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Proceedings article written by LCDR Lambert, NIOC Maryland.
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To meet the challenges and threats of the information age the Navy is realizing that cyberspace means a lot more than just the Internet
he definitions and policies regarding cyshyberspace are being discussed and debated throughout the Department of Defense Howshyever the discussion has largely centered
around the conventional view of cyberspace as simply the Internet To be current and useful the debate should expand the focus to consider the similarities between the conventional view of cyberspace operations and classic electronic warfare (EW) more specifically offensive cyshyberspace operations (OCO) and electronic attack (EA)
Such an expansion will enhance the development of a more comprehensive non-kinetic warfare doctrine which includes other disciplines such as psychological operashytions military deception etc Because of the very nature of cyberspace and its dependency on the electromagnetic spectrum the separation of OCO and EA is and will conshytinue to become indistinguishClble as time and technology progress If the debate remains solely focused on the comshymonly accepted view of cyberspace as simply the Internet then we will miss an opportunity to increase the range and depth of our non-kinetic arsenal
To make the case for expanding non-kinetic capabilities OCO and EA should be approached in a more integrated fashion The underlying physics of OCO and EA drive toshyward a natural convergence of capabilities Industry already demonstrates an increasing reliance on radio-frequency (RF) interfaces into Internet-protocol (IP)- and non-IP-based networks Failure to change the Navy approach to this imshypending convergence will put the maritime commander at an operational disadvantage To avoid this consequence the Navy must align OCO- and EA-related governance organizational stmcture and acquisition models so that the maritime commander has a more seamlessly integrated coherent and useful set of non-kinetic options
Defining Cyberspace Debatably it has become difficult to reach consensus
on how to define cyberspace because both cyber and cyshyberspace are contrived terms that originally tried to give name and substance to any number of interrelated inforshymation and communication systems However because of this artificiality the detinitions have morphed many times and in many ways such that their present forms are little more than a synonym for the IP-based technology
u S w bull n ovAiAt 1tC(I(PHOTO
Senior Navy officials tour the new Space and Naval Warfare Sysfems Command dala center at SPAWAR Systems Center Atlantic in Charlesshyton South Carolina on 7 October 2011 Electronic warfare is part of at least three systems commands SPAWAR Naval Sea (NAVSEA) and Naval Air (NAVAIR) With each command working on its own piece of cyberspace the authors caution interoperability issues duplicities and inefficiencies are a real possibility
Rear Admiral Sean Filipowski former director for Electronic and Cyber Warfare in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations provided a great alternative to this popular view of cyberspace
lWJhen I talk about cyber I view it as more than e-mail and internet type activities on IP-based networks Information moving through the RF in digital form such as tactical data links UAV control systems and satellite-based conununicashytions are also cyber in my book My other point of clarifishycation is about the electromagnetic spectrum [EMS] versus cyberspace Some would argue these are separate and distinct However I would submit that one is a physical domain which is the electromagnetic spectrum and that cyberspace is a manshymade infrastructure that operates in part in the EMS I
DOD has given some credence to the larger idea of cyberspace operations Popular military understanding of such operations attempts to draw parallels to some of the military principles of the more recognizable warfare doshymains (e g land sea air space)2 However even with this acknowledgement of a larger idea of cyberspace operashytions current understanding and practical usage still tends to focus on a conventional Internet-only view
This wrongly relegates the EMS to being a small part of what makes modern networks possible thus underestimatshying complexity and overlooking emerging oppOltunities As a manufactured environment one can aim to shape OCO through its physical pieces although to master it one must also understand and account for the larger environment in which it exists and the underlying electromagnetic physics on which it relies Although it is true that computer netshyworks do help in navigating cyberspace they are simply tools and not the environment itself Fundamentally we are talking about informationdata traveling through the spectrum Once we understand how technology intluences and affects the information and its tlow then we can focus on tools and methods to create desired effects
EW and Cyberspace Operations To understand the broader idea of affecting information
tlow through the EMS let us examine some common nonshykinetic methodologies No doubt there are non-kinetic tools that affect free space and other non-kinetic tools that affect wired networks If one accepts the broader scope of cybershyspace operations as being reliant on the EMS the question becomes whether tactics techniques and procedures (TIPs) can be used interchangeably to create similar effects in the expanded environment leading to a converged non-kinetic warfare doctrine If either EA TIPs or OCO TTPs are used to affect the tlow of datainformation then regardless of the tool used or the doctrine followed both have an effect on an adversarys ability to make decisions
wwwusniorg PROCEEDINGS 41
EA and OCO share more than a commonality of battle space The EMS and the underlying physics that govshyern it are fundamental to both EA and the widely excepted view of OCO
