Epicurus on Pleasure, the Complete Life, and Death: A ... · proceedings of the aristotelian society 138th session issue no. 2 volume cxviii 2017 - 2018 epicurus on pleasure, the

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EDITED BY GUY LONGWORTH

Epicurus on Pleasure, the Complete Life, and Death: A Partial Defence

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Alex Voorhoeve is Professor in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He works primarily in the theory and practice of distributive justice (especially with respect to health care), in decision theory, and moral psychology, but also has interests in the work of Epicurus, Mandeville, Hume and Smith. His articles have appeared in Ethics, Philosophy & Public Affairs, and Economics & Philosophy, among other places. He is the author of a book of interviews with leading thinkers, Conversations on Ethics (Oxford, 2009), and co-author of Making Fair Choices on the Path to Universal Health Coverage (World Health Organization, 2014).

e d i t o r i a l n o t e

The following paper is a draft version that can only be cited or quoted with the author’s permission. The final paper will be published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Issue No. 2, Volume CXVIII (2018). Please visit the Society’s website for subscription information: aristoteliansociety.org.uk.

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e p i c u r u s o n p l e a s u r e , t h e c o m p l e t e l i f e , a n d d e a t h : a pa r t i a l d e f e n c e 1

a l e x v o o r h o e v e

introduction: an invalid argument?

EPICURUS FAMOUSLY CLAIMED that “death is nothing to us. For all good and evil lie in sensation, whereas death is the absence of sensation” (Letter to Menoeceus 125, all translations from Long and Sedley 1987). Leading philosophers have interpreted this argument as follows (see, e.g. Nagel 1970; Williams 1973):

1. Pleasure is the only intrinsic good; pain the only intrinsic evil.

2. Pleasures and pains cease at death.

Therefore,

C. Death is nothing to us.

Of course, this argument is invalid. All that it establishes is that death is not intrinsically bad. But, consistently with hedonism, one can hold that death is still comparatively bad when it prevents more pleasurable time alive. As Williams puts it:

“Consider two lives, one very short the other containing enjoyment to a ripe age. (…) If the [good things in life] are valuable, then more of them is better than less. But then it just will not be true that to die earlier is all the same as to die later” (1973, 83-4).

In this paper, I shall propose an Epicurean conception of the good life on which it does follow that death is nothing to those who have successfully aligned their lives with its precepts. (This view builds on, but adjusts, interpretations of Epicurus offered in Mitsis [1988a,b; 2002] and Annas [1987; 1994].) I shall also argue that this conception of the good life is

1 Earlier versions of this talk were presented at Bristol University, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Georgetown University, George Washington University, Harvard University, the LSE, Minnesota State University, Newcastle University, and the universities of Groningen, Reading, and York. I am grateful to those present and to Luc Bovens, Susanne Burri, Fiona Leigh, and Katie Steele for comments.

I apologise to readers for not following the common practice of the Society and not making available a full paper; interested readers may write me on [email protected] to be sent a draft in due course.

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alex voorhoeve epicurus on pleasure, the complete life, and death

more attractive than many have claimed, though I shall also conclude that the price one must pay to lead it is high.

I proceed as follows. In Section 1, I examine Epicurus’ distinctive conception of the greatest pleasure. In Section 2, I examine his view of the good life and show that one who successfully leads this life is invulnerable to death. In Section 3, I defend this view of the good life against several objections, save one: that it is incompatible with love of those whose well-being is vulnerable and with a commitment to risky projects.

1. the greatest pleasure

Consider the following passages from Epicurus on the kinds of pleasures he regarded as generating the best life:

“What produces the pleasant life is not continuous drinking and parties, or pederasty, or womanizing, or the enjoyment of dishes of an expensive table, but sober reasoning” (Letter to Menoeceus 132).

“Refer every choice to the health of the body and the soul’s freedom from disturbance” (Letter to Menoeceus 128).

“The removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures” (Key Doctrines 3).

