Derrida Gadamer and the Ethics of Discussion

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da, Gadam er and the Ethics ofDiscussionChantelle Swartz and Pau l Cilliers

Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Stellenbosch

Stellenbosch7600South Africa

E-mail: [email protected]>AhstractThis essay gives an account o f tlte exchanprs hetu3et.n J;tcqucs Dcrrida andIli~ns-(icorgindamcr at the Goelhe lnstit~~lcn Paris in Apri l 19x1. Manv com-~iicn~atorserceivc ofthis encounter as an "improhahlc dchate." citinp Dcrridn's~ns~rainnliznlion.r. in deconslntative lcnns. dcconcentmtion o f (i;!dilnier'sopenine tcxt as the Innin rcason fur its "impmhahility." An analysis o f tlic qttes-tions that Dcrrirln pose< concerning "commu~iication"as an axiotn from \c,hichwe derive dccidahle lnt lh hrings 11s o rhc ccntrll l fcaturc of this discussion: Hau,docs one cngapc the "other" in convcrsalian in tlic li fh t o f the pruhlcrns pcnnin-inp to ~ticnningl i~lommanicatiott? The essay soegests that the l irst muntl o f cx-changes hetween Dcrrida and Ciadarner is ;I good enaniple of the violcncc tliat isprcvalcnl (and perhaps inevitahlc) in all aci~dcrnicdiscossions. Finally a morc"ethical" approach 1,) discussion. hascd nn Dcrrirla's pnstulttlion o f a "friend-ship." is su~gcsted. t challmgcs the lhcrnimcutic scarcli for consens[ls. whcrchylltc "otltei' IS cnnlracted into fraternity. hut c:lnnut clir ii~natc lcnlents o f bio-lcnce cr~ntpletcly.

Improbable DialogueI s it certain that to the wo rd comrnrr~ticnriort orresponds ;I con-cept that is unique, rizorously conlrol lahlc. and transmittable: i na word, comtnt~nicable'!

(Derri da I9XRa: I )r i l 1981. Jacques Derrida and llans-Cieorg Gatlamer were presented with rlie op-

uni ty "to engage the other in diillogttc nnd to dchate face-to-face" (Miche lfe lde r &2). This evenl is documented in Dialn,yrrc orrd D~c,nrr,rtr~~u.tk>f~:IK,011 ci r) '. Gatlamer's m;tin contribution is called fi,.~r nrrd

/)rc~fotiorr (21;SI). Derrida responds to tliis wi th 7%rw Q~ ~r. cf ~~~rr .c1 H or r .~ - G ' r o r ~(52-54)". Dcrrida's ma in contrihuticm is ent itled /rrrc,r/)refbrp Siprrat rrr~~,r


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seem to tliin k that the "dehate" between De rrida and C ii ~ il a ~ n e rever really took placet h : ~ t " g c n ~ ~ i n cchatc" d id not unf old, that i t was a " n o n - d i i ~ l o s ~ ~ e "r ;In "improhablcencountei' (45). Acco rding lo these conunenti~tors.Derr id : i ts ~~~iu ' i l l ingnesso adhereto the preconditions o f dialogue, as explicated by G i~ d; ~ m ern Tr.r-I r rr it i I ~ r r t ~ , p r r t ~and uf 'cuurse in Tr~rr lr 1 ~ 1 c.rhod (10751, is the main reason for the '-impro bab ility"of t l ie encounter. I n this regard. Derr ida is :~cct~ scd f w i l l i ~ l l y !ntlcrn i in ing :indm arg ina lizing Ciadnmer's texl in o riicr to ensure n l i e r ~ i ~ e n e t ~ t i cbilurc. '

It is necessary to qt~estion ro m the outset the pos sibility o i a n y "encounter" betweend e c ~ ~ n s t r ~ ~ c l i o nnd 'Iier~iieneutics'." Acc ord ing to D er rii l :~ I9XXa ). Iiermeneutic inter-pre tat ion is based on the mistaken assumption that ihought. as representinion. precedesand governs com m ~~ nica t ion.)erivative 01'this h e li c f are tlie equ:~ llymistaken presup-pos itions o i t l i e s imp lici ty o f the o rigin , the log ica l sequcncc o f a l l t ~ ~ c i n g .iornoge-nous analyses and the adlierel ice to the authority o i t l i e category o i "c om ~l ir~ ni ca t io(4 ). 'These notions src indicative o f the p ur s i ~ i t fd in logu es that w i l l br ing t11111 con-sensus; i n Derrida's w or ~ ls, the ho rizon o f inte l l igib i l i ty and m l t h thar is me;~ningful. such that i ~ lt im a tc ly eneral agreement may, i n principle. be attained" ( 7 ) .It w ou ld he ahsurd to deny tlie existence of tlie "encounter" as such. but one c o t ~see that Derrida w ou ld l iave so ~ n e eservations ahout the aim o f t l ie symposium.n ; ~ ~ n c l yo p rovid c ;In op po rtu nit y i'or " humieneutics' ;~nddecunstr~~crion ' :\vo ternistliat name two bodies o r thought. tw o sets o f tests, \v liicl i today hear the signaturcs'Cii~damcr'and 'Derrida"' t o engage [each] other in dialogue" ( MiclielYelder S: Palmer19X9: 1-21. O ne o f hese reservations i s tl ie no tion o f a con liont ation " in the sense o f ii

face-to-f:~ce cl;~sli, declared. involving two identitiable interlocutors or ndversnrics.tw o 'discourses' 11131 w o ll ld be identical w it h iliemselves ;~ nd ocalizable" (Derr id :I9XX;l: 32). Fnr Derrida. deconstruction has no essential characteristics. tlie meaningof ' w lii cl i can be deterlninetl u nivo cally . l i e argucs that deconslrtlction "does not existsomewhere. pnre. prop e~- . elf-identicill. outside o f i ts inscr ipt ions i n ~.o nt l ic tua landdiiTerentiated contexts, i t is only w l ~ i ~ tt does and u,h:~t is done w it h it, Illere where itt ;~kes pli~ ce. " 141 ) I n other words. there are many deco nstr ucr i~~ ns.nd dcconstruc-ti(111s are alw;~ys sul*ected to more devonstructions. Since " rlcconstrt~c tion " i s at anygivcn moment never ~i ic re lyhe sun1 to t:~l f a set o f chnr ~~ cter is t ics11it "rncaning" of3 !\ li'u ycan hcli>m 111scncc~~lnlcr.ulin Scarlc lcvcllud a ri~lillar harge ogitihsl Dcnhla $$.11I1rcli.ru!si.

