From Welfare State to Opportunity State

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From Welfare State toOpportunity StateHow Progressives Should Respond to Demographic Change

Matt Browne, John Halpin, and Ruy Teixeira April 2011



Te “Demographic Change and Progressive Poliical Sraegy” series o papers is a join projec organized

under he auspices o he Global Progress and Progressive Sudies programs and he Cener or American

Progress. Te research projec was launched ollowing he inaugural Global Progress conerence held in

Ocober 2009 in Madrid, Spain.

Te preparaory paper or ha conerence, “Te European Paradox ,” sough o analyze why he orunes o

European progressive paries had declined ollowing he previous auumn’s sudden nancial collapse and

he global economic recession ha ensued. Te saring premise was ha progressives should, in principle,

have had wo srenghs going or hem:

• Modernizing rends were shiing he demographic errain in heir poliical avor.• Te inellecual and policy bankrupcy o conservaism, which had now proven isel devoid o creaive

ideas o how o shape he global economic sysem or he common good.

Despie hese laen advanages, we surmised ha progressives in Europe were sruggling or hree pri-

mary reasons. Firs, i was increasingly hard o diereniae hemselves rom conservaive opponens who

seemed o be wholehearedly adoping social democraic policies and language in response o he eco-

nomic crisis. Second, he nominally progressive majoriy wihin heir elecorae was being spli beween

compeing progressive movemens. Tird, heir radiional working-class base was increasingly being

seduced by a poliics o ideniy raher han economic argumens.

In response, we argued ha i progressives could dene heir long-erm economic agenda more clearly—

and hus diereniae hemselves rom conservaives—as well as esablish broader and more inclusive

elecoral coaliions, and organize more eecively among heir core consiuencies o convey heir mes-

sage, hen hey should be able o resolve his paradox.

Te research papers in his series each evaluae hese demographic and ideological rends in greaer

naional deail and presen ideas or how progressives migh shape a more eecive poliical sraegy.

We are graeul o he Friedrich-Eber-Siung or heir suppor o his projec.

Mat Browne, John Halpin, and Ruy eixeira

http://www.boell.org/downloads/Browne_Halpin_Teixeira_EuropeanParadox.pdf

http://www.boell.org/downloads/Browne_Halpin_Teixeira_EuropeanParadox.pdf



1 Introduction and summary

3 The shifting politics of the economic crisis

4 A new politics of identity

6 The new progressive coalition

6 The decline of the working class

7 Rising educational levels and white collarization

9 Immigrants and minorities

10 Women

11 Decline of traditional family and traditional religion

12 The rise of the Millennial generation

15 The opportunity state and the future of progressive pol

19 Endnotes

20 About the authors

Contents



1 Center or American Progress | From Welare State to Opportunity State

Introduction and summary

In Ocober 2009, he Cener or American Progress published “Te European

Paradox,” a paper prepared or he inaugural Global Progress Conerence held in

Madrid ha monh.1 Ta paper sough o analyze why he orunes o European

progressive paries had declined ollowing he previous auumn’s sudden nancial

collapse and he global economic recession ha ensued.

Te saring premise was ha progressives should, in principle, have had wo

srenghs going or hem. Firs, we argued ha modernizing rends were shiinghe demographic errain in heir poliical avor. Second, we assered ha he crisis

had illusraed he inellecual and policy bankrupcy o conservaism, which had

now proven isel devoid o creaive ideas o how o shape he global economic

sysem or he common good.

Despie hese laen advanages, we surmised ha progressives in Europe were

sruggling or hree primary reasons. Firs, i was increasingly hard o diereni-

ae hemselves rom conservaive opponens who seemed o be wholehearedly

adoping social democraic policies and language in response o he economic

crisis. Second, he nominally progressive majoriy wihin heir elecorae was

being spli beween compeing progressive movemens. Tird, heir radiional

working class base o suppor was boh shrinking and increasingly being seduced

by a new poliics o ideniy driven by culural insecuriies raher han by eco-

nomic argumens.

In response, we argued ha i progressives could dene heir long-erm economic

agenda more clearly—and hus diereniae hemselves rom conservaives—

esablish broader more inclusive elecoral coaliions, and organize more eecively

among heir core consiuencies o convey heir message, hen hey should be ableo resolve his paradox over ime.

While many o he prescripions we oulined in ha paper over a year and a hal

ago sill hold, i is high ime or us o revisi and reassess he challenges progres-

sives now ace. Tis is he ocus o our paper. In he pages ha ollow, we will




examine he shiing poliics o he economic crisis ha has enabled righ-wing

populism o seal away progressive consiuencies on one side o he poliical spec-

rum, while more leis paries have nabbed progressive values voers on he oher

side. We hen delve in more deail ino his new poliics o ideniy and break

down he elemens o a new progressive coaliion ha mus answer his challenge:

• Te radiional (ye shrinking) working class• Rising educaed, middle class, and proessional voers• Immigrans and minoriies• Women• Singles and seculars• Te younger generaion

Aer examining how hese new poliical acors ino he conours o radiional

progressive paries, we hen conclude wih wha we hope is a provocaive argu-

men ha progressives mus go beyond deending he welare sae o advocacy o a new agenda cenered on wha we call he opporuniy sae.

