Cyrus R. Vance Oral History Interview- JFK #1, 8/3/1964

Administrative Information

Creator: Cyrus R. Vance

Interviewer: Joseph Califano

Date of Interview: August 3, 1964

Place of Interview: Arlington, Virginia

Length: 51 pp.

Biographical Note

Vance, Cyrus R.; General Counsel, Department of Defense (1961); Secretary of the

Army (1961-1963). Vance discusses his role in John F. Kennedy’s [JFK] presidential

campaign (1960) and his position as General Counsel. He covers the riots surrounding the

enrollment of James Meredith to the University of Mississippi, and discusses JFK’s

decisions to use armed forces in order to maintain order throughout this situation, among

other issues.

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Transcript of Oral History Interview

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Suggested Citation

Cyrus R. Vance, recorded interview by Joseph Califano, August 3, 1964, (page number),

John F. Kennedy Oral History Program.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATI ON JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY

Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Ora l History Interviews of Cyrus R. Vance

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United states Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Cyrus R. Vance do hereby give, donate, and convey to the United states of America all my rights , title, and interest in the tape recording and transcript of personal interviews conducted on August 3, 1964 at Washington, D. C. and prepared for deposit in the John F. Kennedy Library. This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

( 1 ) The transcript shall be made available for use by researchers as soon as it has been deposited in the John F. Kennedy Library .

(2) The tape recording shall be made available to those researchers who have access to the transcript.

(3) I hereby assign to the United States Government all copyright I may have in the interview transcri pt and tape.

(4) Copies of the transcript and the tape r ecording may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies deposited in or Kennedy Library.

of the transcripi and tape recording may be John F.

Archivist of the United States

?&&

Cyrus R. Vance

Table of Contents

Page Topic

1 Vance’s initial interactions with John F. Kennedy [JFK]

3 Vance’s participation in JFK’s presidential campaign, 1960

3 Vance as General Counsel of the Department of Defense during

the Kennedy Administration

5 JFK’s defense policies

7 The “Oxford situation,” 1962: James Meredith and the

University of Mississippi

19 JFK’s signing of the Proclamation and Executive Order

regarding the “Oxford situation”

41, 50 Reflection on, and reassessment of, the “Oxford situation”

CALIFANO: This is an interview with Cyrus R . Vance, General

Counsel of the Department of Defense from J anuary 29, 196 1 until July 4,

1962. On July 5, 19 62, he was sw orn in as Secretary of the Army and

remained in that post until January 28 , 1964. On J a nuary 28, 1964 , he

was sworn in as Deputy Secretary of Defense, a post h e now holds. Today's

date is August 3, 1964, and the interview is being conducted in Secretary

Vance's office. The individua l doing the interviewing is myself, Joseph

Califano.

CALIFANO:

VANCE:

Mr. Va n ce, when did you first meet President Kennedy ?

I fi rst met Preside n t K ennedy, I b e lieve, i n Februa ry

of 1942. At that time I was about to go into the Navy and was awaiting a

definite date on which I was to r eport. I went down during the month of

February to Charleston, South Carolina, to the wedding of a good friend

and former roommate of mine, Stanl ey R e sor. At the wedding there wa s

a young naval officer w ho was introduced as Ensign Kennedy. H e was a

slim, shy and attractive y oung man. We spent, I would guess, about

15 or 20 minutes together talking about the Navy and his tour in Charleston

where I believe he was awaiting a ship. I didn't see him again until after

he was nominated for the Preside ncy. At that time I met him at a dinner

which was held at The River Club i n New York at which he asked a number

of lawyers and businessmen in the New York area to meet wi th him to

discuss prospects for the coming campaign.

CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, when was the first time you met

President Kennedy a ft e r he was elected Pre sident?

VANCE: After he was elected President, the first time I met

him was a t a swearing-in ceremony at the White Ho use . At t hat time he

swore in about t e n of us. I can recall t hat Byron White wa s the re, and

also fr om the Defense Department Tom Morris, Charlie Hitch, Paul Nitze

and m y self. The swearing-in took place at about 5:00 o'clock in the

afternoon a t a ceremony in the East Room . The President not only invited

a ll o f those who we re to be sworn i n but also their wives and children. My

wife and our two e ldes t daughte rs went with me t o the swearing-in. A fte r

the swearing-in, the Pres ident and his wife greeted a ll of the gue sts,

which wa s a great thrill not only t o those w ho we r e bein g s w orn in but to

their families as well.

CALIFANO: Do you remember anything the President s aid to you

a t that time?

VANCE: I b e lieve the only thing he said at that time was,

"Cy , I a m awfully glad to see you and I am delighted that you are going to

b e working with us. 11

CALIFANO: I might just go back for a m inute. Did you have any

contact with Pre sident K e nne dy between the time he spoke to you at The River

Club and the time he swore you in?

VANCE: No, I didn't have .

2

CALIFANO: Did you do any work for the Preside nt during the

campaign?

VANCE: Yes, I did some work during the campaign. I

participated in furnishing ideas with respect to the Defense program

which I transmitted to S enator Symington who at that time was working on

a report for the President in the Defense area.

CALIFANO:

VANCE:

CALIFANO:

ministration:

VANCE:

Was that the limit of your activity?

Yes, plus soliciting s ome funds for the campaign.

How did you come to be a part o f the Kennedy Ad-

I recall this rather vividly. I believe it was Friday

before Christma s o f 19 60 that I r eceived a t e lephone call late in the afternoon

from Ros Gilpatric, who was a lawyer in New York and a friend with w hom

I had worked on a number of l egal matters. Ros said that he had just come

back from out of town and had a matter which he would like to discuss with

me the next morning if I could stop by his house. At that time Ros had

already been designated as the prospective Deputy Sec retary of Defense,

so that I thought that it might have something to do with possibly going down

to Washington to work for the Defense Department. The next morning I

went down to Ros' house and met with him in his living room. Ros said

that he and Bob McNamara had bee n meeting to select those who were to

work with them in the new administration at the Defense Department, and

they would like very much for me to join them as General Counsel. Ros

3

then got out an organization chart and went over it with me, pointing out

those w h o m they were going to a sk to f ill the various spots . H e s a id he

thought t hat the post of G ene r a l Couns e l would be a ve r y interes ting one .

He pointed out tha t it cover e d a wide gambit of activities a nd that it would

not be confined t o l e ga l work. H e s aid that h e h oped that I woul d accept the

invitation to join t he Defense team as G e n e r a l Counsel and to w ork closely

with him and Secretary McNa mara. He ask e d that I consider this very

car e fully and let him know the next Wednesday if I c ould possibly do so.

We the n spe nt about an hour discussing Defens e problems, afte r which I

went home t o mull over the tough decision of whether o r not I should give

up the p r actice of l aw a nd c ome down to Washington. Over t h e Christmas

holidays I had numerous conve rsations w i th my wife, Gay, at which we

discussed the pros and cons of going down to wo rk for the Gove rnment. I

believe it wa s on Monday that I r eached a final de ci s ion, that I would go

down to Washington if appointed, and called Ros t o tell him that I would be

most happy to come and work with him a nd Secretary McNamara.

CALIFANO: When, Mr . V a nce , did you first meet Secretary

McNa m a r a ?

VANCE: I believe it was on January 4th. Mr. McNamara had

been skiing at Aspen and wa s due to r e turn o n the 4th. A few days befor e

that, Ros called me and told me that Mr. McNamara would be back on the

4th and asked me to fly down and meet with him and Secretary McNamara

that day. A s I r e c a ll it, I caught an early morning plane fr o m New York,

4

flew into National Airport and came over to the Pentagon to Ros Gilpatric's

office. After talking to R os for a few minutes , we went into an office which

is adjacent to that of the Secretary of Defense and met Mr. McNamara.

We had a conversation of 15 or 20 minutes, a fter which time I went back

with Ros to his office. In the course of the conversation Mr. McNamara

had asked me if I would come and work as General Counsel of the Defense

Department. I told him that I would be delighted to do so and looked forward

very much to working with him and Ros. Shortly thereafter, Ros took me

down and introduced me to the then current General Counsel, Mr. Vince

B u rke, who filled m e in on the duties of my ~pective office. Mr. B u rke

also set me up in an office adjacent to his, w here I proceeded to dive i nto a

host of papers to try and fill m y self in on the dutie s of the General Counsel

and my upcoming activiti es for the next seve ral years.

