion have created unctional differentiations that reduce the utility o a Symbiotic model. He

also questions the premise that the PLA is accepted as a legitimate political actor, asserting that

it has always remained subordinate to the Party. While acknowledging that the PLA has played

a major role in policymaking, he attributes this dynamic to the revolutionary status o military

leaders, not the inherent political legitimacy o the PLA as an institution.45Like Shambaugh, hebelieves that this symbiotic relationship will weaken as the ounding revolutionary generation

passes away.

By the mid-1990s, scholars agreed that elite biurcation and proessionalism had produced

a military more clearly differentiated rom the Party and diluted the traditional symbiotic re-

lationship. Shambaugh notes that Symbiosis will always have some place in the study o Party-

army relations because o the close relationship between the two actors.46Increasingly, discus-

sions within the civil-military literature raise the question o the appropriate use o the term

symbiosis given generational turnover and a steadily proessionalizing PLA. When the term is

employed today, it is used in a looser sense to reer to the inherent interdependence between theParty and army, as Shambaugh suggested. From here the literature was lef to consider whether

the trends o the early 1990s would produce a PLA with greater institutional separation and

autonomy or result in the Party instituting greater political control over the PLA to ensure con-

tinued loyalty.


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Proessionalism

Te Proessionalism model is most commonly associated with Harlan Jencks, Ellis Joffe,and Paul Godwin.47Tey reject Huntingtons assertion that military proessionalism and political

involvement must be diametrically opposed. Instead, they see a less political military, or as Jencks

terms it, a PLA that strives toward political quiescence.48While admitting that the PLA will

always be a political orce to some degree, the advocates o proessionalism assert that the PLA

is most concerned with advancing its own institutional interests to retain autonomy and develop

as a modern fighting orce. Tese efforts have sometimes aced resistance rom elements in the

Party and the PLA concerned with maintaining the armys political role. Advocates o proession-

alism argue that this red versus expert dynamic best explains Party-army relations.

Te argument o the Proessionalism model remains airly consistent in the pre- and post-iananmen periods; most work has ocused on identiying and cataloging evidence o the PLAs

proessional development.49Following iananmen, Ellis Joffe wrote that proessionalism re-

mains its [PLAs] main uniying and motivation orce and that i orced to choose between di-

erent leadership groups the PLA can be expected to support the group that is most responsive

to its proessional interest. Joffe is not convinced that the PLA will enter uture political strug-

gles. PLA commanders ocused on proessional pursuits will be quick to recall how disruptive

past interventions into politics were to the PLAs proessional development.50In 1996, Joffe went

so ar as to declare proessionalism the victor in the longstanding red versus expert debate.51

In his excellent 1999 retrospective, Tomas Bickord generally agrees with proponents oproessionalism, but identifies two countervailing trends: the militarys role in oreign policy and

PLA commercial activity. Te PLAs commercial role was significant at the time, but has dropped

precipitously since the 1998 divestiture order. Whether a PLA role in policy constitutes a chal-

lenge to proessionalism is debatable; even Huntington accepts the militarys role as a group

o proessional advisors in policymaking when specialized military expertise is necessary. Te

extent o the PLAs role, influence, and coercive power in this domain remains up or debate. 52

Advocates o proessionalism are aware o the potential tension between a PLA that is

less involved in elite politics but is more deeply involved in oreign and deense policymak-

ing. A significant policy role gives the PLA the potential to exert influence in policy areasthat affect the overall political climate. Swaine offers an in-depth look at PLA involvement

in the policy process.53Mulvenon and Joffe consider the ambiguous implications o a more

proessional PLA.54Since iananmen, there have been ew reasons or the PLA to intervene

in politics or to resist civilian authority, but the possibility that the PLA could seek to reenter


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the political arena still exists i civilians prove incapable o handling a crisis or its critical in-

stitutional equities are challenged.

