Cover Note with AA Logohkia3way.blob.core.windows.net/pdf/tc/NATS_phase1a.pdfASSI Air Safety Support International ATC Air Traffic Control ATCO Air Traffic Controller ATFCM Air Traffic

Important Note

Airport Authority Hong Kong (AAHK) is responsible for preparing the Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA) Master Plan 2030 and commissioning the associated consultancies. At different stages of these consultancies, the consultants produced various documents for AAHK’s consideration, culminating in the production of final reports. Where a final report was not produced, the consultants’ work was consolidated into the HKIA Master Plan 2030 Technical Report. As the reports were produced at different times, they may contain outdated or inconsistent contents.

The HKIA Master Plan 2030 was not drawn up solely on the basis of the various consultancies commissioned by AAHK, but also has incorporated input from relevant airport stakeholders as well as AAHK’s own input on the basis of its solid experience in airport operations. Hence, for any differences between the consultancy reports and the HKIA Master Plan 2030, the latter and the Technical Report should always be referred to.

Airport Authority Hong Kong

July 2011

Commercial in Confidence

Page 1 of 26 Issue 2 Draft V.3 15/01/2009 © NATS 2008

Reference: Deliverable P5 Appendix A Approved By: Project Manager

AIRSPACE AND RUNWAY CAPACITY STUDY PHASE 1a

Final Report


Page 2 of 26 Final Issue 15/01/2009 © NATS 2008

Reference: Phase 1a Deliverable Approved By: Project Manager

© 2008 NATS

This report must not be disclosed to third parties or copied or reproduced in whole or in part without NATS' prior written consent. Any amendment, variation or distribution of this correspondence must be authorised in advance by NATS. In the event that this proposal is superseded the holder shall ensure

its safe disposal.




GLOSSARY AACM Autoridade de Aviação Civil Macao

AAHK Airport Authority Hong Kong

ACC Area Control Centre

AIP Aeronautical Information Publication

AMC Air Movements Controller

AMN Air Movements Controller North

AMS Air Movements Controller South

AMSTS Aircraft Movement Statistics System

APP Approach Sector

APU Auxiliary Power Unit

ARP Aerodrome Reference Point

ARR/Arr Arrivals

ASSI Air Safety Support International

ATC Air Traffic Control

ATCO Air Traffic Controller

ATFCM Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management

ATM Air Traffic Management

ATS Air Traffic Service

BS British Standard

CAD Civil Aviation Department Hong Kong

CAD Computer Aided Drawing

CAT Category

CD Compact Disc

CDC Clearance Delivery Controller

CNS/ATM Communications, Navigation, & Surveillance for Air Traffic Management

DEH Departure High Sector

DEM Digital Elevation Model

DEP Departure Sector

DEP/Dep Departures

DFS Deutsche Flugsicherung

DME Distance Measuring Equipment

DVD Digital Versatile Disc

DVOR Doppler VHF Omnidirectional Range

E East

EAT Expected Approach Time

ETA Expected Time of Arrival

ETD Expected Time of Departure

EU Evaluation Unit

FAD Final Approach Director Sector

FIR Flight Information Region

FL Flight Level

FLO Flow Controller

GMC Ground Movements Controller




GMN Ground Movements Controller North

GMS Ground Movements Controller South

HK Hong Kong

HK CAD Hong Kong Civil Aviation Department

HK FIR Hong Kong Flight Information Region

HKIA Hong Kong International Airport

IAS Indicated Airspeed

IWP Intermediate Approach Waypoint

IAWP Initial Approach Waypoint

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation

ILS Instrument Landing System

ISO International Organization for Standardization

LCE Local Competency Examiner

MATC Manual of Air Traffic Control

MCH Macau High Sector

MCL Macau Low Sector

MMD Mott MacDonald

MSA Minimum Sector Altitude

MVMT Movements

Nm/NM Nautical Mile

OCA Obstacle Clearance Altitude

OCH Obstacle Clearance Height

PANS Procedures for Air Navigation Services

PDG Procedure Design Group

PDT Procedure Design Team

PRD Pearl River Delta

RDL Radial

RESA Runway End Safety Area

RET Rapid Exit Taxiway

RFL Requested Flight Level

RNAV Area Navigation

ROT Runway Occupancy Time

RRSM Reduced Runway Separation Minima

RVA Radar Vectoring Area

RWY Runway

S South

SAR Special Administrative Region

SARP Standards & Recommended Practices

SDD Situation Data Display

SID Standard Instrument Departure

SOIR Simultaneous Operations on Parallel or Near Parallel Instrument Runways

SRTM Shuttle Radar Topography Mission

STAR Standard Terminal Arrival Routes

TAAM Total Airport & Airspace Modeller




TMA Terminal Control Area

TME Terminal Control East Sector

TMS Terminal Control South Sector

TRE Terminal Radar East Sector

TRK Terminal Radar East Sector

TRN En-route North sector

TRS Terminal Radar South Sector

TRU En-route Upper sector

TRW Terminal Radar West Sector

VCR Visual Control Room

VHF Very High Frequency

VH/VHHH Hong Kong

VM/VMMC Macau

VOR VHF Omnidirectional Range

WP Work Package




CONTENTS 1 Introduction.....................................................................................................7 2 Certification Statement......................................................................................8