We believe he uure o progressivism ress on our suppor o his opporuniy

sae, which we argue mus show he voers o our new coaliion how progressive

sae acion can enhance heir individual lie opporuniies and help hem build

a solid middle-class lie hrough lielong educaional opporuniies, high-wage,

high-skilled economies, he ransormaion o inrasrucure and ciies, clean

energy, a more modern ax and labor marke sysem, new inernaional leader-

ship, and he creaion o a global middle class and new expor markes. We look

orward o your reacions.




The shifting politics of the

economic crisis

In he space o 18 monhs, he European paradox—he conras beween seemingly

avorable underlying condiions or progressives and unavorable poliical ou-

comes—has muaed, become more severe, and spread. A new poliics o auseriy

has ransormed he poliical landscape, in Europe, Norh America, and Ausralasia.

In he public mind, wha began as a crisis o casino capialism—deregulaed nancial

markes and bankers’ irresponsibiliy—has become a crisis o he proigae sae—

excessive public decis and unnecessary and unhelpul governmen inervenion.

While in he mids o he global economic crisis progressives ound i hard o disin-

guish hemselves rom a righ-wing movemen ha seemed—a leas in Europe—o

have adoped many o he core enes o progressive economic policymaking, oday,

he role o he sae and governmen spending is being subjeced o a harsh atack.

Tis new conservaive narraive combines a seducive sory o economic decline in

he ace o rising powers in Asia and waseul governmen spending wih ear o he

oher: be hey immigrans, minoriies or oreigners.

Tis is poliics ha is srong on message bu shor on policy, devoid o any real solu-

ions o our socieies’ economic and social woes. Is cenral hrus is an appeal o he

comor o old ideniies, old ways o hinking, and old srucures. Unorunaely, or

he ime being, i is proving successul a he ballo.

While we should no be surprised by he conservaive movemen’s shor-lived sup-

por or economic simulus and public invesmen—i had dissipaed long beore he

Group o 20 developed and developing naion’s key summi in orono las all—he

incapaciy o progressives o dene and deend an alernaive economic agenda is

roubling. In boh Europe and he Unied Saes, long-erm unemploymen remains

persisenly high, wih he poenial o rise urher, and he hrea o a deaionary rap is ever presen. Worse sill, he poenial or sovereign deaul looms over many

Eurozone counries. Te resurgence o he old conservaive economic orhodoxy no

only pus long-erm job growh and economic recovery a risk, bu also promoes a

horoughly unprogressive syle o leadership—one ha glories he abiliy o impose

suering on ohers in ough imes.




Ye he cenral enes o a progressive alernaive remain unclear. Indeed, in he

curren climax, progressives seem rapped in a socioeconomic conundrum—

orced o deend he saus quo agains a relenless righ-wing atack raher

han ouline a orward-looking agenda o invesmen and reorm. Consider, or

example, ha in many European labor markes an insider-ousider dynamic has

emerged in which progressives are orced o deend he privileged working condi-ions, secure long-erm conracs and generous benes aorded esablished work-

ers, even i hey are no longer suiable o he curren economy—and even i hey

make i increasingly difcul or younger workers o nd employmen.

When progressives do presen overall labor-marke reorms, hese proposals are

oen resised by rade unions, spliting he movemen and alienaing core suppor

groups. Tis challenge becomes ever more acue—paricularly or hose like us

who view rade unions as an essenial ingredien o any rue progressive coali-

ion—as he size o he radiional working class, and hus i’s relaive imporance

o he progressive coaliion declines. Coninuing wih he saus quo will surely lead o more elecoral bleeding o reormis or cener-righ paries. Bu charing a

new pah on labor marke reorm ha provides greaer exibiliy while mainain-

ing he social democraic commimen o economic securiy will be difcul, and

will have o develop in parnership and dialogue wih new consiuencies, paries

and reormed rade union movemens.

A new politics of identity

In his conex, i is perhaps unsurprising ha anxiey abou he uure is rising

and ha ciizens in many o he indusrialized counries across he globe ear

heir bes days are no longer ahead o hem. Tis anxiey is producing new erile

grounds or righ-wing populism.

Emerging in parallel o he radiional albei revialized conservaive atack on

he sae is he presence o a more proound, i nuanced, poliics o ideniy.

Ineresingly, his new poliics o ideniy has boh a posiive and negaive ele-

men. On he one hand, middle-class progressive-values voers and he younger

generaion place an ever-increasing imporance on a oleran sociey ha sup-pors equaliy or gays, promoes muliculuralism, and expresses concern or he

environmen. Tese are wha one could erm posmaerial voers, who are also

commonly among he main beneciaries o he globalizaion o he economy.




On he oher hand, a conservaive poliics o ear is being promoed by he righ.