wo questions linger over the Proessionalism model. First, can a Party-army become atruly proessional army in the Huntingtonian sense? Bickord questioned whether the term pro-

essionalism was being used inappropriately to describe the process o PLA modernization.55

Joffe admits the PLA cannot be a ully proessional army in the Western sense, but argues that

the PLA is not simply a Party stooge.56In 1996, Joffe introduced the term Party-army with

proessional characteristics to describe the PLA. Tis leads to the second question. Consider-

ing the underlying Party-army relationship, is there a ceiling on the extent to which the PLA

will be able to proessionalize? Te answers to these questions have implications or the uture

o Chinese civil-military relation. Contemporary models allude to these questions, but do not

provide clear answers.

Party Control

Te Party Control model emphasizes the role o the Political Work System in ensuring the

Partys command o the gun. Tis type o analysis parallels similar literature on the Soviet con-

trol system. During this period scholars such as David Shambaugh and Nan Li drew on newly

available sources to explicate the particular characteristics o the Chinese system.

Both Shambaugh and Nan Li agree the Party-army relationship will evolve away rom a sym-

biotic relationship toward a more ormalized and institutionalized relationship. Shambaugh ar-

gues that it is the political work system that ultimately ensures Party control. Shambaugh states,I the relationship was more symbiotic, the Party would not go to such great lengths to try and

assert its control over the PLA.57In the afermath o iananmen (when some army units reused

to obey orders), he emphasizes civilian efforts to ortiy traditional mechanisms o Party control

and argues that the accelerating decline o the dual-role elite will make ormal Party controls even

more important. What Shambaugh describes is an evolution rom a Symbiotic model to a Party

Control model.58In this scenario, the new generation o Party leaders lacking revolutionary legiti-

macy and military experience would rely more on direct Party controls to ensure PLA obedience.

Nan Li describes a coming shif rom a predominantly Factional model to a Bureaucratic Behavior

model. He oresees less extensive political controls than Shambaugh, but envisions a Party-armyrelationship increasingly defined by ormal mechanisms and institutions. He does not, however,

see the PLA developing as a distinct interest group.59

For a short time afer iananmen, the Party Control model accurately predicted Party e-

orts to intensiy political campaigns and reassert control over the PLA. Over the longer term,


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however, the Partys direct control over the PLA has weakened and the PLA has gained more in-

stitutional autonomy. Evidence suggests that the time spent on political work relative to combat

training has decreased dramatically since this peak immediately afer iananmen.60Others ar-gue the political work system has not only weakened, but also could be evolving into something

undamentally different. Some developments suggest that as political officers become more

enmeshed in the PLAs corporate culture, their loyalties and command relationships could be

tested in a moment o crisis.61At the same time others are quick to recall that the political work

system and political officers have always encountered these dilemmas and that their role as a

tool o political control or indoctrination has never been as strong as it was made out to be. In-

stead, it has simply been the subject matter o political work that has changed (rom Marxism-

Leninism to nationalism) and not the political work system itsel.62

Combination Models

By the mid-1990s, scholars were orced to reassess the utility o these models in the ace o

trends in civil-military relations. Although the models were originally developed as competing ap-

proaches, experts began to argue that they were not mutually exclusive, but complementary. 63Tis

shif in thinking produced a number o combination models. Ellis Joffe writes in 1996 about a

synthesis o all three models (Symbiosis, Party Control, and Proessionalism).64Shambaugh speaks

o a more linear progression rom symbiosis to Party Control that was leading not to proessional-

ism but to a PLA with limited autonomy.65Although Joffe combines the models while Shambaugh

ocuses on the evolution o the civil-military relationship, they both agree that the previous modelsare inadequate and that a more dynamic model is necessary to explain new developments.

