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ACCESSION NBR:8906270092 DOC.DATE: 89/06/20 NOTARIZED: NOFACZL:50-387 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1, Pennsylva

50-388,Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 2, PennsylvaAUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION

KEZSERFH.W. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

RUSSELL,W.T. Region 1, Ofc of the Director

DOCKET ¹0500038705000388

SUBJECT: Forwards summary rept of safety evaluations approved duringperiod''f Jan-Dec 1988. ~~>~ g~g> I

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Pennsylvania Power 8 Light ompanyTwo North Ninth Street ~ Allentown, PA 18101 ~ 215/7706151

Harold W. KelserSenior V/ce President-Nuclear215/770.4194

Submitted pursuant to10CFR50.59

JUN 20 Isg

Mr. William T. RussellRegional Administrator, Region IU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission475 Allendale RoadKing of Prussia, PA 19406

SUS(UEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION10CFR50.59 SUMMARY REPORTPLA-3215 FILE R41-2A

Dear Mr. Russell:

Pursuant to 10CFR50.59(b), enclosed please find a summary report of the safetyevaluations. approved during the period from January 1, 1988 to December 31,1988 for Susquehanna SES Units 1 5 2.

The report format is as follows:

SER No. - Unique number for each safety evaluation.

Cross Reference - Reference to the document for which the safetyevaluation was prepared.

Description Change - A brief description of the change made to procedures,equipment or tests.

Summary - A summary of the three requirements for determining anunreviewed safety question as defined in 10CFR50.59(a)(2).

If you have any question, please contact D. J. Walters at (215) 770-6536.

Very truly yours,

H. W. Keiser

Enclosure

8906270092 890620PDR ADOCK 05000387P PNU

CC: c oclimenC -aG.Mr. G. S. Barber, NRC Sr. Res1 ent nspector - SSESMr. M. C. Thadani, NRC Project Manager - Bethesda

SER NO: 88-001

CROSS REFERENCE: TP-247-008 Rev. 0

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE

Use the backseating control box to electrically backseat HV-202168 to reducesteam leakage.

SUMMARY:

I. No. All components which are required for safe shutdown of the plantwill not fail as a result of a failure in a high energy or moderateenergy piping system as all components required to perform this functionare analyzed for this event.

II. No. If the proposed action resulted in a crack in the valve casing ofHV-20216B there is a potential to cause an imbalance in the steam flow tothe Main Turbine. This could result in a Turbine trip which is analready analyzed event.

III. No. The feedwater heaters, moisture separator drains and related valvesare not addressed in the basis for any Technical Specification.

SER NO.: 88-002

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 83-632 Rev. 3

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

This revision deletes the automatic acquisition of Vent Monitor Data from theEberline Vent Monitor System for input to the STREAM software system. Ventdata wild be entered manually through keyboard entry as required to supportdose pro)ection calculations.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The intent of FSAR Section 11.5 relating to vent monitoring will notbe changed. The modification to the control units will not affect anysafety-related systems.

II. No. STREAM is only an information system and has no controllingprocesses.

III. No. STREAM enhancements are entirely consistent with the TechnicalSpecifications basis sections including B3/4.11.2.1, B3/4.11.2.2,B3/4.11.2.3 and B3/4.11.4

. 8906270092

SER NO.: 88-003

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR. 87-7030 Rev. 0


This change strengthens the Unit 2 78-inch cooling tower bypass diffuser gridto prevent failures.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed action does not alter the function, prevent theoperation or reduce the redundancy of any safety related components.

II. No. As discussed in FSAR Sections 10.4.5.1, 10.4.5.3 and 9.2.1.3, thefailure of the cooling tower bypass diffuser grid will not compromise anysafety related systems and will not prevent a safe nuclear shutdown.

III. No. The circulating water system, service water system and the coolingtower are not safety related and are not addressed in the bases of theTechnical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-004



This modification adds heat-trace and insulation to the 3/8 inch sample tubingfor the c'ontainment atmosphere H20 analyzers to eliminate the condensationand maintain the containment atmosphere sample in a vapor state.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The heat-trace and insulation will be added such that the seismiccategory I qualification of the analyzer panels will not be degraded.The Analyzer panels are not subject to specific environmentalqualification requirements.

II. No. This modification affects sample tubing downstream of thecontainment isolation valves only, therefore, containment isolationconsiderations are not affected. Also, see above.

III. No. The modification does not affect any of the safety limits orlimiting safety settings of equipment required for safety as discussed inTechnical Specification Section 3/4.3.7.5 and 3/4.6.6.3.

SER NO.: 88-005

CROSS REFERENCE: PMRs 87-9052, Rev. 0 and 87-9053, Rey. 0


Reroute the condensate Supply Line to the Main Condenser keepfill and add twonew Isolation/Supply Valves on Units 1 and 2.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The'ondenser Vacuum Breaker Keepfill is a branch of the Condensatesystem which has no safety related function per FSAR Section 10.4.7 andthis change will not affect any safety related equipment.

II. No. Failure of this line will not cause any flooding problems because itis only a 1-inch line and there is no safety related equipment in thearea. Also see above.

III. No. The Condensate System and the Condenser Vacuum Breaker Keepfill arenot addressed in the bases of the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-006

CROSS REFERENCE: PMRs 87-9121 Rev. 0 and 87-9122, Rev. 0


This change will replace the Historical Recording and Program Development(HRPD) disc drive and controller to increase spare capacity and aid inmaintenance of the disc drive for Units 1 and 2.

SUMMARY:.

I. No. There are no safety-related systems in the Plant Computer Room andthe disc drive does not interface with any plant equipment.

II. No. The proposed change does not change the design criteria for any.system or function as described in the FSAR.

III. No. The installation of the disc drive does not conflict with the basisfor any technical specification.

ERR NO.: 88-007

CROSS REFERENCE: SCP E872034, Rev. 0


Replace existing Westinghouse thermal overload relay heater, catalog !IFH41

with similar heater coil //FH37.

SUMMARY:

I. No. This change is necessary to provide better motor protection forradwaste liquid pump by decreasing overload relay actuation value from10.3-11.2 amps to 7.1-7.7 amps.

II. No. The proposed action does not change the function of the overload northe operation and is in accordance with engineering specifications.

III. No. Selection of the overload relay heater coil is not discussed in theTechnical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-008

CROSS REFERENCE: NL-88-001, Rev. 0


Place the operation of the Low Level Radwaste Holding Facility (LLRWHF), withno physical changes or modifications, under the jurisdiction of the 10CFR Part50 Operating Licenses for SSES, Unit 1 (NPF-14) and Unit 2(NPF-22), and toterminate the existing 10CFR Part 30 License No. 37-06554-4 using the methodestablished by NRC Generic Letter 81-38.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The LLRWHF is a subsystem of the Solid Waste Management System(SWMS, reference FSAR Subsection 11.4.1). The SWMS has no safety relatedfunctions, and the LLRWHF does not contain or interface with any safetyrelated equipment, systems, components or structures.

II. No. LLRWHF accident analyses are not directly addressed in the FSAR.The radiological consequences of the postulated accidents of the LLRWHF

are much less severe than those previously evaluated in FSAR Section15.7.

III. No. Operation of the LLRWHF does not conflict with the basis forTechnical Specification 3.11.3, "Solid Radioactive Waste."

SER NO.: 88-009

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 87-7012, Rev. 0


Installation of new tube bundles in the MG«Set Lube Oil Coolers in the eventthe cooler inspection indicates that replacement is necessary.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The lube oil coolers are non-safety related equipment and do notaffect safety-related equipment.

II. No. The only malfunction that would result from the failure of an MG-Setlube oil cooler would be a recirculation pump trip. Recirculation pumptrips are evaluated in FSAR Section 15.3.1.

III. No. The lube oil coolers do not affect the margin of safety in the basisfor any technical specification.

SER NO.: 88-010

CROSS REFERENCE: SCR J881001T


Sensed level in 2A feedwater heater oscillates to the extent that the lowlevel alarm is periodically actuated.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The feedwater heater level instrumentation is not designated as as'afety-related system in the FSAR. Additionally, this change will notaffect any safety-related equipment or safety function.

II. No. The high level switches which actuate heater isolation and stringisolation are unaffected by this change. A tube leak rupture within theheater would result in a high feedwater heater level and thus possibly astring isolation which is analyzed by the FSAR and is unchanged by thissetpoint change.

III. No. The feedwater heater level instrumentation is not addressed in theTechnical Specification.

SER NO.: 88-011

CROSS REFERENCE: RE-2TY-006, Rev. 0


The procedure, "Determination of A Defective Fuel Rod Location," will be usedto identify the area of the Unit 2 Core that contains the leaking fuelassembly.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The procedure does not require any abnormal equipment configurationsand the procedure assumes all systems required by the TechnicalSpecifications for insuring safety are operable. The FSAR assumes muchgreater source terms than can be obtained from a single leaking rod.

II. No. No abnormal operations or equipment configurations are required bythis procedure. Unit 2 Technical Specifications and preconditioningguidelines will be complied with at all times.

III. No. Technical Specification compliance will be ensured during theperformance of this procedure. Also, see above.

SER NO.: 88-012



The intended goal of this proposed action is to help eliminate unnecessarysnubbers currently installed on SSES piping systems. The scope encompassesthe Unit II undervessel snubbers on RWCU/SBLC systems, and non-safety relatedpiping designed to seismic requirements due to safety impact concerns.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The reanalysis is in accordance with the original design basis andas such addresses all affected aspects of the existing qualificationcalculations.

II. No. The original design basis and code requirements are still met.Reference FSAR Table 3.9-27. Code Case N-4.11, which provides increaseddamping factors for piping analysis, has been utilized.

III. No. Since the proposed action only reduces the overall snubberpopulation at SSES, the bases described in Section 3/4.7.4 are notdirectly affected.

SER NO.: 88-013



Provide controlled personnel access by installing electronic card readers atdoors 150, 106 and 106A.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The installation willnot impose a functional concern to any systemused to mitigate transients or accidents/analyzed in Chapter 15. FSAR.

II. No. A review of FSAR Chapter 8, Sections 8.1.3b, 8.3.1.2 and 8.3.1.2.1and Chapter 15 for system 107 and Sections 9.5.1, 9.5.1.1.21 and Chapter15 for system 012, shows no effect by the proposed design change.

III. No. Units I & II Technical Specifications and Bases have been reviewedfor lighting and miscellaneous distribution system, specifically Section3/4.8, Electrical Power Systems and for the building system, specificallyplant systems Section 3/4.7.7, Fire Rated Assemblies, and no effects werefound as a result of the proposed design change.

SER NO.: 88-014

CROSS REFERENCE: PLIS-29256


The evaluation addresses the strategy to install the piping,and valvesassociated with Residual Heat Removal Waterhammer Mod (PMR 87-3025B&C).

SUMMARY:

I. No. The postulated accident for this particular action is the accidentaldropping (heavy load drop) of t'e pipe and valve on the RHR piping. Ifthis should occur, the safety function of RHR (LPCI) would be unaffectedsince the valves are normally closed and upstream of the postulated heavyload drop.

II. No. The load drop accident is not in the FSAR but is bounded by theguidelines of NUREG 0612. Also RHR (LPCI) will be able to perform its .

safe shutdown function. The containment penetration, piping or integrityis not required for safe shutdown, but only for post accident. The NUREG

does not address post accident requirements.

III. No. The basis for Technical Specification 3.5.1 identifies the need forLPCI, however, this action does not affect the LPCI mode of RHR. Alsocontainment isolation valves, identified in Technical Specification 3.6.3as unaffected due to their physical location.

SER NO.: 88-015

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 87-3035


This DCP will provide controlled personnel access by installing a magneticswitch on Doors 32 and 193, and a magnetic switch and audible alarm on door195.

SUMMARY:

I. No.'his modification will not affect the function or operation of Doors32 and 193. The doors will be maintained as emergency exists from theTurbine Building and remain in compliance with the Fire Protection SystemCodes and Standards.

II. No. FSAR Chapter 8, Sections 8.1.3b, 8.3.1.2 and 8.3.1.2.1 and Chapter15 show no effect by the proposed design change.

III. No. Technical Specifications and Bases were reviewed for the lightingand miscellaneous distribution system, specifically Section 3/4.8,Electrical Power Systems, and no effect was found.

SER NO.: 88-016



Provide permanent wall penetrations near doors 195, 32 and 150 to accommodatevarious services required during outages such that the door doe not have to beblocked to allow for cables and hoses.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The Turbine Building is a non-Q, non-Seismic structure. AlsoTurbine Building HVAC systems have no safety related functions. Thismodification has no effect on the ability to mitigate any transient oraccident described/analyzed in Chapter 15 of the FSAR.

II. No. All systems are functionally unchanged and the original designintent has not been altered.

III. No. Technical Specifications have been reviewed. None of the TechnicalSpecifications are affected, and the margin of safety as defined thereinwill not be reduced.

SER NO.: 88-017

CROSS REFERENCE: SCR J881002T


URC Lo Resin Level Control - Support TP-139-038URC optimization.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The URC does not perform any safety related function.

II. No. The URC does not perform any safety related function.

III. No. The URC is not addressed in Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-018

CROSS REFERENCE: SE-H202-Standby, Rev. 0


Justification for considering an H 0 Analyzer operable when it is placed inthe "standby" mode of operation an$ kt's associated loop of CAC InboardIsolation Valves have been deactivated, from the upper relay room, in order tocomply with Action Statement a.2 for Technical Specification 3.6.3.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The change does not interfere with the H 0 analyzer's ability toconform to the accident analysis contained in t5e FSAR Sections6.2.5.5.3, 18.1.30.1.6 and Table 6.2.13 and in NUREG-0737.

II.. No. The equipment alignments and operations are bounded by existingplant design.

III. No. The operability of all equipment is maintained in accordance withTechnical Specifications 3.3.7.5 and 3.6.6.4.

SER NO.: 88-019



Retube the Division I CRM drywell sample return path from its existing line toone of the two drywell sample supply lines to maintain the Division I CRM

system operability while repairs are carried out on the drywell sample returnoutboard Containment Isolation Valve, by routing the sample return via analternate path.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The containment atmosphere monitoring system is used during normaloperation for detecting possible coolant leakage. It provides indicationonly and performs no active safety function. The change does not preventany other system from performing its function.

II. No. The CRM's provide o active safety function during a loss of coolantaccident. The functional operation of this system will remain unchangedas required by Technical Specification 3/4.4.3.

III. No. The proposed action provides operability of redundant divisions,which will increase the system reliability.

SER NO.: 88-020



Removal of the 10X minimum opening travel limit on the startup feedwatercontrol valve.

SUMMARY:

No. The valve is part of the condensate and feedwater system describedin FSAR Section 10.4.7. The systems have no safety related functions;the valve is a non-safety related valve; no safety related equipment isimpacted by this modification.

II. No. Instrument loop failure is not specifically addressed in the FSAR,however, a failure of the modified loop will have the same effect as thatof the existing loop, therefore, no new failure mechanism will beintroduced.

III. No. Technical Specification 3/4.3.9 is not affected by this mechanism.The modified loop is only utilized during startup and low load operationand should eliminate the oscillatory behavior of the startup valvebetween 0 and 10X open.

SER NO.: 88-021



This change replaces the motors and actuator spring packs for the Unit 1

reactor feedpump discharge valves in an effort to solve repeated failures toclose.

SUMMARY:

I. No. RFP discharge valves are located in the feedwater piping upstream ofthe outermost containment isolation valves and are not essential for thesafe shutdown of the plant.

II. No. As addressed in FSAR Section 10.4.7.3 the portions of the feedwatersystem upstream of the outermost containment isolation valves are notessential for safe plant shutdown. In addition, the failure of the RFP

discharge valves, before or after this modification, cannot effect theoperation of any safety related equipment.

