Full cases for Statutory Construction

8/11/2019 Full cases for Statutory Construction

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23326 December 18, 1965

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., JOSE E. ROMERO, SALVADOR ARANETA, GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA, PIOPEDROSA, CONRADO BENITEZ, JOSE M. ARUEGO, SOTERO H. LAUREL, FELIXBERTO M. SERRANO, and ROMANOZAETA, petitioners,vs.

PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, JOSE VELASCO, ELADIO SALITA and JOSE AVILES, respondents.

Roman Ozaeta, Guillermo B. Guevara, Jose M. Aruego, Sotero H. Laurel and Felixberto M. Serrano for themselves and for

other petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

REGALA,J.:

We are called upon in this case to decide the grave and fundamental problem of the constitutionality of Republic Act No

3836 "insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and

Representatives, and to the elective officials of both houses (of Congress)." The suit was instituted by the Philippine

Constitution Association, Inc. (Philconsa, for short), a non-profit civic organization, duly incorporated under Philippine

laws, by way of a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Auditor General of the Philippines

and the disbursing officers of both Houses of Congress from "passing in audit the vouchers, and from countersigning the

checks or treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator or former Member of the House of Representatives

of retirement and vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic Act No. 3836; and likewise restraining the respondent

disbursing officers of the House and Senate, respectively, and their successors in office from paying the said retirement

and vacation gratuities."

It is argued that the above-numbered Republic Act, at least to the end that it provided for the retirement of themembers of Congress in the manner and terms that it did, is unconstitutional and void. The challenge to the

constitutionality of the law is centered on the following propositions:

1. The provision for the retirement of the members and certain officers of Congress is not expressed in the title of the

bill, in violation of section 21 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution.

2. The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the

members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.

3. The same provision constitutes "selfish class legislation" because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire

after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service,which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of

the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only

equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months.

4. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress

are concerned, is another attempt of the legislators to further increase their compensation in violation of the

Constitution.

The text of Republic Act No. 3836


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The text of Republic Act No. 3836 reads:

AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-

SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Subsection (c), Section twelve of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred eighty-six, as amended by

Republic Act Numbered Thirty hundred ninety-six, is further amended to read as follows:

"(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to a member, regardless of age, who has rendered at least twenty years of service.

The benefit shall, in addition to the return of his personal contributions plus interest and the payment of the

corresponding employer's premiums described in subsection (a) of Section five hereof, without interest, be only a

gratuity equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service, based on the highest rate received, but not to exceed

twenty-four months: Provided, That the retiring officer or employee has been in the service of the said employer or

office for at least four years immediately preceding his retirement.

"Retirement is also allowed to a senator or a member of the House of Representatives and to an elective officer of eithe

House of the Congress, regardless of age, provided that in the case of a Senator or Member, he must have served at

least twelve years as a Senator and/or as a member of the House of Representatives, and, in the case of an elective

officer of either House, he must have served the government for at least twelve years, not less than four years of which

must have been rendered as such elective officer:Provided, That the gratuity payable to a retiring senator, member of

the House of Representatives, or elective officer, of either House, shall be equivalent to one year's salary for every four

years of service in the government and the same shall be exempt from any tax whatsoever and shall be neither liable to

attachment or execution nor refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.

"This gratuity is payable by the employer or office concerned which is hereby authorized to provide the necessary

appropriation or pay the same from any unexpended items of appropriations or savings in its appropriations or saving in

its appropriations.

"Elective or appointive officials and employees paid gratuity under this subsection shall be entitled to the commutation

of the unused vacation and sick leave, based on the highest rate received, which they may have to their credit at thetime of retirement."

SECTION 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, June 22, 1963.

The Solicitor General's Office, in representation of the respondent, filed its answer on September 8, 1964, and contends

by way of special and affirmative defenses that:

1. The grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner

does not constitute "forbidden compensation" within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the PhilippineConstitution.

2. The title of the law in question sufficiently complies with the provisions of Section 21, Article VI, of the Constitution

that "no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of

the bill.

3. The law in question does not constitute legislation.


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4. Certain indispensable parties, specifically the elected officers of Congress who are authorized to approve vouchers for

payments for funds under the law in question, and the claimants to the vouchers to be presented for payment under

said items, were not included in the petition.

5. The petitioner has no standing to institute this suit.

6. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely "in the nature of a basis for

computing the gratuity due each retiring member" and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.

