Friederick Moltmann Existence-paper

8/8/2019 Friederick Moltmann Existence-paper

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The Semantics of Existence

Friederike Moltmann

IHPST (Paris1/ENS/CNRS)

[email protected]

1. Introduction

The notion of existence has puzzled philosophers for a very long time, and a great range of

views about that notion can be found throughout the history of philosophy. While some

philosophers think that existence and ontological commitment can and perhaps should be

pursued independently of the linguistic form of the relevant sentences, the linguistic form of

statements of existence has also often been taken to be revealing as to the ontological issues

themselves. In any case, it is a worthwhile and important project to see what the actual

semantics of sentences expressing existence in fact is, and it is what the present paper aims to

pursue. This paper explores the linguistic semantics of statements of existence with respect to

its philosophically relevant aspects, but it also yields a number of results that are of interest to

linguistic semantics as such, for example concerning the distinction between stage-level andindividual-level predicates and the semantics of stative and eventive verbs.

The verb existis of course a central expression for making statements about existence.

Many philosophers have expressed particular views concerning that expression (or

occurrences of it), though at the same time existhas hardly been a subject of study in

linguistic semantics, it seems because of its apparent technical and thus marginal status. This

paper explores the semantics of sentences with verbs of existence, not just with the verb exist,

but also other predicates of existence, such as occurorobtain and the somewhat related

expression real. It appears that from the point of view of natural language semantics, existand

other existence verbs do not in fact behave that exceptionally, but pattern in a number of

respects together with other classes of predicates, in ways that are revealing for the

philosophical issues themselves. I will focus on verbs of existencewhen they occur

predicatively, as in (1) and (2):

(1) a. The man we talked about exists.

b. The golden mountain does not exist.


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(2) Electrons exist.

These examples illustrate in what ways existseems so peculiar as a predicate. In (1a), exist

appears to apply trivially, stating that an existing man exists. In (1b), existis said to be false of

the subject referent an object that is said not to exist. In (2), existseems to not act as a

predicate at all, but to express existential quantification

While there is a major philosophical tradition according to which existence statements are

not semantically subject-predicate statements, more recently a number of philosophers have

defended the view that existis in fact a first-order extensional predicate, at least with singular

terms as subjects. In this paper I will explore this view in its full generality. I will argue that

existence predicates such as existand others like occurand obtain have a particular lexical

meaning, which matches the particular nature of the entities they apply to. At the same time,

existhas certain features that make it applicable independently of the type of entities in

particular contexts. I will argue that existacts as a first-order extensional predicate also in (2),

where the bare plural has in fact the status of a kind-referring term rather than being

quantificational.

Sentences with the verb existas in (1) and (2) have a very different semantics from certain

other sentences that can be used to express existence, in particularthere-sentences and

existentially quantified sentences. There-sentences and quantificational sentences may involve

a significantly greater domain of entities than what existcould be true of. This may suggest

that existis on a par with the adjectival predicate real, but in fact the two expressions are

fundamentally different linguistically and carry different ontological implications.

I will first point out a range of differences between there-sentences and sentences with

existence predicates and propose particular lexical analyses of different existence predicates. I

then will give an account of existence statements with bare plurals and mass nouns as

involving kind reference. Finally, I will compare the predicate existto the expression real.

2. Existence statements and there-sentences

In philosophy, there are two opposing views on existence. On one view, existence is a

univocal concept and closely tied to existential quantification and counting: if there is one

thing and there is another thing, even of a very different kind, then there are two things. On

the other view, things of different kinds may exist in fundamentally different ways. While

there have been philosophical considerations put forward for the one view or the other, it


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appears that natural language in fact supports both views.1

There are two distinct types of

sentences corresponding to the two views: there-sentences as well as sentences with simple

existential quantifiers (some) reflect the first notion of existence; existence statements, which

may contain a variety of existence predicates (such as exist, occur, take place, obtain), reflect

the second notion. While there are different existence predicates for existence statements,

existat the same time has special semantic features that make it suitable as a univocal

concept, applying to entities of any sorts.

There-sentences and existence statements differ in several linguistic respects: with respect

to their syntactic structure, with respect to the ontological commitment they carry, and with

respect to any constraints on the kinds of entities they may be about.

There-sentences consist in there, followed by a verb (such as the copula be), a weak NP

(an NP carrying existential import), and possibly a 'coda', a predicative expression of some

sort; in (3a), the coda is empty giving the statement an existential interpretation; in (3b), the

coda is a location modifier, giving the statement a locational interpretation:2

(3) a. There are black swans.

b. There is [a man] [in the garden].

Existence statements have a very different syntactic structure: they are subject-predicate

sentences with a verb of existence as predicate, such as exist, occur, orobtain, and any kind of

NP (not just a weak NP) as subject, such as a singular or plural terms or a bare (that is,

determinerless) plural or mass noun:

(4) a. The president of France exists.

b. The students exist.

c. Vulcan does not exist.

d. Natural numbers exist.

1

See van Inwagen (1998) for a philosophical discussion of the two views and a defense of the former, and

McDaniel (to appear a, b) for a recent defense of the latter. The latter view was also that of Aristotle and Ryle.

2There-sentences may also contain an implicit location restriction. Thus (1b) can be understood as in (1a) in a

particular context:

(1) a. There are exactly three scientists in this laboratory that can solve the problem.

b. There are exactly three scientists that can solve the problem. (can be understood as in this laboratory)


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The common view about (4c) is that it is a quantificational statement just like (3a). I will later

argue that (4c) is in fact entirely parallel to (4a) (on its most natural reading).

There-sentences and existence statements are not just syntactically different; they also

display fundamental semantic differences.3

The first difference is one of ontological

commitment: There-sentences can quantify over past, merely possible, and merely

intentional objects, objects that exist(or other existence predicates) could not be true of:

(5) a. There are historical buildings that no longer exist.

b. There are possible buildings that do not actually exist.

c. There are imaginary buildings that do not exist.

(6) a. There are buildings built in the past that no longer exist.

b. There are buildings I might have built that do not exist.

c. There are buildings John thought of that do not exist.

In these sentences, it is the particular construction and semantic context that enables

quantification over such 'nonexistent' objects. In (5), existential quantification over past,

possible and intentional objects is made possible by the intensional adjectives historical,

possible, and imaginary. In (6), it is made possible by the use of relative clauses containing a

modal verb (requiring a relative-clause-internal interpretation of the head of the relative

clause buildings). Without such modifiers the sentences could not possibly be true:

(7) ?? There are buildings that do not exist.

The contrast between (5a, 6a) and (7) also shows that ordinary sortal predicates like building

are existence-entailing, just like existitself.Existcannot be true of past and merely possible

objects because such objects are not in the domain of the presently actual ones. Existcannot

be true of intentional objects, either. Intentional, nonexistent objects are highly controversial

and require an in-depth discussion that goes beyond the scope of this paper (McGinn 2000,

author, ms). In this paper, I will assume that natural language does permit intentional objects

as denotations of noun phrases, as is particularly plausible for sentences like (5c) and (6c),

though not too much in the subsequent discussion hinges on this assumption. I will follow

McGinn (2000) in taking intentional objects to be the denotations of NPs that fail to have an

3Priest (2005) takes there-sentences and exist-sentences to pattern the same semantically and to be distinct from

quantification (which for him allows for a grater domain of quantification), erroneously, I think.


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actual referent; intentional objects then are things that essentially do not exist, that is, for

which existis defined, but is not true of (unlike of fictional characters (author, ms)).4

Ordinary existential quantification shares with there-sentences the ability to quantify over

nonexistententities:some can be used to quantify over past, possible, and intentional objects,

while stating that they do not exist:

(8) a. Some historical buildings no longer exist.

b. Some possible buildings do not actually exist.

c. Some imaginary buildings do not exist.

It is clear from these examples that the ontological commitment that may be expressed by

there-sentences or existentially quantified sentences has to do with the use of an existence-

entailing predicate, not the there-construction or quantification as such.