III. No. The feedwater system is not safety-related and is not addressed inTechnical Specifications and willnot allow any safety-related componentsto be impacted.

SER NO.: 88-022

CROSS REFERENCE:. PMRs 87-9181 and 87-9182


Install sightglasses at each of Reactor Feed Pump Seal Water Drain Tanks tofacilitate local manual tank level control operation.

SUMMARY:

I. No. FSAR Section 10.4.7.1 states that the FW system has nosafety-related function. The proposed installation of sightglasses atthe RFP Seal Water Drain Tanks does not affect any equipment related tosafety.

II. No. The proposed action reduces the possibility of loss of condenservacuum or excessive seal water leakage to the Turbine Building floordrain by providing the backup means of seal water drain tank levelcontrol.

III. No. Technical Specification 3/4.3.9 addresses FW Turbine trip systemactuation instrumentation with respect to the reactor vessel water levelhigh trip instrumentation only. The proposed modification does notaffect that trip system.

SER NO.: 88-023

CROSS REFERENCE: Bypass to Install Temporary Power Fox an Instrument AC

Panel.


Tie-in of Uninterruptable Power Supply to Instrument AC Panel 2Y219 to supportcommitments to provide reliable power to Regulatory Guide 1.97 instruments.

SUMMARY:

I. No. Both the temporary power source and the load (Panel 2Y219, Breakers2 and 8) are non-g/Non-Class 1E. .The loss of either cannot impact thesafe shutdown of the plant.

II. No. The temporary source of power to Panel 2Y219 is less reliable thanthe original source and thus the risk of losing power to 2Y219 is panelis not outside the scope of accidents or malfunctions previouslyevaluated.

III. No. Panel 2Y219 is a non-class 1E load and is not required by nordiscussed in the Basis for Technical Specification 3/4.8.3, Onsite PowerDistribution System.

SER NO.: 88-024

CROSS REFERENCE:, PMR 88-9001, Rev. 2


Retube the Division I CRM drywell sample return path from its existing line toone of the two drywell sample supply lines to maintain the Division I CRM

system operability while repairs are carried out on the drywell sample returnoutboard Containment Isolation Valve, by routing the sample return via analternate path.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The containment atmosphere monitoring system is used during normaloperation for detecting possible coolant leakage. It provides indicationonly and performs no active safety function. The change does not preventany other system from performing its function.

II. No. The CRM's provide o active safety function during a loss of coolantaccident. The functional'operation of this system will remain unchangedas required by Technical Specification 3/4.4.3.

III. No. The proposed action provides operability of redundant divisions,which will increase the system reliability.

SER NO.: 88-025

CROSS REFERENCE: TP-288-005 Rev. 0, TP-288-006 Rev. 0

'he

proposed action is to perform a single "Enhanced Performance Test" thatdemonstrates both the 250VDC battery's ability to deliver its rated capacityand supply. the design basis load profile.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed test will adequately demonstrate that 250VDC Batterieshave sufficient capacity to supply their required loads for four hoursand are at least 80X of manufacturer capacity rating.

II. No. FSAR Section 8.3.2 was reviewed. The batteries will be tested todemonstrate sufficient capacity to power the actual battery loads thusenabling them to perform their intended design function.

III. No. Technical Specifications section 3/4.8.2 were reviewed. Theproposed Battery Banks replacements are being accomplished to increasethe overall reliability and performance of the 250VDC system. Theproposed test is in compliance with Technical Specifications fordemonstrating operability of the 250VDC battery banks.

SER NO.: 88-026



This change replaces Fisher proportional Type 2506 moisture separator draintank level controllers with Fisher prop/reset Type 2516 controllers to improvethe capability for flexible response action and make them equivalent to thecorresponding level controllers in Unit 2.

SUMMARY:

I. No. This design is in conformance with the guidelines delineated in FSAR

Sections 10.1, 10.2.2.1 and 10.4.10.2. Protection against malfunction ofthe proposed level controllers is provided by the MSEP emergency dumpcontrollers, MSEP drain tank high level switches and turbine tripcontrols.

II. No. This modification is on a non-safety related system which has noactive safety function.

III. No. The moisture separator system is not addressed in Unit 1 TechnicalSpecifications.

SER NO.: 88-027

CROSS REFERENCE: PMRs 87-9119, Rev. 0 and 87-9120, Rev. 0


To improve the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) data acquisition systemerror detection and processing by revising the SPDS IMUX and RDCX software toprovide a more complete data packet sequence and error checking to preventcorrupted data from being displayed to the uses of SPDS.

SUMMARY:

I. No. SPDS is 'not required for safe operation of the plant and is only adata acquisition and display system which enhances emergency responsecapability. There is no impact on the plant equipment and system towhich SPDS inputs are attached.

II. No. This modification will not alter the interface of SPDS to safetyrelated systems through the SPDS Class lE IMUX's which are the onlysafety-related portions of SPDS. The safety related portions of SPDS aresuitably isolated from the non-safety related portions.

III. No. Availability of SPDS is not included in Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-028

CROSS REFERENCE: NL»88-003


The proposed action is to maintain the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system F008valve functional by powering its Unit 2 Division II 250VDC power supply withthe systems'attery charger.

SUMMARY:

I. No. FSAR Sections 3.6A, 15.6.6 or 6.2 do not evaluate the function ofthe F008 valve as related to safety specifically in conditions 4 and 5.The proposed actions maintain the valve functional and enhance thePlant's ability to prevent or reduce consequences of accidents.

II. No. The proposed action provides a means to isolate a potential draindown path through the normally open F008 valve and therefore reduces thepossibility of an accident.

III. No. Operability of the F008 valve is not required in conditions 4 and 5

per Technical Specification 3/4.6.3.

SER NO.: 88-029

CROSS REFERENCE: PMRs 87-9149, Rev. 0 and 87-9150, Rev,. 0


Installation of a permanent public'ddress (PA) station in the Unit 1 ReactorBuilding, EL. 719,, drywell personnel airlock and at the Unit 2 drywell controlpoint in the Reactor Building, EL.719, outside the personnel airlock.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The plant PA system is not safety related and does not perform asafety function. A review of FSAR Sections 9.5.2.2.1, Intra-plant PA,section 9.5.2.2.6, System Evaluation, section 3.8.2.1.2, EquipmentHatches and Personnel Lock and section 6.2.6.2, Primary ContainmentPenetration Leakage Rate Test found that they are not affected by theproposed change.

II. No. A review of FSAR Chapter 15 shows no effect by the proposed designchange.

III. No. The plant PA system is not addressed in Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-030

CROSS REFERENCE: NL-88-002


During performance of the 18 month or 60 month 125V battery dischargesurveillance test, the proposed action is to maintain the battery'sdistribution system energized by a temporary cross-tie (jumper) to the otherchannel within the respective division.

SUMMARY:

I. No. Potential accidents have been evaluated in conditions 4 or 5 withonly one division (two channels) of 125VDC control power operable. Theproposed action does not affect the operable 125VDC systems.

II. No. The additional supply of 125VDC power to, equipment, other than theminimum required for plant safety, enhances the ability to cope withaccidents and malfunctions.

III. No. The powering of additional DC equipment increases the margin ofsafety above that established in the Technical Specifications bases.Since isolation from the operating units'C systems is maintained,equipment required to meet the operating units'C system TechnicalSpecifications bases is not affected.

SER NO.: 88-031



The proposed action is use of the modified/upgraded main steam line plugs withfuel in or out of the RPV and performance of surveillances at a maximum mainsteamline (MSL) pressure of 22.5 psig.

SUMMARY:

I. No. There are no accidents in the FSAR related to the MSL plug, however,there are accidents concerning load drops onto indicated fuel. The MSL

plug is prevented from falling on the core by safety cables attached tothe plug.

II. No. The MSL plug is a safety related component and has been demonstratedby analysis to remain intact during a seismic event. With all of thefuel in the spent fuel pool and the gates installed the reactor cavity isisolated from the spent fuel pool. Therefore a reactor cavity/reactordrain-down event would not occur.

III. No. The minimum water level specified in Technical Specification 3/4.9.8is 22 feet above the reactor vessel flange. The normal water levelduring refueling operation is 24 feet above the RPV flange. The P.E.modified/upgraded plugs are designed to limit leakage from an individualplug to less than 150 gpm if both primary and secondary seals were tofail. This leakag'e value is well within the makeup capabilities of thesystems available through implementation of ON-235-001.

SER NO.: 88-032



This modification designs and fabricates a lifting device (strongback) forlifting/transporting the refueling shield side rails (cattle chute).

SUMMARY:r

I. No. The strongback and lifting lugs are designed to the safety marginsspecified within NUREG 0612. To prevent the cattle chute from fallingonto a loaded reactor core, it is installed/removed with the separatorinstalled in the reactor vessel. Also, the cattle chute shall not betransported over the spent fuel pool.

II. No. The heavy load is still within our commitment to NUREG 0612.

'II. No. A safe load path will be established for transporting the cattlechute.

SER NO.: 88-033


0 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

TP-225-015 provides the guidelines to perform a Freon flush on portions ofcontainment instrument gas (CIG) piping to remove residue and dirt.

SUMMARY:

I. No. A review of FSAR sections 15.1.4 and 15.6.1 "InadvertentSafety/Relief Valve Opening" revealed that the components of theAutomatic Depressurization System valve actuators and solenoids will notbe adversely affected by any residual Freon.

II. No. The freon flush will increase the reliability of the CIG system bycleaning the supply piping and associated components. This insures theCIG system and its'afety related loads will perform their intendedfunction.

III. No. The CIG system or ADS operation which relies upon proper CIGoperation are not discussed in Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-034



Addition of a new charging connection for the Division I ContainmentInstrument Gas (CIG) N Bottles, 2T-213A thru M to allow the bottles to becharged after postulated LOCA event without exposing personnel to assume high2

radiation.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The new charging connection addition will insure availability andoperability of the system in the event of a LOCA and during post-LOCAconditions by providing an accessible location for charging the CIG N2bottles required for ADS operation.

II. No. The design will conform to the applicable. codes and standards asused in the original design and designated in the FSAR.

III. No. There are no Technical Specification requirements for the CIGsystem.

SER NO.: 88-035



Upgrade the maximum design of the high pressure (CCC piping) portions of 225AContainment Instrument Gas (CIG) to 2500 psig from the current 2200 psig.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The purpose of this upgrade is to reset relief valve to 2500 psig toprevent unnecessary N release caused by the relief valve being set tooclose to normal opera ing pressure of 2200 psig. N2 bottled gas willstill be supplied to system at 2200 psig. The original safety reliefvalve design setting of 2500 psig will not be exceeded; system operatingconditions will remain unchanged and system components have been fullyanalyzed and evaluated at the higher pressures of 2500 psig in accordancewith ASME Sec. III.

II. No. Operating conditions will remain the same as per FSAR Section9.3.1.5.1, "Design Basis for CIG System."

III. No. The CIG N2 System or ADS operation which relies upon proper CIGoperation are not discussed in Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-036

CROSS REFERENCE: PMRs 85-3097A&B, Rev. 7 and 85-3098AGB, Rev. 7


This change modifies to the SLC system to increase the infection rate andconcentration of sodium pentaborate solution to achieve the requiredequivalent 86 gpm, 13% wt. injection into the reactor vessel in accordanc'ewith NRC ATWS rule 10CFR50.62.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The SLC system is functionally identical to the original system andnone of the modifications being made create conditions that exceed thedesign bases of the original system.

II. No. The proposed actions do create different operating conditions(increased pump discharge pressure and velocity, increased erosion,higher vibrations) but none which are outside the design bases of thesystem.

III. No. The SLC system flow is increased by a factor of 2, and the minimumsodium pentaborate concentration has been increased thus adding morenegative reactivity, thereby reducing reactor power more rapidly andincreasing the margin of safety.

SER NO.: 88-037



This modification isolates the High Pressure Coolant Infection (HPCI) steamsupply line to the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) heat exchangers.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The RHR steam condensing mode is not required for the safe shutdownof the reactor or accident mitigation. Modifications performed to theHPCI steam line (replacing a tee with an elbow and associated snubberreduction) in no way affects the function of HPCI or its equipment.

II. No. The RHR steam condensing mode is normally isolated. Thismodification provides a more positive means of isolation than theexisting pressure control valves.

III. No. The steam condensing mode of RHR is not required for the safeshutdown of the reactor or accident mitigation.

SER NO.: 88-038



'he

proposed action will replace the existing Raw Water Clarifier Tank'sbelt-driven agitator with a direct drive type variable speed drive assembly.

SUMMARY:

I. No. FSAR Sections 9.2.8.1 and 9.2.8.3 state that the Raw Water TreatmentSystem has no safety related function, does not convey radioactivematerials and failure of the system will not compromise any safetyrelated system or component or prevent a safe shutdown of the plant.

II. No. The only possible accident or malfunction which could be postulateddue to the proposed action is the failure of the agitator, or theshutdown of the Raw Water Treatment System. Such an event has beenevaluated previously in the FSAR as stated above.

III. No. The proposed action does not interface or affect any safety relatedsystem or component defined in Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-039



Installation of a permanent 480 VAC, 3 phase, 100 amp power receptacle for the75 HP hydrolazer located in the Radwaste Building area R-220 EL. 676.

SUMMARY:

I. No. A review of FSAR Section 8.1.3b, Non-class 1E Power System, Section8.3.1.2, Non-Class 1E AC System and 8.3.1.2.1, Operation revealed thatthey are not affected by the proposed design change. The subjectelectrical supply MCCOB342 is within the non-class lE system and iscapable of supplying the additional load of the hydrolazer withoutexceeding the design rating of the equipment.

II. No. A review of FSAR sections 8.1.3b, 8.3.1.2, 8.3.1.2.1 and Chapter 15

shows no effect by the proposed design change.

III. No. The Technical Specifications and bases have been reviewed for thecommon (non-ESS) 480 volt MCC System specifically section3/4.8-Electrical Power Systems, no effect was found as a result of theproposed design change.

SER NO.: 88-040

CROSS REFERENCE: RE-081-033, NL-88-007, Rev. 0 NL-88&07, Rev. 1


Performance of fuel sipping operations on Unit 2 to identify leaking fuelassemblies using GE vacuum sipping equipment.

SUMMARY:

I. No. Fuel inspections using similar equipment were evaluated in FSAR

Section 9.1.4 and found acceptable from the standpoints of accidentprobability of occurrence and consequences. The new equipment isimproved to reduce amounts of radioactive materials handled, reduce dose,and improve accuracy and reliability. The fuel isolation canister is nota heavy load. Hot particle and radiological work is controlled by HealthPhysics procedure. Fuel handling is performed using approved procedures.Equipment compatibility with supporting plant systems was verified.Sipping equipment incorporates safety features which protect fuel.Personnel performing the operation are trained and experienced.

II. No. Fuel inspection using similar equipment has been evaluatedpreviously in the FSAR and found acceptable. The current equipment doesnot create any new hazard. The new equipment is designed to reduce theamount of radioactive material handled, improve accuracy, and to be morereliable.

III. No. Fuel inspections are not precluded by or described in the TechnicalSpecifications. Fuel inspections will not reduce any margin of safety asthe equipment is designed to protect fuel. Fuel handling operations willbe done in accordance with approved procedures.

SER NO.: 88-041



Performance of Hydrolaze Cleaning of the Reactor Pressure Vessel FeedwaterNozzle Thermal sleeve areas in accordance with TP-062-024.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The minimum potential accidents analyzed in the FSAR will not occuras the Reactor is defueled, depressurized and in Condition 5. Thecleaning activity has no physical effect on the system other than toremove activated buildup products.

II. No. An analysis has been performed to demonstrate that no damage to thesparger, nozzle, or thermal sleeve area will result from the activity.TP-062-024 will control work performed.

