French Nuclear Reactors Reaching 40 Years - nuris.orgnuris.org/.../2015/04/...operation-of-french-nuclear-power-plants.pdf · 1! " French Nuclear Reactors Reaching 40 Years Decision

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French Nuclear Reactors Reaching 40 Years Decision process, reinforcement options and related costs

of a life extension of EDF nuclear reactors beyond their designed lifetime

Based on a report commissioned by Greenpeace France Yves Marignac

Director of WISE-Paris

NURIS 2015 1st INRAG Conference on Nuclear RIsks

Universität für Bodenkultur Vienna

17 April 2015

WISE-Paris

2 WISE-Paris NURIS 2015 – BOKU, Vienna – 17 April 2015

Introduction Objective of the study Methodology

Situation Technical/regulatory status of French plants

Safety, ageing and post-Fukushima issues Concerns Safety requirements applicable to PLEX Decision and process and schedule Scenarios Contrasted technical scenarios

Related cost estimates Conclusion Lessons and recommendations

Contents

“We all desire to reach an old age, but we all refuse �� that we’ve actually succeeded”

Francisco de Quevedo, Politica de Dios y Gobierno de Cristo, 1619


Pressing political context

• 40 years of operation of French reactors approaching • Since 2008, EDF has decided on a global strategy of life extension French policy makers are convinced this is the best economic option

• However, operating costs already rise (Court of Account, 2012) Moreover, life extensions are not granted (Nuclear Safety Authority, 2013)

• Meanwhile, France is now committing to reduce nuclear share

from above 75% of generation now down to 50% by 2025

Main objective • Clarify the safety issues and discuss the options • Raise public awareness about the risks and costs at stake • Provide informed basis for decision making

by building contrasted reinforcement scenarios and estimate their costs

Introduction Objective and method


Situation French nuclear fleet

An issue at national level • 58 reactors on 19 sites • A single operator – EDF

(>85% state-owned) • A much standardized fleet

(all PWRs, 6 standards) : - 34 units / 3 standards 900 MWe - 20 units / 2 standards 1.300 MWe - 4 units / 1 standard 1.450 MWe (plus EPR under construction)

• A generic approach

to life extension • Therefore a generic risk

for the nuclear strategy

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Situation Technical and regulatory age

The age of the French nuclear fleet • 30 years of operation on average

(as of 31/12/2014, since first generation)

• A huge “cliff” effect (80% of reactors in 10 years) • A decenial reactor per reactor

safety reassessement with significant gap in the actual implementation

• A growing shift between the technical

and regulatory ages - 27 reactors over 30 years of operation - only 5 have completed 3rd reassessment and obtained the authorization up to 40 years - these 5 had 34 years operation on average

• No clear definition of a “40 years” limit

- neither calendary - nor technical

NURIS 2015 – BOKU, Vienna – 17 April 2015

A triple problematic • Need to compensate ageing by reinforcements • Introduction of new safety requirements after Fukushima-Daiichi • Managing a growing uncertainty between theoretical and real status

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Safety issues

WISE-Paris

Concerns


ASN decision : come as close as possible of Generation III safety requirements (EPR)

years

Safety issues • Intractable limits of the initial design

- for 30 to 40 years of operation at most (big / not replacable components) - severe accidents discarded (before Three Mile Island and Tchernobyl)

• Unavoidable problems of ageing

- concerning big and especially not replacable components (vessel…) - concerning diffuse equipement (e.g. pipings, electric wires…)

• Major failures of “in-depth defense” approach as demonstrated

by the return of experience after Fukushima - design against external events

- reassessement of the risk of major accident on reactors - evidence of the risk of severe accident arising from spent fuel storage

• Implementation of “stress tests” conclusions still a long process => Open questions regarding the final safety requirements,

the technical options and the feasibility of their implementation

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Safety issues

WISE-Paris

Concerns



Decision process Concerns

Essential principes of access to information and participation insuffisciently met in current processes

• A technical process leading to a technical decision (between operator, TSO and regulator)

• No formal process

of public participation on generic requirements or individual decisions by reactor

• No or few formalisation

of opposable requirements => Need for a formal & serious

public participation process

Processus de décision applicable

(VD3 + ECS)


Scenarios Contrasted directions

Deteriorated safety

Maintained safety

Reinforced safety

Reference requirements

Limited evolution of existing requirements

Strong evolution of existing requirements

New set of requirements

Conformity Priority to reactive maintenance Mixed approach Priority to preventive

maintenance

Technical options

Consumption of margins, minimal reinforcements

Targeted action, ultimate “hard core”

Design upgrade, strong reinforcements

Decision process

Pursuing with existing procedures

Reinforced participation in existing procedures

First-license like public process

Délais de réalisation

Ongoing implementation through normal reexams

Anticipation, proactive implementation,

Implementation conditional to extension

S1 S2 S3


Systematic approach • Based on the analysis of stakes

and the positions taken by ASN • Based on the prevention and

mitigation of serious / major accidents: - in the reactor building - in the spent fuel building

• A detail of 36 items

grouped in 9 categories • Each item declined through

different solutions in each scenario in the realm of technical realism but not preempting their feasibility