CALIFANO: One more question about this ea rly period. At that

meeting with Secretary McNamara or in any of the pre-January 20 days ,

did he tell you about President Kennedy's Defense policies or Defense ideas?

VANCE: Yes, we did have , I believe, several discussions of

President Kennedy's Defense policies. These were views which I was ex­

tremely glad to hear because my views happened to coincide with those of

President Kennedy. I had felt very strongly that our Defens e policies in

the past were not adequate and that a major reshaping of those Defense

policies was n ece ssary.

5

CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, what did Secretary McNamara indicate

were Pre sident Kennedy's policies?

VANCE: He said that President Kennedy felt very strongly

that in the past we had shaped our Defense policies on the basis of arbi­

trary budgetary decisions rather than on what was required. He said

President Kennedy had made it very clear that we in the Defense Department

were to come up with a statement of our requirements, and that the money

would then be appropriated to meet those requirements. He further pointed

out that President Kennedy felt strongly that our current strategy was

n a rrow, that it did not provide for flexible r e sponses to varying situations,

and that it would be necessary to do some very hard thinking on how to

reshape our strategic concepts.

CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, did President Kennedy have any specific

ideas of the vast reorganization changes brought about by S ec reta ry McNa mara

in those early days?

VANCE : To the best of my know l edge, the details and the

scope of the proposed reorganization were not discussed in any detail.

Rather, certain fundamental principles were agreed upon, and it was left

to Secretary McNamara to develop the full scope and details of the proposed

changes.

CALIFANO: Two more questions about the early days. Did

Secreta ry McNamara tell you of any of President Kennedy's views about

eith e r the Service Secretaries or the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

6

VANCE: No, I don't believe he ever told me at that time

e ~President Kenne dy 1 s vie ws on tho se two subjects .

CALIFANO: Why don 't w e move now to the s i tuation in Oxford,

Mississippi.

VANCE: I'd be delighted to.

CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, what was the first involvement o f the

Army vis- a -vis the Oxford crisis?

VANCE: The first r ecollection I have of any connection w i t h

the Ox fo rd crisis wa s a meeting which I had w ith Mr. Katzenbach o n

September 5 th , which I believe was just two days afte r L a b or Day.

CALIFANO: 19 62.

VANCE: Yes, in 1962.

CALIFANO: And y ou wer e the n S e cre ta r y of the A rmy ?

VANCE: At that point I was Se cretary of the Army, and Nick

Katzenbach called me and asked if he could come ove r and see me about a

p otentia l problem. I told him I would be delight ed to see him and he came

ove r that morning as I r ecall it. H e told me that we were about to face what

might be a very di fficult problem arising out of the enrollment of J ames

M e redith in the University of Mississippi a t Oxford. He outlined in general

terms what the problem was we faced. H e indicated that he believed that

Governor Barnett and the Sta t e officials would try to prevent Meredith from

enr olling in the University, and t hat it might be necessary to use Government

7

forces t o enforce the court orders if the Gove rnor failed to carry them out.

As I r ecall it, we d i scussed the problem in general terms and ag r eed tha t it

would be necessar y to embark upon joint planning to make s ure that we woul d

b e fully prepared if the situa tion should develop as he feared it might.

CALIFANO: Did you talk at t hat point whether o r not you would use

R e gular Army troops or the Mississippi National Guard?

VANCE: No, we didn 1t. It was j ust a general dis c ussion at

that time with no discussion of the types of troops that might have to be used.

CALIFANO: Was that a bout what was cov e r ed w i th Mr. Katzenbach

at that meeting?

VANCE: Yes , as I recall it, i t was. I think we a lso discussed

who woul d work on the devel opment of the n ecessary plan, and I indicate d to

him t hat I would l et him know as soon as I had a ch ance to do a little fu r the r

work on it and discuss it with the Chief of Staff. As I r e call it, I called him

either the next day or the day the r eafter and told him that you, Joe Califano,

and Creighton Abrams would be the two people charged with working directly

with the Department of J ustice in developing our plans to meet the Oxford

situation.

CALIFANO : Who was Chief of St a ff of the Army at that t ime ?

VANCE: At that time G eorge Decker was Chief of Staff of the

Army. G ene ral Wheele r ha d a lready b een announced a s the prospective new

Chief of Staff but he was n ot actually Chief of Staff.

8

CALIFANO:

VANCE :

What was your next contact with the Oxford situation?

I believe I had a number of telephone calls off and on

over the next week or so with Nick Katzenbach and with Burke Marshall,

who was another Ass i stant Attorney G ene r al. And then I have a recollection

of a m e eting with B urke Marshall in my office on September 14th. As I

recall it, you were present, along with General Abrams and, I believe,

either General Wheeler or General Decker or both of them. At that time

I believe we got into a discussion of more detailed plans for the Oxford

situation.

CALIFANO: Did you then discus s t he use of R e gular Army force s

and National Guard troops?

VANCE: Y es. I think we discussed at that time the possibility

of usi ng either one or two types of forces: (1) Regular Army forces and

(2) National Guard forces. We discussed the pros and cons o f using either

type of troops and did not arrive at any conclusion.

CALIFANO: At that meeting did Burke Marshall in any way indi cate

what he thought the President1 s views were, or w hat the President had told

him or the Justice Department?

VANCE: With respect to what?

CALIFANO: With respect to the use of F ederal troops.

VANCE: As I r ecall it, there was a discussion on that subject,

and Mr. Marshall indicated that the President hoped that it would not be

necessary to use any Federal troops, but that h e was dete rmined to see that

the court orders were carri ed out, a nd that if required troops would be used.

9

CALIFANO: What resulted from tha t meeting, Mr. Vance?

VANCE: As a r esult of that meeting, further detailed planning

was undertaken. in close cooperation with the Department of Justice . This

planning went on for a period of approximately two weeks, during which

increasingly detailed plans were drawn up to meet the various contingencies

which might arise. During the latter part of this two- week period, the

situation increased in pace in the Mississippi area, with various maneuverings

between the Governor and his staff in attempting to block Mr. M e redith's

efforts to seek and obtain ad.mission to the University.

CALIFANO: During this period which, say, takes us up to about

the 26th of September, or close to the week end of the 29th, did you have

any contact with the President on this subject?

VANCE: No, I did not have any direct con tact with the President

on it; however, I had very close contact with the Attorney G eneral, Robert

Kennedy.

CALIFANO: What were his views during this period?

VANCE: His views were very clear, that he hoped we would

not have to use either Federal troops or National Guard units to bring about

the enrollment of James Meredith, but that we would take whatever steps

were required to make sure that the court orders were carried out.

CALIFANO: I s it fair to say that as early as Septembe r 14th, or

even September 5th, it was clear to you that the policy of the Administration

and the President was that Federal troops would be used if necessary?

10

VANCE: Yes, it was clear to me from the start that Federal

troops would be used if required.

CALIFANO: Getting into the time immediately preceding the

week end, do you have specific r ecolle ctions of m eetings with the Attorney

General, or plans that were drawn for Mr. Meredith to enter the University

of Mississippi?'

VANCE: Yes. I recall a meeting held at the Department of

Justice on September 28th at about 1:30 p . m. At that meeting we r eviewed

the detailed plan and discussed in some considerable detail whether o r not

we should use Regular Army troops or National Guard troops in the event

it should b e come n ecessary.

CALIFANO: What was the importanc e of the dis tinction between

these troops?

VANCE: The importance of the distinction b etween the troops

was the r eaction that it might bring about in the State of Mississippi. On

the one hand, there were those who felt that it would be much easier to use

Regular Army troops because they were trained for riot control action,

because their discipline was excellent, and because the chain of command

would be clear and precise. On the other hand, it was argued that intro-

ducing Regular Army troops into the State of Mississippi would bring a

very strong adverse reaction from the l ocal citizens who might claim that

this was an invasion of the State of Mississippi by Federal authorities . In

this connection we discussed at great length the lessons l earne d during the

11

Little Rock in cide nt. In this connection G ene ral Wheeler was of great h e lp,

having s e rved as G e neral Taylor's special r epresentative at Little Rock.

CALIFANO: Were any de ci sions m a de about the use o f e ither

National Guard or Regular Army troops on F r i day, the 28th o f S e ptembe r?

VANCE:

CALIFANO:

VANCE:

No . No final decision wa s reac h e d at that time.

Were any troops alerted for action at that time?

