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Louisiana Judicial College Louisiana Association for Justice Windsor Court Hotel, New Orleans February 18-19, 2016 EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE SEMINAR: STEPS TO JUSTICE Everyday Technology and Its Discovery Jordan Ginsburg – United States Attorney’s Office Matthew Allison – Federal Bureau of Investigation

Everyday Technology and Its Discovery€¦ · Everyday Technology and Its Discovery Jordan Ginsburg – United States Attorney’s Office ... Illegal access to computer systems –“hacking”

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Louisiana Judicial College Louisiana Association for Justice

Windsor Court Hotel, New Orleans

February 18-19, 2016

EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE SEMINAR: STEPS TO JUSTICE

Everyday Technology and Its Discovery

Jordan Ginsburg – United States Attorney’s Office Matthew Allison – Federal Bureau of Investigation

1

Everyday Technology and Its Discovery:Obtaining and Using Digital Evidence

Jordan Ginsberg Matthew AllisonAssistant United States Attorney Special AgentEastern District of Louisiana Federal Bureau of Investigation

Jordan Ginsberg Matthew AllisonAssistant United States Attorney Special AgentEastern District of Louisiana Federal Bureau of Investigation

Topics

BackgroundGathering EvidenceUsing Evidence at Trial

BackgroundGathering EvidenceUsing Evidence at Trial

CYBERCRIME

Illegal access to computer systems

Interference with data or computer systems

Online identity theft

Digital intellectual property crimes

CYBERCRIME

Illegal access to computer systems

Interference with data or computer systems

Online identity theft

Digital intellectual property crimes

ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

Any crime can create electronic evidence

Computers (including mobile phones) store evidence of crimes

Computers (including mobile phones) for communication

ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

Any crime can create electronic evidence

Computers (including mobile phones) store evidence of crimes

Computers (including mobile phones) for communication

3

Focus is on thesubstantive offenses.

Focus is on proceduresfor collecting evidence.

2

What is a “computer?”

Using a Computer in a Crime

An instrumentality (for traditional crimes)Illegal drug distribution

A means of storing evidenceChild pornography

A weaponHackingCyber attacks

An instrumentality (for traditional crimes)Illegal drug distribution

A means of storing evidenceChild pornography

A weaponHackingCyber attacks

Computers Create Digital EvidenceStore evidence

Child pornographyPirated moviesRecords of drug sales

Communication about or during crime

EmailSocial networking Voice and video communicationsTransfer documents and photographs

Store evidenceChild pornographyPirated moviesRecords of drug sales

Communication about or during crime

EmailSocial networking Voice and video communicationsTransfer documents and photographs

MOST CRIMINALS DO NOT KNOW ABOUTTHE DIGITAL EVIDENCE THEY CREATE!

3

Crimes Create Digital Evidence

Any crime can create electronic evidenceCybercrimes - Computer used to commit crime

Illegal access to computer systems – “hacking”Interference with data or computer systemsOnline identity theft

Any crime can create electronic evidenceCybercrimes - Computer used to commit crime

Illegal access to computer systems – “hacking”Interference with data or computer systemsOnline identity theft

7

MOST CRIMINALS DO NOT KNOW ABOUTTHE DIGITAL EVIDENCE THEY CREATE!

Electronic evidence can be fragile

Deleted by a keystrokeDeleted in normal course of businessLost when computer turned offSpecialized knowledge and tools are needed to recover deleted dataSome data cannot be recovered

Deleted by a keystrokeDeleted in normal course of businessLost when computer turned offSpecialized knowledge and tools are needed to recover deleted dataSome data cannot be recovered

8

INVESTIGATORS MUST ACT QUICKLYTO PRESERVE DIGITAL EVIDENCE

Electronic evidence can endure...…in multiple places

“Deleted” or altered data can sometimes be recoveredForensic analysis of computer drives and storage mediaCopies stored with service providers

Data may be recorded across many computers

Data does not naturally deteriorate over time

“Deleted” or altered data can sometimes be recoveredForensic analysis of computer drives and storage mediaCopies stored with service providers

Data may be recorded across many computers

Data does not naturally deteriorate over time

9

4

Electronic evidence is reliable……when proper steps are taken

Some disadvantagesUsers can alter or delete dataInvestigators must know how to identify, collect, and protect dataForensic analysis requires specialized knowledge and tools