For example consider the following list of EA capabilities bull manipulate[ing] their [adversary] radar to show false images~ bull [using]directed electromagnetic energy that in short pulses may permanently disable enemy computer circuitri bull confusing or misleading an adversary manipulates the adversarys decision loop making it difficult to establish an accurate perception of objective reality5
Looking through a different lens one could consider the non-kinetic effects here equivalent to a cyber effect Examine the list again in general terms of more traditionshyally accepted OCO effects to include just some common examples bull inserting false data bull permanently erasing data bull causing irrevocable damage to a network system bull modifying routing tablesnetwork addresses bull denial of service (DOS) and distributed denial of service (DDOS)
Certainly there are technical and tactical differences in the employment of EA and OCO activities However if we begin to view the non-kinetic effects achievable using the entire non-kinetic arsenal then arguably the United States will have a more comprehensive non-kinetic strategy
Combined Strategy There is an effort to adopt a strategy that capitalizes on
a fully networked architecture capable of coordinating milshyitary operations throughout all warfare domains including the electromagnetic environment Furthermore this stratshyegy is supported by a doctrine that advocates control of an adversarys information flow and maintain[ing] domishynance in the battle space The doctrine provides the imshypetus for information dominance as both a desired effect against an adversary and a means for achieving overall success6 As a foundation the strategy and doctrine rely on the integration of cyberspace operations within the larger electromagnetic environment Known as Integrated Network Electronic Warfare this non-kinetic warfare is intended to be coordinated through a single governing authority at the highest levels of command 7
However this is not a US strategy In fact the govershynance here is that of China In contrast US cyberspace strategy is focused more on the widely accepted definition
42 January 2012
of cyber as a collection of wired networks and arguably overlooks the cri tical
radio-frequency aspects of comshymercial and military mobileshy
communication systems Yes cyberspace operations
are included in our strategy hierarchies Yes there is a clear desire to be able to protect and defend our own use of cyberspace while at
the same time being able to project power against
an adversarys use of cybershyspace However the strategies
fall short in addressing the EMS in which cyberspace operations are relishy
ant From context many of the strategies hold to the wired-network view of cyberspace The verbiage is flexible enough to permit a broader interpretation of cyshyberspace which could include EA principles The problem is the context of the strategies coupled with the popular view of cyberspace Because of this wired-network view and ambiguous guidance subsequent governance tends to focus on the more common view of cyberspace and overlooks the critical RF links used by commercial and military mobile networks
Truly without a better consensus of what cyberspace is it is difficult for subordinate governance to establish the extent of cyberspace from the strategy documents alone There is currently neither a joint services nor a Navy cyshyberspace-operations doctrine However a joint doctrine is forthcoming from US Cyber Command How this will scope cyberspace is still unclear but now is the perfect time to embrace the larger view of cyberspace operations and EW as part of the discussion more specifically OCO and EA The Army which does have a cyberspace-opershyations doctrine acknowledges that competition over the use of the Electro-Magnetic Spectrum will increase so cyberspace operations will require access to an increasshyingly wider range of the EMS for effective operations and therefore greater levels of support by EW techniques x This is a good start But to benefit fully from an expanded non-kinetic arsenal EA and OCO doctrines must conshyverge If joint doctrine fails to establish this foundation then arguably we face the very real possibility of a period of disjointed and fragmented control
Command Organization It is important to examine the current command-andshy
control (C2) structure assigned to the OCO and EA misshysions In June 2009 Secretary of Defense Robert Gate~ directed that a subordinate unified command be estabshylished under US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and be responsible for military operations in cyberspace This resulted in the creation of US Cyber Command (USshyCYBERCOM)9 Although USCYBERCOM has OCO reshy
wwwusniorg
sponsibilities it is important to note that USSTRATCOM through its subordinate Joint Information Operations Warshyfare Center retains the responsibility for EW and by exshytension EA While USCYBERCOM and USSTRATCOM continue to discover and attempt to better determine comshymand and control of cyberspace operations writ large we tend to use traditional terms such as COCOM OPCON and TACON along with block diagrams that push us into linear concepts-for an area that defies linearity
In contrast the Navy reorganized to better position itself for a converged information-dominance environment This new organization under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operashytions for Information Dominance (N21N6) administratively and Fleet Cyber Commanclffenth Fleet operationally aligns the Navys information capabilities and info-centric comshymunities and better positions the Navy to meet the chalshylenges and threats of the information age IO In addition the Navy has placed a single one-star admiral as the inttgrashytion point for both electronic and cyber wmfare within the N2IN6 organization This means that in the OPNAV staff EA and OCO are considered fundamentally linked as eleshyments of non-kinetic warfare However challenges at the Fleet level persist with the remnants of EW information operations traditional communicator roles and this new cyber focus The question is what will be the organization manning roles and responsibilities be and can they work together Instead of how will they work together
Acquisition Governance and command organizashy
