Exposure for Nationalism - A Case for Expanding the

Exposure for Nationalism - A Case for Expanding the National Youth Service Corps of Nigeria

Sean Miles Rajman (Student)

11211792

Michael Onyebuchi Eze (Supervisor)

Paul Raekstad (2nd Reader)

Political Theory Track

[email protected]

30.7.2017

mailto:[email protected]

Sean Rajman Exposure for Nationalism University of Amsterdam

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Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences

Graduate School of Social Science

Master of Science

Political Science

Political Theory Track

African Renaissance and the Politics of Development

University of Amsterdam

Exposure for Nationalism

A Case for Expanding the National Youth Service Corps of Nigeria

Master’s Thesis

Sean Rajman

Supervisor:

Dr. Michael Onyebuchi Eze

Second Reader: Dr. Paul Raekstad


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Acknowledgments

To my mother and father,

thank you for your undying care in times of chaos.

To Michael Onyebuchi Eze,

thank you for a most revelatory learning experience.


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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 6

2. Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 8

3. Conceptual Framework ............................................................................................................... 9

4. Chapter 1: A Playground for the Greedy .................................................................................. 12

4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 12

4.2 The Two Publics ................................................................................................................. 13

4.3 Corruption ........................................................................................................................... 16

4.3.1 Dealing with Lawlessness ............................................................................................ 19

4.3.2 Crime and Vigilantes ................................................................................................... 21

4.4 Primordial Affiliation.......................................................................................................... 22

4.4.1 Religion ........................................................................................................................ 22

4.4.1.1 Extremist Violence................................................................................................ 24

4.4.1.2 Social Movements for Hope ................................................................................. 25

4.4.2. Ethnicity and Regionalism .......................................................................................... 26

4.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 28

5. Chapter 2: Nations, Nationalism, and Collective Consciousness ............................................. 31

5.1 Civic Nationalism ............................................................................................................... 31

5.2 Indonesia and Nigeria ......................................................................................................... 33

5.3 Nations ................................................................................................................................ 35

5.4 Nigerian Nationalism .......................................................................................................... 36

6. Chapter 3: Humanity, Dehumanization, and the Value of Relation ......................................... 39

6.1 ‘Thou’ as God and ‘Thou’ as the Human Species .............................................................. 39

6.2 Objectification / Dehumanization ....................................................................................... 40

6.3 Relating: The Value of Information and Dialogue ............................................................. 42

7. Chapter 4: Expanding the National Youth Service Corps ........................................................ 44

7.1 The Current NYSC ............................................................................................................. 44

7.2 Lacking Inclusion................................................................................................................ 46

7.3 Commitment ....................................................................................................................... 49


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8. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 51

9. References ................................................................................................................................. 53

10. Further Reading ...................................................................................................................... 57


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1. Introduction

Research question:

Can an expansion of the National Youth Service Corps rehabilitate the Nigerian secular

legitimacy?

Given that it is one of the most religious nations in the world, one cannot help but notice the irony

in the fact that Nigeria is a secular state. The corruption at every level of the Nigerian government

and the absence of any rule of law, even allowing for laws to be passed that are explicitly

unconstitutional, have left the extremely religious people of Nigeria with a sense that the secular

is not to be trusted. Nigerian leaders are exemplary kleptocrats and have misappropriated or stolen

over $400 billion since independence (Ayittey 2006). Because of the endemic corruption

secularism has become synonymous with moral decay to many Nigerians. It would seem that a

self-determined theocratic government might be the solution to the crisis of legitimacy the

Nigerian state faces. However, the violent tensions between the Muslim and Christian sections of

the country are such that the choosing of a single faith for a theocratic state would be likely to

cause more problems.

The legitimacy issue is in large part due to the origins of Nigerian state power and is only amplified

by the rampant corruption which is associated with the secular (Smith 2007, 14). The Nigerian

borders were set in 1885 at the Berlin Conference and were drawn with absolute disregard for

ethnic, linguistic and cultural cohesion (Maier 2000, 10). Thus, the Nigerian nationality is imposed

and based on nothing more than geographic proximity and compromise between colonial

exploiters. It is no wonder that the Nigerians who led the struggle for independence grounded in

European philosophy would be rejected by the people. The lack of connection and thus stake in

the state’s actions is the base for the massive corruption which the world has witnessed over the

past sixty some years. Some would contend that the Nigerian state was destined to fail from the

start because of the disconnect between those who came to rule and the people of Nigeria. I find

that a nation state is nothing more than a community hoping for a prosperous shared future.


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To solve the corruption, mistrust among peoples, and the secular nation state legitimacy problem,

I am proposing an expansion of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) to include all Nigerians.

That is the focus of this thesis. Currently, serving the Nigerian nation state is only required if one

graduates from an institution of higher education. This does not suffice to bring about widespread

increase in national consciousness. However, an expanded mandatory service will force civic

participation and forge the missing connection between the people and the government.

Furthermore, a benefit of a compulsory national service is that it will bring people from all over

the country together and force them into a relational dialogue, which I describe in Chapter 3. The

hope is that over time this will diffuse the tensions between different groups who are hostile to

each other. Seeing the humanity in each other will result in a nationalist feeling and combat the

mobilization of ethnoreligious groups against each other. Ultimately, I am trying to conceive a

vehicle that would peacefully and organically rehabilitate the secular Nigerian nation state. I

believe that it is a long-term solution because it creates a basis for solving most of Nigeria’s issues

and can bring about the strength required to guarantee Nigeria’s ascension to the status of a power

broker on the international stage.

Relevance:

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and it is extremely pluralistic. This makes Nigeria

a frame of reference from which many things can be learnt about issues facing nation states on the

continent. The problems of ethnoreligious diversity and lacking secular legitimacy are widespread

in Africa. Thus, this thesis fits into the greater scientific debate over ways to approach nation state

development. It presents a way to organically recover from the societal trauma left in the wake of

colonial occupation.

Furthermore, the main argument of the thesis fits into the theoretical debate surrounding the

following questions: What makes a state legitimate? How does power influence collective

consciousness? Should the nation state use power to manipulate collective consciousness?


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2. Methodology

I am making a theoretical argument for a policy suggestion, and therefore, I used a mixed method

of qualitative, cultural, and textual analysis. I did this because I am making an argument based on

Nigeria’s history and the current political climate. I have drawn assistance from various

philosophers and political theorists to argue for an expansion of the National Youth Service Corps

to include all Nigerians in a mandatory civic service. The philosophies emphasizing relation and

national cohesion help me make the case for the need of a massive project to rehabilitate Nigerian

secular legitimacy. Because of the massive amount of information necessary to justify my policy

recommendation, I have found that the amount of research done in other methods traditionally

used in Political Science would require an unrealistic amount of work, given the temporal

parameters given to write the thesis.


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3. Conceptual Framework

To justify the expansion of the National Youth Service Corps to include all Nigerians, there are

four topics that must be discussed. They are split into chapters accordingly:

(i) Is there a disconnect between the Nigerian secular government and the people of

Nigeria? How has this disconnect allowed society in Nigeria to deteriorate to conditions

resembling a ‘state of war’ and thus, given doubt to the legitimacy of the Nigerian state?

(ii) Why does it matter whether Nigerians are unified in their demand for prosperity? What

is nationalism and is Nigeria a nation?

(iii) How is the exposure of Nigeria to its own diversity helpful in achieving peace and

prosperity in Nigeria?

(iv) Why would an expansion of the National Youth Service Corps to include all Nigerians

be helpful in achieving unity and prosperity?

In my discussion of these topics, I have made use of the following concepts:

In Chapter 1, I discuss Peter Ekeh’s essay Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A

Theoretical Statement to illustrate the disconnect between the African common people and the

African bourgeoisie (1975). He argues that there are two publics: primordial and civic. The

primordial public is where people engage each other on a level that demands morality, while the

civic public constitutes the relationship that the people have with the state. Because the state was

founded by the disconnected ruling class, which is still extremely corrupt, the state has become

synonymous with corruption. Furthermore, the elites championed independence based on

European principles and kept the borders established in 1885 by the imperialists (Maier 2000, 10).

This further contributes to the perceived lack of legitimacy, because the nation state is perceived

by the primordial public to be a purely artificial and imposed extractive structure. This disconnect

has allowed for a massive neglect of the people, who do not trust the state to fix the economic

decay, the endemic corruption, or the ethnoreligious violence. I show that there is a disconnect

between the people and the Nigerian state which has resulted in a such a decay of public safety

that the secular government cannot be considered legitimate. It does not meet the most basic


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requirements for realist legitimacy, namely the keeping of the peace. The keeping of the peace is

the basic requirement for the right to rule in Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1998). The emphasis on

the failure to meet this minimal standard serves to demonstrate that there is in fact a crisis in

Nigeria from a value-neutral perspective. I aim to show that the failure of the Nigerian secular

state is perpetuated by the people’s disinterest in it. By Hobbes’ standards, Nigeria is definitely a

state that needs an upgrade in the provision of basic security of its people– at the very least - and

Peter Ekeh’s illustration of the divide clearly shows the lack of national cohesions, and there by

consensus, which is shown to be crucial to prosperity in Chapter 2.

Chapter 2 discusses the value of national cohesion in spirit. First, I briefly discuss the Indonesian

resistance to the Dutch and the consequential collective demand for change since independence. It

emphasizes the value of congruent national and political units to bring about changes beneficial to

the entirety of the population as collective moral outrage is stronger than divided competition for

resources. The Indonesian example shows that it is not the artificiality of nation states which makes

them divided. I then use insights from Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson, and

Ernest Renan to demonstrate that civic nationalism is the concept which demands that the political

and national unit be congruent. The strength of nationalism is that it demands sacrifice from the

nation, and in the same breath demands a future of greatness. To show that Nigeria is a nation

despite its divisions, I use Anderson’s concept of a nation as an ‘imagined community’ (2006).

Furthermore, Renan’s concept of the daily plebiscite highlights that a nation-state’s legitimacy is

only contingent on the affirmation of it. The dedication of its people is that affirmation (1882).

Renan states that “A nation is therefore a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the

sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future”

(Ibid.). The question that remains at the end of this chapter is how is it possible to make Nigerians

feel like their destinies are linked as one and the same, and that their future will be better if they

pursue prosperity in cooperation.

The key to forging a connection between the people of Nigeria is exposure to each other, as Chapter

3 shows. I use insights from Martin Buber’s I and Thou (Ich und Du), specifically his discussion

of the two-fold attitude of man, to show that relating to people exposes their humanity and

sameness to us (2010). Because I am writing a value-neutral thesis, I do not use Buber’s emphasis


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on humanity’s connection through God. I use Aristotle’s recognition that humanity is connected

by virtue of the dependency on each other to continue the existence of the species (Aristotle 1959,

5). I find that the key to curbing violence is to humanize each other. The objectification of human

beings allows for terrible violence and neglect, whereas the exposure to one another highlights

one’s belonging to the greater collective of humanity. In this sense, it is hoped that Nigerians

recognize that they are the same in their diversity. The dialogue that comes from relation, the

creating of one’s self through each other, shapes collective consciousness. Thus, the exposure of

Nigerians to each other should create a Nigerian national identity and a sense of nationalism that

demands safety and prosperity. To achieve this exposure, I suggest the expansion of the National

Youth Service Corps in Chapter 4.