Tis period was short-lived. In 1997, only 1 year afer attempting to combine the models,

Joffe declared that the new Party-army relationship has largely obviated the relevance o ap-

proaches used in the past. He asserted that the assumptions underlying the traditional and

combination models no longer held true. Greater elite biurcation was breaking down sym-

biosis, developing PLA autonomy increasingly worked to undermine Party control, and the

conflict between proessional and political priorities appeared to have been resolved in avor o

proessionalism.66Under these conditions the traditional models and the combination model

no longer had predictive or even explanatory ability. Shambaugh concluded in 2001 that con-temporary China and PLA studies is at a juncture in its analytical development, as past para-

digms have lost much, i not all, o their explanatory power.67

From this point scholars built a new set o models that incorporated elements o earlier

models while also attempting to address the implications o new political and military trends.


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wo models, Conditional Compliance and State Control (guojiahua), emerged in the period

rom 1999 to 2003. Although not mutually exclusive, each emphasizes a different aspect o the

evolving civil-military relationships. Tese two models represent the most recent attempts toconstruct theoretical models o Chinese civil-military relations.

Conditional Compliance

James Mulvenon adopted Ellis Joffes term conditional compliance and expanded the con-

cept to create a ull model.68Te Conditional Compliance model posits an implicit bargaining

and balancing process between separate civilian and military elites and institutions. Civilian

elites seek PLA loyalty and obedience, especially i challenges to Party rule arise. In exchange,

the PLA expects the Party to guarantee its proessional interests including institutional auton-

omy in purely military affairs, budgets and resources necessary or modernization, and a rolein specific oreign policy areas where the PLAs interests are directly involved (such as aiwan,

arms sales, and U.S.-China relations).

Mulvenon argues that the PLA should hold the upper hand in this process. Te new gen-

eration o civilian elites lacks military experience and the personal stature to ensure uncon-

ditional military support. PLA leaders are aware o this and conscious o their role as the last

line o deense or the Party. Tey should be able to exploit this political advantage. Mulvenon

even speculates that increasing biurcation and PLA proessionalism could lead not to political

acquiescence, but to greater political involvement under certain conditions.69However, actors

such as PLA proessionalism and hesitancy to embroil the military in politics moderate PLAwillingness to leverage this power. As a result, the implications o elite biurcation and increased

proessionalism or the PLAs role in politics remain ambiguous. Te two sides maintain a deli-

cate balance that remains very susceptible to shocks and sudden crises.

You Ji describes a similar interest sharing or give and take relationship.70Even with

the breakdown o the old symbiosis, each side still needs the other to advance its institutional

interests. He argues that increased institutionalization o elite politics and the civil-military re-

lationship coupled with the Partys active promotion o PLA proessionalization (in part to dis-

courage PLA political activity) help ensure overall Party control while allowing the PLA greater

autonomy. He labels the resulting relationship between the Party and paramount leader as oneo directional leadership. You Ji notes that these norms are not ully institutionalized, allowing

room or potential conflicts, especially those created by personal influence. Although proes-

sionalization generally leads to less PLA political involvement, an increased sense o corporat-

ism may create a more adversarial relationship when civilian and military interests do not align.


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I this happens, barriers that would keep the PLA out o politics are not necessarily as strong as

barriers that keep the Party out o the PLA. Tis opens the possibility or military intervention

in politics.Both models are essentially more sophisticated combination models that stress the bar-

gaining element in civil-military relations. Mulvenon acknowledges that the conditional com-

pliance model may have only temporary utility. Ongoing changes in the Chinese system and in

Chinese society may require models o civil-military relations that look beyond the Party-army

relationship to consider other social and political actors.

State Control (Guojiahua)

Te State Control model also considers elite biurcation, PLA proessionalization, and an

apparent decline in the PLAs political role. However, David Shambaugh, Andrew Scobell, andothers emphasize institutional and legal changes (mostly notably the 1997 National Deense

Law) that increase the ormal role and authority o State institutions over the PLA.71Tese in-

stitutions include the National Peoples Congress (NPC), the Ministry o Finance, the Ministry

o Deense, and the State CMC. Chinas deense white papers document an increasing number

o laws and regulations governing PLA procedures and activities.