Tis negaive poliics o ideniy works o insill animosiy—oen among hose

whose economic orunes and securiy have declined during he las ew decades

or who are eeling “squeezed” by declining public services and rising living coss

—oward he aoremenioned groups. Tis negaive poliics atacks a remoe

poliical elie and vilies minoriies and hose wih an alernaive liesyle, blaminghem or he decline in moral values, increased economic compeiion or boh

good and bad jobs and declining, and inefcien public services.

aken in combinaion, his new poliics o ideniy raps progressives on boh

sides. Whaever poliical posiion hey adop is bound o alienae eiher heir

working class voers, who end o be more conservaive wih regards o values, or

progressive-values voers and he Millennial generaion, who are urned o by he

more naionalis rheoric ha appeals o he radiional or core voer base.

Tese rends play ou dierenly rom counry o counry, depending on hedegree o poliical compeiion on he le and righ, or he barriers o enry or

new poliical paries. Regardless o he sysem, however, i is common o winess

a ragmenaion o he progressive voe. Te radiional working class is peeled o

o he le and exreme righ by hose seeking o deend he saus quo and oppose

socioeconomic and culural change. Urban and aspiran voers oo, are atraced

by more values-driven movemens and paries such as he greens and liberals, in

par ou o rusraion wih he radiional social democraic and labor paries

inabiliy o modernize heir agenda and embrace he uure.

Boh hese groups—he populis righ and he values-driven le—appear atrac-

ive in heir absoluism, which ends o presen radiional progressive paries as

managerial raher han drivers o change. Indeed, and perhaps more worryingly,

he message o social democraic paries oen amouns o litle more han he

promise o manage decline beter han heir compeiors. However, compeing

progressive paries share a common crucial ailing, namely ha hey end o be

clienelisic in naure, caering o specic groups wih specic ineress. While

heir agendas respond o he immediae and specic concerns o heir consiu-

ens, hey do no oer a naional agenda o renewal ha can ound he basis or a

broader governing consiuency.

So his is he poliical landscape, broadly skeched, in which progressives need o

orge a new poliical coaliion. In he nex secion, we will deail he makeup o

he new progressive coaliion.




The new progressive coalition

In his new conex, he core poliical challenge or radiional progressive paries is

o shape a new poliical ideniy capable o orging a coaliion ha brings ogeher:

• Te radiional (ye shrinking) working class• Rising educaed, middle class, and proessional voers• Immigrans and minoriies• Women• Singles and seculars• Te younger generaion

Te counry sudies done or our cross-naional projec on progressive sraegy and

demographic change demonsrae no jus he desirabiliy bu he necessiy o his

new progressive coaliion. Sar wih he decline o he radiional working class.

The decline of the working class

Across all counries, he size o he radiional or blue-collar working class is

declining sharply. In Germany, or example, he proporion o blue-collar workers

in he workorce has been cu in hal since he lae 1950s o jus over one-quarer

o he workorce oday, while he proporion o whie collar workers has nearly

ripled o 57 percen.2 Similarly, in Sweden he proporion o blue-collar workers

has been cu in hal o one-quarer o he workorce jus since he mid-1970s.

Closely relaed o his rend, employmen in he indusrial secor has dropped rap-

idly across counries, replaced by employmen in he service secor. In Germany,

he indusrial secor has declined rom 55 percen o employmen in 1950 o jus26 percen oday. Similarly, in he Neherlands indusrial employmen dropped

rom 40 percen o 20 percen o he workorce beween 1950 and 2003, and in

he Unied Kingdom rom 47 percen o 24 percen over he same period.3




Finally, union membership has been seadily dropping across counries. In he

Neherlands, union membership has dropped rom 32 percen o 24 percen o he

workorce beween 1970 and 2009. In Ausralia, union membership has been cu in

hal jus since 1990, declining rom 41 percen o 20 percen o workorce.

Since labor and social democraic paries were buil around unionized, blue-collarworkers in indusry, hese rends ogeher signal a dramaic undercuting o he ra-

diional voing base o hese paries. O course, he magniude o hese rends varies

across counries, and in some hese rends are less severe han in ohers. Bu he un-

damenal ac remains ha in all counries he radiional base o social democraic

paries has been subsanially eroded, and is likely o erode urher in he uure.

Moreover, he problem o he declining working class is even more severe han ha

suggesed by he raw numbers on decline. Tis is because even as he ranks o he

radiional working class hin ou hey also become less supporive o social democras

in many counries. In Sweden, he Social Democras’ share o he LO (blue-collarworkers union) voe has declined by 20 poins rom 1982 o 2010. In Denmark, Social

Democras’ share o he radiional working-class voe declined by 17 poins rom he

1960s o he 1990s, in he Unied Kingdom by 18 poins rom he 1960s o he 2000s

and in France (second round presidenial voe) by 19 poins rom 1974 o 2007. 4

Again, here is much variaion across counries in he magniude o his rend. Indeed,

in some counries, among hem Ausralia and perhaps Spain, here appears o be

relaively litle diminuion o working-class suppor or social democras. Bu in mos

counries, i is a serious problem.

