DOrTMENT RESUME

ED 361 238 SO 022 852

AUTHOR Tien, H. Yuan; And OthersTITLE China's Demographic Dilemmas.

INSTITUTION Population Reference Bureau, Inc., Washington,

D.C.

REPORT NO ISSN-0032-468X

PUB DATE Jun 92NOTEPUB TYPE Collected Works - Serials (022) Reports

Research/Technical (143)

JOURNAL CIT Population Bulletin; v47 nl Jun 1992

EDRS PRICE MF01/FC03 Plus Postage.

DESCRIPTORS Birth Rate; *Demography; Family Planning; Family

Size; Foreign Countries; Foreign Culture; Human

Geography; Mortality Rate; *Population Growth;

*Population Trends; *Public Policy; Social Science

ResearchIDENTIFIERS *China

ABSTRACTChina's herculean efforts tO SIJW the increase of its

giant population appear to have worked: the annual birth rate fell

from about 35 births per 1,000 in the 1950s to 20 per 1,000 in the

1990s. This bulletin examines the development and consequences of the

strict population planning control measures introduced in the 1970s,

and strengthened in the early 1980s. Success of these measures has

led to a rapid aging of the population, a marriage squeeze, charges

of female infanticide, and international approbation and censure.

Meanwhile, the huge momentum of the Chinese population base has

continued to add 17 million persons annually; and the total is

expected to top 1.3 billion by the year 2000. The growing numbers

exert considerable pressure on urban areas, as well as the country's

labor force, and education and health systems. Aithough economic

development and reforms have improved life for many Chinese, there is

a widening gap between residents of rural and urban areas. In

addition, industrialization, combined with China's large population,

are contributing to a serious deterioration of the country's natural

resources. (Ten discussion questions are included, as well as 21

figures/tables/exhibits. Contains 16 references to selected readings

and 63 endnotes.) (Author)

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Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made

from the original document.***********************************************************************

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China's Demographic Dilemmas

Introduction 2Demographic Surge During the 20th Century 4China's Demographic Transition 6The Struggle to Regulate Fertility 8Population and Development 24The Future 37

References 41

Suggested Readings 43Discussion Questions 44

Boxes

1. China's Household Registration System 272. China's Entry into the Global Economy 29

Figures

1. The People's Republic of China, 1990 31' Population Growth in China, 1949-1990 5

3. Birth and Death Rates in China, 1949-1991 64. Decline in Chinese Fertility, 1950-1990 11

5. Sex Ratios at Birth, 1970-1987 15

6. China's Population by Age and Sex, 1990 19

7. Population Age 65 and Older in China, 1990-2020 21

8. Working-Age Population in China, 1953-1990 309. Projection of China's Population, 1990-2050 38

Tables

1. IUD Insertions, S ilizations, and Abortions in China, 1971-1989 12

2. Abortion Ratios by Province, China, 1989 14

3. Sex Ratios of Men and Women Born 1955-1965,China and Selected Places 18

4. Principal Population Figures for China, 1990 and 1982 Censuses 225. China's Ethnic Minority Groups, 1964, 1982, and 1990 236. Provincial Population Data, 1990 25

7. Schools and School Enrollment in China, Selected Years, 1975-1989 31

8. China's Health Care Resources, Selected Years, 1975-1989 329. Selected Economic Indicators for China, 1980 and 1989 3310. Availability of Selected Consumer Items, 1978 and 1989 34

POPULATION BULLETINVol. 47, No. 1June 1992

H. Yuan Tien i.- Professor Emeritus ofSociology at the Ohio State University. He haspublished extensively in the area of China'spopulation trends and demographic policies.His latest book China's Strategic Demo-graphic Initiative, was published in 1991.

Mang Tianlu is Professor at the Instituteof Population Science, Beijing College ofEconomics, specializing in the demography ofChina's ethnic minorities.

China'sDemographicDilemmasBy H. Yuan Tien, with Mang Tianhi, Ping Yu, Li faigneng,and Liang Thongtang

2

Ping Yu obtained his Ph.D. in Sociology/Demography from Cornell University. Hisintensts focus on adolescent fertility, familyplanning program evaluation, and survey?march.

fingneng serves as Professor ofEconomics and Director of the Office ofPopulation Research, Nankai University. Hisspecial interests are in the areas of economic.sand population.

Liang Zhongtang is Deputy Director ofthe Shanxi Academy of Social Sciences. A selftaught demographer, he has published in theareas of population planning and fertilityand marriage trends.

Note: The views of the author do notnecessarily nflea those of the contributors orthe Population Reference Bureau.

5

The year 2000 will mark the end of themost tumultuous century in China'spopulation history. In a country thathas weathered the demographic effectsof devastating famines, wars, andepidemics for millennia, the populationgrowth and change that occurred in the20th century have no precedent. At thedawn of this century, there were some426 million people living in China. Bythe year 2000, the Chinese populationis officially projected to top the 1.3billion mark. About twothirds of thisnearly 900 million increase was addedwithin the last 50 years, as mortality wasreduced amid high fertility rates.

The impact of this rapid surge in"demographic affluence" sapped theChinese government's professed faithin the virtue of a large and growingpopulation and spurred a move to curbfertility. China's strategic demographicinitiatives (here referred to as SDI)born out of population anxietiesfanned by the nation's economicaspirations and realitieswere amilestone in the world's annals ofpopulation affairs.

China's population policies arecomprehensive in scope and unique inthrust. The government installed a fullmenu of measures for curbing fertility,embracing delayed marriage, steriliza-tion, all known contraceptive methods,and abortion. Exhortations, campaigns,monetary and material incentives, andnumerous other sanctions were appliedto implement the policies. All theseefforts were, at first, to redirect youngcouples to have fewer offspring and,later, to heed the one-child-per-couple,or "minimal reproduction," policy.

The intent of this call for minimalreproduction was to keep the popula-tion from exceeding 1.2 billion by theyear 2000. The tactics have provedproblematic inside the country andcontroversial abroad for practical,political, ethical, and religious reasons.Moreover, the hoped-for populationgoal has become moot in light of thehigher projected population total forthe beginning of the 21st century. Doesthis mean that China's bid to control

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population growth has been flawed or afailure altogether? If it has failed, whyand where has it foundered? If not,what has China's SDI accomplished?

The massive gain in population inrecent decades has intensified olddifficulties in the country's effort toraise living standards, and ignited neweconomic, environmental, and socialconcerns within the nation's borders.The major issues range from China'spopulation carrying capacity, underem-ployment and unemployment in thecountryside, surging urbanization, andspreading air and water pollution tomass illiteracy and education in relationto development. The national effort toslow population growth itself has added

55-7773r

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China's 1.2 billion people make up one-fifth of the world's total.

4BEST COPY AVAILABLE

such new concerns as the effect of sonpreference on female infanticide andthe sex ratio, the impact of a speedyfertility transition on population aging,and the implications of exempting thecountry's 55 minority groups from thenation's fertility control measures.

The global significance of China'sdemographics is likewise enormous.Whatever the size of China's totalpopulation at the dawn of the 21stcentury, it is certain to account for closetA 20 percent of the world's projectedpopulation of 6.3 billion. China'sindustrialization, modernization,expanding use of natural resources, andrising consumption will increasinglydisrupt the earth's ecosystem.

Population size, growth, and controlare the most pressing challengesaffecting China's demographic future.Old and new problems of populationdistribution and composition, however,are no less urgent This Bulletin exam-ines these and other issues affecting thepresent and future well-being of theChinese population.

Demographic SurgeDuring the 20thCenturyChina's population total first passed the400 million mark about 1850. Thislandmark event had its quiet begin-nings in the late 1600s as living condi-tions improved enough to supportsustained, slow population growth overthe following two centuries. But, amidinternal upheavals and externalincursions, demographic growthstagnated. The population hoveredaround 426 million as the 20th centuryopened.

Internecine warfai e, natural calami-ties, and foreign invasions continued toplay havoc with China's hundreds ofmillions during the first half of thepresent century. Incomplete populationcounts reinforce the perception ofdemographic stagnation. The firstnational census, taken in 1953 after the

Figure 2Population Growth in China, 1949-1990

1200

1000

p00L.=

6005

8- 400

01949 1959 1969

Sourco: Notional Rani ly Planning Commission of CNA&

end of the civil war and the establish-ment of the People's Republic in 1949,recorded a larger than expectedpopulation of 583 million. Since then,there have been three additionalnational enumerations in 1964, 1982,and 1990.

In between the censuses, year-endpopulation estimates appeared intermit-tently. The quality of these estimatessuffered in part because of the 20-yearneglect of demographic affairs andstudies in China after 1957.

The censuses a 1953 and 1964 werelimited in content and yielded only afew hand-tabulated statistics. The veryexistence of the 1964 census was notconfirmed until 1979. But in the moreopen climate of the 1980s, the ThirdNational Census in 1982 gained aninternational audience. Tabulationswere accelerated by the romputertechnology China received under afinancial and technical aid agreementwith the United Nations PopulationFund (UNFPA). The collection of themost massive amounts and varied sortsof population data ever was an interna-tionally important success. For the firsttime, it produced relatively accurate

1979 1999

information about China's populationcircumstances.

The 1982 census enumerated ahigher population total than had beenestimated by the National StatisticalBureau. It also provided the first solidbasis on which to evaluate previouspopulation ..rtiriates, and confu-rnedChina's emergence as the world's firstdemographic billionaire just before theend of 1981 (see Figure 2).

The Fourth National Census in 1990placed the total population at 1.134billion. This new total revealed thatestimates during the intercensal periodonce more understated China's popula-tion size. At the end of 1989, the year-end total was estimated at 1.112 billion,21.7 million below the census total onlysix months later. China's populationhad grown faster during the 1980s thanpreviously estimated.

The sheer enormity of the surgesince 1950 is reason enough for a closescrutiny of China's newest popuhdonchapter. However, what has made thischapte:. most intriguing and extraordi-nary goes beyond the swelling numbers;it is the events and policy changes thataccompanied the surge.

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5

6

China'sDemographicTransitionThe events that unfolded since the1950s are part of one of the fastest, ifnot the fastest, demographic transitionsin history. Most industrialized countriesunderwent a fundamental shift fromextremely high to low mortality andfertility rates in the 19th and 20thcenturies, and many expect today'sdeveloping countries to experience thesame sort of demographic transition.Characteristically, morality rites fallfirst as a result of improved hygiene andliving standards, followed by declines infertility. China's cit ographic transitiontook place within recent decades, afraction of the time it took for Euro-pean and other industrialized countriesto realize low fertility and mortality.

In most of the years between 1949and 1974, the annual gain in populationexceeded 2 percent. The few exceptionsresulted from severe policy errors andnatural disasters. Widespread famine

followed the Great Leap Forward in1958-1961, readily evident in thesharply higher death rates and plum-meting birth rates in these years (seeFigure 3). China's population actuallydeclined during this period, but growthquickly rebounded after 1961 as thebirth rate resumed its traditionally highlevels when economic conditionsimproved.

Had the pace of the mid-1960spersisted, the Chinese populationwould have doubled to more than 1.1billion in the mid-1970s. Because of thesubsequent sharp drop in fertility,China did not reach this total until theend of 1989. Behind this 15-yearpostponement lay China's phenomenaldemographic transidon from high tolow fertility. The annual rate of growthdove to and has hovered around 1.5percent or less since the mid-1970s,making earlier growth rates appear tobe from a different nation.

This slowdown in the growth rate isremarkable even though, as will beshown later, disagreement has beenloud and long over its salience inrelation to China's on-going economic

Figure 3Birth and Death Rates in China, 1949-1991

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1949

Birth rate

Death rate

1959 1969 1979 1989

Source: Nacional Family Planning Commission of China.

1 0

development and to the nation'spopulation carrying capacity.

China's rapid demographic transi-don took the world by surprise. Few hadforeseen the possibility of such a quickremission in growth. Perhaps, thepolitics of population numbers or thescarcity of demographic data or bothhindered clairvoyance in this case.

The initial reductions in mortalityillustrate the new government's successin improving health and living stan-dards. With peace restored within andmedical technology borrowed fromwithout., the shift to lower mortalitythe first component of its demographictransitionquickly followed. Most ofthe mortality improvement was realizedby the end of the 1960s, The subse-quently lower rates (7 deaths per 1,000population, or lower) largely reflect theyoung population age structure shapedby high fertility.

Average life expectancy at birthsoared from less than 42 years in the1950s to about 67 years by the end ofthe 1980s. By world standards, China'slife expectancy is high given its relativelylow per capita income. Infant mortalityalso fell sharply over the past fourdecades. Nearly 200 of every 1,000babies died before age one in the earlyyears of the People's Republic. By theearly 1990s, many more newborns weresurviving to adulthood. The infantmortality rate had fallen below 40deaths per 1,000 births.

Falling Fek tilityBirth rates in the high-30s and low-40spersisted for almost two decades after1949. The sharp rise in rates af'ter theirprecipitous fall between 1959 and 1961underscores the speed with whichfertility can resume its traditional levelonce adverse circumstances subside.

With falling death rates, continuedhigh fertility caused the population toboom. During the late 1950s, a briefattempt was made to promote familyplanning in the interest of maternal andinfant health. It produced only afleeting impact, as did the next short

lived revival of family planning effortsduring the early 1960s. The fits andstarts in promoting fertility limitationreflected, among other things, thepolitical tune of the day: "Revolutionplus production," as Mao Zedongproclaimed in 1949, would enableChina to feed and employ the country'slarge and growing population.' Thisauthoritative pronouneement, rooted inpart in an absence of understanding ofdetnographic dynamics, helped keepfertility at the prevailing high levels.

The total population topped the 840million mark at the end of 1969, andgrowth continued unabated as thecrude birth rate persisted above 50births per 1,000 population. Meanwhile,new policy measures aimed at energiz-ing the economy, such as the GreatLeap Fiat-iv-aid and the People's Com-munes, failed to increase productivity orliving standards. The economy stag-nated, the population continued toexpand, and there seemed no way outof the predicament.