Some advantagesComputers keep records unbeknownst to most usersAnalysis can reveal and restore altered or deleted dataA forensic, protected “image” of data is an exact copy of the dataAnalysis of the data can occur using the image

Some disadvantagesUsers can alter or delete dataInvestigators must know how to identify, collect, and protect dataForensic analysis requires specialized knowledge and tools

Some advantagesComputers keep records unbeknownst to most usersAnalysis can reveal and restore altered or deleted dataA forensic, protected “image” of data is an exact copy of the dataAnalysis of the data can occur using the image

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THE INVESTIGATIONTHE INVESTIGATION

Investigative StepsFollow the evidencePreserve evidence (where possible)Obtain off-site evidence (staying covert)Gather on-site evidenceSave the evidence (and keep it safe!)Analyze the evidence

Keep it trial ready!

Follow the evidencePreserve evidence (where possible)Obtain off-site evidence (staying covert)Gather on-site evidenceSave the evidence (and keep it safe!)Analyze the evidence

Keep it trial ready!

5

Off-Site Evidence –Internet Service Providers

Service providers are between suspects and the rest of the world

Service Providers possess important digital evidenceCustomer/subscriber informationTraffic data (logs) – stored and prospectiveContent (copies) – stored and prospective

Service providers are between suspects and the rest of the world

Service Providers possess important digital evidenceCustomer/subscriber informationTraffic data (logs) – stored and prospectiveContent (copies) – stored and prospective

Types of Evidence Available from ISPs

E-mail AddressIP AddressCell Tower LocationContent

E-mailsSocial Media MessagesGPS Location

E-mail AddressIP AddressCell Tower LocationContent

E-mailsSocial Media MessagesGPS Location

Preserving Off-Site Evidence

6

Off-Site Preservation

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(f):

(1) In general.—A provider of wire or electronic communication services or a remote computing service, upon the request of a governmental entity, shall take all necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending the issuance of a court order or other process.

(2) Period of retention.—Records referred to in paragraph (1) shall be retained for a period of 90 days, which shall be extended for an additional 90-day period upon a renewed request by the governmental entity.

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(f):

(1) In general.—A provider of wire or electronic communication services or a remote computing service, upon the request of a governmental entity, shall take all necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending the issuance of a court order or other process.

(2) Period of retention.—Records referred to in paragraph (1) shall be retained for a period of 90 days, which shall be extended for an additional 90-day period upon a renewed request by the governmental entity.

Obtaining Off-Site EvidenceSubpoena: Non-content

Search Warrant: Content

Subpoena: Non-content

Search Warrant: Content

How Do You Know?

Content vs. Non-ContentNon-Content

Subscriber InfoIP Address used to access accountCredit care used to pay for serviceCell Tower Location

Legal RequirementCourt Order/SubpoenaOnly demonstrative relevance

Content vs. Non-ContentNon-Content

Subscriber InfoIP Address used to access accountCredit care used to pay for serviceCell Tower Location

Legal RequirementCourt Order/SubpoenaOnly demonstrative relevance

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Obtaining Off-Site EvidenceSubpoena: Non-content

Search Warrant: ContentEmailCloud storagePrivate messages**Prospective GPS Location Information

Court OrderHistorical cell-site location information

Subpoena: Non-content

Search Warrant: ContentEmailCloud storagePrivate messages**Prospective GPS Location Information

Court OrderHistorical cell-site location information

CELL-SITE DATA (CSLI)In re: Application for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013)

2703(d) order is sufficient to get historical cell site records because

A 3rd party is recording the information for non-law enforcement reasons (business records)Users know about cell towers (bars!)They choose to make a call (like sending a letter?)Contractual terms of service

Upheld post-Riley, United States v. Guerrero, 2014 WL 4476565 (5th Cir. 2014)

In re: Application for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013)

2703(d) order is sufficient to get historical cell site records because

A 3rd party is recording the information for non-law enforcement reasons (business records)Users know about cell towers (bars!)They choose to make a call (like sending a letter?)Contractual terms of service

Upheld post-Riley, United States v. Guerrero, 2014 WL 4476565 (5th Cir. 2014)

8

Off-Site Search Warrant: 18 U.S.C. 2703

Probable cause to believe that account contains evidence and instrumentalities utilized in commission or furtherance of crime signed by a judge