Tere is also considerable variaion in where he los suppor rom blue-collar work-

ers is going. Some o i is going o he radiional righ, bu in counries wih srong

mulipary sysems much o ha los suppor also nds is way o paries o he popu-

lis le, such as he Socialis Pary in Neherlands or he Le Pary in Germany, and

he populis righ (he PVV in Neherlands, he Naional Fron in France, he Sweden

Democras in Sweden, JOBBIK in Hungary), wih he later ypically predominaing

over he ormer.

Rising educational levels and white collarization

Te oher side o he decline in he radiional working class is he rise o whie-

collar and proessional workers (someimes lumped in wih shopkeepers and he

sel-employed and reerred o by he cach-all phrase “middle class”). As menioned




earlier, he proporion o whie-collar workers in Germany’s workorce has nearly

ripled since he 1950s, and he rae o whie collarizaion is no ar o in oher

counries. Tis is a universal rend.

Closely relaed o his is anoher universal rend: he rise in educaional levels.

Across counries here has been a sharp decline in he ranks o hose wih helowes levels o educaion and a rapid increase in hose wih he highes levels o

educaion—college and advanced degrees. In he Neherlands, or example, he

proporion a his educaional level rose 15 poins beween 1985 and 2009, and

in France his proporion rose 14 poins beween 1982 and 2006. As a number o

he counry sudies noed, he highly educaed group is expeced o coninue is

rapid growh in he uure.

Tese are changes wih proound implicaions or progressives. Simply on he

level o numbers, he sheer size o he whie-collar populaion means social demo-

craic paries have become ar more dependen on whie-collar voes or elecoralsuccess han hey were in he pas. As poliical scienis Gerassimos Moschonas

has shown,5 as he radiional working class declined in size and reduced is sup-

por levels or social democras, hese paries did manage o compensae—a leas

parially—by atracing whie-collar voes, requenly a higher raes han hey

did in earlier decades. As a resul, he weigh o whie-collar voers among he

social democraic elecorae has increased dramaically. ake Sweden, or example,

where 67 percen o Social Democraic voers were blue collar in 1976 compared

o jus 27 percen who were whie collar—by 2006, he blue-collar proporion

had dropped o 40 percen while he whie-collar share had risen in 49 percen.

Perhaps he mos progressive elemen o he burgeoning whie-collar popula-

ion is proessionals, who have he highes educaional levels. Since he highly

educaed are increasing so rapidly, his would appear o be good news or social

democras. Te problem, however, is ha proessionals and he highly educaed,

while progressive, do no necessarily choose he social democras when hey voe

progressive and here are muliple paries o choose rom.

Insead, hey requenly urn o social democras’ compeiors on he cener-le,

especially liberals and greens. Because o his, social democras acually endo underperorm among hese consiuencies relaive o heir overall elecoral

suppor, while heir cener-le compeiors overperorm. In an analysis o 2006

daa on 12 European counries—Ausria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,

Germany, Ireland, Neherlands, Norway, Sweden, Swizerland, and he Unied

Kingdom—Social Democras underperormed across counries by 2 poins




among he college educaed, and by 1 percenage poin among proessionals,

while he res o he cener-le overperormed by 6 poins among he college

educaed and by 8 poins among proessionals.6

A recen case in poin: In Germany in he 2009 elecion, Social Democras did

5 poins worse among proessionals han among nonproessionals, and 7 poinsworse among he college educaed han he noncollege educaed, while he

Greens did 8 poins beter among proessionals and 9 poins beter among he col-

lege educaed han among hose wihou hese characerisics.

So, while he rise o proessionals and he highly educaed may be a boon or pro-

gressives overall, i is no necessarily a boon or social democras. O course, his

dynamic varies by counry, and is inuenced, among oher hings, by he naure o

he pary sysem. Generally speaking, he closer o a wo-pary sysem a counry

is, he more likely he main le pary can capure hese consiuencies. Conversely,

he more robus he mulipary sysem, he less likely he main le pary willdominae hese consiuencies.

Te Unied Saes provides a limiing case—essenially a pure wo-pary sysem—

and he Democras do indeed dominae he proessional voe. Te oher side o

he equaion is shown by counries such as he Neherlands and Germany, where

Liberal and Green Paries drain away progressive proessionals o he clear deri-

men o he social democras.

Tis conras is nealy illusraed wihin one counry, Ausralia. In he Ausralian

sysem, he primary voe is a voer’s rs choice among all paries; he wo-pary

preerred voe is, in essence, which o he wo main paries—he Labor Pary or

Naional Coaliion—he voer preers. In 2007, proessionals gave Labor 43 per-

cen o heir rs preerence voe (2 poins under he overall elecorae) bu gave

Labor 58 percen o heir wo-pary preerred voe (4 poins more han he overall

elecorae). Te dierence was an unusually high primary voe or he Greens

among his group, which hen ranslaed ino Labor suppor on he wo-pary

preerred voe.