Chapter 4 is the culmination of the argument. The National Youth Service Corps has served an

aim to bring about a similar mindset, discussed in my second chapter, by means of exposure to

Nigerian diversity, as I describe in my third chapter. The Service Corps’ official objectives are

largely aligned with the thinking of my thesis; however, the Corps fails to bring about the

conditions it is supposed to because it is not inclusive enough. Thus, Chapter 4 mainly serves to

highlight the elitism. This elitism comes from the Corps requirement that only graduates of higher

education take part in the daily plebiscite. It does not have a grand enough scope to bring about

significant change in Nigeria and furthermore, it simply continues the gap that was created by the

early Nigerian nationalists and the British when they set out to build the ‘Nigeria Project’

(Campbell 2013, 5). I argue that the NYSC has the potential to be an effective means to expose

Nigerians to each other, to foster nationalism, to provide a massive expansion of public goods, and

in doing all of this to rehabilitate Nigerian secular nation state legitimacy. Elitism and its limited

size is holding the Corps back. What the NYSC needs and what Nigeria needs is, as Chinua Achebe

correctly observed, committed leadership (Achebe 1983).


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4. Chapter 1: A Playground for the Greedy

4.1 Introduction

To justify the need for a vehicle to revitalize Nigerian national consciousness, this chapter

illustrates the decay of the Nigerian nation state from a value-neutral standpoint. I discuss the

history of the Nigerian government and the current disregard of the law by the government and

public. This chapter focuses specifically on the degeneration of the people’s relationship with the

government and the law. It shows that the historical lack of recognition of state legitimacy let the

government disregard its own laws and fail to provide for the basic needs and safety of the Nigerian

people. The chapter also shows that the lack of national unity and investment in the state has

allowed for Nigerian society to devolve into criminality, religious division and ethnocentric

contestation for resources. It has allowed this disorganization to such a degree that the Nigeria’s

secular nation state legitimacy is not met by the minimalist standards of realist legitimacy. The

criteria for whether the current status-quo in Nigeria is a desirable condition or not is judged based

on the assumption that people come together in political communities to avoid early deaths - to

escape the ‘state of war’ (Hobbes 1998) - whether they be the result of violence, some kind of

medical ailment, or starvation.

First, I discuss the history of the Nigerian state to show that the state was an alien extractive

creation based on European ideas that are meaningless to the Nigerian people. This led to a

disinterest in the success of the federal government and a normalization of ethnocentric bias. Thus,

corruption has become normalized because it is an accepted way of getting ahead in an

ethnocentric political sphere. It is thought of as a way to garner a win for one’s kin in a system that

is fundamentally hostile to the general population. Insights from Peter Ekeh’s work on the subject

aids me in this exposition (1975). Furthermore, I show that the law is not an ethically binding force

to many Nigerians because the financial capability to provide public goods is consumed by the

corrupt leadership in government. Ultimately, the accepted practice leaves the public to look for

extralegal means of survival.

Second, I show that the disconnect has left people to fend for themselves outside the law. People

have incorporated corruption and criminality into their daily lives. Criminality might be considered


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immoral, but the law is disregarded in favor of survival. Furthermore, I show that the attempt at

extrajudicial justice contributes further to a violently chaotic public life.

Third, I cover the abandonment of a potential Nigerian nationalism for the various stronger

primordial nations of religion and ethnicity. I conclude by emphasizing that the divided struggles

to survive and the escape from perceived immorality of the state yield conflict and poverty. Thus,

this chapter bares that the problems in Nigeria are of such magnitude that the Nigerian state does

not meet the most minimal theoretical requirements for state legitimacy of keeping the peace, as

presented in Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1998).

4.2 The Two Publics

In Peter Ekeh’s essay Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement (1975)

it is argued that there is a disconnect between state and the people. He argues that there are two

publics within Africa and, more specifically, in Nigeria: the primordial and the civic one. The

people of Nigeria interact with both publics, but only recognize the primordial public as a sphere

of moral authority.

The primordial public is one that is perceived to be authentic and moral. The primordial public

holds powerful sources of belonging and identity. Those sources are religion and ethnicity. The

primordial public is a sphere seen as important. People in Nigeria see their primordial associations

as moral authorities. The groups in the primordial public are the ones that must be preserved and

benefitted because they are considered refuges from the alien state (Ibid, 100). The primordial

public is considered to be pre-colonial and traditional. Thus, most actions in the civic public are

dictated by the supposed interests of one’s primordial association (Osaghae 2003). The result is an

ethnocentric contestation of political power and resources which has the contestants disregard the

law.

The civic public is an amoral sphere in which one interacts with the post-colonial state, the sphere

that is ridden with corruption and immorality. It is perceived as a source of resources just as the

Nigerian colony was seen by the British. It is to be engaged only when necessary or beneficial.


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The early leaders of the Nigerian state and their successors use principles that are hostile to

Nigerians and the people of Nigeria recognize this (Cunliffe-Jones 2010). Thus, Nigerians

recognize state power, but they do not recognize its ethical authority.

The disconnect between the two publics comes from the origins of the state. The Nigerians put in

charge upon departure of the colonists were simply replacing the British colonial state (Campbell

2013, 6). The following quote shows the fundamental hostility of the colonial state and the

severance it caused between the civic state and the primordial public.

“Above all else, the colonial doctrine of indirect rule led to the anti-democratic principle

that the public domain is the sole property of rulers and that it is theirs to control as they

please – perhaps the most damning consequence of colonialism and the bane of

democracy in modern Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa.”

(Ekeh 2011)

Thus, the Nigerian state is seen as an ultimately authoritarian extractive body. It is seen as a vehicle

to expand one’s own interest at the expense of others. Everyday corruption is a way to make sure

one gets what one needs. The lack of belonging in the civic sphere is a consequence of the rejection

of a state that claims democratic values but operates in an extractive manner, just as the colonists

did. The amoral civic public is the consequence of colonialism and those leaders who lacked the

resolve, or perhaps even the desire, to reject the colonists on terms which considered the welfare

of the population. The inability to create an inclusive Nigerian nation state derives from this: The

rulers of Nigeria did not reject the authoritarian modus operandi of the colonial administration

(Campbell 2013, 6). This is the origin of incongruence between the political and national unit, the

existence of the two publics, and the incarnation of a lack of nationalist principle (Gellner 2006,

1). The nationalist principle is essential for the proper function of the nation state.1

The perception of an amoral state has not changed since independence. Not only is the state

foreign, it fails to provide basic public goods, and thus, the primordial public (National Human

1 This is thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2


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Development Report 2016), which was already considered to be morally superior, also provides

for the safety and survival of people. The corrupt behavior of the powerful has thus failed to

legitimize the secular nation state, further damaging the public’s relationship to the already

perceptively illegitimate state. In this sense, the people of Nigeria cope with the amorality of the

state by not attributing any kind of moral authority to it. As the law is disregarded by the leaders,

the public imitates this behavior. The public does this because the standard is set by the leadership.

More importantly, however, they imitate it because they live in poor conditions which require them

to emulate the corruption and to rely on their kin for survival (Smith 2007, 38).

The corruption and bad public policy have forced those who need morality to look elsewhere for

support in times of need, allowing for further fracturing of the primordial public. There is not only

a dissociative perception of the state by the people, but a fracturing of public cohesion by

differentiation between ethnoreligious groups. The people of Nigeria gravitate towards the

primordial to escape reliance on the state. However, since the primordial public has turned to

religion and the civic public has beckoned the call of ethnocentrism (Cunliffe-Jones 2010, 30), the

corrupt government operate as they wish, only furthering the state of decay within the Nigerian

economy and public security (Ibid, 143).

In the following section, I explain why corruption and criminality is a means to survive and how

it is largely responsible for the further perpetuation of distrust among fellow citizens, leading to

divisions in the primordial public along religious and ethnic lines. I also show how the turn to

religion further detracts from a Nigerian national feeling and provides for a platform conducive to

discriminatory violence. Finally, I discuss the origins of ethnocentrism and how the contestation

of resources is affected by ethnic division. This presentation of a divided primordial public

explains the need for an overarching nationalism, which will be the subject of Chapter 2.


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4.3 Corruption

“When Nigerians talk about corruption, they refer not only to the abuse of state offices for some kind

of private gain but also to a whole range of social behaviors in which various forms of morally

questionable deception enable the achievements of wealth, power, or prestige as well as much more

ambitions. Nigerian notions of corruption encompass everything from government bribery and graft,

rigged elections, and fraudulent business deals, to the diabolical abuse of occult powers, medical

quackery, cheating in school, and even deceiving a lover”

(Smith 2007, 5)

In this section I argue that corruption permeates every facet of public life in Nigeria. The

disconnect between the people and the state allows for an environment without any rule of law as

anything can be bought and must be bought in many cases (Ibid.). This is the amoral nature of the

civic public as described by Peter Ekeh (1975). The reason I emphasize corruption as integral to

Nigeria’s sociopolitical landscape is because it illustrates that the Nigerian public engages in

criminality and corruption as a means to cope with the state’s failure to provide basic order for

safety. The law does not provide a morally binding framework in the mind of the people. This is

fundamental to the turn to alternative sources of belonging and welfare, which manifest itself in

criminality, religiosity, and ethnocentrism. Therefore, I first discuss the corruption of the state and

its police. Then I show that the public has turned to illegal means of surviving the state’s failure to

provide goods.

Corruption is important to the elusiveness of a Nigerian national identity. It is the primary

perpetuator of the disconnect between the people and its government. If citizens cannot even trust

the police to help in emergency situations, they will turn away from the government to aid their

survival and justice (Smith 2007, 167; Cunliffe-Jones 2010, 24). Every time a government official

acts corruptly, it chips away at Nigerian nationalism and makes it more difficult to revamp a sense

of being Nigerian. It is a cycle: The more corrupt people are, the less people care. This in turn

opens the door for further corruption. In addition, the misappropriation of wealth by elites leaves

the poor to fend for themselves in an illegal fashion (Smith 2007, 38).

First, I show that corruption has been practiced in Nigeria since the very first election after

independence, though it has become the norm since the Biafra war (Campbell 2013). As discussed


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previously, the legitimacy of the state was never recognized by the people. The contestation of

state resources by different ethnic groups became extremely apparent in the numerous coups that

preceded the war and during the war itself (Maier 2000, 50-53). Then, I discuss the existence of

the ‘Ogas’ – essentially the African oligarchs – who maintain political influence to extract as much

wealth as they can from Nigeria while still holding the country together (Ibid, 32). Third, I discuss

the relationship of the Nigerian people with the police. Following the display of governmental

corruption, I present various ways the Nigerian population deals with the absence of reliable

government, which is outside any consideration of the law.

The leaders of Nigeria set the precedent for corruption as a normal way of operating in the early

years of independence. Election rigging – in the form of voter intimidation, ballot forgery and

political assassinations among other things – is the most internationally obvious. Further federal

corruption includes the theft and mismanagement of over $400 billion dollars by Nigerian leaders

between 1960 and 2006 (Ayittey 2006). With such a disappearance of money for public goods, it

is no surprise poverty has been widespread in Nigeria since independence and has increased since

the beginning of the Fourth Republic (Campbell 2013, 11).