2.1 Quality Certifications ..................................................................................... 8 2.2 About ASSI.................................................................................................. 8

3 Procedure Design Group (PDG) Remit..................................................................9 4 Design Methodology........................................................................................ 10

4.1 Assumptions .............................................................................................. 10 4.2 Procedure Design Methodology ..................................................................... 10 4.3 Obstacle Data ............................................................................................ 10 4.4 Magnetic Variation ...................................................................................... 11

5 Conventional Procedures ................................................................................. 12 5.1 Minimum Sector Altitude (MSA) .................................................................... 12 5.2 Basis of Calculation..................................................................................... 12 5.3 ILS Runway 07L ......................................................................................... 13 5.4 ILS Runway 25R......................................................................................... 14 5.5 Departure Runway 07R (Only if required)....................................................... 16 5.6 Departure Runway 25L (Only if required) ....................................................... 16 5.7 Weather Minima ......................................................................................... 16

6 RNAV Procedures............................................................................................ 17 6.1 General Comments ..................................................................................... 17 6.2 ILS Runway 07L ......................................................................................... 17 6.3 ILS Runway 25R......................................................................................... 18 6.4 Departure Runway 07R (Only if required)....................................................... 19 6.5 Departure Runway 25L (Only if required) ....................................................... 19 6.6 Weather Minima ......................................................................................... 20

7 Other Issues .................................................................................................. 21 7.1 Steep Climb Gradients................................................................................. 21 7.2 Danger Area VHD5...................................................................................... 21 7.3 SKARA ...................................................................................................... 22

8 Recommendations .......................................................................................... 23 9 Compliance Matrix .......................................................................................... 24 10 Files ............................................................................................................. 25

10.1 Source Data............................................................................................... 25 10.2 Drawings................................................................................................... 25 10.3 Procedure Files........................................................................................... 25

11 Conclusions ................................................................................................... 26




1 INTRODUCTION In Phase 1 of the Hong Kong Airspace & Runway Capacity Study, NATS identified a number of potential enhancements for Hong Kong International Airport and the air traffic services provided in the Hong Kong Flight Information Region (HK FIR). These enhancements when implemented will deliver additional capacity to the airspace and the airport. The conduct of this phase (Phase 1a) of the Hong Kong Airspace & Runway Capacity is in response to one of the recommendations from Phase 1.

Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA) has two parallel runways which are currently operated in segregated mode. The northern runway (07L/25R) is normally used for arrivals and the southerly runway (07R/25L) is normally used for departures. The procedures for these runways, however, do not comply with ICAO Simultaneous Operations on Parallel or Near-Parallel Runways (SOIR) requirements. This prevents fully independent segregated operations from being maintained except when conditions are good enough to allow visual separation to be maintained between a departing aircraft and an aircraft executing a missed approach from the parallel runway. This prohibits the airport from achieving its maximum potential capacity.




2 CERTIFICATION STATEMENT The procedures detailed in this report have been designed by NATS' Procedure Design Group. They can be contacted by the following means:

Table 2.1 Contact Details

Address Procedure Design Group, NATS, Heathrow House, Bath Road, Hounslow, Middlesex, TW5 9AT, UK

Phone +44 208 7503790

Email [email protected]

2.1 Quality Certifications NATS is certified to "BS EN ISO 9001:2000 Quality Management Systems – Requirements" standards and are externally audited by DNV UK. The Procedure Design Group within NATS is also specifically certified by Air Safety Support International (ASSI) to design Standard Instrument Flight Procedures for use at aerodromes situated in any of the Territories detailed in the UK Air Navigation Order 2001 and 1989 as amended.

A copy of NATS' ASSI Certificate is available on the accompanying CD.

NATS certifies that all procedures detailed in this document and on the accompanying CD for Runway 07L/25R at Hong Kong International Airport have been designed to comply fully with all relevant requirements detailed in ICAO PANS-OPS and Manual on SOIR.

The said procedures have been designed and checked by the primary procedure designer and verified independently by a second designer before being released. NATS certifies that all calculations made in the process of designing the said procedures are accurate and free of mistakes.

2.2 About ASSI ASSI is a not-for-profit, wholly-owned, subsidiary company of the United Kingdom Civil Aviation authority, established under Directions from the UK's Department for Transport. ASSI's mission is to ensure, in an inclusive and sustainable manner, that the UK meets its international obligations in respect of aviation safety regulation within the UK Overseas Territories.