A brief historical background of Republic Act No. 3836

Republic Act No. 3836 was originally House Bill No. 6051, which was introduced by Congressmen Marcial R. Pimentel of

Camarines Norte and Marcelino R. Veloso of the Third District of Leyte, on May 6, 1963. On the same date, it was

referred to the Committee on Civil Service. which on the following May 8, submitted its REPORT No. 3129,

recommending approval of the bill with amendments, among others, that the word "TWENTY" in the bill as filed

representing the number of years that a senator or member must serve in Congress to entitle him to retirement under

the billmust be reduced to "TWELVE" years, and that the following words were inserted, namely, "AND THE SAME

(referring to gratuity) SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM ANY TAX WHATSOEVER AND SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FROM ATTACHMENT

OR EXECUTION NOR REFUNDABLE IN CASE OF REINSTATEMENT OR REELECTION OF THE RETIREE." On May 8, 1963, the

bill with the proposed amendments was approved on second reading. It was passed on third reading on May 13, 1963,

and on the same day was sent to the Senate, which, in turn, on May 23, 1963, passed it without amendment. The bill

was finally approved on June 22, 1963. As explained in the EXPLANATORY NOTE attached to the bill, among others

The inclusion of members of Congress in subsection (c), Section 12 of C.A. 186, as amended, will enable them to retire

voluntarily, regardless of age, after serving a minimum of twenty years as a Member of Congress. This gratuity will insure

the security of the family of the retiring member of Congress with the latter engaging in other activities which may

detract from his exalted position and usefulness as lawmaker. It is expected that with this assurance of security for his

loved ones, deserving and well-intentioned but poor men will be attracted to serve their people in Congress.

As finally approved, the law (Subsection [c], paragraph 2, Section 1, R.A. 3836) allows a Senator or a Member of the

House of Representatives and an elective officer of either House of Congress to retire regardless of age. To be eligible

for retirement, he must have served for at least twelve years as such Senator and/or as member of the House ofRepresentatives. For an elective officer of either House, he must have served the government for at least twelve years,

of which not less than four years must have been rendered as such elective officer. The gratuity payable by the

employer or office concerned is equivalent to one year's salary for every four years of service in the government. Said

gratuity is exempt from taxation, not liable to attachment or execution, and not refundable in case of reinstatement or

re-election of the retiree.

First legal pointpersonality of the Petitioner to bring suit.

The first point to be considered is whether petitioner Philconsa has a standing to institute this action. This Court has not

hesitated to examine past decisions involving this matter. This Court has repeatedly held that when the petitioner, like i

this case, is composed of substantial taxpayers, and the outcome will affect their vital interests, they are allowed tobring this suit. (Pascual v. Secretary, G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960; and Gonzales v. Hechanova, 60 Off. Gaz. 802

[1963]).

The petitioner, Philconsa, is precisely a non-profit, civic organization composed of several leaders from all walks of life

whose main objective is to uphold the principles of the Constitution.

In rejecting the motion to dismiss in the case of Pascual v. Secretary, supra, this Court stated, among other things, that

"there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of the taxpayers, laws providing the disbursement of public funds,

upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an


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In addition to the above prohibitions, the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) also prohibits members of Congress to have

any special interest in any specific business which will directly or indirectly be favored by any law or resolution authored

by them during their term of office.

It is thus clear that the Constitutional Convention wisely surrounded the Constitution with these limitations and

prohibitions upon Members of Congress. This is a practical demonstration or application of the principle of the and

balances which is one of the peculiar characteristics of our Constitution. In the light of this background, can We conclude

that Congress can validly enact Republic Act 3836, providing retirement benefits to its members, without violating the

provisions in the aforementioned Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, regarding increase of the compensation act

including other emoluments?

It is worthy to note that the original salary for the members of the National Assembly (unicameral body) was fixed at

P5,000.00 per annum each. This was raised to P7,200 per annum by the enactment of the 1940 Constitutional

amendment, when the unicameral body, the National Assembly, was changed to Congress, composed of two bodies, the

Senate and the House of Representatives. Again, in 1964, by the enactment of Republic Act 4143, the salary for the

Members of Congress was raised to P32,000.00 per annum for each of them; and for the President of the Senate and the

Speaker of the House of Representatives, to P40,000.00 per annum each.

Likewise, it is significant that, as stated above, when the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation

for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum, but it embodies a special proviso

which reads as follows: "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term ofall the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase." In other words, under the

original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members,

no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected

subsequent to the approval of such increase. (See Aruego, The Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 1, pp. 296-300; Sinco,

Philippine Government and Political Law, 4th ed., p. 187)

This goes to show how zealous were the members of the Constitutional Convention in guarding against the temptation

for members of Congress to increase their salaries. However, the original strict prohibition was modified by the

subsequent provision when the Constitutional amendments were approved in 19402

The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation "otheremoluments." This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefits as provided

for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term "other emoluments."

Most of the authorities and decided cases have regarded "emolument" as "the profit arising from office or employment;

that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees

and perquisites.3

In another set of cases, "emolument" has been defined as "the profit arising from office or employment; that which is

received as compensation for services, or which is annexed to the possession of office, as salary, fees and perquisites;

advantage, gain, public or private." The gain, profit or advantage which is contemplated in the definition or significance

of the word "emolument" as applied to public officers, clearly comprehends, We think, a gain, profit, or advantage whichis pecuniary in character. (citing Taxpayers' League of Cargon County v. McPherson, 54 P. 2d. 897, 90l.: 49 Wy. 26; 106

A.L.R. 767)

In Schieffelin v. Berry, 216 N.Y.S. (citing Wright v. Craig, 202 App. Div. 684, 195 N.Y.S. 391, affirmed 234 N.Y. 548, 138

N.E. 441), it has been established that pensions and retirement allowances are part of compensation of public officials;

otherwise their payment would be unconstitutional.