These rapid twists and turns ofeventsand continuing efforts todevelopprompted the launching ofChina's SDI. As a result, Chinese fertilitydecelerated, plummeting nearly 50percent between 1970 and 1979, from34 to below 18 births per 1,000 popula-tion. No further large drops haveoccurred, which suggests that the limitto population planning may have beenreached given China's current socioeco-nomic circumstances. In the 1980s,however, various revisions in populationcontrol measures, changes ;n the agestructure, and fluctuations in age atmarriage operated to lift fertility a littlefrom the all-time lows of the late 1970s.The birth rate fluctuated around 21during the 1980s, and the 1991 birthrate estimate was only slightly lower, at19.7 births per 1,000.

The deceleration in the reproductivecadence in China after 1970 wasremarkable. China brought about thesecond dimension of the demographictransition, low fertility, in less time thanit took to realize mortality reductions.More noteworthy, the huge slowdown in

azinese fertilitydecelenderl,

plannmetingnearly 50 percentbetween 1970 and1979.

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Ethnic msnonties, numbering 91 million in 1990, are exempt from the onechild-per-couple

childbearing was achieved in onedecade, far less than the 50 to 75 yearsmost European countries took toaccomplish their fertility transition.

In speed and scope, China's demo-graphic transition is extraordinary evenwmpared with other Asian countriessuch as Thailand, South Korea, andJapan, which have undergone rapidfertility declines since 1950. Thedeployment of China's revolutionarySDI is a watershed for what is the mostcomprehensive, determined, andsuccessful effort ever made to regulatepopulation growth in any modernnation.

What was the thinking behind thisall-out attempt to lasso fertility? Flow didthe efforts succeed in lowering birthrates in a society still undergoingsocioeconomic development? Why didthe population planning programssucceed when other government-directed programs, such as the GreatLeap Forward and People's Communesfailed? What can other developingcountries learn from China's experi-ence? The evolution of the Chineseapproaches to and achievements inmanaging population affairs are whatmake China's newest populationchapter especially engrossing.

The Struggle toRegulate FertilityChina's theories and policies towardpopulation growth have undergoneprofound changes during the last threedecades. The first moves to promotepopulation planning, in the 1950s andagain in the early 1960s, extolledfertility control in the name of maternaland infant well-being. China's popula-tion planning activities since the earlv1970s have differed in both rationaleand range from the two short-livedcampaigns of the earlier year. Themore recent effort was a response to thesurge in numbers and concomitantdifficulties. It has become an integralpart of the nation's economic develop-ment plans and, as it blossomed intoChina's SDI, it is meant to serve thecollective interest of the whole country,

The aim of the population planningefforts of the early 1970s was to slow thedemographic clock to better cope withexisting population-related problemsThe approach to lower birth rates wasembodied in the flexible wan, xi, slumcampaignmeaning later marriage.longer spacing between births, andfewer children.

Towatil the end of the 1970s, partypolicvmakers defined new economictargets for the year 2000, lending moreurgency to the population planningeffOrts. A demographic ceiling wasidentified: the population was not toexceed 1.2 billion at the end of thecentIwy. This goal and the adoption ofthe now renowned one-child-per,couplepolicy &ring 1978 and 1979 would notonly allow the country to realize the2G00 goal but eventually to shrink thetotal to conliirm to the country'sassumed population carrying capaNot only was the demographic clock toIx. stopped befow midnight, but itshands were to be moved backward.

The population planning policies of'the 1970s initially lacked the usualtheoreticafjustificathm for such an all-Out government intelvention. The callha population planning stressed theneed to end the intolerable state of"total anarchy" in procreation2 whichlx.stowed political legitimacy onpopulati(m control. However, maternaland infant welfare remained theprimary rationale cited in internaldisci issions and at in ternati(malgatherings.'

Finally, population specialists at thenewly established Office of PopulationThemy Research of the Beijing Collegeof Economics fleshed out a new socialistprinciple of direct government interven-tion in family formation. The work waspublished as Renlunt Lunn (PopulationTheo7) in 1977.'

Under the rubric of the themy ofproportionality of production andreproduction, the rationale for popula-tion planning may be stunmarized asfollows: Human reproduction, like theproduction of goods and services in aplanned economy, nmst not remain in astate of anarchy. Childbearing is notonly an individual and family matter, italso affects the nation's total populationsize, the socialist revolution and socialistdevelopment. The dissemination ofcontraceptive knowledge and technol-ogy in China is more than a matter ofcouple-centered and couple-managedFamily planning in accordance with thecouple's interest and inclination. It is toplace childbearing in each and evervhousehold on the track of the nation'sunified plan."

More important, these populationspecialists averred, "Our nation's control

7Utin /Kik girls a5sure this mothiv more than one child, but no sons.

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The Chinese birthlute had already

fallen to iis lowestrecorded kvel by

the time thestringent goalswere adopted.

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of population growth ... certainly doesnot mean no population growth and,indeed, it does not imply populationreduction.... It is only a matter ofmaking the rate of population [growth]a little slower according to plan."'

These expanded rationales con-tained neither the idea of zero popula-tion growth nor the one-child policyand the strong incentives and sanctionsto encourage compliance with fertilitygoals. They also proved conspicuouslyshort on tactics of implementation. Thisleft a vacuum which others filled byrecasting the guidelines in more explicitand stringent terms. Indeed, 20 years ofneglect of demographic studies hadcreated an enormous void of expertisein demography, providing ampleopportunities for new participants inpopulation policymaking.

During this same period, officialswere attempting to forge the nation intoa powerful socialist country based onthe "four modernizations" of agricul-ture, industry, defense, and science andtechnology. They further envisionedxiaoltang shuiping, or the attainment of a"comparatively comfortable level ofliving," by the century's end, whichcalled for the quadrupling of the totalindustrial-agricultural output between1981 and 2000. Rapid populationgrowth was viewed as an impediment tothese economic goals, and somepolicymakers advocated stringent limitsand stronger measures.'

The one-child idea at the nationallevel emerged, interestingly enough,along with the renewed access todemographic literature from abroad asChina began to open its doors in the1970s. The notion of zero populationgrowth (ZPG), by all accounts, was anAmerican import." just as its simplicityhad captivated many in the UnitedStates where foreign immigration was agrowing demographic concern, inChina it attracted various naturalscientists with direct access to thehighest levels of population polic,-making. They may have grafted it ontoChina's population] planning ellin-tunder the stress of meeting the 2000

goals° without fully ascertaining itsbackground and ramifications. This wasthe likely origin of the one-child-per-couple limit and other ideas welloutside the original framework "ofachieving socialist planned reproduc-tion with Chinese characteristics."

In Population Control in China, avolume later published in the UnitedStates, proponents of exact populationgoals developed the arguments in favorof minimal reproduction. The authorsalso included such notions as optimumpopulation and population carryingcapacity, ideas that had elicited ferventexchanges but few conclusions amongscholars of diverse disciplines beforeWorld War II.'° For China, in theirreckoning of the country's populationcarrying capacity in terms of landresources, nutritional requirements,fresh-water resources, ecologicalequilibrium, and economic develop-ment, "the [ultimate] target populationof 700 million cannot be said to beunfounded," and "the best way tostabilize China's population at thetarget level" would be to implement theone-child limit until at least the end ofthe century. Otherwise, "the [Chinese]population will remain a time-bombwaiting to be detonated.""

The Chinese birth rate had alreadyfallen to its lowest recorded level by thetime these stringent goals wereadopted, as shown in Figure 3, page 6.The less stringent fertility reductionembodied in the wan, xi, shoo campaignand of the fertility concept that "one[child] is not wanting, two arc good,and three are excessive," were working.China's total fertility rate (TFR), oraverage number of lifetime births perwoman at current age-specific birthrates, fell from 6 in thc 1950s to around3 lx-fiwe the start of the policy ofminimal reproduction in 1979 (seeFigure -I).

The ideal of only one child provedcontroversial in China'2 and its imple-mentation provoked strong resistance.There were strong misgivings amongthose at the provincial and grassrootslevels about the one-child policy. (An-al

Figure 4Decline in Chinese Fertility, 1950-1990

4-4

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8

Rural

Total

Urban

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

Source: Compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Center for international Research.

officials advocated sanctioning a secondchild after an appropriate interval. Asecond child provides additional laborimportant to parents in the countryside,particularly in the most impoverishedareas. It is also a second chance torealize the aspirations of many parentsfor a son should their first child be agirl. The realities of real hardship andgender preference fostered covertresistance to the one-child limit, which,in turn, compounded the difficulties forlocal cadres in implementing popula-tion planning.

Some have also argued that eco-nomic refbrms begun in 1978 may haveweakened the enforcement of popula-tion policiesPbut the effect of thesereforms on actual fertility remainsspeculative. Alter 1978, the family wasrestored as the basic unit of productionin the countiv,..side, altering the ruralinfrastructure and loosening the socialcontrol of the communes. Coinciden-tally, the birth rate rose slightly in theearly 1980s. Some interpreted this riseas a sign that peasants were having morechildren to bolster their family laborsupply. More likely, the birth rate waspushed up temporarily by shifts in the

age structure, a rise in marriages, andchanges in population planningregulations. For most of the 1980s, thebirth rate hovered around the levelattained before the economic reformsor the one-child policy were in effect.

The impact of China's policy ofminimal reproduction has been limited.The TFR never fell below a 2.5 child-per-woman average in rural areas, althoughit dropped to about 1.2 in urban areas.By the mid-1980s, less than one-fifth ofall eligible married couples had signedthe one-child certificatea contractwhich granted couples and their childeconomic and educational advantagesin return for promising not to havemore than one child. 'fhroughout the1980s, nearly half of all reported birthswere second, third, or higher order;Arths." Various surveys suggested thatthe desire to have at least two childrenremained strong among Chinesecouples.''

Acquiescing to widespread aspira-tions for a second child, Peng Peivun,the head of the National FamilyPlanning Commission, declared in 1988,"In the countlyside, couples will now beallowed a second chalice after an

appropriate interval should their firstchild be a girl." More noteworthy, asone population specialist on the staff ofChina's Population Information andResearch Center related, "MI throughthe years of China's sixth five-year plan(1981-1985), and at present, the greatnia'jority of Chinese peasants have allborm' two children or more."'

Young couples in China are havingfewer children than their parents'generation. The 1990 TFR of 2.3 wasless than half the rates of the I960s.Couples of reproductive age thus haveadhered to the general terms of China'sSDI, but simultaneously demonstratedtheir resilience and resourcefulness inrealizing their aspirations for more thanone child. One lesson to be drawn fromChina's experience is: To slow down thedemographic clock, yes; to reverse thedemographic clock, no! The actualbehavior of couples thus has mostpoignantly set the limits to population

Thble 1

IUD Insertions, Sterilizations, and Abortions in China,1971-1989 (in millions)

Year IUDs

Sterilizations

Female Male Abortions Total

1971 6.2 I 7 1.2 3.9 13.1

1972 9.2 2.1 1.7 4 8 17.8

1973 14 0 3 0 1.9 5.1 23 9

1974 12.6 2 3 1.4 5.0 1 1.3

1975 16 7 3 3 2.7 5 I 27 8

1976 1 , 6 2 7 1.5 4 7 20.6

1977 13.0 2.8 2 6 5 1 23.6

1978 11.0 2 5 0 8 5 4 1 9.6

1979 13 5 5 3 1 7 7.9 28 3

1980 1 1 5 3 8 , .4 9.5 26.2

198 1 10 3 1.6 0 6 8 7 21 2

1982 14.1 3 9 I 2 12.1 31 6

1983 17 8 16 4 4.4 14.4 53 0

1984 11 4 5.7 I 5 8.9 27 4

1985 9 6 2.3 0 5 10 9 23.4

1986 11.4 3.0 1 I 11 6 27 I

1987 H 7 5 1 20 10.4 32 1

1988 14.5 4 9 I 7 I 2.7 3 3 8

1989 15 5 6 1 ? 4 10 6 34 8

Note. I lit iiiti ,1 [lie low, nim hut c(jual lu Hoak t,, comicling.Source: Chinn Populacon Data Handbook (Beijing: China Population and Research InformationCenter, various years).

12

planning under China's currentsocioeconomic circumstances.

Outside China, thc one-child-per-couple policy has aroused strongreactions. In addition to questioningthe right of a government to intervenein a couple's reproductive matters,there are strong misgivings about thereported coercion of women to have ailalxwtion or an 1UD-insertion. Othersobject for moral reasons to the strongrole of abortion and sterilization in theChinese population planning effOrt.Under intense pressure from groupscritical of China's policies, the U.S.government has withheld its contribu-tion to the UNFPA since 1985) 7

Methods of Fertility ControlWidespread access to family planningmethods was a hallmark of China'spopulation planning program. Contra-ceptive use by women of reproductiveage had already reached 71 percent by1982, close to the level in most devel-oped countries and well above the ratesin other Asian countries. In Thailand,South Korea, and Indonesia, forexample, contraceptive use rangedfrom 25 to 50 percent in the early1980s. By 1990-still ahead of otherAsian countries-contraceptive use hadreportedly risen above 85 percent inChina, oimpared with about 77 percentin South Korea, 66 percent in Thailand,and 50 percent in Indonesia.'

Although many other birth controlmethods were available, over 80 percentof Chinese using contraception in 1982relied on one of three ti et hods: IUD,female sterilization, or male steriliza-tion. Abortion was the backup method.The heavy reliance on these threecontraceptive methods and ahortionhas continued.

Between 1971 and 1989, the numberof II!D insertions, sterilizations andabortions nearly tripled, from 13 to 35million procedures (see Table ). Malesterilizatimms doubled, female steriliza-tions almost quadrupled, and abortionsand lUD insertions increased by twoand one-half times. Although negativepublicity about IUDs was pnictically nil,

it swelled and swirled around the otherprocedures. "Coercive planned parent-hood" has been alleged internationally,with the pitch of outcries particularlyhigh in the United States.'" Thegathering squall abroad over steriliza-tion and abortion in China gainedstrength as China's own mass mediadisclosed evidence of improprietiescommitted by local planning units.

