Duyeon Kim - Center for Strategic and International Studies

US-ROK PEACEFUL NUCLEAR

COOPERATION RENEWAL

CSCAP | 17th WMD

2013.6.2-6.3 | Manila, Philippines

Duyeon Kim

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2 Copyright © D. Kim ,Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

I. Current Status

II. Background

III. New Agreement Issues

IV. Enrichment Debate

V. Pyroprocessing Debate

VI. Security Context

VII. Options

VIII. Conclusion

CURRENT STATUS

3 Copyright © D. Kim , Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

US-ROK agreed (April 2013) on simple extension for two

years: date change to March 2016.

US working with Congress on extension: requires

Congressional approval in both Houses (like regular law).

US-ROK stuck on enrichment and pyroprocessing.

Best to settle technically, but has become ROK presidential

agenda item.

Both sides’ positions firm

• Conditional language may be possible but US would

want unilateral right, ROK would want

predictability/certainty

Another extension (or even lapse?) likely if no agreement.

BACKGROUND


US-ROK nuclear industries interdependent for decades

Current Agreement

- ROK nonproliferation assurances.

- No reciprocal nonproliferation controls.

- Prior consent to reprocessing.

- US right to approve retransfer to third party.

- No US right to approve enrichment.

1974 US-ROK agreement expires March 2014 but

extended for 2 more years (March 2016)

- Stuck on US consent to enrichment and pyroprocessing

BACKGROUND

5 Copyright © D. Kim, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

New agreement will…

- Contain reciprocal nonproliferation guarantees,

removes one-sidedness.

- But require new assurances and guarantees under

1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (amended Atomic

Energy Act): expanded scope, broader, more intrusive.

NEW US-ROK AGREEMENT ISSUES


ROK:

- Desires US advanced consent to enrichment and

pyroprocessing.

US:

- Not pushing ROK to renounce ENR rights (“gold

standard” doesn’t apply)

- But opposes spread of ENR technology.

- Programmatic consent (“advanced consent”) to only 3

partners: EURATOM, Japan, India:

1) Major nuclear programs.

2) Already have ENR capability.

3) Adhere to nonproliferation obligations.

4) Important strategic US partners.



ROK:

1) Major peaceful nuclear program.

2) Adheres to nonproliferation obligations.

3) Important US strategic ally.

Then why does US see ROK differently?

- Not concerned about ROK going nuclear.

- But opposed to spread to countries without existing

ENR capabilities.

- Mere presence of facilities in unstable region, DPRK

- Makes it harder to persuade DPRK to denuclearize.



ROK views:

- Civil nuclear power program comparable to EURATOM,

India, Japan.

- 23 reactors 35% electricity… 16 more by 2030.

- Nuclear power cheapest source of energy.

- Aspires to be major nuclear exporter provide

reactors + enrichment to buyers.

- Responsible member of international community, meets

nonproliferation obligations.

- Inalienable right (under NPT).

- Seems to distinguish possessing the “right” vs.

exercising that right.

ENRICHMENT DEBATE


ROK US

• To enhance energy security (reduce reliance on foreign suppliers)

• Several service providers

• Secure competitiveness in reactor sales (full package)

• International market worked smoothly over five decades

• Does not import US uranium but apparently desires political acknowledgement from nonproliferation point of view

• Consumers suffered few disruptions of supply

Security of supply argument = weak Political acknowledgement?

ENRICHMENT DEBATE


Challenges to multinational facility:

- US political endorsement.

- Construction: formidable, costly.

- Finding country willing to transfer technology difficult.

- Technology holders increasingly unwilling; NSG

stricter guidelines on technology transfers.

- Multinational facility: approx. 15 years to construct.

Still… US unprepared now to grant consent doesn’t rule

out possibility in the future if nonproliferation and economic

circumstances were favorable.

US refusal to approve enrichment should not be a deal-

breaker.

PYROPROCESSING DEBATE


ROK’s spent fuel dilemma:

- No adequate intermediate storage facility.

- Some on-site storage saturation begins in 2016.

- No adequate geological repository to dispose used fuel.

- No adequate long-term safety measure of repository

over millions of years.

- Strong public opposition and stakeholders for waste

disposal.

So… “ROK needs pyroprocessing”

PYROPROCESSING DEBATE


ROK US • Proliferation-resistant: does not

produce pure plutonium • 2008 Study: Pyro still proliferation-prone

• 10 year study premise: Success commercial pyro

• 10 year study premise: No such assumptions

• Pyro is most economic way to spent fuel management

• Pyro is not economical. Once-through is less expensive, provides adequate security of fuel supply for at least 100 years.

PYRO ≠ REPROCESSING PYRO = REPROCESSING

NORTH KOREA CONTEXT


US:

- Granting ROK consent could complicate persuading

North Korea’s nuclear dismantlement.

- Some concerned with ROK nuclear armament.

- 1992 South-North Joint Declaration still valid and

important.

- 1992 S-N Joint Declaration stipulated in September

2005 Six Party Talks Joint Statement.

Reality?

- DPRK linked or unlinked to 123?

- Unlinked regarding ROK’s motivations/intentions.

But linked for US believing it would be difficult to

persuade DPRK to denuclearize… but does it?

- Debate over validity of 1992 South-North JD

POSSIBLE “REALISTIC” OPTIONS


Conditional consent (based on outcome of joint study or other)

- US would need unilateral right

- ROK would want more predictability and certainty

Lobby for affirmative Congressional approval

- Risks: Congressional members seeking additional legal conditions,

unacceptable to US and ROK

Allow a lapse for short-period

- Seems likely if no side budges or unable to agree.

- Economic/political consequences? Short-term not bad but long-

term: grave implications.

Another extension of existing agreement

- Blow to alliance

- Impact on industries?

CONCLUSION


No options are ideal. All have costs and risks.

New agreement offers potential for:

- Strengthening alliance.

- Opening up new avenues for future joint cooperation

and global competitiveness in 21st century.

Need to resolve differences over enrichment and pyro.

- Requires acknowledgement of political sensitivities and

legal requirements of both ROK and US.

If it becomes political/alliance issue at top level, what

would be the bargain?

Other challenges:

- Other tough bilateral issues rolled over from previous

administrations.

- Evolving industry, new entrants, new competitors.


THANK YOU

Documents

Duyeon Kim - Center for Strategic and International Studies