Debriefing EU Mediators:Summary and key lessons from a debriefing with the former EUSR for the Great Lakes Region, Roeland van de Geer

December 2012

European Forum for International Mediation and Dialogue

About mediatEUr

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mediatEUr brings together a network of proven and qualified mediators and experts. We support professionals and policy makers working in this field with the latest tech-niques and methodologies, drawing on sound knowledge of the field. We work in particular to help the EU develop its capacities to support successful peacemaking across the world.

mediatEUr is ideally placed to deliver, as we combine expertise in mediation, peace processes and transitional justice with a solid understanding of EU affairs.

To find out more about our work, please visit www.themediateur.eu.

Acknowledgments

This report was authored by Canan Gündüz and Eugène van Kemenade, with con-tributions from Antje Herrberg. The team is grateful to participants at the debriefing seminar for their insights and nuanced questions which added significantly to the de-briefing process. Antje Herrberg and Roeland van de Geer provided several rounds of peer-reviewing which improved the content of the report.

The mediatEUr team thanks Roeland van de Geer for the time, attention and open-ness he gave to this debriefing exercise – including not only the actual debriefing itself, but numerous preparatory conversations and subsequent work with the team on drafting the debriefing report. While Ambassador van de Geer provided inputs on the content of this report, mediatEUr assumes full responsibility for the accuracy of the content, as well as any omissions or errors. Recommendations and key lessons drawn are our own.

Debriefing EU Mediators:Summary and key lessons from a debriefing with the former EUSR for the Great Lakes Region, Roeland van de Geer

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Debriefing EU Mediators

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms 3Background: Debriefing EU Mediators 4Lessons Learned from the Debrief 51. “Who are you, Mr. van de Geer?” 72. The Context: A Region at War 83. Embarking on the Assignment 9

3.1. The Official Mandate – Letter and Spirit 93.2. Starting Up 103.3. Building a Team 11

4. “We have to break up the conflicts into parts that we can address”: The Anatomy of an Unfolding Mediation Process 12

4.1. Analysing and Deconstructing the Great Lakes 12 Conflicts to Design a Strategy

4.2. Building Momentum and Starting to Engage 134.3. Coming to Agreements 144.4. The Post-agreements Phase 16

5. Working with EU Institutions 185.1. Relations with Member States 185.2. Working with Heads of Delegations and Heads of Missions in Country 185.3. Coordinating EU Institutions 19

6. The Role of the EU and the EUSR in the Great Lakes 21 Peace Processes: Actor or Spectator?

7. Preparing EUSRs for their Assignments 248. Conclusions: What Makes a Good Mediator? 25Annex 1 – List of EUSR Mandates 28Annex 2 – List of Special Envoys for the Great Lakes Region 29Annex 3 – List of peace agreements signed during the EUSR’s mandate 30

Figures and tables

Table 1: List of EUSR team members 11Table 2: Summary of Peace Agreements, Role of EUSR, and Status of 15

ImplementationFigure 1: Regional and Thematic Priority Areas in the EUSR’s Strategy 13

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List of Acronyms

AU African UnionCEPGL Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries CHA Cessation of Hostilities AgreementCNDP National Congress for the Defence of the PeopleDDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and ReintegrationDEVCO Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation DRC Democratic Republic of CongoEAC East African CommunityECHO European Community Humanitarian OfficeEEAS European External Action ServiceEIP European Institute of PeaceESDP European Security and Defence PolicyEU European UnionEUPOL EU Police MissionsEUSEC EU Mission to Provide Advice and Assistance for Security Sector ReformEUSR European Union Special RepresentativeFARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of CongoFDLR Democratic Forces for the Liberation of RwandaFNL National Liberation FrontGBV Gender-based ViolenceHoD Head of DelegationHoM Head of MissionICGLR International Conference on the Great Lakes RegionLRA Lord’s Resistance ArmyMONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the

CongoNGO Non-governmental OrganisationPolAd Political AdvisorPSC Political and Security CommitteeRELEX Directorate-General for External RelationsSADC Southern African Development CommunitySSR Security Sector ReformSTAREC Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern DRCUN United NationsUS United States

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Background: Debriefing EU Mediators

The European Union (EU) is becoming increasingly active as a global peacemaker, supporting peace processes and also directly mediating between conflict parties in several instances. Given this commitment, it is important to create systems that can enable synthesis and management of the knowledge gained and learning from these engagements. This can further strengthen the EU’s efforts in peace mediation in other parts of the world.

The aim of this new publication series is to analyse and then present key practice and policy lessons through the work of EU mediators. This debriefing report is based on:

n A structured, 45-minute debriefing by an appointed debriefer (Antje Herrberg) based on good practice in mediation supervision.

n A consequent facilitated discussion with regional and peace mediation experts at a debriefing seminar to offer further points of inquiry and help synthesise learning collectively.

n A drafting, editing and peer-review process by a team of authors present at the debriefing.

n A subsequent editing and reviewing process with Roeland van de Geer to further refine and nuance the points synthesised in this report.

This effort forms part of mediatEUr’s wider work on developing building blocks for a European Institute of Peace, funded by the Swedish and Finnish Ministries of Foreign Affairs. The aim of this project is to assist in the creation of a framework for a European Institute of Peace (EIP). One of the building blocks for a future EIP can be precisely this type of knowledge gathering and management from EU mediators’ experiences.

Objectives of the Series

1. To generate insights on EU peace mediation lessons and challenges in specific regions through an interactive and systematic debriefing of EU mediators.

2. To produce broader, relevant insights for peace mediation both within and beyond the EU.

3. To produce a toolkit which systematises debriefings with EU mediators in the future, based on existing debriefing good practice and experiences gathered by the project.

This report is based on the recording of the debriefing exercise; information obtained from discussions with Roeland van de Geer; notes from the seminar; further subsequent discussions with the former European Union Special Representative (EUSR). As such, it reflects Roeland van de Geer’s own perceptions and points of view, with the exception of the ‘Key Lessons’ section, which was synthesised by the mediatEUr team.