1~ l l ~ csllrr's rrrpt,!lsr. JL . hurlilr'r l i r , > v I, , i J o Tl,i,rg.v ll'ill, li,,il.s I T I ~ttvuolllcr i s dcc.ott~u~~lrnIDerrido l 9 X s i b ) 11, R~.it'.r~,ri,8$77w l l i l ? ~ ~ ~ i ~ t ~ c c ~ . vI (~7d1.0 I)(,wi~icd.S~iar11. I L1771 arytlcl l l~ i l llcrr~diIh;td "i!~isun~lc~\l~ra~tlt!ld l i ~ i r r l i i l~c lZu\li!!'s posilnm ill s~l .c~. i l lpoiltl< $ ! L I ~l l t ts l l lc c c ~ ! ~ f r ~ ~ ~ ~l l c -l\vccn Dcmdk, ;and AUSIIII~~ ! e \ e r t ~ i I cakes III~~L'c..1 I 'JS) 11, l . i t ~ > i l t , < i1,rv. r)crr~cb.~ ' I XS t i l Clkrnl;$lluahcl~vccnIICIII. SCBTICbijr i i lrady ~~>il,~nitludhin~rclo Ihc c~ i r l c o c c l.lllal 'v?lcollnl?r.'' If Ihcr~' ad hccll n o ~nc0llll1i.r - i3 ' ' ~ ~ ~ ~ F I I c I ~ I I I I ~ v ~ ' 'I1crc ~ , ~ lhr lln l lun~:hnl I I UF~C .~U Ihc a r p i c d ag:lil,sl inr rc jcclrd. :\rrl8rding lo tDr.rrid;&. v;t~lc's tlggcslion lhalII1c CICI ~CT IICVCT (/liir@nnlu: lllil n c ~ c r l00k P ~ ~ c L . .-(PCIIS 1 1 1 ~ I)OCC t i l l llli. w r y tljillg 111:iI h110111tnol. l ~ ~ l ~ l t t l~CIC~II;VCakc!) pli,ce: llltls I I1)cmidaI pr l in! fixrl in l l l c


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4 S. A l i . .l. I'hilos. ?Oll3. 231to delimit the exact or final meaning. I t fi,llows ho rn i l l is "~ ~n de cid ab il i t y"hat one'sonderstanding o f what tl ie other i s saying i s never complete. This lack o f pure understallding subvens any attempts at unnlvelling rhc n.r~rh.and n o : l~nount l f "sincerity"w i l l ever guarantee :I "genvine" dialogue.

I f ho th partners are adamant about the m l t h claims o f tl ici r respective positions o n aparticular subject matter, i t i s possihle to feign sincerily i n valuin g the other's positionas ;In equ:ll contributor to " the tn~th."Re latin g to this poin t. Ci:id:tiner h:~sa r g ~ ~ e dhatI ~ e r ~ ~ i e n e u t i cnderstanding does no t preclude disagreement, ;is lon g as the d ia lo g l~partners agree to disagree (W arnke 1987: 102-103). 'The pro bl c~ na lic spect nf 'tl iis po-s i t ion is that i t boi ls c lown to a way ol 'appuasing others in order to l ~ t ~ l dn to one'sow n po int o f view. Sucli an attitude does not bri ng i l i c partncl-s closer to ;I supposed"tn~th." but serves ;I political purpose, nnmely to protect and rcinlilrce their uriginolpositions. Thus. Ciadanier's reverence fur "sincere" pa rtic ipa tion i n a di:~logue o\ er -l o o h the unde rlying pow er relations that characterise ou r "encotlnters" het\veen eachotlicr. O ur truth claims are never devoid o f some ilnderly ing intercsr o r value tIi:tt we:~dhereo. I t follow s t11:lt when one appeals to some po in t o f view, i t is to tl ie erolu siono f some other p oin l(s l of v iew.

Derrida w ou ld q~ reslin n iadamer's artempt to merge different poinls ot'vie\r, into de-cidable meaning. since this ti ~ s io n resupposes the stable un ity o f ;I text. :2cconling toDe rrid;~ . every new interpretation causes n break and a restru cu ~ri ng f the text. I nother words. there is no single correct way o f interpret ing ;I text tli;~t wi tl~ sta nd s ther.different readings. Every diFerent reading has the potenti;~lol' $1 dill;-rent meaningand. therefore. another truth'. I n the G:~d i~m eri:~ nialogc~e, espect for the other's c:i-p x i l y to contribute to the meaning o f t i le text does nnt include a strong enough recog-n i t ion o l ' tl is "o therness" o f the other, w h e r ~ ~ sh is r c c ~ i g n i t i o ~ iou ld he the p~ rc on dt io n o f any Derr ideiln "d i ; ~ lo ~ i~ c . "The central question tliat becomes apparent f?c>ni his analysis o f the li rst roun d utexchanges between De rridd and Ga da~ ner el;~tes o Ii u w one engages the "other" i nc liscussion in the l ight o f l h e prohletns pertain ing l o "m ea nin gl i~ l o~ iu i iunicu t ion. 'Ai-ter investigating t l ~ efailed encounter." attention w i l l be pilid to tl ie (Derridean) notio n