In another case, State v. Schmahl, 145 N.W. 795, 125 Minn. 104, it is stated that "as used in Article 4, section 9, of the

Constitution of Minnesota, providing that no Senator or Representative shall hold any office, the emoluments of which

have been increased during the session of the Legislature of which he was a member, until after the expiration of his


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term of office in the Legislature, the word "emoluments" does not refer to the fixed salary alone, but includes fees and

compensation as the incumbent of the office is by law entitled to receive because he holds such office and performed

some service required of the occupant thereof."

From the decisions of these cases, it is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument,

because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.

Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of

Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were

immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and

the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article

VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.

Third Legal PointWhether or not the law in question violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is that the features of said Republic Act 3836 are patently

discriminatory, and therefore violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. (Art. III, Sec. 1, part. 1.)

In the first place, while the said law grants retirement benefits to Senators and Members of the House of

Representatives who are elective officials, it does not include other elective officials such as the governors of provinces

and the members of the provincial boards, and the elective officials of the municipalities and chartered cities.

The principle of equal protection of law embodied in our Constitution has been fully explained by Us in the case ofPeople

v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 126, where We stated that the classification to be reasonable must be based upon substantial

distinctions which make real differences and must be germane to the purposes of the law.

As well stated by Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States (second edition), p. 1937, the principle of the

requirement of equal protection of law applies to all persons similarly situated. Why limit the application of the benefits

of Republic Act 3836 to the elected members of Congress? We feel that the classification here is not reasonable. (See

also Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 11th ed. [1962]; Selected Essays on Constitutional Law [1938-62], p. 789; The Equal

Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. Law Rev. 341.)

Secondly, all members of Congress under Republic Act 3836 are given retirement benefits after serving twelve years, no

necessarily continuous, whereas, most government officers and employees are given retirement benefits after serving

for at least twenty years. In fact, the original bill of Act 3836 provided for twenty years of service.

In the third place, all government officers and employees are given only one retirement benefit irrespective of their

length of service in the government, whereas, under Republic Act 3836, because of no age limitation, a Senator or

Member of the House of Representatives upon being elected for 24 years will be entitled to two retirement benefits or

equivalent to six years' salary.

Also, while the payment of retirement benefits (annuity) to an employee who had been retired and reappointed is

suspended during his new employment (under Commonwealth Act 186, as amended), this is not so under Republic Act3836.

Lastly, it is peculiar that Republic Act 3836 grants retirement benefits to officials who are not members of the

Government Service Insurance System. Most grantees of retirement benefits under the various retirement laws have to

be members or must at least contribute a portion of their monthly salaries to the System.4

The arguments advanced against the discriminatory features of Republic Act 3836, as far as Members of Congress are

concerned, apply with equal force to the elected officers of each House, such as the Secretaries and the Sergeants-at-

arms. Under Republic Act 3836, the Secretaries and Sergeants-at-arms of each House are given the benefits of

retirement without having served for twenty years as required with other officers and employees of the Government.


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Fourth Legal PointWhether or not the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is germane to the subject matter expressed in the

act.

Another Constitutional point to determine is whether the title of Republic Act 3836 complies with the requirement of

paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads as follows:

No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the

bill.

We are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts to construe the constitutional

provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally.

It is the contention of petitioner that the said title of Republic Act 3836 gives no inkling or notice whatsoever to the

public regarding the retirement gratuities and commutable vacation and sick leave privileges to members of Congress. It

is claimed that petitioner learned of this law for the first time only when Jose Velasco, disbursing officer of the House,

testified on January 30, 1964, before Justice Labrador, in connection with the hearing of the case, and he revealed that

in 1963, Congress enacted the retirement law for its members. In fact the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1964-65,

Republic Act No. 4164, provides:

13. For payment of retirement gratuities of members of the Senate pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3836:

PROVIDED, That no portion of this Appropriation shall be transferred to any other item until all approved claims shall

have been paidP210,000.00.

In the appropriations for the House of Representatives the following items appear:

7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of Members and employees of the House of

Representatives, as provided for under Republic Act No. 1616P300,000.00

8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves as provided for under Republic Act

No. 611, and retirement gratuities of Members and employees of the House of Representatives under Republic Act No.

1616P1,300,000.00.

In the Appropriations Act of 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642), the following item appears in the appropriations for the

Senate:

13. For payment of retirement gratuities of Senate personnel pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1616:

PROVIDED, That no portion of this appropriation shall be transferred to any other item until all approved claims shall

have been paidP100,000.00.