These claims have struck some commentators as implausible, even bizarre. Adherents of a rival school of hedonistic philosophy, the Cyrenaics, are reported by Clement of Alexandria to have scoffed that Epicurus apparently believed that pleasure is maximized when one attains “the condition of a corpse” (Stromata, 2.21). Cicero, meanwhile, referred to the last claim as “an outright contradiction” (On Ends 2.29-30), and Julia Annas (1987, 6) remarks that they are “nobody’s idea of how to maximize pleasure.”

1.1 tranquillity and invulnerability

Following Mitsis (1988b), however, I believe these remarks of Epicurus’ can be understood as reflecting a sensible and interesting view of the greatest pleasure. Let us start from the idea that if an Epicurean believes they are likely to face significant evils (or, as I shall say for simplicity, they believe they are vulnerable), they will feel distress. It follows that the absence of distress (the absence of bodily pain and “the soul’s freedom from disturbance”) implies they do not believe they are vulnerable. Now, there are two ways in which an Epicurean can fail to believe they are vulnerable. One is to suspend belief about it. The other is to believe they are not vulnerable. The latter is the route that Epicurus appears to

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alex voorhoeve epicurus on pleasure, the complete life, and death draft paper

advocate, since his extant writings dwell on the common causes of human vulnerability and describe how one might make oneself less so. If, therefore, we assume an Epicurean forms beliefs about their vulnerability, then we can conclude that a tranquil Epicurean believes they are not vulnerable (in the sense that they believe that it is sufficiently unlikely that they will face substantial evils).

What could justify this belief? For Epicurus, a key source of vulnerability lies in our desires: the thwarting of an important, strongly held desire will be perceived as an evil, and the thought that such a desire is sufficiently likely to be thwarted will cause us distress. But we can, he proposes, greatly limit the likelihood of this perceived evil by limiting our desires and eliminating false beliefs.

What form should this limiting take? In Key Doctrines 29, he distinguishes three types of desires (see also Nussbaum 1994, chapter 6).

(i) “Natural and necessary” desires are for things required for bodily and mental well-being, such as food, water, shelter, clothing and friendship. Consequently, they are based in correct beliefs about one’s good and one ought not try to rid oneself of them.

(ii) “Natural and unnecessary” desires are equally not based on false beliefs about what is good, but are such that we need not satisfy them to lead a good life. In some instances, this is because we can avoid having these desires—an example might be the desires to care for one’s child, see it grow up, and have it go on to lead a happy life. One can avoid this natural desire simply by avoiding having children. In other cases, this is because one can leave the desire unsatisfied without substantial harm or frustration—as Epicurus may have believed it was possible to train oneself to do with sexual desire.

(iii) “Empty” desires are those that are based on false beliefs about nature or the good, and which are therefore cured by acquiring true beliefs. An example is the desire not to die which stems from the false belief that after death one will face an afterlife of suffering in Hades.

Epicurus argues that, as far as possible, we should rid ourselves of all but our natural and necessary desires. Under reasonably fortunate social and economic circumstances, we can arrange our lives so that we can be confident that they will be readily satisfied. This will be a substantial step towards limiting our vulnerability.

As Steven Luper (1987) has argued, however, one needs to say more about the nature of an Epicurean’s desires. For it is compatible with desiring only one’s basic needs that one wants them in order to stay alive for many years to come. But, especially if death at any age is as likely

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an occurrence as research suggests it was in Antiquity (Frier 2000, for example, estimates that an average 15-year-old, male or female, had a 7% chance of dying within five years and only a 52% chance of making it to 45), one could not be confident that this desire would not be thwarted. To be sufficiently invulnerable to death, one would need to have desires which stand a low chance of being thwarted by it.