3 PROCEDURE DESIGN GROUP (PDG) REMIT The PDG remit was to design new procedures to allow fully independent segregated operations. The new procedures should be designed in accordance with ICAO PANS-OPS Doc 8168 Volume II criteria and should meet the ICAO Simultaneous Operations on Parallel or Near-Parallel Instrument Runways (SOIR) Doc 9643 requirements. The new procedures must also be contained within the Hong Kong FIR.

The preferred solution was to redesign the missed approaches for Runways 07L and 25R to diverge from the existing Runway 07R and Runway 25L SIDs. The Runway 07R and Runway 25L SIDs were only to be modified if it was determined to be impossible to provide practical SOIR compliant missed approaches for Runways 07L and 25R without also changing the SIDs.

Agreed deliverables include:

Procedures • 1x Conventional Turning Missed Approach for Runway 07L

• 1x Conventional Turning Missed Approach for Runway 25R

• 1x RNAV Overlay of Turning Missed Approach for Runway 07L

• 1x RNAV Overlay of Turning Missed Approach for Runway 25R

• 1x Conventional Departure for Runway 07R (Only if required)

• 1x Conventional Departure for Runway 25L (Only if required)

• 1x RNAV Overlay of Departure for Runway 07R (Only if required)

• 1x RNAV Overlay of Departure for Runway 25L (Only if required)

Documentation

• Calculation records for the above procedures

• Charts for the above procedures

• Report on the full design process and results




4 DESIGN METHODOLOGY

4.1 Assumptions The following assumptions were made to ensure a rigorous design baseline:

• The data provided by HK CAD presents the best known data environment available for procedure design and is accepted by the customer as a base to perform procedure design calculations.

• ATC separation was not considered as part of the PDG design process.

• No ship taller than 40m above sea level will be permitted within 1NM of the runway.

• Procedures to cover for civilian CAT A, B, C, and D type aircraft.

• Aircraft with a maximum wing span of 80m and a maximum glide path antenna to wheel height of 8m will be accommodated.

• The runway is appropriately certified as a precision runway.

• Flight validation of the procedures will be carried out before operational use of the procedures.

• As no source survey data was supplied, NATS assumes that the provided Excel files containing runway, navaid and obstacle data will be verified and checked by the appropriate Authority to comply with ICAO data requirements relating to the operational use of RNAV procedures.

4.2 Procedure Design Methodology ICAO PANS-OPS Doc 8168 Volume II, 5th Edition, Amendment 1 criteria were used as base design criteria. Where applicable, HK CAD policy and HK AIP information was used as reference material. HK CAD policy will take precedence over ICAO criteria as published and/or notified.

4.3 Obstacle Data

4.3.1 Survey No survey data was provided.

4.3.2 AIP Information Excel files containing all obstacles and navigation aids listed in the HK AIP were provided by HK CAD. The location of each of these obstacles and navigation aids was assumed to be accurate to within 20m laterally and 0m vertically.

4.3.3 Charts An electronic copy of the ICAO Type B Chart for HKIA was provided by HK CAD. The location of each spot height or obstacle shown in the chart was assumed to be accurate to within 100m laterally and 0m vertically.

4.3.4 Spot Heights CAD drawings of the area around HKIA were provided by HK CAD. The location of each spot height shown in these charts was assumed to be accurate to within 20m laterally and 0m vertically.

4.3.5 Digital Elevation Model (DEM) A Digital Elevation Model was used to amplify and support the survey data due to the high ground to the north, east, and south of the airport. Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) elevation dataset was used. The location of each DEM point within




5NM of the Aerodrome Reference Point (ARP) was assumed to be accurate to within 65m laterally and 16m vertically. The DEM points outside 5NM of the ARP were extrapolated onto a 200m grid to reduce the size of the data set. The location of each extrapolated DEM point was assumed to be accurate to within 285m laterally and 16m vertically.

4.3.6 Data Precision PDG applies different obstacle tolerances depending on the precision of the data and our confidence in its accuracy. As no precision information was received with any of the data provided, obstacle tolerances were chosen based on PDG's previous experience dealing with similar data.

20m is the smallest obstacle tolerance that would typically be used in order to provide an additional safety buffer. 100m is what is typically applied to "manual" obstacles – obstacles that have been identified from topographic maps.

The On-Airport Obstacles (AD 2.10-2) were given to a precision of one tenth of a second which equals just over 3 meters. The Aeronautical Ground Lights (AD 2.10-3) and Significant Obstacles from the Type C chart were given to a precision of one second which equals just less than 31 meters. 20 meters of tolerance was applied to all of these obstacles.

The CAD files from Lands Department were georeferenced and the spot height density would imply that they had been surveyed quite accurately. But as the precision of the original measurements was not stated, 20 meters of tolerance was applied to these obstacles as well. The Type B chart received from HK CAD was not geo-referenced and had to be placed, scaled, and rotated in AutoCAD manually. As the PDG could not be confident of the accuracy of the placement of the chart or the precision of the charting and printing, 100 meters of tolerance was applied to these obstacles.