Yes . By that time I b e liev e we had placed on a lert

two task forces. I believe they were task forces Alfa and Bravo. One of

the se task forces was built around an MP c ompany - - I believe it was the

503d from F ort Bragg. And the oth e r wa s built around a battle group fr om

the S econd Infantry Divis ion. I believe it was the 503d Battalion r ather

than company from F ort Bra gg that I mentioned.

CALIFANO: What we re the pla ns, if the r e w ere specific plans a t

this time, for placing M e r edith at the University o f Mississippi?

VANCE: The plans were as follow s : A large numbe r of Federal

marshals were to go to Mississippi. They we r e to be s tationed a t a place

called Holly Springs , which was, I believe, some 15 or 20 miles from the

town of Oxford. This would be their home camp. They would be available

there to be used if required to a ssist Meredith in e nrolling at the campus.

The plan was that the Justice D e partment officials, toge the r w ith the marshals,

would s eek to register Meredith, using t he smallest number possible. If

they w ere turned back by the Governor o r the Lieutenant Governor , they

would then increase the number of marshals and try again. As I r e call it,

12

we eventually planned for about 200 marshals to be p r e s ent who would be

on call to assist.

CALIFANO: Were any dates set for regi stering Meredith a t the

University at this time?

VANCE: Yes. Seve r a l dates had been s et; however, with

respect to each of these dates the Army was not to play a ny part. During

this period of time , registration was to be accomplished by Mr. Meredith

going with a r e presentative of the Department of Justice plus one or more

m a rshals who would see k to a chieve his enrollment.

CALIFANO: Do you know what date wa s s e t? You said several.

Wa s there a ny agre ement by Friday, the 28th of S e ptember, o n w hen

Meredith would be brought to the Unive rsity?

VANCE: As I re call it, M e r e dith had b een brought to the

University once or twice by that time , and I believe on the 28th we agreed

that Meredith would b e brought back again on Monday, w hich would be,

I b elieve, the first of Octobe r, a nd was to be enr olled at a bout 12:00 o'clock

noon.

CALIFANO: We re you under the impression on the 28th of

S e ptember that the President was in close touch with the situa tion in

m aking the decision?

VANCE: Yes, the President was in very close touch with the

situation. He was discussing the matter v e ry frequently with his brothe r,

13

the Attorney G e neral , and with Nick Katzenba ch a nd Burke Marshall.

CALIFANO :

that time?

VANCE:

S e pte mber 29th.

CALIFANO:

VANCE:

CALIFANO:

Had he discussed the situation with y o u at all a t

No. I did n ot meet with the Pre sident until

Whic h was the next day.

That was the next day.

Who was present at the m eeting with the Pre sident

and what took place there?

VANCE:

CALIFANO:

VANCE:

As I recall it, i mmedia t e ly prior to the meeting ---­

A nd why was the meeting called? Excu s e me.

A s I r ecall it, immediately p rior t o the mee ting

at about 11: 15 , I met with G eneral Whee l e r and w ith G enera l Abrams to

dis cuss the propose d plan s for Monday. One of the issues w hic h we

discussed at tha t time was the possible use of Nationa l Gua rd t r oops as

opposed to R e gular Army troops. One of the main purposes of the

meeting with the President was to dis c uss this issue , as well a s to

r e view our over- all plans for the next M onday.

CALIFANO: Mr. Vance , w hat took place a t you r meet ing with

the President, or the meeting preceding it in preparation for tha t

meeting?

14

VANCE: At the meeting with the President we first reviewed

the proposed plan of action for next Monday. I believe the Attorney General

outlined the proposed plan, and then both General Wheeler and I commented

on the pla n.

CALIFANO: Did the Attorney Gene ral outline the plan essentially

as you just outlined it here?

VANCE: He outlined it essentially as follows: That we would

preposition our Regular Army units at the Memphis Air Station and would

hold them in reserve. In the meantime, we would move down to Holly

Springs the marsha ls who w ould be on hand. The marshals would go

with Meredith to t h e camp us and s eek to accomplish the enrollment. If

any thing went w rong we would then use whatever troops were requir e d. In

the meantime, we had also decided to alert, if nece ssary, elements of the

Mississippi National Guard. We would the n be a ble to make a decision as

to w hether or not we would use only Regular Army troops, or whether we

would use National Guard troops, or whether we would use both.

CALIFANO: What were your comments, or General Wheeler's

comments, on the plan as outlined by the Attorney General?

VANCE: We both said that we agreed with the proposed plan.

I mentioned the fact that Senator Stennis had spoken to me and had said that

he was greatly concerned about the way the situation was developing, and

had urged very strongly that if it were necessary to use troops, we should

not use National Guard troops because of the reaction that this would have

in Mississippi.

15

CALIFANO: I thought that you said earlier you thought the use

of Mississippi National Guard troops might be easier on the State of

Miss i ssippi than the intr oduct ion of R e gular Army troops.

VANCE: The re were those who b elievedthat this would be the

case . On the other hand, Senato r Stennis felt very strongly that the

converse would be true.

CALIFANO: Before we go into further details of the meeting, do

you remember who else was there? You indicated that you were present,

the President, the Attorney General, and General Wheeler.

VANCE:

CALIFANO:

Mr. McNamara and B urke Marshall were also present.

What happened after you commented on the Attorney

General 1 s outline of the plan?

VANCE: We discussed at some l e ngth the pros and cons of

using National Guard units, and no fin a l decision was reached as to whether

or not we would use National Guard t roops in the event that troops were

r equired.

CALIFANO: Do you remember what the President said at that

meeting:

VANCE: No, othe r than to ask our various views with r espect

to this issue and the adequacy of the plans.

CALIFANO: But was it clear at this meeting that he had r eached

no decision with respect to what troops to u se?

VANCE: It was clear that he had not reached a decision as to

what troops to use.

16

CALIFANO:

VANCE:

CALIFANO:

VANCE:

Did he seem to be on top of the entire situation?

Yes, he certainly did .

Was anything e lse discussed a t the meeting?

No. As I recall it, having approved the proposed

plan we decided to keep in close touch the rest of the afternoon to see what

developed.

CALIFANO: How long did the meeting last, Mr . Vance?

VANCE: I believe that I got back to the Pentagon about 1:30

and had lunch i n the Army Dining Room with G eneral Wheeler and others.

I do recall that a b out 2: 30 that afternoon I met with Gene r a l Abrams again

to review the situation, and made several telephone calls to Nick Katzenbach

to find how the situation was deve loping i n Mississippi. I also r ecall that

during the afternoon I met with you and I believe Ted Decke r to go over a

proposed Proclamation and Executive Order. At that time Ted Decker was

the Judge Advocate General of the Army and you we re General Counsel of

the Army.

CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, you met to go over a proposed Executive

Order. Was this Executive Order in the hands of the President at this time?

VANCE: I do not b e lieve it was in the hands of the President.

This Executive Order and Proclamation had been wo rked on several days,

however, by the Army and the Departm e nt of Justice, and we were at this

point virtually agreed on its final form.

17

CALIFANO: Did a nything else s ignificantly happe n that Sa turday

afternoon?

VANCE: Yes. After meeting with you and T ed Deck e r , we

talked again with, I b elieve, Nick Katze nbach and Burke Marshall a t the

Department o f Justic e and ag r eed upo n the final fo r m of the Proclamation

and Executive Order. Later that afternoon, I went over to the Capi tol at

the request of Senator Stennis to meet with him. Senator Stennis repe ated

to me his c oncern about the situation in Mississippi and again urged that

National Guard troops not b e used. I told him tha t we wer e fully cognizant

of his views in this r e gard a nd h ad, in fact , discussed them at a m eeting

with the President.

CALIFANO : Mr. Vance, did you then go home?

VANCE: No, I c a me back to t h e office and worked o n t h e variou s

plans to m a k e sure that everything was in order for t he next day. As I

reca ll it , we had determined at that time to move T ask Force Alfa into

Memphis and set up our h eadquarter s there. We had also had discussions

w ith the Department of Justice as to what our setup would b e in Oxford.

It h a d b e en determined that we would use the Marshal's office, which was

in t he basement of the F ederal Building the re as I r e call it, to be the local

h eadquarters. As I recall it, L o u Oberdorfer, another Assistant Attorney

G e neral, was to be pre sent a s the senio r p e rson at that office. We had

some discussion as to wha t communications we could introduce into the

Oxford area prior to M o nday , and it had bee n daermined that the only

18

communications which we could put in was a SCAN line from the

Marshal's office back to the Naval Air Station at M emphis.