Proponents o this model assert that these changes have increased separation o the Party

and PLA and that this trend may continue. Shambaugh highlights the possibility that Chinese

civil-military relations might evolve to resemble Party-State relationships in other areas such as

economic management where the Party still lays out broad economic policy directions (ang-zhen), but the state oversees direct policy (luxian) and implementation o policy (zhengce).72

You Ji argues that as the personal authority o civilian leaders has decreased, they have had to

rely more heavily on institutions to control the PLA. Tis makes the relationship easier to man-

age and the rules o the game clearer but may in the long run . . . acilitate a grand divorce be-

tween the Party and the military in the orm o a depoliticized and state-run military.73Sham-

baugh argues that a battle between the Party and the State over control o the military would

most likely benefit the PLA, which will gain greater autonomy rom both in the process.74

Advocates o this model acknowledge that any evolution toward state control remains in

its inancy. Te existence o both a Party and State Central Military Commission (with identi-cal membership) highlights ambiguity in current command relationships. At some point this

may acilitate a transition to state control, but speeches by civilian leaders and editorials in the

PLA Dailycontinue to insist on the Partys absolute leadership and strongly criticize calls or

a national army. Te existing state control literature does not address the uture relationship i


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state control ully replaces Party control. I such a transition were to take place, it would require

the replacement o current Party control mechanisms with new control mechanisms to ensure

civilian control. In cases such as aiwan, South Korea, and Indonesia, this has been an extendedand difficult transition. Te end point o such a transition might also involve reduction or elimi-

nation o military representation in political bodies such as the NPC, Central Committee, and

Politburo. Tis highlights the possibility that a Chinese military under state control might be

more proessional (in the Huntingtonian sense) and have less o a political role.

Interpretive Approaches

Work in the last 5 years by Ellis Joffe,75Yu Bin,76and You Ji77has employed interpretive ap-

proaches attempting to identiy key eatures o Chinese civil-military relations. Some o these

works are retrospective, while others ocus on contemporary issues such as Hu Jintaos ongoingconsolidation o power and the eventual transition to the 5 th-generation leadership. Tis litera-

ture ocuses on identiying conditions, variables, and actors important to understanding the

civil-military relationship, but to date has not produced a new generation o theories or models

to predict the uture evolution o civil-military relations. Some writings do contain specific pre-

dictions, but these generally reflect the authors analytical judgments rather than conclusions

derived rom a comprehensive theory.

For example, Ellis Joffe has identified our actors (leadership politics, the paramount

leader, the military mindset, and circumstantial imperatives) that shape the PLAs role in

politics and examined how they have fluctuated over time. Tis descriptive analysis helpsexplain past events, especially during the Mao and Deng periods. However, this type o analy-

sis is airly common throughout the study o Chinese civil-military relations and does not

represent a distinctively new approach or model.78Te actors are very general, rely heavily

on analytical judgment, and have limited predictive power (circumstantial imperatives, by

definition, are unknown until a crisis orces a critical decision). While useul in analyzing

civil-military relations in China, this recent work does not provide a ramework through

which specialists in other disciplines or regions could conduct a comparative analysis o civil-

military relations.

Cases

With these analytical models in mind, we will now examine our cases rom the last 20

years that provide evidence about the PLAs role in elite politics. We selected cases where au-

thors employing the analytical models discussed above offered relatively clear predictions about


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events. Our goal is to assess the utility o these models as predictive tools, or ailing that, to as-

sess whether they were able to explain the events in hindsight.79

PLA Reactions to Intensified Party Control afer iananmen

In the immediate afermath o iananmen, the Party made great efforts to strengthen its

control over the PLA. Political work and education within the PLA were increased, and the

power o the General Political Department (GPD) under Yang Baibing experienced a resur-

gence. Over the next several years, most analysts oresaw continued Party efforts to strengthen

control mechanisms and tension between the political character and proessional development

o the PLA. Shambaugh and Nan Li identified conditions that would lead to increased Party

control over the PLA or the development o new institutional mechanisms that would help the

Party manage the PLA. Other analysts such as Joffe and Swaine predicted that certain elementso the PLA, namely the officer corps, would resent and possibly resist increased Party control.