There have been superficial attempts to combat corruption on the part of the state. As it turns out,

the corrupt power brokers in Nigeria very much enjoy the status their kleptocracy brings, and this

is evident in the prevalence of military coups which were supposed to restore righteousness to the

Nigerian government of their corrupt leaders, only to replace them by equally corrupt military

leaders (Campbell 2013; Smith, 2007; Maier 2000; Cunliffe-Jones 2010).

There appeared to be a change, however, when former president Obasanjo turned to Nuhu Ribadu

to head the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) after the last military ruler had

been replaced by another superficially democratic government in 1999 (Adebanwi and Obadare

2011, 192). The difference between Ribadu’s anti-corruption campaign and the ones in the past

was the grand scope of his investigation and the targets of it. Previous campaigns were simply

instruments to remove political opposition. While many of the people investigated in the campaign

were opponents of Obasanjo, Ribadu did not shy away from investigating his associates as well

(Ibid, 200). Ribadu was initially quite successful, only to run into James Onanefe Ibori, an ‘Oga’


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responsible for installing Obasanjo as the president. As so often happens, the law is unimportant

to the political exchange and goodwill of others, in this case of an ‘Oga’.

“With Ibori’s arrest and trial, Ribadu seemed to have ‘overstepped his boundaries’, and a decision on

his exit from office seems to have been taken at that point. The actual process of his removal was

messy and riddled with many official gaffes and contradictions. Even so, it brought home how

dangerously close Ribadu had been to, quite literally, ‘taking the food from the mouth’ of the ruling

elite.”

(Adebanwi and Obadare 2011, 192)

The reason Ribadu ultimately failed to rid the country of corruption is because of the existence of

the Ogas (Campbell 2013, 26). People’s reliance on each other to survive and become rich is

evident in the way the Ogas operate and survive. They compete and compromise (Ibid, 31),

profiting immensely from the oil that the state exports (Cunliffe-Jones 2010, 135). While they do

care about public opinion, they do not care enough to truly make a change because divided public

opinion does not affect their livelihood.

Corruption does not restrict itself to top tier leaders, however, as it is accepted practice in most

spheres of Nigerian life (Smith 2007). Whether it is the head of the federal police stealing 10 billion

Naira of government funds (Adebanwi and Obadare 2011, 198), or the police officer taking a bribe

to look the other way from a crime or permitting people to pass checkpoints (Smith 2007, 61),

everyone contributes to the culture of corruption.

An obvious cause of low-level corruption is poverty. As people struggle to make enough money

to survive, they turn to illegal means to do so (Smith 2007, 38). Corrupt behavior among

government officials is no different. In the Nigerian case, however, the terrible relationship

between the public and the police has a more fundamental background. The current police force

has its origins in the colonial administration when 30 former Sierra Leonean slaves were used to

enforce colonial mandates and forcefully take resources (Tamuno 1970). Independence from the

British crown has not changed the perception of police to be foreign robbers, as the interactions

between police and the population are now ridden with corruption. This underscores the extractive

nature of the state; the colonial legacy is felt.


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The perception of the police as something fundamentally foreign and corrupt gives legitimacy to

non-state actors when they take matters into their own hands, outside the law. The perception of

police immorality thus legitimizes criminality, or vigilantism, and this in turn takes away the

monopoly on violence from the state. If we consider Thomas Hobbes’, this observation alone

means the state is not meeting the basic requirement for legitimacy (1998).

Furthermore, there are instances of paying the police to murder. Some involve the oil companies

extracting oil in the Nigerian delta. In one famous instance of requested protection from Ogoni

protesters by the oil giant Shell, the Mobile Police shot eighty people and destroyed or damaged

just under 500 homes. The Mobile Police has an especially lethal reputation, having earned the

name ‘Kill and Go’ for its tendency to shoot everything in sight and figure out what happened later

(Maier 2000, 91).

The people’s perception of the police is so negative that one cannot believably argue that the

problem is restricted to a few corrupt officers, as the problem has been described as a “systematic

and collective group failure” (Akinlabi 2016, 4). I argue that it is not simply a failure since the

collective criminality of the police supersedes relatively harmless things like accepting bribes. The

police in Nigeria do not only fail to protect the people, they contribute to a ‘state of war’ (Hobbes

1998) as they allegedly regularly commit crimes such as “[…] extrajudicial killings, undertaking

arbitrary arrests and detention, beating detainees and colluding with criminals” (Akinlabi 2016, 5).

4.3.1 Dealing with Lawlessness

As I have now established governments’ disregard for the law in Nigeria and the perpetuation of

the alienation of the people by the state, I now offer information on ways that people cope to

survive the unreliability of the government in Nigeria. First, I present a case study of NGO workers

who are using their influence to get ahead in ways that are not strictly legal. Then, I discuss the

popularity criminal fraud as an enterprise. I conclude the corruption section with a discussion of

vigilante violence as a reaction to the widespread violent crime.


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Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are in Nigeria to help people in the fight against

things like AIDS, Malaria and general underdevelopment. While there are many issues with

NGOs, I only discuss the prevalence of corruption amongst NGOs in Nigeria to show that

corruption extends beyond the government. It is so widespread and culturally embedded that even

the organizations who fight HIV/AIDS have corrupt practices.

The anthropologist Daniel Jordan Smith’s case study of Nigerian HIV/AIDS NGOs directors

illustrates the spread of corruption amongst non-government (2012). It also shows that corruption

is not only necessary, but is good in many people’s eyes. He presents two cases that starkly contrast

each other in terms of the nature of attitudes, self-interested and nepotistic. First is the case of Pius

Okadigbo, whose benefit to the sick was largely elusive. Evidence of misappropriation is found in

the Smith’s description of Okadigbo’s office:

“His office had all the accoutrements that I had long since become used to seeing in the offices of “big

men” (and “big women”) in government and NGOs: a chilly air conditioner, a computer and printer, a

phone (though cell phones have recently almost entirely displaced landlines), and a private refrigerator

stocked with cold drinks. But in Pius’ office the furniture was more expensive than is typical, the

refrigerator was bigger than usual, the computer seemed to be the latest laptop, the printer was a laser

rather than inkjet, and Pius made a point of showing me that he had internet service (at the time

widely available in internet cafes, but uncommon in private offices). He clearly enjoyed showing off

his success.”

(Ibid, 477)

The other case Smith wrote about is the case of Naija Cares, who was corrupt in her own right.

The difference between her and Pius, however, is that she would at least benefit the people close

to her make advances they would ordinarily not be able to do (Ibid, 478). Thus, while she is a

culprit in the perpetuating corruption, she is at least benefitting the community somewhat. She is

operating outside the law but she provides for herself and her kin. This kind of behavior is

commonly accepted in Nigeria (Smith 2007) as gaining an advantage in an environment that is not

conducive to survival or prosperity within the strict parameters of the morally powerless law. This

is especially true if you are helping others.


21

4.3.2 Crime and Vigilantes

Blatantly stepping outside the boundaries of the nation state’s laws is another symptom of the lack

of ethical commitment to the nation state. While crimes like criminal fraud are thought to be largely

harmless, the general acceptance of such crimes creates an atmosphere that lowers the threshold

to commit violent crimes. The demand for justice answered in the form of vigilante groups - and

their own complicity in criminality - shows that the move away from codified norms enforced by

an impartial entity gives room for instability and violence. This is what this section aims to

demonstrate.

419 is the legal code for criminal fraud under Nigerian law. The crime is so common that 419 has

become a slang term for general deceptive behavior. Many people have received an email from a

person in Nigeria claiming they needed assistance unfreezing money. This kind of email usually

states that they either are a person from a big company, the wife of a deceased dictator, or someone

else of financial magnitude. The idea is to trick the person receiving the email into wiring money

to the scammers. The money is never seen again (Smith 2007, 28-52). This form of crime is

evident of what level of damages are accepted. The targets of these scams are thought to be rich

people from the developed world who will not miss their money anyways.

More dangerous and destabilizing are violent crimes such as robberies and murders in the process

of those robberies. Figures are nearly impossible to find (Ibid, 175). However, it is clear that the

prevalence of violent crime in the 1990s led to the formation of vigilante groups. The most famous

one was called the Bakassi Boys (Ibid, 177; Maier 2000). Their popularity was such that they were

even believed to be superheroes. This led people to draw comics about their supposed bringing of

justice in the form of death to violent criminals (Smith 2007, 179). Eventually, they were exposed

to be frauds who were not acting in the name of justice but being complicit in the same acts of

supposed immorality they claimed to fight (Ibid, 187).

Criminals survive outside of the law. That is how they deal with the lack of provisions of public

goods by the state. This brings with it more violence and further division amongst the Nigerian

people. The call for extrajudicial justice gives way to more death and thus to the approximation of


22

a ‘state of war’ (Hobbes 1998). In turn, more people flee into the realm of the primordial for

morality and survival.

In summary, the widespread corruption is tolerated by the public because the nation is not unified;

the secular nation state is still considered extractive to the people. Furthermore, it does not provide

public safety. They find refuge from the violence and perceived immorality in primordial society.

They break the secular laws in order to survive. Heads of state, police officers and regular people

take advantage of this and the disinterest in state becomes heightened. Without a sense of

belonging to the nation, there is no unified fight against the problems of violence and poverty.

Nonetheless, people have entrenched the primordial divisions emphasized by colonization. The

following sections cover this.

4.4 Primordial Affiliation

The previous section showed the disregard for the laws of the nation state and thus, only showed

people’s interactions in the civic public. This does not suffice to show that the division between

the two publics is responsible for the lack of secular nation state legitimacy. The following sections

explain that the refuge in the primordial public is damaging to the entirety of Nigeria. The

competition between primordial ethnoreligious nations to gain power and resources leads to an

undesirable status-quo. Evidence of this is the violence among different religious groups, which I

shall discuss first. Secondly, I show that ethnocentrism is also responsible for many of Nigeria’s

issues. All of this further underscores the need for a national consciousness that can bring

cooperation among the different peoples of Nigeria to change the situation for the better.

4.4.1 Religion

Many Nigerians deal with the perceived immorality of the secular state by turning to religion for

moral guidance and safety. Before I continue, I must acknowledge that the definition of religion

of itself is extremely debated and, therefore (Droogers 2009), I request that the readers please

satisfy themselves with the following definition. For the purpose of this thesis, religion is defined

as a concept that “[…] covers man’s relation to the entirety of existence. The characteristic feature


23

of religion is conviction, and its contents a world conception which serves for the regulation of

conduct” (Carus 1904, 770).

I discuss religion as a polarizing phenomenon and as a solidifier of division in Nigeria. Initially, I

tell basic facts about religion in Nigeria. Two sections follow. Each of these sections describes a

form of coping – tied to religion – with the perceived failure of the state, whether it be moral failure

or failure to provide basic goods. The first describes the manifestation of religious violence,

focusing mainly on the ‘Jama’atul Athol Sunnah Lidda’wati wall Jihad’, more widely known as

the Boko Haram (Onuoha 2012). Then, the example of the Pentecostal church - as a social

movement - will show that religions need not demand violence or discrimination, even when they

are powerful.

To be clear, I am in no way attacking the religions, their organizations or their members based on

what they believe. The investigation of the validity of any belief system is not the aim of this

chapter. Neither do the examples in this section serve to favor the spread of any specific religion,

or denomination thereof. Furthermore, I am not arguing that all religions are the same. This chapter

is not about comparing religions. The importance of religions as a detrimental factor to Nigerian

national identity is unrelated to the content or soundness of any belief system. One should also

keep in mind that monotheistic religions discussed in the Nigerian context have traditional African

elements in them (Marshall 2009), making them different from what Western people may think of

when speaking of Islam or Christianity.