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Lessons Learned from the Debrief

EUSRs with regional mandates can provide leverage and political clout to the EU to act more effectively in conflict management and resolution:As Roeland van de Geer’s experience shows, EUSR engagement can and should take place at all stages of the conflict cycle: from early engagement to post-conflict transitions. Whilst in early stages of conflict and during crisis situations a loosely-formulated mandate can provide a sufficient amount of flexibility of engagement for the EUSR, at later stages of transition and follow up to peace agreements less ambiguous and more strongly-worded mandates may be more effective.

EUSRs should not be seen purely as ‘crisis management tools’:The EU should consider instituting EUSRs as more ‘permanent’ agents, rather than giving time-limited mandates, particularly in regions with long-standing conflicts and periodic outbreaks of violence. In the Great Lakes, a relative ‘lull’in conflicts towards the end of Ambassador van de Geer’s mandate led the EU to decide not to renew the EUSR mandate. This turned out to be problematic given the subsequent re-escalation of the conflicts and led to the loss of much political capital built up throughout the period of the EUSR’s presence in the Region. Therefore, EUSRs should outlive short-term ‘crisis’ moments and become stable interlocutors for prevention to avoid further outbreaks of conflicts.

EUSRs can provide diplomatic leverage and access to bilateral and EU diplomats within the system: As Roeland van de Geer’s constructive collaboration with in-country Ambassadors throughout the Region illustrates, both the EUSR and the Ambassadors stand to benefit from a proactive and constructive relationship: EUSRs can provide access and raise issues which their in-country counterparts potentially cannot. Member State and EU Ambassadors, in turn, can ensure continuity for EUSRs’ work in their absence, and provide much-needed logistical support.

Playing a high-profile role in peace efforts needs to be matched with a commitment to implementation and monitoring:The experience in the Great Lakes Region shows that, while the EU, alongside other international actors, has played a significant role in the negotiation of several agreements, its subsequent role in supporting their implementation and providing support to security and monitoring has tailed off and not maximised its potential. The EU’s considerable financial aid to the Region in this instance was not matched by the political clout to follow up on the agreements supported.

Deconstructing the assignment into manageable parts:EUSR mandates tend to be broad in scope and ambition. Coupled with complex regional conflict dynamics, such ambitious mandates can seem almost unmanageable for a mediator stepping into the position. The key challenge is to be able to deconstruct and break down conflict dynamics into a manageable portfolio which conforms to the spirit, if not to the letter, of an official mandate. Ambassador van de Geer did so by consulting with a wider audience than is typical for the diplomatic community in order to be as comprehensive and inclusive as possible, and to devise a strategy including both regional and thematic components.

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Debriefing EU Mediators

Bringing together political and development ‘identities’:In line with the EU’s post-Lisbon role, effectively combining political and development roles and cooperating with different EU institutions is critical in conflict contexts. This facilitates the work of Heads of Delegations (HoDs), while their cooperation with the EUSRs, who provide additional political leverage, gives Delegations improved access and more relevance to top decision makers in the Region.

Strengthening EU coherence in action:The debriefing shows that, whilst it is ultimately common sense and necessary, it is also extremely complicated to bring all actors working in a specific region ‘under one umbrella’ across different EU institutions. Even where fully coherent action is not achievable, at a minimum, joint information sharing or the creation of a joint committee of different EU institutions active in the same region will provide the means for longer-term policy alignment.

Support regional efforts at all levelsEven though it may sometimes seem that there are overlapping efforts of regional organisations during a crisis (in this context, the ICGLR: The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region; CEPGL: Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries; SADC: Southern African Development Community), mediators should resist the temptation of ‘favouring’ one over the other for the sake of more efficiency: multiple engagement with a range of institutions provides an opportunity to reinforce messages and maximise opportunity for engagement.

Work and stick with your ‘buddies’: This debriefing has shown the tremendous value in building networks and collegial friendships with fellow envoys working on the same region. Besides the importance of information sharing, a collective approach among envoys creates important leverage for peacebuilding. In the case of Burundi, this collective approach was formalised in the “Political Directorate”, chaired by South Africa with a broad ranging membership including the Great Lakes Special Envoys.

What makes a good mediator?Each individual brings a unique set of skills, experience and talent to the role of mediator. The debriefing highlighted a number of aspects which make for a ‘good mediator’. These can be synthesised in the following points:

n The added value of a EUSR as a mediator is also to be an ‘honest broker’: the job is not about pleasing others, but being critical when necessary.

n Being an ‘outsider’ gives EUSRs more scope for frank discussions. n A EUSR needs to be an outstanding team builder, both within his/her own team, but also with his/

her colleagues.n A mediator is accountable not only to conflict parties but also ‘the man and woman in the street’.

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“Who are you, Mr van de Geer?”

The first thing that strikes you about Roeland van de Geer is his ability to ‘click’ with those around him: he is clearly a man who likes people, and people like him. This ability to strike up a personable and open rapport with anyone, from the most junior staffer to the Presidents of the countries in which he has worked, has generated a strong sense of loyalty and commitment from those who work with him, some of them now seated around him for a joint debriefing of his time as EUSR for the Great Lakes Region.

His eyes blink somewhat mischievously as he responds to the first question: “Who are you Mr van de Geer?” He laughs: “I’ve always kept that hidden very well”; then, more seriously, “very much a normal person”. His background is, in fact, not that of a typical ‘career diplomat’, perhaps even the opposite - a somewhat ‘reluctant diplomat’, he returned to academic life several times after a number of assignments for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Roeland van de Geer’s working life began as a sailor in the Dutch merchant fleet, which brought him for the first time to the African continent, aged only 18. This was clearly a formative experience and the beginning of a long and enduring relationship with the continent. Apart from four years as Dutch America’s Director and a brief period as Dutch Ambassador to Afghanistan in 2006-07, “it has always been Africa” for him.

In 1982, after four years at the Free University, Amsterdam, seconded to the National University of Lesotho, he joined the Africa Department of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He continued to work for the Dutch Foreign Ministry in Africa, including Ambassador to Mozambique (1994-1998) and Dutch Africa Director (2002-2005); however, he kept in close touch with university life – in 1987-1989 he returned to the Free University and in the 2005-2006 academic year he taught at a variety of universities, including UPeace in Costa Rica.