Most anticipated an intensification o the red versus expert debate, with serious implications or

the PLAs proessional development.80

Contrary to most predictions, the political campaigns and more invasive political con-

trols dissipated relatively quickly. Te power o Yang Baibing and the GPD was checked

through the actions o other coalitions within the leadership, possibly including a rustrated

officer corps. Political activity within the PLA continued, but in increasingly moderate orms.

Furthermore, PLA proessionalization continued, accompanied by an apparent uptick in in-

stitutional autonomy.Several o the models had explanatory value, but no model was able to independently

predict or explain these events. Advocates o the political control model accurately predicted

an increased emphasis on political control afer iananmen, but appear to have overestimated

civilian Party leaders ability (or desire) to maintain these controls or underestimated the PLAs

ability to resist them over the long term. Shambaughs subsequent writing about a progres-

sion rom a model o Party Control to limited autonomy acknowledges this outcome. In the

long run, the Proessionalism model seems to have accurately predicted that some elements o

the PLA would resist increased politicalization and fight or the PLAs institutional autonomy.

Factional rivalries between GPD Director Yang Baibing and other leaders were also actors. Inthis case, a combination o models offers the ullest explanation. However, the most persuasive

combination o elements rom different models can only be determined in hindsight. A key

difficulty is the lack o a rigorous methodology capable o weighting the different elements o a

combined model in order to develop predictions.


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In the end, Jiang succeeded despite these obstacles, and the role and direct influence o the

PLA in the leadership transition appear to have been limited. Te peak o PLA involvement in

the succession process probably occurred in 19901992 when the action centered around VicePresident Yang Shangkun and his hal-brother, GPD Director Yang Baibing, was most active.

Military involvement came not through institutional actions or active participation o the PLA,

but through a select group o revolutionary dual-role elites such as Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shang-

kun, and Yang Baibing. However, afer the purging o the Yang brothers in 1992, there is little

evidence o military involvement in succession. Numerous authors raised the possibility that

the Yang amily army would breed resentment among the PLA officer corps and even coun-

terbalancing rom other elites, but none predicted their downall at the 14thParty Congress.83

Tis unexpected event changed the dynamics o the leadership succession and appears to mark

the height o PLA involvement in elite politics in the post-iananmen era.Te most common model used to develop predictions on the militarys role in the succes-

sion was the Factional model. Michael Swaines 1991 study illustrates how models could support

very detailed and insightul analysis yet produce only conditional and ofen inaccurate predic-

tions. Afer a comprehensive analysis o actional divisions within the PRC elite, Swaine offers

our general succession scenarios, labeling them rom least to most likely. His general conclu-

sion was that the three most likely scenarios were not avorable or Jiang and would involve the

military as an active participant. Swaines least likely scenario was or Jiang and a pro-reorm

regime to succeed without military involvement, which he regarded as possible but only i a

large number o conditions were ulfilled. Yet this scenario most closely (though not exactly)describes how events unolded. One o the key conditions Swaine (and others) identified was

the order in which top revolutionary elites pass away. Swaine lays out a number o complex pos-

sibilities and describes how each would affect Jiangs chances. O these possibilities, the one that

Swaine estimates would give Jiang his best chance at political survival is closest to what actually

occurred. Other studies during this time consider similar variables that lead to similar assess-

ments.84Tis highlights the contingent nature o predictions in a political system with weak

institutions and strong inormal power networks.