No adverse impacts will result to primary containment, secondarycontainment, control room habitability, ECCS evaluation, pipebreakanalysis, overpressure analysis, instrument response or Class lEdistribution.

inventories

SER NO.: 88-042

III. No. The plant will be in Condition 5. The only affect can be looseparts upon startup. Joints of hydrolaze equipment will be mechanicallyconnected with safety cables and welded at each connection. Material

will also be conducted.



Placing the fuel pool cooling systems in a configuration for cooling the Unit2 Fuel Pool with Unit 1 Fuel pool cooling system and Unit 1 fuel poolavailable.

SUMMARY:

I. No. A review was conducted of FSAR Section 9.1, Appends 9A, and Chapter15. Postulated consequences of utilizing the proposed configuration wereanalyzed and shown to be less significant than previously analyzed.

II. No. There is no new accident possible beyond loss of fuel pool coolingas previously analyzed in the FSAR.

III. No. There is no Technical Specification or basis applicable to thisconfiguration as the Technical Specification is only applicable whenirradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel.

SER NO.: 88-043

CROSS REFERENCE: TP-237-001, NL-88-010, TP-237-001, Rev. 1;TP-237-001, Rev. 2


Draining the Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank to the Liquid Radwaste (LRW)Collection System.

SUMMARY:

I. No. FSAR sections 9.2.10.3 and 9.3.3 were reviewed. Performance of thisletdown does not change the probability of tank rupture. Failure ofdischarge piping does not affect plant safety. Actuation of the Unit 1

Turbine Building. Outer Area Sump alarm (High-High) will requiretermination of the draindown and restoration of piping to pump'he sumpto LRW. The possibility of temporary pipe breaking was analyzed, and theconsequences considered with respect to FSAR requirements. The affectsof temporary piping on permanent plant equipment was analyzed anddetermined compatible.

II. No. In the event of a break in the temporary piping and no operatoraction, water would not affect any safety related equipment in theturbine building. Radiologically, such a break is bounded by FSARanalysis.

III. No. The basis for Technical Specification 3/4.3.3, was reviewed. Nosystems required t'o be operable in this plant condition are affected bythe performance of the TP.

Radiological doses, assuming a CST rupture, were calculated and shown notto exceed Technical Specification 3.11.2.3 and 3.11.4.

SER NO.: 88-044



Removal of nuisance alarms from the alarm CRT connected to the plant computersystem.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The modification affects the plant computer system, which is definedas a non-safety-related system. The alarm CRT displays do not interferewith or impact the control room annunciator system.

II. No. The modification affects the plant computer system which is definedas non-safety-related.

III. No. The alarming software in the plant computer system is not mentioned~ ~

in the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-045



Add a software option to the "31 Day Zone Access Summary Report" to allowprinting of the report by selected cost areas.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The software addition does not affect the FSAR analysis. Thesecurity computer is not a safety system nor is it a system related tosafety. The proposed action does not alter the intent of thecomputer-based Security Management System or its performancecapabilities.

II. No. The proposed action will be implemented on the Security ComputerSystem which can not independently control the plant. The action doesnot affect the ability of the system to monitor security violations.

III. No. The Security Computer System is unable to exercise independentcontrol of the plant and plant operation will continue unaffectedregardless of the hardware associated with the Security Computer System.

SER NO.: 88-046

CROSS REFERENCE: NSAG Report i/1-88, NL-88-006


Operation with the shipping cask storage pit gates removed.

SALARY:

I. No. Given the number of alarms which would accompany a drainagetransient, the availability of makeup paths, and the existence ofoff-normal operating procedure ON-135-001, it is less likely the poolwould be permitted to drain to curb level through an open drain thandrain as a result of gate seal failure. The affects of gate seal failurehave been addressed in FSAR Section 9.1.2.2, (i.e. 10CFR100 dose limitswould not be exceeded). Water level may be slightly lower for a gateleak detection drain, but radiological consequences would be identical asfuel would remain covered.

II. No. The effect of losing pool inventory through leaking pool gates,which is analyzed in FSAR Section 9.1.2.2, is no different than that oflosing inventory through an open drain in the cask storage pit with thegates removed. Therefore, the subject case is developed by previous FSARanalysis.

III. No. Technical Specification 3/4.9.9 governs water level in the spentfuel storage pool. Level is required to be maintained 22 feet above topof irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool racks. Theonly credible leakage path introduced by this case limits leakage to lessthan 50 gpm. Decreases in level caused by this leakage and eventualisolation prior to exceeding technical specification minimum level.

SER NO.: 88-047

CROSS. REFERENCE: TP-235-006, NL-88-011, Rev.0; NL-88-&11, Rev. 1


Fuel pool cooling piping flush

SUMMARY:

I. No. A review of FSAR Sections 9.1.3, 9.2.10, 12.2.1.3, 12.2.1.4.2 and15.7 was performed. A technical review did not identify any concernsrelative to piping or component failure. The release of the totalinventory to the reactor building is more conservative than theCondensate Storage Tank rupture which is less severe than theconcentrates storage tank rupture analyzed in FSAR Section 15.7.3.5.

II. No. The TP will not affect the operation of Unit 1 fuel pool system.The test does not affect the design basis of the system. The test alsodoes not; affect any ECCS power supplies or essential water inventoriesrequired for the safe shutdown of Unit 1. The Unit 2 core is beingmaintained in the Unit 2 fuelpool and cross-tied to the Unit 1 fuel poolcooling system. This TP does not affect operation in this mode. Unit 2

service water is out of service for flushes with the heat exchangerisolated and vented. Samples will be taken on the service water side toensure against leakage.

III. No. Technical Specifications 3.9.8 and 3.9.9 refer to required waterlevels during refueling operations. This TP will not affect the abilityto maintain level.

SER NO.: 88-048

CROSS REFERENCE: NL-88-012, NL-88-012, Rev. 2


Use of the Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) as a receiving tank forpowdered resin and activated corrosion products from common fuelpool filterdemineralizer.

SUMMARY:

I. No. FSAR Section 9.2.10.3 addresses the rupture of the tank andretaining of its volume within the tank dike. The probability theoccurrence of the event is not increased by the TP as the tank isdesigned and operates as a receptor for flush effluents. No designparameters are exceeded during the process. The rupture of the CST isnot specifically analyzed in FSAR Chapter 15. However, the worst case ofa similar type is analyzed in Section 15.7.3.5.

II. No. FSAR Section 9.2.10.3 evaluates the rupture of the Unit 2 Condensate~

~

~

~ ~

~

Storage Tank.

III. No. Radiological doses have been calculated to be below appropriateTechnical Specification limits.

SER NO.: 88-049



Install cross-tie piping between the domestic water system and well watersystem.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The systems involved have no safety-related function and the failureof these systems would have no effect on systems related to safety.

II. No. The systems involved are not safety related and there is nopossibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than thatevaluated previously in the FSAR.

III. No. Neither the clarified water system nor the domestic water system areincluded in the basis of any Technical Specification. No systems whichrely on either of these systems are in the basis of the technicalspecifications.

SER NO.: 88-050



Relocate the Fire Zone 0-41A-D smoke detector relay board from Transponder 117to Transponder 116.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The Fire Protection System is not required for safe shutdown of theplant and is not safety related. Failure of the system will notcompromise any safety related system or component or prevent a safeshutdown.

II. No. The Fire Protection System is not required for safe shutdown nor isit safety related. The modification will not impose functional concernsto any system used to mitigate transients or accidents described/analyzedin FSAR Chapter 15.

III. No. The modification does not impose a functional concern or affect thedesign basis for the Fire Protection System. The change allows for resetof a smoke detector alarm at the Control Room Fire Protection Panel. Themargin of safety as discussed in the Technical Specifications is notreduced.

SER NO.: 88-051

CROSS REFERENCE: PMRs 87-9220 and 87-9221


Reroute the pre-action sprinkler system.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The functions of both the pre-action sprinkler system and theelectrical detection system are not affected by this action.Implementation of this change increases the reliability and availabilityof fire protection in the plant area affected.

II. No. The design criteria of this. change is non-quality, non-seismic, andme'ets all the original design inputs and codes imposed upon the originalequipment.

III. No. Unit 1 Technical Specifications 3/4.7.6.2 and 3/4.8 were reviewed.It was determined that the proposed modification had no affect on thetechnical specification or the margin of safety provided in the basesthereto.

SER NO.: 88-052

CROSS REFERENCE: NL-88-014, Rev. 0, OP-068-140


Use of the Westinghouse-Hittman Nuclear Incorporated mobile system to performin-cask dewatering of radioactive waste.

SUMMARY:

I. No. FSAR Section 15.7.3 analyzed a rupture of a radwaste tank in theRadwaste Building. This evaluation bounds the postulated failure of adewatering radwaste liner/high integrity container within the RadwasteBuilding. The use of a mobile radwaste system in the Unit 2 ReactorBuilding does not increase the probability of occurrence or consequencesof the limiting accident as analyzed in the FSAR for the Solid RadwasteSystem. The FSAR notes provisions provided for mobile processingservices in Section 11.4.

II. No. Use of the mobile dewatering system does not create any adverseimpact to safety-related systems, equipment, or structures. Thedewatering process does not create any new accidents not previouslyevaluated in FSAR Section 15.7.3. The review of this issue consideredcontainment of radioactive material. The dewatering process, dewateringsystem safeguards, hydrogen gas production, electrical loading, crosstieof waste transfer lines, fire protection, QA, QC, and personnel training.

III. No. Technical Specifications related to solid r'adwaste processingaddress only the aspects of the process control program which will beadhered to as if the waste was processed in the Radwaste Building.

SER NO.: 88-053



Relocate a fire line around the location of the new warehouse off-loadfacility.SUMMARY:

I. No. FSAR Section 9.5.1 defines fire protection system requirements.Activities associated with this modification do no affect safety-relatedportions of the Fire Protection Yard Piping System.

II. No. The modification does not involve a change to the system designbasis. All work takes place in an area where no safety-related orcritical non-safety-related piping or duct banks are located.

III. No. The portion of piping affected is not address by TechnicalSpecifications.

SER NO.: 88-054



Replace existing Cutler Hammer standard trip eutectic alloy, thermal overloadrelay heater coil, with similar heater coil.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed action will serve to improve the availability of theSecurity Control Center Room Exhaust Fan through increasing the actuationvalue of the thermal overload relay. This action serves to preventoverload caused by misoperation during normal plant operation.

II. No. The action does not change the function of the overload nor theoperation, and is in accordance with engineering specifications. Thisaction improves availability.

III. No. Neither the selection of overload relay heater coils or the securitysystem discussed in the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-055

CROSS REFERENCE: SCP NL-88-013, Rev. 0, TP-237-002


Removal of contaminated sludge from the Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank (CST)to a high integrity container.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The radiological consequences of the rupture of the Unit 2 CST isbounded by the analysis for the rupture of the concentrates waste tank inSection 15.7.3.5 of the FSAR. The cleaning of the CST will be performedwhile the tank is isolated from all plant systems except the overflow toLiquid Radwaste. Since the plant will be in Condition 5 and maybedefuel, ECCS systems are not required, no impact on safety-relatedequipment is present.

II. No. The worse case scenario resulting from the pumping evolutions wouldbe rupturing of the hose leading from the top of the CST to the ReactorBuilding Truck Bay and releasing its entire expected contents. Due toits lesser volume, associated lower curie content, and pipingencapsulation, rupture of this line is of a lesser consequence than therupture of the Unit 2 CST, which is discussed in FSAR Section 9.2.10.3.Operational, radiological, and personnel safety concerns were addressed.

III. No. Radiological doses have been calculated and are below appropriatetechnical specification limits. This calculation is conservative in thatit did not factor in shielding from the concrete berm around the tank orattenuation from buildings. All proposed operations are within therequirements of Unit 1/Unit 2 Technical/Specification 3/4.11.3.

SER NO.: 88-056



Convert the 3-packing set seal on valves B31-2F023A&B and B31-2F031A&B to1-packing set seal design.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed action will not adversely affect the function of thevalves as related to safety. The packing change will eliminate problemsassociated with alignment of the flanges and maintenance of the packing.The single packing has the advantage of simplified installation and easeof repacking, which reduces radiation exposure.

II. No. Valve operability will not be adversely affected by the packingdesign change. The action of removing the leakoff line does not affectthe piping system dynamic analysis.

1

III. No. The packing material used satisfy chemistry requirements for SSES.The structural integrity of the piping will remain within therequirements of Technical Specification 3/4.4.1 and 3/4.10.4. Thefunction and operability of the valves are not adversely affected by theaction.

SER NO.: 88-057



Install stem anti-rotation device on the following one inch ASME Class 1

air-operated Masoneilan control valves: HV-255F100, HV-251F122A/B,HV-249F088, HV252F037A/B, HV-243F019, and HV-243F020.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The modification has no adverse impact on the existing valve seismicoperability under the load conditions listed in FSAR Tables 3.9-17 and3.9027. The subject valves form a part of the containment isolationsystem per FSAR Section 6.2.4. It has been concluded that normaloperation of the subject valves will not be adversely affected by theproposed modification. The additional mass of the anti-rotation devicewill not affect the existing dynamic analysis.

II. No. The prop'osed action has no adverse affect on valve operability norsystem dynamic qualification. The alarm does not introduce anypreviously unanalyzed failure modes.

III. No. The proposed modifications will not affect the capability of thevalves to adequately isolate with Technical Specification defined timelimits. After modification, the valves will meet the primary containmentleakage criteria of Technical Specification basis 3/4.6.1.2 and theoperability criteria of technical specification basis 3/4.6.3.

SER NO.: 88-058

CROSS REFERENCE: .PMR 87-3044A&B

DESCRIPT'CON OF CHANGE:

Replacement of the Unit 2 Offgas Recombiner Vessel, addition of a drain valve,and heating system redesign.

SUMMARY:

I. No. Section 15.7.1 of the FSAR evaluates a failure of an Offgas Systemboundary rupture as a result of a seismic event which is deemed the mostprobable event to cause such a rupture. This change will reduce thesusceptibility of the vessel to cracking. Since the vessel is notrequired to be seismically designed, the probability of occurrence orconsequences of a system boundary rupture remains unchanged by thisaction.

II. No. The improvement in vessel material to reduce its susceptibility tocracking (IGSCC) and the improved design of the heating system reducesthe probability of vessel failure from an event not previously evaluatedin the FSAR. The FSAR evaluates a system boundary failure as a result ofseveral different initiating events, the most probable of which is aseismic event (Section 15.7.1).

III. No. The modification will not affect any of the system performancerequirements discussed in Technical Specification 3/4.11.2. The newvessel will perform in exactly the same manner as the current vessel inmeeting technical specification requirements. The change to upgradedmaterial and redesign of the heating system will reduce thesusceptibility to vessel cracking which will increase the margin ofsafety over the current design.

ERR NO: 88-059

I CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 88-3027, Rev. 0


Unit 1 Raceway Wrapping for Appendix R

SUMMARY:

I. No. Raceway structural seismic, and ampacity requirement were assured tobe satisfied.

II. No. This modification does not interface with logic, control, oroperation of any plant systems or components. The addition of fireenclosures enables safe shutdown circuits to function in the event of afire.

'II.

No. Structural and seismic integrity is not compromised by theadditional weight of the protective material. Power cables have beenderated to assure they will be operating within their design temperatureafter the raceways are enclosed. No plant parameters are affected bythis modification.

SER NO.: 88-060

CROSS REFERENCE: Partial Implementation of PMR 87-3025 During U2-2 Refuelingand Inspection Outage (RIO).