The appointment in 2007 as EUSR for the Great Lakes, succeeding Aldo Ajello, was, therefore, very much a “logical step in an Africa-centred work life”.

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The Context: A Region at War

Since the early nineties, the Great Lakes Region, which includes Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and mineral rich eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), has witnessed genocide, armed conflicts and inter-state conflicts. Regional conflict continues to directly affect the lives of millions of people, with the rates of sexual and gender-based violence (GBV) amongst the highest in the world. Armed groups are seeking control of those areas with abundant natural resources. Throughout the nineties, the civil wars in Burundi, Rwanda, DRC and Uganda were mutually reinforcing and strongly intertwined. When open war and violence in DRC formally ended in 2003, several armed groups, which in fact originate from neighbouring countries, continued to operate in eastern DRC: the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) from Uganda; the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) from Rwanda; the then-called National Liberation Front (FNL) from Burundi. Although the situation has improved, the security situation continues to be fragile as underlying tensions and mutual distrust remain. The entire landlocked region can be characterised as among the poorest in the world.

The armed conflict in DRC resulted in very high numbers of casualties and has led to widespread rape, abduction and torture. There has never been a full cessation of violence: fragile peace agreements have been broken and repeatedly violated. Persistent violence and the struggle for control over natural resources has dragged all of DRC’s neighbours into a regional conflict, as well as a human rights and humanitarian crisis. When van de Geer took up office, the nature of the conflicts in the Region had changed, evolving into localised and more low-intensity, yet deadly, conflicts with the potential to destabilise the fragile peace in the Region.

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Embarking on the Assignment

His appointment as EUSR came at a “natural moment”, Ambassador van de Geer argues: his predecessor, Aldo Ajello, who had held the position for eleven years, “had helped to end the big wars” in the Great Lakes Region, culminating in the Pact on Security, Stability and Development of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in Nairobi, in December 2006.

3.1. The Official Mandate – Letter and Spirit

As a result of the changing dynamics in the Region, supporting the transition from war to peace had a prominent place in Ambassador van de Geer’s mandate (a list of all mandates is included in Annex 1). However, as it became clear right at the beginning of his assignment, the EUSR would still be called upon to help mediate peace agreements in the Region. Supporting a ‘post-conflict’ transition would only become more relevant in the second half of his tenure.

The wording of his mandate is broad and is centred around the following key components:

n Establishing and maintaining close contact with all key players in the Region, including Governments, the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and key African countries;

n Playing an advisory role in terms of EU support to the stabilisation and consolidation of peace processes in the Region;

n Providing advice and assistance to Security Sector Reform (SSR) efforts in DRC in particular;

n Contributing to follow up to the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), in particular when it comes to its role in the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts, the promotion of human rights and democracy, and the fight against illegal exploitation of natural resources;

n Providing a liaison function regarding the EU’s role in the Region among regional opinion leaders;

n Contributing, where requested, to the negotiation and implementation of peace and ceasefire agreements between conflict parties, and engaging with them diplomatically in cases of non-compliance;

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n Furthering the implementation of the EU human rights policy and Guidelines on human rights, in particular the EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict and UN Security Council Resolution 1325.

In van de Geer’s view, the mandate’s broad formulation was an asset in carrying out his work: “As happens often in the EU, you get a not-very-well-defined platform and you are selected because it is assumed that you know what has to be done, you have a fair bit of liberty to carry out [the mandate], but of course you do it always in connection with others”. One of the first tasks he and his team embarked on at the start of his mandate was to divide conflicts in the Great Lakes Region into a number of ‘treatable’ regional processes, which came to form part of the backbone of his evolving strategy (this is further discussed in Section 4).

Van de Geer’s mandate does not explicitly refer to mediation or facilitation, rather to “contribute, where requested, to the negotiation and implementation of peace and ceasefire agreements between the parties and engage with them diplomatically in the event of non-compliance with the terms of these agreements”.1 In spite of this, he was perceived by many in the Region as a ‘mediator’. This mediation role – establishing contact with all sides and facilitating the drafting and signing of agreements – was much more prominent in what van de Geer describes as the “first phase” of his tenure (2007-2008), which focused on mobilising the international community and signing agreements on the four regional conflicts (further described below). During this time, in his view, the mandate was perfectly adequate: “In all honesty, I don’t think a more precise mandate would have made much difference in the first years”. When it came to the ‘post-agreement’ phase (2009-2010), he felt that the mandate could have been reinforced to give the EU a stronger role in regional transitions. Where many in the Region had unrealistic expectations about a ‘post-conflict Marshall Plan’ from the EU and the rest of the international community, he feels that the international community nevertheless ‘under-delivered’, adding that “it would have been useful to have a more precise mandate on EU coordination in the second half of my tenure”.

3.2. Starting Up

In addition to his knowledge of the continent, van de Geer had worked closely with those dealing with African affairs within the EU system, including his predecessor, Aldo Ajello, and Koen Vervaeke, then Advisor to Javier Solana on African affairs and Head of the Africa Unit at the EU Council’s General Secretariat and currently the European External Action Service’s (EEAS) Great Lakes Coordinator. He had also worked with EU institutions as the Dutch Chair of the Africa Working Group in 2004 and as Dutch Ambassador in Mozambique during the Dutch Presidency of the EU in 1997. His time as Ambassador in Kabul prior to his assignment gave him invaluable insights into highly escalated, violent conflicts and dealing with armed groups, experience from which he would frequently draw during his time as EUSR.

Van de Geer was literally ‘thrown in at the deep end’: having just arrived in Brussels from Kabul, he was tasked on his first day to travel to Bonn to brief the 27 EU Foreign Ministers on the EU’s strategy in the Great Lakes Region. Did he receive any briefing or inductions prior to taking up his office? He did not, and is adamant that

1 Council Decision, 2010/440/CFSP, 11th August 2010, Article 3(f)

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this is something the EU system needs to start approaching more systematically (Section 6 discusses adequate preparation of EUSRs for their assignments in more detail). Being familiar with the region, van de Geer felt from the start ‘accepted and welcome’: “I felt very much accepted, even by the rebels”. This was because of his previous experiences in Africa and, according to his colleagues, because of his ability to listen to and engage constructively and respectfully with his interlocutors.