It is thus clear that in the Appropriations Act for 1965-1966, the item in the Senate for P210,000.00 to implement

Republic Act 3836 was eliminated.

In the appropriations for the House (1965-1966), the following items appear:

7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of Members and employees of the House Of

Representatives as provided for under Republic Act No. 1616P1,200,000.00.

8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves as provided for under Republic Act

No. 611, and retirement gratuities of Members and employees of the House of Representatives under Republic Act No.

1616P1,700,000.00.

It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836, amending the first paragraph of section 12, subsection (c) of

Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 660 and. 3096, the retirement benefits are granted to


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members of the Government Service Insurance System, who have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless o

age. This paragraph is related and germane to the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186.

On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act 3836 refers to members of Congress and to elective

officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits,

therefore, for these officials, would relate to subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In

other words, this portion of the amendment (re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and elected officers, such

as the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each House) is not related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth

Act 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which provides for both retirement and insurance

benefits to its members.

Parenthetically, it may be added that the purpose of the requirement that the subject of an Act should be expressed in

its title is fully explained by Cooley, thus: (1) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature; and (2) to fairly apprise

the people, through such publication of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have the

opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,

8th ed., Vol. 1, p. 162; See also Martin, Political Law Reviewer, Book One [1965], p. 119)

With respect to sufficiency of title this Court has ruled in two cases:

The Constitutional requirement with respect to titles of statutes as sufficient to reflect their contents is satisfied if all

parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title, and it is not necessary that the title be a complete index of the

content. (People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535)

The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should be reasonably construed

so as not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation. It should be given a practical, rather than

technical, construction. It should be a sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general

subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject. (Sumulong v. The Commission on

Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 291)

The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is wholly illustrated and explained inCentral

Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883. In this case, the question raised was whether Commonwealth Act 2784, known as the

Public Land Act, was limited in its application to lands of the public domain or whether its provisions also extended toagricultural lands held in private ownership. The Court held that the act was limited to lands of the public domain as

indicated in its title, and did not include private agricultural lands. The Court further stated that this provision of the

Constitution expressing the subject matter of an Act in its title is not a mere rule of legislative procedure,directory to

Congress, but it is mandatory. It is the duty of the Court to declare void any statute not conforming to this constitutional

provision. (See Walker v. State, 49 Alabama 329; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp. 162-164;5See also Agcaoili v.

Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec. 111.)

In the light of the history and analysis of Republic Act 3836, We conclude that the title of said Republic Act 3836 is void

as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation of the aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of

the Constitution.

In short, Republic Act 3836 violates three constitutional provisions, namely: first, the prohibition regarding increase in

the salaries of Members of Congress; second, the equal protection clause; and third, the prohibition that the title of a

bill shall not embrace more than one subject.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, Republic Act No. 3836 is hereby declared null and void, in so far as it

refers to the retirement of Members of Congress and the elected officials thereof, as being unconstitutional. The

restraining order issued in our resolution on December 6, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ.,concur.


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Barrera, J., took no part.

=================================


SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967

BARA LIDASAN,petitioner,vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.

Suntay for petitioner.

Barrios and Fule for respondent.

SANCHEZ,J.:

The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections,1is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which is entitled "An Act

Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another

provinceCotabatoto be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be

enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's

answer is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the present original petition for certiorariand prohibition.

On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The

body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:

Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan,

Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in theMunicipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted

into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province

of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.

Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty

seven general elections for local officials.

Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon,Province of

Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan andKabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in theProvince of

Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent portions of which

are:

For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes, the Commission

RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios of

Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung situated in the

municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon,


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Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and

Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.

Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barriosin two municipalities in the province of Cotabatoare transferred to

the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.

Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive

Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting

legislation."

Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute "should be

implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."

This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the

detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be

declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the

same for electoral purposes, be nullified.

1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall

embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."2

It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative

power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects.Second. The title

of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the

import of the single subject thereof.

Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This

constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command."3Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the

Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact,

in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final

approval in the House of Representatives4where the bill, being of local application, originated.5

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision

as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve

the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill,

and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to

inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent

surprise or fraud upon the legislators.6

In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the constitutional requirement, the

following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines:

The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, andthe subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth,a title which is so

uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as

to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is

really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.

xxx xxx xxx

In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be considered, and the purpose of

the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court.7


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With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title"An Act Creating the

Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"8projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao

del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent

province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur,"

read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has

a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-

one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two

municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the

members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in

Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and

province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and

provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of

Republic Act 4790.

Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in "the substantial diminution of

territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the

municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away "need not

be expressed in the title of the law." This posturewe must saybut emphasizes the error of constitutional

dimensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to anotherof necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of

the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact.

Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29, 1966, as controlling here. The Felwacase is not in

focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads: "An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain

Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment that the provisions

of the law (Section, 8 thereof) in reference to the elective officials of the provinces thus created, were not set forth in

the title of the bill. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act creating said provinces must

be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof"which is "manifestly germane to the subject"

of the legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute now before us stands altogether on a different footing. The lumping

together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence ofthe creation of the new municipality of Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made without

necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa.

