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Final Report, Phase One, Emergency Preparedness for the IASC
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Final ReportEmergency Preparedness Financing and Practice
Jan Kellett
www.devinit.org
June 2012
Final Report: Emergency Preparedness Financing and Practice
www.devinit.org
Final ReportEmergency Preparedness Financing and
Practice
August 2012
Development Initiatives
Keward Court, Jocelyn Drive
Wells, Somerset, BA5 1DB
United Kingdom
This study has been funded by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) on behalf of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Task Team on Funding for Preparedness.
The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed are the responsibility of the authors and not those of the donor or Development Initiatives. For comments or suggestions please contact [email protected]
Special thank to Dan Sparks at Development Initiatives for his work in preparing the data for this report, and his analysis of that data.
www.devinit.org
www.devinit.org
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ContentsIntroduction.......................................................................................................................................4
Revisiting the Key Elements of the Synthesis Report:....................................................................4
Tracking Financing for Preparedness.................................................................................................7
Trends Before Tracking: The Latest DAC data................................................................................7
Emergency Preparedness: Tracking the latest data.....................................................................10
Tracking DRR and resilience– Further attempts to reduce risk....................................................12
Policy and Practice...........................................................................................................................15
Resilience.....................................................................................................................................15
The Donors..................................................................................................................................16
Institutions and the System.........................................................................................................18
The Financing Architecture..........................................................................................................20
Conclusions and Further Recommendations...................................................................................23
Overall Status..............................................................................................................................23
Recommendations:......................................................................................................................23
ANNEXES..........................................................................................................................................25
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IntroductionIn 2011 the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) on behalf of the Inter-Agency Steering Committee (IASC) asked Development Initiatives (DI) to undertake an examination of the current financing of emergency preparedness as well as the structures that promote or hinder that financing. Its task was also to highlight the challenges and opportunities that exist in the current humanitarian system and make recommendations for change, especially with regard to the financing architecture.
The results of this work were brought together in a synthesis report released by DI and FAO in December 2011, with subsequent launches of the work in Geneva, New York and Rome1.
This current report – Emergency Preparedness Financing and Practice – brings together a yearlong tracking of preparedness financing in key humanitarian contexts and puts it in context of the current practice and policy debate on preparedness, and asks if progress has been made.
Revisiting the Key Elements of the Synthesis Report: The Definition
A working definition of emergency preparedness was developed with key stakeholders. This was based on the ISDR definition of disaster preparedness but widened to include conflict and other contexts, whilst also ensuring there was a foundation for the development of a tracking methodology beyond current existing database code limitations.
“The aim of emergency preparedness is to strengthen local, national and global capacity to minimise loss of life and livelihoods, to ensure effective response, to enable rapid recovery and increase resilience to all hazards (including conflict and epidemics).
This entails readiness measures (risk assessment, contingency planning, stockpiling of equipment and supplies, training, community drills and exercises) and institutional preparedness (coordination arrangements, early warning systems, public education) supported by legal and budgetary frameworks. ”
1 This report can be found at http://www.devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/Emergency-Preparedness-Study-Final-Synthesis-Report-Development-Initiatives-for-FAO-on-behalf-of-the-IASC.pdf
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Figure 1: Concentric circles denoting connections between the various elements of DRR, resilience, emergency preparedness etc.2
As an additional outcome to the initial discussions on definitions and one that also fed into the final phases of the same discussion, Development Initiatives also developed this infographic to help highlight how various elements of risk reduction and management fit together.
The Core Tensions
In developing this work four key and perhaps unsurprising issues were identified as tensions affecting the drive for improved engagement with and financing for emergency preparedness:
The need to include conflict and disaster preparedness at the same time. The contrast between preparedness for the system and national capacity development. Short-term perspectives and longer-term risk reduction. The manner in which preparedness straddles the divide between humanitarian and
development aid (a divide replicated across donor, agency and financing mechanism structures) and often falls into the gap between them.
The Main Findings of Synthesis Report
Completed in December 2011, the synthesis report was the main deliverable of the entire project and its main findings were as follows:
There has been renewed and increasing emphasis on the importance of preparedness, especially when set against the seemingly continual growth in humanitarian expenditure year on year. Preparedness is seen as potentially transformative.
Disaster preparedness expenditures have been very low, with less than 62 cents on it out of every US$100 of humanitarian funding in crisis-affected countries. Wider emergency preparedness expenditures (tracked for Jan-Sept 2011) showed similar low volumes.
The available financing mechanisms are not geared towards preparedness, and the volumes of preparedness funding through them is at best minimal.
2 This figure has been created by the authors to provide an idea of how the various areas within DRR, preparedness and climate change fit together. It is not meant to be a definitive examination of the connections but intended rather to provide a visual guide to how elements may interrelate.
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There are lessons to be learnt in how to engage the international community and attract funding, such as how many Humanitarian Country Team’s use the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and the particular success of the Nepal Consortium.
For donors, policy and funding linked to preparedness (if they exist) are based first and foremost on natural disasters as part of a long-term DRR strategy. Although much of humanitarian funding is actually responding to conflict donor policy in this area is usually less coherent and comprehensive.
In investigating financing options it was clear that the creation of a single financing mechanism for preparedness at global level would probably be considerably problematic and may not prove the solution it would purport to be.
The Key Recommendations from the first phase:
As a result of the analysis undertaken and described above, the study team developed specific recommendations for change, especially with regards to the financing architecture3.
The Enabling Environment:
Work with donors via forums such as the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) group and the G20 to address the issue of bifurcated aid architecture and especially its impact on funding.
Develop working partnerships with key actors working in the same environment as ‘humanitarians’, including the development community, peacekeepers, private sector etc. Develop an understanding of how emergency preparedness fits with other processes such as peacebuilding and transition.
The Risk Context:
• Undertake comprehensive risk analyses which address multi-hazards including conflict, and which will ensure emergency preparedness financing is needs driven.
• Explore exactly what is meant by conflict preparedness and how it relates to disaster preparedness, both short and long term.
• Evaluate the need for further cost benefit analysis specifically related to preparedness, that can make the case clearly. This should be based on a common understanding of all risks, highlighting strategies to reduce those risks. Disseminate existing cost benefit analyses and ensure they reach senior decision makers.
Financing:
• Increase preparedness financing using existing pooled funds that already channel money to preparedness and adapt them to fit.
• Explore in detail the value-added feasibility of a creating a new vertical fund dedicated to emergency preparedness.
• Consider setting aside funds for specific preparedness projects within existing funding mechanisms.
• Use the CAP to fund preparedness strategically. Include preparedness in guidance notes, and track investment in preparedness through a marker.
Leadership and Role Clarification
• Work to reduce duplication and promote global coordination by identifying global leads that work to an overarching risk reduction framework linked to different funding streams.
Extend and adapt the country-based model:
• Investigate the possibilities of adapting the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium model of integrated preparedness and DRR to fit other country contexts.
3 A more complete set of recommendations are available in the final section of the full synthesis report.
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Reporting:
• Work with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) to improve reporting of preparedness of all kinds by establishing coherent coding.
• All actors to greatly improve the transparency of all preparedness expenditures.