Here, it is useful to introduce Williams’ (1973) distinction between “categorical” and “merely conditional” future-oriented desires. Categorical desires are desires that a future state should obtain, simpliciter. An example is a desire to see one’s friends next year. Where such desires involve oneself, they can be thwarted by one’s death—dying would interfere with seeing one’s friends. Merely conditional desires, by contrast, are desires that a future state should obtain, but only on the condition that one is then alive. An example is a desire to see one’s friends next year if one is alive which does not involve the wish to be alive in order to see them. Merely conditional desires cannot be thwarted by one’s death—they can be thwarted only by being alive without the then-desired state obtaining. As Luper (1987) remarks, to make it the case that death can do one no harm by thwarting one’s central desires, one must therefore conditionalize many of one’s self-oriented desires about the future. And there is indeed evidence that Epicurus advocated such a strategy (Epicurus 1993, Fragment 78). If, through ridding ourselves of all but natural, necessary desires and conditionalizing many of these, we limit ourselves to desires which cannot be thwarted by death and are unlikely to be thwarted otherwise, then we will justifiably feel substantively invulnerable.

1.2 the pleasures of invulnerability

We have established a link between the removal of all bodily pain and mental distress and a sense of one’s invulnerability. But why is the latter pleasurable—indeed, how could it be said to involve the greatest pleasure?

One can answer this question as follows. First, as Mitsis (1988) argues, being invulnerable involves feeling safe, in control, and content, because one has everything at hand that one wants, and one is confident that one’s future-oriented wants will be satisfied or at least not thwarted.

Second, as Striker (1993) points out, in the tranquil state that accompanies this sense of invulnerability, one will be open to and arguably get the most out of the episodic pleasures: a conversation with a friend, the sight of a beautiful sky, or eating a piece of cheese will all bring pleasure because one is able to wholly engage with them and the accompanying sensations.

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Third, on the Epicurean view, the attainment of invulnerability is a laborious process of ridding oneself of the state of anxiety brought about by common false beliefs and unnecessary desires. Once one has attained it, one can therefore taste the pleasure of comparing oneself to troubled souls. In what we retain of Epicurus’ writing, the comparison is to one’s former self. As he puts it:

“The limit of pleasure in the mind is produced by rationalizing [O’Connor: a reflection on] those (…) things (…) which used to present the mind with its greatest fears” (Key Doctrines 18).

His follower Lucretius, however, focuses on the comparison with non-Epicureans:

“When winds are troubling the sea, it is a pleasure to view from land another man’s great struggles; (…) because it is a pleasure to observe from what troubles you yourself are free. (…) Pleasantest of all is to be master of those tranquil regions well fortified on high by the teaching of the wise. From there you can look down on others” (De Rerum Natura, 2.1-61).

Moreover, the achievement involved generates a justified pride. Or, as Epicurus writes:

“Natural philosophy [makes people] self-sufficient and proud at their own goods, not at those of their circumstances” (Vatican Sayings 45, see also 47).

In sum, the tranquil state involves a multitude of pleasures: feeling safe, in control, and content; the enjoyment of unperturbed, fully engaged perception and thought; the satisfaction of comparing oneself to less tranquil others (or past selves), and of proper pride in one’s accomplishment.

This answers the Cyrenaics’ charge, quoted above, that Epicurus’ conception of the limit of pleasure involves the “condition of a corpse”. But can we also say that the tranquil state yields the greatest pleasures? Here, as several commentators have pointed out (Annas 1987 8-10; Striker 1993), we can appeal to the fact that, contrary to Bentham (1823, Chapter IV) and contemporary Benthamite measures of self-reported “positive affect” (see Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin 1997; Kahneman et al 2004) Epicurus does not believe there is a simple measure “positive experience” that comes in varying degrees, and on which an experience is more valuable the “stronger” it is. Denying that there is such a simple measure opens up room for judging different kinds of pleasures as less or more valuable, while retaining the hedonistic idea that all and only pleasures are intrinsically valuable. On my proposed view, Epicurus makes

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use of this room to specify that the pleasures attendant on the tranquil state are the most worthwhile, because they are generated by a state that has the potential to last and which is itself attained by the exercise of theoretical and practical reason.

2. the complete life

With this view of the greatest pleasure in hand, we can take the next step towards establishing Epicurus’ view of the good life. The following fragments make clear that Epicurus was well aware of the idea that merely asserting hedonism and the idea that death is our complete end was not enough to establish that death is nothing to us. For it shows that he had in mind a notion of a complete life, which, once attained, would not be improved by longer duration:

“The flesh places the limits of pleasure at infinity, and needs an infinite time to bring it about. But the intellect, by making a rational calculation of the end and the limit which govern the flesh, and by dispelling the fears about eternity, brings about the complete life, so that we no longer need infinite time. But neither does it shun pleasure, nor even when circumstances bring about our departure from life does it suppose that it has in any way fallen short of the best life” (Key Doctrines, 20-1).