Immigrants and minorities

Over he las ew decades, he immigran and minoriy populaion has increased

subsanially across counries and in mos o hem is coninuing o increase. In

he Unied Kingdom, he nonwhie (black, Asian, and minoriy ehnic, or BAME)




populaion is projeced o reach 20 percen o he populaion by 2031, compared

o 13 percen in 2001. In he Neherlands, he migran populaion share is pro-

jeced o reach 26 percen by 2040. In Spain, he immigran populaion has grown

rom 200,000 o jus under 6 million since 1981. In France, around 150,000 newly

nauralized ciizens are being added o he elecion rolls every year, which could

mean 750,000 newly nauralized ciizens paricipaing as rs-ime voers in he2012 presidenial elecions.

Across counries, he general endency is or immigran and minoriy voers o

voe le—and especially or social democras. Tere are dierences, however, by

counry o origin. In Germany, or example, migrans rom urkey are paricularly

likely o voe Social Democraic while migrans rom he ormer Sovie Union are

leas likely o do so. In France, migrans (and heir children) o Arican origin are

mos supporive o he le. In he Unied Kingdom, hose o Caribbean origin are

mos supporive o Labour, hough all BAME subgroups display much higher sup-

por raes or Labour han he res o he populaion. Bu regardless o variaion, heoverall endency is clear and unambiguous—he rising immigran and minoriy

populaion is a boos or progressives in general and social democras in paricular.

However, several nuances o his rend complicae his posiive sory. One is ha

he poliical eecs o immigraion, especially in erms o naional elecions, end

o be bluned by he nonciizen saus o many immigrans. Second, he immigran

and minoriy populaion ypically sars rom a small base, so even a airly rapid

increase in heir numbers will have limied poliical eecs, a leas compared o

he Unied Saes. Finally, reacions o immigraion are very, very complicaed and

can send radiional working-class voers away rom social democras oward he

righ. And among progressive, culurally oleran consiuencies, social democras

may also nd hemselves losing voes—here o paries like he greens and liberals

ha have a sronger ocus on diversiy and an open sociey.

Women

Hisorically, social democraic paries have done beter among men han women.

Across counries, his endency is being reversed so ha in recen elecions socialdemocras end o do beter among women han men. Ye in mos counries his

dierence is modes, especially when compared o he Unied Saes, and his

dierence has also arrived ar laer han in he Unied Saes, where women sared




voing more le han men back in he 1970s. Bu he uniormiy o his rend is

neverheless sriking, suggesing ha women voers are likely o become increas-

ingly imporan o progressive elecoral success in mos i no all counries.

One reason or he progressive rend among women is ha he composiion o he

emale populaion has changed in imporan ways. Mos obvious is he enry o women ino he labor orce and ou o a radiional home-bound role ha ended

o oser conservaism. Bu i is also rue ha women have moved rapidly ino he

ranks o higher educaion and more skilled proessions, wih heir rae o advance

requenly eclipsing ha o men. Women are also more likely o be single or o

remain single han hey were in he pas, anoher social change ha promoes a

more progressive viewpoin.

Decline of traditional family and traditional religion

Across counries, he radiional amily is declining and we are seeing a lo more

single-person households. In he Unied Kingdom, he number o single-person

households rose by 73 percen beween 1981 and 2008. In he Neherlands, he

proporion o unmarried voers in he 20 o 65 age group increased rom 26 per-

cen o 36 percen in jus 12 years (1998-2010). In Ausralia, beween 1991 and

2006, he proporion o never-married or divorced women among 25-o 29-year-

old women rose by 14 poins (25 o 39 percen).

By and large, single voers are more likely o suppor he le han married voers.

And among single voers, divorced or separaed voers are even more likely han

never married voers o do so. Overall, hen, i seems clear ha he ongoing rend

oward more single-person households should bene progressives.

Bu as wih proessionals and he highly educaed, hese benes may ow less o

social democras han o heir cener-le compeiors in mulipary sysems. In

he same 12 European counries menioned earlier, social democras underper-

ormed across counries by 2 poins among singles while he res o he cener-le

overperormed by 7 poins among hese voers.7

Along wih he radiional amily, radiional religion is declining and secularism

is on he rise. In Ausralia, he proporion o hose wih no religion rose rom 14

percen o 21 percen beween 1991 and 2006. In he Neherlands, he proporion

o hose wih no religion almos doubled rom 23 percen o 44 percen beween

1971 and 2009. Similarly, in France, hose wih no religion rose rom 13 percen




o 30 percen beween 1988 and 2007. Oher changes o he radiional religious

universe include increases in hose wih non-Chrisian religious aihs alongside a

general decline in religious observance among hose who reain a Chrisian aih.

On one level, hese changes indirecly bene he le since hey undercu ra-

diional linkages beween religion and poliics, which have ypically beneedconservaive paries. More direcly, secular voers end o lean le poliically. In

he Neherlands, hose wih no religion avored paries o he le over paries o

he righ by 22 poins in 2006. In Ausralia, secular voers gave Labor 65 percen

o heir wo-pary preerred voe in 2007. In addiion, voers wih non-Chrisian

aihs and unobservan voers also end o lean le.