of 'an "ethic o f discussion" \v lii cl i may lead to an ;~ltert i ;~tive node o f engaging inphilos oph ical dialogue, a mode wh ich attempts to acknow ledge otherness.The "Encounter"The proceedings at tlie I9X I encounter is started ol'f by G?td;11iier. I ~ l e rovides an his-torical account o f t l ie development o f her~ nm eutics.and then turns his attention toDerrida'!: cl;iim that i t is Nietzschc. not Heidcgger. n.ho was mo re r;~dic al n his at-tempts to li e s philosophy o f logocentrism :ind metaphysical concepts such as "heing"and "trt~ th." (iad;tmcr echoes the lleideg ger inn position that Ni ee sc lie rlot on ly li i i l s inovercoming metaphysics. hut is himself a metaphysical thinker. While det'ending hisow11 liern~eneuticpro,jecl. eldarner also defends lleide gg er up to the mom ent whenthe latter turns to "qc~asipoeticel anguage in nrd er to escape the l:~nguageofmetaphys-


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Afr. J. Philos. 20111. 2 3 ) 5mer's point o f departure in Te rl ,r r id / n t ~ ~ r [ ~ r r ~ o r i n ns tliat man is blessed w it liy to understand. Since we share the cap:sity to understand. tlie tln iver-I la im o f I iertneneutics i s "beyond any douht" and the hernieneutic standpoint i sstandpoint o f every reader" (Gatlamer in M iche lfelde r Rr Palmer 19x9: 21. 31).

w this understanding takes place is tnodelled on the nct of' conversation. The factess o f our o w n tru th claims at risk. B y encountering alternative perspectives i nitl i others. our ow n i~nderstan ding. s we ll as that o r t h e other, is relieved o fe.iitdice inherent i n o ur truth claims. I n this endeavour to find ~n ean ing. he en-th others w i l l thcrefnre lead t o n hetter and mutoal understanding. Gadamertends. ho ~ ~ e v e r ,liat understanding w i l l n ot be attained unless a fitndamental pre-ditio n is realised. namely the good i~ , i l l r th e partners i n t l ia logue to try to under-

r ow n prejudice to re al ly "hear" wha t the other hns to say.datne r avours the im mediacy o f conversation over engaging i n di i l losue wi t l ien texts. since tli e ibrm er makes "proper understanding" possihlc tli ro us li theve-and-take" o f discussion. Partners in conversation liave tlie opportun ity to c l a r i l jir intended meanings on the basis o f some or other response (34). The rc-ionship hetween text i ~ n deader is analogous to the relationsh ip hetween partners i nion. Llnderstantling a text entails an overcolning o r what is "alienating" o r

:I text so that the "hor izon o f tlie text and the horizon o f the reader is dis-(111. Tlios, li ke different standpoints o f dialogue partners. the separate per-ectives o l I text tlnd interpreter must merge to achieve the process o f ~nders tand ing.)errida arsues arain st the lienneneutic cotnpuls ion l o fin d a "lin al troth."remarks could tr igge r an account of "the deep connection, ex isti ng hetweensearch Sor meaning ant1 the prqiect o f metaphysics'' (M ic lie lfe ld er 8r3). I{c~w ever. r i te to l i ~ rt n . )errida (ocuses neither exclusively n or pri-i ly on w liat appears to be central o r paramount. hu t on tliat wh ich appears "mnr-." I n this sp ecilic encounter. l ie responds b y way o f ;I"deconcentration" (Derridi~:. 44) o f ( iatlamer's text. Indeed. our o f a thirty page apology i b r the "universal-

o f hermeneutics. Derrida chooses one line - "Both partners must have tlie goocll l to try I n understand each nther" (Ciadarner in Mich elfelder L% Palnier 10x9: 33).is "must" is used to uncover tlie metaphysical presuppositions embedded i n G i l d i t -e could say that there i s som ething pn tm nis ing i n the way that Ciadarner presents"dialogue partner." and tlie re;tder. u,ith n lesst)n on tlie work ing s and trierit tofhet--. N o won der then that 1)errida w k s in his lirs t naraeranli o r his first resnonse- .

,\I l l i s pninl il is inlp,rl;lnl la nolr lllf imponanrc of Dcmida's illr i , r cv \~rirm lo I.#!!rrned 11rc Ib r lllir di.icussio~~. icliar


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whether "anything was takin g place here other than imp robable dekttes"" ( iMichelfelder Rr Palmer 1989: 521. Ironical ly. Gadamer w o ~ ~ l datcr concur with thissen~iment.~ h o u g hbr dif ferent reasons. For Gadi~~iier.lie dialogue between himsela n D errida is ~ ln s u cc s ss li ~lecause De rrid; ~ reli~ se s o i~ndcrstancihim. In factDerrida re li~ se s o ilnderstand Gatktmer i n t lie way that l ie wants to be understoodw lii ch is his (Gadanier's) o w n way. What is really happening liere can be glm ne tl k o nexa min ing the three questions Derrida poses to G ad a~ iie rn inore detili l.QIIC,.V!~


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I mean by goo d will to understanding]." since "whoever op en s his155)

di.~~~,qwr.vith liiiii is perceived hy Ciadarner as unurilling-iordt~r:rrc~rrrlim. Ci;idnmcr believes, however. tllat Derrid;! t;icilly iiglres lonsus between theni sin ce lie direcls liis questio ns directly to (;adamer. thus(55) . In this vein. Kearney 11903:charges Ilerrida with "a will to overpo wer Gad ame r through delihernte misu nder-