Chinese mass media and officialpronouncements have treated steriliza-tion and abtwtion differently. Exhorta-tions to males to accept vasectomybecame particularly frequent after theavailability of a plastic plug injectiontechnique in the 1970s enhanced thereversibility of the procedure.

In reality, the lion's share of theresponsibility for birth control rests withwomen in China, as it does elsewhere.Tubectomies exceeded vasectomieseach year between 1971 and 1989,sometimes by three or four times, asshown in Table 1. Women in allcountries typically have more experi-ence with temporary metho(Is of birthcontrol than men and may he moremotivated to seek a 1)cl-tutu-lent solu-tion.2" In China's case, women who werein a clinic for childbirth often weepressured bv the local populationplanning cadres to accept sterilization.Many mothers with at least one previousbirth were persuaded to undergotubectomv on the spot. This approachnwant that women (or men) whoaccepted sterilization generally did soafter age 30 and after having borne twoor more children, perhaps renderingsterilization less controversial thanabortion:2'

Although contraceptives andsterilization are used by over 80 percentof Chinese women of reproductive age,contraceptive lailtire and nonuse are apresent-clay reality. Chinese IUDs have arelatively high failure rate of I 0 to 15percent, compared with a 1 percentfailure rate fin. most European orAmerican IUDs. Abortion was animptmant backup met ht)(1 during(;hina's rapid fertility transition, and,with the more stringent goals and

policies of the 1980s, it has assumed aneven greater role. China's populationplanning officials estimate that 70percent of abordons arc due to contra-ceptive failure 2 2

The reported ratio of abortions tobirths in China increased from below200 per 1,000 live births in 1971 to 309and 574 in 1978 and 1980, respectively,just prior to and following the initiationof the one-child measure. Since then,the reported abortion ratio has fluctu-ated, but has generally risen higher.

These reported ratios probablyoverstate the ratio of abortions to births.Local planning units are reimbursed foreach abortion, gking them a financialincentive for fully reporting eachprocedure, while births are known to beunderreported. Also, the rapid declinein live births over the past 20 yearsprimarily pregnancies averted throughcontraceptive usemay have artificiallyinflated the ratio. Clearly abortion wasnot responsible for the entire drop inbirths. Nevertheless, the one-child policyis associated with a substantial jump inthe number of abortions. Abortionincidence in China was running about 4to 5 million a year between 1971 and1978. The number exceeded 9.5 millionin 1980 and 10 million in all but twoyears doting the 1980s.

Induced abortions had alreadyexceeded 7.9 million in 1979, as theone-child measure was going into effect.In the same year, 13.5 million IUDinsertions and nearly 7 million femaleand male sterilizations occurred.Viewing the contraceptive use andabortion figures ttgether reveals boththe scale and the nature of populatit niplanning activities. It also facilitates anassessment of the role of alittrtion inChina's ix yulation planning effort.

Population planning programsaverted an estimated 56 million birthsbetween 1970 and 1979. During thesame decade, approximately 47 millionabortions took place. Because ;1 womancan have more than one pregnancyaboried in t h e time it takes to carry apregnancy to term, each abortion doesnot prevent one birth. After allowing for

In redity, thelion's share of themponsibili47 forbirth control restswith women inChina, as it doeselsewhere.

/3

such repeat abortions, the 47 millionabortions may have averted about 19million live births, or 34 percent of theofficial estimate of births averted duringthe 1970sP

The all-time high number ofabortions occurred in 1983 when the

Table 2

Abortion Ratios by Province,China, 1989

Province Abortion Ratio*

Total 632

Northeast

Heilongpang 326

265

Liaoning 18 !

North

Hebei 860

Shanxi 387

Beipng 436

Tiaripn 440

Shandong 756

954

East

Anhui 363

pangsu 591

Shanghai 2.022

/hepang 619

Central

lubel

Hunan 609

Jiangxi 669

South

[ war 728

aongdong 771

Guangxi 1.130

rtn 736

Southwest

Guizhou 537

Sichuan 590

unnan 680

North west

Nei Nlonggol 39;.

')haanxi 455

Ningma 290

Gansu 290

Qinghai 360

Xinjiang 402

* .Thu1-firms pet :.000 liti bil [hi;Mite: :Thor non [mit haw beeii alirl ill! IAnutlet reporting ol births oi abturtion, at the lot altete!Source: Calculated from China, Population PlanningYearbook, 1990 (Beijing: National Family PlanningCommission), p. 386, 402.

14

1

proportion of men and women age 20to 29 in the population also reached apeak, rising to nearly 17 percent of thetotal population from about 13 percentin the mid-1970s. This increase in thenumber of persons of marriageable age,together with lowered age requirementsfor marriage, appears to have increasedabortion incidence independent of thestricter population planning effortsbecause an increase in the number ofnewly married couples leads to morefirst births.

Abortion incidence has never becnuniform across the country. The rangeof variation can be discerned from thefirst set of detailed statistics (see Table2) released by the National FamilyPlanning Commission at the end of1990. which covers all the prmincesexcept Xizang (Tibet).

Lower abortion ratios preNailed inthe inland provinces compared with thewealthier coastal provinces. Someinland provinces include large concen-trations of minorities who have beenxempt from the more stringent

population planning measures. With afew exceptions, abortion ratios werehigher in the better-off cities and townsthan in rural areas.

Increased abortion incidence hasbeen cited by critics outside the countryasjustification fOr ending internationalpopulation assistance to China.Opposition to abortion its well as toother colltraceptive methods has a longhistory. Ilowever, relative to the past,plamwd parenthood now carries little if'any moral or ethical stigma in most ofthe modern world. Induced abortionplayed a major role in slowing popula-tion go twth in many develoiwd anddeveloping nations, including japanand South Koree.. Of course. Japaneseand Korean women could all haveundergone the procedure wiluntarily.lii (:hina, on the other hand, manymillions of abortions occurred undertlie watchful eyes of populationplanning personnel. The scope andthrust of China's population planningef hill thus has pnivoked the charge of"coercive planned parenthood."

Gender Preference

A society's population portrait and anindividual's demographic behavior maybe analyzed in terms of mortality,fertility, migration, or marriage. Thesephenomena reflect life events that arc!intertwined: changes in any one affectthe others and vice versa. When radicalchanges in these variables are inducedunder less rapidly changing socioeco-nomic circumstances, they impinge ontraditional behavior and customs,inspiring the individual to resist orcircumvent the new rules.

In China's case, lower mortality, thecontinuation of labor-intensive agricul-ture, the stringent restraints on residen-tial mobility, and the sanctions topromote minimal fertilitv createdunanticipated repercussions and newcontroversies.

High sex ratios at birth in Chinaduring the 1980s are a case in point.Interest in this matter grew out of thedisclosures of kInale infitnticides and aflow Of stern official condemnations of'the practice in the Chinese mass media.Precise figures, whether impossible toobtain or deliberately withheld, havenever been provided in Chinesesources. The absence of data ignitedinstant curiosity, particularly in fOreigncircles. Discussions of the impact of theone-child policy drew further attentionto the matter because of the knownpreference for male offspring amongChinese cot Ties.

The 1982 census shed no light onthe matter. It predated the time whenfemale infanticide was allegedly on therise. To ascenain the incidence offemale infanticide, analysts soughtindirect evidence by examining avail-able data on sex ratios. In nearly allpopulations, 105 to 106 male babies areborn fbr each 100 female babies..Thepresumption is that most, if not all,deviations above this level in Chinacould indicate excess female mortalitywhether from overt infanticide or theabandonment of female babiesrirsimply the failui e of parents to reportfemale births.

Figure 5Sex Ratios at Binh, 1970-1987

114

112

110

103

106

104

102

I 00

Normal sex ratio at birth

9

1970 1975 1980 1985

Source: Stnn Johansson and Gla Nygren. "The Missing Girls of China: A New DemographicAccount." Population and Development Review 17, no. I (March 1991 39.

The sex ratios among live births inChina during the 1980s, reconstructedon the basis Of two nationwide fertilit,surveys, show a clear increase in theproportion of male babies (see Figure5). Ahhough fertility surcys, which -askwomen to remember the gender andtiming of each birth, are subject tomisreporting, the fact that the twodifferent surveys produced similarresults give credence to claims that girlshave been "disappeenng" from thexported births. The high sex ratioamong live births during the 1980s isundoubtedly related to the govern-ment's population policy. Sex ratios forbabies born to couples complying withlocal birth plans were in the normalrange, while those born outside theplans were as high as 115 to 118 in theyears after 1983.'2' This indirect evidenceimplies that more boys than normalwere reported; or, to put it negatively, asmany as 500,000 girls were "missing" onthe average each year from 1985through 1987.

Because some 22 to 23 million birthsoccur annually, the exclusion of a half-million female births matters onlyslightly as far as the birth rate is con-cerned. It matters a great deal if, in light

15

of prior allegations, the missing girlswere victims of female infitnticide.25

There may be other plausibleexplanations of the high sex ratios.Given the preference for male offspringand the one-child policy, some analystshave suspected that expectant motherscould be aborting their pregnancies ifthey knew that the fetus was female. Butgender-specific abortion is illegal, and itis unlikely that medical technology fordiagnosing the gender of a fetus wasever available enough in China to havecaused the great leap upward in sexratios among live births.

Another explanation for the missinggirls is that the births of girls are grosslyunderreported, especially those of girlsgiven away in adoptions. Under-reporting may be an outright failure to

GirLs often receive fewer family mources than boys.

,4

16

41

..

BK1 IMPV MARliwo.F.

report the birth of a girl or to report itas a stillbirth prior to private adoptionarrangements.

Adoptions rose sharply in the 1980s.There were over 500,000 cases in 1987and about 400,000 per year between1984 and 1986, compared with fewerthan 200,000 before the one-,:hildpolicy. The extremely low sex ratios of27 to 36 boys per 100 girls among theadopted children are not surprising;parents traditionally are more likely togive away girls, a practice that intenfied under the one-child stipulation.When the adopted children by year ofadoption are added to their respectivecohort of births, the sex ratio at birthcomes closer to normal for the years inquestion. This reduces the number ofmissing girls by half.2'

A significant numlwr of unreportedfemale babies may remain with theirparents, but are never reported to theamlnirities. There is no direct way todetermine the number oF such con-cealed girls. The 1990 census did notreveal the whereabouts of the missinggirls. It did confirm the high sex ratioamong children born in the 1980s,particularly in rural areas. In urbanareas, the sex ratios among childrenborn between 1985 and 1989 were 109for those age one or under and 1(17 to108 fOr those ages two to four. In therural areas, the sex ratios were 112 forages one arid tinder and 109 to 110 forchildren two to fOur$27

Another possible explanation of theskewed sex ratios is that inure girls diein infancy simply because of traditionalgender discrimination. Data from alarge ntnnber of develt)ped ccnintries aswell as from developing countrieswitliout strong sex preferences indicatethat the internationally "normal" sexratio among infant deaths is 130? Thesex ratios among infimt deaths inChina, as reported 1w women in the1988 survey, fell consistently below 130.The average was 114 for the 1980s. 1 hislow ratio suggests that girls receive lesscare and attention than boys in manyChinese homes, reducing the chance of'survival of girls beyond their first

birthday. More impoctant, this genderdiscrimination affects girls mostadversely in the poorest areas.

Sex ratios among infant deaths inChina continue to be far below the 130mark, underscoring the excess femalemortality among reported births. For1989, according to the 1990 censusreturns, the ratio was 100.3, and it wasonly 96.3 among infants who diedduring the first months of 1990...19

This phenomenon is not new. Sexratios among infants, as reported bvwomen in the 1988 survey, were slightlyabove normal during the 1960s and1970s before the one-child policy was ineffect:" Traditional norms and behaviordie hard in many parts of present-dayChina, particularly irs the countryside.

The one-child policy may or maynot have intensified the traditionalneglect or infant girls or promptedinfanticide, but the higher thanexpected sex ratios at birth should notbe linked to overt female infanticklewithout more direct evidence.

Whether the mystery of the missinggirls is explained by underreporting ofbirths, concealment of girls, or infanti-cideor some combination of thesefactorsthe greater vigilance, strictersurveillance, and tougher adininistrsuivesupervision that some Chinese havecalled for" cannot remove she fiircesthat drove couples to evasive behavior.The !lard fact is: The lesser value placedon girls and the extent to which thisguides the behavior of fainilies caughtin a perilous village existence are part ofChina's socioeconomic and demo-graphic realities

MarriageThe fluctuation in the age at firstmarriage is another case in which theimposition of policies that go againsttradition have yielded some unexpectedresults. Marriage has always been earlyand universal in China, although theage at first marriage increased after thefounding of the People's Republic.China's first marriage law was enactedin 1950, raising the marriage age to 18

for women and 20 for men from ages 16and 18, respectively, in pre-I949 years.The law's intent was to cotmter thepernicious effects of early marriagearranged by relatives when childrenwere in their early teens, or evenyounger. The early fertility limitationscript of the 1950s made no reference tolate marriage as a means of familylimitation, perhaps because of its neo-Malthusian overtones. The link betweenlater marriage and lower fen, v wasofficially sanctioned during the short-lived upsurge in birth control activitiesin 1956 and 1957. It was justifiedbecause of its positive impact onmaternal and infant health and on thephysical well-being, education, and workexperience of young people.

Subsequently. wanlater marriagebecame the first component of China'sSDI. Women and men were encouragedto marry after their 23rd and 25thbirthdays, respectively. By the late 1970s,provincial, municipal, and local regula-tions further raised marriage ages: to 25and 27, respectively, for women andmen in the cities; and to ages 23 and 25in rural areas.