Bu in many counries, he benes o social democras in paricular rom hese

rends are diminished by compeiion rom oher paries on he cener-le—

greens, liberals, and even he populis le. In he Unied Kingdom, or example,

Liberal Democras do much beter han Labour among hose wih no religion.And in Germany, in he 2009 elecion, Social Democras did no receive dispro-

porionae suppor rom unobservan or secular voers, while he greens did 10

poins beter among unobservan Proesans han among observan voers and

he Le Pary did 15 poins beter among seculars han among observan voers.

Even in Ausralia, where seculars gave such a high proporion o heir wo-pary

preerred voe o Labor, heir primary voe or Labor was 15 poins lower due o

an unusually high primary voe or he Greens.

The rise of the Millennial generation

Ino his brave new world seps he Millennial generaion (dened here as hose

born beween 1978 and 2000). Tey compose essenially all o he 18- o 34-year-

old age group o voers and will coninue o do so or anoher seven years, aer

which a new generaion will sar enering he elecorae. In his generaion, all he

rends discussed hus ar nd heir sronges expression. Compared o previous

generaions, Millennials are:

• Less likely o be working class• More likely o be highly educaed• More likely o be proessionals (or in raining o be one)• More likely o be o a minoriy or migran background• More likely be o single (compared o previous generaions a he same age)• More likely o be secular in religious orienaion




Tey are, in shor, he vessels o moderniy wih an oulook—paricularly among

women—ha is noably cosmopolian, oleran, and open compared o previ-

ous generaions. Tey are also, o course, a generaion whose access o economic

mobiliy bears a vexed relaionship o he welare sae and o he older voers who

are is chie beneciaries.

Te good news or progressives is ha his generaion appears o lean le in mos

counries. O course, as a number o he counry papers poined ou, i is difcul a

his sage o disenangle he eecs o age rom cohor—ha is, he exen o which

young voers may be leaning le simply because hey’re young as opposed o par

o an unusually progressive cohor. Bu cerainly in he Unied Saes here are indi-

caions ha he Millennial generaion is disincively progressive as a generaion, as

well as in oher counries, among hem France, Sweden, Ausralia, and Germany.

Te bad news is ha, excep in he Unied Saes, he Millennial generaion is

relaively small. As mos counry papers noed, declining eriliy has led and willconinue o lead o an older age srucure in heir socieies, where he relaive

weigh o he young declines and ha o he elderly increases. o give jus one

example, in he Neherlands in 1950, jus 8 percen o he populaion was above

65, bu by 2040 ha number is expeced o reach 27 percen.

Ye i’s worh noing ha by 2040 he Millennials will be ages 40 o 62 and on he

cusp o dominaing he ranks o seniors. Tis could over ime miigae any con-

servaive eecs o a senior voer bulge. In addiion, by ha year he generaion

ollowing he Millennials (2001-2020) will be ully in he elecorae, a generaion

ha should be even more aeced by he modernizing rends ha have shaped he

Millennials. Depending on heir poliics, his new generaion could, in andem

wih he Millennials, make he long-erm conservaive poliical eecs o socieal

aging ar less dauning han hey now appear. Sill, i is undeniable ha, or now,

he relaively low-populaion weigh o he Millennials will limi heir progressive

poliical impac.

Te urher bad news is ha is ha in many counries progressive Millennial

voers are looking pas he main le paries o greens and liberals. Tis appears

o be a universal problem excep in he Unied Saes, where he sysem does nopermi his kind o pary compeiion. In Germany in 2009, Social Democras did

8 poins worse among Millennials han among he earlies generaion o voers,

while he Greens did 15 poins beter among Millennials han among he oldes

voers. In he same 12 European counries menioned earlier Social Democras




underperormed across counries by 4 poins among Millennials, while he res o

he cener-le overperormed by 9 poins among hese voers. And mos shock-

ingly, in Hungary Social Democras’ curren suppor among he Millennial genera-

ion is so low i is no signicanly dieren rom zero in a saisical sense.

As a number o he counry papers noed, he relaive unatraciveness o socialdemocras o younger voers in heir counries is resuling in a rapid aging o he

suppor base or hese paries. In he Neherlands, or example, hal o he Labour

Pary’s supporers in he 2010 elecion were over 50 years old while jus 17 per-

cen were beween he ages o 18 and 34. In Sweden, every successive generaion

has had a smaller proporion o Social Democraic supporers, inexorably driving

he average age o pary supporers upward. Beting on older voers o keep social

democras poliically viable seems like a risky sraegy bu i is, in eec, where

many social democraic paries are currenly placing heir bes.




The opportunity state and the

future of progressive politics

Te need or a new progressive coaliion is hereore clear and compelling. Te

old one is simply no longer viable and any atemp o resusciae i would be a

proound error. Bu here is no doub ha orging his new coaliion is a dauning

challenge.

Dauning as i may be, i also presens an opporuniy or radiional social demo-

craic and labor paries o regain heir hegemonic role. In he uure hese radi-

ional hegemonic paries may indeed need o build poliical coaliions wih hegreens, liberals, and ohers, bu labor and social democraic paries mus sill aspire

o be naional paries o renewal and reorm, no paries capured by specic iner-

ess wihin socieies. I hey are able o dene a new poliical agenda, one ha is

capable o combining he socioeconomic concerns o he more radiional groups

wihin he laen progressive coaliion wih he posmaerial values driven ideniy

o aspiran, younger, and upper-middle-class proessional voers, hey will remain

he driving orce—or guiding ligh—o progressive poliics or years o come.