As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs. Village of Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649.

There, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of

Muskegon." The statute, however, in its section 1 reads: "The people of the state of Michigan enact, that the following

described territory in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and the same is hereby constituted

a village corporate, by the name of the Village of Fruitport." This statute was challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident of

Ottawa county, in an action to restraint the Village from exercising jurisdiction and control, including taxing his lands.

Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the Michigan State Constitution, which reads: "No law shall embrace

more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." The Circuit Court decree voided the statute and defendant

appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the decree of nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well

apply to this case:

It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport," would have been a sufficient title, and that the

words, "in the county of Muskegon" were unnecessary; but we do not agree with appellant that the words last quoted

may, for that reason, be disregarded as surplusage.

. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of the title of an act for the purpose of saving

the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.


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A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to "challenge the attention of those affected by the act to its

provisions."Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan, 228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262.

The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegon county. The act goes beyond the restriction.

As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: "The title is erroneous in the worst degree, for it is misleading."9

Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not expressed in the

title, were likewise declared unconstitutional."10

We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.

2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in the

municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere nullification of the portion thereof which took

away the twelve barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato. The reasoning

advocated is that the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of Lanao del Sur.

We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, that where a portion of a statute is

rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld.

Black, however, gives the exception to this rule, thus:

. . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,

inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and

that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts

are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them,11

In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court, thus:

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the

valid portion if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be

so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if

they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . . Enough must remain to make a complete,

intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . . The language used in the invalid part of thestatute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will

independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate, . . . .12

Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to create the restricted area ofnine

barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the towns

of Buldon and Parang, Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in the negative.

Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the

functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in

the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.13

Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of

maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory, and income. It was

apparently these same factors which induced the writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking

of the original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now

Republic Act 4790, reads:

The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the collective income is sufficient

to maintain an independent municipality.


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This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of

municipal autonomy.

When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barriosnot nine

barrioswas in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself,

thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of

Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to

progressive community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent

municipality, still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assume that the

inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into a municipality, what with the

consequent duties and liabilities of an independent municipal corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with the

income to be derived in their community? How about the peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obligations?

This Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems,

or to answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to impute to Congress an

undeclared will. With the known premise that Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of progressive

community, large aggregate population and sufficient income, we may not now say that Congress intended to create

Dianaton with only nineof the original twenty-onebarrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured.

For, this unduly stretches judicial interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to

pass the line which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditional

separation of powers, we may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the

originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function ofCongress, not of this Court, to spell out that congressional will.

Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.14

3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that petitioner has no substantial legal

interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic Act 4790. Stated differently, respondent's pose is that

petitioner is not the real party in interest.

Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the constitutional requirement that the subject

of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on whether petitioner's substantial rights or

interests are impaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is residing hasbeen transferred to a different provincial hegemony.

The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain that the

law so created is not dismembering his place of residence "in accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in this

jurisdiction.15

Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his own barrio before it was

annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to vote in a town different from his actual

residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different communities which are fanned into the new

town; he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and

benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of desire tovote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before dismemberment.

Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the

community affected thereby,16

it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any

citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by

Congress.

For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit respondent Commission from

implementing the same for electoral purposes.

No costs allowed. So ordered.


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Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ.,concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO,J., dissenting:

With regret and with due recognition of the merit of the opinion of the Court, I find myself unable to give my assent.

Hence these few words to express my stand.

Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the creation of the municipality of Dianaton in the province of

Lanao del Sur. The title makes evident what is the subject matter of such an enactment. The mere fact that in the body

of such statute barrios found in two other municipalities of another province were included does not of itself suffice for

a finding of nullity by virtue of the constitutional provision invoked. At the most, the statute to be free from the

insubstantial doubts about its validity must be construed as not including the barrios, located not in the municipalities of

Butig and Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, but in Parang and Baldon, Cotabato.

The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which

shall be expressed in the title of the bill.1This provision is similar to those found in the Constitution of many American

States. It is aimed against the evils, of the so-called omnibus bills, and log-rolling legislation, and against surreptitious or

unconsidered enactments.2Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the members of the legislature a

well as the people should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision thus

precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.

It is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or impede proper legislation. The construction must be

reasonable and not technical. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general

object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for the

accomplishment of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the title of

the act a complete index of its contents. The constitutional provision is satisfied if all parts of an act which relates to its

subject find expression in its title.3

The first decision of this Court, after the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in 1938, construing a

provision of this nature, Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank,4held that the inclusion of Section 11 of Act No.