CALIFANO: What w a s the rea s o n for t hat, Mr. V a nce?

VANCE: It w a s felt that to put in a large mobile communica -

tions unit might exac e rba t e the situation in Oxford. In addi tion , t h ere

was a small mobile communications setup at the so-called tent camp

at Holly Springs where the marshals were to b e billeted. I believe the

marshals 1 camp had been set up on about Friday, and I believe that a

M a jor Christopherson wa s the enginee r in charge of s e tting up the

t ent camp and providing faciliti es for the marshals .

CALIFANO: Do e s thi s a bout sum up your activi ties o n Saturday

a fte rnoon?

VANCE: No , I a m afra id it doe s n 1t. I fina lly got away from

the office about 8:30 that night . I wa s supposed to go t o dinn e r a t J e eb

Halaby 1 s. Je eb was the Admin istrator of the Federa l Aviation Authority,

a nd I was supposed to get the r e at 7:30 but didn't arrive until about 8:30 .

During the cou rse of the dinner I rece ive d two phone calls. I believe the

first phone call was from Nick Katzenbach and the second was from the

Attorney General. Nick called to say that things we re not developing well

and that it looked as though the Preside nt might have to sign the Proclamation

and Exe cutive Order that evening. He aske d if we were all set to go if

this should happen, and I said that we w e re. Shortly thereafter, the

Attorney Genera l called me a nd confi rme d that the Pre sident w a s thi nki ng

19

of signing the Proclamation a nd Executive Order that night. H e said he

would call me back as soon a s he g o t further info r mation. At about 10: 30

I got a s econd phone call from th e Attorney General, who said the

President would sign the Proclama tio n and Executive Order that night .

I told him that I was going to go back to my office a n d pick up a copy of

the Order to be signed by Mr. M c Namara and w ould go ove r to his hou se

a nd stand by awaiting the President's signing of the Proclamation and the

Executive Order.

I went back to the P e ntagon from the H a labys by car. My wife drove

me over and left me off there. I w e nt i nto my safe a nd got out a copy of

the Pro clamation and Executive O rder to be signed by the Pre sident, plus

the original of the Orde r to be signe d by Mr. McNamara implementi ng the

Preside nt 's Exe c utive Order. Jim B a ldwin, my Military As sistant , had

a rrived back at the P entagon , a nd he a nd I gci i n a car togethe r and d r ove

over to Mr. McNamara's hous e . As I reca ll it, we a rrived shortly befor e

12:00 o' clock. Mr . McNamara and I got on a phone t o the White House

a nd were informe d when the Preside nt signe d the Proclamation and

Executive Orde r . Imme diate ly the r eafter, Mr. McNama r a signed an

Orde r impleme nting the Exec utive Order w hich the President had signed.

The Executive Orde r signed by the President instr ucted the Secretar y

of De fense to take a ll action necessa ry to enforce the court orders a nd

to remove any obstructions to justice. It further provid e d that h e could

use such R egul ar Army forc es and Air forces, in addition to any National

20

Guard units which were federalized by the Order, to carry out the

mandate of the Executive O rder.

When Mr. McNamara signed this Order, I left and returned to

the Pentagon. At the Pentagon I called the White House to find the

number of the Executive Order, w h ich I then filled in by pen in the Order

already signe d by Mr. McNamara. We then prepared a t e legram to the

Governor of Mississippi and to the Adjutan t General of the State of

Mississippi, which r eci ted the Proclamation and Executive Order signed

by the President and the Order signed by Mr. McNamara. This tel egram

thus notified the Governo r and the A djutant G ener al that the Army and Air

National Guards of the State of Mis sissippi had been called to F ede r a l

active duty effective as o f 0002 on the 30th of S eptember.

CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, two points w e should pick up. Did

Mr. McNama r a say anything when he signed the memorandum delegating

authority to you?

VANCE: No, he did not s ay anything about the memor a ndum

to me, but he did comment on a provision of the E xecutive Order. I've

forgotten which paragraph it was, but I believe it was either paragraph

numbered 1 or 2 . He asked if it we re clear under the terms of this

pa ragraph a s to w ho had the r e sponsibility to carry out the purposes of

the Executive Order. H e s a id that h e thought there might be a question

as to whethe r or not the full authority r ested in the Se cretar y of Defense

in light of the language used in the E xecutive O rder . We discussed this

~ , . 21

and determined that it wa s sufficiently clear to show that the a uthority

wa s vested in th e Secretary of Defense.

CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, was this a change in the timing of the

Oxford scenario a s you developed i t Saturday afternoon?

VANCE : It wa s a cha nge i n tha t we had not expected that it

would be n ece ssary to issue a Proclamation and Exe cutive Order on

Saturday night. It was thought that if it we r e to be issue d it would probably

b e issued on Sunday.

CALIFANO : Are you aware of the exact reason w hy the President

decided to do this Satu r day n ight?

VANCE:

Governor B a rnett .

CALIFANO:

VANCE :

actions.

CALIFANO:

I believe it was becaus e of certain actions taken by

Do yo u have any recollection of wha t those actions we r e?

At this time I cannot recall the precise nature of those

Incide ntally, Mr . Vance, up to this time had you had

any other communications with Governor Barnett other than the telegra m

you s ent him?

VANCE:

CALIFANO:

VANCE:

No, I had no communications with Governor Barnett.

What did you do afte r you sent the t e l egr a m out?

I then met w ith Gene ral Greenlie f and other members

of the Army Sta ff to review the troop listsof the Mississippi Na tiona l Guar~

22

both Army and Air. As I recall it, we spent over an hour r eviewing the

troop lists to asce rta in where a ll of the units were l ocated and the a pproxi­

mate movement times which would be r equired to move these units from

their home stations to Oxford. We also dis cussed the q ue stion of how

m uch time would be required in terms of a lert for these va rious units.

CALIFANO: Do you have a recollection of how many men were in

the Mississippi National Guard at this time?

VANCE: My recollecti on is that it was somewhere in the

neighborhood of 10 , 000.

CALIFANO: Wh at did you then do, M r . Vance?

VANCE: At that time I went home a nd left G e neral Greenlie f

and some othe r members of the Army Staff in the Army War R oom, who

w e r e finishing up on the paper w o rk that was r e qui red in connection w i t h

the call-up .

CALIFANO:

VANCE:

Were there any Army troops in Oxford at this time ?

There were no Army troops in Oxford at this time .

T here was a cavalry troop-I believe Troop E--of the Na tional Guard

which had its h e adquarters in Oxford, but the r e were no Regul a r Army

troops there . A s I previously indicated, there wer e a few engineer s outside

of Oxford at the Holly Springs camp.

CALIFANO: When did you return to your office, or when was the

next contact on Sunday, Se ptember 30, w ith the Oxfor d situation?

23

VANCE: As I r ecall it, on Sunday morning General Wheeler

and I went over to the Attorney General's office and discussed with him

the steps which we could anticipate during the next 48 hours. At that

time, we envisaged that Meredith would be returned to Oxford at about

noon on Monday to be enrolled at the Univers ity. After our meeting at

the Attorney General's office, G eneral Wheeler a nd I came on back to

the P entagon and I went to my office. As I recall it, General Wheeler

and I spent half an hour or so discussing our plans , and the n he went

home for lunch and I stayed on at the Pentagon.

CALIFANO: What did you d o at the P e ntagon, Mr. Vance?

VANCE: As I recall it, I got out the troop lists and the outline

plan and reviewed them once again. I then stood by to hear from the

Atto rney Gene ral on how things we r e developing during the day.

CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, w hen did you next hea r from the Attorney

General, or what was the next action you took in connection with the Oxford

situation?

VANCE : As I recall it, I h eard from the Attorney General at

about 1:30 . Under t h e plans which were about to go into effect, the Army

had ordered the Commanding Officers of three Mississippi Guard units

to report to General Billingslea, who was Assistant Division Commander

of the 2d Infantry Division, to report to him in Memphis at 1600 on the

afternoon of September 30th. My r ecollection is that the Attorney General

called me at about 1: 30 saying that it had been determined to move the

24

marshals fr om M emphis into the tent camp that day. I discuss ed this

with him and suggeste d that he get in touch directly with Ge neral Abrams,

who was at Memphis a s the Chief of Staff's personal representative. In­

cidentally, General Abrams is now the Vice Chief of St a ff of the Army ,

to s ucceed General Hamlett on Septemb er first . After the Attorney

Gene ral hung up, I sent a message to G e neral A b rams telling him that

he would rece ive a call from th e Atto rne y General setting forth the plans

w ith r esp e ct to t he movement of the marshals fr om M emphis to Oxfo rd

that afternoon.

