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Spouses Lim v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 192615, January 30, 2013

J. Brion(2nd Division)

Facts: Respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) filed a complaint for collection of a sumof money against the petitioners. The verification and certification against forum-shopping attached tothe complaint were signed by Francisco R. Ramos (Ramos), then BPI Assistant Vice-President and

Mindanao Region Lending Head.

The petitioners moved to dismiss BPIs complaint on the ground of litis pendentia. The RTCdenied the petitioners motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration stating thatthere exists different causes of action between the two actions.

The petitioners filed another motion to dismiss, this time, on the ground that there had been afatal defect in the verification and certification against forum shopping attached to BPIs complaint.They argued that the verification and certification did not state or declare that Ramos was authorizedby BPIs Board of Directors to file the complaint through a board resolution made specifically for the

purpose. BPI filed a comment on the petitioners second motion to dismiss.

BPI submitted a copy of the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) signed and executed by RosarioJurado-Benedicto (Benedicto), the Assistant Vice-President of BPI, granting Ramos the authority to

represent the bank and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping on BPIs behalf.

BPI contended that its submissions already constituted substantial compliance with theprocedural rules and should be applied in this case to facilitate and effectuate the ends of substantial

justice.

The RTC denied the petitioners second motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion forreconsideration. The petitioners assailed these orders of denial in the petition for certiorari they filed

with the CA.

The CA, in dismissing the petitioners certiorari petition, ruled that the SPA granting Ramos theauthority to represent BPI and to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping and the

certified true copy of BPIs Corporate Secretarys Certificate, although belatedly submitted, constitutedsubstantial compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court.

The petitioners moved to reconsider the said decision but the CA denied their motion, hence,

this petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred in not finding that the RTC had committedgraveabuse of discretion in denying their second motion to dismiss. They contend that the RTC lacked

jurisdiction over BPIs complaint because Francisco R. Ramos, the bank officer who filed the complaintin BPIs behalf and who signed the verification and certification against forum shopping, did not havethe authority to do so at the time the complaint was filed.

Issue: Whether the Special Power of Attorney and Corporate Secretarys Certificate that BPIbelatedly submitted constituted substantial compliance with the requirements under the rules onverification and certification.

Held: A closer look into the SPA and the Corporate Secretarys Certificate submitted by BPI

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reveals that, at the time the subject complaint was filed on January 26, 1999, Ramos did not have theexpress authority to file and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping attached to

BPIs complaint. The SPA, which appointed Ramos and/or Atty. Mateo G. Delegencia as BPIs attorneys-in-fact in the case against the petitioners, was executed only on July 8, 2008. Even the CorporateSecretarys Certificate that named the officers authorized by the BPIs Executive Committee to grant

and extend a SPA to other officers of the bank was executed only on February 21, 2007. The ExecutiveCommittee is part of the banks permanent organization and, in between meetings of BPIs Board of

Directors, possesses and exercises all the powers of the board in the management and direction of thebanks affairs.

BPIs subsequent execution of the SPA, however, constituted a ratification of Ramosunauthorized representation in the collection case filed against the petitioners.A corporation can actonly through natural persons duly authorized for the purpose or by a specific act of its board of

directors, and can also ratify the unauthorized acts of its corporate officers. The act ofratification is confirmation of what its agent or delegate has done without or with insufficientauthority.

We note that, at the time the complaint against the petitioners was filed, Ramos also held the

position of Assistant Vice-President for BPI Northern Mindanao and was then the highest officialrepresenting the bank in the Northern Mindanao area. This position and his standing in the BPIhierachy, to our mind, place him in a sufficiently high and authoritative position to verify the

truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the subject complaint, to justify his authority in filingthe complaint and to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping. Whatever islacking, from the strictly corporate point of view, was cured when BPI subsequently (although

belatedly) issued the appropriate SPA.

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Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Spouses SorianoG.R. No. 178312, January 30, 2013

J. Bersamin(1st Division)

Facts: The respondents are the children of the late Spouses Jorja Rigor-Soriano and MaginSoriano, the owners of the two parcels of land covered by TCTs.

The properties became subject to Operation Land Transfer (OLT) and were valued by the LandBank and the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) at P10,000.00/hectare. Contending, however,that such valuation was too low compared to existing valuations of agricultural lands, the respondentscommenced an action for just compensation, claiming that the properties were irrigated lands that

usually yielded 150 cavans per hectare per season at a minimum of two seasons per year. They askedthat a final valuation of the properties be pegged at P1,800,000.00, based on Administrative Order No.61, Series of 1992 and Republic Act No. 6657.