Most Nigerians are religious and the demographic is split roughly in half. Just over half of all

Nigerians are some form of Muslim, while the other almost half is made up of the different

Christian denominations, leaving a small margin of purely traditional African believers

(Okpanachi 2009). While neither Islam or Christianity are indigenous to Nigeria - Islam came

before Britain expanded its protectorate northwards (Cunliffe-Jones 2010, 168; Campbell 2013,

47). Christianity came with the colonists (Erivwo 1989). – they are currently functioning as a more

powerful source of identity than national identity. This is a problem because it further divides the

public.


24

As discussed in the previous two sections, the state is failing to bring about conditions that are

beneficial to the Nigerian people and is not a source of morality or authority. Thus, the people stay

divided and entrenched in the primordial public, relying on religious organizations to help with

basic provisions and a sense of moral security. This will become evident further in this section. In

2013, the mean years of schooling were roughly five years, the average life expectancy was 52,

and a GNI per capita was the equivalent of just over 15 euros (2017 exchange rate) (National

Human Development Report 2016, 15). Thus, it is no surprise that the people look for an

alternative source for identity and help. Religious groups step in because the state is failing to pull

the people out of poverty and what is seen as complete moral chaos (Marshall 2009; Smith 2007).

The most obviously undesirable consequence is religious extremism.

4.4.1.1 Extremist Violence

Ninety percent of Nigerians are ready to be martyrs (BBC News 2004). Thus, religion has the

power to mobilize in the name of what believers deem is right. In the first eleven years after the

last military dictatorship, which ended in 1999, over 10,000 people died due to violence with

religious background (Uzodoke and Maiangwa 2012). Since then, the violence has only become

more prominent.

Since the supposed ascension of Abubakar Shekau to lead the Boko Haram there has been a spike

in religious violence (Weeraratne 2015, 3; Campbell 2013). The Boko Haram alone killed almost

5,000 people in the first seven months of 2014 (Weeraratne 2015, 4) The reason is that the Boko

Haram is increasingly targeting civilians in contrast to its original modus operandi. The

dehumanization of their victims by manipulation of religion has enabled them to kill anyone who

is defiant to them. The following statement by Shekau is evidence of this. “I enjoy killing anyone

that God commands me to kill the way I enjoy killing chickens and ram” (BBC News 2014).

Granted, the concentration of this specific violence is in the Northern part of Nigeria and the capital

Abuja (Campbell 2013, 129). It is spreading rapidly, however, and at the end of 2014 it was

estimated that roughly three million people were under the control of the Boko Haram as the group

had expanded past the borders of Nigeria and declared its own caliphate (Weeraratne 2015, 9).


25

This is a clear manifestation of the weak state losing control. The absence of a unified Nigerian

spirit allows this to happen. People giving up on the state to join a religious terrorist organization

is an obvious undesirable condition, evident in lives claimed by the Boko Haram in the name of

their extremist mandate.

While the religious do good for their communities and faith is a source of hope for many Nigerians,

a danger presents itself in the strengthening of the religious because it can be easily used to

dehumanize others. There is nothing wrong with having a religious identity; however, there should

be a shared identity within a nation which supersedes that. Those who think a phenomenon like

the Boko Haram are simply a result of a weak security problem need to realize that it is precisely

the excessive use of force which has provided the Boko Haram with sympathizers to join their

ranks. Indiscriminant state violence has given a justification for more extremist violence in a

community that largely despises it (Weeraratne 2015, 18). The use of more force is not what is

needed. The leaders of terrorist groups capitalize on the further alienation of the people by the state

which is already perceived to be illegitimate. A strengthening of national identity and the provision

of public goods by the state would be beneficial, so that a moral and financial vacuum is not left

for extremist leaders to fill.

4.4.1.2 Social Movements for Hope

The least contentious manifestation of the turn to religion are movements like the Pentecostal

church. The appeal of this moral alternative to the secular state is summarized by Ruth Marshall.

“Capitalizing on the moral uncertainly engendered by the boom and bust, converts presented

themselves as a new sort of citizen: honest, hardworking, trustworthy, and incorruptible” (2009,

114). She is describing the born-again members of the Pentecostal church in the 1990s. The image

of the benevolent religious, which is a stark contrast to the corrupt government, still attracts many

Nigerians. The Pentecostal church has had a massive revival since the 1970s (Ibid.). This revival

is a symptom of the turn to the primordial public as described by Ekeh. Religion does not only

have a hold on people in Nigeria because of the economic despair but also because religion is

perceived to be a source of salvation. The religious dress modestly (thought a sign of being a good

person) compared to the supposed immoral folks and they educate themselves. They are perceived


26

to be all around good people. In some sense, being a born-again Pentecostal is even a fashion

statement (Ibid.).

Religion is not by its nature divisive or destructive. In our context, it is quite clearly a polarizing

phenomenon as it is so important to many Nigerians and the groups are understood as moral nations

within the immoral nation. It gives people hope (Maier 2000, 265). People are willing to die for

their religion by combatting the amoral state and other religions. This demonstrates the need for

an identity in Nigeria that supersedes religious boundaries and can bring everyone together. While

the secular state is clearly failing, religion does not seem to be an alternative national identity

because while it does not necessarily profess violence, it is used to mobilize Nigerians against each

other. Historically, this has been done to dehumanize those who hold different beliefs or no beliefs

to justify the use of violence. Violence or the threat thereof is then used to extract resources and

deprive the objectified of the same (Agbiboa 2013, 9). It is nearly impossible to get someone to

kill another person for no other reason than their identity without dehumanizing them (Grossman

1996). Recognizing that religious difference is not as important as it appears to be for those who

are hopeless, is key to curbing the violence and bringing people together.

4.4.2. Ethnicity and Regionalism

As if the rampant corruption and religious divisions were not enough, Nigeria is home to major

ethnolinguistic diversity. “There are three major ethnic groups in Nigeria: (a) the Igbo in the

southeast, (b) the Hausa-Fulani in the north, and (c) the Yoruba in the southwest” (Agbiboa 2013,

10). These three major ethnic groups do not make up the entirety of the population – only about

two thirds – and are supplemented by minorities, who are not to be discounted from the political

landscape. Furthermore, all the groups mentioned can be further divided into dozens of linguistic

groups, making up hundreds of variations (Jinadu 1985; Agbiboa 2013).

Ethnic diversity does not necessarily present a problem. It is the political mobilization along the

regional ethnolinguistic lines that creates problems. Similar to the mobilization by appeal to

religious belief, the creation of a political identity linked to ethnicity has a strong pull. One’s kin

is believed to be more reliable than the state. The colonial British were aware of this and largely

created the divisions between the different ethnic groups (Agbiboa 2013, 13), labeling them tribes.


27

The most obvious example is the Yoruba ‘tribe’. It was a completely artificial creation and “[Prior

to the British mission…] Yoruba as a political unit or identity was nonexistent” (Ibid.). The fusion

of ethnicities to make a larger one was used to gain political relevance. The Hausa- Fulani and the

Igbo followed suit, and after a short unification to expel the British, they turned against each other

and went on to dominate their respective regions (Ibid.).

The divide and conquer tactic of the British empire has had damaging effects besides the extraction

of resources and exploitation of the Nigerian people until this very day. The first major ethnic

crisis was the attempted secession of the Igbo people to create a Biafran state in 1967 (Campbell

2013; Cunliffe-Jones 2010), an endeavor which left 2 million people dead (Agbiboa 2013, 17).

However, the mobilization by ethnicity has been the norm from the very beginning of Nigerian

independence as the disparity of resources left politicians to band their ethnic coalitions together

to gain power, leaving the rest of the country behind.

Evidence of this was the makeup of the first three Nigerian political parties. The first party, the

National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), was a mixed party (Davidson 1992,

111). Another early Nigerian party was the Northern People’s Congress (NPC). It was a party that

was mainly made up of Northern Hausa-Fulani, taking the first institutional step towards

ethnolinguistic regionalism (Eze et al. 2015, 114). The second party to embark on the path of

ethnolinguistic regionalism was the Action Group, a party mainly made up of Yorubas from the

Southwest (Davidson 1992, 111).

The creation of these parties along regional and ethnic lines was ideal for politicians. The people

in each of the large ethnic groups felt they were in a vulnerable position (Suberu 2001), making it

nearly impossible to band together under the national banner. The state was not seen as reliable,

moral or strong enough to spread resources equally among the civic nation. The supposed disparity

of resources enabled the politicians to fear monger, claiming they would get the people of their

groups the resources they needed. Cooperation between ethnic groups was thought not to be a

worthwhile pursuit. The idea is that one takes care of kin and does not bother with the rest of the

Nigerian people (Smith 2007, 11).


28

In the case of Nigerian resource contestation, we are talking about the struggle for oil (Maier

2000). Nigeria is one of the most oil rich countries in the world. For some, the stakes are worth

killing for. What intensifies the desire to dominate the other groups completely is the fact that oil

makes up for over ninety percent of all Nigerian exports (Cunliffe-Jones 2010, 129). If you control

the oil, you control the economy, the wealth, and thereby the country.

Even though the origins of the ethnic groupings are artificial, it does not make them any less real.

The following captures the reality of the discriminatory and hostile feelings among the different

groups which hinders national unity and prosperity in Nigeria:

‘“A lot of the landlords were Igbos, and everybody I’ve talked to, and certainly I

felt a little bit of this after the war, felt that Igbos look down on Ogoni people,”

Saro- Wiwa’s eldest son, Ken Wiwa Jr., told me in an interview in London. “The

whole chauvinism made a distinct impression on the Ogonis. Ogonis were almost

like slaves on their own land.”’

(Ibid, 84)

These ethnic divisions yield little understanding of national interest and sharing of power in

Nigeria. This allows for the ascension of demagogues. The people tolerate corruption because

national political power is seen as a tool to get resources for one’s kin. The rulers who have been

pocketing Nigerian state funds live lavishly, however, and leave little to those they claim to

champion. The following is evidence of this. The Northern Hausa- Fulani have been the most

successful ethnocentric politicians, though the North is the poorest and most violent area in the

country (Campbell 2013, 12).

4.5 Conclusion

I showed that people take refuge from the extractive amoral state and that these refuges are

criminality, religion and ethnocentrism. Furthermore, I have shown that the disinterest, lack of

belonging to the Nigerian state has further enabled the corrupt government and violent non-state

actors, nearly regressing to a ‘state of war’ where the state has neither the monopoly on violence

nor legitimacy from any other source (Hobbes 1998). It is the abandonment of the government and


29

the lack of congruency of the political and national unit which allows the decay of the state and

violence in the public sphere.