Partial Implementation of the RHR Waterhammer Modification during the Unit2-2RIO due to the inability to procure qualified valve actuators.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The nonfunctional piping supports, and valves are not connected toexi'sting plant systems mechanically or electrically. The installationhas been reviewed for all applicable design requirements such as SeismicII/Iand will not present a hazard to safety-related equipment in thearea. The piping and valves will be "laid-up" in a way which preservesthe quality level for future use.

II. No. The non-function piping, valves and supports do not interface withexisting systems and are supported for all design basis loads. No newfailure mechanisms are introduced. The design has been evaluated againstall applicable review programs. The portions of the modification whichwill be installed and functional have been evaluated. There are nointeractions between the installed scope and the deferred scope which areimportant to safety.

III. No. The Technical Specifications evaluated by the original PMR safetyevaluation were reviewed in light of partial implementation. TechnicalSpecification 3/4.5, ECCS is related to'HR system performance which isnot affected. Technical Specification 3/4.6 Containment Systems has todo with leakage. The valves which are not tied-in do not contribute toleakage. The F)11 valves which are converted to locked manual willcontinue to be leak tested and added to all other tested valves. Totalleakage is not increased.

SER NO.: 88-061



Replacement of the Offgas Recombiner Vessel, drain valve, and heating system.This action is being taken to preclude cracking as a result of IGSCC.

SUMMARY:

I. No. Section 15.7.1 of the FSAR evaluates a failure of the offgas systemdue to system boundary rupture. The vessel being installed is not assusceptible to cracking as the old vessel. The heating system upgradereduces the stress levels in the vessel and thereby reducessusceptibility to cracking. The heating system upgrade involves localchanges that will not affect local distribution. The drain valve isdesigned in accordance with the design requirements for D-augmented forgaseous radwaste systems.

II. No. The modification does not change the evaluation of FSAR Section15.7.1.

III. No. This modification does not, affect any of the system performancerequirements concerning radioactive releases or explosive mixturesdiscussed Technical Specification 3/4.11.2. The new vessel will performthe same as the current vessel with additional protection against IGSCC.The upgraded heating system will perform better than the old heatingsystem in terms of preventing heater burn out and minimizing vesselcracking.

SER NO.: 88-062

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 87-9092A,B, Rev. 1


Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system enhancements to include: 1) removal ofthe time delay interlock that prevents operation of the heat exchanger bypassvalves for ten minutes after receipt of a LOCA signal, 2) consolidation ofthe containment spray valve initiation permissive switches and the containmentspray valve LOCA isolation manual override switches, 3) replace the controlswitches for the RHR heat exchanger shell side bypass valves (3 position,spring return to auto position) with 3 position, maintain contact models, and4) rearrange the RHR system panel inserts.

SUMMARY:

I. No. As initially designed, the time-delay relay acts to prevent theoperator from closing the RHR heat exchanger bypass valve for ten minutesfollowing a LOCA signal. The object is to take advantage of the fullflow capability of the RHR pumps for LPCI injection following a LOCA.Present emergency operating procedures are symptom based. Operators aretrained to monitor RRV water level to assure adequate core coolingexists. Once assured, the operator has the option to secure LPCIinjection. The symptom-based EOPs direct actions that are not based upontime, but upon specific symptoms such as increasing suppression pooltemperature. With the present design bypassing the ten-minute interlockcan be achieved with administrative controls to achieve conformance withapproved EOPs. The elimination of the ten-minute timer does not alterany actions necessary to protect for heat exchanger damage. It onlyimpacts when these actions can be performed. The operator by incorrectactions has the capability to damage the RHR heat exchanger both beforeand after the deletion of the timer. A review of FSAR Chapters 6,7 and15 determined that no accident analysis is dependent on the ten-minutedelay. The modified design will not adversely affect any FSAR analysisand will provide sufficient interlocks to provide enough time for asatisfactory start of the LPCI mode of RHR when required.

The consolidation of the containment spray valve initiation permissiveand containment spray valve LOCA isolation manual override switchessimplifies actions necessary for the operators to respond to an abnormalevent. The simplified control circuit reduces the probability that thecontainment spray mode of RHR will not be available during an accidentdue to failures of these components.

The use of maintained contact switches for the heat exchanger bypassvalves allows the operator to perform other actions during thisevolution. All functions of the switch remain the same. It will openand remain open following a LOCA signal independent of switch position,until the operator reinitializes the circuit and then placing the switchin the desired closed or open position. The rearrangement of the panelinserts does not alter the design of those controls which arefunctionally unaffected. The new inserts are design to the samestandards and requirements as the present inserts.

No. Revision 3 to the EPQs produced by the BWROG in response to symptomscharacteristic of an ATWS have been reviewed by the NRC and an SER hasbeen issued. The EOPs direct reduction in vessel injection tillwaterlevel is maintained between -38 and 0129 inches and initiation ofsuppression pool cooling as soon as possible. PP&L's EOPs are moreconservative in their response to an ATWS. A safety evaluation on thisdeviation from Rev. 3 of the EPGs has been submitted to the NRC.

For a true ATWS event, concern exists regarding initiation of suppressionpool cooling until after the time delay relay timer. In general, thetime-delay relay can be an impediment to the quick and safeaccomplishment of SSES EOPs. Removing the timer allows the EOP responseto be implemented rapidly and safely without the need to install jumpersbetween terminal points as required under the present design. The resultis an increase in plant safety.

With respect to terminating vessel injection and initiating suppressionpool cooling during an ATWS events, PP&L believes the NRC SER applies toand bounds SSES EOPs and that the elimination of the time-delay relayfunction is consistent with the NRC accepted accident response scenario.

The removal of the timer would allow the operator to place one or bothloops of RHR in suppression pool cooling during the first ten minutes ofa LOCA if he misinterpreted plant symptoms and come to the wrongconclusion that an ATWS had occurred in lieu of a LOCA. This mistake isconsidered to be non-credible. The logic detailing this conclusion iscontaminated in the SSES Individual Plant Evaluation which has beensubmitted to the NRC for review.

A single failure in either the pre- or post- modification heat exchangerbypass valve circuitry will result in a loss of one loop of RHR which hasbeen analyzed in the FSAR. The loss of a RHR heat exchanger due tooperator error in placing the loop in suppression pool cooling during thefirst ten minutes of a LOCA is also bounded by this analysis. Per FSARSection 15.0.3.2.1.1 an operator error is a single failure and additionalfailures of active components are not considered in transientevaluations. Circuit techniques are such that common mode failures ofboth RHR divisions due to this modification are not credible.

The combination of the containment spray valve initiation permissiveswitches and containment spray valve LOCA isolation manual overrideswitches do not create the possibility of a new situation or malfunctionthat did not exist prior to the modification. Circuit techniques aresuch that common mode failures of both RHR divisions due to thismodification are non-credible.

The change of the RHR heat exchanger bypass valve control switch tomaintain contacts does not change the function of the switch. Theconsequences of a failure of the control switch and circuitry do notchange as a result of the modification. The worst case malfunction dueto a single failure, loss of one loop of RHR during a LOCA, is evaluatedin the FSAR. Common mode failures of both RHR division due to thismodification are non-credible.

The redesign of the RHR control panel inserts does not functionally alterthe RHR system. Human factors and operator experience have beenincorporated into the panel design.

III. No. The modification does not alter the automatic functioning of the RHR

system. The ability to comply with any technical specification is notaltered. The improved ease of RHR system operation and the ability toenter suppression pool cooling early in an ATWS event improve themargin-of-safety. The modification will not alter the system'sconformance to the Bases for Emergency Core Cooling System (Section3/4.5)

~~

~

SER NO.: 88-063



Replace the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Channel /341 Area Radiation Monitor (ARM)instrumentation (Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) Chamber Shield Area) withinstrumentation having a higher range'.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The ARM system has no function related to the safe shutdown of theplant or to the quantitative monitoring of the release of radioactivematerial to the environment (FSAR Section 12.3.4) . ARM Channel 841 willbe upgraded to provide a sensitivity range which envelopes the operationalhigh radiation dose rate conditions experienced in the TIP Chamber ShieldArea.

II. No. The ARM system as defined in the FSAR performs no safety relatedfunction. After installation, the modified ARM system will be capable ofmonitoring the high radiation dose rate levels in the TIP Chamber Area.

III. No. Channel f341 ARM and its monitored area are not addressed in theTechnical Specification Bases. The proposed modification will not changethe status of the subject ARM channel.

SER NO.: 88-064

CROSS REFERENCE: SCP PJ882004


Unit 1 Isophase Bus Duct Cooling System set point change on the low air flowalarm.

SUMMARY:

I. No. FSAR Sections 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 9.4, and 10.0 were reviewed. Isophasebus duct cooling is not discussed. The isophase bus duct and associatedcooling system is a non-seismic, non-safety system. Failure of thecooling system results in high bus temperature which does not permitoperation at, 100X power.

II. No. The proposed action will improve system reliability and plantavailability. The change will result in the system performing itoriginal design intent.

III. No. The Technical Specifications do not address the isophase bus ductsystem nor do the proposed actions impact sections 3/4.8.1 (A.C. sources)or 3/4.8.3 (onsite power systems).

SER NO.: 88-065

CROSS REFERENCE: TP-161-018


Backseating of the RWCU Suction Inboard Isolation Valve to reduce drywellleakage.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed backseating is within the mechanical designcapabilities of the valve. Protective circuits prevent overcurrent fromdamaging the motor. The valves containment isolation signal will bedisabled during the procedure, therefore, Technical Specification 3.6.3.awill be entered. Isolation is not compromised because of the presence ofthe outboard valve. Backseating will result in increased safety byreducing the damaging affects of valve leakage thxough the packing.

II. No. A valve body/bonnet crack has been evaluated in FSAR Sections 6.2.1and 15.6.

III. No. The Technical Specification basis for containment isolation valvesis to ensure that containment atmosphere is isolated in the event of anaccident. The proposed backseating action includes demonstration of thevalve's ability to isolate.

SER NO.: 88-066



Change the configuration of the existing reactor cavity seal hose connectionfor both the upper and lower reactor cavity seals.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The FSAR does not specifically address reactor cavity seals or theconsequences of their failure. The FSAR does address normal watershielding and maintenance of coverage of fuel. Seal failure that allowspool water to drain will not permit level to decrease to below the levelof the top of fuel assemblies. FSAR App. 9A discusses of pool cooling.The proposed action will not affect this analysis. The proposed actionwill improve the reliability of the instrument air supply andsubsequently serve to decrease the probability of failure.

II. No. The potential for and consequences of a reactor cavity seal failurehave been previously evaluated in SSES NSAG Report No. 13-84. The reportconcluded that gross leakage of reactor cavity and spent fuel pool waterdue to seal failure should not result. I

III. No. No Technical Specifications specifically address reactor cavityseals or instrument air system. Technical Specification 3/4.9.8 and3/4.9.9 require 22 ft. of water be maintained over the top of active ofthe reactor pressure vessel flange and the irradiated fuel assemblesseated in the spent fuel storage rack. The proposed action will improveseal hose connection and reliability of the hose and seal.

SER NO.: 88-067



Jumpering one cell out of Battery Bank 1D610

SUMMARY:

I. No. The battery with one cell removed and in its current condition iscapable of meeting all necessary functional requirements.

II. No. See Item I above.

III. No. Technical Specification 3/4.8.1, 2, and 3 discusses maintenanceactivities and tests to ensure the operability and capacity of thebattery. The battery with one cell removed in its current condition willmeet its functional requirements.

SER NO.: 88-068


DESCRIPTIO OF CHANGE:

Install temporary instrumentation to monitor the exterior surface differentialtemperature across the RPV feedwater nozzle safe ends.

SUMMARY:

I. No. Electrical separation will be maintained between temperaturedetector cables and any safety related cabling precluding an increase inthe probability of any electrical common mode failure due to thismodification. The Transient Monitoring System will be used to transmitdata from the drywell to the TSC. This modification will not alter thenon-safety related function of the system. Since this system does notdirectly interface with any safety or power generation systems and thesystem output is not readily available to the plant operator, themalfunction of this system will not impact the probability of occurrenceof any accident or malfunction analyzed in FSAR Chapters 6 or 15.Installation of the instrumentation will permit detection of Feedwaterthermal sleeve seal leakage.

II. No. The instrumentation system does not interface directly with anysafety or power generation system. Temporary wiring will not pose adebris hazard. Electrical separation between temporary cable and anysafety related cable will be maintained.

III. No. The modification does not interface or alter any system subject to aTechnical Specification.

ERR NO.! 88-069



Accept the results of applicable section of SE-224-A02 and SE-224-C02 in'lieuof portions of SE-224-107 which could not be performed.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed tests to satisfy surveillance requirements adequatelydemonstrates the capability of the diesel generators to perform theirsafety related functions described in FSAR Section 8.3.1.4.

II. No. The proposed action provides equivalent testing to verify dieselgenerator design function.

III. No. The testing is consistent with the content of operability testrecommendations provided in the Technical Specification basis.

SER NO.: 88-070

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 84»3104, Rev. 1


This modification sets the Emergency Switchgear Room Cooling Units controllerto auto mode upon recovery of power after a LOOP or LOCA initiation.

SUMMARY:

I. No. There is no change to the normal function of the controllers. Thismodification improves the reliability of this safety related system byminimizing operator action after a LOOP.

II. No. This modification allows the equipment to function as originallyintended.

III. No. This modification assures that the pressure controller circuit willbe set to the auto mode after a LOOP or LOCA initiation. The function ofthe Emergency Switchgear Room Cooling System and the ESW System are notaffected by this modification.

SER NO.: 88-071



This proposed modification deals with the repair of the tear in the "25"nozzle on the "C" feedwater sparger.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed modification will return the sparger to an acceptableoperational status by sealing a tear which would provide a detrimentalleakage flow path.

II. No. The proposed modification has no effect on feedwater sparger headeror end bracket .integrity and improves the integrity of the repairednozzle to an acceptable level.

III. No. The feedwater sparger is non-code, non-safety-related and is notdescribed in the basis for any Technical Specification.

SER NO.: 88-072

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 88-3006D


This proposed modification reroutes the security fencing to enclose theexisting warehouse within the site protected area.

SUMMARY:

I. No. This modification is not safety related.

II. No. The proposed modification does not involve a change in the securitysystem design basis. The proposed modification is not safety related.

III. No. This proposed modification is not covered by a technicalspecification.

SER NO.: 88-073



This modification will add cables; statistical multiplexer with a modem andterminals to the RDAS and SPDS computer systems located in the EOF.

SUMMARY:

I. No. There are no safety-related systems in the EOF Computer Room and theequipment being added does not interface with any plant equipment.

II. No. The proposed modification does not change the design criteria forany system or function as described in the FSAR.

III. No. The installation of the equipment does not conflict with the basisfor any technical specification because the proposed RDAS changes do notchange nor affect the POWERPLEX fuel thermal margin calculations.

SER NO.: 88-074



The proposed action is-to operate Unit 2 Cycle 3 with a slightly revised coreloading plan as compared to that approved by the NRC.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed action only makes minor changes to the original coreloading plan and the revised core loading plan does not use any new fueldesigns, nor does it require any changes to plant procedures, plantsystems, or plant operations..

II. No. The proposed action 1) uses no fuel designs, 2) affects only 12 fuelassemblies, 3) uses no unconventional core loading plans and 4) does notrequire any changes to plant procedures, systems, or operations.

III. No. The approved analysis is more conservative than the proposed action.

SER NO.: 88-075



The proposed procedures are being developed to control the installation andremoval of an access barrier in the Reactor Pressure (RPV) Vessel in order tosupport the repair of the feedwater sparger.

SUMMARY:

I. No. A heavy load analysis of the access barrier and modified PreferredEngineering strongback has been performed and indicated that theconsequences of a postulated drop of the access barrier and strongback iswithin the fuel handling accident of FSAR Chapter 15.7.4 and theguidelines of NUREG 0612.