3.3. Building a Team

Arriving as a new EUSR into an existing team seems to have posed no great problem for van de Geer. He speaks proudly about all of his team members, which included five Political Advisors (PolAds): two part-time Advisors were in Brussels working on legal affairs and acting as contact points for Brussels-based counterparts of EU institutions, civil society organisations and embassies, and three support staff. Van de Geer is keenly aware of the importance of strong logistical and administrative support within the EU system: “‘Administratively, the EUSR’s office is a separate unit. If one needs contracts, if one is stranded in Nairobi and has to go to Addis [Ababa] and the last plane is cancelled…you are seeing the President tomorrow and you need your own plane and 15,000 dollars, that’s when you really need your support staff…and we always did it’. Within the team he placed a premium on regional knowledge (most Political Advisors had previously worked on the Region or had been based there previously) and the right mix of technical and social skills required for the job.

Table 1: List of EUSR Team Members

The Political Advisors in EUSR’s team covered each one of the four regional conflicts (FDRL, National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), FNL and LRA) and one of the functional action lines (SSR, GBV, illegal exploitation of natural resources, and transitional justice):

Adriana Bucci, ItalyVéronique Aulagnon, FranceAnna Sundström , SwedenJulie Godin, BelgiumFrancesca Cardona, Italy Jean-Michel Dumont, BelgiumPål Wrange, Sweden Philippe Maughan, BelgiumBernard Leloup, Belgium

Administrative team:Angela Jenkins, UKAna Segura Martínez, Spain Anna Karagiavouroglou, Greece

Note: Different individuals formed part of the EUSR’s team at different times.

The combination of a regional presence in Goma with a strong central office in Brussels turned out to be key: it was the Brussels office that played an important back-stopping role for the rest of the team on mission, and performed a liaison function with EU institutions (further described in Section 5).

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“We have to break up the conflicts into parts that we can address”: The Anatomy of an Unfolding Mediation Process

4.1. Analysing and Deconstructing the Great Lakes

Conflicts to Design a Strategy

During his first week in office, the EUSR and his team presented a six-month work plan to a number of key EU institutions. The EUSR’s strategy was partly built on discussions with Aldo Ajello and Koen Vervaeke, but also with a varied and broad group of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), research institutes, universities and EU institutions.

This process and the subsequent consultations in the Great Lakes Region provided the basis for the EUSR’s strategy: “Through all these discussions we opted to cut the complex and multi-layered conflicts in the Great Lakes into tangible problem areas that really could be addressed…we didn’t invent these processes, they were taking place in the Region; but, by focusing on these eight areas, we felt we had our policy for the Region”.

This included focus on four main armed conflicts:

1. The continued presence of the Rwandan-dominated FDLR in eastern DRC in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, which has greatly contributed to the escalation of conflict in the Region;

2. The internal conflicts caused by Congolese armed groups in the eastern DRC (as well as the Congolese Army, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC));

3. The LRA, operating in DRC, Sudan and the Central African Republic; 4. The problem of the FNL rebel group in Burundi.

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In addition to these four geographical processes, the EUSR and his team started to address four functionally-defined ‘action lines’:

1. SSR, specifically in DRC;2. The fight against the illegal exploitation of natural resources;3. Tackling GBV and sexual violence; 4. The wider issue of impunity.

Figure 1: Regional and Thematic Priority Areas in the EUSR’s Strategy

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4.2. Building Momentum and Starting to Engage

A major part of 2007, the first year of van de Geer’s assignment, was spent defining strategy and bringing together those members of the international community involved in the Great Lakes Region. As a first priority, van de Geer met with the Presidents of DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. The team also met with key interlocutors from the UN, the AU, South Africa, the United States (US) and EU Member States, in particular those which had Special Envoys for the Region. Bringing the international community together to address issues in the Great Lakes Region in a coherent fashion was a successful strategy. The group of Special Envoys started to meet regularly, at first in the office of the EUSR and later in other locations: “We started to meet more often and after a few months we really had a group of people together that was united around the key issues in the Great Lakes, it worked great”.

At the same time, the EUSR and his team actively liaised with the non-diplomatic community such as NGOs, research institutes and other institutions which were working on the Great Lakes Region. Meetings were held in Brussels before and after missions to the Region to allow for a continued exchange of information, and to improve

Regional Conflicts Functional lines

FDLR, DRC SSR of the Congolese Army

Other internal conflicts and armed groups in eastern DRC

Illegal exploitation of natural resources

LRA, northern Uganda, Sudan and the CAR

Sexual and gender-based violence

FNL, Burundi Impunity

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overall coordination. The EUSR sought ways and means to work with non-governmental institutions as partners; he would therefore brief them about his upcoming programme and ask for comments and feedback. Returning from the field he would organise debriefings to keep non-governmental institutions informed and engaged. The same approach was followed in the Region itself, often with individual NGOs.

4.3. Coming to Agreements

The EUSR’s involvement in the four regional processes was of course largely determined by the dynamics created by local political developments and armed violence. However, his broad mandate allowed van de Geer to build momentum on behalf of the EU and EU Member States, and, with the group of other Special Envoys, to create well-supported inclusive fora for exchange, which ultimately led to the signing of agreements on all four regional processes. Building momentum for these negotiations to be effective involved a number of meetings, for instance in the case of the Goma Process meetings with Laurent Nkunda of the CNDP, with the Mai Mai leadership, and with FARDC commanders. In the Burundi Process, the EUSR held frequent discussions with the leadership of the FNL in the run up to the agreement. These meetings posed numerous challenges: “Once, when dealing with the CNDP in eastern Congo, we wanted to speak with Nkunda, but soldiers of rival groups built barriers and would not let us through and told us to go. But we did not give up, and stayed. When it became dark MONUC [the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo] advised [us] urgently to leave, simply because the situation became too insecure at night. While you wish to push through, you also have the responsibility for the safety of your team, of course”.

In his outreach to parties in the Region, the EUSR benefited greatly from crucial logistical support from the UN: “I never could have done [it] all without the great support of the UN. When I arrived in the Region there was almost all the time an aeroplane at our disposal. I have always felt that that was great and we should have thanked the UN more profoundly”.