Thus, secular nation state legitimacy remains unachieved. Without a unified spirit the problems of

violence and poverty go unanswered and are amplified. The capital to finance the solution to solve

all of Nigeria’s problems exists. Nigeria boasts over 100 billionaires who live in safety and clearly

benefit from the real financial potential of the nation state (Campbell 2013, 13), yet the population

lives with just enough or not enough to survive by legal means. This disparity in wealth is the

source of the criminality and the corruption so embedded in Nigerian society that the criminal code

for fraud – 419 - has become an omnipresent slang term for any sort of shady behavior (Ibid; Maier

2000; Smith 2007; Cunliffe-Jones 2010). The people are occupied with a free-for-all for the scraps

that are left by the billionaires. This distracts them from the fact that they are being neglected. It

is the greed of those who have the wealth and power in Nigeria which is responsible for the corrupt

behavior of the citizens who are simply trying to survive. The people are not happy about the

spread of corruption (Smith 2007, 225), but the cost of fighting the corruption for the average

citizen is too high. When things like refusing to pay a bribe at a checkpoint can get you shot in the

head (Cunliffe-Jones 2010, 21), the risks seem too costly unless you have a high chance of success.

Divided as Nigeria is right at the present, the problems will not be solved. Collective moral outrage

is needed to make corruption too dangerous for the elites. This tool cannot be conceived if people

let themselves be manipulated into division based on whatever differences there may or may not

be. Nigerian nationalism is something that will bring about a demand for change. Apathy and

acceptance of chaos - which is what the turn to the divisions of the primordial is - leaves everyone

worse off as violence and poverty persists.

If people only care about their kin, then situations such as the onslaught of the people in Niger

Delta will continue. The people there have been fighting for preservation of the purity of their

waters, of their homes, and of their lives for decades (Maier 2010; Campbell 2013). The abuse

continues. People who are paid off to kill people in the next village comply because they need to

eat. They have to survive this way as long as the government fights on behalf of the oil companies

and corrupt politicians. (Maier 2010). Meanwhile the rest of Nigeria stands by. Politicians in

Nigeria know that division is what keeps them rich and they learned this from their predecessors.


30

There was reason behind the British pursuing a policy of divide and conquer in their colonies

(Cunliffe-Jones 2010, 73): A divided society is a playground for the greedy.


31

5. Chapter 2: Nations, Nationalism, and Collective Consciousness

The last chapter establishes that there is a disconnect between the people of Nigeria and their alien

government. Furthermore, the lack of public goods provided does not counter the historic

disconnect because the state has failed to bring safety and prosperity. I also established that this

disconnect allows for Nigerian civil society to devolve into a ethnocentric free-for-all which flings

Nigeria into an undesirable status-quo. In this chapter I argue for the importance of Nigerian

nationalism to bring about conditions favorable to the population of Nigeria and to restore secular

nation state legitimacy. This will highlight the need for a vehicle that can bring about the conditions

necessary to establish such national consciousness. The argument is made up of four parts. First, I

discuss civic nationalism as a concept rather than an ideology, combatting conventional liberal

attitudes towards the term along the way. Then, I briefly discuss Indonesia’s history and current

situation to show that a unified populous can have a positive effect on prosperity, illustrating the

need for civic nationalism in Nigeria. I also discuss the concept of a nation, which is important

because it demonstrates that Nigeria is and should and should be recognized by its people as a

legitimate nation. I finish the chapter by showing that Nigeria is not without its nationalist

tendencies. However, a connection between the different Nigerian primordial groups is needed to

bring about nationalism and the collective demand for safety and prosperity.

5.1 Civic Nationalism

Nationalism is a term that triggers imageries of hate, exclusion, racism and murder. I am in no way

referring to this kind of nationalism. Ernest Gellner wrote that “Nationalism is primarily a political

principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (1983, 1). I do

not think this definition suffices. The concept of nationalism I am referring to is a love for one’s

community that supersedes any kind of interest, and demands sacrifice (Anderson 2006, 144).

Civic nationalism is not by its nature exclusive. It expects contribution in return for protection.

“[…] from the start the nation was conceived in language, not in blood, and that one could be

‘invited into’ the imagined community. Thus today, even the most insular nations accept the


32

principle of naturalization (wonderful word!), no matter how difficult in practice they make it”

(Ibid, 145).

Exclusion is not an inherent part of civic nationalism, it was simply made to be so. Since the civic

nation is a community hoping for a joint, prosperous future, things like racism in fact only work

against the nationalist principle. A true nationalist anywhere would be failing his community

immensely by excluding those who bring potential benefit to the same. Because the pragmatic

nationalists realize - as those who champion dialogical Ubuntu – that “The stranger or traveler is

appreciated not necessarily because they possess subjective superiority, but in-as-much as they

bestow on the community epistemic access to fresh ideas” (Eze 2017, 100). In this sense, it would

be counterproductive to be exclusionary because it would not benefit the civic nation in its pursuit

of greatness. “[…] nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of

eternal contaminations, transmitted from the origins of time through an endless sequence of

loathsome copulations: outside history” (Anderson 2006, 149). Thus, racism has its origins in

separating nobility from the common man (Ibid.). Blood lineage was emphasized to justify the

distribution of feudal power. It was a way to separate those of supposedly divinely ordained lineage

and the noble from the serf.

Therefore, ethno-nationalism is contradictory in itself. The modern nation state is sovereign

because it is an empowerment of those previously ruled by those belonging to the “hierarchical

dynastic realm” (Ibid, 7), breaking down the barriers set by genetic difference. Thus, it is

contradictory to say that civic nationalism equates to racism in any way, though one must admit

that the history of ethno-nationalism has given doubt to the inclusiveness of the term. Nationalism

is only limited in the sense that even the most pluralistic nations have borders, however elastic

they may be (Ibid.).

Popular rule or democracy are not necessary conditions for civic nationalism. What civic

nationalism requires is an imagined community, limitation, and sovereignty (Ibid.). The nation

state has the right and obligation in the mind of the people to bring about greatness, which is felt

in the everyday life of those subjected to the laws of the state. It is felt in their safety and in their

prosperity.


33

5.2 Indonesia and Nigeria

The last chapter established that there is a disconnect between the people of Nigeria and their

government. It showed that the primordial communities remained more important than the state

because the state is considered extractive and does not provide basic public goods. I briefly present

a contrast to the Nigerian case: Indonesia.

The Indonesian case is relevant because it is strikingly similar to the Nigerian one. Even the dates

of the first coups and end of dictatorial rule are within a year of each other. Indonesia was a colony,

an artificially unified territory. Number four globally in terms of population, Indonesia has

multiple major religions and more than 200 languages are spoken there (Ibid, 121). Therefore,

there is ample potential for division along ethnoreligious lines.

A big difference in their history is the level of resistance to the colonial occupier. The Nigerians

never united against the British. More importantly perhaps, is the fact that there was not a true

fight for independence. The British left somewhat voluntarily (Cunliffe-Jones 2010). The British

worked together with the proponents of Nigerian nationalism on the ‘Nigeria Project’ leading up

to independence (Campbell 2013, 5) The movement for Nigerian independence was thus not a

widespread phenomenon, or an extremely violent struggle that brought cohesion to the Nigerian

people. The story in Indonesia was vastly different and shows that nationalism, a collective

demand for national greatness, is crucial to positive developments. The Indonesians and the Dutch

had had very violent confrontations since initial contact, through which a feeling of national

togetherness was forged.

‘In Java in the 1820s the Dutch encountered fierce revolts. Then, in 1870, when they sought to add the

province of Ache to the colony, they faced awesome resistance. And, in the end, the Dutch only took

control of the province after a 30-year war that cost the lives of 37,000 soldiers fighting for the Dutch,

and more than 100,000 lives in total. Even then, they required a force of 35’000 men to hold their

hard-won prize, part of a 70,000-strong force required to maintain their grip on Indonesia as a whole

[…] The comparison of the force the Dutch needed to take control of Indonesia with the 2,000- 3,000

men required to take Nigeria- at scant loss of British life-is a striking one indeed’

(Cunliffe-Jones 2010, 182)


34

The current Indonesian people always saw the Dutch as their enemy. This lead them to form

Indonesian parties to resist the Dutch occupation as early as 1920 (Ibid.).

Indonesians continued to have collective moral outrage. The fight against the Dutch brought the

Indonesians together. The struggle for independence was the vehicle that brought about

nationalism, which demanded the betterment of their lives and help from the government. This is

why the Indonesia has prospered in comparison to Nigeria: Indonesia has “[…] a literacy rate of

nearly 90 percent instead of 60 percent, and an average life expectancy of 70 years, not 45 years”

(Ibid, 185). The violent struggle against an occupier is not a necessary condition for the fostering

of a nationalist feeling; however, it can serve as a vehicle for the unification of a people as it did

in the Indonesian case.

While Suharto, the last Indonesian dictator, was corrupt, he still was forced to raise the standard

of living steadily (Ibid, 184). Even that was not enough for the unified Indonesia. He was forced

out of office in 1998 because he was not living up to the standards expected by the population. It

had led to nationwide protests (Ibid, 185). Thus, a feeling of togetherness which demands

excellence from the state is present in Indonesia. This is the importance of nationalism. The

demand for prosperity and safety is key, whether the state is democratic or not is irrelevant. What

matters is that the political unit acts in the interest of the members of the civic nation.

We can see that a unified civic nation demands the betterment of their standard of living.

Indonesia got their affirmation of the nation from their resistance to the Dutch. The affirmation

of unity then led them to keep demanding the betterment of their society in later stages of their

nation-state. They had a transformation, expelling undesired alien administrators to make their

own nation-state. Nigeria never had a vehicle such as the violent struggle against occupation to

bring about a fusion of variety into a shared national consciousness. The alienation of the

Nigerian secular state does not mean Nigeria is not a legitimate nation-state and cannot have its

own nationalism, however. Nigeria just needs a vehicle to bring about shared national

consciousness.


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5.3 Nations

From reading the last section, one may think that a bloody revolution against the alien government

of Nigeria is the key to forging collective consciousness. This is not necessary or desirable,

however, as we are operating under the assumption that the whole point of politics is collectively

avoiding violent death (Hobbes 1998). If the betterment and preservation of lives was not the goal,

I might as well have argued for the creation of nation states within Nigeria – Yoruba, Igbo, etc. –

as is sought after by some (Cunliffe-Jones 2010, 177). The problem with pursuing the paths of

self-determination for each of these nations is the potential for incredible bloodshed. The Biafran

war should serve as a lesson that the stakes are too high. The different regions in Nigeria depend

on each other too much to split (Ibid.). Furthermore, an ethnocentric government in each region

would open the door for more problems as seen with the increase in violence since further divisions

in the federal system (Eze et al. 2015, 116).

The counterargument demanding partition holds that the numerous ethnic conflicts of the post-

colonial states come from the fact that the territories which later became the African nation states

were artificially created in the Berlin Conference of 1885 (Maier 2000, 10). The same

misconception is made about states in the Middle East and elsewhere. Though the carving-up of

territories by Western powers completely disregarded and was often not informed by the make-up

of the populations involved, the artificiality of nation states is irrelevant to their reality. Even if the

population does not feel to be one, the nation state still exists. It is the enduring civic dedication

of those who do believe in the nation state, even if they are few, which affirms its validity.

Thus, the reason Nigeria is fractured to the point where secular nation state legitimacy is

questioned is not because of the artificiality of the nation. It is the emphasis on division which

hinders Nigerian prosperity. It is the division between the two publics that Ekeh described which

leads to the questioning of Nigerian secular legitimacy (1975). British colonial policy highlighted

and even created differences in ethnicity to keep the people focused on them. This has had a lasting

effect (Achebe 1983, 27). What detracts from the belief in the nation state is not its artificial origin,

but its perpetuation of the extraction and alienation.