The "late marriage rate"thepercenmge of marriages in a calendaryear occurring to individuals older thanthe minimum ages cited aboveeventually enierged as a performancemeasure of local population planningunits. During 1977-1980, variouslocalities claimed that 75 to over 95percent of the marriages in theirjurisdictions were in the wan category.Among women, 88 percent of allmarriages in 1980 were late marriages.'"The higher marriage age probably didslow China's population growth, andmay have averted an estimated 100million births between 1950 and 1980.'

Amid the reported gains in latemarriages, China amended the nationalmarriage law in 1980, setting theminimum age for marriage at only 20for women and 22 for men. Thc lax.requirements of the 1980 marriage lawcame as a surprise in light of thereported popularity of late marriage. Inpractice, many couples had been

2

Sex ratios amonginfant deaths inChina continue tobe far below the130 math,underscoring theexcess femalemorktli4iamongrvported births.

7

manying informally at younger ages. Inrelaxing age liits in the 1980 law,policymakers may have been trying toencourage more couples to inm-rylegally by making the age limits morerealistic.

Shortly thereafter, reports of a revivalof early marriage created an uproaramong population planning officialsand in population journals. Many ofthose who sounded the alarm quicklyblamed the less stringent minimum agerequirements for marriage in the 1980law. They also cited the harmful effectsof other influences, such as remnantfeudal-traditional ideologies, bourgeoisliberalization, and the earlier physicalmaturation and socialization of youthsin the midst of the "poisonous ele-ments" of western civilization thatrushed in as China opened up to theoutside world iu the 1980s.'

The so-called "earl ). marriage" raterefers to the proportion of women whomarry befOre their 20th birthday. Thisusage, while simple and convenient inptlicv evaluation and appraisal, ignoresthe vital difference:: between the currentsituatitm and the eat iv tnarriages of thepre-1949 era. More itnpiwtantly, itoverlooks die ( ustommT age difference

between brides and grooms, and the"marriage squeeze" phenomenon.

In all societies, age defines anindividual's marriageability in the mostbasic way. Whether a spouse is arrangedor freely chosen, the groom is generallytwo to three years older than the bride.An imbalance in the ratio of males tofemales in the prime marrying ages isoften referred to as a marriage squeeze.Such an imbalance is usually caused bysharp fluctuations in birth ratesthough it may have other causes, suchas the heavy migration of one sex intoor out of an area, or hy war casualties.

Two sharp declines in the birth rateoccurred in China: The first resultedfront policy errors and famine experi-enced during the Great Leap Forward,between 1959 and 1961, and the secondoccurred as the population planningcampaigns intensified, between 1975and 1977. The fall in births duringthese years exerted a lasting impact onChina's age structure, as shown by theindentations in the age pyramiddepicted in Figure 6.

\lining men 1)orn in China from1956 to 1958, just before the first birth-rate dive, wiaild normally have marriedwomen in the 1959-1961 cohort, about

TaNe 3

Sex Ratios of Men and Women Born 1955-1965, China and Selected Places

Age in1982

Year of

birthPopulation (millions)

Males Females

Sex ratio'

(China) China Shaanxi

Relative sex ratio'

Guangdong Qinghai

Xingling,

Hunan

! 7 1965 1 !.9 65 78 113 62 57

18 1964 12 4 43 63 84 35

19 1963 13 7 53 71 52 17 44

20 1961 / 1 7.9 97 94 100 58 80 85

21 1961 5 3 5 4 99 189 140 89 199 267

22 19(30 7 1 / 105 140 108 174 148 164

23 1959 7 4 6 9 107 134 109 133 140 147

24 1958 10 I 9 3 109 109 103 108 11 I 104

25 1957 9 8 9 1 ; 08

26 1956 9.2

27 1955 0.2

Males per 100 females of the same age° Males per 100 females with males three years older than females.Source: Calculated from the 1982 Census.

18

Figure 6China's Population by Age and Sex, 1990

Age

65

55

45

35

25

15

5

Males Females

Birth Year

<1905

1915

16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 2

(Million)

Source: Ten-Percent Sampling Tabulation of the 1990 Population Census of China (Beijing: China Statistical PublishingHouse, 1991), Table 4-1.

4 6 8 10 12 14

I 925

1935

1945

1955

1965

1975

1985

three years younger I.:Ian themselves,but they fr outnumbered the womenborn during these years (see Table 3).The ratios of the 1956-1958 cohort mento the 1959-1961 cohort womenreached 134 to 189 in the nation as awhole; and were much higher in someprovincial and local areas. Largediscrepancies of this sort occun-edthroughout China because the birthrate from 1959 to 1961 amounted to atmost two-thirds of the rate three yearsearlier, 1956 to 1958.

When the 1956-1958 cohort of menreached marriage age in 1982 to 1986,they faced a marriage squeeze that was

particularly intense at the local level.The I lousehold Registration Systemconstrained their geographic mobility,further limiting their search for mates ofappropriate ages. Many single men mayhave found a way out of this quandaryby marrying much younger women,lowering the average marriage age forwomen and precipitating the earlyniarriage outcry.

By 1982 to 1984, the proportions ofwomen who married before 20 years ofage ranged from 24 to 27 percent in thecities and 31 to 36 percent in the ruralareas." In contrast, the percentage ofearly marriages were 20 or below in

19

20

cities and 27 (ir belt Ay in rtirid areasduring the late 1970s. But lower fluesresumed alter 1985, suggesting thatearly marriage was a transient phenom-ena. mu the harbinger of a return to thetradition of early matrimony.

Given the marked fertility dropsduring the smind half of the 1970s,another marriage squeeze is likely toOccur in or shortly before 1996,affecting men born in the early 1970s, asdepicted by the uneven age distributionin Figure 6. Because fertility fell muchfarther and faster in urban areas, cityand town residents will probably bcmost affeeted.lb Demanding that theselate-marrying men postpone marriagebeyond age 25 is not a viable solution;neither is the prohibition of earlymarriages among women. A nu weproductive step would lw to encourageOw practice of contraception at thecat ly stage of marriage.

Population AgingChina's rapid transition to low fertilityand mortality has created another kind

of age imbalance, an increase in theproportion of eklerly. Elderly Chinese,like infimts and young adults, also havemine into the limelight in the aftel-math of China's iap:d nun tahty andlei Wily 'iansit ions. Attention to theeldet ly leapt to new heights almost assoon as the one-c. hild-pekcouple poll(W( II( into effec t !Me corn et n uninedi-atel) gained graphic I epiesentanon. Ayoung «mple is sandwiched betweenfi mr aged pal ents and one votingoffspi mg, cleating a 4-2-1 populationpyi amid

The possible emel gem e of such anabnot mal age stt out lie was a hot topicamong population Sp« ialists andothei s in (lima Numerous population'mote( tions appeale(I and WO e lased asevidence in the course of the debateThe arious series of the pi (leen( ms,iii terestin0 entiugh, sielded neat lyidentical number S of pet sons age 65and mem fot any given veal in thePo eseeable future. Thk leflec ts thegenet al view that, with nun taht) ahcadyat low levels, fin ther (hops ai e unlikel)'to occur and that the sue of the eldetly

About 7 percent of Chinese-90 million personswill be over age 65 //y 2000

I"igure 7Population Age 65 and Older in China, 1990-2020

180

160

140

120

0 00-05

80

?o°

c 60.9.

40a.

20

F.

66

90

113

167

1990 2000 2010 2020

Source: United Nations. The Sex ond Age Distribution of Populations, the 1990 Revision (New York: UN, 1991). pp. 132-133.

popt dat it ni can lw projected with a fairdegree of certainty. Future fertility,thereli we, will have ti gre:iter influencethan into:tiny on population agingin China.

lowcwr, the Chinese population isnot yet "aged." By international stan-dards, a p(yulation is aged whenpersons age 65 or okler account formcwe than 7 percent of the totalpopulation. Such individi ails :untaintedto only 4.9 percent of the Chinesepoptilatiott in 1982. The 1990 censusplaced their share at 5.9 percent.Barring untiweseen changes in fertilityand mortality, at least 7 iwrcent of theChinese population will he 65 years ofage or older in the year 2000, placingChina in the "aged" category.

The aging issue is of ctirrent impor-tance because of the huge numbersinvolved. In 1980, the population age 65and older totaled almost 50 millionpersons. Their numbers increased toabout 66 million in 1990 (see Figure 7),a figure close to the combined popula-tions of the four largest U.S. states:CalifOrnia, New York, Texas, andFlorida. The projected annual additions

to the 65 and older population willamount to 4.5 million persons between2010 and 2030.37

Population aging--along with theintroduction of the pension svstenthasswelled the ranks of the retired. Inurban China, their numbers jumped to21.2 million in 1988 from 1 million in1964. The annual average net gainamounted to 1.6 million during the1980s, and will reach 1.8 million diningthe 1990s.

Most urban retirees are covered by apension system. On the other hand, themajority of persons age 65 and older (5(1million or more) live in rural areas andstill lack any oki-age security protection.The most recent data indicate that onlysome 3.9 million individuals (panty fOrbenefits under village-nin five-guaranteeschemes (that is, guaranteeing grain,fabric, medicine, old-age care. an(lburial). The bulk of China's elderly inthe villages are actually or potentiallythe wards of individuals, principallytheir own adult children. The very realvalue of children as providers of old-agesecurity is part of the socioeconomicreality that limits China's SDI.

P52/

China's Minority PopulationsChina's ethnic minority populations :reanother' sociopolitical reality that hasconstrained the imputation planningpolicies. Among the first batch of hand-tabt dated figures of the Fotirth (;enstisreleased in Ocurber 1990 were thenumber and proportion of minoritynationalities. This speedy release was nocoincidence. Tic size and growth of thecountry's 55 ethnic minorities have longbeen a top concern among China'spolicymakers, population planningofficials, and demographers. Thisconceit-1 has recently intensified becauseof both internal and internationaldevelopments.

The 1990 census placed the poiada-don of ethnic minmities at 91,2 million.Although this is only 9 pet cent of thetotal population, minorities hadincreased by nearly 21 million, a relativesurge of :16 percent, since the 1982census. Di wing these eight years, thellan majority grew by 11 percent, lessthan one-third of the rate of increaseamong the ethnic minrwities (seeTable .1).

This surge has poured Ittei ou theon-going debate among populationplannhig officials and others. Specifi-cally, should some ethnic minoritiescontinue to be exempt fi-om the

Table 4

Principal Population Figures for China,1990 and 1982 Censuses

1990 1982

Total Popti lation 1,133,682,501 1,008,175,2881 lel 1.042,482,187 940.880.121

Minonty 91,200.314 67.295.167

Sex ratio (males/I 00 females) 106.6 106.3

Persons per household 3.96 4.41

Percent urban 26.2 20.6

Percent illiteratekerniliterate 15 9 22.8

Educational attainment (% who have attended).

University 4 0.6

Middle school 8 0 6.8

Jr middle school 23 3 17.9

Elementary 35.2

Source: China's Fourth National Census, Release No, I. 1990.

22

nation's comprehensive measures forcurbing fertility?

When Chitties population planningeffirrt intensified in the I970s, allininority nationalities were exeloptfrom it, Not only was this good ethnicjirrlitics, it also recognized the relativelyhigh nurrtality and wniparatively lowlevel of ectmontic di.vel(prnent am( mgminority groups. Gradually, however,fertility limitation was promoted inareas with a heavy concentration of'minority poptdations in the late I 980s,such as Nei Monggol (Inner Mongolia)and Xibjiang. These mtwes wereprompted by the 1982 census resultsthat reported a minority popuhuirmincrease of 68 percent since the 1964census.

By the time of the 1990 censusreturns. administrative measures offertility control had already heenintbrduced in all areas of ethnicconcentrations except Xizang (Tibet).ln no case, In nveyer, have the cflortsbeen as intense as the one-child policydirectr.d at the 11an tinese majority.The measures currently in force indifternnt localities stipulate that themajority ()Ellie ethnic minorities (Allhave two children, btu that nomads andpeasants in specific Ininority areas canhave three children. Only under certainvery special circumstances can minori-ties have lour children.

Except for the Korean and Manchuminorities, the TFRs of all ethnittninotities were above three, and, insome cases, above five, according to the1982 census. Some sample surveys ofthe mid-1980s suggested that theseTFRs may be on their way down, httt1990 cenyts data confirm that minorityfertility is stili very high. Nearly 16percent of births among ethnicminorities were fourth or higher paritybirths in 1989, compared with only tipercent of births among the Ilanmajority.''m

Ifigher fertility, coupled withreduced mortality, explains the surge inethnic minority populations during therecent past. However, other forces havedirectly and indirectly exerted strong

influence in recent times. The adoptionin 1981 of Guidelines for Restoring orAmending Ethnic Minority Status openedthe way for many to claim or reclaimminority status. Reclassification or self-reidentification swelled the ranks ofmany ethnic populations, particularlythose of less numerous groups. Otheradministrative procedures and preferen-tial treatment affecting the minoritynationalities in labor recruitment,school admission, and work assignmentencouraged many people to identifythemselves as members of a minority.

Exemption of minorities from theone-child-per-couple limit also encour-aged people to claim or reclaim non-Han ethnic heritage. The vast majorityof children from inter-ethnic marriageshave, on their own or on parentaladvice, reported themselves as minori-ties. Consequently, the Manchupopulation increased to 9.8 million in1990 from 4.3 million in 1982, despitetheir low fertility. This extraordinarysurge denoted an average rate of growthof 16 percent per annum, the highestamong all ethnic minorities. During thesame period, the Tujia group grew at anannual rate of more than 12 percent,leaping to 5.7 million in 1990 from 2.8million in 1982.