( 13 5) echoes this sentimen t when he su gge sts that Derrida'!, in sis-liat tliere are no "true" reading s o f a text, that m isunde rsvan~ lingn discourse isbelies tlic fict that lic too wants to he read and understood. Derri(1;l's rc-Here Derrida (IYXRa:) criticises the "use and abuse" of the argument that, since the deconstructionist istnitli. stability. or the unity of meaning, in inten!:ion or" lie has no gro und s upon w h ic l~ o demand that his own text sho t~l (ltcrprrted correctly. If D errid :~ irl not wan t to he reud o r undersrood. there wouldbe no need to write. o r sign liis texts. M ore pertinently. if Derridn o nly believedof misunderstanding. on what grnunds could lie charge

11% misread o r misunderstood hini'! DerridaLi~irirctlrtc was concerned with analysing "tlie brutality with which. he-uite ~ii ani fes t xterior, Searle had read m e, o r rather avoided readingo i~ nderstand" I 13). Th is citation. although not referred to by Kearney,

n discli~ilnero the possihility of' only m isunderstanding. D errid i~s notstanding" Gadniner in som e way lhat can he corrected. He is ma king a standd oppose thm i. N o consensus is possible on tliis level.

oes , lhowevcr, cavtion that language and intcrpretation are prohlematic:no reason to :/ivrrr.r.~ ny thin g. In fact. langu age is mo re 1h;lnprnhlemnticity" (120).lity of a misinterpret;~tion can tl ~ e re fi ~ reot he dismissed. Derrida adds:i n agreement on this suh,ject attests by itself to this more

prtrr ~nisiinderstanding. Evidence ofto be found in tlie following exaniple:Whatever the disagreements between Seerle and myself may have been, for in-stance, no one doubted tliat I had understotld at least tlie English grammar andvocabulary of his sentences. Without th~tcr debatc would have hegun. Whichdo es not a ~n ot ln t o s;~ yin g hat all possihility n l'misund erstandin gs on my partis excluded a priori. but that they would have to he. one can hope at least. ofanother o r~l er . 14 6)is "other o r d e i' is in Derridenn ternis ;I way of arres ting "mistinderstanding" hy the


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by a pan ic u l i~r ontcxt. fo r insrance. " th is or t h i ~ t a t i o n ~ ~ lulttlre, i n tl ie university oro i ~ t s i ~ l ehe university, in school or elsewhere. on television, in the press. or in a spe-c ia lised co l loq i~ io m"since D errida does not believe i n the "po ssibil ity o f an absolutedetennination o f the 'minimal" ' (145). Un like Ciadarner. De rrid ;~believes that the"nonns of minitnal intel l igibi l i ty" are not absolute and ah historical. but nierely "morestable than others" (147). Crucially, Derrida points out that there is a "right track" andbetter way to interpl-eting a text (146). T o be on the right track does not si gn ify a rendin g that is huyond a ll equi\focation. hut instead rcrers 111 "interpre tations [th at ] areproh ahil ist ical ly dominant and conventionally :~ck nt~\\, ledg edo gran t ;~ccess o what[tl ie wr iter] thought lie Incant and to what readers For the most part tl lo i~ g h they couldonderstand." ( 11-11 Derrida's insistence on the possib ility o f a rig ht track challm fes thede linit i on o f "deconstruction" as the p t ~ t ho re lat iv ism and int leter~i i in is~n.rI i ich l ieargues "is,/irl,r(. (tIi:~t's ig ht : fi~lse,not true) i l ~ l t leeble: i t supposes a ba il ( th i~ t ' sight:b l r t l , not good ) and feehle reatl ing o f numerous texts. f irst o f : ~ I lminc, w hi ch thereforenus st tin all y he read or reread" ( 146).What is tl ie difference between a bat1 rending and a m isu iide rst an din ~'?fhe possibi l-i t y o f a " b i~ d eading'' \ro ul d also suggest the poss ibi l i ty o f ;I "g._oud reird~ ng." DoesD e r r i d i ~ laim that n " b l l c l reatling" is a re;lding thal does not correspond with what histext intends, h r if his is the case, then li is detractors w ou ld question h is argunient i nhvour of "undecidabil i ty." In th is rcg:~nl . t l icy w o t ~ l dll ig n De rrid~ l's nsistence on a"good reeding" \\,it11 the Ga da ~n er ian oti on that "reading and ondersrimding m rd n that\\,lint is :~nnounced s led hirck to its origin al authenticity" ((iad ilme r in M ich elfeld er S:I'almer 1989: 35).

What Derrida actually argues against is the liermenel~tistsearch l i ~ rhe hidden"truth" o l 'tests, The argument t i ~ r~nd ecidab il i ty loes not im ply [ l int meaning is inde-tertninnte. U ndecidabi l i ty impl ies that meaning can never be c o r r r ~ ~ l ~ ~ r t ~ .Th is 1n:lkes po-sitions of totirl isation. fitlt i lm en t and plenilude impossible to m aintain ( 1 16). Mcilningis nevcr pitrely undecidable. I n f i~ct. D e r id a w ou ld argue irgi~in st i ther complete un-decidabil i ty, or complete decidabil i ty. I lndecidahil i ty l i inges on the "r lerer,~ni~~~rrs-cil ltrtion between possibil it ies" 1148). i n other words, the t r u t l ~ s "un~ lecidab lc" he-cause there are distinct and also l im ite d p ossibil it ies of mea ning that compete amongeach other from which one makes a l im ite d choice. When one interprets. unc risksthese finite and deter~nin:~teossibilities. H e assens that when lie "puts ra tlic tllly in toquestion" sitch notions as "tr-utli." "refhence" ant1 "stable contexts ol'i nte ~p re tat ion ."he is not contesting that there i.7 and that tlicre .shrrrih/ hc truth. reference and stablecontests of interpretation. I n the matter o f tl ie "s t;~bility" o f an interpretalive context,Derricl;~ poin ts to the "essence" (docs this no t suggest so~ ne th in gntrinsic. true or sta-ble'!) of sla bil ity . u4iic h is "always provisiona l and linite " (1 50 ). I n other words. therei s no ahs (~ I i~ tetalri l ity; i n Fact, stability is by ile fin itin n always de stabilirahle.