III. No. The installation of the access barrier is not addressed in the basisfor any Technical Specification.

SER NO.: 88«076

CROSS REFERENCE: PMRs 88-3030, Rev. 0; 88-3030, Rev. 1; and 88-3030, Rev. 2

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE: ~

The purpose of this modification is to improve the leak-tightness of theReactor Water .Cleanup Containment'solation Valve so that it is capable ofmeeting its Local Leak Rate Testing requirements.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The performance characteristics of the replacement valve either meetor exceed those of the existing valve.

II. No. The operation of the replacement valve is the same as the existingvalve.

III. No. The replacement valve/existing actuator combination will meet theisolation time of Technical Specification 3/4.6.3.

SER NO.: 88-077

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 87»3023


This modification provides for an improvement of the Primary 81 and Primary 82carrier relaying schemes for Unit 1. These two sets of independent relayingschemes detect electrical faults on the 230k V line between the SynchronizingCircuit Breaker and the Susquehanna 230 k V switchgear.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed action does not affect the plant electrical systemwhich provides normal and emergency AC power to reactor protection andengineered safety feature equipment.

II. No. The proposed action increases the accuracy of the carrier relayingscheme used for transmission line protection in the event of anelectrical fault on the system.

III. No. The proposed action enhances the ability of the carrier relayingscheme to allow the Unit 8'1 Generator to ride through an electrical faulton an adjacent transmission line.

SER NO.: 88-078



The purpose of this modification is to install a stem anti-rotation device oncertain one inch ASME Class 1 air-operated Masoncilan control valves on theHigh Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), Residual Heat Removal (RHR), ReactorCore Isolation Cooling (RCIC), Core Spray and Recirculation Systems.

SUMMARY:

No. The modification would not affect normal or accident operation.Also the additional mass of the anti-rotation device will be less thanone pound and therefore will not affect the existing dynamic analysis ofthe subject piping system.

II. No. The proposed modification also does not introduce any previouslyunanalyzed failure modes into the overall design of these valves or thesystems in which they are contained.

III. No. The proposed modification will not affect the capability of thevalve to adequately isolate within the Tech Spec defined time limits.

SER NO.: 88-079

CROSS REFERENCE: PMRs 88-9007, Rev. 0; 88-9007, Rev. 1; 88-9007, Rev. 2


This modification changes. the insulation around 14 heat traced containmentisolation solenoid and nine heat traced H 02 Analyzer solenoid valves,calibrates heat trace controllers, and connects the installed spare heat tracecircuit.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The insulation will be replaced with new insulation in accordancewith FSAR commitments. By ensuring that valve and line temperatures arewithin the design temperature range for its equipment decreased theprobability of equipment malfunction and maintain the consequences of anaccident to the previously evaluated in the FSAR.

II. No. This modification provides a change of existing insulation with areplacement insulation and brings line and equipment temperature into thedesign range and, as such, is intended to eliminate the possibility ofmultiple malfunctions different than those previously evaluated.

III. No. By brining this equipment into its design temperature operatingrange this modification supports the margin of safety described in theTechnical Specification Bases.

SER NO.: 88-080



This modification changes the Low Level Radioactive Waste Holding Facility(LLRWHF) and existing Low Pressure Turbine Rotor Stands in order toaccommodate rotor transport to the LLRWHF and rotor storage within the LLRWHF.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The LLRWHF is a subsystem of the solid waste management system(SWMS). The SWMS has no safety related functions and the LLRWHF does notcontain or interface with any safety related equipment systems,components or structures. The LLRWHF is a subsystem of the SWMS as astorage facility only and does not play a critical role in normal plantoperations.

II. No. The LLRWHF is designated as non-seismic Category I with no qualityinsurance requirements. There is no safety impact. All design conformsto the Technical Facility Description, the Safety Analysis Report and theFSAR.

III. No. The proposed modification does not affect the basis for TechnicalSpecification 3.11.3.

SER NO.: 88-081



This modification changes out miniature incandescent indicating lamps on MainControl Room Panels with long life, Light Emitting Decode (LED) typeindicating lamps.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The design of the LED-type indicating lamps and its interface withplant systems is compatible with the analysis described in FSAR Section7.5.

II. No. The proposed modification duplicates its function of the existingindicating lamps by displaying a clear on-off indication to the'perator.

III. No. No changes are being made to any plant equipment by thismodification that will affect any Technical Specification setpoints ormargins or cause'ny adverse effect on safety-related systems.

SER NO.: 88«082



The purpose of this modification is to improve the leak-tightness of theReactor Water Cleanup Containment Isolation Valve so that it is capable ofmeeting its LLRT requirements.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The performance characteristics of this replacement valve eithermeet or exceed those of the existing valve.

II. No. The operation of the replacement valve is the same as the existingvalve.

III. No. The replacement valve/existing actuator combination will meet theisolation time of Technical Specification 3/4.6.3.

SER NO.: 88«083



This .modification relocates the diesel generator building basement vent fancontrol and indication to elevation 677'ear the basement entry hatches ineach of the four diesel bays.

SUMMARY:

I. No. These fans are non quality having no safety related function.Failure of the fans will not compromise any safety related system orcomponent or prevent a safe shutdown of the plant.


III. No. The proposed modification affects non-safety related equipment notaddressed in the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-084



The proposed modification is a one-for-one replacement of the inlet EmergencyService Mater (ESW) check valves to the diesel generators.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed modification is a one-for-one replacement of theexisting check valves. System operation will remain the same. 'he newcheck valves will be designed to be more reliable than the original checkvalves.

II. No. The proposed modification makes the ESW system functionally the sameas it originally was.

III. No. The proposed modification does not effect the function and operationof any safety-related equipment.

ERR NO.: 88-085

CROSS REFERENCE: NCR 88-0084


The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the replacement of Temp-Matfibrous blanket insulation with NUKON fibrous blanket-type insulation.

SUMMARY:

I. No. NUKON fibrous blanket-type meets all the criteria of the FSAR.

II. No. The replacement of Temp-Mat fibrous blanket insulation with NUKON

fibrous blanket-type insulation does not introduce any new failure modes.

III. No. Insulation is not addressed by any Technical Specifications. Alsothis modification does not reduce the margin of safety in the followingTechnical Specification sections: ECCS (3/4.5.1 and 3/4.5.2);Suppression Chamber (3/4.5.3), Drywell Average Air Temperature(3/4.6.1.7) and Drywell Air Flow System (3/4.6.6.3).

SER NO.: 88-086



This modification adds a Non-Class IE 125V battery bank for emergencylighting. It also removes the emergency lighting from the Class 1E 125Vbatteries.

SUMMARY:-

I. No. This modification results in an increase in the margin of plantsafety by increasing the Class 1E battery capacity available for existingClass 1E loads and improves electrical isolation by removal of theNon-Class lE battery loads fed from Class lE supplies.

II. No. The new equipment for the 125V DC emergency lighting power systemwill be located in the Turbine Building and is designed to non-class lE,non-seismic standards and therefore in either design, the system cannotbe expected to operate after a design base earthquake.

III. No. This modification removes the Non-Class 1E emergency lighting loadcurrently on the Class 1E 125V batteries resulting in an increase in themargin of safety of the Class 1E batteries.

ERR NO.: 88-087



This modification changes out miniature incandescent indicating lamps on MainControl Room Panels with long-life, Light Emitting Decode (LED) typeindicating lamps.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The LED lamps are designed to provide the same functions, both tothe operator and the electrical circuits, that was previouslyaccomplished by the incandescent lamps.

II. No. The proposed modification duplicates the function of the existinglamps by displaying a clear on-off indication to the generator.

III. No. The LED lamps are designed such that there will be no damaginginteraction with the safety-related instrumentation systems to which theyare connected.

SER NO.: 88-088



This modification eliminates the duplication of alarms by removing the FireProtection System Simplex CPU originated alarms from the annunciator window onPanel OC653.

SUMMARY:

I. No. This modification will allow direct operator interface with theaudible-visual alarms on the fire protection panel CPU's without havingto acknowledge a duplicate alarm on Panel OC653. It removes anypossibility of confusion that could result through receiving simultaneousduplicate alarms.

II. No. By eliminating the interlock, operator alarm response time isdecreased while eliminating the possibility of confusion that couldresult from receiving simultaneous duplicate alarms.

III. No. This modification removes the necessity of acknowledging duplicatealarms, and ensures that potential confusion that could result fromsimultaneous duplicate alarms is avoided.

SER NO.: 88-089



The scope of this modification is to provide a total of 11 ramps/curbs in thedemineralizer room areas on Units 1 and 2.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The addition of the ramps within the Turbine Building and ControlStructures has no effect on the FSAR.

II. No. The design criteria of this modification is non-quality, non-seismicand meets all the original design inputs and codes imposed on theoriginal structure.

III. No. There are no Technical Specifications concerning the structuralrequirements for curbing in the Turbine and Control Building structures.

SER NO.: 88-090



This modification provides for an improvement of the Primary 81 and Primary i/2carrier relaying schemes for Unit 1. These two sets of independent relayingschemes detect electrical faults on the 230 KV line between the SynchronizingCircuit Breaker and the Susquehanna 230KB switchyard.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed action does not affect the plant electrical systemwhich provides normal and emergency AC power to reactor protection andengineered safety feature equipment.

II. No. the proposed action increase4s the accuracy of the carrier relayingscheme used for transmission line protection in the event of anelectrical fault on the system.

III. No. The proposed action enhances the ability of the carrier relayingscheme to allow the Unit 81 Generator to ride through an electrical faulton an adjacent transmission line.

SER NO.: 88-091

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 87-3028B, Rev. 1


This modification installs internal seals in conduits which penetrate ControlStructure fire area barriers.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The conduit sealing requirements are consistent with the methodsdescribed and committed to in the Fire Protection Review Report (FPRR)Revision 3.

II. No. Conduit sealing does not impose any changes to the performancecapability of those cables encased by the seal. Heat transfercharacteristics of the conduit sealing materials are such that cableampacity derating is not required.

III. No. Conduit sealing does not affect the design basis of the systemswhose conduits are being sealed.

SER NO.: 88-092

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 88-3019A


This modification installs fire wrap on conduits and junction boxes in theControl Structure.

r

SUMMARY:

I. No. The addition of fire wrap provides additional protection for safeshutdown circuits.

II. No. This modification does not interface with the logic, control orgeneration of any plant systems or components.

III. No. The reliability of the electrical cables to perform their requiredfunctions is not reduced.

SER NO.: 88-093

CROSS REFERENCE: PMRs 88-3020A and 88-3021A


This modification installs fire wrap on conduits and junction boxes in Unit1/Unit 2 Reactor Building.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The addition of fire wrap provides additional protection for safeshutdown circuits.

II. No. This modification does not interfere with the logic, control oroperation of any plant systems or components.

III. No. The reliability of the electrical cables to perform their requiredfunctions is not reduced.

SER NO.: 88-094

CROSS REFERENCE: SCP J-882020


This setpoint change package provides a change to the Reactor Building Steamtunnel differential temperature setpoint. This setpoint change packagerevises the setpoint to provide main steam isolation when the differentialtemperature exceeds 48 degrees F.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The existing setpoints for main steamline high differentialtemperature are not consistent with the location of the temperaturesensors in Unit 2. This setpoint steamline leakage to values which areconsistent with their present location.

II. No. This setpoint change does not change the manner in which theinstalled equipment performs its safety function; they merely change thesetpoint to values that are consistent with the existing location of theUnit 2 temperature sensors.

III. No. The lowering of the administrative setpoint increases theprobability of detection of a steam leak and is therefore in theconservative direction.

SER NO.: 88-095



This modification corrects the revised leads at the alarm module and recorderinputs for Unit 2 Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel Differential Temperaturesensor.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed modification places the subject protective function infunctional compliance with the system as described in the FSAR.

II. No. This modification merely corrects an installation error and does notchange the intended design function of the installed system.

III. No. The modification brings the system into agreement with the TechnicalSpecifications. The ability of the system to perform its design functionis not degraded.

SER NO.: 88-096



This modification corrects the reversed leads at the alarm module and recorderinputs for Unit 2 Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel Differential Temperaturesensor.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed modification places the subject protective function infunctional compliance with the system as described in the FSAR.

II. No. This modification merely corrects an installation error and does notchange the intended design function of the install'ed system.

III. No. The modification brings the system into agreement with the TechnicalSpecifications. The ability of the system to perform its design functionis not degraded.

SER NO.: 88-097



The purpose of this modification is to inspect, repair and apply structuralsteel fireproofing in several areas of the Control Structure.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The modifications will actually verify that the separation criteriarequired by the FSAR are in place.

II. No. The fireproofing system has no active function on the performance ofthe plant.

III. No. The implementation of this modification will assure compliance withthe provisions of Technical Specification Section 3/4.7.7 — Fire RatedAssemblies.

SER NO.: 88-098



The purpose of this modification is to inspect, repair and apply structuralsteel fireproofing in several areas of the Unit 1 Reactor Building.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The modifications willverify that the separation criteria requiredby the FSAR are in place.


III. No. The implementation of this modification will assure compliance withthe provisions of Technical Specification Section 3/4.7.7 — Fire RatedAssemblies.

SER NO.: 88-099



The purpose of this modification is to inspect, repair and apply structuralsteel fireproofing in several areas of the Unit 1 Reactor Building.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The modifications will verify that the separation criteria requiredby the FSAR are in place.


III. No. The implementation of this modification will assure compliance withthe provisions of Technical Specification Section 3/4.7.7 - Fire RatedAssemblies.

SER NO.: 88-100

CROSS REFERENCE: PMRs 88-3022, 88-3023 and 88-3024


Inspect, repair and apply (as necessary), structural steel fireproofing inseveral areas of the Control Structure, the Unit 1 Reactor Building and Unit 2

Reactor Building.

SUMMARY:

I. No. Fireproofing has been applied to main structural steel or steelattachments to meet the intent of FSAR Section 3.12. The proposed actionwill verify that the separation criteria required by FSAR Section 3.12exists. If it does not, fireproofing will be applied.

II. No. The fireproofing system has no active function until a firesituation develops. If this design basis event were to occur, thefireproofing will provide the required protection to the steel for aperiod of three hours. If additional fireproofing must be installed, themethod will be the same as those used successfully in the past.

III. No. The proposed actions ensure compliance with the TechnicalSpecifications and their bases.

SER NO.: 88-101



Modification to the Security Data Management System (SDMS) software whichcontrols the exit turnstiles, to make the turnstiles fail to open if a badcard or passback is detected.

SUMMARY:

No. FSAR Section 13.6 does not identify the Security Computer System asa safety system nor as a system related to safety. Implementation of theproposed action will not alter the intent of the computer based SecurityData Management System.

II. No. The proposed software change affects the Security Computer Systemwhich cannot independently control the Plant. The proposed action is anenhancement of the current ability to monitor actual or potentialsecurity violations.

III. No. The modification has no effect on any Technical Specification bases,setpoints, or margins, nor can it cause any adverse affect to any safetyrelated systems.

SER NO.: 88-102



Revise the routing of electrical detection conduit for the Pre-actionSprinkler System to eliminate interferences which occur whenever rotor repairis required on adjacent turbines in the Feed Pump rooms..

SUMMARY:

I. No. FSAR Chapters 8 & 9 have been reviewed. The proposed action revisesexisting electrical detection conduit and re-installs it in the same areaas the pre-action Sprinkler System. The termination points will notchange. The reliability and availability of the fire protection systemin this area, during feed pump rotor removal, will be increased.

II. No. The proposed action does not alter the design intent of the TurbineBuilding or its associated fire protection system. The proposedmodification reworks non-safety conduit; all work will be performed inaccordance with existing procedures.