The second difference concerns different types of entities. There-sentences differ from

existence statements by allowing quantification over any kind of entity:

(9) There were many objects / events / facts / situations /

The same holds for ordinary quantificational sentences, which allow for quantification over

any type of entity with the same kinds of quantifiers (some, a, ). By contrast, different

existence predicates (exist, occur, take place, obtain, remain) are generally restricted to

particular kinds of entities.Existgenerally can apply only to entities that are not events, in

particular when it involves a temporal specification (such as past tense). There are instead

specific existence predicates for events, such as occur, happen, and take place:5

(10) a. The murder * existed / ok occurred.

b. Johns speech * existed / ok took place this morning.

A-temporal existcan apply to events, but it is a use ofexistthat is to be distinguished from

tensed exist, and I will turn to it in the next section. I will come to the specific lexical

meanings of (tensed) existand occurlater, in Section 4.

4

For a critical discussion of McGinns (2000) view see van Inwagen (2008).5

I will disregard the difference between occur, happen, and take place in what follows.


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Entities such as facts, possibilities, and situations might be said to exist, but they more

naturally obtain or remain. Obtain and remain are existence predicates that are restricted to

abstract entities of the sort of facts and situations. Why do obtain and remain not apply to

ordinary objects? There is one common property of the kinds of entities that are facts or

situations, and that is that they are not in the world, but at a world, as Strawson (1950) put

it.6

A plausible view of what makes an entity be at a world rather than in the world, is that

such an entity is an abstraction from objects in the world and properties of them as well as

relations among them: it is an abstract entity and thus lacks a location, but it may be entirely

dependent on concrete objects as well as properties of them and relations among them. This

means that the predicates obtain and remain locate entities ata world, whereas existlocates

entities, at least primarily, in the world (unless used in a derivative way).7

Another existence predicate applies specifically to laws: a law exists in a state s just in case

it is validin s; in the case of laws, existence means validity. Yet another existence predicate is

live orbe alive.Live applied to biological entities presupposes a body, but the biological

entity exists just as long as it has a life. Again, thepredicate existcan somewhat marginally

be applied to biological organisms (the horse still exists, the man still exists).

Even though existin existence statements is obviously a predicate syntactically, there is a

significant philosophical tradition of proposals according to which the existence verb in such

sentences does not have the function of predicating a property of the subject referent. This

tradition includes Kants view that existence is not a property as well as Freges view

according to which existis a second-order predicate, predicated of a concept denoted by the

subject. More recently, however, some philosophers tried to do justice to the fact that existin

6

This is a view not shared by all philosophers; Austin (1979) famously disagreed with Strawson (1950) on the

ontological status of facts.

7This also holds for the possibilities that are the referents of terms of the sort the possibility thatS. Possibilities

may obtain orremain:

(1) a. The possibility that John is no longer chairman obtains.

b. The possibility that John will become chairman remains.

What are possibilities as the referents of terms like the possibility thatS ? Possibilities obviously are only partial

possible worlds, as characterized by the content of the that-clause, and in fact possibilities as referents of terms

of the sort the possibility thatS can only be epistemic possibilities, not, say, physical, deontic, or metaphysical

possibilities. Thus, the possibility that John is no longer chairman exists, because his not being chairman any

longer is not excluded by what the interlocutors are supposed to know. But there can be no such thing as the

possibility that John can lift the table, understood as physical possibility; or the possibility that we may enter the

room, understood as deontic possibility; and the possibility that I do not exist does not obtain because of what is

metaphysically possible, but rather it is excluded because of what I know. Possibilities are in fact not on a par

with possible objects which have being independently of what is actually the case and what is actually known.


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existence statements is a predicate linguistically and have argued that at least with singular

terms as in (4a,b) existacts as a predicate also semantically (Salmon (1987, 1998), Miller

(1986), McGinn (2000)). The fact that existis not true of all the objects one can quantify over

or make reference to was a crucial motivation for Salmon to take it to be a predicate; the fact

that different existence predicates apply to different kinds of entities gives a good piece of

further support for the view. It means that existence predicates have a particular lexical

content, imposing particular conditions on the objects they can apply to.

3. A secondary meaning ofexist

Different kinds of existence predicates appear to attribute particular ways of being to

particular types of entities, whereas existential quantification just counts entities in whatever

way they are. Yet not all existence predicates are alike in that respect. Even though exist

occurs as a predicate with a lexical meaning restricting it to entities with no temporal parts, it

has special features making it in some sense applicable to the larger domain of entities as

such.

This peculiarity ofexistmanifests itself in three kinds of contexts. First, existappears to be

able to apply to intentional entities of any sort in negative existence statements and questions,

as in (11) or, in fact, to entities that might have been merely intentional entities, as in (12):

(11) a. The Third World War does not exist.

b. Does the Third World War exist?

(12) The medieval war mentioned in the book exists.

Crucially, on this use, existis tensed, and applies even to objects in the past without temporal

specification.

Other existence predicates cannot apply in this way: occur, happen, and take place can

never apply to enduring objects or facts and obtain can never apply to events or enduring

objects, live can never apply to non-biological entities, and is validcannot apply to other

things than laws. This difference is obviously a difference in the presuppositional part of the

lexical meanings of the predicates in question: existis false of entities if they are merely

intentional; all other existence predicates are false of entities if they are intentional entities of

the presupposed type.


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Existis special also in its ability to occur with bare plurals and mass nouns that may

describe entities of any sort:

(13) a. Great wars still exist.

b. Political protests do not exist in Bhutan.

Finally, existdiffers from other existence predicates in its ability to occur in there-

sentences:

(14) a. There exists a man that can solve the problem.

b. There exists a man in Germany that can solve the problem.

Among the other existence predicates only locational or existential remain are possible in

there-sentences:

(15) a. There remained three people in the garden.

b. There remains no other possibility.

All other existence predicates do not fare that well in there-sentences:

(16) a. ? There occurred three murders this morning.

b. ?? There took place a protest in this country.

c. ?? There obtains no other possibility.

d. ?? There live still three men of her family.

There are different views of how there-sentences are interpreted and these observations

obviously bear on the issue. On one view, discussed in Higginbotham (1987), what follows

there is just interpreted like an ordinary existence statement, in virtue of a movement of the

weak NP to sentence-initial position, to replace there. Thus, (15a) is interpreted as in (17a)

and (15b) as in (17b):

(17) a. Three people remained in the garden.

b. No other possibility remains.


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There are problems for this view, though. One of them is the inability of most predicates of

existence to occur afterthere, whether they are existence predicates of objects, events, or

situations.8 Ordinary existence predicates, with their ordinary meaning, simply do not occur in

there-sentences, and existis entirely exceptional in that respect. According to Higginbotham,

be in there-sentences is in fact the be of existence, a problematic suggestion because be is

hardly used for expressing existence anymore. A more plausible view ofbe in there-sentences

than as existential is as locational be (as inJohn is in Paris), so that the coda is considered a

specification of a location in a somewhat extended sense (including a domain of entities

sharing a property).

If the verb in there-sentences is a predicate of location, also the possibility ofremain in

there-sentences, as opposed to other existence predicates, is explained: only remain, not the

other existence predicates, has a locational use (John remained in Paris). Given this

generalization, existin there-sentences should also be considered locational, acting somewhat

pleonastically as equivalent to locational be. I take this to be a secondary meaning ofexist, a

meaning available only in a context in which existcannot occur as a true existence predicate

with its usual lexical meaning (which I turn to in the next section). On the locational use, exist

expresses a relation between entities (of any sort) and locations; the location is specified by

the overt location modifier or in the absence of a location modifier, it will be the actual world,

as in (14a).

Ifexisthas a secondary meaning as a locational predicate, this can explain its application to

objects not satisfying the sortal requirements ofexistas an existence predicate. In there-

sentences, existoccurs with its locational meaning and thus does not impose a sortal

requirement at all. Also, ifexistin negative existentials as in (14a) has in fact a locational

meaning, it will not require that objects it applies to be enduring objects. Rather, here the

presupposition is simply that the subject stands for a non-intentional or an intentional object;

in the former case, existis true of the object, in the latter it is not:

(18) [exist]w

([NP]) = 1 if [NP] is a non-intentional object,

[exist]w([NP]) = 0 if [NP] is an intentional object,

[exist]w([NP]) = undefined otherwise, , i.e. if [NP] is empty.