Tracking Financing for PreparednessIn 2011 and 2012 DI has been tracking expenditures in preparedness in a set of ten key countries, a representative group with differing contexts and profiles, differing in the type of crisis, scale of humanitarian response, the use of appeals, the preponderance of funding via financial mechanisms and geographical spread4.
Trends Before Tracking: The Latest DAC dataThe latest data released by OECD DAC reconfirms our analysis from the synopsis report: disaster prevention and preparedness has not been a major priority for donors. Whilst overall volumes have increased over the last five years, reaching close to US$500 million in both 2009 and 2010, the proportion has never reached 5% of the total humanitarian assistance5. Over this period 2006 to 2010 only five of the 23 DAC donors spent more than 5% on disaster prevention and preparedness (Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Spain) and only two of those spent 10% (Japan and Korea.)6 However on a more positive note more donors are reporting at least some expenditure in disaster prevention on preparedness, 20 of 23 in 2010 compared with only 10 in 2006.
4 See the annex for more details on the rationale for countries chosen.5 Additionally this seeming sudden growth in expenditure may also be inflated by the fact that the code for disaster prevention and preparedness was only introduced in 2004 and reporting quality has taken time to improve to current levels.6 Note that figures for DAC in this report are slightly different from those of the synthesis report completed in December 2011 as all projects have been recalculated using constant 2010 prices rather than 2009. Additionally the World Bank started reporting to disaster prevention and preparedness for the first time and has retrospectively added expenditures in years previous to 2010.
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Over the full five years there was US$1.5 billion spent on disaster prevention and preparedness. This is however a very small amount when compared to total humanitarian assistance however, just 2.9% of US$51.8 billion.
the agreed upon definition for this study.
The top recipients of disaster prevention and preparedness over the five years 2006 to 2010 are largely countries that suffer from regular floods, cyclones and the occasional earthquake. Ethiopia stands out from the rest, being one of the few that suffers regularly from drought and the only country from sub-Saharan Africa. In fact out of the top 20 recipients of disaster prevention and preparedness, only three are from sub-Saharan African, Ethiopia ranked 8th, Uganda, 15th and Niger 20th. This is despite the many droughts that affect many sub-Saharan countries on an annual basis.
Figure 3: Top ten recipients of disaster prevention and preparedness, 2006 to 2010, (US$millions). Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC.
Figure 2: Disaster Prevention and Preparedness 2006-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC.
Country VolumeBangladesh 84.3Vietnam 77.5Haiti 73.8Indonesia 65.2Phillipines 44.6El Salvador 30.9Ethiopia 25.4India 23.6Myanmar 21Hondurus 20.6
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Disaster Prevention and Preparedness in the Ten Case Study CountriesUnsurprisingly given the relatively low volumes overall, the ten case study countries have almost all received very low amounts of disaster prevention and preparedness.
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Grand Total
Total HA % DP&P
Bangladesh 1.0 5.1 20.5 30.9 26.9 84.3 491.9 17.1%Colombia 0.0 0.5 0.2 1.8 1.0 3.5 450.9 0.8%DRC 0.9 1.1 6.9 2.3 1.9 13.0 2233.6 0.6%Ethiopia 0.9 0.0 6.7 8.0 9.8 25.4 2616.9 1.0%Ghana 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.6 27.8 2.0%Haiti 1.4 9.2 8.3 22.7 32.1 73.8 2032.7 3.6%Nepal 0.0 2.4 3.3 4.9 3.4 13.9 233.6 6.0%Somalia 0.0 0.0 1.2 2.3 2.1 5.6 1778.5 0.3%Sri Lanka 0.3 2.0 6.2 3.8 2.0 14.3 1075.4 1.3%Uganda 0.4 0.5 3.6 4.3 8.5 17.4 871.5 2.0%Total 4.9 21.1 56.9 81.2 57.7 251.8Figure 4: Volumes of disaster prevention and preparedness to the case study countries, 2006 to 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC.
The amounts and proportions of overall humanitarian assistance are particularly disappointing. Four countries (Colombia, DRC, Ethiopia and Somalia) have only received 1% or less humanitarian assistance as disaster prevention and preparedness over the five years. The remarkably low volumes to Ethiopia and Somalia (just US$25.4 and US$5.6 million respectively) are dwarfed by massive humanitarian response expenditures in those countries and seem particularly relevant given the attention the Horn of Africa has received over the last year and more.
Bangladesh
Colombia
DRC
Ethiopia
Ghana
Haiti
Nepal
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Uganda
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
84.33.513.025.4
0.6
73.813.9
5.614.317.4
Emergency/distress relief Emergency food aid Relief co-ordination; protection and support servicesReconstruction relief Disaster prevention and preparedness
Only three of the ten case study countries, Bangladesh , Nepal and Haiti, have received more than the average (2.9%) spent on disaster and prevention to all countries over the five year period. These are relative bright spots in an otherwise bleak picture. Bangladesh in particular has seen repeated and significant investments in disaster prevention and preparedness since Cyclone Sidr in 2007, with more than twenty million in each year.
Figure 5: Humanitarian assistance by sector for case study countries. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC.
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In looking at the codes in detail we can see how other humanitarian expenditures account for a far higher volume and proportion of the total. Expenditures on food aid, for example, dwarf those spent on prevention and preparedness, more than twenty times higher in all the sub-Saharan countries in the case study. Response overall far outweighs all expenditure on disaster preparedness in all these countries, regardless of their particular.
only partially. (See the data methodology in the annex for more details.)
Emergency Preparedness: Tracking the latest data2011 Emergency PreparednessThe estimated funding for emergency preparedness to all recipient countries was US$158.7 million in 2011, US$81.7 million regarded as completely allocated for emergency preparedness activities and the remaining US77.2 million for projects with a preparedness component. This US$158.7 million accounted for only 1.5% of the total US$10.3 billion of humanitarian funding reported to FTS in 2011. Given that nearly half that funding was for projects that are only in part focused on preparedness 1.5% represents a very low commitment placed on preparedness within overall humanitarian assistance.
Over the year out of a total of 127 recipients of humanitarian assistance 49 received at least some volume of emergency preparedness. However volumes are considerably concentrated with the top four recipients (Somalia, South Sudan, Afghanistan and Yemen) accounting for the same volume as the
Figure 6: Top recipients of emergency preparedness, 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS
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remaining 45 countries combined. This leaves a lot of countries sharing very little preparedness expenditure; investment in preparedness appears hardly systematic.