Te cenral enes o such an agenda, we believe, should be buil around he idea

o an “opporuniy sae.”

Te primary achievemen o poswar social democracy (and o a lesser exen

American liberalism) was he creaion o he mixed economy and a srong welare

sae o help harness he bes aspecs o capialism and proec people rom he

wors aspecs. Tis model varied across naions, o course, bu all employed

similar heoreical and pracical models—Keynesian demand managemen, he

provision o public goods, social securiy measures, and cooperaive labor and

managemen srucures. Te combinaion o susained economic growh, ull-

employmen policies, indusrial planning, and social provisions generaed unprec-edened prosperiy, peace, and rising living sandards or millions o people.

Poliically, he “people’s pary ” sraegies o social democraic and labor paries

creaed broad and susained coaliions ha enabled governmens o pursue a

balanced approach o he sae and he economy. Tis legacy o expanded ree-




dom, equaliy, and social solidariy remains vial, and is sorely needed o sem

oday’s conservaive and neoliberal ide. Bu he radiional welare-sae model

o governance canno be our only progressive vision or sociey (or or voers).

Wihou repeaing he exhausive reamen his subjec has received over he

years, i is commonplace o acknowledge ha oo much has changed in erms o

economic organizaion or us o rely on older visions o democracy and he polii-cal economy.

Wha does his mean?

Firs, i is clear o us—and perhaps o oher auhors in his series—ha he noion

o solidariy ha suppored he grea 20h cenury social democraic riumphs

is dying. In a ime o rapid economic change, voers are becoming increasingly

decenralized, individualisic, and more amily and communiy ocused in heir

worldviews. Choice reins in all aspecs o lie, and radiional social roos are

deerioraing or being replaced by new models o social ineracion, paricularly among younger people. As much as we migh gh agains he rend, voers

are no becoming more commited o shared naional goals, common poliical

plaorms, or o building sronger European or global ideniies. Bonds o work,

religion, and class mater ar less o people hese days, and as we are seeing wih

he erce immigraion batles across our naions, he humaniarian and mulicul-

ural impulse underlying our progressivism is no easily exended o ousiders.

Tese developmens can be addressed bu i will require a radically dieren

noion o solidariy—one ha helps people undersand he collecive economic

need or breaking down barriers o individual achievemen and he moral basis

or helping ohers reach heir highes poenial academically, proessionally, and

culurally. Tis is a srong orm o solidariy, bu one ha recognizes he impor-

ance o individual and localized lives. I is deeply progressive in is commimen

o human digniy and equaliy, bu i is less class bound and more open o people

o dieren walks o lie.

And despie shor-erm challenges on issues such as immigraion, his new vision

o solidariy mus embrace raher han rejec he progressive commimen o

diversiy and individual reedom ha are mainsays o he worldview o youngergeneraions. Solidariy, as reconceived or a new era, will ocus more on muual

responsibiliy and he need o oser individual achievemen and communiy

sabiliy in an era o scarce resources and a rapidly shiing global economy.




Second, i seems clear o us ha our economic growh model and exising social

proecions are inadequae or addressing he barriers o social mobiliy ha exis

wih increased global compeiion or jobs and rising economic power in oher

pars o he globe. As imporan as exising policies are or our working class base,

i is no hard o see how universiy sudens migh scrach heir heads wondering

wha rade unions acually do and how hey migh use a manuacuring rerainingprogram. Tese sudens are probably more worried abou rising ees and cumber-

some labor marke proecions ha make i hard or hem o ge jobs. So hey ake

a look a he liberals.

Or perhaps hese young sudens are ocused on susainabiliy and renewable energy

producion and like wha he greens have o say. Maybe hey see inefcien civil

service procedures and bureaucraic wase and wonder why he sae can’ be more

efcien as cener-righ paries argue. Meanwhile, hard-pressed workers are hearing

daily rom le-wing orces abou he ailures o neoliberal policies and social demo-

craic mismanagemen o he economy in he lead up o he nancial crisis.

I’s no wonder he social democraic and labor share o he voe is collapsing

across our naions. radiional working-class suppor is rapidly shrinking, and

rising progressive consiuencies do no see social democraic and labor paries

as visionary or disincive in heir approach. Tey oen see saus quo leaders,

oudaed pary srucures, and muddled policy ideas. Tereore, he ideniy, insi-

uional oureach, and agenda o our paries does no wih how younger, more

mobile, and more diverse voers see heir world.

Progressive orces will always ocus on he mixed economy, social proecions,

and ull employmen policies. Bu we mus do more o show he voers o our new

coaliion how progressive sae acion can enhance heir individual lie opporu-

niies and help hem build a solid middle-class lie hrough lielong educaional

opporuniies, high-wage, high-skilled economies, he ransormaion o inra-

srucure and ciies, clean energy, a more modern ax and labor marke sysem,

new inernaional leadership, and he creaion o a global middle class and new

expor markes. In shor, we need a vision o an opporuniy sae ha combines

radiional securiy measures wih new eors o suppor greaer social mobiliy

and reduce social inequaliy.

