Comparing Light Divisions

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A betier urzder.$tandirrg of the ,.lrmg of Excellence [igh t dirisionconcept may be obtained hy comparing the organization to simiiarWorld War II divisions. The tables of wraaization and eqnipmeu i(TOES) used for the comparison badmaay changes during tbe war,arzd the Acing of Excelknre light divisions TOE is still eroluing.Pm-haps tfw ccrntpariscms made here UIQYcOnfribnte to Inakirlg amm-c workable, effrctirc unit.

THERE se~ms to be a lot of rhetcmc con-cemmg the orgarrizatlon and use of the.Army of Excellence ll~ht divmons that areno\ vbeing formed and equlppwf A comparl-wn to some of its precfece.ssors ma.v help [nunderstanding the idea hehlnd the co!>-cvpt ,md may hlghl~g}t some of the strenmhs.ind wvakncsws of such a umtThe current US light dwmon of 1986 (US

W L ight), the L S llght dii,islon of 1944!(S 44 l.lqht). the German light diws)on of194? (German 42 Light) and the GermanVolksgrenadier Dwmon of 19-!4 tGerman 44Vo[iisgrerradierl have basic orgamzatlonalroots. They were all designed under con-stmlnts of transport-abil~ty. mob]lity ormanpo!ver. Tww of these dlvlslons (the Ger-

man 42 Ll~ht and the (;erman 4.$ Volks.Erenadieri saw substtintial combat The US44 L]ght sdw combat only after substantialchanges htid been made to Its table oforga-rrization and equipment ITOE) [IOth Moun-tain IJ j\ monl. A comparison of these divi-sions In organization, combat power, sur-vl~,ablllty, strategic transportability andtact]cal moblllty provides insights mto howthe Army Ofcxcellen,,e I lght divis]on mightperform in combat.DevelopmentUS44 Light. NlaJ orcomponents of the di-

vision (see Figure 1) were three infantryregiments of three battalions each, a divl-

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sion artillery of three 75mm howitzer bat-talmns and an antttank battery, divisiontroops of an engineer battalion, a machlne-gun antiaircraft battalion and a medicalbattalion. The TOE strength of the divisionwas 8,984. The 44 Light was designed to re-duce the Armys need for strategic trans-port. Although substantially smaller thanthe standard Infantry division, it was hopedthat the hght diwsion would be able tobringas much firepower, under the circumstancesIn which It was to be used, as that of a stand-ard Infantry divmonThe Ilgbt division concept was tested in

the rugged terrain at Hunter Liggett Train-ing Area, Callforma, February-April 1944.Although additional transportation and en-gineer assets were made avadable, the dlvl-sions were never able to deploy more thanSIXbattal Ions of Infantry. The remainder ofthe infantry had to be used to build trails orbring up supplies. In conducting the exer-c}se, the II I Corps concluded that the lightdlvlslon was Incapable of sustaining Itselffor any length of, time: General DouglasMacArthur commented that the proposeddlwslon was too defscIent in firepower and --too Iog)stlcally weak forserv]ce in the Pacif-ic \ tbe area for which the dwmon was prl-

U31944 itigh IDiishm

marily designed. )Thw comment serv~d onlytoconfirm the conclusion that the light divi-sion was not wanted in the Army GroundForces organization.!

German 1942 light Division+$

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~ K,,8?JIRH3 ~ Hmy mm, ~ Mtch!.wnsawn WWtiorMa4eISema.ArmyOut!of Baffle 1929-1945,GmwMWMW?,.411mtwna,1981,Vohme,P90 -Figure 2

German 42 Light. As can be seen in Fig-ure 2, major components consisted of two in-fantry regiments of three battalions eachand an artillery regiment of two battal-ions of 75mm howitzers and a battaIion of150mm howitzers; division troops consistedof a motorized reconnaissance battalion, anantitank battahon, an engineer battalionand a signal battahon. The TOE strength ofthe dlvlslon was 13,056. The German 42Light was the second of two different lightdivision organizations. The divisions wereformed in the winter of 1941-42. This wasafter the invasion of the USSR which hadIdentdied missions that either could not beread]ly accomplished by astandard infantrydivision or could be accomplished with lessmanpower.Two regiments instead of three were

formed because it was not envisioned thatthe division would be involved in prolongedcombat. It was also thought that it was bet-ter tohave three battalion regiments, allow-ing the regimental commander to keep a re-serve rather than the division commander.The battalions were trained tobemore inde-

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1944 Volksgrenadier Division* 10072