CALIFANO: Were the mars hals moved as planned?

VANCE: Yes, the marshals were moved as planne d to Ox ford

tha t aftern oon . I ncidentally, Genera l Abrams had gone down to Memphis

a t 10:0 0 o' clock on Sunday morning and he arrived there about 12:00 n oon,

as I r ecall it. The marshals we r e met at the a irport by, I believe, five

trucks from the tent camp at H o lly Springs . They we r e then to be trucked

from the a irport over to Holly Springs.

CALIFANO: Mr. V a nce, w hat was your next contact o r action that

y o u took in connection with the Oxford situation?

VANCE: My r ecollection i s that at about 5: 30 in the afte rnoon

I r eceived word that it ha d been d etermined to m ove M e redith onto the

campus. I don't r ecall w hethe r I received this information from the

Attorney G e ne r a l, or w h ethe r it came from Nick Katzenbach . I do recall,

howeve r , r eceiving such a c ommunicat ion a t a bout 5:30 tha t afternoon.

25

CALIFANO: Where was Mr. Katzenbach?

VANCE: Mr. Katzenbach was in Oxford a t that time. I

immediately communicated this informa tion to G eneral Abrams at

Memphis .

CALIFANO: Was Meredith at M emphis at this time?

VANCE: Yes. I subsequently learn e d that Meredith had been

brought to the Oxford airport by John Doar, an attorney at the Department

of Justice, and as I r e call it they arrived somewhere around 5:50 in the

afternoon.

CALIFANO: Do you know why it was decided to move Meredith

t o the Oxford campus?

VANCE: I recall that this was a determination made at the

time and, I believe, in the field by Mr. Katzenbach after discussing the

matter with the Attorney General. I believe the reason for it was that

the situation seemed quiet at Oxford and that they, therefore, thought he

could be introduced onto the campus without any trouble.

CALIFANO: To your knowledge, was the President a part of this

decision?

VANCE: I do not know whether he was or not.

CALIFANO: Was the A ttorney General at the White House on

Sunday afternoon, or was he in his own office?

VANCE: I believe he was in his office when he called me at

1:30 and again at 5:30.

26

CALIFANO: What next happened as far as you were concerned

after 5 : 30:

VANCE : As I recall it, at about 6:45 I received a telephone

call from Mr. K ennedy, the Attorney G eneral, statin g that Meredith had

been introduced onto the campus and was safely located at the Lyceum

Building. I communicated this information, as I recall it, to General

Abrams in Memphis.

CALIFANO: At this point at 6:45 on Sunday evening, were there

any troops in Oxford in addition to those that had been there before,

Mr. Vance?

VANCE: No. The only t roops tha t we re there were the few

people fr om the tent camp at Holly Springs.

CALIFANO: Were you getting reports from Oxford a s to the

situation at the Lyceum Building o r on the campus?

VANCE: No, I was not getting any reports directly from

Oxford. The reports were coming directly from Mr. Katzenbach to the

Department of Justice.

CALIFANO: How did the situa tion progress as far as you were

concerned?

VANCE: As I recall it, the President was to make a speech

to the nation at somewhere a r ound 6:00 or 6:30. He had delayed making

this speech, and it was broadcast on the radio and television that the

speech would b e made late r in the e vening. We turned on our television

set and stood by awaiting the President's mes sage.

27

CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, did you have anything to do with

drafting the President's speech?

VANCE: No, I didn't.

CALIFANO: Did you know what was going to be in it?

VANCE: I knew the general outline s of the spe ech but I did

not know the final details. As I r ecall it, it was being drafted in the

White House by the President and Mr. Sorenson and the Attorney General.

CALIFANO: Do you know why the President delayed the time of

giving his speech?

VANCE: I believe it was b ecause of telephone conversations

between either the President and Governor Barnett, or the Attorney

General and Governo r Barnett.

CALIFANO: Do you know anything a bout the substance of those

telephone conversations?

VANCE: No, I do not.

CALIFANO: What was your next involvement in the situation in

Oxford?

VANCE: I attempt ed to get h old of Mr. Katzenbach by telephone

but hi s direct line was busy, as wer e the comme rcial lines. I , the r e fore,

sent word to M e mphis for them t o get word to Mr. Katzenbach to call me

as soon as he could. At about 8:00 o' cl<0ck or 8: 15 as I recall it, Mr.

Katzenbach called me. I told him that I thought it would be a good idea

to have an Army officer come over to the L y ceum Building as promptly

as we could get him there to act a s liaison between him and G en e ral

28

Billingslea, who was in over-all command of all Federal fo r ces in the

area. Nick said he thought this would be a fine idea, and I said I would

get somebody there as promptly as we could. I believe it was at about

this time that Nick told me that the crowd was getting larger outside

the building, a nd that things did not look as quiet as they previously had;

however, the situation was still well in hand.

CALIFANO: Do you know where Mr. Meredith was at this time?

VANCE: I recall that he was moved from the Lyceum Building

to a nearby dormitory. I've forgotten what the number of the dormitory

was or what its name was.

CALIFANO: Did you do anything as a r esult of Mr . Katzenbach' s

statement that the situation was worsening on the campus?

VANCE: We decide d to follow the situation very closely in

light of Mr. Katzenbach's report and, therefore, k ept in close touch with

both Memphis and the Departme nt of Justice.

CALIFANO: What was you r next action during the night, or your

next contact with either Justice or the White House?

VANCE: At about 9: 30, I received a telephone call from the

Attorne y G ene r al asking whethe r or not we could qua r ter about 200 Federal

m a r shals at the local armory. I sent a message to Gene r al Billingslea,

with a copy to General Abrams, telling him about this query and asking

him to get in touch with the people in Oxford and see whether this could

be accomplished. At about 10: 30, I received a telephone call from Mr.

29

Katzenbach in Oxford. Mr. Katz enbach said the situation h a d gotten

very serious a nd that they had to use t ea r gas. He requested that we

get them additional tear gas and gas masks as soon a s possible. I

immediately sent a message to Gene r a l Billingslea telling him that Mr.

Katze nbach needed gas ma sks and was attempting to contact General

Billingslea. I a ske d him to establish and maintain communications

directly with Mr. Katzenbach so that the r esponse woul d be as prompt

as possible.

CALIFANO:

VANCE:

CALIFANO:

VANCE:

Were any troops moved at this time?

No troops wer e moved at this time .

What next happen ed, Mr. Vance?

Shortly afte r 10: 30, G eneral Billingslea r e ported

by phone to the Army War Room that he had checked on the armory and

found i t occupied by cavalry troops. H e said that he had placed his M P

battalion and helicopter company on alert for possible call for assistance

from marshals o n the campus, and that he had put the guard on one hour

a l ert. General Abrams reported that a liais o n officer to Justice on the

campus was already on his way and was to report at the Lyce um. H e

s a id that h e was going in a marshal's car in civilian clothes.

CALIFANO:

VANCE:

Did the situation continue to get wor se on the campus?

Yes. It continued to worsen, and I b e lieve it was at

about 10:30 that further action was taken. At about that time we re ceived

30

instructions from the Pr esident through the Attorney General to move

between 800 and 1, 000 National Guard troops to Oxford. This order wa s

communicated to G ene r a l Billingslea in Memphis.

CALIFANO: Was this a decision by the President to handl e the

situation with National Guard troops?

VANCE :

CALIFANO:

VANCE:

CALIFANO:

VANCE:

Yes.

Were any Regular t roops in the area at that time?

No . The closest Regular troops we re in Memphis.

What next happened, Mr. Vance?

The situation continued to worsen on the campus

and violence broke out on a la rge scale. A t about 11:30 , in response to

a telephone call from the Attorney General, I directed the initiation of

movement of R egul a r Army MP units from Memphis to Oxford in numbers

deemed necessary by General Billingslea to support the Federal marshals.

CALIFANO: Do you have any recollection of how many troops

General Billingslea moved in at this time?

VANCE: As I recall it, General Billingslea moved in a company

of MPs which he was going to move in by helicopter, and the balance of

forces he was going to move by road down to Oxford because there were

only sufficient helicopters to move one company.