2011 Emergency preparedness
Partial preparedness
Total emergency preparedness
Total HA
Emergency preparedness % of HA
HA rank 2011 (out of 127)
EP rank 2011 (out of 49)
Bangladesh 2.4 0.0 2.4 51.1 4.6% 26 15Colombia 2.0 0.0 2.0 54.9 3.7% 25 20DRC 0.0 2.4 2.4 500.9 0.5% 7 16Ethiopia 1.0 2.2 3.2 821.4 0.4% 3 12Ghana 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.0% 73 N/AHaiti 3.4 2.8 6.2 483.2 1.3% 8 5Nepal 2.3 2.2 4.5 41.1 11.0% 30 10Somalia 11.6 26.4 38.0 1,280.0 2.9% 1 1Sri Lanka 0.03 0.0 0.03 172.8 0.0% 15 50Uganda 1.1 0.1 1.1 43.9 2.7% 27 26Grand total 23.8 36.1 59.9 3452.8 1.7%
Figure 7: Comparison of emergency preparedness financing to case study countries. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS data, downloaded January 2012
For the ten case study countries the amount spent on emergency preparedness was US$59.9 million in 2011. The funding is highly concentrated once more. In this case the US$38 million spent in Somalia accounts for the bulk of emergency preparedness spent in all ten countries. Yet even then it only accounts for a rather small proportion of the country’s total humanitarian assistance, just 2.9% of the US$1.28 billion spent that year in the country.
Overall, proportions of humanitarian assistance spent on emergency preparedness are small for all countries, with all but Somalia below 5%. The other three large recipients of humanitarian expenditure in the case study – DRC, Ethiopia and Haiti – received only 0.5%, 0.4% and 1.3% respectively as emergency preparedness. This is considerably worrying and perhaps surprising given these countries particular contexts, especially for Haiti and Ethiopia where recent natural disasters have had such media and political attention7.
Noticeably both Ghana and Sri Lanka received almost no funding for emergency preparedness over the year. For Ghana this is perhaps not surprising given that it is a country without major recent crisis and with very much a development agenda (receiving US$6.9 billion in almost entirely development aid over the years 2006 to 2010.) Sri Lanka is of some concern however. In 2011 US$178.2 million of humanitarian aid was reported to FTS, US$35.6 million in response to the January floods. Yet despite this and other natural hazards only 30,000 USD was spent on preparedness for the whole year.
2012 Emergency PreparednessVolumes of expenditures on emergency preparedness in the first half of 2012 are very low, even by the standards set by 2011.
The amount reported as emergency preparedness was only US$80.2 million for all 103 recipients of humanitarian assistance in 2012. This cannot simply be explained as a function of timing, donors waiting longer than the first six months of the year to spend, since in the same period US$6.3 billion of
7 See DRR/Resilience section for Ethiopia however for data which suggests some countries receive funding for more comprehensive risk reduction activities.
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humanitarian assistance was reported to FTS. That means the amount spent on emergency preparedness has been only 1.3% of all humanitarian funding so far this year, a drop of 0.2% on the full 2011 figure.
Emergency preparedness funding is considerably concentrated once again. South Sudan alone accounts for more than 27% of the total and the next four countries account for another 29%. 28 countries share less than US$36 million.
2012 Emergency preparedness (green)
Partial preparedness (amber)
Total emergency preparedness
Total HA
Emergency preparedness as % of HA
HA rank 2012 (out of 103)
Bangladesh 0.3 0.0 0.3 20.8 1.5% 32Colombia 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.5 0.0% 27DRC 0.0 0.0 0.0 335.9 2.0% 7Ethiopia 3.6 1.4 5.0 334.3 0.0% 8Ghana 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.0% 56Haiti 0.7 1.9 2.7 66 4.0% 21Nepal 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.8 0.0% 36Somalia 0.0 0.3 0.3 659.1 0.04% 1Sri Lanka 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.2 0.0% 28Uganda 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.6 0.0% 33Total 4.6 3.6 8.3 1521
Figure 8: Comparison of emergency financing to case study countries, 2012. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS.
Unsurprisingly given the low amount expended on emergency preparedness overall, the case study countries received very little funding. During this period the ten countries received US$1.5 billion of humanitarian assistance and only US$8.3 million was spent on preparedness. For some countries the picture is particularly concerning; DRC, Somalia and Ethiopia continue to receive large volumes of humanitarian funding and yet in 2012 very little has been spent on preparedness; in DRC, there was no spending on preparedness at all in the first six months of this year.
Tracking DRR and resilience– Further attempts to reduce riskThe tracking of expenditures over the last 15 months reveals how emergency preparedness has not been a priority for donors. However preparedness expenditures themselves does not account for all attempts to both reduce the impact of natural and man-made hazards, and of course the large yearly humanitarian expenditures. As part of this exercise Development Initiatives therefore also tracked expenditures in
Figure 8: Top recipients of emergency preparedness, 2012. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS.
0
5
10
15
20
25
0.0%10.0%20.0%30.0%40.0%50.0%60.0%70.0%80.0%21.8
6.4 5.9 5.8 5.0 4.2 2.9 2.7 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.9
6.6
Emergency preparedness funding
Emergency preparedness as % of HA
US$
mill
ion
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disaster risk reduction as well as resilience in order to give a wider picture of funding reported to OCHA FTS that is ex ante to crisis8.
The picture is a revealing one. Firstly there are some major humanitarian recipients that received substantial volumes of the DRR/Resilience funding in 2011, Afghanistan and Ethiopia especially, but also OPT, Haiti, Kenya and Niger. The US$168.3 million to Afghanistan was two-fifths of the entire amount spent on DRR/Resilience to all recipients, and it accounted for 22.7% of its humanitarian aid that year. A large proportion of this (US$154 million) was granted to the World Food Programme for a project aimed at ‘enhancing resilience and food security.’
Once again overall figures are somewhat misleading since the US$570 million spent on all preparedness and DRR/Resilience projects is more than treble that just spent on emergency preparedness alone, the volumes of risk reducing programmes are once more highly concentrated. In this case money spent in Afghanistan, Somalia and Ethiopia accounts for more than the remaining 124 countries received combined.
Total emergency preparedness
DRR and Resilience
Total all EP, DRR and Resilience
Total Humanitarian
EP, Resilience and DRR as % of HA
Bangladesh 2.4 5.1 7.5 51.1 14.7%Colombia 2.0 1.2 3.2 54.9 5.8%DRC 2.4 0.4 2.8 500.9 0.6%Ethiopia 3.2 90.1 93.3 821.4 11.4%Ghana 0 0 0 3.5 0.0%Haiti 6.2 22.3 28.5 483.2 5.9%Nepal 4.5 0.6 5.1 41.1 12.4%Somalia 38 5.1 43.1 1280.0 3.4%Sri Lanka 0.03 0.7 0.73 172.8 0.4%Uganda 1.1 0.6 1.7 43.9 3.9%Grand Total 59.9 126.2 186.1 3452.8 5.4%
Figure 10: Combined risk reduction expenditures in case study countries, 2011: Source: Development Initiatves based on UNOCHA FTS
8 Note whilst OCHA FTS may have certain DRR expenditures reported, this will not incorporate all donor contributions to reducing disaster risk, since a sizable portion of these expenditures are likely to have been seen as development aid. In order to show total expenditures of the international community only the DAC database can be used. See the annex for data on this, drawn from OECD DAC for the ten case study countries.
Figure 9: Combined emergency preparedness volumes with DRR and resilience, 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS
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For the ten countries being tracked in more detail the DRR and resilience volumes are significant, especially for Ethiopia, with an additional US$90.1 million (largely through another similar WFP resilience programme.). This brings overall investment in broadly risk reducing programmes in Ethiopia to a much improved 11.4% of humanitarian assistance. Only Bangladesh (14.7%) and Nepal (12.4%) have higher proportions. However, overall funding in reducing risk in DRC, Somalia and Sri Lanka is still very low, both in volume and in proportion to total humanitarian aid.