Th e ~ iie an in g n interpreter attaches to lhis/hur rcading o f the test is based on achoice hetween finite possibil it ies, and thus also on exclusion. Ilowcvc~-. ho or \vlialdcterniincs whether something is "valid ly" a possible niran ing'l Derrida writes that theposs ibilities are "l li yh ly ~ICIPI?II~II~~/ i n str ictl y ~ i r / i r r e ~ litl~atiuns'' ( 148). '1.0 this cnd.


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f a text - Derrida is adamant that the interpretative experience shi~rild othe form o f a relativism w here o ne can sa y :jest anything at all" (145). Bell5: 382 ) points to the f;lct that the logic o f remaining true to the text implies whntida c alls "protrhcols ol' reading'' that will liinction as guard-rails to prevent anyhatsoever lion1 heing ad vanced. D errida doe s not tell us what these protocols'lie confesses th:~t he h i ~ s c1t yet foon(l any protoco ls that satisfy him (Bell 1905:1490: 118). Now il'these protoc ols of reading, which are to judge whether

ny '~f~/c~rr.,nir. ,ln/r~icilln/ir>r.,f'ill do" (B ell: 38 2) . Furtlierniore. will theses" o r stan dards {rf reatling remain the snme, or would tliey also be "struc-n the case of the latter scenario, such proto-as standard criteria. since they would he asing a general, evaluative function invok es connotations o f a inutliality betweenelies Derridn's suggestion. \vitIi reference to his "second" qi ~e st io n oier. of a radic:11 break and ; ~ n vcrall re-stnlcturing of the context. If Derrida hadss this ostensihle dilenmla. his response \vould reflect his deconstructionist ap -discussed in the li~ llo w ing ection.we we turn to Derrida's next "question," two iniporlant im plications that em erge

of ' Derrid:is lirst question to Ciadamer should be noted. I'irstly.presiipposition of :I common i~nderstanding oils down t o a will to powerd as s i ~ ch crvcs as >I"means


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Gatlanier 's not ion o f a '.fils ion o f horizons."' W l i i ~ ts the besis ol' the possibility o f afusion o fh or iz t~ ns ? hustennan points out that such a possibi l i ty is ensured b y the ihctt h i t d if ferent IILII-irons are a lready im pl i c i t ly jo ined. and I l i t ls not l ~ ~ l l yis ti nc t, i n w h i ~Ciadarner has called "the depths o f r;~dition" I ? 17).'"C ul le r (1991: 153) indicates that "[ the] appeal to consensus an d convention - ru th

as what is va l idated b y ou r accepted methods o l va l i da t i on - wo rks to I rel lt t l ie nor m asI'oundation - [and] n ornis are produced b y acts o f exclusion." I n Derridv's (19XXa:146) o\vn "defin i l ion" o f dccol istruct ion, thc deconstruct io~i is fnever contests or de-str


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Afr. J. Philos. 2003. ??(I 1 I Ito or disclaimed by or circumscribed in a book. What it doesn, however. is that these referents are talked abou t within an "interpretative expel-i-When one. f or instance. refers to that which is invoked by tlie referent "ideol-" it is trdced from a st ri~c tu ren which it is differentiated from othe r referenrs such

"semantic." "historical." "symbolic," etc. T l t l~ s meaning" is not inherent to tliei t doe s not exist in n text as so mething static and d ecid ;~h le. his is not to suggest

110 meaning in a text. The meaning one gleans from a text is the choicee makes bctwecn num bers of different referents, each invoking a different intcrpre-on. D en id a a rgu es that such an interpretation ass umes meaning only insofar a s it is"movement o f differential referring" ( 1410, in other words, n~ei~ningh;lt is differ-and also the act o f dilt'ering. Meaning is not ex tra-testu :~l. it is ronte x-

A context is. how-rated will! mea ning since it changcs with every o ther interpretative ex-;IS pure, given. lixed, etc. In tliemeaninp-as-d~/Ii:r~z~~cc~.here is always already a con-thol~pl ihat contcxt can never claini a totality.By no \\, the exasperated her ~n ene utwill point to the only "thing" (hut what i q 'it"!)se em s to escape this endless play of rii[f i:ra~~co. amely di(li;rti~'lmrc(, itself. l ' o bor-imon's (i n Michelfelder & Palmer 198'): 132) phrase. can o ne glim pse an "entirehysical mach inery" behind this position of


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course as lead ing to fragti1ent:ltion. anarchy and men~iing lessness.According to this\*iew. i f knowledge cannot he grounded ol~,iectively,eilch (lis~.ourse w i l l become independent of ;ill others. leading to lhe closure and isol;ltion o f discursive com mu nitiesT o this Derrida wou ld ansu,er. as l ie does i n Tile Priwcif)lc u l ' R r r u o ~ l:Tire L / r t i ~ . o sI r r Tile EI~L'Y?/'/IT Pr~/)ilr:.What is tilealit by conim unity and itis tiu ttio ti lnllst he reth ot ~g lit" De rrida 1983: 16). I n this text D erritla proposes a "comniunity ol'thought"that w oo ld raise new questions i n order to underst;~ndan institutio n's history as w e ll astlie specitic nomis. the fitndanlental axiomatics. rhetoric. rites and prticcdi~rcshat con-stitute that instit i~tioti15 -16 ). These new modes ol'qitestioning, Derr idn explains. arcalso "a ne w relation to language and tr;alitions, a new rrf l iu rr ~ rr i, ~ ~ ~ ,tid new ways oltaking responsibil i ty." (15 ) Tlie new responsibil it ies are described in tetms ol'a doublegesturc: they must at once kecp aliv e the mem ory of tradition and make :In opcning to-ward the furore ( 16- 171.