Land Bank disagreed, insisting that Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228governed the fixing of just compensation for the properties. It prayed that the valuation by the DAR beretained or that a valuation be made judicially.

The RTC rendered judgment ordering the defendant Land Bank of the Philippines to paypetitioner Manolo Goduco the total amount of One Million Two Hundred Twenty Seven Thousand FiveHundred Seventy One & 10/100 (P1,227,571.10), Philippine Currency, representing the justcompensation of the properties.

Land Bank and the respondents filed separate motions for reconsideration, but the RTC deniedtheir motions. Land Bank appealed to the CA but the latter affirmed the RTC decision.

The CA denied Land Banks motion for reconsideration. Hence, Land Bank appealed via petitionfor review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Thereafter, Land Bank submitted to the Court a so-called Joint Manifestation and Motion (Re:

Unconditional Acceptance of Revaluation) dated February 9, 2012, stating that the approval by LandBanks responsible officers of the revaluation of the properties pursuant to DAR Administrative OrderNo. 1 dated February 18, 2010, Series of 2010, was communicated to the respondents for theirunconditional acceptance. It prayed that the appeal be now resolved on the basis of the acceptance of

payment by the respondents.

The Court required the respondents to comment on Land Banks submission of the JointManifestation and Motion (Re: Unconditional Acceptance of Revaluation); and directed the parties to

submit their formal written agreement within 15 days from notice,

Land Bank submitted a Manifestation, informing the Court that the parties had filed byregistered mail their Joint Motion to Approve the Attached Agreement, submitting therewith their

Agreement dated November 29, 2012.

The Court received the Joint Motion to Approve the Attached Agreement and the Agreementdated November 29, 2012. Thereby, the parties prayed that the Court consider and approve the

Agreement as its disposition of the petition for review on certiorari, and render its judgment inaccordance with the terms of the Agreement.

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Held: There is no question that the foregoing Agreement was a compromise that the partiesfreely and voluntarily entered into for the purpose of finally settling their dispute in this case. Under

Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocalconcessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Accordingly, a compromise iseither judicial, if the objective is to put an end to a pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the objective is

to avoid a litigation. As a contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent. However, a judicialcompromise, while immediately binding between the parties upon its execution, is not executory until

it is approved by the court and reduced to a judgment. The validity of a compromise is dependent uponits compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law. Also, the terms and

conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy andpublic order.

A review of the terms of the Agreement, particularly paragraph 6 and paragraph 7, indicates

that it is a judicial compromise because the parties intended it to terminate their pending litigation byfully settling their dispute. Indeed, with the respondents thereby expressly signifying their"unconditional or absolute acceptance and full receipt of the foregoing amounts as just compensationfor subject properties the First Party and the Second Party hereby consider the case titled "Land Bank of

the Philippines v. Heirs of Spouses Jorja Rigor-Soriano and Magin Soriano, namely: Marivel S.

Carandang and Joseph Soriano (G.R. No. 178312) pending before the Supreme Court, closed andterminated," the ultimate objective of the action to determine just compensation for the landowners

was achieved.

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Spouses Golez v. Spouses NavarroG.R. No. 192532, January 30, 2013

J. Reyes (1st Division)

Facts: Spouses Ricardo and Elena Golez entered into a written agreement with respondentAmelita Navarro, a real estate dealer, appointing her as their exclusive agent in the sale of theirproperty in Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, worth six hundred thousand pesos (P600,000.00). They

likewise agreed that if the price of the sale exceeds P600,000.00, Amelita will be given a commissionequivalent to 90% of the amount in excess thereof.

Amelita found an interested buyer, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Mormons).

No sale between them, however, transpired because they couldnt agree on the selling price ofP1,200,000.00. Upon knowing this fact, the petitioners took over and continued negotiations with theMormons representatives in Manila.

The petitioners successfully sold their property to the Mormons for the amount of P800,000.00.The sale included other lots owned by the petitioners and the total purchase price amounted toP1,300,000.00. Amelita was neither notified of the sale nor was she given any commission. Hence,

upon discovery of the transaction, she asserted her right to be paid her commission but the petitionerssternly refused. Because of this, Amelita brought the matter to the Office of the Barangay Captain ofMolave. However, no amicable settlement took place between her and the petitioners.