4007, the Reorganization Law, providing for the mode in which the total annual expenses of the Bureau of Banking may

be reimbursed through assessment levied upon all banking institutions subject to inspection by the Bank Commissioner

was not violative of such a requirement in the Jones Law, the previous organic act. Justice Laurel, however, vigorously

dissented, his view being that while the main subject of the act was reorganization, the provision assailed did not deal

with reorganization but with taxation. While the case ofGovernment vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Bankwas decided by a

bare majority of four justices against three, the present trend seems to be that the constitutional requirement is to be

given the liberal test as indicated in the majority opinion penned by Justice Abad Santos, and not the strict test as

desired by the majority headed by Justice Laurel.

Such a trend has been reflected in subsequent decisions beginning with Sumulong v. Commission on Elections,5up to and

including Felwa vs. Salas, a 1966 decision,6the opinion coming from Justice Concepcion.

It is true of course that in Philconsa v. Gimenez,7one of the grounds on which the invalidity of Republic Act No. 3836 was

predicated was the violation of the above constitutional provision. This Retirement Act for senators and representatives

was entitled "AN ACT AMENDING SUB-SECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE

HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX." As we noted, the

paragraph in Republic Act No. 3836 deemed objectionable "refers to members of Congress and to elective officers

thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits, therefore,


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for these officials, would relate to a subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words

this portion of the amendment ( re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and appointive officers, such as the

Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each house) is not related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act No.

186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which provides for both retirement and insurance

benefits to its members." Nonetheless our opinion was careful to note that there was no abandonment of the principle

of liberality. Thus: "we are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts to construe

the constitutional provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally."

It would follow therefore that the challenged legislation Republic Act No. 4790 is not susceptible to the indictment that

the constitutional requirement as to legislation having only one subject which should be expressed in his title was not

met. The subject was the creation of the municipality of Dianaton. That was embodied in the title.

It is in the light of the aforementioned judicial decisions of this Court, some of the opinions coming from jurists

illustrious for their mastery of constitutional law and their acknowledged erudition, that, with all due respect, I find the

citation from Corpus Juris Secundum, unnecessary and far from persuasive. The State decisions cited, I do not deem

controlling, as the freedom of this Court to accept or reject doctrines therein announced cannot be doubted.

Wherein does the weakness of the statute lie then? To repeat, several barrios of two municipalities outside Lanao del

Sur were included in the municipality of Dianaton of that province. That itself would not have given rise to a

constitutional question considering the broad, well-high plenary powers possessed by Congress to alter provincial and

municipal boundaries. What justified resort to this Court was the congressional failure to make explicit that such barriosin two municipalities located in Cotabato would thereafter form part of the newly created municipality of Dianaton,

Lanao del Sur.

To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it must be construed as to exclude from Dianaton all of such barrios

mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found in municipalities outside Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can

meet the test of the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to the legislative intent. What was created was a new

municipality from barrios named as found in Lanao del Sur. This construction assures precisely that.

This mode of interpreting Republic Act No. 4790 finds support in basic principles underlying precedents, which if not

precisely controlling, have a persuasive ring. In Radiowealth v. Agregado,8certain provisions of the Administrative Code

were interpreted and given a "construction which would be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law."In Sanchez v. Lyon Construction,9this Court had a similar ruling: "Article 302 of the Code of Commerce must be applied

in consonance with [the relevant] provisions of our Constitution." The above principle gained acceptance at a much

earlier period in our constitutional history. Thus in a 1913 decision, In re Guaria:10"In construing a statute enacted by

the Philippine Commission we deem it our duty not to give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of

Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in conflict with the higher law. In

doing so, we think we should not hesitate to disregard contentions touching the apparent intention of the legislator

which would lead to the conclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law in violation of the Act of Congress.

However specious the argument may be in favor of one of two possible constructions, it must be disregarded if on

examination it is found to rest on the contention that the legislator designed an attempt to transcend the rightful limits

of his authority, and that his apparent intention was to enact an invalid law."

American Supreme Court decisions are equally explicit. The then Justice, later Chief Justice, Stone, construed statutes

"with an eye to possible constitutional limitations so as to avoid doubts as to [their] validity."11

From the pen of the

articulate jurist, Frankfurter:12

"Accordingly, the phrase "lobbying activities" in the resolution must be given the meaning

that may fairly be attributed to it, having special regard for the principle of constitutional adjudication which makes it

decisive in the choice of fair alternatives that one construction may raise serious constitutional questions avoided by

another." His opinion in the Rumely case continues with the above pronouncement of Stone and two other former Chief

Justices: "In the words of Mr. Chief Justice Taft, '(i)t is our duty in the interpretation of federal statutes to reach

conclusion which will avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality', Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 US

331, 346, 48 S. Ct. 194, 198, 72 L. ed. 303. . . . As phrased by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, "if a serious doubt of

constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute

is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.' Crowell v. Benson, 285, 296, 76 L. ed. 598, and cases cited." The


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prevailing doctrine then as set forth by Justice Clark in a 1963 decision,13

is that courts "have consistently sought an

interpretation which supports the constitutionality of legislation." Phrased differently by Justice Douglas, the judiciary

favors "that interpretation of legislation which gives it the greater change of surviving the test of constitutionality."14

It would follow then that both Philippine and American decisions unite in the view that a legislative measure, in the

language of Van Devanter "should not be given a construction which will imperil its validity where it is reasonably open

to construction free from such peril."15

Republic Act No. 4790 as above construed incurs no such risk and is free from the

peril of nullity.