For the short tracking period of 2012 an additional US$298.1 million has been found to have been spent in all recipient countries. This represented a further 4% of all humanitarian aid targeted towards risk. The largest recipient has once again been Ethiopia (US$127 million) largely spent on food-related resilience work undertaken by WFP and with funding from seven different donors. Other countries that received almost no funding for preparedness activities received considerable funding for DRR and resilience, including OPT/Palestine, Somalia and Niger.
Total emergency preparedness
DRR and Resilience
Total Total Humanitarian Assistance
Preparedness, DRR and Resilience % of HA
Bangladesh 0.3 0.0 0.3 20.8 1.4%Colombia 0.0 0.3 0.3 33.5 0.9%DRC 0.0 0.0 0.0 335.9 0.0%Ethiopia 5.0 127.0 132.0 334.3 39.5%Ghana 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.0%Haiti 2.7 0.6 3.3 66.0 5.0%Nepal 0.0 0.2 0.2 14.8 1.4%Somalia 0.3 22.7 23.0 659.1 3.5%Sri Lanka 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.2 0.0%Uganda 0.0 0.8 0.8 19.6 4.1%Grand Total 8.3 151.6 159.9 1521.5 10.5%
Six of the ten case study countries received funding for risk and resilience activities. Unsurprisingly funding to Ethiopia takes up the largest proportion (84%) of this expenditure. When this spending is added to emergency preparedness we can identify some changes in donor priorities with regard to risk. We can now regard 39.5% of Ethiopia’s humanitarian funding has targeted risk in one way or another. However, for most of the other countries overall proportions remain low, with Haiti (5%) and Uganda
Figure 11: Combined risk reduction expenditures to all recipients, 2012: Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS.
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0 132.0
45.0 39.5
23.0 22.6 22.210.9 6.5 6.3 5.9 5.1 4.2 4.2 3.7 3.4 3.2 3.1 2.4 2.1 2.1
24.4
Emergency preparedness Broader DRR and resilience Series4
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(4.1%) far behind Ethiopia. Worryingly DRC and Sri Lanka have not received any risk related funding for the first six months of 2012.
Reporting Risk Financing
Tracking financing for risk remains far too difficult with current donor reporting methods failing to capture the financing of disaster risk reduction activities effectively. There has been growing consensus on developing and implementing global norms for precisely tracking financing of DRR and risk-reducing post-disaster reconstruction and recovery, which will go beyond the limited reporting available within humanitarian codes. The DRR finance tracking will not only help in building convincing economic evidence for investing more in DRR and risk-reducing recovery and reconstruction, but will also help in i) harmonizing resource allocations, ii) real-time analysis of ex-ante and ex-post disaster investments, and iii) effectively measuring and reporting results.
The Disaster Aid Tracking (DAT) initiative of the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) aims at collaborative development of a global system for tracking investments in disaster risk reduction, post-disaster recovery and reconstruction. This online dashboard is based on the AidData model which captures all OECD CRS financial flows and also adds comparable aid flows from other non-conventional donors. (www.gfdrr.aiddata.org.)
A group of experts has come together - UNISDR, UN Inter Agency Standing Committee's working group on preparedness financing, OECD and GFDRR - to finalize common definitions and statistical procedures for the detailed DRR finance tracking.
Policy and Practice9 Over the lifetime of the financial tracking there has been no substantial change in the context of humanitarian need. For much of 2011 the focus of the international humanitarian community (though not always the funding) was on the Horn of Africa, suffering the worst drought in 60 years. Attention switched to the Sahel in 2012 as serious drought affected many countries, pushing up food prices and forcing population displacement, a situation exacerbated by the impact of the Libyan crisis and a generally deteriorating security situation in northern areas. There is nothing particularly new about this or other humanitarian contexts. Complex emergencies continue to receive the bulk of humanitarian funding, such as Afghanistan, OPT, Sudan, Somalia and DRC and seem as intractable as ever, whilst other countries such as Niger, Mali and Yemen are seen as increasingly fragile, with seriously deteriorating conditions.
The overall challenges remain as large as they ever were. The funding requested through the CAP for 2012 (at US$7.7 billion) was as large as it was the previous year with the same major humanitarian recipients appealing for large sums. Many donors, mired in continuing domestic financial troubles, remain under pressure to reduce expenditures or to justify their existing humanitarian contributions more than before. Funding for emergency preparedness, as part of sharpening focus on the reduction of risks of all kinds, is seen as one tool to reduce humanitarian financing whilst also helping to break out of the current cycle of massive humanitarian expenditures in what are largely the same countries10.
9 Note that this section of the report is based upon an analysis of the continuing policy and practice concerning emergency preparedness, based on a review of a selection of recent literature and interviews with a selected set of key informants. It is not meant to be a comprehensive overview of the whole of emergency preparedness but rather a connection of current thinking and work to the original synthesis report completed in December 2011.10 There is considerable evidence to suppor this analysis: that most humanitarian assistance is spent in the same country year on year, as much as US$7 out of every US$10. See Development Initiatives GHA reports 2009 through to 2012.
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ResilienceThe concept of ‘resilience’ re-entered the policy debate with some force over the last 18 months, in part reflecting these continuing pressures on financing and the need for solutions to long-term humanitarian aid. In its current form it has been largely pioneered by DFID’s humanitarian review and its commitment to ‘make building resilience a core part of DFID’s approach in all of the countries where we work11’, and act as a leader in driving forward the resilience agenda in general. With DFID being both a consistently active and influential player in humanitarian policy, and invariably the second largest contributor of humanitarian assistance by volume, resilience has unsurprisingly been taken up by many elements of the humanitarian system, (as well as other actors operating in the same contexts.)
Broadly speaking resilience appears to be very useful for ongoing debates on improving engagement with and funding for preparedness. In its widest current articulation it appears attempt to help make countries, communities and families resilient to all manner of shocks both in the short and the long-term. This connects with many of the recommendations within the emergency preparedness synthesis report already prepared, including helping bridge over the divide between development and humanitarian activities in the same country, addressing both conflict and natural disaster concerns, and the underpinning aspect of resilience in that it should be based on much-improved analysis of all risks.
Perhaps the greatest challenge facing resilience as it develops can be traced back directly to the work on the full definition of what it is and what it is not, which for many actors has yet to be finalised. Some of the questions the current debate on resilience raises connected to this includes:
The scope of the definition is not yet clear. Who is being made resilient and to what? Is it resilience of all things to all shocks? Where does resilience spending end and development aid in general begin?How will resilience be integrated into aid programming. Is resilience about specific at-risk sectors such as agriculture or is it a new way to approach all programming?
Is resilience a rebranding of existing approaches? Some of the debate suggest similarity to durable solutions, livelihoods, social protection, or perhaps more widely DRR in conflict situations.
There is concern that ‘comprehensive’ definitions of resilience, which could be reduced to ‘protecting all things from happening to all people’ could crowd out the developments already made and long-standing in various sectors, such as DRR and peacebuilding. Similarly there is work to be done to understand what role emergency preparedness plays in resilience and how similarly resilience can practically increase engagement with preparedness.