High natural increase and broad-ened claims to minority status explainthe massive increase in the latest censuscount of the minority populations.Eighteen of China's 55 ethnic minori-ties exceeded one million each in 1990,compared with l 0 in 1964 (see Table 5).The Zhuang are the largest minoritygroup, numbering 15.5 million,followed by the Manchu (9.8 million)and the predominately Moslem Hui(8.6 million). Other numericallysignificant groups are the Miao (7.4million), the L'ighurs (7.2 million), theNi (6.6 million), and the Mongolians(4.8 million).

The minoritv nationalities havepolitical and economic significancedisproportionate to their numbers. Thelarger groups are concentrated in thestrategically sensitive border areas.Recognition of their geographic

Table 5China's Ethnic Minority Groups, 1964, 1982, and 1990

Ethnic group

Number (in 1,000s) Percent increase

1982-19901964 1982 1990

Total China 694,582 1,008,175 1,133,682 12

Total minority 45,040 67,295 91,200 36

Mongolian 1,973 3,417 4,807 41

Hui (Moslern) 4,489 7,227 8,603 19

Tibetan 2,505 3,874 4,593 19

Uighur 4,000 5,963 7,214 21

Miao 2.789 5,036 7,398 47

Yi 3.389 5457 6.572 21

Zhuang 8,403 13,388 15,490 16

Bur 1,352 2,1 23 2,545 20

Korean 1,349 1,766 1,921 9

Manchu 2,701 4,304 9,821 128

Tong 838 1,426 2.514 76

Yac 858 1,404 2.134 51

Bai 710 1,132 1,595 4 I

Tujia 525 2.835 5.704 101

Hani 630 1,059 1,254 18

Kazak 492 908 I , 112 23

Thai 536 841 1,025 22

Li 440 818 1 .110 25

Other* 7,044 3.436 5.035 -17

Undetermined I 7 881 753

* Other ethnic groups include Lisu, Va. She, Gaoshan, Lahu, Shui, Dongxing, Naixi,Jingpo, Kirgiz, Tu, Daur, Mularn. Qiang, Pulang, &Jar. Maonan. Gelo, >Ube, Achang,Tajik. Purni, Nu, Eluosi. Ewenki, Benglong, Bonan, Yugur, Jing, Tatar, Drung, andOrogen.Source: China. 1982 Population Census of China (Beijing Statistical Publishing House. 1985); andChina Population Information and Research Center, China's 4* National Population Census Data

Sheet (Beijing, 1991).

concentration and of religious, cultural,and other differences, led to theestablishment of the five autonomousregions of Xinjiang (62 percent minor-ity), Nei Monggol (19 percent minor-ity), Ningxia (53 percent minority),Xizang (96 percent minority), andGuangxi (39 percent minority), and ofnumerous autonomous prefectures andcounties in the northwest, north,northeast, and southwest. Thes( lieadjacent to Vietnam, India, Pakistan,Afghanistan, and Myanmar, or, moreimportantly, share extended borderswith various republics of commonreligious and ethnic heritage nowindependent from Moscow.

Release of the 1990 census returns onthe ethnic minorities helped sharpenthe debate over whether to intensify

2723

It is higNy unlikelythat the current

Pak); allmvingmore than one,

two or even threebirths among theethnic minorifieswill be changed.

24

population planning efforts among theethnic minorities. The imperative offertility reduction was accepted by theparticipants at a national conference onChina's ethnic minorities held inBeijing in October 1991. However,conference participants were divided onhow best to realize it whether throughstronger administrative measures, orthrough greater socioeconomicdevelopment and education in the areasof ethnic concentrations.

The issue has not been resolved.Preparations are now under way to holda conference in late 1992 to addresspopulation planning work among theethnic minorities. Because of theconcern for "political stability, socialtranquility, and national unity," it ishighly unlikely that the current policy ofallowing more than one, two or eventhree births among the ethnic minori-ties will be changed. The head of theNational Family Planning Commission.Peng Peiyun, recently stated that "underthe current international and internalcircumstances, stability in policy must bemaintained; there must be neithertightening nor loosening up."" China'sethnic minority populations are sure toincrease in number and proportion forthe foreseeable future.

Population andDevelopmentChina's rapid transition to low fertilityin the 1970s occurred in the relativeabsence of economic development. Noone can know how events would haveunfolded if population growth hadcontinued unabated, or conversely, ifthe fertility drops had occurred earlier.Although China achieved considerableeconomic success in the 1980s despiteits large population size, demographicfactora were also at work. The effects ofthe growing population and changingage structure are evident in the surgingurbanization, the size and quality of thelabor force, the functioning of thehealth care system, and the expansion

of the economy. The magnitude offuture population growth will placecontinuing stress on these and otherfacets of Chinese life.

Surging UrbanizationWhile population size and growth havebeen the primary concern ofpolicymakers, surging urbanization andpopulation redistribution are closebehind. In the context of China'seconomic development and moderniza-tion, tne effects of population redistri-bution operate on two dimensions.Redistribution encompasses not onlyrural-to-urban migration, but also theoutpouring of people from the agricul-tural sector into 'he industrial andservice sectors. This process hasinvolved far-reaching changes in wherepeople live and what jobs they hold.

Urbanization would seem a simplemeasure of development and modern-ization. In China, however, the criteriaused to define an urban area have beenin flux in recent years for political morethan scientific reasons. Driven by thenotion that higher urbanizationdenoted a higher level of developmentand, hence, greater prestige, govern-ment officials reclassified numerousareas from rural to urban in the early1980s. This action instantly pushed thelevel of urbanization above the 50percent mark.

The 1990 census followed twoprocedures in identifying urbanpopulation. By one procedure, itreported 601.3 million persons residingin administratively defined cities andtowns. On this basis, more than 53percent of the population would betermed urban, an increase of 394.7million since the 1982 census. But mostof this increase resulted from theadministrative upgrading of numerousareas from rural to urban designations.

The upgrading, which occurredmostly after 1984, followed less rigidcriteria for establishing shi (municipali-ties) and then (towns). IncludingBeijing, Tianjin, and Shanghaithethree municipalities under the direct

"lab le 6

Provincial Population Data, 1990

1990 Population'(millions)

% increasesince 1982

1989-1990

TFR

No. ofcities

Percent

urban

Nonpermanentresidents'

Density'1990

Total 1,134.2 12.5 2.3 456 26.2 27 118

NortheastHeilongpang 35.2 7.8 1 8 29 47.2 55 78

jthn 24.7 9.3 1 8 21 42.7 33 I??

L Ianoning 39 5 10 5 1 6 20 50.9 29 270

Northi- lebel 61 1 15 2 2 5 22 19.1 17 325

Shank 28.8 13 7 2.5 13 28 7 36 184

Beijing 10 8. i 7 2 1.6 1 73.1 59 614

Tonr 8 8 i 3 2 1.8 1 68 6 27 777

Shandong 84.4 13 -I 2 2 32 27 3 18 53c)

Henan 85 5 14 9 3 0 25 15.5 ! 8 572

East

Anhui 56 2 13 1 2.6 18 17.9 20 404

Jiangsu 67 I 10 8 2.1 25 21 2 30 654

Snarghai 13 3 12.5 i 5 1 66 2 47 2.118

ZhcTang 414 6 6 1.5 24 32 8 26 407

Central,bei 54.0 12.9 2 6 29 28.9 22 290

Hunan 60.6 12.3 2 5 25 18.2 16 286

jiangx, 37 7 13 6 2 6 15 20 4 24 226

Southeastfupart 30.0 16.1 2.7 14 21.4 47 248

Guangdong 62 8 17 2 2.7 19 36.8 64 353

Guangxi 42.2 16.0 2 8 12 15.1 20 178

I la,nan 6 6 15 7 2.9 3 24 1 44 193

SouthwestGuiThou 32 4 I 3 4 3 2 8 18 9 20 184

Stchuart 107 2 7 5 1 9 23 20.2 16 188

Yunnan 370 136 2.8 1 I 19.7 16 94

Xizang ( 1. am; 2 2 16 0 4.5 2 12.6 33 2

NorthwestNei Mon4,,ol 21 5 14 3 2.1 16 36 1 45 18

Shaanxi 32.9 I 3.8 2.8 I 1 21 5 22 160

Ningx,a 4 7 19 :3 2 8 4 25 7 28 90

Gancu 22.4 14.3 2 4 13 22 0 19 49

Qinghai -1 5 11 4 2 6 3 27.3 56 6

Xinjiang IS 2 15 9 3.1 16 31 9 18 9

.P.1,111.16.11 solals do not lin hale iimnignints withmit 1,114( ial ( lem.uu e :»Oli,n) prisons wiling in Un-

armed kw ms.'per I .0110 resident,:pel.(nIs per kilometerSources: China Population Information and Research Center, China's 4th Notional Populavon Census Data Sheet (Bei!ing:1991); and United Nations, "Accessibility of Contraceptives," Asian Populution Studies Series, no. 103B (Bangkok: UN,

1991): Table I.

jitrisdiction of the central g-(Wern-ment-thete are 110W ,156 municipah-tics, or cities (see ('able 6), and 9,322towns, compared with 236 munichmli-tics and 2,66,1 towns counted in the1982 census.

Using a second set of criteria, theNational (:ensus Office placed the totalpopulation of:cities and '<Arm 2f1 30provinces, autonomous regions, andmunicipalities al 296.5 million. Thislower figure excludes city and town

BEST COPY AVAILABLE25

residents outside the jurisdiction oftheir administratively establisheddistricts and street or neighborhoodcommittees (wards). By this calculation,26 percent of China's population livedin urban areas in 1990, This figure,according to the census officials,"objectively reflected the present levelof urbanization in China."m

The second calculation indicated amuch smaller, but still substantial,increase of nearly 90 million in theurban population in the eight yearssince the 1982 census. The extent towhich this rise resulted from administra-

In-migration rmaributeti nwst to Shanghai's growth in the I980s.

26

MT WI,

five upgrading of areas cannot yet becalculated.

Using either definition, Chinaexperienced a striking increase inurbanization over the past decade,raising the concern of policymakers.The current urban situation differsconsiderably from that of 1949 to 1979,the first three decades of the People'sRepublic. During that period, only alittle over one-third of the increase inurban population was due to migrationfrom rural areas; nearly two-thirds ofthe growth stemmed from naturalincrease within the urban populationitself.'" The eight-year intercensalperiod between 1982 and 1990, incontrast, registered not only greaterabsolute gains in urban population,but also greater contributions fromin-migration.

Aside from the impact of administra-tive reclassification, the surge reflectedthe mounting population movementfollowing the decollectivization ofagriculture and economic deregulationacross the country after 1978. Popula-tion gains in China's two leadingmetropolises demonstrate the effects ofthese refbrms.

Beijing, the capital, reported a 17percent increase in population, andShanghai, a 13 percent rise, between1982 and 1990. During the sameperiod, the rate of natural increase(births minus deaths) was nearly 8percent in Beijing and 5 percent inShanghai. In-migration accounted forthe lion's share of the cities' growth.

The volume of' internal migration inrecent years can only be guessed. Onefactor that confounds accurate estima-tion is the resident status of personsbased on the Household RegistrationSystem (I IRS). The HRS, established inthe late 1950s, has become an integralpart of Ch in a's two-tier rural-urbansocioeconomic system (see Box 1).

Provincial population increasesbetween 1982 and 1990 varied consider-ably, from a low of 7 percent inZhejiang to a high of 20 percent inNingxia. The level of in banization alsovaried considerably, from 13 percent in

Box IChi' La's Household Registration System

China's household registration system(HR ;) was instituted in urban areas inthe ady 1950s and later expanded torural areas. The system was originallycreated to provide a continuousrecord of births, deaths, migration,marriage, and changes in householdcomposition. Except during the GreatLeap Forward (1958-1961) and theCultural Revolution (1966-1970), theHRS has recorded Chinese populationchanges every year since its inception.The quality of the data has beensporadic, but they provide the mostcomplete national informationavailable for many of the early years.

The systemunder the control theMinistry of Public Security since themid-1950shas also become artintegral part of China's two-der rural-urban socioeconomic system. Al-though the HRS was originallydesigned as a population register, ithas evolved into an powerful bureau-cratic mechanism, loaded withadministrative, distributive, punitive,and social control functions withominous ramifications for the indi-vidual almost exclusively lyy reason ofbirth rather than merit.

Xizang (Tibet) to 73 percent in Beijing.Because fertility is higher in rural areasall over China, the more rut-al provinceshad slightly higher populatiim gniwth.

File more urban prt winces tended tohae num. tnni-j)ermanent residentsper I .000 permanent residents. Thesenorl-f)ertnattent residents are most likelyto he migrants who !nosed to cities andtowns from the umntiTside. \lam mayintend to stay but cannot obtain legalresident status.

Because of the many difficultiesinvolved in altering one's resident statusunder the terms of the I II Rti. many

urban In-migrants simplt do not repontheir pesence. rhe failure to register

For the individual of rural birth,rural residency constitutes a formi-dable barrier to educational, employ-ment, and marriage opportunities.City residents, in contrast, receiveconsiderable government subsidies inrice, cooking oil, housing, medicalcare, and transportation, as well aspensions and other entitlementprograms. A migrant from thecountryside to the city can neverqualify for these subsidies no matterhow long he lives in an urban area.

Changing the HRS into an authen-tic population register rather than ameans of enforcing policies poses adilemma for the Chinese government.Freeing rural residents from theconstraints of the HRS could unleash apool of valuable talent. However,although the subsidies to officialurban residents are being graduallyreduced through price increases andwage adjustments, it is unlikely thegovernment could afford to offerthese same benefits to the unofficialurbanites. Also. rapidly scaling backthe FIRS is likely to accelerate rural-to-urban migration and complicateurban development.

has been particularly prevalent amongthose leaving the countryside afteragricultural decollectivization and theemergence ot the market economy.

l'he convergence of the variousdennigraphic and economic foreesconsequently has given rise to what(lii tlest. trflicials and demographerslabel as -floating population,- a catch-allat eg(n-v which includes construction

workers. itinerant craftspei sons, hawkersof clothing and ctinstuner warmpeddlers of farm pugluce, and young11 I nil 1,omen and men seeking servicejobs in private households. No pwciseestimates of the floating populaticm at eavailable, but authorities have placed

27

28

,

Urban growth was accompanied b y a labor force shift toward industrial employment.

the number at 60 million on an averageday.'2 There is yet no way to ascertainthe length of their stay, but a hugeproportion of themand their chil-drenmay well stay in the cities forgood. A recent report showed that atleast 33.8 million people migrated fromtheir hometowns to other cities, count-ies, or towns between 1985 and 1990."