tions go a long way in establishing lasting programs But ultimately one must examine the acquishysition process for procuring capabilities By breaking down traditional stoveshypipes of authorities and acquisition (eg OCO and EA) DOD could capitalize on the ongoing technology convergence to acquire more effective integrated and affordable non-kinetic capabilities to support the combatant comshymanders
The Joint Strategic Planning System construct results in the comshybination of govemance and capability and ultimately apportions money to these unions As discussed the strategy hierarchies do express a need for an expanded range of military operations that include cyberspace Their verbiage focuses on the conshyventional view of cyberspace operations neveltheless they do not prohibit a broader interpretation of cyberspace operations which could include EW speciticaUy EA By broadening the focus to consider the similarities between the conventional
wwwusniorg
view of OCO and EA the strategic direction could ultimately lead toward expanded non-kinetic capabilities and a bettershyaligned acquisition process
The Navy divides its acquisition establishment into four systems commands (SYSCOMs) with each responsible for enshygineeling building buying and maintaining programs in their respective areas However electronic warfare for example is a pcut of a number of programs in at least three different SYSshyCOMs (ie NAVAlR NAVSEA and SPAWAR) Cyberspace operations are even more distributed Most if not all programs embed a cyber element So cyber procurement spans across all of the SYSCOMs as well as multiple directorates at OPNAY
Consider the missionsdescriptions of three SYSCOMs bull Space and Naval Wmfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) the Navys designated technical authority and acquisition command for command control communications computshyers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance [C4ISRJ business information technology (IT) and space systems I I bull Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) NAVSEAs focus is on ships submarines and combat systems and establishing and enforcing technical authority in combat system design and operation 2 bull Naval Air Systems Comrriand (NAVAIR) the Navys focus on naval aviation aircraft weapons and systemsu
Arguably these three descriptions alone highlight the need for better-defined electronic- and cyber-warfare acquishysition Without question ships aircraft and C4ISR systems
are dependent on cyberspace Therefore NAVAIR NAVSEA and SPAWAR must be concemed
with how cyberspace influences their respective areas of responsibility
With each command working on its own piece of cyberspace
interoperability issues dushyplicities and inefficiencies are a real possibility
Without a clear defishynition of an electronicshycyberspace capability (or a supporting electronicshycyberspace capability) and who is responsible for it there is little integration
oversight for capabilities that support larger programs
This lack of integration causes duplicity and incompatibility beshy
tween the programs themselves not to mention their underlying electronicshy
cyberspace capabilities (eg a ships radar may interfere with aircraft communications)
SPAWAR claims Our projects and programs will align with OPNAV requirements and the operational needs of FLTCYBERCOM [Fleet Cyber Command] TENTH FLEET [US 10th Fleet] As more systems converge and become even more reliant on cyberspace (ie everyshything networked together) and SPAWAR is the systems
PROCEEDINGS bull 43
command for the 10th Fleet (eg the Navys operational electronic-cyberspace warfare commander) then the amshybiguities in the responsibilities of the other SYSCOMs and their relationship with SPAWAR (and even with other warfare commanders) will become less clear
A study of peacetime doctrinal innovation between the World Wars reported that innovation in military doctrine requires that a generation of officers schooled and comshymitted to waging new forms of warfare develop over a period of up to twenty years14 Cyberspace operations currently finds itself in a similar period of innovation The ambiguity surrounding cyberspace operations speshycifically OCO and the interface with the EMS could prevent a seamless integration into a broader warfare concept Until we fully address the technological conshyvergence between RF to IP and RF to non-IP networks and its i~pact to both EA and oeo our 20-year clock has not even started If we are serious about improving non-kinetic warfare and its consideration as an alternashytivecomplement to kinetic warfare we need to make bold steps to address not just cyberspace operations but how it interfaces with the EMS bull
1 RADM Sean Filipowski Looking Forward for Maritime Spectrum Warfare Phoenix Challenge Conferences San Diego CA 2011 2 Gerry Gilmore Official Cites Value of Cyberspace to Warfighting Operations Defense Link 8 April 2009 wwwstratcommiVnewsarticle7610fficial Cites Value of Cyberspace to Warfighting Operations
3 C Wilson (20 March 2007) CRS Report for Congress Information Operations Elecshytronic Warfare and Cyberwar Capabilities and Related Policy Issues wwwlasorgsgp crsinatseclRL31787pdf p 7 4 Ibid 5 Electronic Warfare Joint Pub 3-13 (25 January 2007)1 p 1-5 6 B Krekel Capability of the Peoples Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network ExplOitation (McLean VA Northrop Grumman Corporation Information Systems Sector 9 October 2009) p 7 7 Ibid 8 Cyberspace Operations Concept Capability Plan 2016-2028 (22 February 2010) TRAshyDOC Pamphlet 525-7-8 p 9 9 Robert Gates Establishment of a Subordinate Unified Command US Cyber Comshymand Under US Strategic Command for Military Cyberspace Operations Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Under Secretaries of Defense (Washington DC Secretary of Defense 23 June 2009) p 1 10 Rhumb Lines 2 October 2009 Navy Office of Information wwwnavysnaorg newsgramRhumblinesJune20UpdatesiRhumb20LinesO0201nlormation20Domishynance202200CT2009pdf 11 SPAWAR (nd) About Us Team SPAWAR wwwpublicnaVYmilspawarPagesi AboutUsaspx 12 NAVSEA (nd) Aboul NAVSEA wwwnavseanavymiVAboutNAVSEAaspx 13 NAVAIR (nd) About NAVAIR WWWnavairnavymiVindexcfmfuseaction=home displayampkey=9E99EE24-2F3D-4E23-AOC1-A54C18C3FFC8 14 G J Rattray Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace (Cambridge MA the MIT Press 2001) p 181