Donor engagement with resilience is mixed. On the one hand there are very positive signs that some donors are looking at this through a single lens rather along silos of humanitarian and development aid. (This can be seen in engagement and policy development with donors like the UK, USA, Japan and the EC.) However there is also some evidence to suggest other donors, perhaps in general smaller donors with less capacity, are relying on their traditional DRR structures (almost always located in the humanitarian departments) to develop policy on resilience.
On balance much of the discussion around resilience is proving very useful to increasing engagement with and funding for preparedness. There is an undeniable momentum. There is political support, with involvement at senior levels, such as can be seen in the Champions of Resilience group. There are also examples of the system reacting to this focus well ahead of any changes in actual policies; for example
11 UK Government’s Humanitarian Policy: Saving lives, preventing suffering and building resilience:
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eight of 16 countries appealing through the CAP for 2012 make express usage of the term resilience12. Recent statements suggest a further crystalising of opinion that resilience is a ‘long-term development orientated process that requires a comprehensive approach13’, which if fully developed suggests an approach that avoids aid silos, and works in every situation, regardless of country context, much in line with findings of this work on emergency preparedness financing. Cost-benefit studies are already underway at DFID and elsewhere, hoping to prove that investments in resilience pay off well into the future. Finally, many donors have stated they are undergoing a review of existing risk-related policy in light of the influence of debates on resilience.
The DonorsIn a short time it is difficult to gauge the exact level of engagement with emergency preparedness across the donor community, especially one that is so diverse in terms of policy development and capacity. However it would be correct to state that there has been increased attention to planning for crises before they occur, often in part due to domestic pressures on humanitarian financing. Donors are asking for more evidence that their financial contribution is making a difference and that it is good value for money, drives that suggest preparedness (which implies reducing the impact of risk and also future expenditure) is also of some considerable interest.
Leadership and the GHD
The GHD group (chaired from 2011 to 2012 by Germany and Poland) has however made preparedness a priority for the humanitarian donor community, and a core element of the co-chair’s agenda. They report working in four inter-locking areas – institutional preparedness, country level including for the long-term, financing and funding mechanisms, and continued development of partnerships. Many of the key issues articulated by the GHD are very similar to key findings of the synthesis report: the balance of long-term preparedness lead by national authorities with system preparedness, the need to focus on country level actions, basing programming on analyses of all risks and a far greater emphasis on outreach beyond the humanitarian system.
The GHD co-chairs have signed off their year of leadership with an invite to members to join a new workstream: ‘preparedness, risk reduction, resilience and response.’ GHD donors have even gone so far as stating that preparedness requires a development approach, and needs to be integrated into long-term development programmes.
Policy Development
In terms of actual policy, whilst there are signs that donors are considering to make preparedness a priority action amongst the many, definitive progress is slow. Whilst we would not expect nor want policies solely developed for preparedness, even general policies on aid remain in general inadequate, certainly if they are meant to guide donors towards implementing the ‘emergency preparedness’ described in this work for the IASC.
There is some development in related areas however. As mentioned before, resilience is having considerable traction, and in some debates something like emergency preparedness is articulated as an
12 In 2011 only three countries – Kenya, Niger, Somalia – use the term resilience. In 2012 it was used in 8 individual appeals.13 Almost exactly the same statement can be found in the Secretary General’s report on natural disasters and can be traced back to ECOSOC 2011’s statement on the coordination of humanitarian affairs in 2011: http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2011/res%202011.8.pdf.
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element of resilient interventions14. There is also growing support for the idea that DRR is not a humanitarian issue alone, although there are also suggestions that humanitarians need to concentrate on preparedness, which would tend to go in the opposite direction and reinforce the divide between aid structures and financing. Related to this, there are growing calls for (and by) donors that DRR should become more central to development, a call likely to increase towards the post-MDG and post-HFA discussions in 2015. The reduction of risk of all kinds remains very much a key topic for donors.
There are also useful examples of good practice. The UK’s humanitarian policy focus on resilience details commitments to making interventions from both humanitarian and development financing, and its statement that resilience is partly ‘improvements to social, economic, environmental, political and physical planning and to preparedness for potential natural and manmade disasters’ is very much in keeping with findings of Phase 1 of the work on emergency preparedness. Meanwhile the Swiss government’s strategy for 2013 to 2016 for the first time unifies its entire international cooperation under a single policy, one where many kinds of interventions can support the same objective, including prevention and preparedness needs.
Funding Developments
Unsurprisingly given the relatively slow development of donor policy, pledges and commitments to preparedness have not been commonplace over the last year. There have been some positive developments however, not explicitly for preparedness but linked to existing donor priorities or as response to events in the Horn of African and the Sahel. Resilience has featured strongly in these developments. The following longer-term aid investments are likely to have a preparedness component:
According to a press release accompanying the publication of the new Australian aid policy, the country ‘will invest $435.6 million over 4 years to strengthen developing countries’ preparedness for natural disasters.’
In response to the continuing drought and crisis cycle in both the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, USAID has recently created a ‘global alliance on drought and growth’, a multi-stakeholder attempt to tackle the cycle long-term. At a recent conference focusing attention to this new initiative USAID itself announced plans to commit more than US$280 million over the next year.
The ‘Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience’ initiative commenced recently by the EC has already pledged 250 million euros to support ‘recovery from the recent drought and strengthen resilience to future crises. Amongst its specific priorities is one for ‘disaster preparedness and [for] building stronger bridges between humanitarian and development projects.’
DFID has completed consultations for its Global Resilience Action Programme, an initiative ‘designed to help countries and countries to become better prepared when disasters hit and to improve the effectiveness of any response.15’ The programme will be formally launched in Autumn 2012.
OECD workplan developments
THE OECD, after direct request by donors, has agreed to put resilience on its own agenda, and has allocated several millions of dollars to develop policy in this area, and acknowledging that ‘‘building resilience is one issue which has captured the interest of members as it is seen as key to tackling both emerging and long-standing challenges.’ Especially useful is the call to ‘bring together the development and humanitarian communities to develop shared understanding, language and concepts for the joint
14 A likely important example of this is the upcoming European Union ‘Communication on Resilience’ (prepared jointly by DEVCO/ECHO). It is likely to include the need for higher degree of flexibility in programming (especially to address unforeseen crises), new modalities of assistance, and finding short-term interventions that have a long term impact.15 See http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Work-with-us/Consultations/Closed-consultation/Response-to-the-public-consultation-on-the-Global-resilience-action-programme/
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analysis and management of risk and opportunities.’ Some have expressed concern that the OECD’s commitment to ‘create a practitioner level toolkit for risk and resilience programming’ including assessing risk, building resilience and identifying/disseminating good practice’, suggests some crossover in already competing mandates.
Institutions and the System
The IASC and the Transformative Agenda
The Transformative Agenda16 (TA) is an attempt of the humanitarian system to look again at humanitarian reform, especially in light of recent very large disasters. Lead by the ERC and the IASC principles, this process is focusing first on how the system can better manage level three emergencies, with special attention paid to leadership, accountability and ensuring that appropriate coordination exists at all levels. Preparedness did not feature heavily in the first tranche of this renewed focus on reform, although the chapeau document outlining the priorities did make special reference to ‘building capacities for preparedness [that ] will act on both the programmatic and financial side,’ though without specific actions.