8

Another argument against the view is that in many languages verbs occur after existential pleonastic pronouns

that have no use as existence predicates. Thus, French has avoirhave in existential sentences, and German

geben give.


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The secondary location meaning will also be relevant when specifying the particular meaning

existhas with bare plurals and mass nouns.

4. The primary meaning ofexistand the meaning ofoccur

We can now turn to the particular lexical content ofexistand occur. The difference between

existand occurindicates that existdoes not just locate entities in a world at a time; rather it

does it in a way that has to do with a fundamental difference between objects and events.9

Objects and events differ fundamentally in their ability to have temporal parts, at least

according to one important view10

: according to that view, events are perduring entities with

temporal parts, whereas objects are enduring objects that have only spatial parts. An object is

an entity that is wholly present at each instance of its lifespan. By contrast, at a given moment

that is a proper part of an events duration, only a temporal part of the event is present, not the

whole of the event. Thus, in first approximation, the conditions on the application ofexist

may be stated as follows:

(19) a. For an entity x that cannot have temporal parts,

existis true of x at a time t in a world w iff for any subinterval t' of t, (the whole of) x

is present at t in w.

b. For an entity x that can have temporal parts,

occuris true of x at a time t in a world w iff for any proper part t' of t, only some

proper part of x is present at t' in w.

Stating the content ofexistand occurin terms of such application conditions on objects does

not yet account, though, for some crucial difference between the two verbs, namely the fact

9Existcan also apply to a temporal stage of an individual:

(1) The Berlin of the 1920ies

does not exist anymore.

This means that a temporal stage of an individual still has the ontological status of an object, not that of an event;

that is, its parts are not temporal.

10

There are also philosophical views, for example that of Sider (2001), according to which both objects andevents can have temporal parts and thus according to which there is no fundamental ontological difference

between objects and events. Natural language does not seem to reflect that view, though.


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that existis a stative verb and occur an eventive verb. This difference is particularly apparent

from the possibility of applying the progressive to occur, but not to exist:

(20) a. * The building is currently existing.

b. The protest is finally occurring / taking place.

The difference is also reflected in the corresponding nominalizations. The existence of the

buildingclearly describes a state, whereas the occurrence of the protestdescribes an event.

The latter can have typical event properties, such as being sudden, which the former cannot.

Given the Davidsonian view on which events act as implicit arguments of verbs, the event

or state that nominalizations stand for is quite simply the implicit event or state argument of

the verb from which the nominalization was derived. Given that view, existis a stative verb

which describes states that would also be the referents of NPs with the corresponding

nominalization, such as the existence of the president of France, whereas occuris an

accomplishment or achievement verb that describes events that would also be the referents of

NPs with the corresponding nominalization, such as the occurrence of the murder.

The occurrence of the murder is not the same event as the murder: The latter may have

been done with an axe, may have been grisly and brutal; the former cannot be any of that;

though it could be sudden, unexpected, or early. An occurrence of an event e in fact is an

event that does not have any inherent qualitative properties and in that respect generally

differs from e; it is an event that is entirely constituted by transitions from the temporal

location of one part of e to the temporal location of another part of e. Thus, occurwhen

applied to an event e describes another event that consists in the transitions among the

presences of the parts of e at relevant subintervals that belong to the duration of e. Exist

when applied to an object x, by contrast, describes a state that is the presence of the whole of

x during the time in question. With Davidsonian event arguments, the lexical meaning ofexist

and occurcan thus be characterized as below:

(21) a. For a world w, an entity x without temporal parts, and an interval t, [exist]w,t

iff e consists in the presence of (the whole of) x in w at t for any subinterval t of t.

b. For a world w, an entity e with temporal parts, and an interval t,

[occur]w,t iff e consists of transitions from the presence of e in w at t to

the presence of e in w at t for any minimal parts e and e of e for which there are

subsequent subintervals t and t at which e and e take place.


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Thus, the lexical content ofexistinvolves mapping an object onto a (non-qualitative) state of

the object at a time. The lexical content ofoccurinvolves mapping an event onto a non-

qualitative event that reflects the temporal part structure of the former.

The difference in the kinds of events that existand occurdescribe can explain a further

difference between the two existence predicates, namely a difference in location modification.

Existence statements with occurdo allow for location restrictions:

(22) The murder occurred in Munich.

By contrast, location restrictions (modifying the verb or entire sentence, not the subject) are

generally not possible in existence statements with exist. With singular terms and strong

quantifiers, such modifiers are completely excluded:

(23) a.* The man we talked about exists in another city.

b. * Mary does not exist in Germany.

(24) a. * Every cat we talked about exists in this city.

b. * Most people mentioned in this book exist in Germany.

c. * The only man who can solve the problem exists in Germany.

Exist-sentences with singular terms do not allow an implicit location restriction either:

(25) a.* The man we talked about exists. (to be understood: in another city).

b. * Mary does not exist. (to be understood: in Germany).

(26) a. ?? At least five million people exist. (to be understood: in this country).

b.?? Several universities exist. (to be understood: in this city).

There are two exceptions to the constraint against location modifiers in existence statements,

First, with weak quantifiers as subjects, location modifiersare at least marginally acceptable:

(27) a. ?? At least five million people exist in this country.

b.?? Several universities exist in this city.

c. Several / Exactly three hundred / At least ten cats exist in this village


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Second, exist-sentences with bare plurals or mass nouns as subjects are unproblematic with

location modifiers:

(28) a. Giraffes exist only in Africa.

b. Wild ponies do not exist in Germany.

c. Pure air does not exist in China anymore.

Both cases can be accounted for on the basis of the secondary locational meaning ofexist.

The relative tolerance of location modifiers in (27) can be related to the acceptability of

location modifiers in the corresponding there-sentences:

(29) a. There exist at least five million people in this country.

b. There exist three scientists in this city.

The sentences in (27) in fact arguably are derived from the same underlying syntactic

structure as a there-sentence, by moving the weak NP in postverbal position into the position

that would, without movement, be spelled out as there. In that construction, recall, existcan

occur only with its locational meaning, not as a true existence predicate.11

That meaning is also at stake in exist-sentences with bare plurals or mass nouns as

subjects, as I will argue in the next section.

Not all adverbial modifiers are unacceptable in exist-sentences. Temporal modifiers are

unproblematic in existence statements with exist, just as in there-sentences:

(30) a. One building in this village still exists.

b. There is still one building in the destroyed village.

The restriction against location modifiers with existcan be explained given recent linguistic

work on the semantics of stative verbs. Given a Davidsonian event semantics, adverbial

modifiers will be predicates of an implicit event argument. Since events are generally spatio-

temporally located, existeither does not have an event argument or else its event argument is

11

Williams (1984) argued that the subject position ofthere-sentences and the postverbal weak NP are linked by

coindexing; the proposal would be that such coindexing would permit movement of the postverbal NP into

subject position, before there-insertion.


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of a sort that would not be spatially located. Whereas some semanticists such as Katz (2003)

propose that stative verbs in general lack an event argument (but perhaps have a time

argument instead), I will follow Maienborn (2001, 2007) according to whom also stative

verbs have an implicit event argument position, namely for states. Moreover, I will follow

Maienborn (2007) in distinguishing two kinds of stative verbs. Stative verbs such assit, wait,

stand, orsleep take concrete states as arguments (Davidsonian states, as Maienborn calls

them). Such verbs allow for location modifiers, as well as manner modifiers, and they can act

as infinitival complements of perception verbs:

(31) a. John sat in the corner.

b. John sat awkwardly.

c. Mary saw John sit in the corner.