4.4 Magnetic Variation The current magnetic variation declared for HKIA is 2°W dated 2005. In order to accurately design these procedures, magnetic variation was calculated as 2.399°W using the British Geological Survey’s World Magnetic Model.




5 CONVENTIONAL PROCEDURES

5.1 Minimum Sector Altitude (MSA)

5.1.1 Observations In order to design the missed approach procedures, an assessment of the current MSA was undertaken. The current MSA stipulates that certain sector altitudes are only valid "within HK FIR". This does not conform to ICAO PANS-OPS criteria. A new MSA was therefore constructed to accommodate all aircraft within 25NM of TD VOR.

PANS-OPS states that the MSA "shall apply within a radius of 46km (25NM) of the homing facility". In order to comply with this requirement, the northeastern sector minimum altitude would have to be increased by 500ft due to the mountain to the northeast of Shagang. It is therefore decided to specify a DME boundary which would allow the inner sector minimum altitude to stay the same and only require the increased altitude in the outer sector. As the DME boundary for the northeastern sector was already being implemented, the northwestern sector was also examined to determine if there would be any operational benefit from a DME boundary in that sector. It is found that a new western sector with a DME boundary could reduce the outer sector minimum altitude by 200ft and the inner sector minimum altitude by 1200ft.

5.1.2 Results 6 sectors were constructed as follows:

Table 5.1 Minimum Sector Altitude

Sector Bearing DME Range Sector Altitude

1 065 to 245 0NM to 25NM 2800ft

2 010 to 065 0NM to 12.5NM 3300ft

3 010 to 065 12.5NM to 25NM 3800ft

4 290 to 010 0NM to 25NM 4300ft

5 245 to 290 0NM to 12.5NM 3100ft

6 245 to 290 12.5NM to 25NM 4100ft

5.1.3 Reference Files

Table 5.2 Reference Files

MSA Calculation Summary (pdf)

/CD/VHHH MSA/VHHH MSA.pdf

Complete MSA Spreadsheet (xls)

/CD/VHHH MSA/VHHH MSA.xls

Diagram of MSA Sectors (jpg)

/CD/VHHH MSA/VHHH MSA.jpg

Diagram of MSA Sectors (kmz)

/CD/VHHH MSA/VHHH MSA.kmz

5.2 Basis of Calculation In designing the new missed approach for each runway, analysis was begun at the FAP to ensure an accurate start-of-climb point to work from. As part of this analysis, the location of the FAP was calculated based on the intermediate sector altitude, the glidepath angle, the threshold elevation, the reference datum height, and the




curvature of the earth. The distance from the DME was calculated taking into account the DME elevation, the intermediate sector altitude, and the slant range. This gave a distance of 13.594NM.

The FAP itself has not moved as the glidepath antenna is still in the same place, the glidepath angle is still the same, and the intermediate sector altitude is the same. It is likely that the original calculation did not take curvature of the earth into account and therefore came up with a slightly larger result. When flight-checking each procedure the DME reading can be noted as the aircraft crosses the glidepath to verify these calculations.

5.3 ILS Runway 07L

5.3.1 Final Segment The existing ILS procedures for Runway 07L was taken as the starting point for the new missed approach. The initial and intermediate segments were not re-evaluated. Analysis began at the FAP using the existing 1700ft intermediate altitude.

The analysis of the obstacle assessment surfaces revealed that the OCA(H) values for the Cat I and Cat II approaches could be significantly reduced. Separate values were calculated for each category of aircraft.

The OCA(H) values are as follows:

Table 5.3 Runway 07L Obstacle Clearance Altitude (Height)

Aircraft Category A B C D

CAT I (2.5%) 1076 (1054)

1086 (1064)

1096 (1074)

1106 (1084)

CAT I (6.8%) 159 (137)

169 (147)

178 (156)

188 (166)

OCA (OCH)

CAT II (6.8%) 70

(48) 87

(65) 100 (78)

113 (91)

5.3.2 Missed Approach Segment In order to comply with SOIR criteria, the missed approach for Runway 07L has to diverge from the SID for Runway 07R by at least 30 degrees. Due to the proximity of the HK FIR border to the north, a turn of 30 degrees exactly was chosen. The aircraft continues on a heading of 043° to intercept RDL 073 from LKC VOR. This places the aircraft almost 5NM away and parallel to 07R SIDs and keeps it within Hong Kong airspace. The aircraft then intercepts RDL 330 to TD VOR and can be vectored for another approach or diverted to an alternate airport.

If the aircraft has had a radio comms failure then it intercepts RDL 250 from TD VOR and takes up the hold at SOKOE. It would then follow the "Loss of Communication" procedures detailed in Paragraph 7.2 of Section VHHH AD 2.22 of the HK AIP.

The critical obstacle for the missed approach is the tower on top of Castle Peak. This necessitates a missed approach climb gradient of 6.8% up to an altitude of 2300ft. The climb gradient can then be reduced to 2.5% up to an altitude of 5000ft.

