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Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid CHRIS MARCOUX THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY CHRISTIAN PERATSAKIS UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

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Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid. Chris Marcoux The College of William and Mary Christian Peratsakis University of Texas. Augmenting Available Data. Improving the breadth of coverage - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Do the Strong Receive What They Can?

Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

C H R I S M A R C O U XT H E C O L L E G E O F W I L L I A M A N D M A R Y

C H R I S T I A N P E R AT S A K I SU N I V E R S I T Y O F T E X A S

Page 2: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid
Page 3: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Augmenting Available Data

I. Improving the breadth of coverage Adding multilateral and bilateral donors not reporting to OECD DAC Moving beyond ODA by including other types of aid flows Adding additional years of data for existing donors (e.g. IDA)

II. Improving the depth of coverage Adding more detail for existing project records

Documents Descriptions Co-financiers

Page 4: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Getting the Data

OECD CRSDonor Documents: Annual Reports, Project Factsheets

Historical Data Often not digitized

Webscraping: Online donor data Reliable; Quick; Automatically updated New information captured readily

Direct from Donors: Phone; Email; Site Visits Official; Primary source Difficulties of winning donor cooperation

Page 5: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

$0

$20,000,000,000

$40,000,000,000

$60,000,000,000

$80,000,000,000

$100,000,000,000

$120,000,000,000

$140,000,000,000

$160,000,000,000

$180,000,000,000

$200,000,000,000

CRS CRS Augmented Non Dac

Total Development Flows in AidData by YearMillions (2000 USD)

Page 6: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

List of FieldsBlue = New in AidData

AidData 1.0 has 67 variables: Donor Project ID Donor Code/Name Beneficiary Location Recipient Code/Name Source Source Detail Source Type Contacts/Role of Contact Financing Agency Implementing Agency Other Organization Commitment Date (not

available in online version of CRS)

End Date Start Date Year Commitment Original Currency Disbursement Original

Currency Total Cost Commitment Constant Commitment Current Flow Code Grace Period Grant Element Interest Rate

Investment Marker Date of first/last repayment Number of repayments per year Type of repayment Status Tied Aid, Partially Tied Aid, Untied Aid Description (long) Description, original language Short description Title Title, original language Biodiversity Marker Climate Change Marker CRS Purpose Code/Name (partially new, we

imputed values for the data we added) Environmental Impact Assessment Marker Freestanding Technical Cooperation Gender Equality Marker PDGG Marker Sector Name/Code Sector Programme Aid AidData Activity Codes/Descriptions AidData Dominant Sector Code/Name AidData Feasibility Study Marker AidData Technical Assistance Marker Notes

Page 7: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Aid From Recipient Perspectives

When Small Donors Matter: Small donors can still have a

big impact in specific countries

Example: Mauritania in 2007 Existing sources of data

misses 61% of the flows Mauritania received.

Existing Data 39%

New AidData

Data61%

Total Aid given to Mauritania in 2007 (in USD 2000):

Existing Data vs. PLAID Augmented Data

Page 8: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Composition of Flows to Africa

•0%=All Aid from Traditional Donors•100%=All Aid fromNon-Traditional Donors

Page 9: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Annual reports and websites of donor agencies emphasize the high levels of environmental degradation experienced by recipient countries.

Recipient governments complain of donor-dominated environmental agendas that focus on regional and global threats and neglect development (as well as local environmental needs).

Who is right?

Page 10: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Categorizing Environmental Assistance

5-point ordinal scale

Environmental, Strictly Defined (ESD)

Environmental, Broadly Defined (EBD)

Neutral (N)

Dirty, Broadly Defined (DBD)

Dirty, Strictly Defined (DSD)

Page 11: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Categorizing Environmental Benefit

All environmentally friendly projects (ESD or EBD) are further coded by scope:

Green Global or Regional Environmental Problemsex: climate, ozone depletion, biodiversity

Brown Local / National Environmental Problemsex: drinking water treatment, soil erosion

Page 12: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Tracking Environmental Aid

19801981

19821983

19841985

19861987

19881989

19901991

19921993

19941995

19961997

19981999

20002001

20022003

20042005

20062007

2008$0

$20,000,000,000

$40,000,000,000

$60,000,000,000

$80,000,000,000

$100,000,000,000

$120,000,000,000

$140,000,000,000

$160,000,000,000

Dirty

Neutral

Environmental

Page 13: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Environmental Aid & Additionality