The EUSR and his team were involved in a number of peace agreements (the full titles are included in Annex 3):

n The Nairobi Agreement of November 2007 between DRC and Rwanda provided for the repatriation of Rwandan rebels, by force if necessary. The EUSR and his team participated in preparatory talks and the main negotiations, with talks chaired by the UN. In this agreement the UN, EUSR and US signed as witnesses.

n The Goma Agreement, signed by the Kinshasa government, CNDP General Laurent Nkunda, and Mai Mai militias on 23rd January 2008, called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of troops from key areas, and a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process for combatants. The EUSR played a daily coordinating role amongst members of the international community during the full negotiation period. The EUSR himself and his team members participated in talks directly. This agreement was reconfirmed on 23rd March 2009 in a second Goma Agreement, which was signed by UN Special Envoy Obasanjo on behalf of the international community.

n In 2008, the last Burundian rebel group, the FNL, signed a ceasefire agreement with the Government of Burundi which resulted in the transition of the FNL from a rebel group to a political party in 2009. The EUSR helped to establish the ‘Political

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Directorate’, chaired by South Africa, and brought together representatives from the AU, UN, US, EU, Belgium, France, Sweden and Norway. All Special Envoys participated in the talks in the capacity of the Political Directorate. While the FNL became a political party, it rejected the results of the local elections in 2010 (as did several other opposition parties) and boycotted the remainder of the elections held later in the year, including the national elections. This led to further tensions and the subsequent exile of the FNL leader.

n In 2007-2008 eleven pre-agreements were signed with the LRA which were meant to lead to the signing of a final peace agreement by LRA leader Joseph Kony. The EUSR team helped to facilitate discussions which led to the signing of the pre-agreements in Juba. Eight of those agreements were signed by the EUSR team as witnesses.

Table 2: Summary of Peace Agreements, Role of EUSR, and Status of Implementation

Agreement Role/Involvement of EUSR Status of Implementation

The Nairobi Agreement of November 2007 between DRC and Rwanda provided for the repatriation of Rwandan rebels, by force if necessary.

• The EUSR and his team participated in all preparatory talks and main negotiations

• The talks were chaired by the UN

• UN, US and EU signed as witnesses

• Implementation ongoing, but slow progress due to ongoing difficulties in relations between Kinshasa and Kigali

The Goma Agreement signed by the Kinshasa government, CNDP General Laurent Nkunda, and Mai Mai militias on 23rd January 2008 called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of troops from key areas, and a DDR process for combatants.

• International community involvement in the talks coordinated by the EUSR

• Daily coordination meetings during the full negotiation period

• The EUSR and his team participated in the talks

• The Agreement was reconfirmed on 23rd March 2009 in a second Goma Agreement, signed by UN Special Envoy Obasanjo on behalf of the international community

• Implementation challenges due to lack of security in eastern DRC

In 2008, the last Burundian rebel group, the FNL, signed a ceasefire agreement with the Government of Burundi which resulted in the transition of the FNL from a rebel group to political party in 2009.

• Establishment of the ‘Political Directorate’, chaired by South Africa

• Members: AU, UN, US, EU, Belgium, France, Sweden and Norway

• All Special Envoys participated in the talks as the Political Directorate

• Opposition parties rejected the result of the local elections and refused to participate in the national elections, which led to tension and the subsequent exile of the FNL leader

11 pre-agreements signed in 2007-2008 with the LRA which were meant to lead to the signing of a final peace agreement by LRA leader Joseph Kony.

• EUSR team helped facilitate discussions which led to the signing of 11 pre-agreements in Juba

• 8 of those agreements were signed by the EUSR team as witnesses

• Joseph Kony refused to sign the final agreement which was meant to bring together all pre-agreements as annexes; Diaspora exerted influence over Joseph Kony to reject peace process while President Museveni was still in power, and continue fighting instead

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4.4. The Post-agreements Phase

In late 2008, halfway through the EUSR’s mandate, the group of Special Envoys felt that “they had done what [they] could do as a group of special envoys on these conflicts”. The situation was not yet ideal but clearly much progress had been made: the brutal violence in DRC came to an almost abrupt end after the Goma Agreement; the number of FDLR combatants was greatly reduced from 20,000 to 7,000; the FNL was participating well in negotiations to lay down arms and was becoming a political actor. Thanks to the EU Mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform (EUSEC), substantial progress was made in registering FARDC soldiers, which showed that FARDC was much smaller than previously assumed – about 120,000 troops, rather than 150,000.

It was at this time, in late 2008, that the group of Special Envoys asked the UN to bring in an Envoy at the highest political level: a person who could further deepen and consolidate the relationships with the Presidents in the Great Lakes Region and who could consolidate the several agreements signed thus far. “The UN brought former Nigerian President Obasanjo which I thought was absolutely great. We as Special Envoys then started to play a supportive role under Obasanjo”, says van de Geer.

However, there were also setbacks: among much speculation as to his ultimate reasons, Joseph Kony, the LRA leader, refused to sign the final peace agreement in Uganda; the Goma Agreement was soon violated by most of the parties in conflict. In van de Geer’s view, the violations of the Goma Agreement were partly a result of the fact that the UN force, MONUC, was insufficiently equipped to follow up the Goma Agreement and to separate the fighting parties. Van de Geer actively lobbied at this time to deploy 500 European troops to eastern DRC, but was not able to convince EU member states to reach a common position. This made the Goma Agreement vulnerable and the situation soon slipped back into conflict. Although Obasanjo managed to conclude a second Goma Agreement in early 2009, his involvement did not bring the results that had been hoped for: his relationship with the Presidents in the Region did not develop further and, as a result, direct access to the Presidents decreased and the content of the second Goma Agreement was much weaker than the first. “Looking back to this I feel now that we should have continued ourselves”, states van de Geer.

Towards the end of his mandate, van de Geer and his team advised High Representative Ashton that it was no longer necessary to bring in another EUSR for the Great Lakes, as the conflicts seemed to be subsiding, and that developments were heading in the right direction. Instead, a coordinating Great Lakes Region function integrated into the EEAS was proposed, complemented by HoDs’ work on the ground.