CALIFANO: Did G e neral Billingslea have discretion to move any

number of troops in?

VANCE: Yes, he did.

31

.. . .

CALIFANO: After he had moved these two companies of troops

in, were more troops ordered in by the President?

VANCE : At about 11 :45, the President directed that before

G eneral Billingslea commit h i s forces he proceed to Oxfo rd and make

an eval uation of the situation, reporting the results of his evaluation

directly to the President. He further specified that G ene ral Billingslea

could initiate movement of all forces under his command, including all

of the National Guard, to Oxford or other locations in a position to be

employed.

CALI FANO: Was this a direct conversati on between you and the

President?

VANCE: As I recall it, it was a direct conversation between

me and t h e President.

CALIFANO: Did h e say anything else to you at that time to your

r ecollection?

VANCE: Nothing except that the situation was getting very

serious.

CALIFANO: Did General Billingslea then report to the President?

VANCE: I do not know what General Billingslea did immediately

thereafter. It is my recollection that he made preparations for moving

as promptly as possible to Oxford so that he could survey the situation and

communicate back to the President.

CALIFANO: What was you r next p e rsonal contact w ith the situation?

32

.. . ... .... .. , •• , ..... ' ........ . ,; • • .. - • • _.,_ ..... . . .... .. _ • • • - ·-· .. ..... .. .. · -·· · ~ ·· ... .. . . <.1 ....... ..... - .... . -· · -~ • - - •••••• • ,; • ·- · .... . . •• • ~ · ......... .. .

VANCE : At about 12:00 o 1 clock, I gave directions to initia t e

movement of the 720th MP Ba ttalion from Fort Hood to Memphis. At about

15 minutes a fter midnight I dispatched a message to G e neral Billingslea

i nfo rming him that he is authorize d to take all neces sary action with a ll

of the forces at his disposal to relie ve the pres sure on the Federal marshals

on the campus and restore order in Oxford. I further directed that he report

the progress of his action on the movement of troops and the situation as

frequently as he could.

CALIFANO:

by the Pre sident?

VAN CE:

CALIFANO:

received from him.

VANCE :

CALIFANO:

VANCE:

CALIFANO:

W e re you told to give the s e orde rs to Gene ral B i llingslea

Yes , I was.

This was in a call subsequent to the first call you

That is correct.

Do you recall anythi ng e lse he said to you at that time?

No, I don't.

Did you have other conve rsations with the President

during the evening as troops were moved in?

VANCE: Yes, I talked to the President I believe at l eas t 15 times

during the night.

CALIFANO: Could you, to the best of your recollection, tell me

what the P r esident said during those conve rsati ons , o r dir ected?

33

-~ VANCE: At about 0045 , I r eceived a call from the President

asking me whether the troops had actually left the field at Memphis for

Oxford. As I recall, I told the President , after checking, tha t the first group

had left the fi eld. Subsequently I found out that this was not correct, and I

called the President back and told him that the information I had given him

regarding take-off was not correct. We then attempted to get in touch

directly with G eneral Abrams at Memphis to find out the exact status of the

movement of the troops from Memphis. We could not get through because

the line to G eneral Abrams ha d b een preempt ed by the Attorney General

who was talking di rectly to Ge n eral Abrams in Mem phis. Subsequently we

got through to M e mphis and received word that the h elicopters had not yet

left but we r e on the field awaiting tower clearance. I then c a lled the

President at about 1 : 35 and told him that the helicopters were still on the

field but we re waiting for tower clearance.

CALIFANO:

VANCE:

Do you r emember what the Pre sident said at that time?

Yes. The President asked me why it was taking so

long for them to get off the ground. He commented that the situation was in

very serious shape and unless they got there fast the marshals might be

overrun and would have to fire their weapons, and then the whole situation

might get completely out of hand.

CALIFANO:

VANCE:

Did you say anything to thes e remarks of the President?

I told the President we were doing everything we could

to get the troops there as fast as possible, and I would call him as soon as

the planes we re in the air. I kept in close touch with the air station at Memphis

34

.· .

and made a progress r eport to the President a bou t ten m inutes late r ,

saying that the plane s had still not l eft the field. T he P r e side nt aga i n asked

me why the planes h ad not yet gotten off the fie ld . I told him that we still did

not know but that I would inform him as soon as we had some information .

About eight minutes later I calle d the President again and t o ld him the h e li -

copters V\Ould take off momentarily. Shortly thereafter the helicopters did

take off and I so reported to the President.

CALIFANO: Was that your las t conve rsation with t h e President

that evening?

VANCE: No. I had a number of other conve rsa tions with the

Pre sident during the eveni ng. I neglected t o mention a previous c onversa-

tion that I h ad w i th the Pre sid ent. The President c a lle d directly about

22 minutes after twelve and gave instructions to me t o commit the National

Gua rd unit l ocat ed in Oxford, na mely Troop E. I gave these instruct ions

and the troop was commi tted. Some time the reafter the President called

me and asked me w hether, in fact , Troop E had l eft the a rmory. I attempted

to ascertain this information from Memphis , bu t again the line s were pre -

empted and I was unable to get through. I aske d my Military Assis t ant,

Jack Cushman, to place a call directly to the armory and see if he could

r each anybody there. Jack did place such a call and got a cook on the other

end of the line. He was the only person who was left in the armory. Jack

aske d him w h e the r or not the troops had left for the campus , and h e said

that h e wasn' t permitte d to talk to anybody, that the l as t instr uctions the

35

.. .... ~ ,. . . . . . ' . - . . . . . . . .

troop comma nder had give n t o him we r e not to t a lk to anyb od y a s n ews­

pap e r r eporte rs would proba bly be c a lling. Ja ck Cushma n t o ld h im that

he was c allin g o n beha lf o f t he S e cretary of t he Army and h e ne e d e d the

i nformati o n . T he cook decline d t o give a ny furthe r i nformation; t h e r e ­

upon, I took the phone and spok e to the cook and asked him for this

information. H e asked me who I was, and I told him that I was the

Secre tary of the Army and I nee d e d this information for the President.

H e t o ld me tha t thi s w as a likely sto ry, that h e didn't belie v e it. A fter a

coupl e of min ute s I wa s a ble t o convi nce him at l eas t temp orar ily that I

was the Se cre tary of t he Army, a nd h e informe d m e t ha t the troop had

l e ft a b out ha lf an h our a go for the campus . I r e po rted this informa tion

b a ck t o the White H ous e. L a ter during t h e evening I s p oke w ith the

Pre sident many tim e s. We dis c u ss e d the s i tuation from t ime to time a s

i t developed.

CA LIFANO: How did the t r o ops build up during t he evening ? Do

you have a ny estima te of tha t , or recollection of that?

VANCE: As I r e call it, the membe rs of Troop E arrived on

the campus sometime around 1:00 o'clock Washingto n time and stood with

the marsha ls in resisting the attempts o f the mob to reach the Lyceum.

This unit was commanded by Captain F a ulkner and did a very good job

under extremely difficult conditions. Subsequently o ther e l ements of the

108th Armore d Cava lry Regime nt, of which Troop E was a component ,

b e gan to a rrive o n t h e c a m pus. M y r ecolle ction is tha t the troop bui ldup

36

went something as follows: by about 3:00 o'clock in the morning there

were 600 soldiers on the campus; by 4:00 o'clock, approximately 1, 100;

by 5:00 o'clock in the morning, 2, 100; and by 8:00 o'clock the next

morning, 4, 000.

I m ight add h e re that the b attle group from the 2d Infantry Division

was on its road march from Fort Benning to Memphis during the afternoon

and evening of the 30th. And as I previously stated, the operation was to

have taken place at 12:00 o'clock on Monday, and their instructions had

b een to conduct a road march w hich would get them to Memphis on Monday.

It was necessary, as the situa tion worsened during the night, to tur n the

battle group from its Memphis destination and to commit it to Oxford. We

did this by getting word to the battle group on the road. As I recall it, we

did this by reaching them at a place called Selman. They then turned and

moved south and arrived in Oxford and went into deployment directly from

the r o ad march.

CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, were more troops committed beyond the

4, 000 you m entioned?