The missed approach instruction is as follows:

"Ahead to 300ft, then left on heading 043°M and climb to 5000ft. Continue climb on 043°M, crossing IZSL D5.5NM at 2150ft or above, turn right to intercept LKC DVOR RDL 073 outbound then right to intercept TD VOR RDL 330 inbound to TD and expect radar vectors."

The radio comms failure instruction is as follows:

"Ahead to 300ft, then left on heading 043°M and climb to 5000ft. Continue climb on 043°M, crossing IZSL D5.5NM at 2150ft or above, turn right to intercept LKC DVOR




RDL 073 outbound then right to intercept TD VOR RDL 330 inbound and finally right to intercept TD VOR RDL 250 outbound to SOKOE and hold."

5.3.3 Design Chart

Table 5.4 Design Chart

Design Chart /CD/VHHH 07L Missed Approach 30 Left/Hong Kong 07L.pdf



ILS Calculation Summary (pdf)

/CD/VHHH 07L Missed Approach 30 Left/VHHH 07L ILS.pdf

Complete ILS Spreadsheet (xls)

/CD/VHHH 07L Missed Approach 30 Left/VHHH 07L ILS.xls

Diagram of OAS (jpg) /CD/VHHH 07L Missed Approach 30 Left/VHHH 07L OAS CAT I DL.jpg

Diagram of OAS (kmz) /CD/VHHH 07L Missed Approach 30 Left/ VHHH 07L OAS CAT I DL.kmz

Missed Approach Summary (pdf)

/CD/VHHH 07L Missed Approach 30 Left/ VHHH 07L Missed Approach 30 Left.pdf

Complete Missed Approach Spreadsheet (xls)

/CD/VHHH 07L Missed Approach 30 Left/ VHHH 07L Missed Approach 30 Left.xls

Diagram of Missed Approach (jpg)

/CD/VHHH 07L Missed Approach 30 Left/ VHHH 07L Missed Approach 30 Left.jpg

Diagram of Missed Approach (kmz)

/CD/VHHH 07L Missed Approach 30 Left/ VHHH 07L Missed Approach 30 Left.kmz

5.4 ILS Runway 25R

5.4.1 Final Segment The existing ILS procedures for Runway 25R was taken as the starting point for the new missed approach. The initial and intermediate segments were not re-evaluated. Analysis began at the FAP using the existing 4500ft intermediate altitude.

The analysis of the obstacle assessment surfaces revealed that OCA(H) value for the Cat I approach could be reduced. Separate values were calculated for each category of aircraft.





Table 5.6 Runway 25R Obstacle Clearance Altitude (Height)


CAT I (2.5%) 1238 (1216)

1248 (1226)

1258 (1236)

1268 (1246)

CAT I (7.0%) 172 (150)

182 (160)

191 (169)

201 (179)

OCA (OCH)

CAT II (7.0%) 80

(58) 97

(75) 110 (88)

123 (101)

5.4.2 Missed Approach Segment In order to comply with SOIR criteria, the missed approach for Runway 25R has to diverge from the SID for Runway 25L by at least 30 degrees. Due to the proximity of the HK FIR border to the west, a turn of 180 degrees was chosen. There is a 200kt speed restriction on the turn in order to keep aircraft within Hong Kong airspace. The aircraft intercept RDL 073 from LKC VOR then intercept RDL 300 to TD VOR as per the existing procedure. The aircraft can then commence another approach or be diverted to an alternate airport.

If the aircraft has had a radio comms failure then it would follow the "Loss of Communication" procedures detailed in Paragraph 7.2 of Section VHHH AD 2.22 of the HK AIP.

The critical obstacle for the missed approach is the tower on top of Castle Peak. This necessitates a missed approach climb gradient of 7.0% up to an altitude of 2300ft. The climb gradient can then be reduced to 2.5% up to an altitude of 5000ft. The missed approach instruction is as follows:

"Ahead to 500ft, then right to intercept LKC VOR RDL 073 outbound and climb to 5000ft. Continue climb on LKC VOR RDL 073, crossing LKC D3.9 at 2150ft or above, then right to intercept TD VOR RDL 300 inbound to TD and hold, or as directed by ATC."


"As Missed Approach."

5.4.3 Design Chart


Design Chart /CD/VHHH 25R Missed Approach 180 Right 200 Knots/Hong Kong 25R.pdf



ILS Calculation Summary (pdf)

/CD/VHHH 25R Missed Approach 180 Right 200 Knots/VHHH 25R ILS.pdf

Complete ILS Spreadsheet (xls)

/CD/VHHH 25R Missed Approach 180 Right 200 Knots/ VHHH 25R ILS.xls

Diagram of OAS (jpg) /CD/VHHH 25R Missed Approach 180 Right 200 Knots/ VHHH 25R OAS CAT I DL.jpg

Diagram of OAS (kmz) /CD/VHHH 25R Missed Approach 180 Right 200 Knots/ VHHH 25R OAS CAT I DL.kmz





