Civpro Digest Pool January 24, 2014.docx

RULE 4 Venue AUCTION IN MALINTA, INC., VS. WARREN EMBES LUYABEN, G.R. NO. 173979, February 12, 2007 PABALAN

Doctrine:Mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. It must be shown that such stipulation is exclusive. Facts: Warren Embes Luyaben won in the auction of petitioner. Respondent paid for the equipment but petitioner was not able to produce the same. Luyaben then filed a complaint for damages against Auction in Malinta, Inc. (AIMI) in RTC-Kalinga where Luyaben resides. AIMI moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue by invoking the following stipulation in the Bidders Application and Registration Bidding Agreement which states that: ALL COURT LITIGATION PROCEDURES SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN THE APPROPRIATE COURTS OF VALENZUELA CITY, METRO MANILA. Issue:WON stipulation in the Agreement effectively limits the venue of the case exclusively to the proper court of Valenzuela City? -- NO. Held:The SC held that mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. It must be shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as exclusively and waiving for this purpose any other venue, shall only preceding the designation of venue, to the exclusion of the other courts, or words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. In the instant case, the stipulation in the parties agreement, i.e., all Court litigation procedures shall be conducted in the appropriate Courts of Valenzuela City, Metro Manila, evidently lacks the restrictive and qualifying words that will limit venue exclusively to the RTC of Valenzuela City. Hence, the Valenzuela courts should only be considered as an additional choice of venue to those mentioned under Section 2, Rule 4. Being that Kalinga is where the aggrieved party resides, RTC-Kalinga is a proper venue for the case at bar, following Rule 4 Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that:Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Gumabon vs. Larin G.R. No. 142523, November 27, 2001, 370 SCRA 638 TABAG

DOCTRINE: A court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. Improper venue not being included in the enumeration, it should follow that motu proprio dismissal on said ground would still not be allowed under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

FACTS: Petitioners executed a Deed of Sale With Right of Repurchase in favor of respondent Aquilino Larin. It was a sale of land in Pampanga. The right of repurchase indicated that petitioner-vendors can buy the so land at any time after each harvest of each crop year. 39 years later, petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC QC seeking the return of the title from Larin who refused to turn over said title even after payment of full amount. Larin alleges that it was not an equitable mortgage but a sale w right to repurchase. And that no amount was paid to him, and the repurchase right has already expired. He filed a counterclaim. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss counterclaim because there was no certification of non-forum shopping. RTC dismissed counterclaim. Demurrer was also denied. Judge eventually inhibited.

TC: When it was re-raffled, new Judge Ceguera dismissed the case on the ground that being a real action, it should've been filed with the RTC Pampanga.

CA: CA denied petition even if it was assailed that Larin never alleged the issue of venue or competence of the RTC QC

ISSUE: W/N a trial court judge can motu proprio dismiss an action for its improper venue.

HELD: NO.The motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court.Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2,[7] Rule 9, and Section 3,[8] Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change.Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. Improper venue not being included in the enumeration, it should follow that motu proprio dismissal on said ground would still not be allowed under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Sections 6,[10] Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure further provides that if no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided under the rules, including improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer, and upon the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be made thereon as if a motion to dismiss has been filed. But, as it is, improper venue not having been so raised by respondent as a ground to dismiss, he must be deemed to have waived the same.

SC RULING: Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. Civil case is reinstated and remanded.

Paglaum Management v. Unionbank, June 18, 2012 ATIENZA FACTS:Paglaum Management and Development Corporation (PAGLAUM) is the registered owner of three parcels of land located in the Province of Cebu with Benjamin B. Dy, the president of petitioner Health Marketing Technologies, Inc. (HealthTech) as co-owner. On 3 February 1994, Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) extended HealthTech a credit line in the amount of P 10,000,000 which was eventually increased to 36,500,000. This was secured by 3 real estate mortgage on the lands. The venue in the real estate mortgage was stipulated to be in Makati, Metro Manila or in the place where any of the Mortgaged Properties is located (Cebu), at the absolute option of the Mortgagee, the parties hereto waiving any other venue.Unfortunately, Healthtech is having difficulties on paying its obligation. They both executed a Restructuring Agreement whereby it states that that any action or proceeding arising out of or in connection therewith shall be commenced in Makati City, with both parties waiving any other venue. Healthtech still defaulted on the obligation. Union Bank foreclosed the properties through an auction sale, bought it as the sole bidder as secured a Certificate of Sale. Healthcare filed a complaint for annulment of sale and titles on the RTC of MAKATI. The RTC ruled in favour of Healthtech and restrained restraining Union Bank from proceeding with the auction sale. Union Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss citing lack of jurisdiction and improper venue. RTC of Makati granted Union Banks motion to dismiss. CA affirmed Makati RTC. Hence this appeal to SCUnion Bank argues that the Restructuring Agreement only pertains to the loan and does not affect the stipulations in the real mortgage which states that it has the option to choose the venue. Healthtech argues the restructuring agreement also carries with it the venue for the settlement of cases for the real mortgages.