By contrast, stative verbs such as own, belong, resemble, and know do not allow for location

modifiers or manner adverbials, and they cannot act as infinitival complements of perception

verbs:

(32) a. * John resembles Mary in Germany.

b. * John resembles Mary with effort.

c. * Bill saw John resemble Mary.

Maienborn calls the state arguments of such verbs Kimian states, following Kims (1980)

conception of events. According to that conception, events are implicitly defined in terms of

their existence and identity conditions, on the basis of individuals, properties and times,

(33) a. For a property P, an object o and a time t, the event f(P, o, t) exists if Pt(o).

b. Two events f(P, o, t) and f(P, o, t) are identical iff P = P, o = o, t = t.

Kimian events are abstract; they are in fact obtained by abstraction in a Fregean sense. (33a,b)

are abstraction principles that provide identity conditions for events, but no such properties as

location or duration. Kimian events are thus not in, but at the world.

It is generally agreed that the conditions in (33) actually define facts rather than events.

But it is a definition that, with one modification, is also suited for states. States are like facts

in that they naturally 'obtain', rather than exist and thus are just as abstract as facts, not being


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in, but at the world. States have a duration, though. This can be captured by taking states to

be obtained just from a property and an individual, with an additional condition specifying the

duration of a state, as in (34c):

(34) a. For a property P and an individual o, the state s(P, o) obtains just in case for some

time t, Pt(o).

b. Two states s(P, o), s(P, o) are identical in case P = P and o = o.

c. A state s(P, o) obtains at a time t just in case Pt(o).

Given their abstract status, as entities implicitly defined by the conditions in (34), states will

fail to have a location, will not allow for particular manifestations, and are not possible

objects of perception. More precisely this holds for Kimian states, which I will now call

abstract states to distinguish them from concrete states.

Existclearly classifies with abstract state verbs. Besides not permitting location modifiers,

existdoes not allow for manner adverbials, unless existis coerced into a concrete way of

being reading (on which existwould also take location modifiers):12

(35) a.?? The man we talked about exists quietly / discretely / secretly.

b. ?? The animal exists peacefully in the forest.

Existmoreover cannot be used in an infinitival complement of perception verbs:

(36) * John saw the house exist for a long time.

The incompatibility of location modifiers with existthus follows from existtaking abstract

states as event arguments. But what kinds of abstract states would these be, from what sort of

property would they be obtained, given the definition in (34)? The property on which the

abstract state argument of a stative verb should be based cannot be the property expressed by

the stative verb itself; otherwise there would be a circularity: the argument of the verb would

then in fact be dependent on the content of the verb itself. In the case ofexist, the property

should be a time-relative property -- or a relation between properties and times, which holds

12

See Maienborn (2007) for the possibility of coercion of state verbs into an eventive reading.


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of a time t and an object x in case at any subinterval of t (the whole of) x is present, as in

(37a). An event argument ofexistrelative to a time and an individual will then be as in (37b):

(37) a. P = tx[t < t AT(x, t)]

b. For a time t, an event e and an individual x, [exist]tiff e = f(P(t), x)

We can now turn to occurrences. Occurrences may also seem abstract: they are not

qualitative, and as we have seen, do not permit manner adverbials or instrumentals. However,

occurrences, like basically all events, still can be located in space:

(38) Johns murder occurred / took place in Germany.

Moreover, they can be the object of perception:

(39) John saw the murder occur this morning.

Even if occurrences cannot have a range of qualitative features, they are still concrete, in the

sense of being 'in' the world, with a spatio-temporal location, perceivability, and causal

efficaciousness. Thus occurrences cannot be conceived of as abstract states, as being obtained

from properties and objects by abstraction. Occurrences need to be conceived of as

qualitatively 'thin' but still concrete events. I suggest that events in general should be

construed in terms of the notion of a concrete state, as transitions among concrete states.

Concrete states in turn may be conceived of as being composed of individuals and particular

features of those individuals. Qualitatively thick events will generally be transitions among

concrete states composed of individuals and qualitative features. By contrast, occurrences can

be viewed as transitions from compositions of event parts with the temporal feature being at

a particular time, to other compositions of this sort. If we take c to be the relevant

composition function, then the occurrence relation can be characterized as follows:

(40) For events e and e and a time t, [occur]t iff e = transit(c(e1, x[AT(x, t1)),

c(e2, x[AT(x, t2)), ) and e1, , en are relevant temporal parts, with t1, , tn as

their duration.


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Given this account, occurrences are as concrete as other events; they will just involve less

qualitatively specified concrete states.

5. Other modes of existence

The different kinds of verbs of existence with their restrictions to particular kinds of entities

support the old philosophical view according to which there are different modes of existence

for different kinds of entities. There is one other mode of existence that is interesting to

consider in relation to natural language, and that is that of dependent existence, recently

discussed by McDaniel (to appear a, b). Both properties and tropes according to Aristotle

involve a notion of existence in, that is, a two-place notion of existence that holds between

substances and dependent entities (on Aristotles view). Another form of dependent existence

involves entities like holes, entities constituted by the absence of material. Natural languages

appear in fact to display a particular construction expressing dependent existence, such as the

have-construction in English. The object position ofhave is, like there-sentences, subject to

the indefiniteness effect, and the have-construction can express both the particular relation

between a substance and a property or trope and that between a substance and a hole:

(41) a. John has the property of being happy.

b. John has intelligence / fear / joy.

(42) The box has a hole.

This suggests that the have-construction expresses dependent existence, whereas there-

sentences express location-bound existence (in the broadest sense). (Though of course the

have-construction is polysemous and in addition expresses other dependence relations than

ontological ones, such as possession and kinship (John has a car,John has a child)).

6. Existence statements with bare plurals and mass nouns

6.1. Bare plurals and mass nouns as kind-referring terms

Let us now turn to existence statements with bare plurals or mass nouns as subjects:

(43) a. Giraffes exist.


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b. White gold exists.

The general view in the philosophical literature is that such sentences have a fundamentally

different logical form from those with singular terms in that they are quantificational

sentences. That is, existin such sentences would contribute to the expression of existential

quantification rather than acting as a predicate of individuals.

There is a range of evidence that shows that this view is mistaken. It appears that with the

verb existbare plurals and mass nouns are not (or at least not generally) quantificational NPs,

expressing existential quantification. Rather they are kind terms in the sense of Carlson

(1977). Thus,giraffes in (43a) stands for the kind whose instances are particular giraffes and

white goldin (43b) for the kind whose instances are particular quantities of gold. With exist,

bare plurals and mass nouns are kind-referring terms just as with kind predicates such as rare,

widespread, orextinct, that is, instance-distribution predicates:

(44) a. Giraffes are rare.

b. Dinosaurs are extinct.

Carlson (1977) had argued that bare plurals and mass nouns are in fact always kind-

referring, but that they trigger different readings with different classes of predicates. There are

two classes of predicates that are particularly important in that respect: so-called stage-level or

episodic predicates on the one hand and individual-level orcharacterizing predicates on the

other hand (Carlson 1977, Kratzer 1995). Roughly speaking, episodic predicates express

properties perceived as temporary, and characterizing predicates properties perceived as

permanent (and thus in particular essential properties). Carlson (1977), who introduced the

distinction in the context of the semantics of bare plurals and mass nouns, called the first class

stage-level because they are predicates that when predicated of an individual can be taken to

be predicated of just a temporal stage of the individual, whereas individual-level predicates

were so-called because they can be understood only as predicates predicated of an individual

as such. The terms episodic predicate and characterizing predicate avoid making a

distinction between individuals and their temporal stages (Krifka et al. (1995)).

The two classes of predicates characteristically exhibit different readings with bare plurals

and mass nouns. With episodic predicates, bare plurals and mass nouns trigger existential

quantification over the instances of the kind, as in (45), whereas with characterizing

predicates, they trigger generic or universal quantification, as in (46):


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(45) a. Firemen are available.

b. Water is nearby.

(46) a. Apples are healthy.

b. Water is transparent.