/CD/VHHH 25R Missed Approach 180 Right 200 Knots/ VHHH 25R Missed Approach 180 Right 200 Knots.pdf


/CD/VHHH 25R Missed Approach 180 Right 200 Knots/ VHHH 25R Missed Approach 180 Right 200 Knots.xls

Diagram of Missed Approach (jpg)

/CD/VHHH 25R Missed Approach 180 Right 200 Knots/ VHHH 25R Missed Approach 180 Right 200 Knots.jpg

Diagram of Missed Approach (kmz)

/CD/VHHH 25R Missed Approach 180 Right 200 Knots/ VHHH 25R Missed Approach 180 Right 200 Knots.kmz

5.5 Departure Runway 07R (Only if required) No changes were required.

5.6 Departure Runway 25L (Only if required) No changes were required.

5.7 Weather Minima The above procedures have been designed to comply fully with all relevant requirements detailed in the ICAO SOIR Manual. There are no applicable ATC weather minima. Simultaneous (SIM) Mode can be operated in all conditions.




6 RNAV PROCEDURES

6.1 General Comments Very little ICAO guidance is available when combining conventional ILS and RNAV procedures and associated missed approaches. NATS took guidance from various sources to provide the offered RNAV overlay procedures.

NATS therefore strongly recommends that these procedures are trialled and flight tested using the proposed coded procedures before they are operationally implemented.

6.2 ILS Runway 07L This procedure is intended to be flown using RNAV until passing the IWP. The intermediate approach and final approach segments should then be flown conventionally using the ILS for horizontal and vertical guidance. The missed approach should be flown using RNAV and RNAV holding should be used, if required.

6.2.1 Initial Segment The redesigned ILS procedure for Runway 07L was taken as the starting point for the new RNAV procedure. The entire instrument approach was converted to RNAV and re-evaluated. Analysis began at the IAWP using the existing 8000ft initial altitude.

The initial segment is broken into two phases. Phase 1 begins at the IAWP (GUAVA) and ends at 07L01. The minimum altitude for this phase is 2000ft due to the hill on Dan’gan Island. Phase 2 begins at 07L01 and ends at the IWP (07L03). The minimum altitude for this phase is 1700ft due to the hill to the east of Lajiwei.

6.2.2 Intermediate Segment The minimum altitude for the intermediate segment is 1700ft.

6.2.3 Final Segment The final segment is to be flown conventionally and there is no change from the conventional procedure.




CAT I (2.5%) 1076 (1054)

1086 (1064)

1096 (1074)

1106 (1084)

CAT I (6.8%) 159 (137)

169 (147)

178 (156)

188 (166)

OCA (OCH)

CAT II (6.8%) 70

(48) 87

(65) 100 (78)

113 (91)

6.2.4 Missed Approach Segment The RNAV missed approach copies the conventional missed approach. Aircraft must overfly waypoint 07L05 then climb straight ahead to 300ft before turning left to intercept a course of 043°magnetic to waypoint 07L06. The critical obstacle is still the tower on top of Castle Peak. This necessitates a missed approach climb gradient of 6.8% up to an altitude of 2300ft. The climb gradient can then be reduced to 2.5% up to an altitude of 5000ft.





"Ahead to 300ft, then continue RNAV to 07L06."



6.2.5 Design Chart


RNAV Runway 07L Chart (pdf)

/CD/VHHH 07L RNAV Approach/Hong Kong 07L RNAV.pdf

RNAV Runway 07L Coding (doc)

/CD/VHHH 07L RNAV Approach/VHHH 07L RNAV Coding.doc

RNAV Runway 07L CRC File (txt)

/CD/Database/WPSRWY07L.txt




/CD/VHHH 07L RNAV Approach/VHHH 07L RNAV Missed Approach.pdf


/CD/VHHH 07L RNAV Approach/VHHH 07L RNAV Missed Approach.xls

RNAV Hold Summary (pdf) /CD/VHHH 07L RNAV Approach/VHHH SOKOE RNAV Hold.pdf

Complete RNAV Hold Spreadsheet (xls)

/CD/VHHH 07L RNAV Approach/VHHH SOKOE RNAV Hold.xls

6.3 ILS Runway 25R This procedure is intended to be flown using RNAV until passing the IWP. The intermediate approach and final approach segments should then be flown conventionally using the ILS for horizontal and vertical guidance. The missed approach should be flown using RNAV and RNAV holding should be used, if required.

6.3.1 Initial Segment The redesigned ILS procedure for Runway 25R was taken as the starting point for the new RNAV procedure. The entire instrument approach was converted to RNAV and re-evaluated. Analysis began at the IAWP using the existing 8000ft initial altitude.

The minimum altitude for initial segment is 3300ft due to the hill to the southeast of Cheung Kang.

6.3.2 Intermediate Segment The minimum altitude for the intermediate segment is 2800ft due to the hill to the southeast of Cheung Kang.