ISSUE: WON Makati RTC is a proper venue for the case

HELD: YESThe SC held that an action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to annul a private sale of real property. Therefore, this case falls under Rule 4. The general rule in Rule 4 is that the venue is on where the property is located. However, among the exceptions is where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof. The SC adds that the mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. Failure to do so would result to the parties stipulating additional venues for the case.In this case, both the stipulation in the Real Estate Mortgage and the Restructuring Agreement has words of exclusivity. The SC held that the Restructuring Agreement should prevail as this modified the entire loan obligation. The later Restructuring Agreement reveals the intention of the parties to implement a restrictive venue stipulation, which applies not only to the principal obligation, but also to the mortgages

Note: In one of the Real Estate Mortgage, the phrase "parties hereto waiving" from the entire phrase "the parties hereto waiving any other venue" was stricken from the final executed contract. This was held not to be enough to show exclusivity.

RULE 5 Uniform Procedure in Trial Courts/ Summary Procedure Republic v. Sunvar Development, June 20, 2012, G.R. No. 194880 BOMBALES DOCTRINE: Under the rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary pleading is a prohibited pleading.FACTS: Petitioners Republic and NAPOCOR are registered co-owners of a parcel of land which they leased to the Technology Resource Center Foundation, Inc.,(TRCFI) for a period of 25 years ending on December 31, 2002. The TRCFI was given the right to sublease this land to Sunvar, through sublease agreements with the common provision that their sublease agreements were going to expire on December 31, 2002, the date that the TRCFIs lease agreements with the petitioners would expire. In 1987, when the government was reorganized, the TCFRI was replaced with the Philippine Development Alternatives Foundation (PDAF). Before the expiration date, Sunvar wrote to PDAF and expressed its desire to renew the sublease over the subject property and proposed an increased rental rate and a renewal period of another25 years. PDAF forwarded the letter to petitioners. By June 25, 2002, PDAF had informed Sunvar of petitioners decisions not to renew the lease. When the lease contract and the sublease agreements expired, petitioners recovered all the rights over the subject property. BUT, respondent Sunvar continued to occupy the property. Six years after the expiry date, petitioner Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), advised respondent Sunvar to vacate the subject property. Although Sunvar duly received the Notice, it still did not vacate the property. Almost a year after the first notice, respondent Sunvar received from respondent OSG a final notice to vacate within 15 days. When the period lapsed, respondent Sunvar again refused to vacate the property. Petitioners then filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTC of Makati City. Sunvar moved to dismiss the complaint, questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC as the action was supposed to an accion publiciana rather than one for unlawful detainer.The MeTC denied respondents Motion to Dismiss Then Sunvar filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Makati City to assail the denial by the MeTC of respondents Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner questioned the RTCs jurisdiction and prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition.The RTC denied the motion for dismissal and granted the Rule 65 Petition, directing the MeTC to dismiss the Complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the instant petition. ISSUE: Did the RTC violate the Rules on Summary Procedure when it took cognizance and granted the certiorari petition filed by Sunvar?

HELD: YESSC Ruling: Under the rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary pleading is a prohibited pleading. Hence, the RTC should have dismissed Sunvars petition outright for being a prohibited pleading. Petitioners have already alerted the RTC of this legal bar and immediately prayed for dismissal of the certiorari petition yet the RTC not only refused to dismiss the certiorari petition but even proceeded to hear the Rule 65 petition on merits According to former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, the proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would result in the sorry spectacle of acase being subject of a counter productive ping pong to and from the appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its interlocutory rulings.

GERLIE M. UY VS. JUDGE ERWIN B. JAVELLANA, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666, September 05, 2012 ] BUENAVENTURA

Doctrine: The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.