But can a hedonist develop a coherent account of such a life? Cicero famously thought not, raising a question which he took to be unanswerable:

“The one who thinks that a life is made complete by pleasure, how can he be consistent if he denies that pleasure increases by duration?” (On Ends, 2.88)

The analysis in Section 1 allows us to answer Cicero’s question. If Epicurus is right, the greatest pleasures are attained in the tranquil state. Now, of necessity, a tranquil person has no strong, central desires that can be thwarted by death. This implies that they will desire more time alive in the tranquil state only conditionally. And, if we assume (as we should), that their desires follow their view of the good life, it follows that they will regard their life as complete. In the view of a tranquil Epicurean, the best life is one in which a person has achieved the tranquil state through philosophy, disciplining their desires and making wise choices regarding their living arrangements, choice of companions, and habits. And once they are in this state, another day in it will be welcomed, but will not make their life as a whole any better than it already is.

Would Epicureans be justified in taking their lives to be complete? This is a complex question, but there are some grounds for regarding their view as reasonable. Naturally, if one takes a subjective, or informed preference-

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based view of the good life (e.g. Arneson 1990), then their lives will indeed be complete just because they judge them so. But interestingly, as Annas (1987, 1993) argues, the Epicurean view can also be seen as justified from a well-known objective view of the good life, because it is designed to meet the conditions on a conception of the good life specified by Aristotle in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, namely, a life that is:

(1) Typically human, i.e., involving the exercise of theoretical and practical reason;

(2) Maximally in our control;

(3) Desired for its own sake (and not for the sake of anything else); and

(4) Self-sufficient, in the sense that it contains those things that all by themselves makes a life choiceworthy and lacking nothing, including from the perspective of others, such as friends and fellow citizens.

That the Epicurean conception meets conditions (1), (2) and (3) is relatively straightforward; Epicurus was at pains to argue (4) as well. In particular, he argued that a tranquil person will love their friends as themselves (Vatican Sayings 56) and can be counted on to respect the personal rights and property of fellow citizens (Key Doctrines 5). We shall return to the question of how plausible this assertion is in Section 3 below. At least, we are in a position to see that there is a coherent, and, on some prominent general conceptions of the good life, justified view of the good life on which, once one has achieved tranquillity, death can do one no harm, because one’s life is complete.

To spell out the revised proposed Epicurean argument more clearly:

1. Pleasure is the only intrinsic good; pain the only intrinsic evil.

2. Pleasures and pains cease at death.

Therefore,

C1. Death is not intrinsically bad.

3. The best life is one in which one has achieved tranquillity and remains tranquil until death.

C2. For the tranquil, death is not a comparative bad.

Therefore,

C3. For the tranquil, death is neither an intrinsic nor a comparative bad.

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The conclusion is, then, that “death is nothing [bad] to us [tranquil Epicureans]. This conclusion is compatible with the idea that death is bad for non-Epicureans and for Epicureans who are attempting to attain tranquillity and have reasonable prospects of eventual success, but who are not there yet, say, because they have not yet suitably adjusted their desires and beliefs.

3. is the epicurean tranquil life good?

The Epicurean view which emerges is, I argue, invulnerable to a number of common criticisms. First, consider Steven Luper objection that Epicureans can achieve invulnerability only through altogether giving up on a conception of a good or worthwhile life. Or, as he puts it:

“Since Epicureans cannot allow themselves any motivation to live, they must ensure that they never think that it would be good to live. A conception of a good or worthwhile life is a description of a life that would be good to live: such a conception Epicureans completely lack” (1987, p. 243).