The logical form of (45a) would thus be as in (47a) and the one of (45b) as in (47b), where I

is the instantiation relation and Gn is a suitable generic quantifier (cf. Krifka et al. 1995):

(47) a. x (x I [firemen] & available(x))

b. Gn x (x I [apples] healthy(x))

It is also generally held that bare plurals and mass nouns allow for a generic (habitual) reading

with episodic predicates; thus (45a) also has the reading: for any firemen x, x is available. By

contrast, characterizing predicates do not allow for an existential reading.

Carlsons view according to which bare plurals and mass nouns are always kind-referring

is not universally accepted. More common in fact is the view that in addition to being kind-

referring, bare plurals and mass nouns may also have an interpretation on which they express

existential quantification (with episodic predicates), a view I will turn to further below.

However, whatever view one may adopt, the various arguments for kind reference do apply to

bare plurals and mass nouns with the predicate exist; thus establishing bare plurals and mass

nouns are kind-referring in that particular context.

First, definite anaphora behave with bare plurals differently from NPs that clearly express

existential quantification, such as three dinosaurs:

(48) a. Dinosaurs do not exist. But they once did exist.

b. Three dinosaurs do not exist. * But they (three dinosaurs or other) once did exist.

They in (48a) stands for the entire kind, the denotation ofdinosaurs, but they in (48b) can only

stand for particular instances of the kind, which is unsuitable for the predicate once did exist.

Furthermore, bare plurals and mass nouns in exist-sentences do not take wide scope over

negation or other quantifiers:

(49) a. Dinosaurs do not exist anymore. (* for some dinosaurs x, x does not exist anymore)


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b. Two dinosaurs do not exist anymore. (ok: for two dinosaurs x, x does not exist

any more)

Ifdinosaurs in (49a) stands for a kind, then notcan only deny the holding of the predicate of

the entire kind, not of just some instances. By contrast, two dinosaurs in (49b) can take scope

overnot.

Another piece of evidence for kind reference with existis that bare plurals and mass nouns

in the subject position of a sentence with existcan be modified by a relative clause whose

predicate is an instance-distribution predicate:

(50) Dinosaurs, which used to be widespread in Europe, do not exist anymore.

Further evidence comes from temporal modifiers. Stilland no longerin (51a, b) are

understood so as to qualify the entire lifespan of the kind and not that of particular instances:

(51) a. Dolphins still exist.

b. Dinosaurs no longer exist.

The same point is made by aspectual predicates such as continue and cease:

(52) a. Dinosaurs continued to exist.

b. Dinosaurs ceased to exist.

Only the entire kind can be said to continue or cease to exist.

Yet another argument for kind reference with existcomes from location modifiers, which,

recall, are possible in exist-sentences with bare plurals or mass nouns as subjects. This is

again seen below:


b. Syphilis does not exist in Europe anymore.

I will come to an explanation for the possibility of location modifiers on the basis of kind

reference at the end of this section.


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A final piece of evidence that bare plurals are kind-referring with existis that singular

indefinite NPs and other existentially quantified NPs are significantly less natural as subjects

ofexist-sentences:

(54) a. ? A giraffe exists.

b. ? Some giraffes exist.

Intuitively, (54a) is about the existence of a single giraffe, not about giraffes as such; similarly

(54b) states that for some x that are giraffes, x exist. It does not just say that there are giraffes

or that giraffes exist. That is, in (54a) and (54b), a andsome and existdo not merge into a

single existential quantifier, but ratherexistis predicated of entities that a giraffe orsome

giraffes quantifies over. The logical form of (54a) would thus be as in (55a), whereas the

logical form of (54a) would be as in (55b), for the kind of giraffes k:

(55) a. x(giraffe(x) & exist(x))

b. exist(k)

We can thus conclude that bare plurals and mass nouns in exist-sentences are kind terms.

The view that bare plurals or mass nouns in existence statements are kind-referring has almost

never been pursued in the philosophical literature, which generally takes those NPs to be

quantificational (somehow merging their semantic contribution with that ofexist).13

There is some evidence that bare plurals and mass nouns may also sometimes act as

existential quantifiers even in exist-sentences. First of all, there is somewhat indirect evidence,

coming from languages such as French and Italian which do not have bare plurals or mass

nouns. In French and Italian, definite plurals and mass nouns are used as kind terms (les

giraffes the giraffes, lorGold), and NPs with de are used for existential quantification.

(Jean a achet des livres John has bought books,Jean a bu du vin John drank wine). In

exist-sentences, often both options are possible:

13One exception is Geach (1968), who suggests that existcan apply to bare plurals as well as singular terms for

the same reason that a predicate like disappearcan apply to the two kinds of terms:

(1) a. John disappeared.

b. Dinosaurs disappeared.

Disappearin (1b) is a typical kind predicate, an instance-distribution predicate, see the end of this section.


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(56) a. Les nombres naturels existent.

b. Des nombres naturels existent.

Natural numbers exist.

However, when the nominal does not describe a natural class or kind (that is, a maximal

collection of resembling particulars), the second option is better:

(57) Des nombres primes entre 10 et 15 / ?? Les nombres primes entre 10 et 15 existent.

Prime numbers between 10 and 15 exist.

In that case, English would also use the bare plural, as indicated in the translation of (57).

There is also evidence from English that bare plurals in such contexts are existentially

quantified, rather than kind-referring, and that is that simple bare plurals such as natural

numbers and bare plurals such as prime numbers between 10 and 15 behave differently with

respect to anaphora support, as illustrated below:

(58) a. * Prime numbers between 10 and 15 exist. I did not think that they would exist.

b. Natural numbers exist; I did not think that they would exist.

Kind referring they as in the second sentences cannot take existentially quantified bare plurals

as antecedent. Thus, some bare plurals or mass nouns with existare in fact used as

existentially quantified NPs, rather than as kind-referring, namely precisely those for which

the descriptive content of the NP would make kind reference implausible.14

6.2. Kind reference of bare plurals and mass nouns with exist

In general, existholds of a kind (as denoted by a bare plural or mass noun) just in case there

are instances of the kind that exist. Existential quantification is clearly involved in cases like

the following:

(59) a. Electrons exist.

14See also Chierchia (1998) on conditions on bare plurals and mass nouns to be interpreted by existential

quantification rather than kind reference.


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b. Unicorns exist.

c. Prime numbers exist.

d. White gold exists.

e. True justice exists.

That is, a kind exists in virtue of there being actual instances.

The existential reading obviously classifies existas an episodic predicate. Before

discussing why existshould classify as episodic, let us consider whetherexistcan also display

a generic reading, as would be expected for stage-level predicates. Such a reading generally

goes along with focusing the predicate, and indeed the reading seems to be possible with

suitable examples. Thus (59a) can also be read: electrons really exist, and do not just have a

theoretical status in science; the generic quantifiers here is naturally restricted contextually,

as roughly in any electron predicted by theory really does exist;

There is another class of examples that naturally display a universal reading with exist, and

these are mathematical examples. Mathematical examples figure prominently in a recent

paper by Fine (to appear), who points out that the statement in (60a) is intuitively stronger

than that in (60b):

(60) a. Integers exist.

b. Natural numbers exist.

(60a) appears to claim the existence of every integer, not just some integer (which may in fact

be a natural number). By contrast, (60b) claims the existence of only every natural number.

However, on the view on which existence statements express existential quantification, the

converse holds: (60b) would make a stronger statement than (60a).

Fines use of such examples was to make a general point about ontological commitment,

namely that statements of ontological commitment in general involve universal quantification

and thus require existto act as a predicate roughly equivalent to real. If there are statements of

ontological commitment that are universally quantified, as (60a) and (60b) appear to be, then,

as Fine argues, statements of ontological commitment in fact involve a domain of entities

which may or may not be real and state which ones in them exist, that is, are real. For that

reason, existhas to be a predicate, in fact a predicate roughly synonymous with real.