Urbanization has brought littlechange in China's regional populationdistribution. Seventy-one percent of thetotal population in 1990 lived in the 15provinces (Jilin, Liaoning, Hebei,Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian,Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Sichuan,Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, and Anhui) and3 municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, andTianjin) along the coast and the YangziRiver. This heavy concentration ofpopulation in coastal and maritimeprovinces further accentuates thepattern of past decades, if not centuries.China's newly created economic freezones and special economic zones(SEZ) are all on the coast (see Box 2).Coastal provinces and municipalitiesaccount for 305 of the 456 cities of,municipal status in 1990.

BEST COPY AVAILAN r.

Jobs and WorkersThe surging urbanization of recentyears has been accompanied by largeshifts in the ways in which people earn aliving. As of 1989, 90 percent of workerswere engaged in primary or materialproduction (agriculture and industry),3 percentage points less than in 1978.Correspondingly, 10 percent of workerswere employed in non-materialproduction (such as commerce andtrade, transportation, and postal- andtelecommunications)."

Fundamental changes have occurredin China's economy since the start ofthe 1978 economic reforms. Thedevelopments reflect a sizable reduc-tion in agricultural employment, from71 percent of the work force in 1978 to60 percent in 1990. Industrial employ-ment, 18 percent in 1978, increasedamid the exodus from the agriculturalsector, but not at a commensurate pare.Retrenchment or redirection ofgovernment investments during thereform years produced ups and downsin industrial employment. In 1990, 22percent of workers were in industry. In

Box 2China's Entry Into the Global Economy

rhe economic reforms i-droduced in1978 had far-reaching implications forthe countryside, where three-fourths ofChinese live. The restoration of thefamily as the .main unit of agriculturalproduction, the gradual relaxation ofprice controls, and creation of owner-directed enterprises, have beentransfOrming rural life.

But the major impact of thesereforms may lie in the phenomenaleconomic growth in (Mina's ii.aritimeprovinces. These areas form a wedgefor China's entry into the globaleconomy and provide the most visiblesigns of modernization. To implementChina's "opening to the outsideworld," economic free zones wereestablished in a growing swath of citiesalong the c)ast. In these areas,bureaucratic restrictions were relaxedor eliminated to attract foreign capital.But the strongest incentives fin- foreigninvestmentand most impressivegrowthhave been in the five specialeconomic zones (SEZs) created inSouth China: Shenzhen. Zhnhai, andShantou in Guangdong Province,Xiamen in Fujian Province, andI lainan, China's island province.

These South China provinceswhich have a combined population of'nearly 100 millionwere the logicalkication for these experiments inmarket economy. They had been theprimarv actors in international tradebefOre the establishment of thePeople's Republic; and the people ofGuangdong Province have closefamilial and linguistic ties to theresidents of neighboring I long Kongand Macao.' By the time the British(;olony of I long Kong is returned toChina in ,fune 1997, the economy ofGuangdong will already be integratedwith that of I long Kong.

;tiangdong Province has enjoyedthe fastest ectintnnic giiiwth in EastAsia over the past 15 years, comparing

well with so-called Asian Tigers such asHong Kong, South Korea, andSingapore, and Small Tigers such asThailand. Numerous Asian compa-nies, along with European and U.S.firms such as Peugeot and Proctor andGamble have been attracted tot;tiangdong and the SEZs by' the lowcost and high productivity of theworkers and athantageous regula-tions. Some 2 million Guangdongresidents are employed by HongKong-owned factories. Industrialoutputprincipally of clothes, shoes.and tovsrose by 15 percent per Yearin Guangdong during the 1980s.Exports from the province accounted;Or one-third of China's total exportsin 1990.' The Hainan and Fujian SEZhave also scored huge economicsuccesses.

Wealth has brought cellulartelephones, crowded restaurants,imported consumer goods, and othersigns of modern urban life to theseonce sleepy coastal cities. Guangdongreportedly has the highest standard ofliving in China. While the e,:onomicgrowth and modernization of this areamay have widened the gap betweenthe lives of urban and rural, andinland and coastal, residents, they areprobably harbingers of the future.Superhighways, airports, and ports arealready under constructionandmore are plannedto enable China'soastal regi9ns to catch up with other

Asian nations and become Asia's nextSmall Tiger.

References

I. 1 tuang faille. "Development of(:hina's SEZ," Brifing Riview, 8 April1991: 20-26.

2. "Die Smith China Miracle," ThrErnnomst, 5 October 1991: 19-22: andndrew Cowley, ".k.sia's Etn('rgingEconomies: 17fr Erommuq, 16November 1991: 3-18.

t ) 29

Fipre 8Working-Age Population in China, 1953-1990

1953

1964

1182

1990

324

37'

596

Percent of tots/population

57%

53%

59%

721 64%

0 100 200 340 400 500 600

Working-age popiAation in millions (15-60 ran of age)

700 830

SOUrte: StatiStla Ye-arbook o id*" (Beilinr. China Statistical Press, 1985), pp. 600-605: andTen-Percent Sompting abulation of the 1990 Population Census of China (Beillnar. ChinaStatistical

Publishing House, 1991), Table 4-1.

I 1.

Education has become nearly universal at the primary levet

contrast, employment in the tertiarysector (trade, commerce, construction,and service occupations) increasedsteadily between 1978 and 1990,growing from 12 to 18 percent of thework force.

Thc size, growth, and skills ofChina's work force continue to presentserious challenges to the government.

30

The 1990 census placed persons ofworking age (15-60 years) at 721million, or 64 percent of the popula-tion, registering an intercensal growthof 22 percent since 1982 (see Figure 8).Persons of working age will probablynumber 770 million by 2000, increasingChina's potential labor force by 5million each year until the end of thecentury."

China's demographic surges in the1950s and 1960s have produced ayoung labor force. The median age ofthe work force was 31 in 1990. Eightypercent of the working-age men andwomen were under age 45. Thedemographic momentum created bythe high birth rates of the past contin-ues to increase the working agepopulation. The number of 15-year-oldsentering the labor market reached 2L7million in 1990, more than twice thenumber (10.1 million) in 1953. Theflow of new workers will stay high forquite some time, exceeding the numberof available jobs. In 1990, there were anestimated 11 million unemployed in thecountry-500,000 more than in 1989.46However, this probably underestimatedthe situation because it did not includethe invisible unemployedsurplus oridle workersin offices and factories.47

The lack of jobs continues to beserious in large cities. In 1982, while thenational unemployment rate was 5.5percent, the rate reached 8.3 percent inBeijing and 7.7 percent in Shanghai."'The number of those "waiting for jobassignment"the euphemism for theunemployedexceeded 5.8 million inthe urban areas, according to the 1990census. More than 80 percent were 15to 24 years of age.

In rural areas, the decollectivizationof agriculture has revitalized produc-tion but rendered superfluous morethan 140 million former workers in thecommunes and production brigades.Another 170 million may become so bythe end of the century.°

The job situation has a brighter side.Opportunities in trade, commerce, andservice occupations have mushroomedfollowing the economic deregulation of

recent yews Between 1977 and 1985,nem ly 12 milhon small-scale indwidualbusinesses came into exi.itence, employ-ing 18 million peop1e.5"

Efforts to improve the rural.jobsituation have focused on sidelineoccupations, low tedmology industries,and small town developments. By 1985,the number of people employed 1wvarious rural enterprises totaled 60million. It is estimated that ruralindustries and enterprises will be able toemploy 180 million people, or 40percent of the rural labor force by theyear 2000.'1 Whether this will ease thepressure to leave tho rural areas for thecities remains to be seen.

The short-term successes in laborfbrce absorption have been encourag-ing, though far from sweeping. ToChinese officials and labor specialists,the long-term remedit-s lie in upgradingthe skills of the young work force,increasing productivity, and boostingeconomic development.'

EducationThe quality of China's growing laborforce is a niajor concern forpolicymakers. The low educational andskill levels of Chinese sorkers are a dragon China's aspirations to become ani/ijor player in the workl economy.While China is attempting to expandeducational opportunities throughoutthe country, the generally low literacylevels of adults and the constantlyexpanding school-age population aremajor impediments to achieving aneducated work force.

Student enrollnient and eflucaticmallevels have shown remarkable improve-ments in recent decades. In 1989, some232 million students were enndled inschools of all types in China, comparedwith 203 million in 1975, just prior to

nuidernization decision.The expansion encompassed largeincreases at the university level and intechnical-vocathmal and adult educa-tion. Tile number of institutions ofhigher learning increased to 1,079 in1989 ()bin 675 in 1980. Their enroll-ment rose by 82 percent to 2.1 million.

In 1'189, some 5 million students wcieenrolled in agricultural. vocational, andtechnical schools; and 37 million werereceiving instructions in adult schools ofall types (see Table 7).

Education at the primary level hasbecome nearly universal, reaching anestimated 97 percem of children. Butonly 70 percent of the primary schoolgraduates go on to:junior high schooland only a little over one-third of thesestudents continue on to senior highschool. No more than 2 percent (Ifpersons ages 20 to 24 go On u) theuniversities, compared with 5 percent indeveloping countries in general."

Ta ble

Schools and School Enrollment in China, Selected Years,1975-1989

Level 1975 1980 1985 1989

Number of schoolsInstitutions of h.gher

learning 387 675 1 .016 1.079

Secondary <chools

123.505 118.377 93.221 89.575

Technical 1.326 2,052 2.529 2,940

Vocational 887 1.017 1.028 1.044

Agricultural na 3314 8,070 9.173

Pnmary school', 1,093.317 9 i 7.316 832.309 777.244

Kindergartens 171,749 170.4I9 172.262 172.634

Schools for theblind and deaf 746 297 350 483

School enrollment (in 1,000s)

Total enrollment 203,228 216,014 217,318 232,088Institutions of higher

learning 501 1.144 1.703 2,082

College new admissions 191 281 619 597

Secondary schools

Regular 44.661 55.081 47,060 45,540

Technical 405 761 1.013 1,493

Vocational 307 482 558 685

Agricultural na 454 2.295 2.823

Adult schools' na na 15.533 36,613

Pnrnary schools 150,941 146.270 133.702 123,731

Kindergarten; 6 200 11.508 14,797 18,477

Schools for the

blind arid deaf 7 / 33 38 .17

' lii hiding iaimileins in adult iinoinition. (if mi.rlian. M., 01111411V, mud pl I( Jiltingna: iicU acailabliiSource: Statisucal Yearbook of-China 1990 (Beijing: China Statistical Press. 1990).pp. 703. 706-708.

31

Budgefitr) conmtamts, contumouswaves of new students, and the shortageof qualified teachers make furthereducational expansion unlikely for theforeseeable fitture. Full-time facultymembers in institutions of higherlearning doubled between 1981 and1988, reaching nearly 334,000. Many, ifnot most, were recent universitygraduates. Primary and secondaryschool teachers numbered approxi-mately 9 million in 1988. An estimated1.8 million additional teachers will beneeded to realize (3-iina's current planto universalize education below seniorhigh schoo1.51

The educational level of the adultpopulation has improved over the pastdecade thanks to literacy campaigns andexpanded student enrollments since theI970s, but it remains limited. In 1990,16 percent of Chinese over age 16 wereilliterate or semiliterate (unable to reador write more than a few characters),down from 23 percent in 1982. Two-thirds of these were women. Some 37percent of adults had at least attendedelementary school, but only 8 percenthad gone as far as middle school, andonly 1.4 percqu had attended univer-sity. This was only a slight improvementover educational achievement in 1982,as seen in Table 4 , page22 .

DIN, 8China's Health Care Resources, Selected Years, 1975-1989

1975 1980 1985 1989

Medical personnel (in I .000s)

Total 2.594 3.535 4.313 4.787

Senior physicians 293 /47 602 1.023

Juniot physicians 356 144 473 321

Practitioners of Chinese medicine 229 262 336 370

Nurses 380 149 569 512

Other 1,336 I .(137 2,333 2.562

Medical facilities (in 1,000s)

Hospitals 62 65 60 62

1-lospital beds 1.764 2.184 2:187 2.867

Beds/1.000 persons 7,1 2 02 714 2 33

lin hiding jilis.ch juts Ti until n I Wesicin invdicine, pliat niac isis. andpidin . O N ill..11111 %WI keiSource. Public Health Yearbook or China IS 10 (Beijing: People's Health Press) pp. 453-454.

32

Health CareEconomic refornis, surging urbaniza-tion, population growth, and aginghave had a fundamental impact onChina's health care system. China'sexpressed goal has been to provide"basic health care for all by the year2000." The country has already suc-ceeded in expanding both medicalpersonnel and facilities (see Table 8).1mprmed care and prevention pro-g1..als have virtually wiped out suchdiseases as smalllanc, cholera, malaria,typhoid, and scarlet frver; have reducedinfimt mortality to below 40 deaths per1,000 births; and raised the life expect-ancy at birth to 67 years. Furtherreductions in mortality, however, maybe thwarted by demographic, eco-nomic, and political factors.