Captain Batson is an information-warfare ofticer currently assigned to the OPNAV Staft He is the Cyber Warfare Branch head N21N6F31 He was commissioned through the University Of Mississippi NROTC and holds an electrical engineering PhD from the Naval Postgraduate School
Lieutenant Commander Labert is an information professional currently assigned to the Potomac Institute for POlicy Studies in Arlington Virginia He is a Navy Cyber Federal Executive Fellow He was commissioned through the US Naval Academy and holds an information systems and operations masters degree trom the Naval Postgraduate School
Naval Warfare Critical Engineering Challenges
February 9-102012 Hyatt Regency Crystal City Arlington VA
Technical Program Highlights - Keynotes Panels Presentations 81 Morel
bull Invited Keynote Speakers Include
bull ADM Jonathan W Greenert USN Chief of Naval Operations
The Honorable Sean J Stackley Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research Development and Acquisition)
VADM Kevin M McCoy USN Commander Naval Sea Systems Command
bull Moderated Panel Sessions on Commonality and Mil-Specs
bull More than 30 Technical Paper and Poster Presentations plus Student Posters
bull Community Briefings VIP Exhibit Hall Tours and Networking
Associated Events
bull Global Shipbuilding Executive Summit (Invitation Only) - ASNE welcomes participants for this international gathering of shipbuilding executives held in conjunction with ASNE Day 2012
bull ASNE Honors Gala - An extraordinary evening including the presentation of several of ASNEs most prestigious awards followed by international food and drink at the Gala Reception in the Exhibit Hall
bull Second Annual Naval Engineering Historical Display
44 bull January 2012 wwwusniorg
EA and OCO share more than a commonality of battle space The EMS and the underlying physics that govshyern it are fundamental to both EA and the widely excepted view of OCO
For example consider the following list of EA capabilities bull manipulate[ing] their [adversary] radar to show false images~ bull [using]directed electromagnetic energy that in short pulses may permanently disable enemy computer circuitri bull confusing or misleading an adversary manipulates the adversarys decision loop making it difficult to establish an accurate perception of objective reality5
Looking through a different lens one could consider the non-kinetic effects here equivalent to a cyber effect Examine the list again in general terms of more traditionshyally accepted OCO effects to include just some common examples bull inserting false data bull permanently erasing data bull causing irrevocable damage to a network system bull modifying routing tablesnetwork addresses bull denial of service (DOS) and distributed denial of service (DDOS)
Certainly there are technical and tactical differences in the employment of EA and OCO activities However if we begin to view the non-kinetic effects achievable using the entire non-kinetic arsenal then arguably the United States will have a more comprehensive non-kinetic strategy
Combined Strategy There is an effort to adopt a strategy that capitalizes on
a fully networked architecture capable of coordinating milshyitary operations throughout all warfare domains including the electromagnetic environment Furthermore this stratshyegy is supported by a doctrine that advocates control of an adversarys information flow and maintain[ing] domishynance in the battle space The doctrine provides the imshypetus for information dominance as both a desired effect against an adversary and a means for achieving overall success6 As a foundation the strategy and doctrine rely on the integration of cyberspace operations within the larger electromagnetic environment Known as Integrated Network Electronic Warfare this non-kinetic warfare is intended to be coordinated through a single governing authority at the highest levels of command 7
However this is not a US strategy In fact the govershynance here is that of China In contrast US cyberspace strategy is focused more on the widely accepted definition
42 January 2012
of cyber as a collection of wired networks and arguably overlooks the cri tical
radio-frequency aspects of comshymercial and military mobileshy
communication systems Yes cyberspace operations
are included in our strategy hierarchies Yes there is a clear desire to be able to protect and defend our own use of cyberspace while at
the same time being able to project power against
an adversarys use of cybershyspace However the strategies
fall short in addressing the EMS in which cyberspace operations are relishy
ant From context many of the strategies hold to the wired-network view of cyberspace The verbiage is flexible enough to permit a broader interpretation of cyshyberspace which could include EA principles The problem is the context of the strategies coupled with the popular view of cyberspace Because of this wired-network view and ambiguous guidance subsequent governance tends to focus on the more common view of cyberspace and overlooks the critical RF links used by commercial and military mobile networks
Truly without a better consensus of what cyberspace is it is difficult for subordinate governance to establish the extent of cyberspace from the strategy documents alone There is currently neither a joint services nor a Navy cyshyberspace-operations doctrine However a joint doctrine is forthcoming from US Cyber Command How this will scope cyberspace is still unclear but now is the perfect time to embrace the larger view of cyberspace operations and EW as part of the discussion more specifically OCO and EA The Army which does have a cyberspace-opershyations doctrine acknowledges that competition over the use of the Electro-Magnetic Spectrum will increase so cyberspace operations will require access to an increasshyingly wider range of the EMS for effective operations and therefore greater levels of support by EW techniques x This is a good start But to benefit fully from an expanded non-kinetic arsenal EA and OCO doctrines must conshyverge If joint doctrine fails to establish this foundation then arguably we face the very real possibility of a period of disjointed and fragmented control