VANCE: Subsequently we achieved a buildup in support of the

operations there w ith a t otal of about 22, 000 troops. As the evening pro­

gressed, after discussions with the President, we decided it was necessary

to get a much larger force than we had anticipated. We were receiving

reports from FBI and Army intelligence sources that many cars and other

means of transportation were moving towards the Oxford area with

37

. . -. , . . .... .... - .. . . . ... . .. . ............ .... .. . • . • ...... - ....... . ... .. ~ ...... , .............. ..... ··- · . _., __ ....... .... . ..._.,. . .... ,,. ....... .. , .. ,. ... ...... ..... \ _ ..... , .. -. ...

troublemakers. We were fearful at that time that the entire situa tion in

that part of Mississippi might get completely out of hand and, therefore,

believe d it desirable to move in such a large force that we could imme ­

diately contain any situation that might develop.

CALIFANO: Was this a personal position of the President?

VANCE: This was a personal position of the President in which

I participated. I believe it was at about 1:30 or so that I called General

Wheeler who was still at home. I had not called him earlier in the evening

as things had been developing so rapidly that the r e was no time to do anything

other than to stay completely on top of the situation. At about 1:30, I called

G eneral Wheeler at home and told him it appeared that we might have to

move in an additional division, and that I thought it desirable that he join

us as soon as he possibly could. He said tha t he would be down immediately.

After G ene ral Wheeler arrived, we had furthe r dis cus sions with the President

and d e cide d to deploy an additional division. We selected the 82d Division

and the 101st Division and gave the necessary orders to the Army Continental

Command to deploy five battle groups from each of these divisions to the

Mississippi area.

CALIFANO: Do you have some recollection of the time at about

which this decision was made?

VANCE: My recollection is that this decision was made some -

where b etween 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the morning.

CALIFANO: Did G ene r a l Wheeler talk to the President as well as

you?

38

VANCE:

CALIFANO:

No, I was the only one who talked to the Pr e sident.

Throughout the evening, w hat is y our evaluation of

the President's attitude and action? Was he cool, was he in charge of

the situatio n?

VANCE: Yes, the President was cool and was in charge of the

situation. He was deeply concerned about the possible loss of life and

was terribly distressed when he h eard of the three deaths on the campus.

He was de termined to take all steps within his power to make sure that

the situation did not get fu rther out of hand and that there be no further

loss of life. It was for this reason that he felt so strongly that we should

move in a ll troops that could conceiva bly be use d so as to demonstrate by

a n ove r w helming forc e that the o rders o f the courts could not be flouted

by diss i dent e l ements.

CALIFANO: Do you remember any other personal statements by

the Pre side nt during the evening?

VANCE: Yes, I do. The President wa s deeply concerned at

the length of time which it took for our troops to get down to Oxford. This

was the first operation of this type that any of us in this Administration

h ad been in contact with. As a result, we were not aware of the difficulties

of movement at night and the difficulties of deploying large numbers of

people as we now are. A ccordingly, I believe we a ll underestimated the

amount of time which would be required to accomplish such troop moveme nt.

CALIFANO: Do you know who was with the Pre sident at the White

House during the evening?

39

VANCE: As I recall it, the Attorney General was with the

President and I believe Burke M a rshall.

CALIFANO: Do you have an opinion as to who ha d the greatest

influence on the President duri ng the Oxford crisis ?

VANCE: Yes, I would feel strongly that the Attorney General

probably had the principal advisory role during this crisis.

CALIFANO: When did the situation begin to cool off?

VANCE: The situation began to cool off when General Billingslea

arrived on the campus with his detachment from the 503d MP Ba ttalion.

Immediately when he arrived on the campus he took complete charge and

broke up the rioters who were surging towards the Lyceum Building. I

might add that Mr. Katzenbach h ad done a magnificent job earlier in the

evening holding the rioters away from the building who we r e seeking to get

a t Meredith. They acted under the most extreme conditions and d eserve

the highest credit and commendati on for their conduct i n this ve ry , very

difficult situation.

CALIFANO: About what time was this when the situation b egan to

cool off?

VANCE: Between 3:00 and 4:00 o'clock.

CALIFANO: Did you continue to stay in close contact with the

President through 8:00 o'clock in the morning, say?

VANCE: Yes, as I recall it, I did. I might add to what I h ave

already said a bout my telephone conversations with the President. When

40

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General Billingslea 1 s troops arrived at the Oxford airport, the President

called to ask that they b e committed a s soon as they arrived. I told the

President that this would be done but that it would be preferable to permit

the entire group to a ssemble and move a s a unit rather t h an to comm it at

piecemeal. I said that I was concerned that if we committed ji piecemeal

they would be much less effective, as they would be chewed up rather than

coming in as a total force. I also had a discussion with the President

about the possibility of the helicopters landing on the c a mpus. We attempted

to do thi s s o a s to shorte n t h e l ead time as it was abo ut two miles from the

a irport to the campus. It was not possible to accomp lish this, howev e r,

b ecause there were no landing lights at the football field where they w ould

have to l a nd, and the refor e they had to land at the Ox ford Un iversity airport

and then m a rch from the r e to the c a mpus.

CALIFANO: Mr . Vance , would you say the situation was unde r

control by 4:00 o'clock i n the morni n g, or w as it afte r that?

VANCE:

CALIFANO:

No, it w as under control by 4:00 o'clock in the morning.

Did you have contact with the President on the Oxford

subject after this evening?

VANCE: Yes, I did. B e fore I went to breakfast that morning,

the President c a lled me and told me that he was concerne d about two things:

first, the length of time that it had taken for the troops to come from

M e mphis to Oxford; and second, the communications which we had during

41

the night between Washington and Oxford. H e asked me to inve stigate the

situation and r eport back to him as to these two matters. I t old him that I

woul d do so and met with the Chief of Staff the next mor ning and asked that

a n immediate investigation b e conducted on these matters .

CALIFANO: What we r e the results of that investigation, and did

you repo rt them b a ck to the Pre sident?

VANCE: Yes, I did. The r e s ult s of the investigation were re-

ported to G ene ral Wheeler and to me by the Inspector G eneral of the Army,

who made a repo rt on the 3rd of October 1962. General Wheeler p r e pared

a memorandum for me based upon the inve stigation of the I nspe ctor G eneral,

a nd General Wheeler and I took this to the President and briefly discus s ed

it with him.

CALIFANO: What w as the substance of the report t hat y ou gave

the President?

VANCE : We told him tha t the re we re seve r a l l esson s which we

ha d l earne d from Oxford. Fi rst, during the p r e -planning pha s e of our

meetings with the r epre s entatives of the Department of Justice, w e had

agr eed upon a n over-all outline of our plan of ope r ations but had not worked

out in s ufficient detail the movement plans and times involved. We sug­

ge sted in the future precise plans be developed and agre ed to by both the

Department of Justi ce and ours e lve s. I suggested that these plans be

initialled by both the Depar tment of Justic e and the Department of D ef e nse

42

so that it would be clear that we fully understood the mutual actions which

each of us would have to take, and there would be no vacuum which might

arise.

Second, we pointed out tha t in any futur e o p e r a tion it would b e neces­

sary to have on-the-ground r econnaissance ahead o f time. In this case we

had n o t been permitted to conduct sufficient advance reconnaissance and,

as a result of this , were hampered in our operations.

Third, we pointed out that originally the guidelines had precluded

the c a rrying of rifles by any of the t roop s . The original instructions were

that they were to carry only night sticks and pistols. When at the las t

moment it became necessary to change the w eapons which they c arried to

rifles , this c a used a delay which would not have been necessary if we ha d

agreed in advance that they should carry their normal equipment, namely

rifles. In addition, we pointed out that rifles a r e much more e ffective in

that they can be used to d efend the A rmy troops with out firing them, and

that w h e n bayonets were placed on the rifle s this would be an additional

stabilizing factor in the situation.

Finally, we recommended that in any future operations we make

sure that we have adequate communications in place in advance of the

ope r a tion. This would be done by placing adequate mobile communications

in the area so that we could be sure to maintain contact from Washington

directly to the area involved. The fact that we had not had advance tactical

communications i n the area seriously hampered our ability to communicate

with Genera l Billingslea at the Oxford area.

43

CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, what was the reaction of the President

t o your recommendations?

VANCE: The President agreed with all of our recommendations.

He said that we had learned some valuable lessons from what had taken

place, and he was sure that none of us would make the same mistakes

again.

CALIFANO: Did you ever have occasion to discuss Oxford with

the President after that?

VANCE: Yes, I did, but i n the context of other operation s .

Subsequent t o the Oxford situation, we had civil disorders in connection

with integration problems in the State of Alabama, and in our discussions

with the President concerning our plans for those operations we drew

heavily upon the experience of Oxford.