Subsequently preparedness has come back strongly into focus, driven in part by the continuing debate on resilience, and the crises in the Horn of Africa and Sahel, that were both foreseen, but arguably for which the system remained largely unprepared. This new focus can be seen by the latest TA action plan that extends to ‘non-L3 contexts, focusing specifically on preparedness actions in priority high-risk countries.’ The IASC working-group also been tasked with re-examining preparedness with special focus in its July 2012 meeting to link emergency preparedness of the system to national-lead preparedness. In December this year the IASC principles will also dedicate an entire meeting to preparedness linked to resilience. The Secretary General’s report on natural disasters due to be released in the Autumn, will further contribute to the momentum behind preparedness within the IASC; it makes it clear that humanitarian action should contribute to resilience and one of the three ways outlined (along with early recovery and early action) is preparedness.
The Workings of the System
At the same time that senior leadership is turning its attention more and more towards preparing for crises, the machinery of the humanitarian system is also developing its work in preparedness and related areas. Some of the key developments include:
The IASC SWG on Preparedness: In 2011 the IASC Principles held a session on preparedness that endorsed the UNDP/World Bank background paper on Building National Capacity for Preparedness and committed to implementing its recommendations. The SWG is implementing these recommendations. To date it is in process of developing a common framework for capacity development of preparedness; it is continuing to develop its support to country leadership and activities, leading on integrating preparedness in existing tools and mechanisms such as the CAP and making connections to non-UN actors.
The Task Team on Preparedness Funding continues to highlight the challenges and opportunities in financing emergency preparedness (of which this summary report is one product.) The first phase study examining financing mechanisms and the architecture of preparedness financing will be completed in August with a second phase, focusing on much-needed country level contexts, commencing soon after.
16 See for details: http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-template-default&bd=87
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UNOCHA, a key institutional actor in preparedness, is currently re-evaluating its role in preparedness, with external consultants due to present their results later this year.
CADRI is a system-unifying feature at country level, and is looking to expand its membership beyond UNOCHA, UNDP and ISDR to other IASC members, and is currently conducting a review of its operations and impact.
Preparedness is making its way into some of the core business documents of the system. For example two key needs related documents - Multi-cluster Initial/Rapid Assessment Framework and the Operational Guidance for Coordinated Assessments – make specific reference to preparedness.
Rome based donors, drawn primarily from their development divisions and departments, have asked the three food and agriculture agencies (FAO, IFAD, WFP) to work together on a concept note for resilience programming and implications on funding resilience.
The global cluster system is considering its role in preparedness. A draft ‘emergency response planning’ tool is already in development and discussion, the highlight of which is the Minimum Preparedness Actions, a list of practical preparedness actions that should be identified and implemented to ensure a minimum standard of preparedness and across contexts.
The Challenges of the SystemWhilst there has been laudable movement by elements of the system, key challenges make progress far more difficult than it should be:
There is no central vision for preparedness that connects all the parts of the system together. Key to this is the lack of an obvious mandated leading institution. No one is currently centrally responsible and the duty sits somewhat uncomfortably between OCHA, UNISDR, BCPR, and the IASC and its sub-working groups.
There are continuing signs that emergency preparedness is still largely articulated as two separate processes – system preparedness to response, and national-lead preparedness as part of risk reduction – that are uncomfortably joined together. The nature of the institutions working in these areas are drawn roughly along these lines. This divide is also drawn (roughly) along humanitarian and development lines.
The process is currently heavily centred on the UN and its agencies and institutions. INGO involvement is mixed so far, dependent on limited access to key forums, perceived usefulness and their own capacity issues.
The Financing Architecture
Investigations into the role financing mechanisms play in preparedness (as part of the synthesis report) revealed that whilst none of the nine analysed17 focused explicitly on financing for emergency preparedness, six of them had funded preparedness activities of various types and of various levels over the reporting period18, though in generally very small volumes. In a detailed analysis of the funds and the way they currently function, no single existing fund was shown to be the perfect solution to how to improve engagement with or attract financing for emergency preparedness. Taking this into account, and aware of the proliferation of financing mechanisms, the recommendations of the synthesis report
17 Three of these were humanitarian (CERF, CHFs, ERFs), three broadly development (BCPR Thematic Trust Fund, UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction, GFDRR) and three for climate change (LDC Fund of the GEF, Strategic Climate Funds, The Adaptation Fund.18 See page 39 of the report and the section on Financing Architecture.
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suggested there is probably no single solution to financing but rather the international community needs to be able to utilise a suite of mechanisms, depending on the context of the country19.
Current Developments on Financing Mechanisms and Preparedness Funding
To date there has not been a deliberate or systematic attempt to investigate the recommendations of the synthesis report regarding financing tools and mechanisms: that all existing mechanisms should be examined leading to the creation to a coherent and flexible set of preparedness financing tools. Questions remain about exactly what the purpose of existing tools if some of them already go beyond their beyond humanitarian life-saving mandates. Clearly at present OCHA has to maintain a delicate balance between protecting the core humanitarian agenda of these tools whilst also responding flexibly to need. One solution to this would be that either tools continue to develop to meet complex needs (including systematically addressing emergency preparedness) or they revert to a more strict interpretation of what is humanitarian. Either solution would allow advocates for greater engagement with preparedness to understand what are the available options and what needs to be done next.
The evidence suggests that despite rather narrow mandates, that funding does continue to arrive to countries for preparedness via humanitarian financing mechanisms. There is evidence to show that CERFs, ERFs and CHFs fund preparedness, though admittedly at very low volumes, and not based on the same criteria given the lack of preparedness policy within these funds. This would suggest that even despite obvious life-saving mandates and guidelines humanitarian country teams still make preparedness at least one of their priorities and obtain funding. There are also examples of best or innovative practice at country level that can be better captured and duplicated.
One of the few specific preparedness developments (and a model which should be monitored to see if in future lessons can be drawn) is from Indonesia where the Australian government approached OCHA and suggested project leftover funds of 230,000 Australian dollars could be used for preparedness by specific clusters. An agreement was subsequently made for the money to be administered by the already-existing Humanitarian Response Fund, but earmarked for specific cluster preparedness activities outside of the HRF (to retain the fund’s focus as an emergency response tool.) The option exists for this mechanism to be used for additional, more comprehensive, funding for preparedness in Indonesia.
In addition to this the inclusion of a question on preparedness within the global review of the Emergency Relief Funds is a positive development.
The Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction (GFDRR)
19 See page 74 of the synthesis report.
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GFDRR continues to attract funding from donors, some of which is likely to be spent on preparedness activities. One of the most recent initiatives is the ACP (African-Carribean-Pacific) fund20 for national disaster facilities. The World Bank and the European Commission (EC) signed a financial agreement of 54.5 million Euro establishing the ACP-EU Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Program to support prevention, mitigation and preparedness to natural hazards in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries21.