Scenarios Technical options

Reinforcement categories

A Protection against hazards cold source, electric feed, flooding, seism, fire…

B Diffuse robustness hydraulic and electric equipments, structures…

C Prevention of accident / reactor building vessel, primary circuit, steam generators…

D Mitigation of accident / reactor building hydrogen risk, heat sink…

E Containment / reactor building filters, containment wall, core-catcher…

F Prevention of accident / fuel building additional storage, pool robustness, cooling…

G Mitigation and containment / fuel building risque hydrogène, renforcement enceinte…

H Ultimate means “hard core” for cold source, diesel generator…

I Control and crisis management I&C, control room, crisis management building

Projections for one reactor • Cautious assumptions,

medium values with uncertainty range

• High discrepancy of costs depending on the level of safety (also subject to local variations)

Scenario S1 : ~ 350 M€ ± 150 M€ Scenario S2 : ~ 1350 M€ ± 600 M€ Scenario S3 : ~ 4350 M€ ± 1850 M€

• A high profitability stake for the operator

• Uncertainty bars: - no crossing of scenarios - no change in costs ratios between scenarios

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Scenarios Cost estimates

WISE-Paris NURIS 2015 – BOKU, Vienna – 17 April 2015


Sensitivity analysis • S1 : 5 items = 50 % of uncertainty (ultimate equipments)

S3 : 4 items = 50 % of uncertainty (“bunkerisation”) S2 more balanced

• 1/4 of items make 2/3 of the global cost difference

between scenarios • Most of these items are crucial to the reinforcement

of reactors safety (especially “bunkerisation”) • These big items are also the most uncertain

(ex. between €500 M€ and 1,5 Md€ for spent fuel building) • Conversely, cost estimates are robust

to uncertainty on more diffuse costs

Scenarios Cost estimates


• The 40 years deadline (although not clearly defined) comes close, and the “cliff” effect imposes to take urgent and massive action

• The natural trend is to go for life extensions by “fait accompli” due to lack of action, in a poor political and regulatory framework

• EDF plans to invest in life extension without sufficient visibility creates a strong risk of regulatory, industrial and financial entrapment

• The issue of the safety requirements applying to extension beyond 40 years and the technical options remain uncertain, therefore also the costs

• The global life extension programme aimed for by EDF is most challenging: - technical feasibility is not guaranteed, - industrial capacity to manage heavy work on such a large scale and in such a short time is doubtful, - financial capacity of EDF is not there

• In any case, it seems that to maintain the French nuclear installed capacity at its current level is already out of reach of EDF

Conclusion Findings and recommendations


Follow-up Cost implications

€/kW Source: Global Chance

Court of Accounts: EDF plan of €55 billion is unrealistic, corrected to €110 billion First calculation of the impact on generating costs Investments bring the generating cost up to €50 to €110/MWh Current guaranteed gross tarif for generating cost is €42/MWh, ~above baseload market


National Assembly, Inquiry Commission on nuclear costs, 2014 report :

• “the report by WISE is one element of the debate on reactors’ life extension” • ASN : “the frame of analysis and the questions raised by the WISE report [are] the right ones

and widely correspond to those of ASN”

• EDF / Nuclear Division Head : “also confirmed the relevance of this work and the accuracy of a number of its assessments, although there is a big gap on 4 to 5 items which makes most of the difference between EDF and WISE”

ASN in a Parliament Hearing, 15 April 2015 :

Post-Fukushima upgrade of a reactor will cost hundreds of million euros, and is not the major part of the costs to pursue operation”

National Bill on Energy Transition (almost passed)

• No public consultation at national level on life extension programme • No definition of the starting point to count 40 years, no specific regulation • But life extension beyond 40 years of each reactor subject to a public inquiry, with EIA However, EPR crisis is likely to increase pressure for low-cost large extension

Follow-up Public debate


Two major areas for engagement of independent nuclear expertise

Monitoring the French safety assessment and decisions

• Long and complex safety assessment process is in its first phase - ASN decision on generic terms of reference of 40 yers reassessment expected end of 2015 - ASN final generic decision in principle expected around 2018 - then reactor by reactor examination

• ASN publicly keen on maintaining high requirements:

French decisions will set a strong precedent Stirring reflexion on the need for shutdown criteria • Dominant representation: safety of reactors increases with time

conformity is monitored, reinforcements are introduced • Realistic representation: safety of reactors is increasingly at risk

conception and fabrication margins are consumed, undetected non conformity increases • Need to define before it is too late what the final limit should be, e.g.

- deterministic (thresholds corresponding to the ageing of key components) - probabilistic (threshold regarding the relative increase of probability of some scenarios) - regulatory (discovery of non conformity, failure to implement due repairs in time)

Follow-up Nuclear expertise

17 WISE-Paris

Thank you for your attention and ready to answer your questions

More information :

WISE-Paris

Yves Marignac, Director

E-mail : [email protected]

Tel : +33 6 07 71 02 41


Documents

French Nuclear Reactors Reaching 40 Years - nuris.orgnuris.org/.../2015/04/...operation-of-french-nuclear-power-plants.pdf · 1! " French Nuclear Reactors Reaching 40 Years Decision