36

As Benedict Anderson stated, “[A nation] is an imagined political community – and imagined as

both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson 2006, 6). This idea does not hinge on unified

language, religion or ethnicity, and the supposed congruence in any one of those is unimportant

fiction dreamt up in the minds of those attempting to hold on to their power in the late 19th century

(Ibid, 85). Mass education in the name of capitalist specialization was the maker of the myth shared

heritage (Hobsbawm 1992).

Neither a bloody revolution nor a partition of Nigeria is necessary to bring about nationalism in

the country. Nigeria’s continued existence, after a tumultuous half a century, is in itself evidence

of the fact of certain measures of legitimacy. As Ernest Renan said in 1882, “A nation’s existence

is, (please excuse the metaphor) a daily plebiscite, just as an individual’s existence is a perpetual

affirmation of life”. Nigeria exists because it is real, because Nigerians want it to be so.

5.4 Nigerian Nationalism

If nations are self-affirming imaginary communities and civic nationalism is a demand that the

imaginary community be a political entity, it is very much possible for Nigeria to become a unified

and prosperous state. It is entirely possible for secular nation state legitimacy to be rehabilitated.

All that is needed is the belief that Nigerians belong with each other. If Nigerians believe in an

actual connection to each other, then the ethnoreligious nations will fade away in the name of

domestic betterment, and perhaps international competition.

In any case, it is not a hopeless endeavor. There are plenty of things that most Nigerians agree on,

including the disdain for corruption and the recognition that the population is complicit in it (Smith

2007; Cunliffe-Jones 2010). Nigerians are also generally compassionate and want to take care of

their kin (Smith 2007, 226). The thing that needs to happen is the extension of their kin to include

all Nigerians. In fact, there are civic environments and organizations that are already overreaching

the boundaries set by religion, ethnicity and geography. An example is the 55,000-person Nigerian

Bar Association, which is pursuing the rule of law and the preservation of Nigeria (Campbell 2013,

169).


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I am not proposing that Nigerians lose their identities as Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa, Fulani, Ogoni or

whatever the case may be, for the variety is an enrichment of society and humanity (Achebe 1983,

28). Neither am I saying that people should abandon their faith. What I am arguing is that these

identities need to be superseded by a collective demand for prosperity in Nigeria. It is the apathy

that allows the corruption (Achebe 1975, 23). One should care for the fate of one’s nation state in

interest of collective self-preservation. At the very least, the people are all under the legal authority

of the federal government, linking their fates.

Therefore, Nigerians need a recognition of other groups of Nigerians to be of the same essence, so

they can recognize the entirety of Nigeria as their kin. The differentiation between Yoruba, Igbo,

Hausa, Muslim, Christian and all the other designations that are given to Nigerians need to take a

backseat in the name of Nigerian civic nationalism. The ethnoreligious contestation of wealth and

resources is detrimental to everyone. Evidence of this was given in Chapter 1.

The nature of a Nigerian collective identity is not something that I wish to discuss in this thesis.

That is for Nigerians to figure out. In order to have the dialogue which will bring about an organic

Nigerian nationalism, Nigerians must relate to each other and for that, they must be exposed to

each other.

As Anderson observes, most members of a nation will never meet (2006, 6). That does not mean,

however, that it is not possible to have an akin feeling towards people we have never met. In fact,

according to Noam Chomsky, the essence of human nature is the creativity that we all have in us

to infer things about places and people we know little information of (Chomsky and Foucault,

2006, 4). Thus, if we have a feeling of how people are around us and associate them with a

nationality, we infer similar attributes to people belonging to the same group. If one meets someone

unfamiliar and relates to them, discovers something agreeable about them, then one is likely to

infer these agreeable qualities to people of a similar designation we make. The more agreeable

people of the same group we discover are, the more we find that group of people agreeable,

regardless of whether me meet them or not.

Thus, if Nigerians relate to someone outside their own group and discover similarities and

agreeableness among those thought to be different, they will likely infer positive things about the


38

rest of Nigerians. We can say that it is entirely possible to create a feeling of Nigerian nationalism

if there is a positive feeling associated with the Nigerians one knows. It can then be inferred that

the Nigerian civic nation is one that one wishes to belong to and care for.

Granted, the cynic is thinking that the same inferring can work the other way. If an encounter

yields a hateful result, then the projection on their kin will be hateful. This notion does not take

into account, however, that the encounter was not a true dialogue, a relation. Because if it had been

a dialogical relation, it would not have yielded dehumanization and objectification. Incomplete

information and distance yields hate. One can only hate a part of a person (Buber 2010, 16). The

next chapter will cover this in more depth.


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6. Chapter 3: Humanity, Dehumanization, and the Value of Relation

As discussed in the previous chapter, the key to becoming a nation is recognizing the similarities

between peoples and becoming one national unit. A nationally and politically congruent Nigeria

could easily become a safe and prosperous state with a fair amount of power in the international

system.

I explain the significance of exposing people to each other, making a people feel like a people.

This is significant because it is the purpose of the NYSC I am proposing to expand. What is

required to make Nigerians one is to enter into a dialog which illuminates the similarities, making

the elevated importance of differences in ethnicity, religion seem less important than the Nigerian

nation state. It is not necessary to lose one’s religious, linguistic or ethnic identity entirely; there

must simply be a recognition of each other’s humanity.

6.1 ‘Thou’ as God and ‘Thou’ as the Human Species

To explain the importance of recognizing each other’s humanity as sameness, I use the conclusion

describing the twofold attitude of man from Martin Buber’s I and Thou (2010, 3). I come to the

same conclusion from a different premise, however. Let us display the conclusion first.

The twofold attitude of man distinguishes between what is akin to one’s and what is not. Buber

describes this in his work the primary word ‘‘I’ and ‘Thou’’. Furthermore, he analyses the primary

word relation ‘‘I’ and ‘It’’. These primary words are each a word in themselves because they

describe our self-perception when we relate to another actuality (‘I—Thou’) and when we do not

relate, objectifying instead (‘I-It’) (Ibid.). Humans are all part of the ‘Thou’ and become human

through their relation to it. When we decide to relate to each other and recognize the humanity and

sameness, we become through another, and thus we are one.

The I-Thou combination and the relation that comes with it makes us recognize that we are no

different from the person we are relating to, thus we are empathetic to that person.


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Buber and I agree on this. It is the qualifying factor of humanity and sameness that we disagree

on. Buber’s conclusion relies on the following premise: The ‘Thou’ is God and by virtue of being

made in God’s image; all humans are connected and the same in their relation to God (Ibid.).

In the interest of transcending religious differentiation, I find that a more universally acceptable

qualifying factor is the fact that human beings are of the same species, and need to cooperate with

each other to continue the existence of that species (Aristotle 1959, 5). This is what binds all people

together. Whether we are fundamentally religious, agnostic or even atheist does not challenge this

assertion. We can agree that humans cooperate to make new humans (Ibid.). It is that dependence

on each other to further the existence of humanity which connects. Thus, we are connected and the

same. What affirms our connection in humanity is the recognition of each other’s uniqueness and

differences while still being part of that same species (Eze 2010, 190). We can replace the theistic

‘Thou’ with one that represents humanity as a connected species. Whether one thinks all humans

are connected and the same because of our relationship to (a) God, or one thinks all humans are

connected and the same because we are of the same species is irrelevant to this point. What matters

is that in both views humanity is connected and the same in one way or another.

6.2 Objectification / Dehumanization

The disconnect between the public and the state, the various ethnocentric factions, and religious

disputes have fractured the Nigerian popular mind. This is a manifestation of objectification and

dehumanization of each other. In I and Thou, ‘The I-It’ primary word describes the dehumanized

relationship.

The ‘I-It’ primary word describes a position that does not allow us to relate to the other because

we are making a difference between us and them. ‘It’ can be replaced with any other third person

pronoun such as ‘she’, ‘he’ or ‘they’. We do not become from each other. People are then nothing

more than objects to us, which allows us not to care for them and to hurt them. An example is the

act of calling people derogatory names to describe them. When we insult people, we affirm that

they are less than human to us. The insults turn the recipients into things, objects. The masking of

a person’s humanity by degrading them to an object allows for their destruction with little harm to

one’s conscience. Such degradation was seen in the Rwandan genocide, which objectified the Tutsi


41

people. They were labeled ‘cockroaches’ in order to facilitate their mass murder, or rather

extermination (Eze 2010, 189). The Tutsi were made out to be less than human, and not of the

same species. This kind of rhetoric is always used to dehumanize those that become dominated by

those who wish to do violence on to others since it makes it easier to kill something that is not

human. If we distance ourselves from them, we are making a statement: ‘They are not us’.

Corrupt behavior is largely contingent on dehumanization. The leaders of Nigeria are only able to

rob everyone and leave the people to kill each other for survival because they have convinced

themselves that they are not their kin. The state and the people need to relate to each other as well.

If Nigerians are to become a civic nation, the reference to the state cannot be ‘the police’, ‘the

politicians’, or ‘the soldiers’. The people who are part of the government cannot be objectified by

the regular people. The humanity of state officials must be recognized just as much as the humanity

of regular Nigerians must be recognized by the government. Anything else does not allow for a

connection between the national government and the people. Mutual dehumanizing, both of the

nation state’s officials and the people, does not allow for a recovery of the secular.

Furthermore, objectification opens the door for much conflict between people and strips people of

their humanity, making us think we can rid ourselves of responsibility for our actions towards

them. If one can successfully objectify people, then one does not care. If we objectify people they

are less than human, and if they are less than human they can be mistreated, left to their misery, or

slaughtered like animals. This is the reason ethnocentrism and religious extremism is so effective

as an indoctrination tool. It facilitates the dehumanization of other peoples and non-believers,

making it easier to kill them. As Grossman explains in his study of killing in combat, On Killing:

The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (1996), it is not natural for a human

to kill another human being.

The rhetoric used by groups like the Boko Haram is a clear indicator that dehumanization of others

happens in Nigeria. Statements such as this one by Abubakar Shekau - which I previous presented

- prove this: “I enjoy killing anyone that God commands me to kill the way I enjoy killing chickens

and ram” (BBC News 2014). This enjoyment is only possible for Shekau because he does not


42

relate to his victims. He dehumanizes them and is then able to slaughter them like they are his

lesser. He does not have any information about them, which makes it easy to distance himself.

6.3 Relating: The Value of Information and Dialogue

The exchange of information is an important process because we become more attached to each

other. The more information we have about something or someone, the more significant something

or someone becomes to us. It takes a greater proportion of the entirety of the information in our

memory, simply occupying a greater proportion of our lives. Hating another person is only possible

because we are blind to their entirety. It is only possible to hate a part of a person (Buber 2010,

16). They are not exposed to us in their entirety, so we do not relate to them. What is meant by

exposure to the other is simply a dialogue between ‘I’ and ‘Thou’. When one speaks to another,

hears about hopes and fears, realizes that they are looking for the same things in life, then one

relates. When we relate to people we recognize each other’s humanity.

Many of Nigeria’s problems are rooted in the lack of exposure people have to each other. The

variety of languages complicates communication. In addition, the ethnically grounded social

barricading, which results in limitation of considered kin in a nation with such diversity, allows

for apathy and acceptance of things that are not in plain view. Nigerians do not think as a collective

body because there is not much enough relating going on.