Four points are worth highlighting in this case. First, the literature ocuses heavily on per-

sonal relationships and traditional Pekingology during this period. Tis may have been neces-sary given weak Chinese political institutions, but it produced predictions based on subjective

analysis rather than rigorous theoretical rameworks. Second, the literature on civil-military

relations contains little consideration o wider political, economic, and social changes. Scholars

were very ocused on the relationship between civilian and military elites, and especially on


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relations between revolutionary elders, next-generation civilian elites, and the senior officer

corps. A broader ocus might have revealed larger patterns that could have helped to predict

the relatively smooth leadership transition. Tird, it is likely that the high priority the PRC eliteplaced on avoiding leadership splits that might produce another iananmen diminished the

impact o traditional sources o civil-military conflict that many analysts emphasized in their

predictions.85Finally, the leadership succession highlights the declining utility o the traditional

models. rends like increasing PLA proessionalism and elite biurcation played an important

role in the final outcome o Jiangs succession. Afer the all o the Yangs and the death o revo-

lutionary elders, contemporary models are better able to explain civil-military events.

PLA Commercial Divestiture

Chinas economic reorms beginning in 1978 had the side effect o stimulating the growtho a vast PLA commercial empire, ofen reerred to as PLA, Inc. During this period the PLA

expanded rom low-level economic activities ocused on sel-sufficiency into ormerly un-

touched areas such as pharmaceuticals, hotels, nightclubs, and tourism. Deng Xiaoping encour-

aged these commercial activities in order to vest the PLA in the reorm and opening program

and as a financial substitute or limited deense budgets in the 1980s.86By the 1990s, it became

increasingly apparent to many Party and PLA leaders that PLA commercial activity was breed-

ing deep corruption and affecting combat readiness. Yet pulling the PLA away rom profitable

commercial ventures presented a fiscal and political catch-22 to Party and PLA leaders.87Civil-

ian Party leaders wanted to address excessive and corrupting commercial activity, but worriedthey lacked the political leverage to remove a major source o PLA unding. Much o the PLA

leadership was concerned about the negative impact o commercial activities, but worried even

more about how to replace the lost revenue.

Te general view in the mid-1990s civil-military literature was that the PRC leadership

would attempt to address some o the negative side effects o commercialization but was unlikely

to orce widespread divesture o PLA businesses in the near uture.88In 1993, ai Ming Cheung

wrote that the next round o PLA commercialization would likely ocus on conglomeratisation,

corporatisation, profitability and quality, and segregation o unctions.89He even speculated

that the traditional battle o red versus expert might be replaced by an intense battle betweenproessionalism and commercialism.90Bickord argued that despite the negative impact o PLA

commercial activity, the PLA as entrepreneur appears to be staying or the oreseeable uture.91

Mulvenon wrote that civilians will most likely continue to avoid direct conrontation with the

military and predicted continued corruption whose growth the military and Party leader-


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ships will be unable to significantly curb.92Joffe approached the issue rom a slightly different

angle, arguing that the PLA leadership could curb PLA commercial excesses and corruption i

it chose to do so, but that PLA leaders were more ocused on the immediate risk o losing undsor modernization. However, Joffe still questioned whether the military and civilian leadership

would be able to reverse the damage i and when they decided divestiture was necessary.93

Afer Jiang Zemins announcement o PLA divestiture in 1998, many analysts concluded

that sudden divestiture was only possible because Party leaders bargained with the PLA lead-

ership.94Mulvenon wrote that although military leaders agreed that divestiture was necessary,

their acquiescence was predicated on a generous compensation package. He suggested that

civilian leaders likely offered the PLA a one-time transer o unds to compensate or the

value o lost enterprises and promised to increase yearly budgets to make up or lost PLA

commercial revenue.95

Te literature correctly identified the tension between PLA commercial activities and mili-

tary missions and concerns among both civilian and military leaders about finding acceptable

alternatives to replace PLA commercial revenue. However, the divestiture o PLA commercial

enterprises came much sooner and with less civil-military conflict than most analysts predicted.