CALIFANO: Was the President any p art of the decision to leave

troops at Oxford for the entire school year?

VANCE: Yes, this was discussed with the Preside nt. We

paid a great deal of attention to the question of how rapidly we could move

troops out of Oxford as soon as the situation stabilized. I believe it was

about four or five days thereafter that we were able to start to move out

the first of the troops . We developed a detailed plan for the removal of

troops from the area which we submitte d to and discussed with the President.

When he had approved this plan we put it into effect. We subsequently

determined, after we had removed all of the National Guard troops from

44

Federal active duty and had returned almost all of the active duty forces

to their home stations, to l eave a small contingent of troops a t Oxford to

ensure Meredith's safety and to make certain that the orders o f the court

were carried out.

CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, there were some specific problem s that

r eceived attention during the Oxford crisis. One was the question of

whether o r not the troops that were sent to the campus were segregated.

Were they segregated?

VANCE: No , the troops that were sent to the campus were not

s egregated.

CALIFANO: Didn' t Mr. Meredith state that they wer e and ques -

tioned your judgment on that?

VANCE: Ye s, Mr. Mere dith did issue a statement to that

effect several days after the incident. What happened in that situation

was simply this: Immediately after the situation was brought under

control , we determined that it would be desirable to remove from the

controlling units Negro personnel because we were fearful that they might

be attacked by some of the local citizens . G eneral Wheeler and I dis ­

cussed this at l e ngth and decided that we should not expose these personnel

to undue risk and, therefore, made the decision to remove Negro troops

from active patrol. This decision was the subject of much comment and

discussion, and after the situation had stabilized itself and had cooled down

we introduced the Negr o e l ements back into their normal duties .

45

CALIFANO: Was the President any part of this decision to remove

N e groes from patrolling in the early stage s?

VANCE: As I recall it, he was not . This was a decision

which was made by General Wheele r and by me.

CALIF ANO: Did you discuss t he question of whether or not troops

should have been segregated with the President either before or during

the week end when you were first sending them on the campus?

VANCE: No, we did not. I might add, Mr. Califano, that the

Negro troops handled themselves with great distinction. I recall one

incident which occurred on the campus at nigh t when a Negro jeep driver

took an injured marshal out through the mob to a hospital and thus saved

his life. This was an act of great bravery under the circumstances. In

short, I would say that all the Negro troops w ho w e re present in Oxfo rd

handled themselves in a magnificent fashion.

CALIFANO: Did you have any conversations with Governor Barnett

either during this week end or subsequently?

VANCE: I subsequently met Governor Barnett at a meeting in

Wa shington where we were discussing the r e organization of the National

Guard, but we did not discuss at that time w hat took place in Oxford.

CALIFANO: The re also on the week end following S eptembe r 29

was a football game scheduled for Oxford that was cancelled. Was that

directed by the President, or was that a decision of yours?

VANCE: That was my decision, concurred in by the Secretary

of Defense. As I recall it, we r eceived a recomme ndation from G eneral

46

Howze, who was placed in over- all charge of our forces in Oxford,

and from Nick Katzenbach that we permit the football game to go forward

on the week end following the rioting. I considered this very carefully

and discussed it with Mr. McNamara. We concluded that this would be

a very dangerous thing to do because of the large crowds which would be

coming into Oxford for the homecoming game and, therefore, directed

the University to either cancel the game or to move it to another location.

After discussions with the Unive rsity officials, they agreed to move the

game to Jackson.

CALIFANO: Did you feel that the F ederal Gove rnment or the

Secretary of the Army had authority to order a football game not play?

VANCE: I certainly did. I discussed this with my legal advise rs ,

and we concluded that I did have this power unde r the Executive Orde r

issued by the President and implementing orde rs issued pursuant thereto.

CALIFANO: Mr. Vance, with respect to General Walker, were

you awa re of General Walker's presence on the campus on the night of

30 September?

VANCE: Yes. I receive d reports during the night that G ene ral

Walker was on the campus. I received further r e ports to the e ffect that

he was making speeches to the mob which were inflammatory.

CALIFANO: Did you order that anything be done about that?

VANCE : I ordered that a n inve stigation be made t o ascertain

w h ether , in fact, this was the case, and furthered ordered all elements

47

of the Army to cooperate with the Department of Justice in following up

on this situation.

CALIFANO: Did you have any discussions with either the President

or the Attorney General about G ene ral Walker's presence?

VANCE: I did not have any discussions with the President

about it. I did with the Attorney General.

CALIFANO: What were those discussions?

VANCE: The Attorney General asked if we would make available

to the Department of Justice the Army's files with respect to General Walker,

and I agreed to his request and instructed that the files be made available.

CALIFANO:

VANCE:

CALIFANO:

Did you have authority to take this action?

Yes, I did.

Did you think that the n umber of troops ordered into

Oxford were excessive?

VANCE : In hindsight, perhaps they were excessive. On the

other hand, I feel that the large number of troops had a stabilizing influence ,

and if I had it to do over again I would err on the side of too many troops

rather than too few.

CALIFANO: You mentioned Senator Stennis. Do you remember

any of your other contacts with him during this week end, or Senator

Eastland, or their contacts with the President, if any?

VANCE: I had a number of conversations with S enator Stennis

during the days following the riot. Senator Stennis was deeply concerned about

48

the use of Negro troops in patrols and urged me on many occasions to

s ee that the y we r e not included in patrols. I had no discussions with

Senato r E a stland.

CALIFANO: Do you r emember any discussions w ith S e cretary

McNamara about Oxford aside from those yo u mentioned this afternoon?

VANCE: Yes. I kept Secretary McNamara informed at all

times of how the situation was proceeding and what actions we were taking.

I would meet with him daily and probably several times a day to keep him

up to date.

CALIFANO: Aside from the decision with respect to the football

game, did Secretary McNamara take part in the other decisions that were

made that eve ning or preceding?

VANCE: My r ecollection is that he took no p a rt in the decisions

of that evening. I did report to him the next morning fully what had taken

place and kept him informed, as I said, on a ll further aspects of our

operations in Oxford. Things were happening so rapidly that evening that

there was not time to keep him informed.

CALIFANO: You mentioned that you did not call Gene ral Wheeler

on that evening until you were on the verge of committing a d ivision.

Would you say that G eneral Wheeler's advice wa s sought on the whole

throughout this week end and used as Chief of Staff of the Army by you

and the President?

49

-~

VANCE: Yes, it was. Certainly General Wheele r participated

fully in the planning which l ed up to the commitment of our forces in Oxford .

He did not participate in the early hours of that evening, and that was only

b ecause I did not call him until, as I have said, approxima tely 2:00 o'clock

in the morning.

CALIFANO: How would you assess President K e nnedy's reactions

and judgments during the week e nd and during the period l e ading up to the

crisis?

VANCE: President Kennedy's r eactions and judgments were

in my view excellent. I think that he made the only decision that could

have been made in ordering the use of Federal troops. I think he was

wholly correct in deciding that there could be no flouting of the laws of

the United States, and I think that the firmness with which he handled the

situation prevented it from e scalating to a much higher degree . His

judgment was sound; he was cool at all times and acted as one would h ope

a President would act.

CALIFANO: Do you think that the Attorney General had more

influence or took a more active role than was warranted during the Oxford

week end?

VANCE: That's a difficult q uestion, Mr. Califano. At that

time, as I previously indicated, we had never engaged in a j o int operation

of this type. As a result , we had not worked out a modus operandi which

would permit the best utilization of the resources of the Government.

50

I think that we all l earned some hard lessons from the actions that took

place in Oxford which we put to good use in future civil disturbance

situations throughout the count r y.

CALIFANO: Do you have anything else that you would like to say

about the Oxford, Mississippi crisis?

VANCE: Yes, I would like to say a word about the fashion

in which I believe the troops car ried out their mission. I have the highest

regard for the way in which b o th Regular Army and the National Guard

units responded. This was an extremely difficul t situation to say the

l east in which it required the utmost of judgment, of courage, and of

understanding. The units, both active and National Guard, lived up to

the finest traditions which we expect from the military and gave all of

us civilians comfort in the knowledge that our military forces were so

well trained and could exercise such excellent judgment under try ing

con di ti on s.

CALIFANO: I have one final question. Have you ever met Mr.

Meredith?

VANCE: No, I have never met Mr . Meredith.

51