III. No. The margin of safety is not compromised by this changed.

ERR NO.: 88-103



Reliability improvements to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) whichinclude: increased cooling of the computer cabinets, upgrading computerhardware, increased cooling capabilities of the function switch panel andinstallation of an SPDS computer terminal adjacent to the SPDS computercabinet in the upper relay room.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed action does not interact with, or affect safe shutdownsystems as defined in FSAR Section 7.4. Also, the proposed changes willnot affect any safety-related equipment or any accident postulations asanalyzed in Sections 6.0 and 15.0 of the FSAR. The proposed modificationdoes not deviate from the FSAR analysis for electrical separation(Section 3.12). In addition, the proposed modification does not degradeor reduce the function of the SPDS as analyzed in FSAR Section 18.1.17.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, the SPDS is a data acquisition systemwhich monitors selected plant parameters during an off-design oremergency condition and cannot interact with, or affect the function of,plant safety systems. Because the proposed SPDS modifications do notalter the function of the SPDS, and because the new terminal will nothave the capability to modify any SPDS displays or algorithms used fordata reduction and validation, these SPDS changes cannot be acontribution to erroneous operator response and cannot create a

* probability for a previously unanalyzed accident or malfunction.

III. No. The installation of the modification as described in Section II doesnot conflict with the basis for any technical specification. The SPDS isa data acquisition system which monitors selected plant parameters duringan off-design or emergency condition and cannot interact with, or affectthe functions of, plant safety systems. Because the proposed SPDS

modifications do not alter the function of SPDS, the proposed actions donot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technicalspecification.

SER NO.: 88-104

CROSS REFERENCE: PMRs 88-3011 A&B, 88-3012 AGB


Enhancements to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), which include:implementing the 'Drywell Spray Initiation Pressure Limit'mergency ProcedureGuideline (EPD) curve CRT display format and revising the SPDS reactor waterlevel algorithm to make the displayed value more accurate.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The SPDS design is compatible with FSAR analyses. All hardware andsoftware engineering has been performed in accordance with applicablecodes, standards, and plant design criteria. There will not be anyimpact on the plant equipment and systems to which the SPDS inputs areattached.

II. No. The installation, routing and termination of cables does not createa possibility of an accident malfunction of a different type than any

-previously evaluated in the FSAR. Only non-lE cables are being affectedwhich will be connected to non-1E terminations.

III. No. No changes are being made to any plant equipment by this design thatwill affect any Technical Specification setpoints, or margins or causeany adverse affect on safety related systems.

SER NO.: 88-105

CROSS REFERENCE: PMRs.85-3098D and 85-3097D


Installation of a control valve and several orifices in the Standby LiquidControl (SLC) system to allow pump throttling during SLC surveillance testing.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed action will install a new valve and orifices in theNon-Q portion of the SLC test line. This operation of the line isisolated from the normal system flow path by two normally closed valves.Therefore failure of the new valve would have no direct effect on systemfunction.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, the new valve is designed to preventthe generation of missiles which could affect other systems.

III. No. The margin of safety is not impacted since the modification is beinginstalled in a non-Q portion of the SLC system.

SER NO.: 88-106



Relocation of a temperature element in the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) roomto a wall mounting so it will be capable of detecting ambient temperaturerises due to steam leaks and provide redundancy.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed modification does not affect the accident analysisdiscussed in FSAR Section 15.6.4. Relocation of the temperature elementis in accordance with the element locations described in FSAR Subsection7.3.1.la.2.4.1.10.3. The sensor is being located so as to avoid area hotspots which can result in premature or spurious system isolations.

II. No. The proposed modification will allow the temperature element toperform its intended design function of monitoring ambient air in theRWCU pump rooms.

III. No. The margin of safety remains intact by this modification.

SER NO.: 88-107

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 88-3017G


Details and instruction to eliminate the remote manual control capability ofthe deluge sprinkler systems in the High Pressure Coolant Infection (HPCI) andReactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) rooms, by removing control switches inthe control room and disconnecting all associated interconnecting wiring withthe local deluge panel.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed modification ensures that a fire in the control roomdoes not result in spurious operation the HPCI and/or RCIC pump roomdeluge systems. Per FSAR Subsection 9.5.1.2.2.4 the HPCI and RCIC roomsare equipped with automatic deluge systems. The proposed action does notaffect the deluge system operation in these two rooms.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, implementation of this modificationeliminates the possibility of a system malfunction and ensures automaticand manual deluge system operation for the HPCI and RCIC rooms.

III. No. The margin of safety is not reduced since automatic operation of thedeluge system is available to the HPCI and RCIC rooms.

SER NO.: 88-108


Relocate temperature elements currently in the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU)

pump rooms to the RWCU penetration room.

SUMMARY:

No. The temperature measurement portion of the leakage detection systemis designed to detect increases in room temperature which are caused byleakage from a hot water line or steam line which then flashes to steam.The RWCU penetration room presently has a Division II ambient temperaturecircuit only. A single failure in the Division II isolation logic wouldprevent a leak in the penetration room from being detected. Moving thesubject temperature elements to the penetration room allows a leak to bedetected and isolated even with the presence of a single failure. Thismodification is in accordance with the redundant ambient temperaturecircuits requirement for the penetration room as given in FSAR Section7.3.l.la.2.4.1.10.3.

II. No. A mathematical analysis of a pipe break for the RWCU penetrationroom is given in Section 3.6A of the FSAR. There is no reference totemperature instrument location given in this section but it is assumedthat a leak is detected and the system isolated. This modificationreduces the probability that leak in the RWCU System will not beisolated. Therefdre, the proposed modification does not increase theprobability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident ofmalfunction of equipment related to safety as previously evaluated in theFSAR.

III. No. The technical specifications do not address temperature sensorlocation. The margin of safety is not reduced.

SER NO.: 88-109



Replacement of the manual actuator on Residual Heat Removal (RHR) maintenancevalves 151F060 A/B and remachining of the valve discs to reduce thepossibility of overseating.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The safety related function of these valves is to act as pressureretaining boundaries for system fluid and to remain open during and aftera seismic event so as not to prevent LPCI initiation. The proposedmodifications do not alter that function.

II. No. The proposed action has no affect on the safety-related function ofthe valves and therefore does not create a possibility for an accident ormalfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in FSAR Section15.

III. No. The proposed action has no effect on the capability valve to retainpressure or the pass flow. Therefore the margin of safety is notreduced.

SER NO.: 88-110



Installation of a non-class 1E 125V DC system to power emergency lighting.SUMMARY:

I. No. Changing the 125V DC emergency lighting alternative source from theClass 1E batteries to a non-class 1E backed 125V DC system does notcompromise the lighting systems as discussed in FSAR Section 9.5.3.3.

II. No. Installation of the emergency lighting non-class 1E 125V DC powersystem removes approximately 166 amps of load on the Class 1E 125Vbatteries. This increases plant safety by increasing the Class 1Ebattery capacity.

III. No. The proposed action removes the non-class 1E emergency lighting loadcurrently on the Class lE 125V batteries resulting in an increase in themargin of safety.

SER NO.: 88-111



Upgrading of the on-off Steam Seal Evaporator condensate makeup level controlsystem hard~are by replacing the capacitance-type level control loop with adifferential pressure-type level control loop.

SUMMARY:

I. No. FSAR Section 10.4.3.1 states that the Steam Seal System has nosafety related function. The instrument loop being modified is notsafety related and is part of a non-safety related system. Failure ofthis instrument loop is enveloped in accident analysis "Malfunction ofthe Main Turbine Gland Sealing System" (FSAR Section 15.7.1.2).

II. No. In addition to Item I above, the consequences of a failure of thedifferential pressure transmitter loop installed by the proposed changeadds no new failure mechanism which might compromise any safety relatedsystem or prevent reactor shutdown.

III. No. The margin of safety is not compromised. The proposed modificationupgrade system performance.

SER NO.: 88-112



Replacement of the existing 125V DC overcurrent device of the AK-2A-25 loadcenter breaker with a new trip device which can provide a short time pick upsetting of eight times rated current and an instant aneous trip setpoint of 30times rated.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The improved coordination of the 125V DC load center breakers withthe DC distribution panel branch circuit breakers will decease theprobability of occurrence and the consequences of an accident ormalfunction. Proper coordination ensures that an electrical fault at theload site can be isolated by the branch circuit breaker.

II. No. The proposed action does not affect, change or interfere with thelogic, control or operation of any plant system or equipment presentlysupplied by the DC load centers and distribution panels. Propercoordination of protective devices ensures availability of power for safeshutdown.

III. No. The proposed action will provide a highly reliable DC power supplysystem, ensure isolation of any electrical fault and minimize its effecton the rest of the DC system. The margin of safety is increased throughthe improved electrical circuit protection provided for safe shutdownequipment.

SER NO.: 88-113I

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 88-3017E


Installation of isolation circuitry and thermal overload bypass circuitry tothe Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Heat Exchanger Service Water Valves to assurecontrol capability during an Appendix R Path 2 shutdown.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed action assures that the thermal overload bypasscircuitry to the Control Room does not affect valve operability whenrequired to support RHR shutdown cooling with a fire in the Control Room.


III. No. The proposed action includes a continuous bypass circuit so that thevalves are in compliance with Technical Specification 3.8.4.2.1,therefore the margin of safety is not reduced.

SER NO.: 88-114

CROSS REFERENCE: PMRs 88-3040 A and B


Replacement of the Reactor Recirculation MG-Set lube oil cooler's admiraltybrass tube bundles with 316 stainless steel tube bundles.

SUMMARY:.

I. No. The new tube bundle material will lengthen the service life of thecoolers and lessen the likelihood of an MG-Set trip due to a coolerfailure. Such a failure would result in an MG-Set and recirculation pumptrip - an event evaluated in FSAR Section 15.3.1.


III. No. The proposed action increases tube life and does not reduce themargin of safety.

SER NO.: 88-115



Replacement of existing main steam supports with redesigned supports.

SUMMARY:

No. The redesigned supports will not change their design function. Theproposed change has a positive impact on safety and reliability byproviding a less damage prone support configuration while maintainingdesign function. The proposed change does not increase the probabilityof any accident previously analyzed.

II. No. " In addition to Item I, the proposed action will install a betterdesigned support - more capable of withstanding the vibratory environmentof the mainsteam system.

III. No. The margin of safety is not compromised. The redesigned supportshelp ensure they will be available during a seismic event.

SER NO.: 88-116

CROSS REFERENCE: NL-88-019, TP-115-003, TP-215-003


These procedures provide the actions for removing the Turbine Building ClosedCooling Mater (TBCCW) system from service, drain, fill,vent, and return toservice during a refueling outage. Provisions are included to provide asource of oil free, dry wait to replace the air compressors and, a source ofcooling for the Control Rod Drive (CRD) pumps.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The effected systems required to be in service are: Instrument Air,Service Air, and the CRD system. FSAR Subsections 9.3.1.1 and 9.3.1.2discuss Instrument and Service Air. Instrument air operated componentsessential for safe shutdown assume the safe position upon loss of airpressure. Service air has no safety design basis. Two temporary aircompressors will be installed during the outage. No individual orcombination of failures described in FSAR Sections 4.1 and 4.6 preventsthe CRD system from performing its primary function of reactivitycontrol.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, failure of a CRD pump would effect atmost, the one rod that could be in test mode. Reactivity control wouldnot be effected since no fuel would be loaded in the proximity of thetest rod.

III. No. Technical Specifications 3/4.9.9, 3/4.1.3.5 and 3/4.9.3 were~ ~

~reviewed. The margin of safety is not reduced.

SER NO.: 88-117

CROSS REFERENCE: NL-88-020, Procedures RE-081-034 and,RE-081-035NL-88-021


Procedures for "Determination and Inspection of Failed Fuel Rods" and"Inspection and Repair of Failed Fuel Bundles."

SUMMARY:

I. No. The inspection to be performed in accordance with the subjectprocedures are not addressed in the FSAR however, the FSAR Fuel HandlingAccident Analysis (Section 15.7.4) results are bounding for theinspection activities.

II. No. The fuel handling accident which could be postulated to occur duringthe fuel inspection is bounded by the FSAR fuel handling accident.

III. No. Fuel inspections are not discussed in the Technical Specifications.However, complying with Technical Specifications 3/4.9.4, 3/4.9.6,3/4.9.7 and 3.4.9.9 ensures that the corresponding assumptions of theFSAR Fuel Handling Accident are not violated.

SER NO.: 88-118


DESCRIPTION .OF CHANGE:

Installation of a four foot extension to the existing diesel generator "E"catwalk at the stairway location..

SUMMARY:

I. No. The catwalk and extension are designed and constructed in accordancewith Reg. Guide 1.29 (FSAR Section 3.13) and FSAR Section 3.7B forseismic loading. Designing in accordance with FSAR criteria assures thatthere is no increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequencesof a previously analyzed accident.

II. No. See Item I.III. No. Operation of diesel generation "E" is not impacted therefore, the

margin of safety is not reduced.

SER NO.: 88-119

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR M79766


Replacement of the existing Condensate Demineralizer effluent motor operatedvalve thermal overload relay heater coil with a similar heater coil whichincreases the trip range.

SUMMARY:

No. The thermal overload relay actuation valve is being increased toprevent unnecessary tripping during normal plant operation. Even ifmotor damage was increased as a result of an oversized thermal overloadfor the stated MOVs, the operation of these MOVs is not required forsafety.

II. No. The proposed action does not change the function of the overloadsand is in accordance with engineering specifications, calculations, andFSAR Subsection 8.3.1.3.13.

III. No. The margin of safety is not compromised.

SER NO.: 88-120

CROSS REFERENCE: PMRs 88-3019A, 88-3020A, 88-3030B, 88-3021A, 87-3044A and87-3044D


Raceway wrapping (Thermo-lag) for Appendix R.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The addition of the fire protective enclosures decreases theprobability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident ormalfunction of equipment related to safety, as previously evaluated inthe FSAR because of the additional protection provided for the safeshutdown circuits. Program requirements assure the structural integrityof the wrapped conduits and junction boxes and their associated supportsdue to the addition of the fire wrap material. The design ampacities ofpower cables have been derated for the respective fire protectiveenclosures and compacted to their full load currents to assure that thecables will operate within their design temperature values. Anelectrical calculation defines the wrapped derated cables, breakercoordination requirements, and procedures for derating under futuremodification programs.

By assuring that the conduits and )unction boxes structural and seismicrequirement are met and that the cable ampacity requirements are met, theprobability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident ormalfunctions of equipment related to safety, as previously evaluated inthe FSAR is not increased, but is actually decreased as a result of theadditional protection that the fire enclosures provide for the circuits.

II. No. This modification does not interfere with the logic, control oroperation of any plant systems or components. The modification increasesthe scope of the visual inspections of fire rated assemblies required,but does not impact the periodic maintenance, calibration, orsurveillance activities of the plant systems or components. Therefore,the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type thanany evaluated previously in the FSAR is not created. The addition of thefire enclosures enables safe shutdown circuits to function in the eventof a fire.

III. No. The margin of safety is not reduced because additional protection isprovided to safe shutdown circuits.

SER NO.: 88-121



Replace damaged cable on the 480V AC power supply by splicing in a new sectionof cable.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed action isolates the portion of the circuit with thecable splice in a totally enclosed metallic raceway, removing the cablesplice from the open cable tray while maintaining the minimum physicalseparation distances per FSAR Subsection 3.12.3.4.2.1d. The proposedaction provides two methods of separation. The proposed action is inaccordance with the FSAR since the cable splice is isolated.

II. No. The FSAR discusses the loss of a 250V DC charger due to cablefaults, and a fire in a single division of cable raceway due toelectrical faults considered as part f the single failure criteria statedin FSAR Section 3.12.3.2. The proposed action is bounded by theseanalyses.