China's medical services operatewithin a three-tier system. At the bottomare the village and township healthclinics that provide care fOr more than70 percent of the population. Theirstaffs consist primarily of the 1.2 million"barefoot doctors" (now called country(1octors) who are paramedics with extratraining in first-aid, hygiene, contracep-tion, and basic preventive medicine.Such clinics exist in about 88 percent ofChina's 743,000 villages. The numberof clinics and country doctors declinedin the 1980s because decollectivizationof' agriculture cut off a major source offundingthe village productionbrigades. Users fres and contributionsby village industries have been insuffi-cient to pay fin- basic rural health needs.Only 40 to 45 percent of the ruralporulation were covered by an orga-nized cooperative medical system inf184, compared with 80 to 90 percent

in 1979. Because about 80 percent ofChinese births occur in rural areas,this erosion of services could meanIcayer quality health care Ibr China'snext generation.

Some 47,500 township medicalhealth centers, with an average of ISbeds and 18 doctors each, made up themiddle tier of' China's health caresystem in 1989. The top tier consisted of'

2,200 county hospitals, with an averageof 175 beds and 211 fOrmally traineddoctors each. These hospitals located incounty seats and large cities are the onlyones that receive fUnds from thenational govemment:6 Urban patients,particularly the 126 million personsenrolled in the system of free medicalcare for government employees andworkers, receive heavily subsidized carefrom the government.

The cost of medical care for individu-als in the public sector and in the state-owned enterprises has skyrocketed, as ithas in other countries. Between 1978and 1996, the cost shot up more than600 percent, to $4.2 billion. Duringthese same 12 years, China's grossnational product only doubled.

The soaring expenditures stem fromthe rising cost of medicine, wastes andabuses in nwdical prescriptions, and thegrowing number of persons entitled tofree medical care. China's rapidtransition to low mortality satisfied theuniversal desire fbr longer 'fives.However, increased longevity, alongwith modernization, ushers in thepnthlenis associated with populationaging, including rising medical costs forsociety, the family, and the individual.

The Economic PictureChina's demographic changes over thepast two decades must be viewed inrelation to the drastic economic shiftsthat occurred during this period.China's gross national product (GNI')inn eased by leaps and bounds duringthe 1980s. The total jumped to $427billion in 1989 from approximately $120billion in 1980.

China's proclaimed goal for thecentury's end was to attain xiaohangshuiping, or a comfbrtable livingstandard, fbr the nation as a whole. Thiscalled fbr the quadrupling of thecotintry's tt)tal industrial-agriculturaloutput between 1981 and 2000. By1989, the mid-pttint in the period inquestion, considerable progress towardthat goal was obvious. By that year, allbut two of tne indices of output and

Table 9Selected Economic Indicators for China, 1980 and 1989

1980 1989

Average

annual growth1980-1989

percent

Total output index'Agncultural 109 188 6 3

lndustnal 119 361 13 2

Consumption index'Urban residents 117 207 5 I

Rural residents 117 215 10Income per head (netY

Urban residents V439.0 V1.260.7

Rural residents 191.3 601.5

Consumption expendituresper head

Total Y/00 0Urban residents 1.1024.0

Rural residents 5 ' 8 0

1978- 1011 (base :car)Y1.00 US$11.18 in 1991

Source: Family Plonnirg Yearbook 1990 (Beijing: National Family Planning Commission 1990).

consumption shown in Table 9 were atleast double the levels of 1978, the baseyear for the indices.

Both the GNP and total persomilincome rose at an annual average rate ofmore than 9 percent during the 1980s.The industrial sector led all others inexpansion, reporting an average growthof more than 13 percent per annum.The agricultural sector also advanced,but at only half the pace. Tertiaryemployment increased its share ofoutput in the GNP from 16 percent in1980 to over 22 percent in 1991.-6

Recent industrial and agricultundgains have already raised living stan-dards. Overall consumption hasincreased by an annual average of 6.6percent. The pace of gain among rural-agricultural residents has been a littlehigher (7 petT('nt) than that among thenon-agricultural urban population (5percent). Life in China is better, and therelative improvement has been slightlygreater fbr those living in rural than intrban areas.

Lift in the countn,side has.benefitedfrom the rapid pnrliferatam of ntralnon-agricultural enterprises engaged in

37 33

the processing of agricultural productsand in commodities manufacturing.Ministry of Agriculture figures show thattheir total production nearly doubledbetween 1978 and 1990, from $91billion to $180 billion; and a growingpercentage of these commodities aresold abroad. Such rural enterprises nowemploy 22 percent of China's ruralwork forcenearly 93 million people.'

The Chinese people enjoy access to agreater variety of consumer goods. Theincreases in durable goods alone wereremarkable during the 1980 decade(see Table 10). The number of bicycles,which are the equivalent of cars inAmerican households, jumped to 328from 77 per 1,000 population between1978 and 1989. Television sets rose fromnearly zero to 149 per 1,000 populationin one decade. Most impressive, thenumber of washers and refrigeratorssoared f'rom absolute zem in 1978 to 78and 23 per 1,000 population, respec-tively, by the end of the decade. Otherleading consumer goods, such aswatches, sewing machines, radios,cameras, and electric fans, also regis-tered substantial gains.

'The per capita consumption of rice,pork, beef and lamb, eggs, poultry,seafood, sugar, cooking oils, liquor and

Thble 10Availability of Selected ConsumerItems, 1978 and 1989

Per 1.000 population

Item 1978 1989

Sewing machines 35 122

Watches 85 50 '

Biqvcles 77 328

Flectnc fans 10 156

Washers 78

Refrigerators 23

elevisions 3 149

Radios 78 236

Cameras 5 I 9

Source: Family Planning Yearbook 1990 (Beijing: NationalFamily Planning Commission, 1990), p. 429.

34

wine, cotton and synthetic textiles, andcigarettes all showed either marked ormodest increase. The daily average foodintake has reached 2,637 calories,according to a United Nations estimate.

Indeed, for many in China, thc1980s were a period of rapid economicexpansion. Their level of living hadalready progressed a long way towardriaokang shviping before the start of theeighth five-year plan in 1991. Anotherdoubling in production may beexpected by 2000.

While living standards are improvingon the national level, extreme povertypersists in numerous areas throughoutChina. Inland and remote provinces inwestern China lag far behind thosealong the coast in eastern China. As of1986, almost a third of the country'scounties were officially identified as"poverty counties." These 664 countiesare located mostly in the mountain andarid plateau regions. The annual percapita income among their residentsamounts to only 30 percent of the 1986national average of $199.00. Nearly 20percent of the population may be belowthe poverty level by this definitionorin Chinese terms, still unable to reachthe level of wenbao (warmth and bareessentials).

There are no precise figures on thenumber of people hovering just abovethe poverty fine in recent years. Relativepoverty probably engulfs additionalhundreds of millions of people. Nor arethere more recent figures on thenumber of persons who remain belowthe line in 1992/The tardiness inrel( ,Ing poverty data is in sharpcorn) t to the speed with which Chinadisseminates huge amounts of informa-tion whenever gains have octurred inthe economy.

Despite persistent poverty and signsof deteriorating health care in niralareas, the lot of China's1.2 billionpopulation ha.s markedly improved,though the road to xiaohang shuipingforall remains long and difficult.

flow can the rapid and widespreadachievements of the last dozen years beexplained? No similar growth occurred

t...1 L.)

during the 1950s and 1960s when thesize of the population was only half thatof' the 1980s. What is the relatiocishipbetween population size and economicdevelopment in this most populousnation on earth?

Most of the recent economic gainshave been attributed to policy changesthat reduced government control of'businesses and industries, increased theimportation of foreign technology andcapital, and allowed prices to fluctuatewith market conditions. However, allthese explanations highlight theeconomic-political variables to theexclusion of China's momentousdemographics. This exclusion incitesspeculation about whether a large andgrowing population materially obstructsreal economic growth.

It could also be argued that had thecountry's population planning beeninitiated earlier, in the 1950s and 1960s,the level of economic developmentwould have been higher than it hasbeen. Similarly, had fertility controlbeen in place earlier, the total popula-tion would now be smaller and thestandard of living would be higher inper capita terms. But these are hypo-thetical arguments. The populationtotal now is much larger than it wouldor could have been had China'sdemographic initiative started earlier.Notwithstanding the tardy start infertility curbs and the deafeningpopulation explosion, the pace andscope of economic growth havedemonstrably surged during the 1980sand are moving vigorously ahead inthe 1990s.

Environmental DegradationRapid demographic growth generatesdifficulties of all sorts in a poor andbackward economy, primarily providingsufficient fbod, employment, housing,health care, and the like. Besides theseissues of' daily existence and well-being,as the saying goes, to populate is todevastate. The larger the base popula-tion, the more widespread is its environ-mental impact in terms of reclamation

of wastelands, deforestation, or acceler-ated soil erosion. Additionally, andmore importantly, economic develop-ment and modernization exert a farmore insidious and injurious impact onthe environment. For example, urban-ization and industrializationwithinadequate sewage and treatmentfacilitieshave already polluted most ofChina's rivers and produced a seriousshortage of drinking water in urbanareas. The municipality of Beijing isprojected to have a shortfall of 500,000cubic meters of water daily by 2000,equal to about two-thirds of its currentsupply. Groundwater levels have alreadyfallen sharply in the region, causingserious land subsidence in some areas ofBeijing.'

Modernization and populationgrowth have also intensified solid wastedisposal problems. Plastic and styrofoamlitter the urban landscape and followthe railroad tracks from one end ofChina to the other.

Population, Development., and LandTlw growing population base, landdegradation, and industrial expansionhave caused a decline in the per capitasupply of agricultural land. Recentestimates place arable land in China atabout 14 percent of the country's 9.6million square kilometers. The totalarea under cultivation anmunts to 135million hectares (one hectare = 2.47acres), and there remain no more thanapproximately 500 million mu (one acre

6 mu) that may possibly be reclaimedfor agricultural 1)1wposes. On a percapita basis, cultivated land has droppedto 1.8 mu in 1988 from 2.7 mu in 1949,even though the overall amount of' landunder cultivation increased from 1.6 to2.0 billion mu between 1952 and 1988.The supply of arable land per head maydrop to 1.6 mu or less by the year 2000.

Pasture lands, now situated almostexclusively in northern China, areestimated to cover 310 million hectares.Of these, only two-thirds can be effec-tively used to raise livestock. Only aboutone-fifth of' the pasture land provideshigh quality fiAder.

:149

The larger thebase population,the morewidespread is itsenvironmentalimpact.

35

36

h

1 Ns;;;4,--

On a per capita basis, the amount of arable land in China has declined dramatically.

China's forests also are dwindling.Only 13 percent of China's land wasunder the c(Wer of foliage in 1989,down rutin 15 percent in 1971."Moreover, ecoktgical abuses of pastmillennia, stall as "slash and burn"agriculture and denuding wocallands

htel wIgal, have turned vast areasinto deserts in northern and northwest-ern China. 1,ttnd degradation is spwad-ing eastward and southward, robbingthe country further of agricultural andlaisture ho a Is. Scmie 120,000 squarekiloineters of China tam. are permanentdeserts and another 15,800 squarekilometers are being menaced byspreading sands.

Although China's finite landresources are threatened bv theeximnding populathm and econinnicdevelopment, the stress has been easedbv improved agricultural and relatedoutput in recent decades. Of' course,populati(m guactli ttccelerates demandfor residential space and, other thingsbeing equal, encntaches on arable land.The growing competition fbr land fbr

prft7, rE

t. it" 'r 1110, 4.3

economic development, die continuing

urbani/ation, and populathm gu avtltaccentuate the need fin effective land-use managenlent.

Soil degradation in China reflectsboth natural hwces and the errors ofpast centuries, but it has la.en acceler-ated in no small measure by morerecent policies. To increase the landavailabh. for grain production, Variouspost-1919 measures pnumpted indis-criminate clearing and cultivation offorests and grasslands. This misunder-standing of the dynamics of the CCU-tiVtilent was responsible for lastingdamage to the soil.

just as China's policvmakers'understanding of demographic trendsemerged belatedly, their ecologicalenlightenment surfaced only in themid-1970s. Since then an increasedappreciation of ecological issues hitsstimulated efforts to restore fitrest andpasture lands, to protect existing fon .,tsand grasslands against encroachment,mid to brotalen ref( trestation effCtrts."'1.egislation to formalize these steps

4 3

emerged in the 1980s, resulting in acomprehensive Environmental Pro-tection Act.

Pollution from Energy SourcesAlthough there was already heightenedecological concern by the start of theeighth flve-year plan in 1991, China'secological circumstances remain criticalChina needs to increase its energyconsumption as the population andeconomy grow, vet China is still heavilydependent upon energy sources thatdenude forests and pollute the air. Theannual consumption of timber as fueldecreased bv 8 percent between 1988and 1990, according to the Ministry ofForest. Nevertheless, because of theshortage of alternative fuels, nearly one-third of China's annual total timberconsumption goes up in smoke, usedfor household cooking and heating.This is the main reason why the timberconsumption still outstrips forest growthin one-third of the 30 provinces,municipalities and autonomous regions.

In urban areas, cooking and heatingdepend on coal and a small amount ofnatural gas. Although this spares sometimber land, air pollution from coalburning has more serious health effects.Air pollution is being compounded byincreased use of coal in industry as thecountry develops economically.

Coal-burning generators account for80 percent of the electrical powergenerating capacity. Plans are underway to increase annual coal production(1 billion tons in 1990) by an additional20.8 million tons and to raise electricgeneration by another 86.2 millionkilowatts. Neither increase will meetChina's industrial and civilian needs inthe decades ahead. Furthermore,increased coal burning will not onlycontnbute to respiratory and otherhealth problems within China hut todepletion of eanh's protective wonelaver. China ranks just after the UnitedStates, the former Soviet I Tnion. andEurope in the volume of emissions ofcarbon dioxide from foscil fuels."

Perhaps new technologies or otherfuel sources can both satisfy the

country's growing industrial and civilianneeds and provide cleaner air. Thereplacement of the existing 6,000 steamlocomotives, which consume 15 milliontons of coal annually, with diesel engineswould reduce emissions but it is a costlyand lengthy step. There is no evidenceof a substantial increase in China'soi limit of crude oil in the near future.Nuclear power generation is in itsinfancy in China. The proposeddamming of the Three Gorges of theupper Yangzi River to produce electric-ity, which gained official approval inMarch 1992, remains controversial.Besides the immediate flooding ofvaluable amble tracts and the eventualdisplacement of 1 million or morepeople, the dam's long-term impact onthe adjacent and downstream areaswould be substantial and possiblydisastrous.