Thereafter, Amelita, together with her husband Carlos, instituted a complaint for collection of

sum of money, breach of contract and damages against the petitioners. The petitioners filed theirAnswer, denying any liability. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

In its Decision dated October 28, 1998, the RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. On appeal,

the Court of Appeals (CA), in its Decision dated September 29, 2006, affirmed with modifications theRTC Decision.

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

(1) Declaring Amelita Navarro to be entitled to the commission on the sale of appellants

properties subject of the contract of agency;

(2) Ordering appellants to pay, jointly and severally, to appellees the amount of one hundredeighty thousand pesos (Php180,000.00) representing the commission for the sale of appellants

properties subject of the contract of agency; and

(3) Deleting the award of moral damages and attorneys fees.

In its other aspects, the appealed decision shall remain undisturbed.

The matter was elevetad via petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court but the samewas denied.

The motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied with finality on February 23, 2009;thus the resolution of the Court became final and executory. Consequently, the respondents filed a

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Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Execution which was granted.

Thereafter, the respondents filed a Motion for the Judicial Determination of the MonetaryAwards subject for Execution and for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution.

Acting on the motion, the RTC issued an Order explicitly providing for the amount of

P504,000.00 as the total monetary award, computed as follows:

P180,000.00----------representing the plaintiffs commission as modified by the Court of Appeals

P324,000.00----------representing the interest of the unpaid commission at the rate of 12 percent

per annum computed from the sale of defendants property to the Mormons Church onNovember 9, 1994 until fully paid (P180,000.00 x 12% = P21,600.00 x 15 years =P324,000.00)

Accordingly, the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff issued the subject Alias Writ of Execution.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, mainly contending that the terms of the order and

the alias writ of execution "varied the law of the case" and awarded more than what the CAs judgmentdecreed.

The RTC denied the petitioners motion, hence, a petition for review on certiorari was filedbefore the Supreme Court.

The petitioners contend that the order of execution issued by the RTC does not conform to theterms of the dispositive portion of the CA decision, hence, invalid. The imposition of a 12% interest onthe award from the sale of defendants property to the Mormons Church on November 9, 1994 until the

same is fully paid to the plaintiffs is not ordered in the CA judgment and the RTC committed an error inincluding it in its order.

The respondents, on the other hand, call for the dismissal of the petition on the grounds that

the petition is "an erroneous remedy, the filing of which is out-of-context" and that its filing is"indubitably a subterfuge, contrary to public policy and sound practice, and contemptuous incharacter."

Issue: Whether the payment of interest from the date of sale, when none was so decreed in themodified decision of the honorable court of appeals, was proper.

Held: Clearly, the RTC exceeded its authority when it insisted on applying its own construal of

the dispositive portion of the CA Decision when its terms are explicit and need no furtherinterpretation. It would also be inequitable for the petitioners to pay and for the respondents, who did

not appeal the CA decision or questioned the deletion of the 12% per annum interest, to receive morethan what was awarded by the CA. The assailed RTC order of execution dated December 21, 2009 andthe alias writ of execution dated May 17, 2010 are, therefore, void. Time and again, it has been ruledthat an order of execution which varies the tenor of the judgment, or for that matter, exceeds the termsthereof is a nullity.

Having said that, it must however be clarified that the imposition of 12% interest is stillwarranted in the case at bar, not from the date of sale on November 9, 1994, as the respondents insist;but from the finality of the decision up to the satisfaction of judgment in line with the doctrine laid

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down in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. The Court notes that the petitioners alsoconcede that the payment of 12% interest from the finality of judgment is in order pursuant to Eastern

Shippings Lines, Inc. where the Court held that:

"When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an intereston the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of

6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages

except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly,where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from

the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when suchcertainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shallbegin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time thequantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual

base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, therate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be

12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be

by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit."

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People v. CabunganG.R. No. 189355, January 23, 2013

J. Del Castillo(2nd Division)

Facts:Appellant was charged with the crime of rape. After trial, he was declared guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The accused was further ordered to pay the offended party the sum of Seventy Five ThousandPesos (Php 75,000.00) as civil indemnity.

Appellant sought reversal of his conviction before the CA. However, the CA, affirmed, withmodifications, the RTC Decision in that the amount of civil indemnity was reduced and appellant wasordered to further pay the victim moral damages.

Still undeterred, appellant elevated the matter before the Supreme Court, arguing that thelower courts erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape.

Thus, the High Court had the opportunity to review the propriety of the award of damages.