Facts:This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for "gross ignorance of the law and procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Gerlie M. Uy (Uy) and others against Presiding Judge Erwin B. Javellana (Javellana) of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), La Castellana, Negros Occidental.Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug cited several occasions as examples: (a) In Crim. Case No. 04-097, entitled People v. Cornelio, for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana issued a warrant of arrest after the filing of said case despite Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; (b) In Crim. Case No. 04-075, entitled People v. Celeste, et al., for Trespass to Dwelling, Judge Javellana did not grant the motion to dismiss for non-compliance with the Lupon requirement under Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, insisting that said motion was a prohibited pleading; (c) Also in People v. Celeste, et al., Judge Javellana refused to dismiss outright the complaint even when the same was patently without basis or merit, as the affidavits of therein complainant and her witnesses were all hearsay evidence; and (d) In Crim. Case No. 02-056, entitled People v. Lopez, et al., for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and, instead, conducted a preliminary examination and preliminary investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the case for arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming that therein complainant and her witnesses had no personal knowledge of the material facts alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a ground for dismissal of said case.

OCA held: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its report dated January 2, 2006, found Judge Javellana liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure when he did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in cases appropriately covered by said Rule

SC Ruling: Affirmed OCA's ruling

HELD: The SC ruled that the judge committed a gross ignorance of the law and upheld the decision of the OCAThe cases People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et al. pending before Judge Javellana were both for malicious mischief which falls under the jurisdiction of the MTCs under the Revised Rule of Summary Procedure. The crime of malicious mischief is committed by any person who deliberately causes damage to the property of another through means not constituting arson. Article 329 of the same Code should be applied. If the amounts of the alleged damage to property in People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et al., P 6,000.00 and P 3,000.00, respectively, are proven, the appropriate penalty for the accused would be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods which under Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code, would be imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. Clearly, these two cases should be governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.Judge Javellanas issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the accused in People v. Cornelio is in violation of Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, categorically stating that "the court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever required." Judge Javellana never claimed that the accused failed to appear at any hearing. His justification that the accused was wanted for the crime of attempted homicide, being tried in another case, Crim. Case No. 04-096, is totally unacceptable and further indicative of his ignorance of law. People v. Cornelio, pending before Judge Javellanas court as Crim. Case No. 04-097, is for malicious mischief, and is distinct and separate from Crim. Case No. 04-096, which is for attempted homicide, although both cases involved the same accused. Proceedings in one case, such as the issuance of a warrant of arrest, should not be extended or made applicable to the other.In People v. Lopez, et al., Judge Javellana conducted a preliminary investigation even when it was not required or justified.The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under said Rule. Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to why he needed to conduct a preliminary investigation in People v. Lopez, et al. We stress that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases. Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those specifically laid down by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or delaying the resolution of the case, and defeating the express purpose of said Rule.We further agree with the OCA that Judge Javellana committed a blatant error in denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by the accused in People v. Celeste, et al. and in insisting that said Motion was a prohibited pleading, even though the case was never previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa as required by Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. A case which has not been previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa shall be dismissed without prejudice. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to comply with the Lupon requirement is an exception to the pleadings prohibited by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Given the express provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.We find irrelevant Judge Javellanas argument that referral to the Lupon is not a jurisdictional requirement. The following facts are undisputed: People v. Celeste, et al. was not referred to the Lupon, and the accused filed a Motion to Dismiss based on this ground. Judge Javellana should have allowed and granted the Motion to Dismiss (albeit without prejudice) filed by the accused in People v. Celeste, et al.The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure has been in effect since November 15, 1991. It finds application in a substantial number of civil and criminal cases pending before Judge Javellanas court. Judge Javellana cannot claim to be unfamiliar with the same.Every judge is required to observe the law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; and anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.Resultantly, Judge Javellana cannot invoke good faith or lack of deliberate or malicious intent as a defense. His repeated failure to apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in cases so obviously covered by the same is detrimental to the expedient and efficient administration of justice, for which we hold him administratively liable.As for Judge Javellanas refusal to dismiss People v. Lopez, et al. and People v. Celeste, et al., however, we exonerate him of the administrative charges for the same. Judge Javellana is correct that the appreciation of evidence is already within his judicial discretion. Any alleged error he might have committed in this regard is the proper subject of an appeal but not an administrative complaint. We remind Judge Javellana though to adhere closely to the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in hearing and resolving said cases.

1Civil Procedure Rules 4 to 5