None of the known solutions toChina's dependence on coal is risk-free,nor can they furnish more than a tokenof the energy that is needed. Theburning coal will not soon, if ever, beextinguished and air pollution contin-ues to be China's leading environmentalhazard.

A systematic, effective, and completeenvironmental clean-up is an idealbeyond realization at present. In thelong run, as the country developsfurther economically, China may be in abetter position to redress the situationand to afford adequate safeguardsagainst environmental hazards. How-ever, few developed nations haveeffectively tackled pollution problemswithin their borders. Neither willChina's many environmental issues beeasily or quickly resolved. Ecologicalintelligence and management, notunlike the issue of population inself, arematters of politics, economics, andideology.

The FutureDida, wubn, rendua"vast territomabundant materials, and massivepopulace"--long has epitomizedChina's circumstances in the minds of

A sptematic,ffedive, andcompleteenvironmentaldean-up is anideal lygondrealization atpresent

37

38

many. Renduo bears the double messageof achievement and apprehension.China's demographic affluence, as thesaying explicitly means, holds greatpotential for economic growth: Morehands mean greater accomplishments.Simultaneously and implicitly. Moremouths entail greater consumption andother difficulties.

Renduo trenchantly sums up bothChina's past faith and the present fearin population numbers. Ironically, thepresent fear is expressed in ways thatacknowledge the finite availability andrelative scarcity of land and resources,tempering belief in dicta and wubo.These fears have also been voicedalongside fervent articulations of theserious consequences of depletedresources and environmental pollution,and of the need for the current genera-don to control fertility for the sake ofthe generations to come.

The perspectives on dida, wubo,renduo thus have changed. The partyand government have come to believein population planning. A plethora ofeconomic, political, international, andenvironmental factors are shaping thepace and breadth of China's population

policies. Because of these policies, arapid transition to low fertility hasoccurred. However, the specificpopulation ceiling of 1.2 billionoriginally set for the year 2000 remainselusive. While the TFR among urbanwomen has generally been below 1.5throughout the 1980s, the Ilk amongtheir more numerous rural sisters hashovered around 2.8, always remainingwell above the one-child goal.

China's fertility realities are atvariance with the country's populationplanning goals, and China's agestructure would prevent meeting theoriginal population ceiling even if thefertility fell further. During the eighthfive-year plan (1991-1995), women inthe peak childbearing ages of 20 to 29years will increase by 16 percentbecause of the high fertility two to threedecades ago, prompting a modest babyboom. Even if the current populationplanning measures are strictly imple-mented, the nafional TFR would be 1.6,and an additional 17 million peoplewould be added to the population eachof those five years. The century-endpopulation total will be probably beclose to 1.3 billion (see Figure 9).

Figure 9Projection of China's Population, 1990-2050

.0174

2.2

2.0

1.6

I .2

Constant fertility

Lower fertility

1.0

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040

Source: United Nations. Worfcl Population Prospects 1990 (New York: UN, 1990): and unpublished data.

4 2,

2050

The official target for 2000 has beenraised to 1.294 billion but Chineseofficials concede that even this will bedifficult to achieve. In order to staybelow this number the TFR must fallfrom 2.3 in 1990 to 2.1 in 1995 andbelow 2 by the century's end." Underthis scenario. China's population wouldreach about 1.6 billion by 2050, assum-ing no increase in the TFR.

If, during the next 10 years, fertilitycannot be further reduced from the1990 TFR of 2.3, the Chinese popula-don will rise above 1.3 billi( m by 2000,top the second billion mark in 2050,and continue to grow unabated fordecades thereafter.

It would be fOolhardy to do morethan conjecture about the size of theChinese population half wav into the21st centuiv. Nor would it be prudent toventure an opinion on when theChinese population will stop growing.Evidence inside China allows noindulgence in this regard.

Many European and other devel-oped nations have had below-replace-ment fertility (a TFR below about 2.1)for decades. But their demographic

insitions evolved not only under amuch longer time table, but under vervdifferent social, economic and politicalsituations. Until early in the 20thcentury, the argument for limitingchildbearing in the ['oiled States andEurope was to lessen the burden ofexcessise fertility on the individual, mostparticularly among the po( )1.. Demogra-phers labeled this a neo-Malthusiantransition. As a social movement, neo-Malthusianism emerged against abackdrop of high fertility, encouraging"limited parenthood" or "basing fewerchildren." One-child families orchildlessness were not part of themessage.

In tinie, cont0)11ing fertility eniergedas a sophisticated, positive means toalh1sY couples to pursue other life gt yals.Couples' fertility preferences conse-quently became more varied and morespecific, including not just fewerchildren, but also only one child, evenno children, One-child families and

childlessness had become more com-mon in the United States and parts ofEurope before 1,%,ald War II. Althoughinterrupted by the post-war baby boomof the 1950s and 1960s, below replace-ment TFRs eventually became wide-spread across post-war Europe and theUnited States.

Below or near replacement fertilityrates are not a continuation of the nen-Malthusian transition. Their emergencehas been quite appropriately acclaimedthe second demographic transition.'"flaying fewer children was the mainmechanism of change in earliertransitions. The second demographictransition entailed having onls one childor none at all.

Such fertility preferences andbehavior at the individual level grew outof rapid changes in socioeconomicconditions; in geographic and socialmobility; in attitudes toward sex,Marriage, and the family; and in belief'sabout gender equahts, extra-familialcareers, and motherh(md. In short, theideas of basing only one or no childrengained ascendancy in an urban-indus-trial-ideological milieu that hears littlereseinblance to the backdr(4) of theprevious, so-called neo-Nlalthusiantransition.

Nor do the present socioeconomicconditions in China's vast countrs sidebeliefs about sex, marriage, and thefamily, and ideas of gender equalityresemble the situation in developeclcommies now practicing minimalreproduction and childlessness. Hereinlie the limits to China's strategicdemographic initiative.

China's recent economic gains makeit clear that a large and gomingpopulathm may not be of itself anobstacle to economic development. Thisobsen.ati(m does ilOt endorse the viewthat larger poptdations stimidategr(myth. Rather, it eniphasizes thatChina's national well-being may beconting('nt 111)011 a balanced mix ofdenu)graphic regulatitm and economicderegulathm and related refiirms.

"Opening up to tl te outside world"has received greater emphasis in recent

d1 go

China's fertilityrealities are atvariance with thecountry'spoptiladonplanning

39

refbrms, especially in urban areas.Opening up has meant not onlyimportation of capital, technology, andinformation, bit: also travel by individu-als beyond national borders. Only arelatively small minorityin particularresidents of major cities along thecoasthave profited from thesechanges.

The great majority of the Chinesepopulation in the countryside couldalso benefit from an "opening up to theoutside," if that entailed allowing freermovement from crowdcd villages foreducational and employment Opportu-nities. Accelerated rural developmentand modernization may thus befacilitated, broadening the possibility offurther or second fertility transition.

Devehyment and modernizationalone may not lower fertility. Nor is it

likely that government policies alonecan slow or stop the growth of theChinese population. The differencebetween having fewer children andhaving a single child is enormous, notjust in quantitative terms, but also in thequality of life. The wav to a moresatisfitctoty demographic future maybest be paved by ensuring greater andmore equitable educational andeconomic opportunities fbr all Chinese.

At

.arkFi

Greater and more equitable edumtional and economic opportunities are the key to a brighter future.

40REST COPY

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1988).51. Ibid.52. P.Y. Li, "On Plans to Reform Employment during the Eighth Five Year Plan," Zliongguo

Laogong Kexue (Labor Sci-mce of China) 10 (1991): 3-11.53. L.A. Reed, Education in the Peopk's &public of China and U.S.-China Educational Exchanges

(Washington. DC: National Association for Foreign Student Affairs, 1988); C. MacKerrasand A. Yorke, Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary China (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1990); and China, National Statistical Bureau, Statistical Yearbook ofChina, 1990 (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1990), p. 721.

54. China, Education Yearbook of China, 1989 (Beijing: People's Education Press, 1989), pi. 72;China, Statistical Yearbook, pp. 705 and 722; and U.S. Federal Research DMsion, Libraryof Congress, China: A Country Study (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,1988), p. 170.

55. Public Health Yearbook of China, 1990 (Beijing: People's Health Press, 1990), pp. 453-459.56. H. Yuan Tien, China's Strategic Denwgraphic Initiative (New York: Praeger, 1991), pp. 217-

221.57. China Daily, 25 September 1991.58 World Resources Institute, World Resources 1992-93 (New York: Oxford University Press,

1992).59. Food and Agriculture Organization, 1990 FAO Produaion Yearbook 44 (Rome, Italy: FAO,

1991).60. I.iu Qi, "Ecological Farming." Beijing Review 34. no. 28 (15 July 1991): 23-25; and Zhao

Yuqing, "China's Nature Preserves Rapidly Expand," Beijing Review 34, no. 17 (29 April1991): 27-30.

61. Mild fiesoural 1992-93, p. 206.62. Zhang Lei and Yang Xiaobing, "China's Population Policy," Beijing Review 35. no. 15 (13

April 1992): 17-20.63. Dirk van de Kaa, "Europe's Second Demographic Transition,- Population Bulletin 42, no.

1 (Washington, DC: Population RefeAeltce Bureau, 1987).L.)

Suggested ReadingsCho Lee-Jay. Population Dynamics and Policy in the People's Repubhc of China. Honolulu: East-

West Center, 1984.

Coale, Ansley J. Rapid Population Change in China, 1952-1982, Report No. 27, Committee onPopulation and Development. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1984.

Wang Feng, Nancy E. Riley, and Lin Fu De. "Recent Trends in Fertility andNuptiality in China," Science 251 (1991): 389-393.

Crane, Barbara B., and Jason L Finkle. 'The United States. China, and the United NationsPopulation Fund: Dynamics of U.S. Policymaking." Population and Development Review 15.

no. 1 (March 1989): 23-59.

Croll, Elisabeth, Delia Davin, and Penny Kane, eds. The Single-Child Policy in China. New York:

St. Martin's Press, 1985.

Fraser, Stuart E. China: Population, Education, and People. Melbourne, Australia: La TrobeUniversity Press, 1987.

Goldstein, Sidney, and Alice Goldstein. Permanent and Temporwy Migration Differentials in

China. Papers of the East-West Population Institute, Number 117. February 1991.

Greenhalgh, Susan, and John Bongaarts. "Fertility Policy in China: Future Options." Science

235 (1987): 1167-1172.

Jobansson, Sten. and Ola Nygren. 'The Missing Girls of China: A New DemographicAccount." Population and Development Review 17, no. 1 (1991): 35-51.

New China's Population. New York: Macmillan, 1988.

Peng Xizhe. Demographic Transition in China: Fertility Trends Since the 1 950s. Oxford, England:Clarendon Press, 1991.

Poston, Dudley L., Jr., and David Yaukey. The Demography of Modern China. New York: Plenum

Publishing Corp., 1992.

Wang Jiye and Terence H. Hull. eds. Population and Development Planning in China. Sydney,

Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1991.

Tien, H. Yuan. China's Strategic Demographic Initiative. New York: Praeger, 1991.

"Revival of Early Marriages in China: Covert Causes and Overt Effects." Paperpresented at annual meeting of the Population Association of America, Denver,

Colorado, 2 May 1992.

Whyte, Martin K and S.Z. Gu. "Popular Response to China's Fertility Transition." Populationand Deve4mtent Review 13, no. 3 (September 1987): 471-493.

"14

43

-

44

Discussion Questions1. Discuss the unique cultural, demographic, social, and economic factors that character-

ize China's population. How have these characteristics affected the success of thestrategic demographic initiative (SDI)?

2. Construct a chronology of China's population initiatives since the 1950s.

3. How much influence has the international community played in the shaping of China'spopulation policies and the implementation of these policies?

4. Discuss the plausibility of the explanations given for the high sex ratios shown in China,since the implementation of the one-child policy.

5. Consider the implications of China's population size and structure for future policydecisions concerning aging, labor force, marriage, and minority populations.

6. Assess the impact of increased consumption in China on the global environment.

7. Compare China's demographic transition experience and age/sex structure with otherdeveloping countries and developed nations. Do you think that other nations canprovide a model of possible future trends for China? What is the likelihood that China'sSDI would be a model for reducing population growth in other countries?

8. Appraise the implications of "opening up to the outside world" for China and the globalcommunity.

9. The authors raise the argument, "...had the country's population planning beeninitiated earlier, in the 1950s and the 1960s, the level of economic development wouldhave been higher than it has been." Do you agree?

10. China's population was about 1.17 billion in 1992 and projected to grow to 1.3 billion by2000. This projection suggests that China will exceed the 1.2 billion ceiling originallyset for 2000 in the SDI. Discuss the factors that have contributed to China's inability toattain this goal?

Prepared by Kimberly A. Crews

Population Reference Bureau. Inc. (PRB),l'RR gatficrs. interprcts. and dissemimites int onnation on thc I at ts andimplications ol national :Ind ncirld population wend,.. Uotitidedin I 924.icis A prn atc. laniprotit i:din animal ortzani/alion ilia! I ,tt})1)tIII('d 11

awl contracis. indiNnitial and Icrimratr conbthimons. 11141111)erhips. :oldof publication.. It ()nsults \still whirr group m ihc 1 ii.ittd Statcs and abroad.

operatcs infOnnation and libran v., and t.sues a %mien ol publicamm..l'RB.also aysist. du' (lc% clopnwnt Di'populatIou edit( :Mon throu0 I ormal andinf ormal prog,ram..

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ar.0-

Volume 44 (1989)

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