In the last months of van de Geer’s mandate, however, conflicts in the Region flared up once again: although Nkunda was removed from DRC by Rwanda, Bosco Ntanganda started up a similar movement, creating new conflicts which continue to affect the Region today. In Burundi, the 2010 elections led to a hugely fragmented political landscape, with political leaders leaving the country and elements within the FNL itself re-organising as a rebel group. At this point, the EUSR’s office revised its own position and argued in favour of the continuation of a regional EUSR. Civil society organisations active in the Region argued for the same.

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In the end, Member States accepted the High Representative’s recommendation for a Coordinator for the Great Lakes Region, a role now performed by Koen Vervaeke, the Deputy Africa Director in the EEAS. However, the relatively long period between van de Geer’s departure and Vervaeke’s appointment resulted in decreased capacity and the EU ‘dropping the ball’ on a number of key issues such as the illegal exploitation of natural resources. While Vervaeke successfully rebuilt the dossier, this required a lot of energy and the rebuilding of contacts and relationships.

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Working with EU Institutions

5.1. Relations with Member States

Aside from directly reporting to the High Representative, Ambassador van de Geer felt most directly accountable to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in Brussels; however, he not always agree with it: “pleasing the Member States was not my strongest point…but the members of the PSC also saw that, in the light of sometimes contradictory positions of Member States, I had to draw my own line”. On the whole, however, he feels Member States were supportive of his team’s work, as he enjoyed good access and benefited from regular discussions: “Member States are the closest thing you have to peers in Brussels”. The EUSR and his team felt that the PSC was very effective in communicating messages and strategy to EU capitals, while also functioning as a sounding board for his ideas on new policies and upcoming missions.

5.2. Working with Heads of Delegations and

Heads of Missions in Country

Having been a bilateral ambassador himself, van de Geer understood very well the position of Heads of EU Delegations and Ambassadors of EU Member States. He describes the cooperation with EU HoDs as ‘more than excellent’ in all four countries in the Region, as well as in Kenya, South Africa, and in the US. He refers in particular to the working relationship in Burundi, where they “really developed as a team”; EU Heads of Mission (HoMs), both of the EU Delegation and Member States, actively helped to shape his missions. In his view, the degree of cooperation between HoDs and EUSRs is directly related to the degree to which HoDs view themselves as ‘diplomats in the traditional sense’, i.e. playing an active political role. In those cases where they perceive themselves more as technical administrators of trade and development cooperation, working closely with a EUSR, who usually has a more political mandate, comes less naturally. Where the EUSR worked

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closely with HoMs, as in the case of Burundi, they would provide continuity to the EUSR’s work in his absence. In turn, he would encourage them to “use my visits for certain things that can help you”, for example Article 8 political dialogue consultations.

The presence of a EUSR helped HoMs to increase EU visibility and to facilitate high-level access, for example meetings with Presidents and Ministers. Van de Geer would normally have meetings with Presidents at the beginning or at the end of a mission. To avoid encroaching on Ambassadors’ bilateral mandates and work, he says: “[I] always insisted that I was not bilateral, I was regional. So my perspective was always to deal with regional issues”. Burundi was the exception, which was facing an internal conflict with limited regional dynamics. He says this meant that his role became “much more bilateral than I originally thought – but we were a small team of ambassadors, and we worked very well together…” During missions, he would normally be based in EU Delegations.

In Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, HoMs saw his presence as an opportunity to assist in regional conflicts from the outset. This was perhaps less the case in DRC – principally, in his view, because of differences among Member States about how to approach the conflict, how far the EU should go in its support, and how prominent a political role it should really play.

5.3. Coordinating EU Institutions

I didn’t call these coordination meetings to show how important we were as EUSR. There was simply not a forum in Brussels where everybody who worked on this huge problem in the Great Lakes would come together.

One of the first things van de Geer’s office in Brussels initiated was to convene regular coordination meetings on the Great Lakes Region between different EU institutions in Brussels. This included regularly convening units and teams working on the Great Lakes under different ‘chains of command’ such as the Council Secretariat, European Commission Units, including the Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (DEVCO), the Directorate-General for External Relations (RELEX) and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), but also the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Missions such as EUSEC and EU Police Missions (EUPOL), and the European Parliament. Van de Geer introduced monthly coordination meetings, where an exchange of information on policy, as well as on implementation, took place.

To help advance his political work, van de Geer was keen to include those who worked on development and humanitarian assistance: “The technicians who build the roads, the emergency aid people, they are the ones I wanted to talk to, because they know what is happening on the ground”. This left some institutional counterparts “in shock” he jokingly recalls, as those with political mandates and those with a humanitarian or development focus were not at all used to sitting down together. What van de Geer had hoped for, and what his office never quite achieved throughout his tenure, was the establishment of a sort of ‘institutional steering committee’. In his view, such a Committee should have met to discuss

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Terms of Reference for each of his missions and would have been an excellent forum to debrief upon his return to Brussels.

Putting a staff member on the ground in Goma was at first seen almost as a threat by some, but he lobbied for ‘one EU team in Goma’, consisting of staff of the Council, the Commission and EU Member States. Here too he advocated for close coordination between the different EU representatives in Goma, for example establishing the practice of one joint weekly report to the EU HoMs in Kinshasa. Additionally, van de Geer argued in favour of a common Europe House in Goma. Those who felt that development and political agendas should not be mixed which, in van de Geer’s view, was “exactly what should have happened”, particularly resisted this idea. On the whole, van de Geer feels, internal EU coordination should have progressed much more, but the time was not ripe for it.

On the EUSRs’ role in the post-Lisbon EEAS, Ambassador van de Geer feels strongly that it would make sense to maintain EUSRs and that they should be well integrated into the EEAS. This would assist in improved coordination between different dimensions of the EU’s mandate (political, developmental, and trade related). EUSRs integrated into the EEAS would remain, to use a military term, ‘special forces’, who “would be able to move behind enemy lines before the regular forces would move in”. To this end, EUSRs would need to receive adequate institutional support; too often at present do EUSRs feel “I am appointed, I’m here, now what do I do?”