In jurisdiction where provider is locate, where offense occurred, or where offense is being investigated

Served on provider (like subpoena)Provider isolates account, create exact duplicate and transmits to agent“Minimization” not necessaryDate restrictions are allowable

Probable cause to believe that account contains evidence and instrumentalities utilized in commission or furtherance of crime signed by a judge

In jurisdiction where provider is locate, where offense occurred, or where offense is being investigated

Served on provider (like subpoena)Provider isolates account, create exact duplicate and transmits to agent“Minimization” not necessaryDate restrictions are allowable

Subscriber Notification (“Thank you Mr. Snowden”)

Many electronic communication service providers notify subscribers after receiving “legal process”Facebook, Yahoo!, Google, Twitter, Apple, Instagram, LinkedIn, Microsoft, PinterestIncludes GJ and administrative subpoenas

NOT preservation letters (except Twitter or Wordpress), per the provider

Typically 60-90 days until disclosure…unless “prohibited by law.”

Many electronic communication service providers notify subscribers after receiving “legal process”Facebook, Yahoo!, Google, Twitter, Apple, Instagram, LinkedIn, Microsoft, PinterestIncludes GJ and administrative subpoenas

NOT preservation letters (except Twitter or Wordpress), per the provider

Typically 60-90 days until disclosure…unless “prohibited by law.”

So…2705(b) Non-Disclosure Order

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On-Site Evidence: The Search

Where to Find EvidenceOn-site

A criminal’s devicesComputersTabletsCell phoneStorage drives/USB drives/CDs/DVDsGPS Printers“Smart” watchesAutomobile

On-siteA criminal’s devices

ComputersTabletsCell phoneStorage drives/USB drives/CDs/DVDsGPS Printers“Smart” watchesAutomobile

The Evolution of Privacy Law in a Digital World

City of Ontario, CA v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010)Takeaways:

4th A. protections apply to government employersUnclear whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists“Workplace needs” justification controls, and search was reasonable

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)Takeaways :

A late search = no search warrantGPS on cars (even in public space) violates the 4th

City of Ontario, CA v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010)Takeaways:

4th A. protections apply to government employersUnclear whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists“Workplace needs” justification controls, and search was reasonable

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)Takeaways :

A late search = no search warrantGPS on cars (even in public space) violates the 4th

10

Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014)Facts

Consolidated 2 cases:California v. Riley:

Traffic violation & Weapons chargeSmartphonePictures, videos, and terms = Gang ties

United States v. Wurie (Mass.): Flip phone Receiving calls from “my house”Drug sale and Search Warrant

FactsConsolidated 2 cases:

California v. Riley: Traffic violation & Weapons chargeSmartphonePictures, videos, and terms = Gang ties

United States v. Wurie (Mass.): Flip phone Receiving calls from “my house”Drug sale and Search Warrant

Searching Cellular Phones

Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014):YOU CANNOT SEARCH A CELL PHONE INCIDENT TO ARREST WITHOUT A

WARRANT

(Court focused on volume and breadth of data available on cell phone, ability to access “the cloud,” ubiquity of cell phones, and distinguished “other objects”)

Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014):YOU CANNOT SEARCH A CELL PHONE INCIDENT TO ARREST WITHOUT A

WARRANT

(Court focused on volume and breadth of data available on cell phone, ability to access “the cloud,” ubiquity of cell phones, and distinguished “other objects”)

The Life of Riley (cont.)Strategy: Go for the phone first!

Ok to have limited access (unlock = secure)Faraday bag!!!!

Anticipatory Search Warrants on the rise?“Exigent circumstances”

iPhone 6, iOS 8 (no ability to decrypt)

Compelling disclosure of passwordBiometricPassword as “forgone conclusion?”

Must seek DOJ approval

Strategy: Go for the phone first!Ok to have limited access (unlock = secure)Faraday bag!!!!

Anticipatory Search Warrants on the rise?“Exigent circumstances”

iPhone 6, iOS 8 (no ability to decrypt)

Compelling disclosure of passwordBiometricPassword as “forgone conclusion?”

Must seek DOJ approval

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The Life of Riley (finally)Increased recognition for remote/electronic signing of warrants

It’s in Riley!It’s the 21st century!

What is “probable cause” for a cell phone search warrant?