Command Organization It is important to examine the current command-andshy
control (C2) structure assigned to the OCO and EA misshysions In June 2009 Secretary of Defense Robert Gate~ directed that a subordinate unified command be estabshylished under US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and be responsible for military operations in cyberspace This resulted in the creation of US Cyber Command (USshyCYBERCOM)9 Although USCYBERCOM has OCO reshy
wwwusniorg
sponsibilities it is important to note that USSTRATCOM through its subordinate Joint Information Operations Warshyfare Center retains the responsibility for EW and by exshytension EA While USCYBERCOM and USSTRATCOM continue to discover and attempt to better determine comshymand and control of cyberspace operations writ large we tend to use traditional terms such as COCOM OPCON and TACON along with block diagrams that push us into linear concepts-for an area that defies linearity
In contrast the Navy reorganized to better position itself for a converged information-dominance environment This new organization under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operashytions for Information Dominance (N21N6) administratively and Fleet Cyber Commanclffenth Fleet operationally aligns the Navys information capabilities and info-centric comshymunities and better positions the Navy to meet the chalshylenges and threats of the information age IO In addition the Navy has placed a single one-star admiral as the inttgrashytion point for both electronic and cyber wmfare within the N2IN6 organization This means that in the OPNAV staff EA and OCO are considered fundamentally linked as eleshyments of non-kinetic warfare However challenges at the Fleet level persist with the remnants of EW information operations traditional communicator roles and this new cyber focus The question is what will be the organization manning roles and responsibilities be and can they work together Instead of how will they work together
Acquisition Governance and command organizashy
tions go a long way in establishing lasting programs But ultimately one must examine the acquishysition process for procuring capabilities By breaking down traditional stoveshypipes of authorities and acquisition (eg OCO and EA) DOD could capitalize on the ongoing technology convergence to acquire more effective integrated and affordable non-kinetic capabilities to support the combatant comshymanders
The Joint Strategic Planning System construct results in the comshybination of govemance and capability and ultimately apportions money to these unions As discussed the strategy hierarchies do express a need for an expanded range of military operations that include cyberspace Their verbiage focuses on the conshyventional view of cyberspace operations neveltheless they do not prohibit a broader interpretation of cyberspace operations which could include EW speciticaUy EA By broadening the focus to consider the similarities between the conventional
wwwusniorg
view of OCO and EA the strategic direction could ultimately lead toward expanded non-kinetic capabilities and a bettershyaligned acquisition process
The Navy divides its acquisition establishment into four systems commands (SYSCOMs) with each responsible for enshygineeling building buying and maintaining programs in their respective areas However electronic warfare for example is a pcut of a number of programs in at least three different SYSshyCOMs (ie NAVAlR NAVSEA and SPAWAR) Cyberspace operations are even more distributed Most if not all programs embed a cyber element So cyber procurement spans across all of the SYSCOMs as well as multiple directorates at OPNAY
Consider the missionsdescriptions of three SYSCOMs bull Space and Naval Wmfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) the Navys designated technical authority and acquisition command for command control communications computshyers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance [C4ISRJ business information technology (IT) and space systems I I bull Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) NAVSEAs focus is on ships submarines and combat systems and establishing and enforcing technical authority in combat system design and operation 2 bull Naval Air Systems Comrriand (NAVAIR) the Navys focus on naval aviation aircraft weapons and systemsu
Arguably these three descriptions alone highlight the need for better-defined electronic- and cyber-warfare acquishysition Without question ships aircraft and C4ISR systems
are dependent on cyberspace Therefore NAVAIR NAVSEA and SPAWAR must be concemed
with how cyberspace influences their respective areas of responsibility
With each command working on its own piece of cyberspace
interoperability issues dushyplicities and inefficiencies are a real possibility
Without a clear defishynition of an electronicshycyberspace capability (or a supporting electronicshycyberspace capability) and who is responsible for it there is little integration
oversight for capabilities that support larger programs
This lack of integration causes duplicity and incompatibility beshy
tween the programs themselves not to mention their underlying electronicshy
cyberspace capabilities (eg a ships radar may interfere with aircraft communications)
SPAWAR claims Our projects and programs will align with OPNAV requirements and the operational needs of FLTCYBERCOM [Fleet Cyber Command] TENTH FLEET [US 10th Fleet] As more systems converge and become even more reliant on cyberspace (ie everyshything networked together) and SPAWAR is the systems
PROCEEDINGS bull 43
command for the 10th Fleet (eg the Navys operational electronic-cyberspace warfare commander) then the amshybiguities in the responsibilities of the other SYSCOMs and their relationship with SPAWAR (and even with other warfare commanders) will become less clear