III. No. The margin of safety remains intact since the proposed action willallow compliance with Technical Specification 3/4.8.2

SER NO.: 88-122



Modification of the power supply for the motor operated potentiometers (MOP)in the voltage regulator circuitry of diesel generators A, B, C and D.

SUMMARY:

I. No. A revie~ of FSAR Section 8.0 was performed. No impact was found asa result. The proposed action removes a component which serves no activefunction therefore the reliability of the MOP is not reduced.

II. No. See Item I.III. No. The proposed action does not impose a functional concern to the

diesel generators. The proposed action does not alter lhniting safetysettings of equipment required for safety therefore the margin of safetyis not reduced.

SER NO.: 88-123



The proposed modification will either physically remove, make spare, orabandon all devices from panels, Motor Control Centers (MCCs) associated withthe Residual Heat Removal System and the High Pressure Coolant InjectionSystem which were made functionally inactive by a previous modification.

SUMMARY:

I. No. Motor operated valves which are part of the HPCI steam condensingmode of RHR were previously made inoperative. They are used to re)ectcondensed water or HPCI steam to the suppression'ool. These valves willbe locked closed. Computer points for position indication will also bedeleted.

II. No. See Item I.III. No. Removal of the functionally disabled electrical control devices used

for the RHR steam condensing mode does not reduce the margin of safety.

SER NO.: 88-124

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 88-3038A/B and 88-3039 A/B


Replacement of the 90/10 Cu/Ni tubes in the Turbine Building Closed CoolingWater (TBCCW) heat exchangers with Al-6XN tubes.

SUMMARY:

I. No. FSAR Section 9.2.3 was reviewed. The proposed modification will notimpact operation of the TBCCW system or any support systems, thereforethere will not be any increase in the probability of occurrence or theconsequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment related tosafety, as previously evaluated in the FSAR.

II. No. .See Item I above.

III. No. There is no impact on operation of any system, therefore themargin'f

safety is not compromised.

SER NO.: 88-125

CROSS REFERENCE: Safety Evaluation NL-88-023, Procedure MT-GM-053


Decontamination of the Unit 2 equipment pool using a robot (Super Scavenger).

SUMMARY:

I. No. FSAR Section 9.1.2.2 specifies the normal water level over storedfuel to be approximately 23 feet. The Technical Specifications requireat least 22 feet or water be maintained over the top of irradiated fuelseated in the spent fuel storage racks. Procedure MT-GM-053 providesadequate controls to insure that at least 22 feet of water is maintainedover the top of the fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage racksduring cleaning of the Unit 2 equipment pool.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, MT-GM-053 also provides controls toinsure that the suction hose on pump used to transfer water from the fuelpool to the equipment pool is submerged in the fuel pool to a depth sixinches from the surface. Therefore the maximum level that could occurthrough the hose is six inches. This would result in a level which isgreater than the level preserved by the permanently installed siphonbreakers.

III. No. Procedure MT-GM-053 ensures that the Spent Fuel Pool level will notbe reduced below 22 feet over the top of active fuel. Therefore themargin of safety is not impacted.

SER NO.: 88-126

CROSS REFERENCE: Safety Evaluation NL-88-024


Jumping out one cell in a 60 cell, 125V DC battery bank.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The battery bank is capable of meeting all of its functionalrequirements.


III. No. The bases for Technical Specification 3/4.8.1., 2 and 3 discusseshow maintenance activities and tests ensure the operability and capacityof the battery. These criteria are not )eopardized as a result of theproposed action.

SER NO.: 88-127

CROSS REFERENCE: Procedure EO-IP-055


Implementation of procedure EP-IP-055 which crates a selective load shed ofall non-essential electrical loads within the Reactor Building.

SUMMARY:

I. No. FSAR Section 15.6.5 discussed loss of coolant accidents coupled withsevere natural environmental conditions. The proposed action representsa less severe condition than discussed in this FSAR Section. The loadsshed by EP-IP-055 do not affect any system required for safe shutdown.

II. No. The loads to be shed by the proposed action are non-essentialelectrical loads in the reactor building for the accident unit only.load shed does not affect any system required for safe shutdown asdescribed in FSAR Section 7.4.

The

III. No. The proposed action does not affect the existing TechnicalSpecifications nor does it require the need for additional TechnicalSpecifications. The margin of safety is not reduced.

SER NO.: 88-128



Provide connections to the temporary mobile Dry Active Waste (DAW) SortingFacility.

SUMMARY:

No. Electrically, power will be furnished from the S&A buildingswitchgear which is non-safety related. The electrical configurationfeeding the S&A building is such that the mainfeeder is totallyindependent from direct nuclear plant operation and as a resultsubsequent failure of any S&A building switchgear will not impact thesafe operation of Units 1 and 2. A review of the FSAR has beenperformed, specifically, Chapter 8 - Electric Power, Section 8.3, OnsitePower System. The plant PA station installed within the DAW facilitysatisfies the requirements of FSAR section 9.5.2.2.1 for the EmergencyEvacuation Alarm syst: em.

Mechanically, a fire protection connection will be furnished from theRadwaste Building and designed to provide sufficient demand of water forsprinkling systems inside the temporary passageway and the DAW trailer.The extension of the fire protection line does not degrade the, existingfire protection system as described in FSAR, Section 9.5.1.

Civil/Architecturally, a 6 inch penetration will be installed in thenorth wall of the Radwaste Building. The in'stallation of the penetrqtionwill not structurally degrade the Radwaste Building..'he location ofthis penetration is totally independent of, and will have no impact on,any safety related structure. Once the fire protection piping isinstalled, the penetration will be sealed such that the buildingenvironment will be maintained.

The enclosed passageway will be located on the north side of the northwall of the Radwaste Building. The enclosure will not be attached andtotally independent from any site structures. This temporaryself-supporting structure will be designed to withstand wind loading perFSAR chapter 3, Subsection 3.3.1 "Wind Loadings". This type of structureis not required to be designed for tornado loads per the FSAR subsection3.3.2. However, any portion of the structure which could fail during atornado has been evaluated to have no effect on any safety relatedequipment or structures as defined in subsection 3.3.2.3 "Effect ofFailure of Structures or Components Not Designed for Tornado Loads".

No. See Item I above.

No. The proposed modification involves non-safety related systems andstructures serving non-safety related functions. By review of theappropriate Technical Specifications, it has been determined that theproposed modification does not affect the Technical Specification or themargin of safety provided in the bases for the Technical Specification.

SER NO.: 88-129

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 87-3044 A/B


Replacement of the Unit 2 Offgas Recombiner Vessel with a new vessel made ofupgraded material, improved heat tracing and other system improvements.

SUMMARY:

I. No. FSAR Section 15.7.1 evaluates a failure of the Offgas System due toa system boundary rupture. The proposed replacement will reduce thesusceptibility of the vessel to cracking, improve the system's resistanceto failure and decrease the probability of failure.


III. No. The new vessel will perform the same function as the current vesselin meeting Technical Specification requirements. Its enhanced designwill increase the margin of safety by reducing its susceptibility tocracking.

SER NO.: 88-130


DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:.

Replacement of the con trol switch for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) HeatExchanger shell side bypass valves. Removal of the ten minute time delay onthe heat exchanger bypass valve. Consolidation of the Containment Spray Valveinitiation permissive switches and the Containment Spray Valve LOCA isolationmanual override switches.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed modification does not change the automatic safetyfunction of the system. The use of a maintained contact switch for thehea't exchanger bypass valves will relieve the operator to allow him toperform other reactions.

The consolidation of the Containment Spray Valve Initiation Permissiveand Containment Spray valve LOCA Isolation Manual Override switches willsimplify the actions necessary for the operators to respond to.anabnormal event. A design review of the control logic and review of theassociated operating procedures directing the use of these switches wasperformed. It was determined that the interlock with the injection valveserved no function and is therefore being removed by this modification.The removal of this interlock does not affect normal operation of thevalves.

This modification also provides LOCA signal override control for the heatexchanger bypass valve. This capability will allow the operator tooverride a LOCA signal and throttle closed the bypass valve.

The present design provides a time-delay to remove the LOCA signalinterlock after 10 minutes and allow the operator to manually throttleclosed the heat exchanger bypass valve. With the'added capability of theLOCA signal override added by this modification, the function of the timedelay no longer serves any purpose and will be deleted. A review of FSARchapters 6, 7 and 15 provided no design requirement for the time delay.However, a FSAR change will be submitted to reflect the reviseddescription of the system operation.


III. No. The margin of safety is not reduced since the automatic function ofthe heat exchanger bypass valves is not changed. In fact themargin-of-safety is, if anything, increased by allowing suppression poolcooling to be initiated earlier to maintain a lower suppression pooltemperature.

SER NO.: 88-131



Permanent wall penetrations into the Reactor Building from the east side to.accommodate temporary services required during outages.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed modification will conform to all appropriate designrequirements specified in FSAR Sections 3.3 thru 3.8 and will not affectthe Reactor Building in any adverse manner. Per FSAR Section 9.4.1.2.3,secondary containment isolation is a safety related function of theReactor Building HVAC. This function remains intact as the penetrationwill be sealed.


III. No. Technical Specification 3/4.6.5 discusses secondary containmentintegrity. The proposed modification will comply with the TechnicalSpecifications.

SER NO.: 88-132

.CROSS REFERENCE: Safety Evaluation NL-88-027, TP-243-005


Modify the condenser tube leak test to allow SF to be injected into thecirculating water system.

S SENARY:

I. No. The likelihood of an event listed in FSAR Table 11.3-6 or an eventlisted in FSAR Section 15.7.1.1.1 will not be increased by the proposedchange.

II. No. The breakdown products of SF6 (Sulfate and Fluorine) could create anenvironment susceptible to stress corrosion cracking of the recombinervessel. However the maximum concentration of SF6 that would reach therecombiner vessel is much lower than the limit set by the vendor.

III. No. The design of the Offgas Treatment System as discussed in TechnicalSpecification 3.11.2.6 is not impacted.

SER NO.: 88-133



Relocate the Division I Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) Equipment roomtemperature switch from its original location to a location 18 feet south, onthe same wall.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The switch is mounted in accordance with Seismic Category Irequirements and its relocation will not alter the design or performancerequirements of the system per FSAR Sections 7.3.1 and 9.4.1. Division Icomponents are required for fire protection safe shutdown Paths 1 and 2.Therefore this modification ensures compliance with our commitments to10CFR50 Appendix R.

II. No. The modification is in accordance with existing design criteria anddoes not impact system function. Appendix R compliance, seismicintegrity and other design criteria are met.

III. No. Technical Specifications 3/4.3.7.8, 3/4.6.5.3, 3/4.7.2, 3/4.8.3.1and 3/4.8.3.2 were reviewed. The 'margin safety has not been compromised.

SER NO.: 88-13S

CROSS REFERENCE:( PMR 88-3018E


Installation of isolation circuitry and thermal overload bypass circuitry toResidual Heat Removal (RHR) Heat Exchanger valves to assure control capabilityat the Remote Shutdown Panel during a fire.S SENARY:

I. No. During normal operation and Design Basis Accident (DBA) conditions,the auxiliary relay associated with the isolation circuitry is in thefail safe de-energized position. The relay contacts associated with thethermal overload bypass are also in the fail safe position. Energizationof the relays is only required to perform safe shutdowns with a controlroom fire.

II. No. The proposed modification assures that the valves are not madeinoperable by a fire in the Control Room, therefore the analysis in FSARSection 7.4.14 remains valid.

III. No. The proposed modification includes installation of thermal overloadprotection. Per Technical Specification 3.8.4.2.1 continuous bypasscircuitry has also been installed. Therefore the margin of safetyremains intact.

SER NO.: 88-135

CROSS REFERENCE: 88-9024


Relocation of four (4) temperature elements utilized to monitor ReactorBuilding steamline tunnel supply (low) temperature from their existinglocation in the recirculation plenum to the main steamline tunnel supply ductin the Reactor Building Zone II HVAC system.

SUMMARY:

I. No. FSAR Section 15.6.4 discusses a main steamline break downstream ofthe outboard Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) and subsequent MSIVclosure. The proposed modification has no effect this analysis. Therelocation of the supply temperature sensors is in accordance with thelocations described in FSAR Subsection 7.3.l.la.2.4.1.3 and meets theredundancy requirements of FSAR Subsection 7.3.1.1a.2.4.1.3.5.

II. No. The proposed modification does not change the method in which theinstrument performs its safety function. The new location for the supplytemperature elements allows temperature sensing by these four devices ina common flow path for supply aid to the Reactor Building steamlinetunnel without running either recirculation plenum fan.

III. No. Technical Speci'fications 3/4.3.2 was reviewed. The margin of safetyis not reduced by the proposed modification.

SER NO.: 88-136



Installation of an inlet isolation valve and a tank bypass on the ChemicalWaste Tank.

SUMMARY:

I. No. FSAR Sections 11.2, 15.7.2 and 15.7.3 have been reviewed. Pipingdetails are not specifically discussed. The proposed modification doesnot impact any station design features that are used in radioactiverelease analysis for postulated radwaste system failures. The LiquidRadwaste System is relied on solely for normal plant operation and not tomitigate any transient or accidents described in the FSAR.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, the proposed modification does'notalter the function or design intent of the Liquid Radwaste System.

III. No. The bases for Technical Specification 3/4.11.1 have been reviewed.The proposed modification will not reduce the margin of safety describedtherein.

SER NO.: 88-137

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 88-3017A


Isolation of the Emergency Switchgear Room Cooling Fan (B) from its existingcontrol circuitry and control power fuse. Automatic fan operation isinitiated through a new dual setpoint temperature switch powered from a second(redundant) control power fuse.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed modification provides for the automatic start of thesafety related fan should the existing control circuit for the fan becomedisabled due to a fire. The existing system functions are retained fornormal operation. FSAR Section 9.4.2.2.2 provides a discussion of theemergency switchgear ventilation system. The proposed modification doesnot alter the design or performance requirements of the present system.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, the proposed modification is inaccordance with existing design criteria for the system and does notadversely affect the systems function. The failure modes identified inFSAR Section .9.4, Table 9.4-5 are not impacted.

III.'o. The Emergency Switchgear and Load Center Room cooling system isrequired to support the operation and availability of the Onsite PowerDistribution system as discussed in Technical Specification. The marginof safety is not reduced by the proposed modification.

SER NO.: 88-138

CROSS REFERENCE: SCP E88-2031


Replace existing Cutler Hammer standard trip eutectic alloy, thermal overloadrelay heater coal in the Reactor Feed Pump Turbine valves with a similarheater coil. This replacement increases the trip range of the overload relay.

SUMMARY:

No. The thermal overload relay actuation value is being increased toprevent overloads from unnecessary tripping during normal valveoperation. The increased actuation value has been evaluated anddetermined not to significantly increase the possibility of motorfailure. If motor damage does occur, the operation of these valves isnot required for any safety related valves.

No. In addition to Item I above, the proposed action does not change thefunction of the overloads and is in accordance with engineeringspecifications, calculations and FSAR Subsection 8.3.1.3.13.

III. No. Selection of overload relay coils is not discussed in the bases for~ ~

any Technical Specification.

SER NO.: 88-139



Relocate the existing Control Structure Chilled Water flow transmitter and itsfive valve manifold to a new location 13 feet north on the same wall andelevation.

S SENARY:

I. No. The transmitter will be mounted per Seismic Category I requirements.FSAR Subsections 7.3.1.1b.8.5.7 and 9.2.12 were reviewed for impact. Theproposed modification does not alter the present design or performancerequirements of the system.

II. No. The proposed action is in accordance with existing design criteriafor the system and does not adversely affect system function.