Held: We agree with the CA in reducing the civil indemnity awarded by the trial court fromP75,000.00 to P50,000.00 in view of the finding that appellant is guilty only of simple rape. Also, werespect the award of moral damages made by the CA in the amount of P50,000.00. "Moral damages in

rape cases should be awarded without need of showing that the victim suffered trauma or mental,physical, and psychological sufferings constituting the basis thereof."

We note that both the trial court and the CA failed to award exemplary damages. In People v.

Tejero, we held that "when either one of the qualifying circumstances of relationship or minority (forqualified rape under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code) is omitted or lacking, that which ispleaded in the Information and proved by the evidence may be considered as an aggravating

circumstance. As such, AAAs minority may be considered as an aggravating circumstance. When acrime is committed with an aggravating circumstance either as qualifying or generic, an award ofexemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code." Thus, conformably with theabove ruling, we hold that "AAA" is entitled to an award of exemplary damages in the amount of

P30,000.00.

In addition, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, "interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall beimposed on all damages awarded from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid."

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Meralco v. CastilloG.R. No. 182976, January 14, 2013

J. Villarama, Jr.(1st Division)

Facts: Respondents Pablito M. Castillo and Guia S. Castillo are spouses engaged in the businessof manufacturing and selling fluorescent fixtures, office steel cabinets and related metal fabricationsunder the name and style of Permanent Light Manufacturing Enterprises (Permanent Light).

On March 2, 1994, the Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)approved the award to Permanent Light of a contract for the supply and installation of 1,200 units oflateral steel filing cabinets worth P7,636,800. Immediately, Permanent Light began production of the

steel cabinets so that it can obtain the award for the supply of 500 additional units.

In the afternoon of April 19, 1994, Joselito Ignacio and Peter Legaspi, inspectors of Meralco,sought permission to inspect Permanent Lights electric meter. Said inspection was carried out in the

presence of Mike Malikay, an employee of respondents.

The results of the inspection show that the terminal seal of Permanent Lights meter was

deformed, its meter seal was covered with fake lead, and the 100th dial pointer was misaligned. On thebasis of these findings, Ignacio concluded that the meter was tampered with and electric supply toPermanent Light was immediately disconnected. The questioned meter was then taken to Meralcoslaboratory for verification.

By petitioner Meralcos claim, it sustained losses in the amount of P126,319.92 over a 24-monthperiod, on account of Permanent Lights tampered meter. The next day, in order to secure thereconnection of electricity to Permanent Light, respondents paid P50,000 as down payment on thedifferential bill to be rendered by Meralco.

Thereafter, Meralco performed a Polyphase Meter Test on the disputed meter where it wasfound that such meter was tampered. Thus, Meralco billed Permanent Light the amount of P61,709.11,representing the latters unregistered electric consumption for the period of September 20, 1993 to

March 22, 1994. It assessed respondents a balance of P11,709.11, but later reduced said amount toP5,538.20 after petitioner allowed respondents a 10% discount on their total bill. Then, petitionerreceived the amount of P5,538.20 as full settlement of the remaining balance.

Subsequently, respondents received an electric bill in the amount of P38,693.53 for the periodof March 22, 1994 to April 21, 1994. This was followed by another bill for P192,009.64 covering theperiod from November 19, 1993 to April 21, 1994. Respondents contested both assessments in a Letter

dated October 12, 1994. They likewise complained of a significant increase in their electric bills sincepetitioner installed the replacement meter on April 20, 1994.

While respondents continued to pay, allegedly under protest, the succeeding bills of PermanentLight, they refused to pay the bill for P38,693.53.

Respondents filed against Meralco a Petition for Injunction, Recovery of a Sum of Money andDamages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary

Injunction.

The RTC directed the issuance of a TRO to restrain petitioner Meralco from disconnectingelectricity to Permanent Light. The RTC, later on, rendered judgment in favor of respondents. The fallo

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of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of thepetitioners and against the respondent ordering the latter to pay the former the following:

1. P1,138,898.86 representing overpayments made by the petitioners from May 1994 to

November 2001;

2. P200,000.00 as and for moral damages;

3. P100,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;

4. P100,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and

5. the costs of this suit.