19801981

19821983

19841985

19861987

19881989

19901991

19921993

19941995

19961997

19981999

20002001

20022003

20042005

20062007

2008$0

$20,000,000,000

$40,000,000,000

$60,000,000,000

$80,000,000,000

$100,000,000,000

$120,000,000,000

$140,000,000,000

$160,000,000,000

$180,000,000,000

$200,000,000,000

EnvironmentalNeutralDirty

Page 14: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Green|Brown Aid & Additionality

19801981

19821983

19841985

19861987

19881989

19901991

19921993

19941995

19961997

19981999

20002001

20022003

20042005

20062007

2008$0

$2,000,000,000

$4,000,000,000

$6,000,000,000

$8,000,000,000

$10,000,000,000

$12,000,000,000

$14,000,000,000

$16,000,000,000

$18,000,000,000

GreenBrown

Page 15: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Green|Brown Aid & Additionality

19801981

19821983

19841985

19861987

19881989

19901991

19921993

19941995

19961997

19981999

20002001

20022003

20042005

20062007

2008$0

$2,000,000,000

$4,000,000,000

$6,000,000,000

$8,000,000,000

$10,000,000,000

$12,000,000,000

$14,000,000,000

$16,000,000,000

$18,000,000,000

GreenBrown

Page 16: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Environmental Aid: Bilateral & Multilateral

19801981

19821983

19841985

19861987

19881989

19901991

19921993

19941995

19961997

19981999

20002001

20022003

20042005

20062007

2008$0

$2,000,000,000

$4,000,000,000

$6,000,000,000

$8,000,000,000

$10,000,000,000

$12,000,000,000

Bilateral DonorsMultilateral Donors

Page 17: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Environmental Aid Type: Bilateral Donors

19801981

19821983

19841985

19861987

19881989

19901991

19921993

19941995

19961997

19981999

20002001

20022003

20042005

20062007

2008$0

$2,000,000,000

$4,000,000,000

$6,000,000,000

$8,000,000,000

$10,000,000,000

$12,000,000,000

GreenBrown

Page 18: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Environmental Aid Type: Multilateral Donors

19801981

19821983

19841985

19861987

19881989

19901991

19921993

19941995

19961997

19981999

20002001

20022003

20042005

20062007

2008$0

$1,000,000,000

$2,000,000,000

$3,000,000,000

$4,000,000,000

$5,000,000,000

$6,000,000,000

$7,000,000,000

$8,000,000,000

GreenBrown

Page 19: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Top Recipients of Environmental Aid

1980s ($5.08) 1990s ($2.80) 2000s ($2.26)1. Brazil $134.97 1. China $2.09 1. China $2.78

2. Egypt $9.50 2. Brazil $5.40 2. India $2.92

3. India $5.36 3. India $2.57 3. Russia $0.64

4. Philippines $1.21 4. Philippines $1.43 4. Vietnam $2.75

5. Indonesia $1.50 5. Mexico $10.17 5. Brazil $3.81

6. Korea $195.36 6. Indonesia $1.86 6. Morocco $4.83

7. Bangladesh $0.43 7. Egypt $5.89 7. Indonesia $1.22

8. Turkey $142.34 8. Argentina $11.25 8. Mexico $4.88

9. Algeria n/a 9. Turkey $10.85 9. Iraq $113.02

10. Mexico $6158.76 10. Thailand $4.83 10. Bangladesh $2.01

Page 20: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Namibia Aid Portfolio

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008$0

$50,000,000

$100,000,000

$150,000,000

$200,000,000

$250,000,000

Page 21: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Namibia Aid Portfolio (cont’d)

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008$0

$5,000,000

$10,000,000

$15,000,000

$20,000,000

$25,000,000

$30,000,000

Page 22: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

Next Steps

Develop and test a model of environmental aid allocation that accounts for recipients’ interests and power. Since these may vary by issue, I focus on environmental transfers

related to biological diversity – one of the two major treaties negotiated at UNCED.

Examine how much aid is given under the umbrella of MEAs (financial transfers) and assess success of financial transfers in building capacity (completeness of nat’l reporting)

Page 23: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid
Page 24: Do the Strong Receive What They Can? Explaining the Allocation of Environmental Aid

“Greening Aid” allocation model

1. Ecofunctionalism1. Aid correlates with environmental significance of recipients2. Donors will target recipients with poor environmental quality

2. Institutionalism1. Donors will target recipients based on revealed preferences2. Donors will favor governments that provide credible/verifiable information

about environmental performance

3. Realpolitik1. “Loyal” recipients will receive more aid2. Donors will disproportionately favor large recipients

4. Liberalism1. Donors will favor trading partners