The people’s perception of the state as an alien institution produces a double problematic:

First, it mobilizes on ethnocentric bias that excludes other ethnos. Second, it produces the illusion

of difference by objectifying others who do not belong to the mobilized ethnic group. The resource

free-for-all is enabled by the emphasis on supposed otherness. The British’s tribalization of Nigeria

has made the Nigerian people think of ethnicities as a binary construct of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’.

Description of the other does not allow us to relate (Ibid, 7). Combatting this attitude is highly

important to bring about change for Nigeria.

“I am because you are” describes the fusion of culture and responsibility that happens when we

relate to each other (Eze 2010, 102). Becoming through one another fuses responsibility and

reliance on each other. The various peoples morph into a civic nation, whose attributes are a


43

reflection of their relational dialog. In this sense, the civic nation’s constantly evolving form is an

image of the people’s level of cooperation. It is the national self-actualization through dialog and

relation which creates a collective demand for betterment. If citizens recognize that they are the

secular nation state, and that the secular can be a platform for civic relation, the state will cease to

be alien. Then, the state is held responsible for its corruption and arbitrary violence. The same is

true for its regular citizens. The acceptance of corrupt practices, poverty and violence is something

that can only happen when people do not relate and when they do not believe that they are one.

The civic public must be fused with the primordial public through dialog.

To have this dialog, Nigerian people must be exposed to each other. They must be exposed to the

state in a civic capacity. Then they can relate and become one. The dialog that happens will

profoundly affect everyone in a way that will bring about collective moral outrage over the lack of

societal betterment offered by the Nigerian leadership. Nigerian nationalism and the collective

moral outrage that comes with it can be facilitated through non-violent means. Examples of violent

struggles which led to nationalism bring people together through subjective colonialization and

violence (Eze 2010, 188), and are undesirable as they defy the most basic function of a community

– the collective aversion of violent death (Hobbes 1998). I have an alternative to facilitate exposure

and therefore, dialog and humanization. To serve the aim of revitalizing Nigerian nationalism

through affirmation of humanity, I am proposing an expansion of the existing National Youth

Service Corps.


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7. Chapter 4: Expanding the National Youth Service Corps

The following is the climax of the argument and the entire point of this thesis. I explained that

Nigeria is divided and that the people do not feel to be part of the Nigerian civic nation, in Chapter

1. I showed that this is problematic because it allows for violent criminality, religious violence and

ethnocentric contestation for resources which can also be violent, or simply allow for the neglect

of outgroups. Thus, the secular state does not bring about conditions favorable to the population.

In Chapter 2, I demonstrated that nationalism is of vital importance to the prosperity of nation

states as it brings about cooperation for the betterment of everyone’s lives within a nation state. I

discussed the importance of exposure to relate to others in Chapter 3 and emphasized that

recognizing human sameness is vital to understanding and dialoging to become through each other.

Now, I have a policy suggestion that can facilitate the exposure and could make a major impact on

Nigeria. It has the potential to facilitate the shaping of the Nigerian civic nation through an

expansion of dialog among its citizens and to deliver the public goods that are currently not

adequately provided by the Nigerian government.

I suggest an expansion of the National Youth Service Corps as a vehicle to bring about civic

nationalism. First, I introduce NYSC with its aspirations and merits. Second, I discuss the fact that

the service is too small, which is the main shortcoming of the program. I propose an expansion of

the program and I suggest some additional project areas that could be done by the service, which

are directed at the provision of public goods. Finally, I address the lack of commitment to Nigerian

prosperity and emphasize the importance of a collective demand for greatness.

7.1 The Current NYSC

The National Youth Service Corps was founded in 1973 to promote national unity amongst young

Nigerians (Marenin 1989, 23). The Nigerian federal government mandated by decree No. 24 that

all graduates from universities, advanced teachers’ training colleges, and polytechnic schools serve

Nigeria for one year (Ibid.). Graduates from institutions of higher education must first complete

this year of service before they are granted the permission to work for a regular employer. The

graduates serving in the NYSC are referred to as ‘Corpers’.


45

The NYSC requires the Corpers to go through a training session and then deploys them across

Nigeria (Marenin 1990, 400). The decree states that university graduates are not free to choose

where they end up as the government is trying to expose the Corpers to peoples within Nigeria that

they are unfamiliar with (Ibid, 401).

The following is the collection of stated objectives by the renewed decree No. 51 of 16th June

1993:

1. To inculcate discipline in Nigerian youths by instilling in them a tradition of industry at work, and

of patriotic and loyal service to Nigeria in any situation they may find themselves

2. To raise the moral tone of the Nigerian youths by giving them the opportunity to learn about higher

ideals of national achievement, social and cultural improvement

3. To develop in the Nigerian youths the attitudes of mind, acquired through shared experience and

suitable training. which will make them more amenable to mobilisation in the national interest

4. To enable Nigerian youths acquire the spirit of self reliance by encouraging them to develop skills

for self employment

5. To contribute to the accelerated growth of the national economy

6. To develop common ties among the Nigerian youths and promote national unity and integration

7. To remove prejudices, eliminate ignorance and confirm at first hand the many similarities among

Nigerians of all ethnic groups

8. To develop a sense of corporate existence and common destiny of the people of Nigeria.

9. The equitable distribution of members of the service corps and the effective utilisation of their skills

in area of national needs

10. That as far as possible, youths are assigned to jobs in States other than their States of origin

11. That such group of youths assigned to work together is as representative of Nigeria as far as

possible

12. That the Nigerian youths are exposed to the modes of living of the people in different parts of

Nigeria

13. That the Nigerian youths are encouraged to eschew religious intolerance by accommodating

religious differences

14. That members of the service corps are encouraged to seek at the end of their one year national

service, career employment all over Nigeria, thus promoting the free movement of labour

15. That employers are induced partly through their experience with members of the service corps to

employ more readily and on a permanent basis, qualified Nigerians, irrespective of their States of

origin

(Objectives of the Scheme, NYSC Official Website)


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Thus, the program follows a similar logic to my thesis. By exposing people to the diversity of

Nigeria, the program hopes to further national consciousness in its graduates. As discussed in the

last chapter, the relation between people should further unity among Nigerians. Creating a dialog

seems to be a priority of this program.

In the spirit of this dialog, about 70 percent of the work done by the NYSC is in education (Marenin

1990, 423). The Corpers teach children basic scholastic things and are also involved in outreach

programs, such as HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns (Omorodion et al. 2012). Campaigns such as

the building of HIV/AIDS competent communities are not only successful in spreading

information about the virus and sexuality but also in fostering trust between the Corpers local

communities. Corpers are familiarized with daily life in their assigned communities and they are

introduced to the communities’ elders (Ibid, 79). A study found quite positive results in the impact

of these HIV/AIDS projects. All surveyed members of 10 communities in Edo State reported

satisfaction with the Corpers work (Ibid, 82). In fact, this specific program was so successful that

suggestions for improvements included keeping Corpers in their community (Ibid.). Furthermore,

a study of the effect of the program on national consciousness in 1986 showed that:

“About 85% [of Corpers] “strongly agree” that their year in the NYSC makes them feel proud to have

been able to serve the nation. Seventy-one percent think they have become better Nigerians as a

consequence of the service. […] Twenty-eight percent have noticed a “drastically positive” shift in

their views of local people in their areas of deployment and 38% a “slightly positive” effect […]”

(Marenin, 1989: p. 31)

Thus, it seems that the NYSC does have a positive impact on the participants and those affected

by their work; however, there are some problems with the program.

7.2 Lacking Inclusion

There are a few problems with the NYSC that hinder it in accessing the potential impact it could

have on national consciousness though I find that they stem from one main problem. It is too

limited in scope, because it is not inclusive enough. There are three issues stemming from its


47

limited scope. I discuss each of these. First, the service is not inclusive because the selection

criteria make it too elitist. Second, the scope of the service is not large enough to make a significant

impact on the provision of public goods, training, and thus, on reestablishing a positive connection

between the people and the government of Nigeria. Finally, the problems that involve improper

participation stem from the service’s elitist scope, enabling the affluent and connected to hinder

the aims of the program.

Since only people with a higher education are mandated to participate in this program, the impact

on national consciousness is not significant. Chapter 1 showed that there are significant divisions

within Nigerian society and the program has not done much to change that in its forty-year

existence. The people at Nigerian universities are not the average Nigerian. Only bringing about

national consciousness among the educated does not counter the exclusionary and divisive

inheritance the British left. Limited participation and limited consideration of the average Nigerian

was fundamental to the ‘Nigeria Project’ (Campbell 2013, 5)

Another problem the NYSC faces is that the selection of only higher educated people yields a

small workforce. There were roughly 2.3 million undergraduates enrolled across Nigeria in 2013

(ICEF 2015). Potentially, this means that a few hundred thousand graduates participate in the

NYSC every year. A nation state with almost 200 million inhabitants will not be greatly affected

with such by a small workforce.

Evidence thereof is the lack of progress in the educational sphere. While around 70 percent of the

Corpers were assigned to teach (Marenin 1990, 423), their impact seems to have been relatively

minor. In the modern industrial world, education – especially standardized national language - is

there to make people able to learn to do a variety of jobs of their choosing, or necessity and be

flexible to achieve that aim (Anderson 2006, 56). Nigerians are generally not very educated and

NYSC has not been able to make much of an impact. The mean years of schooling has consistently

been 5.2 in recent years (National Human Development Report 2016, 15). This number is brought

down with statistics from Nigeria’s poorer North (Ibid, 18). Reliance on a formalized school

system is admittedly not the only way to achieve prosperity; however, as the rise in poverty over

the last thirty years indicates, informal education - (‘one-on-one, intra-community training’


48

(Gellner 2006, 31)) - is not able to bring about favorable conditions for the Nigerian people.

(National Human Development Report 2016). The standardization of language may be

economically beneficial as well as helpful to communicate national issues, thereby facilitating the

dialog this thesis argues for. The variety of languages, and the widespread use of Pidgin English,

make it difficult to estimate the percentage of people who know standard English (Akande 2010).

A clearer indicator of insufficient education is the literacy rate of about 60% (Cunliffe-Jones 2010,

185). Therefore, the NYSC cannot educate enough in its current state. As with the entirety of the

program, an expansion of the educational part of the program is necessary. In addition to English

education, Corpers could perhaps learn an additional indigenous language, furthering labor

flexibility and facilitating relation among different peoples, as both communicative and cultural

boundaries are brought down by shared language.

Furthermore, Nigerians have a hard time finding work. This is true for university graduates. It is

also true for the uneducated and unqualified (Ojo 1980, 53). The NYSC does not address this

problem. The NYSC has a small elite pool of workers and cannot make a massive impact on

lacking public goods. Education does not only take the form of language or scholastic skills. The

program could also have programs to teach people professional skills, allowing them to work in

agriculture, construction, nursing or most any other professional field. This would in turn benefit

the regular economy and population beyond the work done in the service. Once Corpers have

completed their obligation, they could establish businesses and work in the private sector.

Furthermore, the Nigerian population can yield massive human capital if the mandate was

expanded, simply because of the enormous population of the country (National Human

Development Report 2016, 22). If all young Nigerians participated in the NYSC they could be

educated and taught basic skills needed to construct schooling facilities, hospital roads and other

infrastructure. The provision of public goods on such a massive scale can help bridge the gap

between government and the people. I suggest the provision of these public goods through the

service so people can see that a program implemented by the government gives them the

opportunity to partake in and better their civil society. This should not only bring people closer

together, it should also boost the state’s trust capital as the benefits from a modern infrastructure,

school system, and medical facilities could surely be felt among most everyone in the nation.