A study of peacetime doctrinal innovation between the World Wars reported that innovation in military doctrine requires that a generation of officers schooled and comshymitted to waging new forms of warfare develop over a period of up to twenty years14 Cyberspace operations currently finds itself in a similar period of innovation The ambiguity surrounding cyberspace operations speshycifically OCO and the interface with the EMS could prevent a seamless integration into a broader warfare concept Until we fully address the technological conshyvergence between RF to IP and RF to non-IP networks and its i~pact to both EA and oeo our 20-year clock has not even started If we are serious about improving non-kinetic warfare and its consideration as an alternashytivecomplement to kinetic warfare we need to make bold steps to address not just cyberspace operations but how it interfaces with the EMS bull
1 RADM Sean Filipowski Looking Forward for Maritime Spectrum Warfare Phoenix Challenge Conferences San Diego CA 2011 2 Gerry Gilmore Official Cites Value of Cyberspace to Warfighting Operations Defense Link 8 April 2009 wwwstratcommiVnewsarticle7610fficial Cites Value of Cyberspace to Warfighting Operations
3 C Wilson (20 March 2007) CRS Report for Congress Information Operations Elecshytronic Warfare and Cyberwar Capabilities and Related Policy Issues wwwlasorgsgp crsinatseclRL31787pdf p 7 4 Ibid 5 Electronic Warfare Joint Pub 3-13 (25 January 2007)1 p 1-5 6 B Krekel Capability of the Peoples Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network ExplOitation (McLean VA Northrop Grumman Corporation Information Systems Sector 9 October 2009) p 7 7 Ibid 8 Cyberspace Operations Concept Capability Plan 2016-2028 (22 February 2010) TRAshyDOC Pamphlet 525-7-8 p 9 9 Robert Gates Establishment of a Subordinate Unified Command US Cyber Comshymand Under US Strategic Command for Military Cyberspace Operations Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Under Secretaries of Defense (Washington DC Secretary of Defense 23 June 2009) p 1 10 Rhumb Lines 2 October 2009 Navy Office of Information wwwnavysnaorg newsgramRhumblinesJune20UpdatesiRhumb20LinesO0201nlormation20Domishynance202200CT2009pdf 11 SPAWAR (nd) About Us Team SPAWAR wwwpublicnaVYmilspawarPagesi AboutUsaspx 12 NAVSEA (nd) Aboul NAVSEA wwwnavseanavymiVAboutNAVSEAaspx 13 NAVAIR (nd) About NAVAIR WWWnavairnavymiVindexcfmfuseaction=home displayampkey=9E99EE24-2F3D-4E23-AOC1-A54C18C3FFC8 14 G J Rattray Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace (Cambridge MA the MIT Press 2001) p 181
Captain Batson is an information-warfare ofticer currently assigned to the OPNAV Staft He is the Cyber Warfare Branch head N21N6F31 He was commissioned through the University Of Mississippi NROTC and holds an electrical engineering PhD from the Naval Postgraduate School
Lieutenant Commander Labert is an information professional currently assigned to the Potomac Institute for POlicy Studies in Arlington Virginia He is a Navy Cyber Federal Executive Fellow He was commissioned through the US Naval Academy and holds an information systems and operations masters degree trom the Naval Postgraduate School
Naval Warfare Critical Engineering Challenges
February 9-102012 Hyatt Regency Crystal City Arlington VA
Technical Program Highlights - Keynotes Panels Presentations 81 Morel
bull Invited Keynote Speakers Include
bull ADM Jonathan W Greenert USN Chief of Naval Operations
The Honorable Sean J Stackley Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research Development and Acquisition)
VADM Kevin M McCoy USN Commander Naval Sea Systems Command
bull Moderated Panel Sessions on Commonality and Mil-Specs
bull More than 30 Technical Paper and Poster Presentations plus Student Posters
bull Community Briefings VIP Exhibit Hall Tours and Networking
Associated Events
bull Global Shipbuilding Executive Summit (Invitation Only) - ASNE welcomes participants for this international gathering of shipbuilding executives held in conjunction with ASNE Day 2012
bull ASNE Honors Gala - An extraordinary evening including the presentation of several of ASNEs most prestigious awards followed by international food and drink at the Gala Reception in the Exhibit Hall
bull Second Annual Naval Engineering Historical Display
44 bull January 2012 wwwusniorg
sponsibilities it is important to note that USSTRATCOM through its subordinate Joint Information Operations Warshyfare Center retains the responsibility for EW and by exshytension EA While USCYBERCOM and USSTRATCOM continue to discover and attempt to better determine comshymand and control of cyberspace operations writ large we tend to use traditional terms such as COCOM OPCON and TACON along with block diagrams that push us into linear concepts-for an area that defies linearity
In contrast the Navy reorganized to better position itself for a converged information-dominance environment This new organization under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operashytions for Information Dominance (N21N6) administratively and Fleet Cyber Commanclffenth Fleet operationally aligns the Navys information capabilities and info-centric comshymunities and better positions the Navy to meet the chalshylenges and threats of the information age IO In addition the Navy has placed a single one-star admiral as the inttgrashytion point for both electronic and cyber wmfare within the N2IN6 organization This means that in the OPNAV staff EA and OCO are considered fundamentally linked as eleshyments of non-kinetic warfare However challenges at the Fleet level persist with the remnants of EW information operations traditional communicator roles and this new cyber focus The question is what will be the organization manning roles and responsibilities be and can they work together Instead of how will they work together
Acquisition Governance and command organizashy
tions go a long way in establishing lasting programs But ultimately one must examine the acquishysition process for procuring capabilities By breaking down traditional stoveshypipes of authorities and acquisition (eg OCO and EA) DOD could capitalize on the ongoing technology convergence to acquire more effective integrated and affordable non-kinetic capabilities to support the combatant comshymanders
