R. Traunmller (Ed.): EGOV 2004, LNCS 3183, pp. 116121, 2004. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Levels of Difficulty in Introducing e-Voting

Alexandros Xenakis and Ann Macintosh

International Teledemocracy Center Napier University

10, Colinton Rd., Edinburgh, EH10 5DT {a.xenakis,a.macintosh}@napier.ac.uk

Abstract. Recent e-voting pilots in the UK have demonstrated that there are different factors to be considered in the administration of electronic voting. In this paper we present a framework for the evaluation of the level of difficulty involved in the deployment of e-voting schemes. Taking the public authoritys point of view we identify eight factors, which increase the overall difficulty of e-voting administration. We suggest that as new e-voting technologies and as-sociated activities are introduced in the re-design of the electoral process, its administration becomes increasingly more difficult. We provide examples ex-plaining the practical use of the suggested framework based on some of the 2003 UK e-voting pilots. In concluding we refer to existing limitations of the framework and suggest future work, which could expand its analytical value.

Introduction

Two recent publications, one from the US and one from the UK, highlight the fact that the successful deployment of electronic voting is proving to be more difficult to achieve than originally envisaged. In the US, one of the most publicized experimental projects SERVE, on behalf of the US Department of Defense, was cancelled [12]. In the UK, the evaluation of the 2003 e-voting pilots highlighted many areas of current e-voting practice that need to be improved [2]. The UK e-voting pilots in particular, have provided us with useful experience, aspects of which we analyze in this paper.

In our research we have found it necessary to differentiate clearly between e-voting pilots that provided an additional voting mechanism, i.e. a new channel for voting, and those which add technology to different stages of the electoral process but which did not provide technology for actually casting a ballot we define these as e-enabled elections. Overall 36 fully evaluated e-voting pilots have been conducted in the UK to this date, 16 in May 2002 and a further 20 in May 2003 [14], [3]. These were in all cases legally binding elections on a Local Authority level. The possible e-voting channels for casting a ballot were: touch-screen voting kiosks, internet voting, interac-tive voice response (IVR) landline telephone voting, SMS text message voting, digital television voting. Seventeen of the UK pilots (4 in 2002 and 13 in 2003) provided voters with multiple e-voting channels. When these channels were offered concur-rently the need for an electronic on-line version of the electoral register was created to allow real-time valid voter identification. When paper ballot voting was maintained as an option, whether polling station or postal, that added extra channels in which a ballot could be cast. The use of the e-register, in combination with traditional polling

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station voting, also enabled voters to cast a ballot at any polling station within their ward. Additionally smart card technology was used for partial voter identification and there was electronic counting of paper ballots. These e-voting pilots, which used the e-register or the e-counting of paper ballots, are examples of semi-automated proc-esses, which partially supported or e-enabled the voting process. Finally it should also be noted that some of the new e-voting channels piloted, due to their nature, allowed remote, unsupervised voting. The introduction of such a range of technical innovations makes the management of an election more difficult for public authority electoral administrators. The purpose of this paper is to provide public authorities, considering deploying e-voting in the future, a framework to assess the potential de-gree of difficulty that a suggested e-voting pilot fosters.

The research presented in this paper forms part of a doctoral program concerned with the identification of the emerging constraints in re-designing the electoral proc-ess in relation to information and communication technologies (ICTs). Empirical research was undertaken which comprised interviews and observations, conducted both during the run-up to the election and on the actual polling day in one of the 2003 UK pilots. The analysis of the published evaluation reports combined with findings from our empirical work have lead us to conclude that there are eight main factors which can increase the level of difficulty of an e-voting pilot. In the following section we present these factors and justify why we consider them to increase the level of difficulty involved in deploying electronic voting.

Difficulty Factors

The introduction of e-voting technology. The traditional voting process makes little use of ICTs. In contrast e-voting implies the introduction of technological elements in some or all stage of the voting process. In the UK pilots we have identified five dif-ferent e-voting channels: Voting kiosks, which have been used in two variations, either dedicated hardware for the sole purpose of voting as was the case in the 2003 Epping Forest pilot [4] or existing multiple-use kiosks as was the case in the 2003 Sheffield pilot [5], interactive Voice Response (IVR) touch tone telephone voting, SMS text message voting, interactive Digital television voting (iDTV) and Internet voting, accessed either from PCs, at home, work, and publicly made available PCs, or internet connected kiosks. The use of WAP enabled mobile telephones has been sug-gested in the literature as an extra gateway for casting an e-ballot [13], [11], however it has not been piloted yet in the UK and therefore not included in this analysis as an extra voting channel. It has also been suggested that e-voting channels and the neces-sary technical infrastructure to support them should be considered differently [11], and that the ownership of infrastructure should initially remain with the control of public authorities [1]. However, the provision of channels and infrastructure has been outsourced to commercial suppliers, with the exception of the 2003 Broxbourne pilot e-enabled schemes where an in-house PA developed e-counting system was de-ployed, [6]. Thus Local Authorities (PAs) remained with the task of providing the necessary administrative support to make all these technologies operational for vot-ing. Such tasks included the provision of voter and candidate data to commercial suppliers, the dissemination of pins and passwords to voters or the collation of results from the different voting channels used. The fact that PAs typically had no ownership