So.rLe W V.ctorMade, Germ. Arm O,Serof Saftle 19391S45Ga.t Markett.g Co &llentmn ?8 1981 vo,mw 1 D 79Figure 3

pendent and contained a higher quality ofsoldier than the regular infantry dlvisiorr,wit)r most of the heavy weapons being de-centralized to the battalion level. Some ofthe Ilght diwsions were given additionaltransport and designated pursuit divi-sions so they could maintain contact be-tween the standard infantry division andthe motorized divisions. Others were orga-nized so they could fight I n the frozen,marshes of northern Russia. From the timethe dlv]sions were organized in 1942 untilthe end of the war, the di~,islons underwentno major modifications in their TOES.German 44 Volksgrenadier. F igure 3shows that major components consisted

of three Infantry regiments of two battal-ions each and an artil lery regiment of onebattalion of 75mm guns (also used In the an-titank role), two battalions of 105mm gusuhowitzers and a 150mm howitzer battahon;cbvmion troops consisted of an antitank bat-tahon, an engineer battahon, a reconnais-sance company and a slgna! battalion. TheTOE strength of the &ivislon was 10,072.The severe manpower losses sustained onboth the Eastern and Western Fror?tsm thesummer of 1944 produced the German 44Volksgrenadier lrr the fall . It was a directdescendant of the 1944 Infantry divlslonwhich had had one infantry battalion takenout of each regiment The German 44 Voiksgrenadler further

reduced the dlvislon by 20 percent, replac-ing the fusilier battalion (Infantry battalion

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on bicycles) with a large fusilier company,replacing one of the 105mm artillery battal-ions with an 18-gun 75mm battalion andforming adivisional supply combining all ofthe divisional services except the militarypolice detachment which was assigned todi-vision headquarters. Company and battal-ion trains were also merged into battalionsupply platoons, thereby freeing the compa-ny commander from all duties other thanoperations. The merger also made supplyoperations more economical in manpowerwhile maintaining the same level of opera-tion.As a result of continuing manpower loss-

es, many battalions lost them thmd compa-ny, and later many companies lost theirthird platoon. The German 44 Volksgrena-dier was liberally supplied with small auto-matic weapons to compensate for the loss ofpersonnel. The majority of newly formed di-visions received only cursory training be- .fore being committed, further reducing theeffectiveness of the division.US 86 Light. As shown in Figure 4, maJ or

components consist of three maneuver br]-gades of three battalions of light infantryeach and a combat aviation brigade of onelight reconnaissance squadron, an attackhelicopter battal]on and two helicopter liftcompanies; division troops consist of a lightengineer battalion, a light alr defense artll-Iery battallon and a signal battallon. TheTOE strength of the division is 10,220.5The light division is designed primarily

for the same reasons as the US 44 Light. tocompensate for transport deficiencies by re-ducing requirements for strategic trans-port to project enough strength so that, inthe areas where It ]s employed, It could oper-ate effectively and as a deterrent; failing asa deterrent, then tohold ground untd heavi-er forces arrive; and tobe easily sustainable.The light infantry battahons are designedso the heavy weapons are in the headquar-ters company, vuth the line companies con-

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The two US llght infantry dlvlslonswere both organized to conduct operationsagainst other Lghi-i.vpe units. The US 44Lights primary combat power came fromthe rifles oftbe infantrymen, as an infantrybattalion had a total of 12 light machine-guns and nine 60mm mortars as supportingweapons. At regimental level, there weresix 81mm mortars. This regimental tire-power could be augmented from dlvlstonwith a combat engineer battalion, a ma-chinegun antiaircraft battallon and one an-titank company of 57mm guns. Added tothe dIvIsion was any available amand navalgunfire. Each infantry company in the US86 ,L lgbt has SIX light machineguns andsix Dragon antiarmor systems. The battal-ion bas four 107mm mortars and four TOW

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antiarmor weapons systems to support thecompanies. The majority of tbe combatpower ]n the ]Ight d~vlslon IS in the combata~rlation brigade The attack hehcopter battallon and Ihe

reconnaissance squadron prowde the mamantlarmor defense for the division and arecapable of movmg rapidly from onf part ofthe division sector toanother. The missionstatement of the US 86 Light shows the divi-sion requires local air superiority and possi-bly naval support to carry out its mmsion.The three 105mm ~attalions are unable toemploy most of the:speclal purpose roundsand, with their limited manpower, will behard. pressed to provide security for them-selves in any combat environment.A comparison of all four llght divisions.9

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Comparing Light Divisions