6.3.3 Final Segment The final segment is to be flown conventionally and there is no change from the conventional procedure.







CAT I (2.5%) 1238 (1216)

1248 (1226)

1258 (1236)

1268 (1246)

CAT I (7.0%) 172 (150)

182 (160)

191 (169)

201 (179)

OCA (OCH)

CAT II (7.0%) 80

(58) 97

(75) 110 (88)

123 (101)

6.3.4 Missed Approach Segment The RNAV missed approach copies the conventional missed approach. Aircraft must overfly waypoint 25R03 then climb straight ahead to 500ft before turning right, direct to waypoint 25R04. The critical obstacle is still the tower on top of Castle Peak. This necessitates a missed approach climb gradient of 7.0% up to an altitude of 2300ft. The climb gradient can then be reduced to 2.5% up to an altitude of 5000ft.


"Ahead to 500ft, then continue RNAV to 25R04."



6.3.5 Design Chart


RNAV Runway 25R Chart (pdf)

/CD/VHHH 25R RNAV Approach/Hong Kong 25R RNAV.pdf

RNAV Runway 25R Coding (doc)

/CD/VHHH 25R RNAV Approach/VHHH 25R RNAV Coding.doc

RNAV Runway 25R CRC File (txt)

/CD/Database/WPSRWY25R.txt




/CD/VHHH 25R RNAV Approach/VHHH 25R RNAV Missed Approach.pdf


/CD/VHHH 25R RNAV Approach/VHHH 25R RNAV Missed Approach.xls

RNAV Hold Summary (pdf) /CD/VHHH 25R RNAV Approach/VHHH TD RNAV Hold.pdf

Complete RNAV Hold Spreadsheet (xls)

/CD/VHHH 25R RNAV Approach/VHHH TD RNAV Hold.xls

6.4 Departure Runway 07R (Only if required) No changes were required.

6.5 Departure Runway 25L (Only if required) No changes were required.




6.6 Weather Minima The above procedures have been designed to comply fully with all relevant requirements detailed in the ICAO SOIR Manual. There are no applicable ATC weather minima. Simultaneous (SIM) Mode can be operated in all conditions.




7 OTHER ISSUES

7.1 Steep Climb Gradients The existing missed approach procedure for Runway 25R has a climb gradient of 5.0%, compared to the NATS designed missed approach procedure which has a 7.0% climb gradient. The existing procedure is certainly easier for the operator to comply with but it is not SOIR compliant. The objective of this study is to provide SOIR compliant procedures in both directions in order to facilitate an increase in capacity at the airport. Unfortunately this requires aircraft executing a missed approach on Runway 25R to make a steep climb at low speed in order to clear Castle Peak and remain within the HK FIR.

Once the PRD airspace issues have been resolved it will be possible to redesign this missed approach that turns right by up to 90 degrees with a much lower climb gradient. The aircraft could then avoid Castle Peak entirely and turn back towards TD VOR further to the northwest. The 7.0% climb gradient is the best SOIR compliant option that can be provided while keeping the aircraft within Hong Kong airspace.

It should be noted that the current Runway 07L missed approach already requires a missed approach climb gradient of 7.0%. As aircraft flying to Hong Kong will not know which runway will be active before they arrive, the operator must already be planning on the possibility of a steep missed approach.

7.2 Danger Area VHD5 The new missed approach procedures will not clear VHD5 when it is active for both runway directions. The minimum climb gradients to clear VHD5 when it is active at up to 1000ft AGL will be more than 10%, which is operationally unacceptable.

It would be possible to use the southwest corner of VHD5 without any interaction with the 07L missed approach. The southwest corner would be bounded by the following coordinates:

• 222448N 1135609E;

• 222454N 1135522E;

• 222337N 1135527E; and

• 222243N 1135539E.

Another alternative is the possibility that the Runway 07L missed approach could turn left only 15 degrees, instead of 30 degrees. Although the result would not be SOIR compliant, it would offer a slightly reduced climb gradient up the Tai Lam Valley and would completely avoid VHD5.

The protection area for the Runway 25R missed approach covers the entire VHD5 area so there is no alternative for that procedure. With the new procedure an aircraft could enter VHD5 at 1726ft in a worst case scenario. With the existing procedure, an aircraft could enter VHD5 at approximately 2500ft which still does not allow the danger area to be active.

A review of VHD5 should be undertaken to assess if the operation can be restricted to sufficiently low altitudes to allow unrestricted operation of the north runway, or alternatively to consider relocating VHD5.




Figure 7.1 VHD5 Usable Area with Missed Approach for Runway 07L

7.3 SKARA The procedures, as designed, have not taken SKARA into consideration. With an initial steep climb up to 2300ft, aircraft will cross SKARA's boundary at or above 2768ft, allowing SKARA to be active up to 1700ft.

To clear SKARA by 1000ft (crossing SKARA's boundary at 3000ft), the initial steeper climb will need to continue up to 2700ft, instead of 2300ft, for both runway directions. The actual climb gradients for each runway direction are unaffected.