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of the technology decreased the level of control that they had over a process for of which they were legally liable. In effect PAs had to rely on technology providers for adequate performance and support of the e-voting technologies. Furthermore PA staff had little or no experience in the use of the voting technologies. Therefore the intro-duction of the innovative e element in the voting process makes its delivery more difficult than the delivery of traditional elections.

Paper ballots along with e-ballots. In most cases the introduction of e-voting chan-nels was complementary to existing polling station voting. That meant that provision had to be made for two different kinds of ballots: the paper ballot and the e-ballot. Double voting could be encountered in more than one ways: two paper ballots, two e-ballots or one paper and one e-ballot. Therefore the parallel provision of paper and e-ballot provides malicious voters with three alternatives of double voting instead of one in the traditional process (two paper ballots). Having two versions of ballots also means that two separate counting processes must be held and results of the two need to be collated at the end to produce the overall final result.

Multiple channels of voting. Every extra channel for casting a ballot provided to voters has two main effects. In the first instance it creates additional workload for those charged with the administration of the extra channel, i.e. the PA staff. Moreover the voting process in general becomes more vulnerable to double voting as each extra channel provides voters with one more opportunity to cast a ballot. It is therefore harder to secure the overall integrity of the election, as every extra channel requires its separate authentication mechanism. However in introducing this factor we consider that the multiple channels offered are not made available at the same, or overlapping voting periods.

Duration of the voting period. In the traditional polling station voting, all voters cast their ballot within the same time frame. The usual time frame for voting at polling stations of one day (8am to 9pm in the UK) is considerably increased when e-voting channels are introduced. To provide an example, internet voting, at the 2003 South Somerset pilot, was available 24hours a day for a period of one week [7]. Extending the voting period, also extends the time frame during which the electoral process has to be safeguarded and therefore more resources, dedicated to this aim, are required.

Simultaneous multiple channels. When multiple channels of voting are available over the same or overlapping voting period then the degree of difficulty is increased, as they need to be secured against multiple uses from the same person. To achieve this objective each voter needs to be uniquely identified through the authentication options followed in the different channels. In effect it requires an integrated e-register available in real-time. On the other hand if voting channels are offered in successive voting periods, then the channels can be more easily controlled, as this is done for one channel at the time. This creates a paradox in relation to the traditional single channel polling station voting, where the fact that voters cast their ballot within the same time frame makes the process more controllable

The use of the electronic register of voters. The deployment of an on-line, real-time updated version of the electoral register was proven to be a more difficult task than originally expected [8], [9]. The e-register has two main uses. Firstly, as back-office application, it serves as a single point of reference for voter authentication, and thus allows multiple channel simultaneous voting. Secondly, as a front office tool, the use

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of the e-register can allow voters to cast a ballot at any polling station linked to the e-register. The concept of specific voters being attributed to a specific polling station has long served the integrity of elections, therefore the use of the e-register creates a less secure environment for voting as voters are no longer related to a specific polling station. This is even more relevant in the UK, where no formal token identification is required in the voter authentication process, other than stating ones name and address to the polling staff. In this case, the idea of familiar faces going to a certain local polling station offered some extra layer of security to the process which is now lost. Security is therefore sacrificed for the sake of convenience.

E-enabled voting. The electoral process becomes e-enabled when at least one of its sub-processes is re-engineered to a semi-automated procedure that introduces some technical element to the electoral process, and involves the action of a human agent for its completion. In such cases the overall process is e-enabled and no longer the same as the traditional process. Still, it cannot be characterized as e-voting as techni-cal elements are introduced in some of the electoral process stages and not all. E-counting of paper ballots is an example of hybrid processes as there is staff involved in the operation of the e-counting machines. The operation of the e-register by staff at polling stations (front office version) is another example. The use of the e-ballot box, which automatically counts a specially printed paper ballot at the same time a voter casts the ballot at a polling station, as piloted in 2003 at South Oxfordshire [10], is yet another example. The human element in these sub-processes although providing greater transparency to the overall process, imply staff costs and effective staff train-ing, while at the same time opening the process to human error related risks.