So I would view the matter, with all due acknowledgment of the practical considerations clearly brought to light in the

opinion of the Court.

==========================================


SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.

HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, and PORFIRIOCANDELOSAS, NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C. MAISO, EDUARDO A. LIBORDO,ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T. DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR., ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B.PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO A. REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M.MENDOZA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978


JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO LAQUI YAQUINO, ELPIDIO ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO VERSOZA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978


JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE LA CRUZ Y

NUNEZ, SABINO BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y UBALDO,respondents.

G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.

THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, and PANCHITOREFUNCION,respondents.

Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the City of Fiscal of Manila and the Office of Provincial

Fiscal of Samar for petitioners.


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Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.

Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.

Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-16.

Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.

Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.

MUOZ PALMA,J.:

These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office

of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are

consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.

These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch

VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVIII, presided by

Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo,

presiding, (1 Petition).

Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon"

in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above

issued in the respective cases filed before themthe details of which will be recounted belowan Order quashing or

dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the

offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.

Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal

possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? This is the central issue which

we shall resolve and dispose of, all other corollary matters not being indispensable for the moment.

AThe Information filed by the People

1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Purisima follows:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN, accused.

Crim. Case No. 19639

VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION 1081

INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3, Presidential Decree No. 9 of

Proclamation 1081, committed as follows:

That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there

wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) carving

knife with a blade of 6- inches and a wooden handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11- inches, which the said

accused carried outside of his residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or implement necessary to earn his

livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.


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Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)

The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of the commission

of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.

2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Maceren follows:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, accused.

CRIM. CASE NO. 29677

VIOL. OF PAR. 3,

PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI

No. 266 of the Chief

Executive dated April 1, 1975

INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in

relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief Executive dated April 1, 1975, committed as follows:

That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there

wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed and pointed weapon, to wit: an ice pick with an

overall length of about 8 inches, the same not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor

being used in connection therewith.

Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)

The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of the

commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.

3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar is quoted hereunder:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused.

CRIM. CASE NO. 933

For:

ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF

DEADLY WEAPON

(VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9)

INFORMATION

The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses PANCHITO REFUNCION of the crime of ILLEGAL

POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by the President of the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972,

pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept. 21 and 23, 1972, committed as follows:


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That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at Barangay Barruz, Municipality of Matuginao, Province

of Samar Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorabe Court, the abovenamed accused, knowingly, wilfully,

unlawfully and feloniously carried with him outside of his residence a deadly weapon called socyatan, an instrument

which from its very nature is no such as could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to earn a livelihood, which act

committed by the accused is a Violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)

B.The Orders of dismissal

In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with the submittal of the defense that one essential

element of the offense charged is missing from the Information, viz: that the carrying outside of the accused's residence

of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion,

insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.

1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:

... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed weapon or the like outside residence may be

prosecuted and tried under P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically allege that the possession of bladed weapon

charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in furtherance of the conditions of rampant criminality, organized

lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are contemplated and recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor.

Devoid of this specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the information is not complete, as it does not allege

sufficient facts to constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in these cases under consideration

suffer from this defect.

xxx xxx xxx

And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of detained persons brought

to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before, policemen - of

course not all can be so heartlessnow have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what

with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of

scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer hadto have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now

anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already serve the

same purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik.

For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and wisely applied, its necessity can never be assailed. But

it seems it is back-firing, because it is too hot in the hands of policemen who are inclined to backsliding.

The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the heart of the Fiscal and the conscience of the Court, and

hence this resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is prompted by the desire of this Court to apply said checkvalves. (pp

55-57, rollo of L-42050-66)

2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by Proclamation No. 1081 is the maintenance of law and order

throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of

insurrection or rebellion. It is therefore reasonable to conclude from the foregoing premises that the carrying of bladed,

pointed or blunt weapons outside of one's residence which is made unlawful and punishable by said par. 3 of P.D. No. 9 is

one thatabets subversion, insurrection or rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder or is intended

to bring about these conditions. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that all previously existing laws that


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also made the carrying of similar weapons punishable have not been repealed, whether expressly or impliedly. It is

noteworthy that Presidential Decree No. 9 does not contain any repealing clause or provisions.

xxx xxx xxx

The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly weapons if not concealed in one's person and if not carried

in any of the aforesaid specified places, would appear to be not unlawful and punishable by law.