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The Role of the EU and the EUSR in the Great Lakes Peace Processes: Actor or Spectator?

I don’t think our team was ever a spectator…but the EU sometimes likes to be a spectator, and that was a big tension at times.

To play a successful role in peace processes one needs to be able to make tough choices, according to van de Geer: “Often we, as [the] EU, had all the elements on the table, but then there was a lack of political will…then we couldn’t get ourselves to go the last 10 percent in the end because the EU was too nervous to take a political lead”. Van de Geer recalls disagreements among Member States to allow MONUC to arrest and if necessary shoot at looting and raping army soldiers: “[While some Member States] panicked, the FARCD itself took responsibility, in the process even having to kill some engaged in looting and raping. In my view the EU here came out unnecessarily weak”.

Similar dynamics hampered EU efforts after the 2008 Goma Agreement. The EU did not sent troops, which compromised the success of the Agreement: “The EU was afraid of body bags, but I was confident that the whole situation would be stabilised in 24 hours and that I would bring them all back safely”. The EU was never seen as an imposing third party, according to van de Geer, indeed quite the opposite: “We were never seen as imposing. If anything, people were disappointed that we never delivered a post-conflict Marshall plan – that was really what the East of the DRC had hoped for, a Marshall Plan to reconstruct the East of the DRC. The stakeholders see the EU as a fresh, modern and forward-looking institution; we were the perfect partner. We under-delivered as such and STAREC [the Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern DRC] should have delivered better and faster. And I would have wanted STAREC to be less UNDP driven, and more EU driven”. His preference at that time would have been for the EU to play a stronger role in STAREC, and for EUSEC and

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EUPOL to have been strengthened. However, van de Geer also understands the difficulty within the EU to make tougher political choices: “There are 27 member states and, for many of them, the Great Lakes Region is very far away and of much less interest. Decisions of things like sending troops are then of course very big decisions to make”.

There is great potential in the Great Lakes Region to address its own regional conflicts, says van de Geer: “I found the International Conference of the Great Lakes…extremely important because it brought the Member States in the Region together…and why did we have the ICGLR? Quite frankly, the main reason was to get Kinshasa and Kigali talking. Because they wouldn’t talk, you build this structure to get them to talk. And this worked very well! In the end, the recent agreements in 2012 have all been concluded through the ICGLR”.

In van de Geer’s view, the value of regional organisations is their political potential and the fact that they are readily available, thus avoiding the need to build and maintain new structures. He disagreed with those who criticised the fact that there were too many overlapping regional institutions: “You have the ICGLR, the CEPGL [Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries], EAC [East African Community], SADC [Southern African Development Community] and others. It is true that one should rationalise – but we are still in crisis mode in the Great Lakes and we just cannot yet take the risk to [lose] the ICGLR, for instance. So I take the pragmatic, opportunistic and eclectic approach, let them exist, and once the Region has stabilised, then rationalise”.

He believes the EU took a much too technical and development-focused approach, as many in EU institutions and among Member States viewed the ICGLR very critically on account of its weak developmental track record. A political and security perspective of what an institution like the ICGLR could achieve in the Region was missing, he adds.

At the same time, purely pushing for ‘African solutions to African problems’ is also not an adequate response for van de Geer: “I do not like the saying ‘African solutions for African problems’ because these are not specific African problems, these are universal problems…human rights problems, so we need universal solutions”.

Looking back on his period as EUSR, van de Geer feels that he was given the platform and the mandate to build up engagement and the momentum for peace processes to develop further. The quality of coordination within EU institutions and with EU Member States developed gradually, in a positive way. However, in the second half of his mandate, when the focus was more on bringing together political, security and development tools, coordination proved to be weaker (or more challenging), particularly in DRC: “This was extremely frustrating at times and I had seldom seen such an absence of coordination. Here I really would have welcomed a stronger mandate to be able to say: “Guys, this is the line and this is how we are going to do it””.

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Van de Geer also discusses continuity: “For example, in the case of the Great Lakes, there was a gap of a few months between my own phasing out and the entry of my successor Koen Vervaeke. But then my team was no longer in the region and the work on the processes was no longer continued. That led, for example, to a lowering [of] attention to illegal exploitation of natural resources, with negative developments. Today we are fully there again, but still, it should not have happened like that”. The same applies to Member State attention to the Great Lakes Region as, over the last several years, van de Geer observes decreasing engagement and commitment from some Member States in the Region, and “increasing DRC fatigue”.

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Preparing EUSRs for their Assignments

When Roeland van de Geer joined the EU as EUSR, he had no previous experience within the EU system, except as Chair of the Africa Working Group and as Ambassador during the Dutch Presidency of the EU. Quite a few EUSRs are appointed in this way from ‘outside the system’ and, in his view, it is important to prepare them adequately for this role. However, this still does not happen today. A systematic induction period similar to the 14-day introduction given to new HoDs would be appropriate, according to van de Geer.

Van de Geer envisages an ‘all-round’ institutional support system for EUSRs which would include:

n A ‘welcome kit’; n An introductory toolkit on dialogue and mediation approaches;n Training and coaching in dialogue and mediation and other skills (areas in which

the incumbent has no previous experience); n Organised handovers from previous position holders;n Systematic briefings by all those within different EU institutions working on a

specific region; n Regular meetings with all relevant EU institutions to act as something of an informal

‘steering committee’ to the EUSR’s work; n Links to existing specialist networks and organisations (for example within the UN

system, or the Oslo Forum).

On the format of this type of debriefing, van de Geer suggested that this could in fact be done in a whole-day format; this could bring together the whole EUSR team for a systematic team debriefing at the end of the mandate.

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“Conclusions: What Makes a Good Mediator?

You have to be tough at times, but you have to be very flexible as well.

Each individual brings a unique set of qualities and skills to the role of a mediator. The debriefing exercise revealed a number of personal traits which Roeland van de Geer brought to the job: a combination of personal charisma and the ability to ‘draw people in’; modesty coupled with a sense of humour; an unwavering determination to be critical where criticism is due, and to not be too concerned with ‘pleasing others’ (be these EU Member State representatives or Presidents of the countries on which he worked): “I had an excellent working relationship with President Kabila,” he explains, “because he feels whether you are serious or whether you are just trying to please him, and he also knows that, if you are only trying to please him, you will give him the wrong advice – because he knew that he made a lot of mistakes”.