Nepal ConsortiumNepal’s success in gaining both financial support for preparedness investments as well as political engagement (both national and international) remains a model that could be replicated or learnt from. The Consortium continues to attract funding, with a recent increase to US$65.2 million. A considerable proportion of this funding (US$17.5 million) is set aside for the second pillar of consortium activities: Emergency Preparedness and Response Capacity, – managed by OCHA. Additional contributions for preparedness activities are also likely to seen through funding to additional pillars, including ‘Community Based Risk Management’(DRM) managed by IFRC and ‘Policy/Institutional Support for DRM’ managed by UNDP.
Consolidated Appeals Process
As described in the synthesis report the CAP is not seen as a comprehensive solution to preparedness financing. It does however offer significant possibilities that can and should be explored not least of which is the transfer of prioritisation and decision-making to country level actors. This is particularly relevant given the current review of the appeals process, which is an opportunity to help the CAP more strategic. In addition the IASC is currently considering whether to make the CAP multi-annual, a development that may be of considerable benefit for the preparedness agenda if agreed.
20 http://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/acp-eu21 Despite having a mandate that stretches well beyond humanitarian life-saving interventions GFDRR continues to receive the bulk of its funding from humanitarian donor agencies. Even with the substantial ACP contribution from the EC’s development arm, the majority of the fund’s US$331.81 pledges (as of April 2012) have come largely from humanitarian donors.
Tracking Preparedness in Humanitarian Financing Mechanisms
As part of the tracking exercise looking at preparedness in ten case study countries there is evidence of preparedness financing. In 2011 a small amount, US$10.5 million was allocated for emergency preparedness to the ten case study countries with a further US$8.4 million spent on DRR.
The CERF distributed funds of US$8.4 million which could be considered as for risk-related priorities to Somalia, Ethiopia and Haiti.
Somalia CHF
Haiti ERF
Haiti CERF
Ethiopia CERF
Somalia CERF
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Emergency preparednessBroad DRR
Haiti also received funding of US$0.8 for disaster and cholera preparedness from its Emergency Response Fund (ERF) It was the only ERF to do so, perhaps unsurprisingly given their mandate and six-month project window. In 2011 Somalia received nearly US$8 million from its Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) that focused on funding institutional preparedness and the capacity of clusters and agencies to respond.
In the first six months of 2012 there was only at additional US$3.4 funding for emergency preparedness and US$1.9 million for other risk interventions via financing mechanisms. US$1.6 million was spent in Somalia and US$3.3 million in Ethiopia.
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Revealingly the 2012 CAP overview document launched in December 2011 shows similar evidence of the previous year, with HCTs continuing to use the CAP for preparedness despite the absence of official guidelines. The 2012 CAP features 16 country appeals for a combined record high of US$7.7 billion22. Nine of the appeals mention preparedness in some way or other. Three make preparedness a strategic objective (Afghanistan, Philippines, Sudan) and three link preparedness to longer-term DRR (CHAD, Cote D’ivoire, Niger.) One country even makes an explicit reference to preparedness helping to reduce the risk of conflict (DRC)23.
22 Note that levels of emergency preparedness funding received via the CAP has not been a part of this tracking exercise. However 2 of the tracked countries (Haiti and Somalia) received small amounts through the appeals process.23 Resilience appears in many of the appeal overviews in the 2012 document, although perhaps reflecting the definitional challenges it is used in many different ways. CAR and Somalia use it specifically for livelihoods and income-generation, it is used for communities for Yemen, linked to DRR for Kenya, and used in a general sense for Djibouti, Afghanistan, Sudan and Niger.
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Conclusions and Further RecommendationsOverall StatusIn summary there have been positive developments for improved preparedness financing over the last year with renewed focus on working in advance of crisis rather than after. However, there has also been a lack of practical movement in some key areas. Although this report is not a systematic review of all aspects of the debate over the last year there are some clear findings:
Preparedness is seen as a possibly transformative tool to reduce pressures on humanitarian financing as well as help positively reduce risks of new crises. Key to this is an understanding that the system cannot continue to deliver year on year high volumes of humanitarian assistance in its current form.
Preparedness financing remains a low priority. There has been very little financing preparedness over the year to the ten case study countries and little to all recipients of humanitarian assistance. Sub-Saharan countries have seen particular low investments in preparedness.
Despite the challenges of inexact or multiple meanings of resilience, the debate around the concept provides significant opportunities for emergency preparedness. This includes political and institutional momentum, the need to focus on all risks and contexts, and the crossing of the divide between humanitarian and development aid.
There has been some discussion of preparedness policy amongst and within donors. This is still largely a policy debate, in part fuelled by continuing examination of what resilience means for them. There have been a few examples of positive change in policy and only limited examples of improvements in funding. Donor reticence to invest in preparedness may be in part due to the lack of visibility that ex-ante funding offers, and an aversion to risk funding in insecure environments.
The transformative agenda has moved to include preparedness as a priority item. Senior-level leadership within the system has started to take a more obvious interest. However practical day-to-day leadership, a central driving force charged with responsibility to deliver, is not present. Many elements of the system are however working on various aspects of preparedness.
There has been little official movement in the key (humanitarian) financing tools and mechanisms in terms of mandate or stance on preparedness. They remain largely stuck between on the one hand respecting their rather clear humanitarian mandates whilst on the other responding to real need to be more flexible and fund ‘before the crisis’. At country level however there are signs that HCTs are already using what they can; in particular the CAP is being used to establish preparedness as a strategic objective, in some cases linking this to longer term risk reduction. There is some, but less, evidence that this opportunism is also being extended to humanitarian financing mechanisms.
The community of actors discussing aspects of preparedness are still largely humanitarian actors talking to other humanitarian actors. Advocacy by the humanitarian system beyond itself has been largely confined to the debate on resilience.
Emergency preparedness still has signs that it is articulated as two separate processes – system preparedness to response, and national-lead preparedness as part of risk reduction – that are uncomfortably joined together.
Recommendations:Many of the original recommendations from the synthesis report are yet to be explored in depth. These should be re-examined. The research for this report suggests some further needs and attaches urgency to some of previously articulated recommendations. (However it should be noted that much of the examination thus far is at a global level and Phase II of the study with its country case studies needs to take place.)
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Focus on delivering as much as possible without solving comprehensively all issues of policy and mandate. This should include:
o Maintaining preparedness as something that straddles divides between aid silos and structures;
o Continuing to use a broad definitions of emergency preparedness but isolate how different elements of it pertain to particular parts of the system.
o From this establish clear roles and responsibilities, and tasks to deliver.o Focus on activities that can be done now, quick wins, whilst continuing to develop more
comprehensive policy.o Tighten up semantics, especially in light of the ongoing debate on resilience.
Resilience:
In light of current debates (and the possibilities) review preparedness in light of resilience and clarify their relationship.
Leadership:
Clear mandated leadership for preparedness should be established, with responsibility for policy development throughout the system, including work with financing mechanisms, the CAP, the cluster system etc.
Urgently examine existing tools and mechanisms:
Humanitarian financing mechanisms and tools have significant potential for funding preparedness. It is recommended that these tools be examined systematically for the role they can play in funding emergency preparedness. Opportunities such as the review of the ERFs and CAP should be seized upon.