Te PLA continues to operate some commercial activities today, but has basically returned to

the pre-1978 era o sel-sustaining economic activities.96Te large one-time compensation

payment and expected budget increase that most believed were a precondition or divestiture

did not materialize. Te 1999 deense budget increased by 12.7 percent, not significantly more

than the 12 percent increase in 1998. Although Mulvenon raises the possibility o hidden addi-tions to military budgets, there is evidence (including PLA complaints) that the civilian lead-

ership did not provide the financial compensation PLA leaders expected. 97 ension resulting

rom the PLA disappointment at the compensation rom divestiture may have been orestalled

by greater deense budget increases ollowing the 1999 Belgrade bombing and continuing into

the next decade.

Tis is an interesting case or elite politics or a number o reasons. Divestiture highlight-

ed the priority placed on military proessionalism. Mulvenon states that military and civilian

leadership in the end decided that the disadvantages o commercialism outweighed the ad-

vantages, particularly with the prospect o proessional tasks like the liberation o aiwan andpotential military conflict with the United States on the horizon.98Divestiture also marked

a key point where post-revolutionary civilian leaders worked with (or possibly against) the

interests o PLA leaders to implement a policy change in a sensitive area o PLA institutional

interests. Divided attitudes within the military about the costs and benefits o commercial


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activities probably acilitated implementation o the divestiture order, but this case suggests

that the PLA had less bargaining power than most analysts believed.

Battle o the wo Centers or wo-line Leadership

Te 16thParty Congress in 2002 represented the first leadership transition between two

groups o post-revolutionary leaders. Hu Jintao had reportedly been singled out as a uture top

leader by Deng Xiaoping, and his ascent to the positions o State Vice President (1998) and Vice

Chairman o the Central Military Commission (1999) highlighted his status as Jiangs likely suc-

cessor. However, his experience and connections with the military remained weak, including

only his oversight o PLA divestiture in 1998 and his relatively short term on the CMC.

Despite Hus weak military ties, most analysts expected a airly orderly succession process.

Tere were ew predictions that the PLA would play an active role in the transition, either byanointing a leader or taking sides in actional politics. Analysts remained interested, however,

in the details surrounding the handover o the CMC Chairmanship rom Jiang to Hu. Many

suggested that Jiang would ollow Dengs example and retain chairmanship o the CMC or 2 or

3 years ollowing his retirement rom his state and Party positions (thereby retaining significant

political influence). Tese predictions proved accurate, although Hu became CMC Chairman

in 2004, on the earlier end o most predictions. wo competing explanations or how events

unolded suggest an indirect but still important PLA role in the process.

Mulvenon cites evidence indicating open PLA support or Jiang Zemins retention o CMC

Chairmanship in the run-up to the 16thParty Congress. Even afer attaining the positions oState President and Party General Secretary in 2002, Hu received little attention in military

commentaries and publications. Yet over the next year, PLA publications voiced strong criticism

over the ambiguity in the chain o command caused by the existence o two centers (Jiang and

Hu). Although these concerns do not represent overt support or Hu, Mulvenon speculates

that this apparent unease among the military undermined Jiangs inormal but necessary base

o support or remaining on the CMC. Mulvenon also notes that Hu Jintao showed impressive

signs o leadership and concern or military interests during the SARS and Ming submarine

crises during this period. Hus actions may have alleviated PLA doubts about his abilities and

motivations as commander-in-chie. Tese actors may have put pressure on Jiang to relinquishhis position on the CMC earlier than he had hoped. I this assessment is correct, it indicates

the PLAs ability to affect the overall political climate, i only implicitly and indirectly. It would

also support contemporary models that assume the PLA has a latent power that, although rarely

used, could prove decisive in a uture and more intense political crisis.


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analysis, even i detailed evidence on the value o each variable is ofen unavailable. However,

the recent tendency to incorporate elements rom competing models into larger combined

models makes it difficult to assess the validity o alternate models or to generate alsifiable pre-dictions. Some earlier models o civil-military relations have been abandoned because genera-

tional change or changes in circumstances in China have made them obsolete. Still, there has

been a notable lack o efforts to develop, employ, and test new theoretical models in this field.