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Statements of ontological commitment to kinds thus presuppose a domain of light entities

and involve predication of a property of existence of such entities.15 The logical form of (60a),

Fine argues, is then as in (61a), or equivalently as in (61b):

(61) a. For every x (integer(x) x exist)

b. For every x (integer(x) real(x))

(Later I will argue that the semantics ofrealis in fact fundamentally different from that of

exist, and that it in particular triggers a different reading with bare plurals.)

It does not seem that the universal reading of the examples in (61) is exactly the same

phenomenon as the generic reading which existas an episodic predicate is predicted to

display. The universal reading displayed by (61a, b) corresponds to an entirely neutral

intonation and moreover, it appears to be the only reading available. In such examples, the

universal reading in fact seems to be a secondary effect of what the sentences actually mean, a

meaning that would involve existential quantification, not universal quantification. The

universal reading in (60a) and (60b) appears to be a pragmatic effect of the particular kind of

entity the bare plural stands for: in the case of clearly defined mathematical sequences,

accepting one simply means accepting all. Note that the same effect seems to be displayed by

the corresponding there-sentences:

(62) a. There really are integers.

b. There really are natural numbers.

Also (62a) seems to make a stronger statement than (62b).16

15

Existalso occurs with definite plurals:

(1) The integers exist.

Such sentences have only a universal reading, on which (1) is equivalent to (2):

(2) Every integer exists.

But the logical form of (1) does not consist in universal quantification. Rather it involves plural reference and an

obligatorily distributive reading ofexist:

(3) a. For a plurality x, exists(x) iff for every member y of x, exist(y).

b. A predicate P is obligatorily distributive iff for any plurality x, P(x) iff for any member y of x, P(y).

That is, (1) consists in a plural description and a predicate that when applied to the plurality denoted by thedescription automatically applies to each instance.


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The universal-quantification effect shows up also with certain kinds of mathematical sets

or classes:

(63) a. Geometrical figures exist.

b. Triangles exist.

c. Equilateral triangles exist.

The universal effect is somewhat less obvious in (63b) and still less obvious in (63c). The

reason is that (63c), and perhaps (63b), does not answer a sufficiently plausible question of

mathematical ontology concerning the ontological nature of a geometrical form, but rather

asks for an example of a geometrical form with a particular specification. The universal-

quantification effect in (63a, b) should thus be traced to a pragmatic implication rather than

the logical form of the sentences themselves.17

Fine certainly is wrong in maintaining that existalways triggers a universal reading with

bare plurals. With non-mathematical kinds, an existential reading is clearly the natural

reading, whereas with mathematical kinds a universal reading appears to be a pragmatic

effect rather than a matter of interpretation. What then about the generic reading that is

available with exist? Such a reading does seem to be of the kind Fine envisioned: here a

domain of light entities in the domain of discourse is presupposed and existstates that they

really exist.

16The universal quantification effect is particularly strong if the sentence states that a kind exists in virtue of

there being an instance. If the sentence explicitly quantifies over instances only and claims that at least one

exists, the universal quantification effect is less strong. Thus, the sentences below do not differ in the way (40a,

b) do.

(1) a. Some integer exists.

b. Some natural number exists.

17 The universal-quantification effect shows up also with believe in, a predicate expressing objectual ontologicalcommitment (Szabo 2003):

(1) a. John believes in unicorns.

b. John believes in integers.

c. John believes in natural numbers.

According to (1a), John is right in his belief if there are some unicorns, whereas for John to be right in his

belief according to (1b) and (1c) all integers / natural numbers need to exist.

Note, though, that believe in does not always require the existence of all or some instances of the kind for the

agent to be right in his belief. Given (2), John can be right in his belief even if there is in fact no actual instance

of true justice:

(2) John believes in true justice.


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By displaying an existential reading as well as, with some effort, a generic reading, exist

classifies as an episodic predicate. The question then is, what sense can one make of the

classification ofexistas an episodic predicate.

6.3. The individual-stage level distinction and exist

The characterizing-episodic distinction is known to be a notoriously problematic distinction.

There are many predicates that seem to express temporary properties but that do not trigger an

existential reading of bare plurals.Nervous, happy, orsickare examples, which contrast thus

with predicates like available, audible, orvisible, which do trigger an existential reading.

Moreover, many predicates that one might classify as characterizing predicates may trigger

existential readings at least in object position, such as belong, own, contain, and include.

Whether such verbs should be considered characterizing or episodic, clearly the object

position of such predicates goes along with an existential reading, whereas the subject

position goes along with a generic reading:

(64) a. Very rich men own expensive cars.

b. Shells contain pearls.

In fact, the existential reading that many episodic predicates seem to trigger does not seem

tied to a kind-referring use of a bare plural, but rather an existentially quantified use. This is

particularly clear when using the anaphora test for kind reference. The anaphora test indicates

that with standard episodic predicates such as buy ordisappearno kind reference is

involved:

(65) a. ?? John bought apples. Mary bought them too.

b. ?? Gold coins have disappeared. They have never disappeared before.

This also holds for the paradigmatic episodic adjectives available and visible:

(66) a. ? Firemen are available. They were not available yesterday.

b. ? Stars are visible in the sky. They were not visible yesterday night.


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In fact, it has been observed that the existential reading of such examples goes along with

stress on the subject, which is indicative of an interpretation as existential quantification

rather than kind reference (whereas with existstress was on the predicate) (cf. Krifka et al.

1995).

The same observation about anaphora can be made for the object position ofown and

contain:

(67) a. ?? Very rich men own expensive cars, though 200 years ago they could not own them.

b. Shells contain pearls. ?? But actually they do not always contain them.

Yet there are also cases of episodic predicates that involve kind reference and trigger an

existential reading, such as taste and live from:

(68) a. Mary has tasted black beans. Joe has tasted them too.

b. Mary lived from black beans. Joe lived from them too.

Thus, existential readings with kind-referring bare plurals appear significantly more limited

than is often assumed, and it is just one of a range of lexically specific readings that predicates

may display with kind-referring bare plurals. Yet there is, in such a more restricted range of

cases, a correlation between episodic predicates and an interpretation of the bare plural

involving existential quantification.

But how can existclassify as an episodic predicate when its application obviously is never

limited to a temporal stage of an individual, but applies to the individuals entire life-span?

There is one obvious criterion classifying existas an episodic predicate in the case of concrete

individuals, and that is that existexpresses an accidental property.18 Concrete individuals must

have the essential properties they have, but they need not have existed. Identifying episodic

predicates with those expressing accidental properties and characterizing ones with those

expressing essential properties is not unproblematic, though. Existence could not be an

18Another criterion may take into account the entire period during which a predicate could be true of an

individual, including the time after the individuals existence, such as the time of the individuals influence.Exist

then comes out a predicate that may apply to only a subinterval of such a period. But also predicates expressing

essential properties, except for those relating to the individuals influence (for example, is a philosopher), wouldcome out as episodic.


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accidental property of abstract objects (such as mathematical objects), whichexist necessarily

(if they exist).1920

However, it appears that in general a predicate is classified as either episodic or

characterizing not on the basis of whether the property it expresses is an essential property of

the object in question or not. Rather a predicate appears to be classified as episodic or

characterizing on the basis of certain kinds of, lets say, primary objects to which it applies

and then the classification is carried over to other objects to which the predicate may also

apply, possibly with an extended meaning. For example, colors are properties that are

essential with some entities (paint), but not others (tables), yet bare plurals and mass nouns

always display a universal, not an existential reading with color adjectives. Thus (69a) and

(69b) could not be true in virtue of an existential reading; they are false because only a

universal reading is available:

(69) a. Paint is red.

b. Tables are red.

Redalways classifies as a characterizing predicate.

In general, then, predicates classify either as episodic or characterizing as such, not when

applied to one sort of object as opposed to another. Predicates appear to decide whether they

are characterizing or episodic on the basis of one type of object and then carry over their

classification also when applied to other types of objects. Forredthe type of object on the

basis of which the classification as episodic or characterizing is made are essentially red

objects, forexistit is concrete objects that exist only accidentally, not abstract objects.