T w o itnportant aspects o f Derrida's n otion o f responsihi li ty should he noted. Firstly.we need to take in to itccount the notion o f a "dou~ble gestilre." The "encounter" he-tween Derrida and Ciad~umers not between two prominent. distinct philosophical tra-ditions. i t i s i ~ho u the sttttus of the metaphysical tradition. something o f \r,Iiich decon-struction is a pal-[ but, simultaneously also its other. Althouglt deconstruction uses the1;lnguage o f mcti~pliysics, ts otltelness is signified b y its subversiun o f tl t i ~ t raditic~nThus, tlte deco nstr~tctionistwrites t w o 1;tngu:iges simultaneously. one i lf h n n ; l t i v e ther~ tl ie r uh\.ersive. Hy accepting tlie danger o f try ing to overcolne m daphys ics. tl ie de-constructionist has hee d herself to unsettle the traditiona l bin ary oppositions. the"dead metaphors" that fun ction as tlncha llenged truths and demonstrate 111s power re-lations produced hy, and tlie limits o f li lnguage withirl, that tradition." Secondly, De r-r ida's interpretation o f the t low o l t i t n e io ;I syste tn d i fk rs f rom i r i~ d i t io t t ;~ lnterpreta-tions that i;~vour the present. T li e notion OI'(/~/T?ITIIIL.L' re t i i i~ id sIZ lltal not only 111s pasthut also tlic future. whatever this may be. has to be considered when we try to cstah-lish meaning. We have to take responsihility for tl ie unknownhle li ltttre. Ilowever. \vccunnot s imply fal l bnck on universal principles. This w ou ld deny the comp lexity o fth eworld. Conversely. we can alsc~ ot rr i lr~~t.verylhing. T11is w o i ~ l d e an e\,asion of ourresponsibility. Derrida (1088: 17) explains that tlic I-esponsihility t l ~ 1 1 e is trying tosituate. 11crc with regilr(ls to a tlni\;ersity system, sti l l places h i m "t l~ irlr in he itniversity.;!long with its melnory and tratlition, tlie irnperati\,e ol' professional rigour and compe-tence." De rrida takes prin cip les seriously. I t can be argued lhnl l le rri da 's approach toprinciples is suclt that we treat them O.T ifthey are universal rules. but we need to re-rnotiv;ltc the legititn.~cyot'these nlles evely tim e we use theln IC ill ie rs I O Y X : 1391.The central problelnatic o f Derrida's "second question" is n challenge to tlie hertne-tierlr ic pc~sti~latioltf a f i~ s i on l l tor izon s. A t s lake is t l ie impl icat ion of ' Derr ida 's con-tention that there is no "defin itive" context. nanicly , a new, residing of ;I text cannotme rely be incorporated \v ith in at1 already "exisling" context. ' l l ~ i s oint i s one o f the~ ~ --I I !3> \vny d '~~x :~ r~~p Ic ,)cmid:~ 10$%,1: 81 ~,rilat l w c ~ lh ia rchpoaco JL A~ls t i t15 l c ~ ~ rv I),,l,iy:.$ l l ' ~ I

If;,rdr 1I1;11 ihc cnnri


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erences between D errida and Gadamer: the latter is sti l l too concerned w it h as i o n fperspecti\,es to rcalise ;I radical "break" i n the context. whereas D errida per-an-other read ing :S n restructuring of the context. Different rererents wouldture" he text di l le ren tly - a co ntinu ing process that cannot be comp leted.n m in d Dcrrickl's rejection o f decision-mnking based only on c;~lculatian.

uld not be nbstrnct n ~ l e shat one b lin dl y adheres to. O n what grounds does one em-y a particular set o f "quiisi-protocols" i n order to establish whether o r not sum r-for instance. a specilic interpretation o f a text. is good'! The answer to this ques-n points once again to tl ie p oss ihility of a m inim al consensus. whic h i s a key aspectDerricki's "third" question.3

third question continues the crit ique o f(ia da lne rts claim that the underlying stnlc-e nfun der stan din g ("Verstehen") is a "gond will." leading to tl ie pos sihility o f con-sus. I ler rida ( i n Michelfeld cr & Palmer 1089: 53) asks whether "the precondition1i~1:srchcrr. ar from be ing the con tinu ity o f [r/i[iort [what C aikimer w ou ld cal l con-us or m ~ tt u a l nderstanding]. is not rather the in te rn ~p tio n f rop/)or/. a certainjx ~ r r f nterruption. the suspending o f ;!I1 niecliatiun." Derrida's questinn is a cr i t i -o f cia dam el.'^ ~~ssump t ionIi;~t when partners in dialogue show tl ie good w il l toi t beconies possible to rem ove tlie "otherness" o f the otherachieve m t ~ t u a l nderstanding. The "otliei'cannot be understood i n any nth#-rway

i-om tli e wou ltl-he onderstander's o w n perspective.n a footnote at the end o f Tile P01iti1:c f fF rie lld ~h il~ . De rrida (1988b: 644) writes:endship. tl ie relat ion with out dependence. w ithout episode and yet in to whi ch en-n al l t lie s i~ np l ic i t y f l it$. passes by way o f he recognit ion of t l i e comlnon slrange-s that does not a llo w us to speak o f o u r friends. but only to speak to them ..." Fromation, it is evident that D errir ln w ou ld perceive the Garlamerinn pursuit o f over-a l i in i i o f \ . i o lm ce that has i ts roots in a ~netapl iys icaldit ion that emphasises uni\rersaliry over differentiation. or consensus over alterity.cor ding to Derritla. the encounter \v il l i the other is always already tnarketl b y asym-