49

Finally, the elitist nature of the current NYSC allows for manipulation of the deployments and

thus, dampens the exposing impact of the service. Clientelism and nepotism have a significant

effect on the randomness of the deployments, as people are looking for ways to stay close to their

kin or avoid danger (Marenin 1990, 428). If the NYSC were not restricted to those who have means

to get into universities, the system would have a grander impact in randomness because the amount

of people who do not have the means to manipulate the system would be so great that the

manipulations become outliers and thus, not as detrimental to the goal of exposing the population

of Nigeria to itself. The facilitation of relation relies on the exposure to the presumed difference.

7.3 Commitment

One could argue that expanding the corps to include all young Nigerians would be an even more

costly endeavor than the already underfunded current version (Marenin 1990, 425) and thus, is a

fool’s errand. However, there is enough financial capital in Nigeria to fund the expansion I am

proposing. Nigeria possesses some of the greatest oil reserves on the planet (Smith 2007, 8). The

problem with getting funding is the corruption through which much of the money disappears or is

misappropriated. Furthermore, taxes need to be collected properly for the government to function

in any desirable capacity.

Another concern is that people would try to get out of doing their time in the service corps. Current

university graduates are often trying to delay or manipulate their service (Marenin 1990, 427).

This does not take into account, however, that there are in fact plenty of less educated Nigerians

who would gladly participate in the corps (Adibe 2015).

Finally, the dangers that come with deploying people in the North are worth mentioning.

Considering the current reach of the Boko Haram insurgency, it might seem irresponsible to deploy

young Nigerians to an area of danger. However, danger in the region is a symptom of lacking

support from the government and the rest of Nigeria (Weeraratne 2015, 16). Combatting the

violence by prosperity is the long-term solution to the problem of instability.


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All these concerns are questions of commitment. It seems to me that the Nigerian people are ready

for a change; however, they must be made to participate in the building of their civic nation. There

must be a recognition of the fact that nation states are not made overnight. When the British and

the nationalist Nigerians finished the Nigeria Project, the story of the Nigerian nation state had just

begun. As Ernest Renan said, the daily plebiscite is what makes nation state. What this means is

that the nation state is a continued renewal and not a finished product. To function properly, the

secular nation state requires the recognition of the collective past and the commitment to a joint

prosperous future and a daily affirmation of a collective destiny for greatness (1882).

I find that the Nigerian Youth Service Corps has the potential to expose various Nigerians to each

other and be the embodiment of a daily plebiscite; however, it needs to be expanded to include

everyone in the Nigerian civic nation. Then, it will it be truly representative and beneficial. Only

an inclusive service can it bridge the gap between the primordial public and the secular

government.

An expansion of the NYSC would require a lot of effort. Societal change needs leadership to make

it happen. Without a commitment to the Nigerian civic nation, the secular nation state will remain

ineffective and the people will continue to suffer. What Chinua Achebe said in 1975 remains true

today: “The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the

responsibility, to the challenge of personal example which are the hallmarks of true leadership”

(1983, 22).


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8. Conclusion

In this thesis, I argued for the expansion of a civic program to include all Nigerian youths in an

organic nation building project, and thereby answering the research question affirmatively. To

justify a vehicle for the rehabilitation of national consciousness, I needed to show that there is a

division between the Nigerian people and the Nigerian secular government. I did so in Chapter 1.

Furthermore, I needed to show that this division is objectively detrimental to the welfare of the

Nigerian population. I did this in highlighting the popular shift towards criminality, religious

division and violence, and ethnocentrism in a pluralistic society. This exposition showed that the

Nigerian government is failing to meet the minimal standards of a legitimate and sovereign state,

according to minimalist realist standards.

In Chapter 2, I explained that the division between the national and the political unit is detrimental

to Nigerian prosperity. I showed that civic nationalism, a shared national consciousness, is key to

cooperating and forcing the government of a nation to protect and provide for its people.

Furthermore, I showed that Nigeria is a nation despite the divisions it has, as there are those who

believe in the Nigerian imagined community.

The third chapter showed that the key to forming a sense of unity and belonging, to humanity as

well as to any community, is exposure to the different people in it. Furthermore, this exposure aids

in the recognition that despite the differences that are highlighted in the objectification of others,

humans are of the same essence. We are all connected to further the species through cooperation.

Thus, the people of Nigeria need to be exposed to each other and recognize that they are the

essentially the same, and that the people whose fates are linked by the power of the Nigerian

secular nation state have a shared destiny.

I then discussed an attempt to rehabilitate the Nigerian civic nation with the National Youth

Service Corps. The goals of the corps follow a similar logic to the one of this thesis. The Corps

aims to expose young Nigerians to the diversity of the country and help in the provision of public

goods as well as to foster a connection between the government and the people. I argued, however,

that the scope of the Corps is not big enough and that it is too elitist. Only graduates of higher


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education are required to take part in the monumental task of bringing about a civic nationalism. I

argued that the elitist way of approaching this task follows the same line of divide which

perpetuates the alienation the Nigerian public. It does not include the people to take part in the

building of the civic nation.

I suggested an expansion of the NYSC because so far it has not prevented the division and violence

in the country, because it lacks inclusion, and thus also lacks the human capital to provide public

goods to bring about significant change in the societal status-quo. I showed that there is a demand

to let people participate in the program who are less educated. I showed that there is potential to

educate Nigerians by giving them the skills to better the status-quo, even after their time in service.

I suggested that the program be mandatory for all young Nigerians. Forced exposure to relate to

the rich diversity of the Nigerian public is a stated goal of the NYSC, but this goal cannot be

achieved unless the service is inherently inclusive. All members of the nation state should partake

in the daily plebiscite and in the constant betterment of their society. In this way, the divide which

is the legacy of the authoritarian colonial government can be shed in favor of an inclusive civic

nation, one that demands participation in the dialog to shape national consciousness and the

prosperity in the Nigerian public space.

I ended by saying that the success of such an expansion and the success of Nigeria in general,

hinges on commitment to it. Thus, I answer the research question - “Can an expansion of the

National Youth Service Corps rehabilitate the Nigerian secular legitimacy?” – with a yes.

However, without the commitment to the betterment of the status-quo, without a leadership willing

to put the civic nation before their personal benefit, there will be no success.


53

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57

10. Further Reading

Adebanjo, A.T. 2015. Culture, morality and the law: Nigeria’s anti-gay law in perspective.

International Journal of Discrimination and the Law, 15(4), pp. 256-270.

Aghedo, I. and O. Osumah. 2012, The Boko Haram Uprising: how should Nigeria respond?

Third World Quarterly, 33(5), pp. 853-869.

Ajala, A.S. 2015. Cultural Patrimony, Political Identity, and Nationalism in Southwestern

Nigeria. International Journal of Cultural Property, 22, pp. 471-485. pp. 471-485.

Baddamasiuy, J. 2011. Shari’ah Implementation in a Democratic Nigeria: Historical

Background and the Quest for Developmental Legality. Journal of Politics and Law,

4(2), pp. 144-152.

Barnes, A. 2010. ‘The Great Prohibition’: The Expansion of Christianity in Colonial Northern

Nigeria. History Compass, 8(6), pp. 450-454.

De Montclos, M.A.P. 2008. Conversion to Islam and Modernity in Nigeria: A View from the

Underworld. Africa Today, 54(4), pp. 71-87.

Erivwo, S.U. 1989. Christianity in Bendel State of Nigeria: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow.

Mission Studies, 12, pp. 17-32.

Gaiya, M.A.B. 2004. Christianity in Northern Nigeria 1975-2000. Exchange, 33(4), pp. 354

371.

Hargreaves, S. 2001. Rising tensions: Sharia law in Nigeria. The Lancet, 358, pp.1900-1901.

Horton, R. and J.D.Y Peel. 1976. Conversion and Confusion: A Rejoinder on Christianity in

Eastern Nigeria. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue des Etudes Africaines,

10(3), pp. 481-498.

John, E.O. 2011. The Rule of Law in Nigeria: Myth or Reality? Journal of Politics and Law,

4(1), pp. 211-214.

Kenny, J., 1996. Sharia and Christianity in Nigeria: Islam and a ‘Secular’ State. Journal of

Religion in Africa, 26(4), pp. 338-364.

Milligan, M. 2013. Fighting for the Right to Exist: Institutions, Identity, and Conflict in Jos,

Nigeria. Comparative Politics, 45(3), pp. 313-334.

Morfit, S., 2010. “AIDS is Money”: How Donor Preferences Reconfigure Local Realities. World

Development, 39(1), pp. 64-76.


58

Olaiya, T. 2015. Interrogating the Non-Justiciability of Constitutional Directive Principles and

Public Policy Failure in Nigeria. Journal of Politics and Law, 8(3), pp. 23-35.

Olarinmoye, O.O. 2013. Negotiating empowerment: Women and identity in Nigeria.

International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology, 5(3), pp. 59-65.

Onwumechili, C. and Oloruntola, S. 2014. Transnational communications, attitudes and fan

identity: studying Nigeria post-media reform. Soccer & Society, 15(3), pp. 389-410.

Osinakachukwu, N.P. 2011. The Electoral Process and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria.

Journal of Politics and Law, 4(2), pp. 128-138.

Osinakachukwu, N.P. 2011. The Success and Shortcomings of Democratic Development in

Nigeria from 1960 to 1999: An Overview. Journal of Politics and Law, 4(1), pp. 166

174.

Pereira, C. and J. Ibrahim. 2010. On the Bodies of Women: the common ground between Islam

and Christianity in Nigeria. Third World Quarterly, 31(6), pp. 921-937.

Pieri, P. et al. 2014. Commanding good and prohibiting evil in contemporary Islam: cases from

Britain, Nigeria, and Southeast Asia. Cont Islam, 8, pp. 37-55.

Rahim, L.Z. 2013. Muslim Secular Democracy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Renan, E. 1882. What is a Nation? (Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?). Presented at the Sorbonne. Paris.

(translated by Ethan Rundell).

Smith, J.S. 2004. Youth, sin and sex in Nigeria: Christianity and HIV/AIDS- related beliefs and

behavior among rural-urban migrants. Culture, Health and Sexuality, 6(5), pp. 425-437.

Smith, D.J. and B. Mbakwem. 2010. Antiretroviral therapy and reproductive life projects:

Mitigating the stigma of AIDS in Nigeria. Social Science & Medicine, 71, pp. 345-352.

Uchendu, E. 2011. Negotiating relationships in a mixed religious society: Islam among the Igbo

of Southeast Nigeria. Journal of Third World Studies, 28(2), pp. 207-224.

Ufere, N. et al., 2012. Merchants of Corruption: How Entrepreneurs Manufacture and Supply

Bribes. World Development, 40(12), pp. 2440-2453.

Uzodike, U.O. and B. Maiangwa. 2012. Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria: Causal Factors and

Central Problematic. African Renaissance: Terrorism in Africa, 9(1), pp. 91- 118.

Williams, D. 2010. Dimensions in the Construction of National Identity in Nigeria. Studies in

World Christianity, 16(2), pp. 169-179.

Documents

Exposure for Nationalism - A Case for Expanding the