Donors investigate their flexibility to fund:
Donors should investigate more thoroughly the financing possibilities within their system, exploring the flexibility that the OECD DAC peer review has highlighted as often existing but under-utilised.
Donors should also examine whether minimum investments in preparedness is in part a result of risk-aversion; if so more attention should be given to the key recommendations of recent Fragile State reports, which clearly indicate the importance of risking aid money to make progress in transition environments24.
Advocate strongly across boundaries and in all fora:
Advocacy needs to be much stronger. In particular, humanitarians (both donor and agency) need to improve their engagement with development counterparts. Examine what tools and approaches are required, and implement. There should be more focus on making opportunities from key events, such as the Global Platform in 2013, the GHD group etc. Seize and utilise the focus on resilience as well as new initiatives such as the Global Alliance on Drought.
Additionally, as the decision to reconfigure funding from humanitarian response to pre-crisis preparedness will impact on how aid is used and seen inside donor countries, humanitarian aid departments (and others) need to make it clear to politicians why preparedness is necessary now and into the future.
24 For recommendations on how to better fund in transition and fragile contexts, see OECD’s 2011 monitoring report at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflictandfragility/internationalengagementinfragilestatescantwedobetter.htm
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ANNEXES
The Choice of Tracked CountriesProject stakeholders selected 10 countries to be tracked for investments in emergency preparedness over more than a year. The countries selected were for their diverse profiles. Some countries have seen substantially more development aid than humanitarian – Ghana is seen by many as a development success.. Only four have seen more than 20% as humanitarian (DRC, Haiti, Somalia, Sri Lanka). Some are seen as transitioning out of conflict, some are mired in it. Some of these countries receive massive amounts of humanitarian interventions year on year (like Somalia, Ethiopia and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)) and others receive very little. Three countries have regular CAPs. Six countries receive regular funding from financing mechanisms.
Pooled Fund?
HA or ODA?
CAP appeal
Region Natural disaster Conflict Success story?
Somalia CHF HA Yes East Africa Drought YesBangladesh None Both No South Asia Cyclones, Floods,
mud-slidesNo Yes
Haiti ERF HA Yes Caribbean Cyclones, floods, seismic
Yes
Colombia ERF ODA No South America Floods, seismic YesGhana None ODA No West Africa Drought, floods No YesNepal None Both No South Asia Drought, flood Yes YesUganda ERF Both until 2010 East Africa Drought, flood YesEthiopia ERF Both No East Africa Drought, YesSri Lanka No Both Usually no South Asia Flood, drought,
seismicYes
DRC CHF Both Yes Central Africa Drought, epidemic YesReducing disaster risk in the case study countries: 2006 to 2010As discussed in the data section of this report funding for risk cannot be all located in the OCHA FTS database as this covers only humanitarian funding. The OECD DAC database accounts for all development aid from OECD member states and therefore can be used to track risk funding more comprehensively. There are, however, as discussed, considerable weaknesses in the current reporting. However, funding for disaster risk reduction (risk funding specifically targeted towards disasters) can be identified for the
Figure 13: Funding for disaster risk reduction to case study countries, 2006 to 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC.
Bangladesh
Colombia DRC Ethiopia Haiti Nepal Uganda Sri Lanka Somalia Ghana0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10687.1
6.2 20.3
553.7
125.7
31.7 25.497
18.5
134.6
Total DRR 2006-2010 Mortality Risk
Figure 12: Table of countries chosen to track for emergency preparedness
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case study countries. In this data, drawn from the five year period of 2006 to 2010 considerable funding for both Bangladesh and Ethiopia are evident.
Donor expenditure on disaster prevention and preparednessDonor governments have quite different funding profiles for disaster prevention and preparedness for the five years to 2010. (Note, as indicated earlier, disaster prevention and preparedness is not the same as emergency preparedness as discussed in this report. See page 10 for details.)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Totals Total HA %DP&P
of HA
Australia 0.1 2.8 15.8 34.3 32.0 85.0 Austria 0.1 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.6 2.2 Belgium 1.4 4.1 10.5 4.3 4.4 24.7 Canada 2.8 7.3 13.7 6.8 9.0 39.7 Denmark .. 1.8 3.8 2.7 6.9 15.1 Finland .. .. 0.7 2.4 2.6 5.7 France .. .. 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 Germany .. 4.1 10.4 24.2 15.2 53.9 Greece .. 0.3 0.1 0.1 .. 0.4 Ireland .. 2.7 11.2 5.3 4.2 23.4 Italy 0.2 0.3 5.7 2.9 0.5 9.7 Japan .. 0.9 48.0 47.5 90.9 187.3 Korea 0.0 0.1 5.5 4.0 0.5 10.2 Luxembourg .. 0.1 0.8 1.4 2.0 4.4 Netherlands 0.4 0.3 2.0 1.7 .. 4.3 New Zealand 0.2 0.5 2.2 2.4 1.9 7.2 Norway .. .. 8.4 24.2 19.6 52.3 Portugal .. .. .. .. 0.0 0.0 Spain 7.4 13.4 20.3 15.4 12.3 68.7 Sweden .. 4.6 7.7 24.2 17.2 53.8 Switzerland .. .. .. 2.4 .. 2.4 United Kingdom .. .. 29.1 54.2 10.3 93.5 United States 15.4 14.3 30.6 59.3 93.2 212.8
Tracking methodology
As mentioned there is currently no separate reporting category within UN OCHA FTS for emergency preparedness. The only way to identify programmes and activities for emergency preparedness is to investigate the project descriptions for each reported contribution.
Using an agreed pre-defined set of words associated with emergency preparedness, a macro in excel was developed to pull out all project lines that contain the relevant words in the subcategory ‘description’.25
Emergency preparednessPreparedness (any derivations ) Capacity HazardEarly warning Planning (contingency) Search and rescueMapping Stockpiling Emergency servicesDrills Evacuation Disaster risk management
25 This methodology can also be applied to data extracted from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC)’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS).
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Pre-positioning Risk assessment/analysis Stand-byEmergency operation centres (EOC)
Exercise Simulation
Each project line was then marked according to whether it is solely focused on emergency preparedness or could include elements of it, using a traffic light system.
Project line corresponds entirely to emergency preparedness.
Project line includes elements of emergency preparedness but also other activities such as response.
Project line does not specifically mention any of the elements of emergency preparedness but focuses on DRR and resilience, which could include aspects of emergency preparedness (this could also be an element of a larger project).
A second macro was created to pull out ‘broader activities’ beyond emergency preparedness, such as DRR and resilience. These were marked in the latter two categories of emergency preparedness.
DRR and ResilienceMitigation ResilienceClimate RiskDRR ProtectionAdaptation Prevention
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Contacts:This report has been written by Jan Kellett on behalf of Development Initiatives. To contact the author write to [email protected].
For correspondence with Development Initiatives write to Dan Coppard at [email protected]
Development Initiatives is a group of people committed to eliminating poverty.
We engage to promote better understanding and more effective use of the resources available for poverty reduction. We try to empower by putting this information, and the capacity to use it, in the hands of those who will eliminate poverty.
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