Against Luper, as Section 2 reveals, Epicureans do possess a conception of the good life which provides them with a motivation to live even when not yet in a tranquil state, namely: to strive to attain the tranquil state and taste its attendant pleasures through the practice of philosophy, self-discipline and a wise choice of living arrangements. And of course, once in the tranquil state, they will not see any particular reason not to continue living, since they must anticipate that their future-oriented desires will be met, should they stay alive.

Second, consider the well-known view that Epicurean striving for invulnerability is incompatible with genuine and deep affection for others, since concern for them will make one vulnerable (see, e.g. Luper 1987, 244; Annas 1994, 236-244). Of course, Epicurus claimed otherwise, holding that friendship is an “immortal good” and that the wise person will care about a friend as he does about himself (Vatican Sayings 78 and 56). And, contrary to Luper and Annas, such genuine concern for friends’ well-being is indeed fully compatible with the striving for invulnerability, if one chooses as one’s friends (and other loved ones) those whose well-being has been rendered secure by their adoption of Epicureanism. This explains why a form of separation from ordinary folk and living in a community of Epicurean friends is required for the Epicurean good life. It also follows that the Epicurean good life is however, incompatible with love for others whose well-being is insecure and dependent on oneself.

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conclusion

I have outlined an understanding of the Epicurean good life which is pleasant, fit for a rational creature, and compatible with a form of friendship, and which, if followed, would indeed render death harmless. It is however, incompatible with love for others whose well-being is insecure, and with a commitment to projects whose completion is doubtful and requires one to live on. Giving up such love and such commitments is a high a price to pay for the pleasures of invulnerability.

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references

Annas, J. 1987. “Epicurus on Pleasure and Happiness,” Philosophical Topics 15 (2): 5-21

Annas, J. 1993. The Morality of Happiness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Aristotle. 1999. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by T. Irwin (2nd edition). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.

Arneson, R. 1990. “Primary Goods Reconsidered,” Noûs: 429–54.

Bentham, Jeremy. 1823. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Cicero, M.T. 1914. On Ends. Translated by H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library 40. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Draper, K. 2013. “Epicurus on the Value of Death.” In The Metaphysics and Ethics of Death: New Essays, ed. J.S. Taylor. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Epicurus. 1993. The Essential Epicurus. Translated by E. O’Connor. Amherst: Prometheus Books.

Frier, B.W. 2000. “Demography”, in A.K. Bowman, P. Garnsey, and D. Rathbone, eds., The Cambridge Ancient History XI: The High Empire, A.D. 70–192. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 827–54.

Furley, D. 1986. “Nothing to Us?” In The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics, ed. M. Schofield, G. Striker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 75-91.

Kahneman, D., P. Wakker and R. Sarin. 1997. “Back to Bentham?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (2): 375–406.

Kahneman, D., A.B. Krueger, D.A. Schkade, N. Schwarz, A.A. Stone. 2004.“A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day Reconstruction Method.” Science 306 (5702): 1776-1780.

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Luper, S. 2009. The Philosophy of Death. Cambridge University Press.

Luper-Foy, S. 1987. “Annihilation,” The Philosophical Quarterly. 37 (148): 233-252.

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Mitsis, P. 1988a. “Epicurus on Death and the Duration of Life.” In Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium on Ancient Philosophy 4: 303-322.

Mitsis, P. 1988b. The Pleasures of Invulnerability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mitsis, P. 2002. “Happiness and Death in Epicurean Ethics.” Apeiron 35 (4): 41-56.

Nagel, T. 1970. “Death.” Noûs 4 (1):73-80.

Nussbaum, M. 1991. “Review Essay: The Pleasures of Invulnerability by Phillip Mitsis.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3): 677-687.

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Rosenbaum, S. 1986. “How to be Dead and Not Care: A Defense of Epicurus,” American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (2): 217-225.

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Striker, G. 1993. “Epicurean Hedonism.” In Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, ed. J. Brunschweig and M. Nussbaum. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-17.

Williams, B. 1973. “Reflections on the Makropolous Case.” In his Problems of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 82-100.

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Epicurus on Pleasure, the Complete Life, and Death: A ... · proceedings of the aristotelian society 138th session issue no. 2 volume cxviii 2017 - 2018 epicurus on pleasure, the