On the other hand, petitioners are hereby ordered to pay to the respondent the amountof P38,693.53 representing the billing differential.

xxx xxx xxx.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC. It deletedthe award of P1,138,898.86 in favor of respondents and instead ordered petitioner to pay temperate

damages in the amount of P500,000. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner abused its right when itdisconnected the electricity of Permanent Light.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner argues that respondents failed to establish how the disconnection of electricity to

Permanent Light for one day compromised its production. Petitioner cites respondents admission thatsoon after the power went out, they used generators to keep the operations of Permanent Light on

track.

Petitioner further negates bad faith in discontinuing service to Permanent Light without noticeto respondents. It contends that the 48-hour notice requirement in Section 97 of Revised General OrderNo. 1 applies only to a customer who fails to pay the regular bill. Petitioner insists that the discovery by

its Fully Phased Inspectors of Permanent Lights tampered meter justified disconnection of electricity tothe latter.

Also, petitioner challenges the award of temperate damages to respondents for the alleged

overbilling. It objects to the admission into evidence of Permanent Lights December 29, 2001 electric

bill, which respondents proffered two years after the case was submitted for decision by the court aquo. Petitioner disputes the finding of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that respondents overpaid on

Permanent Lights electric bill. It reasons that the volume of business of any establishment varies fromseason to season such that it cannot be expected to constantly register the same electric consumption.Lastly, petitioner protests the award of P500,000 in temperate damages as excessive andunconscionable.

Issues: Whether respondents are entitled to claim for damages for petitioners act ofdisconnecting electricity to Permanent Light on April 19, 1994; and whether respondents are entitled to

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actual damages for the supposed overbilling by petitioner Meralco of their electric consumption fromApril 20, 1994 to November 28, 2001.

Held: In order for the discovery of a tampered, broken or fake seal on the meter to constituteprima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity by the person who benefits from such illegal use, thediscovery thereof must have been personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly

authorized representative of the ERB.

Citing Quisumbing v. Manila Electric Company, we reiterated the significance of thisrequirement in Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) v. Chua, thus:

The presence of government agents who may authorize immediate disconnections go into theessence of due process. Indeed, we cannot allow respondent to act virtually as prosecutor andjudge in imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter tampering. That would not

sit well in a democratic country. After all, Meralco is a monopoly that derives its power from thegovernment. Clothing it with unilateral authority to disconnect would be equivalent to giving ita license to tyrannize its hapless customers.

Absent any showing that an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the ERBpersonally witnessed and attested to the discovery of Permanent Lights tampered electric meter, suchdiscovery did not constitute prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity that justifies immediatedisconnection of electric service.

Besides, even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, Section 4, RA 7832requires due notice to the person benefited before disconnection of electricity can be effected.Specifically, Section 6 of RA 7832 calls for prior written notice or warning.

Thus, even when the consumer, or someone acting in his behalf, is caught in flagrante delicto orin the act of doing any of the acts enumerated in Section 4 of RA 7832, petitioner may not immediatelydisconnect electricity without serving a written notice or warning to the owner of the house or

establishment concerned.

Further, Section 48 of ERB Resolution No. 95-21 expressly provides for the application of the48-hour notice rule to Section 43 on Payment of Bills. However, petitioner Meralco, through its Revised

Terms and Conditions of Service, adopted said notice requirement where disconnection of service iswarranted because (1) the consumer failed to pay the adjusted bill after the meter stopped or failed toregister the correct amount of energy consumed, (2) or for failure to comply with any of the terms and

conditions, (3) or in case of or to prevent fraud upon the Company.

Considering the discovery of the tampered meter by its Fully Phased Inspectors, petitionerMeralco could have disconnected electricity to Permanent Light for no other reason but to prevent

fraud upon the Company. Therefore, under the Revised Terms and Conditions of Service vis-a-visSection 48 of ERB Resolution No. 95-21, petitioner is obliged to furnish respondents with a 48-hournotice of disconnection. Having failed in this regard, we find basis for the award of moral andexemplary damages in favor of respondents for the unceremonious disconnection of electricity to

Permanent Light.

Moral damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for physical suffering, mental anguish,fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and

similar injury.

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Jurisprudence has established the following requisites for the award of moral damages: (1)

there is an injury whether physical, mental or psychological, which was clearly sustained by theclaimant; (2) there is a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omissionof the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award ofdamages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

Pertinent to the case at hand, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides for the award of moraldamages in cases where the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of property

without due process of law, are violated.35

http://media/GIYABAT!/Civ2%20Cases/January/January%20(Moral%20damages).htm#fnt35http://media/GIYABAT!/Civ2%20Cases/January/January%20(Moral%20damages).htm#fnt35