wi th a w i l l to power.s w i l l a, pow er is evident i n the gesture o f receiving t lie other f rom one's own per-ive. thus rend ering the understanding o f t l i e other an exercise i n .rcll:interest. i nlie other to prnduce a "s;~me" that cc~incitleswith one's own interest. Whiledarner concedes that w e encounter one another w it h preiudice, he ~ieverthe less ns-tes the pos sibility o f a com me nsur~ ihi l i ty rnught o n by m utu ;~l greement.& Palmer 198s: 263) perceives o f a deconstructiim thatuld eye with suspicion a positio n that purchases "deep truths b y deep violence." bytliat w hic h disturhs the un ity ot'a system o ftr ut h. i.e. those who trouble the

f truth w it h their "otherness." When Gadanier suggests at the he gin nin g o fnter w ith De rr id ;~ l i ;~t the r~n iversa l la im o f hemieneutics i s beyond a11


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charge ol'obscurantism. I n dialogue. writes Keam ey (lOL)?: 4). "One milst seek to saywhat one nieans w tlie other and to try to underst;tnd what the other means to say."This wou ld require. as I je rrid n h i~ n s e lf oints out i n an already lnentioned citation, aleast a m in im al com mitme nt to consensus. :ind the minimu111 requirement be ing tha";In ethic:ll ol lie r must li rs l have itddrcssed the subject i n a Inngoage that the sub jeccan hear and (at least niininlally) understand" (Kcarney 1993: 1). 1 is interesting tonote tw o different emphases in D erridn's ltse o f l ie term "obscurantism."

Firstly, in his text on the raison d'i-Ire o f t l l r i~ n iv e rs i~ y .e r ri d ;~ 19X.7: I ) uggestthat nih i l ism nnd obscur;tntis~n ie in wait "when on occasion great professors 01- eprescntotives o f prestigious institutions lose ill1 sense o f propo nion and con trol: on suchoccasions they fhrgc t the PI-inci le\ that tlie y cl t t i n ~ 0 dctbn


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1. Philos. 2nfl3. 221 1 ) I?ie latter's concept of "good will." which fo rnls the hasis of l'i,r.~lrhmr could neve r

observation." Tlie fact that good will is not "axiomatic" seiiouslystions the validity of Gadam er's cla im to tlie universality o f hernieneutics.ards An Ethic nf Discussion

Everywhere, in particul;~ r in the U nited States and in Europe. thesellldeclared philosophers. theoreticians. and ideologists of communica-tion. dialogue, and consenstls. of univncity and transparency, those whoclaini ccaselcssly to reinstate the classical ethics of' proof, discussion.c~nd xchange. are m ost often those who excuse thelnselves rrom atten-ti\.ely reading ant1 listening to the other. who demonstrate precipitationand dognlatism, and who no longer respect the elem enti~ ry ules of phi-lology and of interpretation. conlbnnding science and chi~tter s thoughthey had not the slightest taste for communication or rather as thoughthey are afraid of' i t ... (Derrida 19XXa: 156-157)

f i ~ rt wou ld he fa ir to iisserc that Derrida p rovides colnpel-nts why we sho uld question "com~ iiunication"as an ax iom from wh!cli de-f "good will" as an un-axiolii. D errida chilllenges the mo st prohleniatic aspect o f Tc,.~r ~ i n dntpi-o the ~lniversl~li tyf herme neutics on the basis o fkind's shored capacity to iinderstond. In oppositinn. Derridn ;lrgues t i ~ rhe tln-

rlability o f meaning. His response mny cretlte the impression that deconstruc tionemphasises the irnpossihility of pure ulidentanding and thus tlie inip~ssihilityt the lieart of such an interpretation 01' deconstruction is a l,i-(iinpossihilityipossihility. com~nunica t ioninon-co~nn~i~niunt ionure under-- r no hnderst;~nding.etc.), which I;~ils to ta ke ac co un t of" ~ o r k i n e s "of difli;r.


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h i m its 'original ' desire-to-say-what-one means" ( IC)XXa: 12); meaning cannot hecons trained b y context; and "understanding" cannot he attained throng11 tlie fus ion ol icrnieneotic horizons since these horizons assume the decidability o i ruth. Thus, Der-rid;? ch:tllenges the notion ol' :I dialogue that is i~nderstoodo be "someone sayingsomething to someone uhol~tsomething" tl iat opens tl ie pos sib il ity o f agreemenl t ie a ~ n e y 093: 41.Tl ie "third" ql~ es tio n hallenges Ciadarner's postulation of' dialogic model o f understanding tliat strives lowards consensus, which does not include a strong enough recog nition o f'tl ie -'otherness" o f tl ie other. When De rritla i isks i n Tire Polir ic.~?/./.'rirrldx11ip that we respect tlie "in fin ite distance" in our movement towards untlerstanding theother (1YX8h: 644). it is not to be co n ii~ se dvit l i t l ie notion ol ' :~ r:r lical ly other." Der-rida's vie\\ o r the other does not r id the other 01' its "otherness." no r does it snc~iui-a gan absolute otlicrness. Th is is i l lustrated hy the esample that even il io ug h Derrida maywant to be onderstood. as adamer suggests, and t l i ~ ~ sot c la im absolute otherness. idoes not f i l lo w th:~t such ;In ~ ~ n d c rs ta n i l i~ igntails that Gadamer should necessarilyugrw wi th Dcrrida's undcrst;~nding. ' l iis w i l l amount to the exclusion o f diffcrencc. Inthis r e p ~ r d . i~ p u lo l9 9 9 : 187) observes t liat. l i i r Derri1l:t. reading and writ in g require;I certain kind o f l i iend sh ip. I-lowe\,er. this fi.ientlsliip that De rrida p us t~ ~ la te smust nothe weighed d ow n h y t lie baggage o f t l ie classical axiomatic o f l i iends hip" (187). i no ther words. convm t iuna l notions o f f r ien~lsh ip n terms o f proximi ty . l i~m i l ia r i tyun i ty ;~n dShision (1x4) . Instead. the Friend wou ld be thought o l' in ternls O F distance. ir-re ~ lu c ih le lterity and strangeness (1x4) .