6.4. The formal semantics of existence statements with bare plurals or mass nouns

Turning now to the logical form ofexist-sentences with bare plurals or mass nouns, it appears

that they do not express simple existential quantification over instances with the predicate

existapplying to some instances; that is, (70a) is not quite equivalent to (70b):

19There are also, it has been argued, abstract objects that exist only accidentally, namely fictional characters

conceived of as abstract artifacts (cf. Thomasson 1999). Laws and institutions may be other cases.

20One might argue that that existclassifies as a characterizing predicate with abstract objects and that this is in

fact the source of the universally quantified reading that existexhibits with mathematical objects. However, I

found that speakers generally have the intuition of a primarily existential reading, with the universalunderstanding being a secondary effect. Moreover, predicates in general do not seem to change their

classification as episodic or characterizing depending on the type of object they apply to (see below).


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b. Some electrons exist.

(70a) claims the existence of a kind and not just the existence of some individual instance

though a kind exists in virtue of there being instances.

That the kind-related application of an episodic predicate is not entirely reducible to the

application of the very same predicate to some instance can be observed with other predicates

as well, such as discoverorrecognize:

(71) a. Joe discovered white gold -- in virtue of coming across some instances.

b. John recognized tuberculosis (by examining an instance of it).

Given this observation and the fact that the existential reading of kind predicates with

episodic predicates is much more restricted than generally supposed, it is not surprising that

the kind-related interpretation ofexistis not derived by simple existential quantification over

instances. Rather, the kind-related interpretation may be derived in some other way, as should

be the case for episodic predicates in general.

To identify the kind-related interpretation ofexist, let us recall that spatial modifiers are

possible in exist-sentences with kind terms:


b. Syphilis does not exist in Europe anymore.

In such cases it is also obvious that existcannot just apply to the kind in virtue of applying,

with its primary meaning, to an instance of the kind: existdoes not apply to particulars with a

spatial modifier. With spatial modifiers, the derived meaning ofexistis not that of an episodic

predicate, but rather that of an instance-distribution predicate. Instance-distribution predicates,

for example widespread, rare, orextinct, express properties concerning the spatial

distribution, and as such they allow for spatial restrictions:

(73) a. Ants are widespread in Europe.

b. Dinosaurs are extinct.


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It appears that predicates in general may obtain a meaning extended to kinds which is that of

an instance-distribution predicate, rather by generic quantification over instances (for

characterizing predicates) or existential quantification over instances (for episodic predicates).

Another such case is the verb disappearin English. As noted by Geach (1968), disappearis a

predicate that also applies to individuals and kinds:

(74) a. John has disappeared.

b. Dinosaurs have disappeared.

Disappearshould be an episodic predicate. But with a bare plural as in (74b), it does not have

a derived meaning consisting of existential quantification over instances and application of

disappear(or a closely related condition) to them, but rather it expresses a condition on the

distribution of the instances as a whole, namely that there are no instances at all.21

In the case

ofdisappear, the kind interpretation is obviously derived by applying the ordinary lexical

meaning ofdisappearto the entire collection of the actual instances

The kind-related interpretation ofexistcan obviously not be obtained by applying exist

with its primary meaning to the kind. Rather the kind-related interpretation appears to be

obtained from the locational secondary meaning ofexist. Using the secondary meaning, the

kind-related meaning ofexistcan be given as below, where I is the instantiation relation:

(75) a. For a kind k and a location l, existk(k, l) iff for some i, i I k, exist2(i, l).

b. For a kind k, existk(k) iff for some i, i I k, exist2(i).

If bare plurals and mass nouns are kind-referring in exist-sentences, then it is clear why

temporal modifiers and aspectual predicates apply in the way they do when existapplies to a

kind term. Temporal modifiers and aspectual predicates shift the time of evaluation forexist

21Having a derived kind meaning as an instance-distribution predicate is a lexically idiosyncratic property of

particular episodic predicates in particular languages. For example, in German, verschwinden disappear fails to

act as an instance-distribution predicate with bare plurals:

(1) Dinosaurier sind verschwunden.

Dinosaurs have disappeared.

(1) has only the reading on which for some dinosaurs x, x has disappeared. It cannot mean that dinosaurs are

extinct. English disappearalso displays the derived meaning of an episodic predicate in sentences such as:

(2) John gets upset when books disappear.


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as a kind predicate, allowing at each time different instances of the kind to satisfy the relevant

condition.

7. The adjective real

Exist, we have seen, is a predicate of individuals that holds of an individual if the individual is

a presently persisting one, and it is false of past and merely possible objects as well as

intentional objects. Existence thus is not a feature of certain entities, and the lack of existence

does not consist in the absence of such a feature, but rather it has to do with the relation of

entities to time and with their quasi-representational status. This is also evident when

comparing existto the adjective real. The two expressions differ fundamentally linguistically

and in the kinds of ontological notions they involve.

One major linguistic difference between the predicate existand the predicate realconsist

in their different readings with bare plurals and mass nouns. Whereas existgenerally triggers a

reading involving existential quantification, realgoes along with universal quantification.

This is illustrated by the contrast between (76a) and (76b) as well as the contrast between

(77a) and (77b):

(76) a. Prime numbers exist.

b. Prime numbers are real.


b. Electrons are real.

Obviously, realclassifies as a characterizing predicate, not an episodic predicate like exist.

But how can realbe a characterizing predicate and differ from exist? Ifrealis contrasted

with the adjectivepossible, it is not obvious at all that it should classify as a characterizing

predicate. It would depend on the philosophical view. If what distinguishes a real from a

merely possible object is that real objects belong to the actual world whereas merely possible

objects belong to other possible worlds, realshould be as episodic a predicate as a predicate

of location, orexistfor that matter. But ifrealapplies to entities whose nature is in some way

different from that of merely possible objects (the latter being conceptual entities of some

sort, lets say), then realwould be a characterizing predicate. At the same time, realshould

not really apply to past object, but the nature of past objects is not different from the nature of


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presently existing objects. Thus, using philosophical considerations alone does not seem to

get us a clear classification ofreal.

A simpler explanation for the status ofrealas a characterizing predicate can be obtained

when taking a closer look at its linguistic behavior.Realis an adjective that is in fact not very

felicitous on its own. It naturally occurs only as a modifier of a sortal noun:

(78) a. A is a real object.

b. B is a real person.

c. C is a real witch.

d. D is a real solution.

In that function, realcompetes with intensional adjectives such as intentional, fictional,

mythical, and possible, which also naturally occur as modifiers of sortal nouns:

(79) a. A is a fictional person.

b. B is a mythical dragon.

c. C is an intentional object.

d. D is a possible house.

Some of those adjectives appear to have the semantic status of operators: if an object x is a

real object, this means that really (in reality), x is an object; when an object x is a fictional

person, this means that in some piece of fiction, x is a person; when an object x is a mythical

dragon, this means that according to some myth, x is a dragon. In the last two cases, x must

be an object that has the status of a fictional character: the operator here serves to permit

ascription of properties as attributed in the story or myth.

Intentionalandpossible are better analysed not as operators but as intensional functors

mapping a sortal noun onto an intentional or possible object. If x is an intentional object, then

x is constituted by intentionality alone; x is not such that it is intended to be an object. If x is

a possible house, then x is not something such that it is possibly a house; rather, x belongs to

some possible world in which it is a house.

The intensional-functor analysis in fact can be applied to (79a) and (79b) as well, thus

providing a uniform semantics of intensional adjectives. Mythicalwould be a functor mapping

a sortal N to a mythical character x constituted by some myth, such that according to that

myth x has N, and similarly forfictional.


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The explanation of the status ofrealas a characterizing predicate is then obvious: realin

general is followed by an explicit or silent sortal noun N and the resulting complex predicate

a realN is a characterizing predicate because N is: sortal nouns are always characterizing

predicates.22

The difference between existand realis also reflected in the corresponding

nominalizations: in (80a), the existentially quantified complement ofreality takes obligatory

wide scope, whereas in (80b) the existentially quantified complement ofexistence can take

narrow scope:23

(80) a. John denies the reality of a witch.

b. John denies the existence of a witch.