Lack o detailed data about the precise nature o civil-military interactions at the senior

level in China has been (and remains) a major impediment to progress. Te data problem has

been compounded by the absence o a major political crisis that might require military involve-

ment and produce more observable inormation about the nature o civil-military relations. At

a certain point, the lack o a major political crisis that might draw the military into elite politics

needs to be treated as significant data about the nature o politics and civil-military relationswithin China. It may be that rapid economic growth and expanding resources to support mili-

tary modernization along with other government priorities have muted potential conflicts be-

tween civilian and military leaders. I this is the case, the current economic slowdown may mark

the beginning o a different era in civil-military relations that may both generate new evidence

about civil-military relations and require new analytical approaches.

Future Directions

We should note the emergence o a relatively new body o literature that ocuses on the

PLAs relationship to the broader Chinese economy and society (rather than ocusing narrowlyon Party-army relations). Tese works draw upon the increasing availability o Chinese-lan-

guage sources to examine issues such as the impact o broader social trends on the PLA,100PLA

recruitment, training, and education,101the relationship and flow o technologies between civil-

ian and military sectors,102and the relationship between the PLA and the broader civilian econ-

omy.103Although this work does not directly examine the relationships between top civilian

and military leaders, it does illuminate broader ways in which the civilian and military spheres

interact and influence each other. Te increasing prominence o the PLAs role in domestic di-

saster relie and protecting Chinas economic interests abroad highlights ways in which the mili-

tary can increase its value to Chinas civilian leaders, a trend not without political implications.We do not have a new theory to offer, but our review o the literature over the last 20 years

suggests some new approaches that may have value in generating evidence about the nature

o civil-military relations in China. Although the trend toward biurcation o civil and mili-

tary elites has reduced ties between leaders, a systematic exploration o those interactions that


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do occur might generate some useul evidence. Tis could include analysis o interactions be-

tween local civilian and military leaders; whether efforts to diversiy PLA officer recruitment

and support postgraduate study provide new opportunities or civil-military interactions andnetworking; whether more structured interactions (via interagency meetings, study sessions, or

NPC sessions) spill over into personal ties; and the content o what civilian leaders learn about

international affairs and military matters in universities and Party school classes.

Another approach might ocus on comparing how broader trends and reorms in civilian

government are implemented in the military. Comparative analysis could examine how actions

such as downsizings, political campaigns, and the promulgation o broad laws or regulations

play out within civilian and military organizations. Tis might provide some insight into the

PLAs responsiveness or resistance to civilian dictates. It would also be worth examining how

broader trends such as the increased emphasis on ormal educational credentials and expertiseplay out within civilian and military domains. Tis approach could also be used to examine how

new policies or slogans identified with particular civilian leaders propagate and are reflected in

ormal military documents (speeches, doctrine, educational materials) and inormal military

products (books, articles, and media commentary). Do these ideas spread differently in differ-

ent services, or in military media versus official civilian media?

Finally, more genuinely comparative analysis could be done. Te field o Chinese civil-

military relations has drawn upon the Huntingtonian tradition and upon studies o Party-army

relations in other communist states. Afer a two-decade hiatus, it might be worth reexamining

the literature on Soviet and post-Soviet civil-military relations.104Tere has also been relativelylittle effort to draw upon the experiences o one-party states that have transitioned to democ-

racy (South Korea, aiwan, Mexico) or to do more systemic comparisons with other Asian

states.105One promising effort, Muthiah Alagappas edited volumes Coercion and Governance:

Te Declining Political Role o the Military in Asia (Stanord University Press, 2001) andMilitary

Proessionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002)

consists o parallel chapters rather than systematic comparisons. However, these studies could

provide the raw material or a useul sta