De rridea o fi.iendsliip is an alternative to the liiend sh ip rierived li.o~ii the "regulartime" and "homogenous space" described i n tlie philosophic;il tra dil ion (190).whereby the "other" is con tracted to [l ie same. into fratel-nity. Caputo argues that theliistciry o f friendship. or. t i~ rlia1 matter. any history o r tradition, is not liotnogcn eor~since it is marked by domin3nt structures tliat silence and repress others 1Iq.i). 'l'hisorre responds l o 1)errida's contention th:~tacademic d isct~ssions re inte rt i~se d i th v i wlence. Den- id;^ (IYRXa: 118. 139. 155) refers to, for instance, the tendency to cri tic ise adialogue partner directly or u sing insults and abusive :~nalogies c l im inlerprering tentsi11ste:rd of cit in g his wo rk i n context, not on ly as a means ol 'cri t icising hy way ot'dem-onstration, hut also to un derline the extent to whic h one may agree w it h him . I l o w -ever. we have shown tli:~t he reconstitution ol'context. w llic h is a precundition ol' tl ieethics i~ l'discussion, on;~uoidahly mp lies p olitic s hecause i t in\,olves exclusion. There-fiirc. Derridn urges an avoidance of funliering one's own interest if t lic cost o f doin gso in\,olves mnking er-rors. not understanding. rcading badly. and not respecting thepragmatic. grnnunatical, or ~ n o r a l ules ( 151). I n short, Dsr rid a a(l\,oc;ttes respect forit n other's ~ , o r kn its entirely even when ~x irt ic ula r spects o ft h a t work may be prob-lematized (14 0).

Caputo suggests that for Derrida li i e n d s l~ ip s marked by ~ l i [ f i ' r ~ i r r c~~ :hcrcfore. thefriend is ;tlways a l r c ~ d y t~lr


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Afr. J. Philos. 2003. 221 I ) 17i t in thest direct m anner possible (19X8a: 114).

The distance that marks one's relationship w ith the other does not sig nif y our mu tualation; instead. this space provides the op po rllln ity for comnluniciltion. Derrida i s10 admit that certain ol ' l i is wril ings and deconstrt~ctivepractices call into

y. He explains thnt l i i s style o f deconstruction aims at m ak ing legible the oslensi-f-evident tn ~th s.whether philosoph ici~l,ethica l or political. that lhide beneatli the( 1 13). A1 the same tim e he is "fnr rafcguartls. fo r m e n -y - he j n ~ l o u s onservation - of numerous traditions" ( 14 1 ). Since Derrida takes ac-nt of traditions he is at once its "less passive. m orc ;~ ttentiv e and mo reheir." and more foreign to i t (1 30 ). Th is is w'hy l i i s style of clecon-uctive w ri t in g or double w ri t in g "must inevitably pa rl i t ion i tselt'along tw o sides o f ni t and continue (up to a certain point) to respect thc ~ u l e s f th;~twhich i t decon-cts or o f which i t exposes the decotlstruc tihility" (152 ). Tliererore, deconstructionnot to b e equated w ith a rejection ol'the traditions associated wi th academic dis-ad, Derrida w ishes to "not close the discussion. hot to give it a fresh( 154).

What does this "fresh start" entail'! De rrida urges us not to reduce inte rloc utio n l o amfo rtable a R ~ i retu,een "those in the know ." no r to a conlm ntatio n between adver-ies un w ill in g to make the el'lbrt to suspend the ir preconceptions. We have 70 con-the real difliculties inv olv ed in dealing w ith difference. Th is mig ht inearl, as incase o f hc cliscussion w ith G:~damer. hat the flnw o f the conversation we have he-sed to. h i ~ so be tlisrupted.

.A. 1995. Philoso phizing the doohlc-hind: D ele t~z eeads N ietzsche. P l r i l f ~ . v r ~ ~Toilfly. 39(4) W inter I')O5. pp. 371-385.P. 1998a. Con!plr.vin. at111Posmrode,?r;,rrr~. Url~l~r.nnurt(,'i,rp Cbnrp1e.r S~:v/(~rn.v.

London: Routledge.P. I99Xh. O n Der ritla and Aparthe id. Sorrrh q/ih.n~~orrr?ral of P l r i l ~ ~ . s o ~17( 1 ). pp. 75-88.

ill iers. P. 2001. Rounddries, Hierarch ies and Netw orks i n Com plex Systems. l.vferrla-t i ~ ~ n a l . / ~ ~ r r r n t r ll ' lr in n ~ a rk ~ n !~rrrir~i~rirerrr. ( ? ) ,pp. 135-117.D. 19x7. Ro riico lI~/~~I~IPIIPII~~(:Fcpririnn.


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Derrida, J. IYXRh. The Politics o f Friendship. ./r~rrrrrrrlu / ' P / r i l ~ ~ s r ~ l ~ h ~ ~ .5. I V X I I . pp.632-648.(iildalner. I - t i . IL )75. f i l r rh i r t z r l h,lc,rlrt~f/. London: Slieed and Wilrd.I iealy. P. 1996. Siu~atedR:~tionality and llermensuric Understanding: A GadnmerianApproach l o R n t i o n n l i t y . l r r t t ~ r ~ ~ ~ r r k ~ r ~ n lh i / o s f ~ l d ~ i l ~ r l /) r r o r r ~ r - ~ ~ .6 (2 ) : pp.1 5 - 1 7 1 .Ksarncy, I


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Derrida Gadamer and the Ethics of Discussion