(80a) has only the reading on which for some witch x, John denies the reality of x, and (80b)

has only the reading on which John denies that a witch exists. In (80a), the denial targets a

feature of a given witch, that of its reality; in (80b), the denial focuses on there being a witch,

not on a given feature that a witch may or may not have. Reality is something only an entity

can have that already has some form of being, whereas existence is something that goes

along with the entity itself.24

The reality of a witch acts as a term referring to a feature of an

individual whose existence is presupposed. In that respect it is just like any other term

referring to a feature or trope, for example the qualification of a candidate, which

contrasts in the same way with the existence of a candidate below:

22What if N is a phase sortal, such as teacherorpassenger? In real teacherand real passenger, realobviously

targets the phase content of the noun, not the sortal content (a real teacheris a person that really is a teacher,

not someone that really is a person and teaches).Thus realwould rather make an episodic contribution to the

complex nominal. Nonetheless real teacherand real passengerclassify as characterizing predicates in that theytrigger generic quantification with a bare plural:

(1) Employees of this organization are teachers.

The characterizing status ofreal teacherorreal passengerthus should be traced to the sortal content of the head

noun, not the contribution ofreal.

23There is no obligatory wide scope of the complement with the bare plural, though, as was pointed out to me

by Richard Kayne:

(1) John denies the reality of witches.

24

Apparently, for Avicenna existence was an accidental feature of entities, that is, a trope. Entities forAvicenna are possibilia defined by their essence.


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(81) a. John denies the qualification of a candidate.

b. John denies the existence of a candidate.

Thus, existence and reality are fundamentally different notions, or so natural language tells us.

8. Conclusion

The predicate existhas puzzled philosophers for a long time. The purpose of this paper was

to indicate how much linguistic semantics can contribute to illuminate the semantic behavior

ofexistas well as other existence predicates. The semantic analysis ofexist(and other

existence predicates) that was proposed explains the various semantic peculiarities ofexistas

quite systematic, as falling within independently established generalizations about predicates

of particular sorts.

Appendix:

The linguistic plausibility of views on which existis not a first-order extensional

predicate

1.Existas a second-order predicate

For Frege existis a second-order predicate: it takes a predicate or concept-denoting expression

and states that its extension is nonempty. Thus, in (1), existwould state that the extension of

king of France is nonempty:25

(1) The king of France exists.

This view has been criticized extensively by philosophers (Salmon 1987, Miller 1986). I will

restrict myself here simply to the question of the linguistic plausibility of the view. For the

view to be plausible linguistically, there should be independent motivations that a predicate

such as existcan go along with a concept-denoting expression as subject and moreover that

definite descriptions can act as concept-denoting. While a function of definite descriptions as

25Similarly, Russell takes existto be a predicate of propositional functions.


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predicates and thus as concept-denoting is plausible (Graff 2001), proper names do not seem

to generally be able to be reinterpreted that way.

Turning then to the predicate exist, the question to ask is: are there other second-order

predicates in natural language that go together with concept-denoting subjects or

complements, and does existbehave like those predicates? A second-order predicate in natural

language would be a predicate that requires predicates as complement or subject, that is,

adjectives or predicative NPs. There is an important class of predicates in natural language

that act that way, namely copula verbs:

(2) John became a man.

The question thus is, does the subject of a sentence with existhave the same predicative status

as the complement of a copula verb? The answer is clearly negative.Existdoes not occur, on

the relevant interpretation, with complements that could qualify as predicates, such as

indefinite singular NPs. Thus (3a) does not just claim the nonempty extension of the concept

denoted by man, in the way (3b) and (3c) do:

(3) a. A man exists.

b. Men exist.

c. There is a man.

To the philosophical objections that have been raised against the analysis ofexistas a second-

order predicate with singular terms, we can thus add that existas a second-order predicate is

implausible also linguistically.

2.Existas an intensional predicate

The second view takes existto be an intensional predicate. That is, existas in (1) would apply

to the intension of the subject, lets say an individual concept, a (partial) function from

possible worlds to individuals:

(4) The king of France exists.


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Existon this account is true of an individual concept I at a time t in a world w iff I is defined

at t in w. The question then is, does existreally classify as an intensional predicate?

When it comes to the notion of an intensional verb, different types of intensional or

apparent intensional verbs need to be distinguished. I will make use of distinctions introduced

in Moltmann (1997, 2008).

One type of intensional verb, verbs like resemble orcompare to, simply takes predicative

complements. Such verbs are thus second-order predicates of another sort than copula verbs,

and we have seen that existdoes not pattern with those.

The second type of intensional verb includes need, look for, recognize, and own. Such

verbs are characterized by a certain nonspecific reading of the complement and a general

restriction to weak quantifiers as complement. The latter constraint manifests itself in that

even if uniqueness were to be fulfilled (in the relevant worlds), an indefinite is required for

the intensional reading (Moltmann 1997):

(5) a. John needs a wife.

b. ?? John needs his wife.

(6) a. The institute needs a director.

b. ?? The institute needs the director.

Obviously, existis not subject to the restriction to weak quantifiers.

Another peculiarity of intensional verbs of the second type (shared by the first type in fact)

is the possibility of the complement being substituted by a special quantifier, a quantifier

such assomething, nothing, or the pronoun that(Moltmann 1997, 2008). Special quantifiers

are neutral in gender, and they can replace the complement of an intensional verb even if that

complement is not neutral:

(7) a. John needs something / * someone a wife.

b. Something / * someone is urgently needed a plumber.

It is easy to see that existdoes not pattern with intensional verbs in that respect. The subject of

an existsentence cannot generally be replaced by a special quantifier, namely not when the

subject fails to be neutral:

(8) * Something / Someone does not exist anymore -- the king of France.


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Thus, existdoes not classify as an intensional verb like need.

There is another type of potential intensional verbs that existis more likely to pattern with,

namely verbs that have been taken to apply to individual concepts, as denoted by certain

definite NPs (Montague 1973). Thus, the predicates change and is risinghave been taken to

apply to individual concepts in the sentences below:26

(9) a. The director changed.

b. The temperature is rising. (Montague 1973)

c. The president is elected every four years.

However, existcannot apply to the kinds of entities that change, is rising, and is elected every

fouryears can apply to:

(10) a. ?? The director always exists. (meaning there is always some director or other)

b. ?? The president now exists; he did not exist for a few years.

c. ?? The director exists, though he did not exist before the election a few days ago.

There are some cases where existappears to apply to the intension of an NP, though in fact

even in those cases existapplies in fact to something else. First, existapparently applies to the

intension of the complement of an intensional verb like nee, ask for, and see in cases such as

the following:

(11) a. What John needs exists.

26It is not very clear, though, that these are truly cases of intensional verbs, that is, verbs that apply to the

intension rather than the extension of an argument. The subject of sentences with such verbs as predicate cannot

generally be replaced by a special quantifier. Thus (1b) as a continuation of (1a) is infelicitous:

(1) a. The president is elected every four years.

b. Something is elected every four years.

Moreover, replacement of the subject by the special pronoun thatis not acceptable, but only replacement by

the non-neutral pronoun he is:

(2) The president is elected every four years. He / * That is not elected every three years.

This is an indication that the subject in (9a) (9c), rather than denoting its intension, in fact stands for a

particular type of entity, an entity with variable manifestations at different times (such as different people). The

verbs would then be extensional predicates with a derived meaning applying to entities with variable

manifestations.


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b. Everything John asked for exists.

c. What John saw exists.

There is evidence that the subject in (11a-c) in fact does not stand for the intension of an NP,

but rather for a kind, that is, what a bare plural or mass noun stands for. Thus, while (12b) as a

continuation of (12a) is perfectly fine, (12c) is not. It is just as bad as (12d), whereas (12b) is

just as good as (12e):

(12) a. John is looking for a tiger.

b. What John is looking for exists.

c ?? What John is looking for exists, namely a tiger.

d. ?? A tiger exists.

e. Tigers ex

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Friederick Moltmann Existence-paper