The Joint Strategic Planning System construct results in the comshybination of govemance and capability and ultimately apportions money to these unions As discussed the strategy hierarchies do express a need for an expanded range of military operations that include cyberspace Their verbiage focuses on the conshyventional view of cyberspace operations neveltheless they do not prohibit a broader interpretation of cyberspace operations which could include EW speciticaUy EA By broadening the focus to consider the similarities between the conventional
wwwusniorg
view of OCO and EA the strategic direction could ultimately lead toward expanded non-kinetic capabilities and a bettershyaligned acquisition process
The Navy divides its acquisition establishment into four systems commands (SYSCOMs) with each responsible for enshygineeling building buying and maintaining programs in their respective areas However electronic warfare for example is a pcut of a number of programs in at least three different SYSshyCOMs (ie NAVAlR NAVSEA and SPAWAR) Cyberspace operations are even more distributed Most if not all programs embed a cyber element So cyber procurement spans across all of the SYSCOMs as well as multiple directorates at OPNAY
Consider the missionsdescriptions of three SYSCOMs bull Space and Naval Wmfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) the Navys designated technical authority and acquisition command for command control communications computshyers intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance [C4ISRJ business information technology (IT) and space systems I I bull Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) NAVSEAs focus is on ships submarines and combat systems and establishing and enforcing technical authority in combat system design and operation 2 bull Naval Air Systems Comrriand (NAVAIR) the Navys focus on naval aviation aircraft weapons and systemsu
Arguably these three descriptions alone highlight the need for better-defined electronic- and cyber-warfare acquishysition Without question ships aircraft and C4ISR systems
are dependent on cyberspace Therefore NAVAIR NAVSEA and SPAWAR must be concemed
with how cyberspace influences their respective areas of responsibility
With each command working on its own piece of cyberspace
interoperability issues dushyplicities and inefficiencies are a real possibility
Without a clear defishynition of an electronicshycyberspace capability (or a supporting electronicshycyberspace capability) and who is responsible for it there is little integration
oversight for capabilities that support larger programs
This lack of integration causes duplicity and incompatibility beshy
tween the programs themselves not to mention their underlying electronicshy
cyberspace capabilities (eg a ships radar may interfere with aircraft communications)
SPAWAR claims Our projects and programs will align with OPNAV requirements and the operational needs of FLTCYBERCOM [Fleet Cyber Command] TENTH FLEET [US 10th Fleet] As more systems converge and become even more reliant on cyberspace (ie everyshything networked together) and SPAWAR is the systems
PROCEEDINGS bull 43
command for the 10th Fleet (eg the Navys operational electronic-cyberspace warfare commander) then the amshybiguities in the responsibilities of the other SYSCOMs and their relationship with SPAWAR (and even with other warfare commanders) will become less clear
A study of peacetime doctrinal innovation between the World Wars reported that innovation in military doctrine requires that a generation of officers schooled and comshymitted to waging new forms of warfare develop over a period of up to twenty years14 Cyberspace operations currently finds itself in a similar period of innovation The ambiguity surrounding cyberspace operations speshycifically OCO and the interface with the EMS could prevent a seamless integration into a broader warfare concept Until we fully address the technological conshyvergence between RF to IP and RF to non-IP networks and its i~pact to both EA and oeo our 20-year clock has not even started If we are serious about improving non-kinetic warfare and its consideration as an alternashytivecomplement to kinetic warfare we need to make bold steps to address not just cyberspace operations but how it interfaces with the EMS bull
1 RADM Sean Filipowski Looking Forward for Maritime Spectrum Warfare Phoenix Challenge Conferences San Diego CA 2011 2 Gerry Gilmore Official Cites Value of Cyberspace to Warfighting Operations Defense Link 8 April 2009 wwwstratcommiVnewsarticle7610fficial Cites Value of Cyberspace to Warfighting Operations
3 C Wilson (20 March 2007) CRS Report for Congress Information Operations Elecshytronic Warfare and Cyberwar Capabilities and Related Policy Issues wwwlasorgsgp crsinatseclRL31787pdf p 7 4 Ibid 5 Electronic Warfare Joint Pub 3-13 (25 January 2007)1 p 1-5 6 B Krekel Capability of the Peoples Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network ExplOitation (McLean VA Northrop Grumman Corporation Information Systems Sector 9 October 2009) p 7 7 Ibid 8 Cyberspace Operations Concept Capability Plan 2016-2028 (22 February 2010) TRAshyDOC Pamphlet 525-7-8 p 9 9 Robert Gates Establishment of a Subordinate Unified Command US Cyber Comshymand Under US Strategic Command for Military Cyberspace Operations Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Under Secretaries of Defense (Washington DC Secretary of Defense 23 June 2009) p 1 10 Rhumb Lines 2 October 2009 Navy Office of Information wwwnavysnaorg newsgramRhumblinesJune20UpdatesiRhumb20LinesO0201nlormation20Domishynance202200CT2009pdf 11 SPAWAR (nd) About Us Team SPAWAR wwwpublicnaVYmilspawarPagesi AboutUsaspx 12 NAVSEA (nd) Aboul NAVSEA wwwnavseanavymiVAboutNAVSEAaspx 13 NAVAIR (nd) About NAVAIR WWWnavairnavymiVindexcfmfuseaction=home displayampkey=9E99EE24-2F3D-4E23-AOC1-A54C18C3FFC8 14 G J Rattray Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace (Cambridge MA the MIT Press 2001) p 181
Captain Batson is an information-warfare ofticer currently assigned to the OPNAV Staft He is the Cyber Warfare Branch head N21N6F31 He was commissioned through the University Of Mississippi NROTC and holds an electrical engineering PhD from the Naval Postgraduate School