III. No. The proposed modification will,not compromise the margin of safety.

SER NO.: 88-140

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 88-3018C


Installation of emergency lighting fixtures in Unit 2 to comply with AppendixR. These lighting units consist of a battery unit which supplies eight hoursof power to a maximum of three sealed beam incandescent lamps. The lightswill be installed in the Reactor and Turbine Buildings.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The addition of emergency lighting units do not affect safetyrelated systems or equipment. The units will be installed usingseismically designed supports. Diesel generator loadings have beenanalyzed and the emergency lighting units added by this modification areacceptable. The proposed modification does not interfere with the logic,control, or operation of any safety related plant system or components.


III. No. The modification does not interfere with the logic, control oroperation of any safety related plant system or component. Voltage dropsand load ampacity are within design limits. The margin of safety is notreduced.

SER NO.: SS-141

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 88»3055 I


Replacement of existing RHR Panel inserts in Control Room panel 1C601 with newinserts. This replacement is the result of removing the steam condensing modefrom the Residual Heat Removal System.

SUMMARY:

I. No. Rearrangement of the panel inserts does not alter the designfunction of those controls which are being relocated. FSAR Section 7.5describes the control room panels however the panel insert layouts arenot discussed. The new inserts are designed to the same standards andrequirements as the present inserts.

II. No. The function and installation criteria of the switches andindicators remain unaffected. Rearrangement of the panel layout is inaccordance with human factors engineering guidelines to ensure thatclarity is maximized and available space is fully utilized.

III. No. The control room panel arrangement is not discussed in the basis forany Technical Specification.

SER NO.: 88-142

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 87»9165


Installation of an alternate charging connection location (Division I) tosupport Containment Instrument Gas (CIG) storage requirements (3 days) and toimprove system reliability by increasing the design pressure for the highpressure piping for both Divisions I and II from 2200 psig to 2500 psig.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The new charging connection ensures that an accessible location forcharging will be available in the event of a .LOCA and during post LOCAconditions. The upgrade to 2500 psig is to prevent unnecessary N2release caused by the relief valve being set to close to normal operatingpressure of 2200 psig. The original safety relief valve design settingof 2500 psig will not be exceeded, system operating conditions remainunchanged, and system components were analyzed and evaluated for thehigher pressure.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, the system will continue to operate perFSAR Section 9.3.1.5.1.

III. No. Technical Specification 4.5.1.d.2.c requires channel calibration forthe CIG low pressure alarm. The proposed modification does not impactthis Specification. The margin of safety is not reduced.

SER NO.: 88-143

CROSS REFERENCE: PMRs 87-9174 and 87-9175~

~

0DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Replacement of moisture drain traps on the Containment Instrument Gas (CIG)compressor with collection tanks.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The CIG compressor drain traps are in the non-safety related portionof the CIG system. The proposed modification will not alter the designcriteria of the system but will increase reliability. The proposedmodification will improve the overall operation of the compressors.

II. No. The portion of the CIG system being modified is non-safety relatedper FSAR Section 3.2.2. The new drain collection tanks will ensureavailability and operability of the compressors.

III. No. Technical Specification 4.5.1.d.2.c requires channel calibration forthe CIG low pressure alarm. The proposed modification will not impactthis Specification. The margin of safety is not reduced.

ERR NO.: 88-144



Install permanent flow integrating counters to measure flow totalization onthe discharge side of both Liquid Radwaste (LRW) filters and on the suctionside of the LRW demineralizer.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed modification will provide reliable instrument loops tosupport operations with respect to both process control and visualawareness of flow totalization involving LRW filter and demineralizeroperation. FSAR Chapter 11 was reviewed. The proposed modification willnot increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accidentpreviously evaluated.

II. No. Item I above.

III. No. Technical Specification 3/4.3 was reviewed. The margin of safety isnot reduced.

SER NO.: 88-145

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 88-3017H


Reroute Residual Heat Removal (RHR) valve controls associated with Head Sprayto bypass the Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP).

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed action will not affect components and cables requiredfor Path 1 safe shutdown. This assures that in the event of a fire inthe RSP, the RHR system is capable of performing its safe shutdownfunctions from the Control Room as described in FSAR Section 7.4. Theproposed modification eliminates the possibility of a fire in the RPS

from affecting the Division I RHR system.

II. No. FSAR Sections 5.4, 6.3, 7.4 and Chapter 15 have been reviewed.Based on the discussion in I above, the proposed action does not create apossibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than anyevaluated previously.

III. No. The proposed modification does not reduce the margin of safety foroperation of the RHR system as defined in Technical Specification3/4.4.9.

SER NO.: 88-146



Installation of a pressure tap on the minimum flow bypass line off the ControlRod Drive (CRD) pumps.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed modification does not alter the function of the CRD

hydraulic system as defined in FSAR Subsection 4.6.1.1.2.4. The proposedaction impacts only the .non-Q portion of the CRD system.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, the modification in no way alters theCRD system function.

III. No. The CRD pump minimum flow bypass lines are not safety related andare not the basis for any Technical Specifications.

SER NO.: 88-147



Upgrading gauges (including their tubing and mounting supports) on theContainment Instrument Gas (CIG) system from non-Q to Q.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The CIG system discussed in FSAR Subsection 9.3.1.5 sates that theemergency backup nitrogen storage system is safety related therefore theproposed action is in accordance with this statement. The upgrading ofthe gauges does not affect the containment instrument gas designparameters discussed in FSAR Table 9.3-8, Chapter 6 or Chapter 15.

II. No. The indicators will be dynamically tested to withstand a dynamicevent. Flexible instrument supports will be replaced with rigid ones.

III. No. The proposed modification provides assurance against loss of the CIGbottles during a dynamic event. Therefore the margin of safety for ADSoperation is improved.

SER NO.: 88-148



Installation of service connections to the temporary, Mobile Dry Active WasteSorting Facility.

SUMMARY:

No. Power will be provided from the S&A building switchgear which isnon-safety related. A fire protection connection will be provided fromthe Radwaste Building, designed to provide sufficient demand of water forsprinkling systems inside the temporary passageway and the Dry ActiveWaste trailer. A six inch penetration will be installed in the northwall of the Radwaste Building. Appropriate sections of the FSAR havebeen reviewed and it has been determined that there will not be anincrease in the probability or consequences of a previously analyzedaccident.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, the installation of all work related tothe proposed modifications shall be performed in accordance with nationalcodes and standards. Any equipment/structures installed as a result ofthe proposed modifications will not affect existing safety relatedqualified equipment.

III. No. The proposed modifications involve non-safety related systems andstructures serving non-safety related functions. A review of theappropriate Technical Specifications resulted in the determination thatthe margins of safety have not been reduced.

ERR NO.: 88-149



Installation of a shut off/isolation valve in the condensate supply to thesuppression pool fillline the "B" loop of core spray. Vent valves will alsobe added downstream of the new shut off/isolation valve and on the 2"condensate supply to the injection lines.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The core spray keepfill is a branch of the condensate transfersystem which has no safety related function, per FSAR Section 10.4.7.The failure mechanism for the new valves is the advertent opening of oneof the valves. This potential for human error exists elsewhere andadministrative controls protect against incorrect positioning of thevalves. The new valves will normally be locked open and if inadvertentlyclosed, will only provide a third level of isolation for the suppressionpool fillline.

II. No. These valves will not affect the operation of any safety relatedsystems since the function and valve alignment of the existing condensatesupply to the core spray system is unchanged. Potential failuremechanisms have been previously evaluated in FSAR Subsection 6.3.2,9.

III. No. The condensate supply to the core spray keepfill system and theaddition of the shutoff and vent valves serve no safety functions and arenot addressed in the Technical Specifications.

SER NO.:. 88-150



Modifications to the plant PA system located in the diesel generator bays.This includes relocating PA stations from one wall to another, upgrading thehandset stations and installing additional speakers.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The PA system is not safety related and does not perform a safetyfunction. The proposed modifications will make the system more effectiveduring normal day to day activities and during operation of the dieselgenerators.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, FSAR Chapters 9 and 15 were reviewedand it has been determined that they are not impacted by the proposedmodifications.

III. No. The PA system is not addressed in the plant Technical Specification.~ ~

ERR NO.: 88-181


I DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Modification of the closing logic for the main steam to steam )et air ejectorisolation valve.

SUMMARY:

I. No. FSAR Section 10.4.2 was reviewed and it was found that it is notimpacted by the proposed change. The proposed modification will notimpose a functional concern to any system used to mitigate transients oraccidents described/analyzed in FSAR Chapter 15.


III. No. The margin of safety is not impacted as a result of thismodification.

SER NO.: 88-152



Relocation of the Control Structure Chilled Water Flow Transmitter and itsfive-valve manifold from their present position to a new location 13 feetnorth on the same wall 'at the original elevation.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The transmitter will be mounted per Seismic Category I requirements.The proposed modification does not alter the present basis, design orperformance requirements of the system as described in FSAR Subsections7.3.1.1b.8.5.7 and 9.2.12.

II. No. The proposed modification does not impact operation of the ControlStructure Chilled Water System or change the operator's interface withthe system. The proposed modification assures system operation asdescribed in the FSAR.

III. No. Technical Specifications 3/4.8.3.1 and 3/4.8.3.2 were reviewed. Themargin of safety is not reduced.

ERR NO.: 88-153

CROSS REFERENCE: PMRs 88-3016M, 88-3016, 88-3016J, 88-3016K and 88-3016L

0 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE:

Modify the control room panel for diesel generators so that both sides of thecontrol room circuits are isolated when transferring diesel control from thecontrol room to the local panel. The panel will be modified by using selectorswitch contacts and normally open contacts of auxiliary relays actuated bylocal-remote selector switch action.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed action will result in complete isolation of the controlroom circuits. Thus protecting the local panels from the effects offire-induced short circuits or short-to-ground in the remote components.The control circuit logic is not altered.

II. No. In addition to Item I above, the use of additional contacts toisolate the unprotected ends of the remote control circuits will notcreate the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different typethan any evaluated previously in the FSAR (Subsection 8.3.1.4.12).

III. No. The margin of safety as defined in Technical Specification 3/4.8.1,is increased by the proposed action.

SER NO.: 88-154~

~CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 87-9191


Installation of a new 8" globe valve in the fire protection system test lineto allow flow tests to be performed without causing damage to the FireProtection system boundary valve.

SUMMARY:

I. No. Per FSAR Section 9.5.1.1.19, the fire protection system has nosafety-related function. The proposed modification does not affect anysafety-related equipment.

II. No. See Item.I above.

III. No. Technical Specification 3/4.7.6 was reviewed. The margin of safetyis not reduced.

SER NO.: 88-155



Replacement of the CRD pumps minimum flow bypass orifices with capillary tubepressure reducers.

SUMMARY:

I. No. FSAR Subsection 4.6.1.1.2.4 was reviewed. The proposed replacementwill not alter in any way the function of the Control Rod Drive hydraulicsystem. The new pressure reducers have a lower erosion rate than theexisting flow orifices and therefore reduce the probability of a pipebreak.


III. No. The Technical Specifications do not address the CRD pump minimumflow bypass lines.

SER NO.: 88-156



Installation of spare auxiliary Blowdown Tanks.

SUMMARY:

I. No.- The proposed installation does not impact any station designfeatures. The tanks neither connect to or interface with any plantsystem.


III. No. See Item I above.

SER NO.: 88-157



Modifications to seismically qualify the Drywell Sump Level Sensing System andcorrect Operational and Health Physic's concerns associated with the sumps.The activities include: performing engineering analyses, replacing rackssupporting level transmitters with seismic racks and modifying the alternatingpump logic+

SUMMARY:

I. No. The Drywell Leakage Detection System is a non-safety system and isnot required to operate following an accident. The systems'ability tomeasure unidentified drywell leakage as discussed in FSAR Subsection5.2.5.1.2.4, will not be affected by the proposed modification.

II. No. The proposed action enhances the system's operating performance byreducing the frequency of check valve related pump-out failures andensuring that the level sensors remain functional following an OBE.

III. No. The function of the Drywell Leakage Detection System described inTechnical Specification 3/4.4.3 is not impacted by the proposed action.

SER NO.: 88-158

~ CROSS REFERENCE: PMRs 88-9034 and 88-9035


Increase the maximum allowable pressure of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)Pump motor oil coolers from 100 psi to'00 psi.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The oil coolers are required for the RHR pumps to perform theirintended safety function and to contain Emergency Service Water (ESW)which is the coolant. No changes are being made to the cooler itself.The cooling coil design, tubing and fitting selections, fabricationtechniques, etc., are consistent with operating up to 200 psi. FSARSections 3.2, 5.47, 6.3.2.2 and 9.2.5 were reviewed and found notapplicable.

II. No. The proposed modification does not alter any plant equipment oroperating practices. In reviewing FSAR Sections 3.2, 5.4.7, 6.3.2.2 and9.2.5 it was concluded that the proposed action does not create apossibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than anyevaluated previously.

III. No. The Technical Specifications do not apply to design details of themotor oil coolers. The margin of safety is not reduced.

SER NO.: 88-159

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 88-3016B


Installation of directional nozzles in the vicinity of the Control StructureChiller Emergency Service Water (ESW) valve.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The proposed action decreases the probability of occurrence or theconsequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment related to safetybecause of the additional fire protection provided for redundant safeshutdown equipment located within the same fire zone.

II. No. The additional water spray nozzles are supplied by a pre-actionsprinkler system as discussed in FSAR Section 9.5.1.2.3. There is nowater in the system during normal plant operation. The concern of waterspray from pipe rupture or leakage cracks onto equipment required forsafe shutdown identified in FSAR Section 3.6 is not applicable since thepiping does not contain pressurized water.

III. No. The margin of safety is increased since additional protection isprovided for safe shutdown equipment.

SER NO.: 88-160

CROSS REFERENCE: PMR 88-3016E


Installation of heat shield wall between the Division I Motor Control Centerand the Division II Control Panel.

SUMMARY:

I. No. FSAR Section 3.12.3.2 indictees that the function performed byelectrical systems and equipment related to safety should not be disableddue to a single design basis event. Installing a heat shield walleliminates direct consequences of a single design basis fire.

. II. No. In addition to Item I above, the wall will be designed as a CategoryI structure. The wall will not be connected to any plant operationalsystem therefore, there is no possibility to create an accident ormalfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously.

III. No. The margin of safety is not reduced. The proposed action eliminatesthe possibility of having the direct effects of a design basis fire fromdisabling both trains of systems such as CREOASS and SGTS.

SER NO.: 88-161



Utilize fittings on the Reactor Cavity Seal hose connections that provide aleak-tight, torque-free connection. the proposed action will also use lessfittings to reduce the number of threaded joints, thereby decreasing thepotential for leakage.

SUMMARY:

I. 'o. FSAR Section 9.1.2.2 discusses the unlikely event that the fuel poolgates fail to contain the pool water. FSAR Appendix 9A discusses theloss of fuel pool cooling and subsequent boiling in the pool. Theproposed action will not affect these analyses.


III. No. The Technical Specifications do not specifically address or providerequirements for the reactor cavity seals. The margin of safety is notcompromised.

SER NO.: 88-162

CROSS REFERENCE: NL-88-028, TP-211-005


Installation of a temporary spool piece between the discharge of Service Waterheat exchanger 2E111A and its isolation valve, and install a temporary 8 inchtemperature control valve.

SUMMARY:

I. No. The temporary spool piece is schedule 40 carbon steel pipe. The newtemperature control valve is smaller than the existing valve but systemperformance will not be affected since during the winter months thecontrol valve is controlling at nearly a full closed position. Thesmaller valve will control in a band where it is open slightly more thanthe permanent valve. In the summer months it will be nearly full open.The bypass is hard piped and consists of similar material as the originalpiping system.


III. No. Technical Specifications are not affected by this installation.

Documents

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