Tis does no mean discarding social democraic principles. Far rom i. o help

make his opporuniy ramework viable, core social democraic argumens will

sill be necessary o make he case or long-erm indusrial policy and o atack




emerging laissez-aire governance. A new era o opporuniy will require a much

sronger sae role in making our economies more compeiive wih oher naions

hrough long-erm invesmens in educaion, energy inrasrucure and ranspor-

aion, and he creaion o high-wage jobs. Individuals alone canno conend wih

he orces shaping he global economy; and social democras, among he array o

progressive paries, are paricularly well placed o argue or he imporance o seri-ous public invesmen and sraegic planning.

Tis will also require susained inellecual and policy atacks on he underpin-

nings o conservaive economics—he efcien-markes hypohesis, deregulaion,

privaizaion, and supply-side ax policy—ha conribue so much o insabiliy

and inequaliy in he world economy oday.

Alhough his synhesis paper is no designed o esh ou in ull deail all o he

policy and poliical conours o he opporuniy-sae idea, we did wan o oer

somehing o he larger Global Progress working groups or discussion and cri-ique. Jus o be clear, our suggesed ocus o he opporuniy sae is no designed

o replace radiional social democraic policies or o push neoliberal heory,

privaizaion, and deregulaion. We are advocaing a srong heory o he sae

wih a new dimension.

I is our belie ha we should show voers how he sae can boh proec people

rom he ailures o markes (he welare sae) and provide a plaorm and se

o ools or people o make he mos o marke opporuniies and o help solve

collecive problems (he opporuniy sae). Given he curren arrangemen o

demographic, economic, and poliical orces, we believe a srong ocus on he

opporuniy sae side o he social democraic equaion migh help o address

some o he elecoral and governing difculies ha coninue o plague he broad

cener-le.

We look orward o discussing his and oher ideas wih you in Madrid.




Endnotes

1 Matt Browne, John Halpin, and Ruy Teixeira, “The European Paradox”(Washington: Center or American Progress Action Fund, 2009).

2 Unless otherwise noted, data and trends cited in the New ProgressiveCoalition section are taken rom the appropriate country paper in theDemographic Change and Progressive Political Strategy project.

3 Angus Maddison, Contours of the World Economy, 1-2030 AD: Essays inMacroeconomic History (Oxord: Oxord University Press, 2007), table2.5.

4 Authors’ analysis o data in Gerassimos Maschonas, “Lower Classes orMiddle Classes?: Socialism and its Changing Constituencies in Great

Britain, Sweden and Denmark”, presentation to Council or EuropeanStudies, March 5, 2008; and Anthony Painter, “The New ProgressiveImperative in Britain” (Washington: Center or American Progress,2011, orthcoming).

5 Maschonas, “Lower Classes or Middle Classes?”

6 Authors’ analysis o data rom the 2006 European Social Survey. Dataare population-weighted to take into account the varying sizes o thedierent countries. “College educated” indicated frst or second levelo tertiary education.

7 Never married and never in civil partnership.




About the authors

Matt Browne is a Senior Fellow a American Progress ocusing on he uure o

progressive poliics, poliical sraegy, and srenghening policy links and poliical

analysis among progressives in he Americas, Europe, and beyond. He is Direcor

o he Global Progress Program a American Progress, and ormer Direcor o he Policy Nework. Among his publicaions, Browne co-edied (wih Parick

Diamond) Rehinking Social Democracy (Poliico 2004).

John Halpin is a Senior Fellow a American Progress ocusing on poliical heory,

communicaions, and public opinion analysis. He is he Co-direcor and creaor o

he Progressive Sudies Program a CAP, an inerdisciplinary projec researching

he inellecual hisory, oundaional principles, and public undersanding o pro-

gressivism. Halpin is he co-auhor wih John Podesa o Te Power of Progress: How

America’s Progressives Can (Once Again) Save Our Economy, Our Climae, and Our

Counry, a 2008 book abou he hisory and uure o he progressive movemen.

Ruy Teixeira is a Senior Fellow a boh Te Cenury Foundaion and American

Progress. He is he auhor or co-auhor o six books, including Red, Blue and

Purple America: Te Fuure of Elecion Demographics; Te Emerging Democraic

Majoriy; America’s Forgoten Majoriy: Why he Whie Working Class Sill Maters;

and Te Disappearing American Voer , as well as hundreds o aricles, boh schol-

arly and popular. He also wries he Public Opinion Snapsho, a weekly column

eaured on he CAP and CF websies.



The Center for American Progress is a nonpartisan research and educational institute

dedicated to promoting a strong, just and free America that ensures opportunity

for all. We believe that Americans are bound together by a common commitment to

these values and we aspire to ensure that our national policies reflect these values.

We work to find progressive and pragmatic solutions to significant domestic and

international problems and develop policy proposals that foster a government that

is “of the people, by the people, and for the people.”

Documents

From Welfare State to Opportunity State