Unsupervised voting. Polling station voting provides a controlled environment. A supervised process is by nature more secure, as there are more opportunities for audit of the process, therefore a higher level of transparency provided. The presence of a human agent in supervised voting insures voter authentication, voter privacy and eliminates the possibility of undue influence imposed upon a voters free choice. All these benefits are lost when voting is unsupervised. Remote voting from home or workplace, using any of the available technologies, voting from public kiosks and postal ballot voting are examples of unsupervised voting channels.

It should be noted that we do not suggest in our analysis, nor have identified in our research that some factors pose greater difficulty than others, or that some channels are more difficult to deliver than others. We therefore attribute the same degree of difficulty to all factors and voting channels. As each factor or channel is introduced the level of difficulty of an e-voting pilot is increased. The starting point for establish-ing the degree of difficulty is the traditional polling station voting process. This is attributed a difficulty degree of 0 as none of the eight factors which could increase its existing level of difficulty is applicable. In the following section we demonstrate how the framework can be used to assess the potential levels of difficulty of e-enabled or e-voting pilots.

Using the Framework to Establish the Difficulty Level of an e-Voting Project Paper ballot based voting can be polling station voting, all postal ballot schemes (no polling stations), or a combination of polling station voting with postal voting. As no

120 Alexandros Xenakis and Ann Macintosh

e-voting channels are included, the degree of difficulty of e-enabled paper ballot vot-ing can increase by the remaining six factors: more voting channels (in this case up to two), offered for a prolonged period of time, being run concurrently, allowing voting from any polling station through the use of the e-register, involving semi-automated processes such as the e-counting of ballot papers and finally some channel being un-supervised (in this case postal voting). As each factor is added the degree of difficulty is increased by one level. Polling station voting can be jeopardized by a prolonged voting period, an e-enabled element or the use of an e-register. The fact that it is su-pervised and the only voting channel offered, excludes all the remaining difficulty factors, so this option can reach the third degree of difficulty. Similarly all postal voting being the only channel offered and unrelated to the use of the e-register, can also reach the third degree of difficulty. When both polling station and postal voting are available over the same voting period, then the sixth degree of difficulty can be reached by introducing an e-register of voters and in addition e-counting.

The second part of this framework starts from the premise that at least one e-voting channel is present. The use of e-voting technology automatically attributes one degree of difficulty. Each of the remaining seven factors could then increase the degree of difficulty by one level for that specific e-voting channel. However this does not cover the extra levels of difficulty that occur with the introduction of more than one e-voting channels, nor the option of paper ballots being offered both at polling stations and as postal voting. On the basis that any extra channel, whether e-ballot or paper ballot, adds one more degree of difficulty, we therefore increase the level of difficulty by one degree for every extra channel offered (other than the original e-channel). Given that we have a total of five e-channels and two paper channels, the degree of difficulty could increase up to six (5 e-channels 1 e-channel already calculated +2 paper ballot channels). Therefore, according to the suggested framework the maxi-mum degree of difficulty that an e-voting scheme could reach is fourteen, (8 difficulty factors, plus 6 if all possible channels are offered). To demonstrate the use of the framework to assess the degree of difficulty involved in an e-voting pilot, we provide an example based on the 2003 UK pilots. In Sheffield, the local authority piloted a simultaneous multiple channel e-voting process involving IVR, unsupervised kiosk, SMS and internet voting, provided for period of seven days, combined with e-register enabled polling stations and postal voting. According to the suggested framework this pilot reached a total difficulty degree of 13, adding the 8 levels of difficulty factors, the 3 extra e-voting channels and the 2 paper channels.

Conclusions

The framework presented in this paper aims at providing public authorities with a method to evaluate the prospective level of difficulty that the deployment of an e-voting scheme might foster. As such it could facilitate the strategic planning of simi-lar pilots, on the basis of which difficulty factor poses an acceptable risk to the overall successful delivery of an election. Some factors are inter-related. The difficulty, which occurs from the administration of simultaneous channel voting, can only apply when multiple channels of voting are made available to voters, as we need at least two voting channels being offered to provide simultaneous process delivery. Similarly when more voting channels are provided concurrently then the introduction of the e-

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register is imperative since it provides the necessary infrastructure for all-channel voter identification. Furthermore in e-voting pilots, when the paper ballot is also made available then the multiple channel factor is always applicable, since the existence of a paper ballot option presupposes the existence of at least one extra voting channel. This framework does not address the issue of multiple agents being involved in the delivery of such schemes, as we consider this is more of an organisational issue rather than an implementation one, which proper management can resolve. Finally we sug-gest that the classification of channels and factors in different levels of difficulty could expand the analytical value of the presented framework.

References

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IntroductionDifficulty FactorsUsing the Framework to Establish the Difficulty Level of an e-Voting ProjectConclusionsReferences