Lieutenant Commander Labert is an information professional currently assigned to the Potomac Institute for POlicy Studies in Arlington Virginia He is a Navy Cyber Federal Executive Fellow He was commissioned through the US Naval Academy and holds an information systems and operations masters degree trom the Naval Postgraduate School
Naval Warfare Critical Engineering Challenges
February 9-102012 Hyatt Regency Crystal City Arlington VA
Technical Program Highlights - Keynotes Panels Presentations 81 Morel
bull Invited Keynote Speakers Include
bull ADM Jonathan W Greenert USN Chief of Naval Operations
The Honorable Sean J Stackley Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research Development and Acquisition)
VADM Kevin M McCoy USN Commander Naval Sea Systems Command
bull Moderated Panel Sessions on Commonality and Mil-Specs
bull More than 30 Technical Paper and Poster Presentations plus Student Posters
bull Community Briefings VIP Exhibit Hall Tours and Networking
Associated Events
bull Global Shipbuilding Executive Summit (Invitation Only) - ASNE welcomes participants for this international gathering of shipbuilding executives held in conjunction with ASNE Day 2012
bull ASNE Honors Gala - An extraordinary evening including the presentation of several of ASNEs most prestigious awards followed by international food and drink at the Gala Reception in the Exhibit Hall
bull Second Annual Naval Engineering Historical Display
44 bull January 2012 wwwusniorg
command for the 10th Fleet (eg the Navys operational electronic-cyberspace warfare commander) then the amshybiguities in the responsibilities of the other SYSCOMs and their relationship with SPAWAR (and even with other warfare commanders) will become less clear
A study of peacetime doctrinal innovation between the World Wars reported that innovation in military doctrine requires that a generation of officers schooled and comshymitted to waging new forms of warfare develop over a period of up to twenty years14 Cyberspace operations currently finds itself in a similar period of innovation The ambiguity surrounding cyberspace operations speshycifically OCO and the interface with the EMS could prevent a seamless integration into a broader warfare concept Until we fully address the technological conshyvergence between RF to IP and RF to non-IP networks and its i~pact to both EA and oeo our 20-year clock has not even started If we are serious about improving non-kinetic warfare and its consideration as an alternashytivecomplement to kinetic warfare we need to make bold steps to address not just cyberspace operations but how it interfaces with the EMS bull
1 RADM Sean Filipowski Looking Forward for Maritime Spectrum Warfare Phoenix Challenge Conferences San Diego CA 2011 2 Gerry Gilmore Official Cites Value of Cyberspace to Warfighting Operations Defense Link 8 April 2009 wwwstratcommiVnewsarticle7610fficial Cites Value of Cyberspace to Warfighting Operations
3 C Wilson (20 March 2007) CRS Report for Congress Information Operations Elecshytronic Warfare and Cyberwar Capabilities and Related Policy Issues wwwlasorgsgp crsinatseclRL31787pdf p 7 4 Ibid 5 Electronic Warfare Joint Pub 3-13 (25 January 2007)1 p 1-5 6 B Krekel Capability of the Peoples Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network ExplOitation (McLean VA Northrop Grumman Corporation Information Systems Sector 9 October 2009) p 7 7 Ibid 8 Cyberspace Operations Concept Capability Plan 2016-2028 (22 February 2010) TRAshyDOC Pamphlet 525-7-8 p 9 9 Robert Gates Establishment of a Subordinate Unified Command US Cyber Comshymand Under US Strategic Command for Military Cyberspace Operations Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Under Secretaries of Defense (Washington DC Secretary of Defense 23 June 2009) p 1 10 Rhumb Lines 2 October 2009 Navy Office of Information wwwnavysnaorg newsgramRhumblinesJune20UpdatesiRhumb20LinesO0201nlormation20Domishynance202200CT2009pdf 11 SPAWAR (nd) About Us Team SPAWAR wwwpublicnaVYmilspawarPagesi AboutUsaspx 12 NAVSEA (nd) Aboul NAVSEA wwwnavseanavymiVAboutNAVSEAaspx 13 NAVAIR (nd) About NAVAIR WWWnavairnavymiVindexcfmfuseaction=home displayampkey=9E99EE24-2F3D-4E23-AOC1-A54C18C3FFC8 14 G J Rattray Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace (Cambridge MA the MIT Press 2001) p 181
Captain Batson is an information-warfare ofticer currently assigned to the OPNAV Staft He is the Cyber Warfare Branch head N21N6F31 He was commissioned through the University Of Mississippi NROTC and holds an electrical engineering PhD from the Naval Postgraduate School
Lieutenant Commander Labert is an information professional currently assigned to the Potomac Institute for POlicy Studies in Arlington Virginia He is a Navy Cyber Federal Executive Fellow He was commissioned through the US Naval Academy and holds an information systems and operations masters degree trom the Naval Postgraduate School
Naval Warfare Critical Engineering Challenges
February 9-102012 Hyatt Regency Crystal City Arlington VA
Technical Program Highlights - Keynotes Panels Presentations 81 Morel
bull Invited Keynote Speakers Include
bull ADM Jonathan W Greenert USN Chief of Naval Operations
The Honorable Sean J Stackley Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research Development and Acquisition)
VADM Kevin M McCoy USN Commander Naval Sea Systems Command
bull Moderated Panel Sessions on Commonality and Mil-Specs
bull More than 30 Technical Paper and Poster Presentations plus Student Posters
bull Community Briefings VIP Exhibit Hall Tours and Networking
Associated Events
bull Global Shipbuilding Executive Summit (Invitation Only) - ASNE welcomes participants for this international gathering of shipbuilding executives held in conjunction with ASNE Day 2012
bull ASNE Honors Gala - An extraordinary evening including the presentation of several of ASNEs most prestigious awards followed by international food and drink at the Gala Reception in the Exhibit Hall
bull Second Annual Naval Engineering Historical Display
44 bull January 2012 wwwusniorg