Everyone has one! Everyone uses one!Nebraska v. Henderson, 289 Neb. 371 (Neb. Oct. 17, 2015)

Increased recognition for remote/electronic signing of warrants

It’s in Riley!It’s the 21st century!

What is “probable cause” for a cell phone search warrant?

Everyone has one! Everyone uses one!Nebraska v. Henderson, 289 Neb. 371 (Neb. Oct. 17, 2015)

Forensic Analysis

Digital Forensics is the science of gathering, retrieving and evaluating electronic stored data.

With the aim of identifying, preserving, recovering, analyzing and presenting facts and opinions about the information.

Digital Forensics is the science of gathering, retrieving and evaluating electronic stored data.

With the aim of identifying, preserving, recovering, analyzing and presenting facts and opinions about the information.

The Forensic Process • Identification• Integrity of Evidence• Preservation• Extraction • Analysis• Documentation• Factual Reporting of the Information

Found

• Identification• Integrity of Evidence• Preservation• Extraction • Analysis• Documentation• Factual Reporting of the Information

Found

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THE PROSECUTION:USING DIGITAL EVIDENCE AT TRIAL

THE PROSECUTION:USING DIGITAL EVIDENCE AT TRIAL

Evidentiary

Evidence is easy to destroy/loseLocate! Preserve! Obtain!

Takes a lot of time to reviewOften requires relying on expertsAdmissibilitySimplification

Evidence is easy to destroy/loseLocate! Preserve! Obtain!

Takes a lot of time to reviewOften requires relying on expertsAdmissibilitySimplification

Choosing an Expert

QualificationsLocationCostBias?Ability to communicate clearly and simply

QualificationsLocationCostBias?Ability to communicate clearly and simply

13

Evidence Admissibility

“Informal” evidence not admissible in courtRequirements for admissibility

Authentication (“official” documentation)Custodian of records

“Informal” evidence not admissible in courtRequirements for admissibility

Authentication (“official” documentation)Custodian of records

Evidence Admissibility (cont.)

Place of manufactureLocation of serversAccuracy of contentTime and dateRules of usage

Place of manufactureLocation of serversAccuracy of contentTime and dateRules of usage

Will a defendant oppose admission?Is there another reason to use a custodian?

Evidence Admissibility: Certification

14

Evidence Simplification

Is the data understandable?Bank records are familiar

Not true with E-Bay or PayPal

Telephone records are simpleNot true with all electronic records (cell-tower data)

Information is often proprietaryA custodian can help explain

Is the data understandable?Bank records are familiar

Not true with E-Bay or PayPal

Telephone records are simpleNot true with all electronic records (cell-tower data)

Information is often proprietaryA custodian can help explain

Questions?Matthew AllisonSpecial AgentFederal Bureau of Investigation(504) [email protected]

Jordan GinsbergAssistant United States AttorneyEastern District of Louisiana(504) [email protected]

Matthew AllisonSpecial AgentFederal Bureau of Investigation(504) [email protected]

Jordan GinsbergAssistant United States AttorneyEastern District of Louisiana(504) [email protected]

Matthew F. Allison After obtaining a BS in Computer Science and a BS in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Texas and working in Research and Development in the Oilfield for 5 years, SA Allison joined the FBI in 2010. For the past 6 years, SA Allison has investigated Cyber Crimes and Crimes against Children involving the use of a computer. SA Allison regularly identifies, preserves, collects, seizes, searches, and maintains digital evidence as part of his investigations. Jordan Ginsberg Jordan Ginsberg is an Assistant United States Attorney in the Eastern District of Louisiana and the Deputy Supervisor of the Office's Fraud Unit. Mr. Ginsberg specializes in the prosecution of various complex white-collar and cybercrimes, including public corruption, financial and health care fraud, computer intrusion, intellectual property violations, and child exploitation and trafficking. Mr. Ginsberg has successfully tried numerous cases concerning financial, computer, and violent crimes, including the first juvenile sex trafficking matter in the Eastern District of Louisiana, and he has argued before the Fifth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals. He also serves as the Office's Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (CHIP) coordinator and is an Associate Professor at Tulane Law School, where he is a member of the Trial Advocacy Faculty. Jordan graduated summa cum laude from Washington and Lee University in 2001 and from the University of Chicago Law School with honors in 2004. After law school, Mr. Ginsberg served as a law clerk in the Northern District of Illinois for the Honorable Mark Filip.