8 RECOMMENDATIONS NATS has designed the above procedures which are fully compliant with all relevant ICAO PANS-OPS and SOIR requirements. However, as stated in Paragraph 7.2, the new missed approach procedures will not clear VHD5 when it is active for both runway directions. A new obstacle – a Digital Television Transmitter – was also being built on top of Castle Peak. This obstacle will most likely become the new controlling obstacle for the missed approach segments. A recalculation of the missed approach climb gradients will be necessary before the NATS-designed missed approach procedures be implemented. Therefore NATS recommends this study be extended with the following design options:

• Option 1 - Recalculate both Runways 07L and 25R missed approach climb gradients, taking into account the new obstacle but keeping the current nominal track. This option will resolve the issue with the new obstacle. However, this option will produce even higher climb gradients than the current designs which might be undesirable. These tracks will still conflict with VHD5;

• Option 2 - Replace the Runway 07L missed approach with one that turns left fewer than 30°. A safety case needs to be developed, however, to support the independent operation of the 2 runways in adverse weather conditions with this non-SOIR compliant design. This option will resolve both the new obstacle and VHD5 issues but only for Runway 07 direction. The missed approach segment in the Runway 25 direction will still be affected by these issues; and/or

• Option 3 - Redesign the Runway 25R missed approach with the protection area partially outside HKFIR. This option will resolve the issue with the new obstacle and the other issues discussed above such as the steep climb gradients and the conflict with VHD5 but only for Runway 25 direction. The missed approach segment in the Runway 07 direction will still be affected by these issues. With the protection area partially outside HKFIR, CAAC may need to be informed and an agreement may need to be sought.

NATS recommends that the following actions are taken in order to select and implement alternative procedures:

• Consult with pilot community and aircraft operators about the new procedures;

• Assess flyability of the new procedures by means of flight checks and/or aircraft simulator runs;

• Undertake a review of VHD5 to assess if the operation can be restricted to sufficiently low altitudes to allow unrestricted operation of the north runway, or alternatively to consider relocating VHD5;

• As part of the safety case to support the implementation of the procedures, local wind and turbulence conditions should be taken into account.




9 COMPLIANCE MATRIX

Table 7.1 Project Details

Project Name / Number Hong Kong Phase 1A – 5046

Procedures Runway 07L and Runway 25R Missed Approaches

Date 21 May 2008

Project Manager Chris Danner

Procedure Designer Ben Sandford

Checking Designer Alec Mclaren

Table 7.2 Compliance Status

Compliance Status

Description Non

Compliant Partially

Compliant Fully

Compliant Comments

1 Supply DVD

2 Supply 4 x Conventional Charts

SID designs not required

3 Supply 4 x RNAV Charts

SID designs not required

4 Supply Calculation Records

5 State Obstacle Clearance Minima




10 FILES

10.1 Source Data

Table 7.1 Source Data Files

AIP Data (Folder) /CD/AIP Data/

DEM Data (Folder) /CD/DEM Data/

Database (Folder) /CD/Database/

Met Data (Folder) /CD/Met Data/

10.2 Drawings

Table 7.2 Drawings

AutoCAD Drawings (Folder) /CD/Drawings/

10.3 Procedure Files

Table 7.3 Procedure Files

Minimum Sector Altitude (Folder)

/CD/VHHH MSA/

Runway 07L Conventional Missed Approach (Folder)

/CD/VHHH 07L Missed Approach 30 Left/

Runway 25R Conventional Missed Approach (Folder)

/CD/VHHH 25R Missed Approach 180 Right 200 Knots/

Runway 07L RNAV Approach (Folder)

/CD/VHHH 07L RNAV Approach/

Runway 25R RNAV Approach (Folder)

/CD/VHHH 25R RNAV Approach/

These folders contain the calculation spreadsheets, complete obstacle database and AutoCAD drawings.

All formulae, equations, and macros have been removed from the spreadsheets and databases as these are NATS' intellectual property. The spreadsheets contain all of the values used in the design of the procedures.




11 CONCLUSIONS Two new missed approach procedures have been designed by NATS as detailed in this document and on the accompanying CD.

These missed approach procedures for the North Runway deliver the track separation required by ICAO from the SID off the South Runway. When implemented, it will enable the two runways to be operated independently in the current segregated mode in all weather conditions. This will enable the elimination of the Coordinated Mode of operations during periods of adverse weather and low visibility. This will allow Hong Kong International Airport to maintain its throughput in such conditions.

Implementation of the NATS designed missed approach procedures is one step towards achieving the rate of 68 movements per hour identified in Phase 1 of this study.

Documents

Cover Note with AA Logohkia3way.blob.core.windows.net/pdf/tc/NATS_phase1a.pdfASSI Air Safety Support International ATC Air Traffic Control ATCO Air Traffic Controller ATFCM Air Traffic