Despite being an ‘outsider’, this honesty in fact made him a trusted advisor and interlocutor to regional leaders in many instances, and enabled him to have frank discussions, even on thorny issues like impunity: “I said to Nkunda: if your troops committed war crimes, then you shouldn’t even want to bring your government in a position where it would need to give you amnesty, as this would never be accepted internationally and would only serve to make your government look weak. He accepted that and was never given amnesty for crimes against humanity and war crimes”.

Ambassador van de Geer is clearly a team-player by nature, frequently referring to “we” and the “EUSR team and office”, constantly stressing the key contributions of his high-calibre team. This is, in fact, one of his major achievements during his time as EUSR: building and maintaining a team spirit among those who worked on the Great Lakes during his time, be that in his own office or with other Special Envoys working on the Great Lakes.

Despite his academic background, the former EUSR sees himself as a ‘practitioner’ or even an activist at heart: someone who ‘rolls up his sleeves’ and gets on with the job. Ambassador van de Geer is little concerned with hierarchy, and was happy to put his

”

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team members in the driving seat: “all PolAds were equal,” he explains, and often he would send them on mission on their own to represent him. He brought a collaborative working style to the position, and saw one of his primary functions as being a team builder – be that between different EU institutions working on the Great Lakes or between different international Special Envoys, who, he admits, “tend to work rather individually”. His efforts not only resulted in the Great Lakes Special Envoys during his tenure working mostly with a joint approach to the Region, but also a number of lasting friendships.

Although van de Geer took a flexible and pragmatic stance to engage with all conflict parties in the Region, including those with track records of serious human rights violations, he maintained a clear sense of moral right and wrong, and accountability throughout. Did he feel accountable to the parties to the conflict? “Not accountable in the normal sense of the word: more accountable in the sense that we had to end these conflicts…and I wouldn’t say that I felt accountable to the parties, most of the parties were rebels…criminals and killers. Therefore I would say: more accountable to the man and certainly to the woman in the street in Goma and in Bukavu...”

Importantly, the former EUSR is able to reflect on past decisions and actions and admit mistakes. At the time of Obasanjo’s appointment as Special Envoy in 2009 by the UN, he felt this appointment would be an important breakthrough. Later, however, this turned out to be less effective, as relationships between the former President of Nigeria and the Presidents in the Region did not develop in the way many had hoped. Looking back, he admits that the Special Envoys should perhaps have continued work at their level, rather than deciding to request that the UN bring in higher-level support for the final stages of the process.

In his view, in the first two years of his mandate, “the ideal profile was that of a mediator”. In the second half of his tenure, the requirements of the assignment changed, as the focus turned towards marshalling SSR efforts in DRC and coordinating development support. In summary, for van de Geer, “an ideal EUSR should be quite happy on the ground”.

Appendices

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Appendices

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Annex 1 – List of EUSR Mandates

COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2007/112/CFSP of 15th February 2007, appointing the European Union Special Representative for the African Great Lakes Region

COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/108/CFSP of 12th February 2008, amending and extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the African Great Lakes Region

COUNCIL DECISION 2010/113/CFSP of 22nd February 2010, extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the African Great Lakes Region

COUNCIL DECISION 2010/440/CFSP, of 11th August 2010, extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the African Great Lakes Region

Debriefing EU Mediators

Annex 2 – List of Special Envoys for the Great Lakes Region

Howard Wolpe, Tim Shortley, US Jozef Smets, Belgium Lena Sund, Sweden Arild Oyen, Norway Duminsani Kumalo and Kingsley Mamabolo, South Africa Bill Swing, Alan Doss, UN-MONUC Olesugun Obasanjo, Benjamin Makapa, Joaquin Chissano, UN-AU Special Envoys, Ambassador Mba, AU Special Envoy for Burundi Ambassador Liberata Mulamula, ICGLR

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Annex 3 – List of Peace Agreements Signed During the EUSR’s Mandate

1. On the FDLR‘Joint Communique of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda on a common approach to end the threat posed to peace and stability in both countries and the Great Lakes Region’, 9th November 2007

2. On the armed groups in eastern DRC‘Peace Agreement Between the Government and Le Congres National Pour La Defense Du Peuple (CNDP)’, 23rd January 2008

3. On Burundi‘Cessation of Hostilities Agreement’ between the Government of Burundi and Palipehutu-FNL, 26th May 2008

4. On the LRANote on LRA pre-agreements: a comprehensive list of all 11 pre-agreements that came out of the Juba talks is not available in public sources. Conciliation Resources lists the following agreements between 2007 and 2008:

‘Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CHA)’, 26th August 2006 ‘The Comprehensive Solutions Agreement’, 2nd May 2007‘The Accountability and Reconciliation Agreement’, 29th June 2007 ‘Annexure on the Implementation Protocol’, 19th February 2008‘Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire’, 23rd February 2008‘Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration’, 29th February 2008‘The Agreement on Implementation Protocol’, 25th March 2008

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© European Forum for International Mediation and Dialogue e.V. (mediatEUr), 2012All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution.The views expressed in this publication are that of the authors, and do not necessarily represent those of mediatEUr, or the funding agency.mediatEUr in Brussels: Avenue des Arts, 24, 10th floor, letter box no.8B-1000, Brussels, Belgium Phone: + 32 2 230 00 15E-Mail: info@themediateur.euwww.themediateur.euCover picture: © Jean-Michel Dumont, 2012. Chapter 1: © mediatEUr / Bea Uhart, 2012.Chapter 2: © mediatEUr / Bea Uhart, 2012. Chapter 3: © mediatEUr / Bea Uhart, 2012.Chapter 4: © Jean-Michel Dumont, 2012. Chapter 5: © Jean-Michel Dumont, 2012.Chapter 6: © Jean-Michel Dumont, 2012.Chapter 7. © Jean-Michel Dumont, 2012.Chapter 8: © Jean-Michel Dumont, 2012.

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