With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui,contends in his opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now made unlawful and punishable, particularly by

paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the intention of the person carrying such weapon because the law makes it "mala

prohibita". If the contention of the prosecution is correct, then if a person happens to be caught while on his way home

by law enforcement officers carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just bought from a store in order that the same

may be used by one's cook for preparing the meals in one's home, such person will be liable for punishment with such a

severe penalty as imprisonment from five to ten years under the decree. Such person cannot claim that said knife is going

to be used by him to earn a livelihood because he intended it merely for use by his cook in preparing his meals.

This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9 were to be interpreted and applied in the manner that

that the prosecution wants it to be done. The good intentions of the President in promulgating this decree may thus be

perverted by some unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It may be used as a tool of oppression and tyranny or of

extortion.

xxx xxx xxx

It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the act which the President intended to make unlawful

and punishable by Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, is one that abets or is intended to abet

subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder. (pp. 28-30, rollo of L-46229-

32)

3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order dismissing the Information filed before him,

thus:

... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited Presidential decree, the same should be or there should be

an allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in furtherance of subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless

violence and public disorder. Precisely Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a state of martial law throughout the country

was issued because of wanton destruction to lives and properties widespread lawlessness and anarchy. And in order to

restore the tranquility and stability of the country and to secure the people from violence anti loss of lives in the quickest

possible manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives and deadly weapons without a permit unless the same would fall

under the exception is prohibited. This conclusion becomes more compelling when we consider the penalty imposable,

which is from five years to ten years. A strict enforcement of the provision of the said law would mean the imposition of

the Draconian penalty upon the accused.

xxx xxx xxx

It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during martial law, as a matter of status symbol, carrying

deadly weapons is very common, not necessarily for committing a crime nor as their farm implement but for self-

preservation or self-defense if necessity would arise specially in going to and from their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo of L-46997)

In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before arraignment of the accused. In the criminal case

before the Court of (First Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at the same time moved to quash the

Information. In all the cases where the accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate release

unless held on other charges.


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C.The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the People.

As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged with illegal possession of deadly weapon in

violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.

We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9

DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972,

RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFORE.

WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, the Philippines has been placed under a state

of martial law;

WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6 dated September 22, 1972 and General Order

No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me;

WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder mentioned in the

aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms, explosives and other deadly

weapons;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in older to

attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and

decree that:

1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is unlawful and the violator shall, upon conviction suffer:

(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution as a Military, Court/Tribunal/Commission may

direct, it the firearm involved in the violation is unlicensed and is attended by assault upon, or resistance to persons in

authority or their agents in the performance of their official functions resulting in death to said persons in authority or

their agent; or if such unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of crimes against persons, property or chastitycausing the death of the victim used in violation of any other General Orders and/or Letters of Instructions promulgated

under said Proclamation No. 1081:

(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life imprisonment as a Military Court/Tribunal/commission

may direct, when the violation is not attended by any of the circumstances enumerated under the preceding paragraph;

(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, members

of the board of directors or other responsible officers of any public or private firms, companies, corporations or entities

who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity concerned

to be used in violation of said General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.

2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand grenades, rifle grenades and other explosives, including, but

not limited to, "pill box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or other incendiary device consisting of any

chemical, chemical compound, or detonating agents containing combustible units or other ingredients in such

proportion, quantity, packing, or bottling that ignites by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of

all or part of the compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden generation of highly heated gases that the

resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive effects on continguous objects or of causing injury or

death of a person; and any person convicted thereof shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen years

as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.


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3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as "fan knife," "spear," "dagger,"

"bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles are being used as necessary tools or implements

to earn a livelihood and while being used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the

penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.

4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed during the commission of or for the

purpose of committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon the offender in its maximum extent, in

addition to the penalty provided for the particular offenses committed or intended to be committed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.

(SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President


D.The arguments of the People

In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila and the

Provincial Fiscal of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of dismissal, the main argument advanced

on the issue now under consideration is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the prohibited acts need not

be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of

public policy.1

The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the intention of the accused who commits the

act is immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and condemns not

only the carrying of said weapon in connection with the commission of the crime of subversion or the like, but also that of

criminality in general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre-martial law days. It is also argued

that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from

the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or

information.2

E.Our Ruling on the matter

1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and

cause of the accusation against him. 3

Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a complaint or information to

be sufficient it must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained

of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to

prepare his defense accordingly. 4

To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is imperative

for the specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact, another compelling reason exists

why a specification of the statute violated is essential in these cases. As stated in the order of respondent Judge Maceren

the carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is the subject of another penal statute and a Manila city ordinance. Thus,

Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides:

Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris, or

other deadly weapon: ... Any person violating the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction in a court of competent

jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six

months, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.


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Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No. 3928 which took effect on December 4, 1957, in

turn penalizes with a fine of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not more than one months, or both, at the

discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise its deadly

character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon ... in any public place.Consequently, it is necessary

that the particular law violated be specified as there exists a substantial difference between the statute and city

ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the circumstances of the commission of the crime and

the penalty imposed for the offense.

We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9

(3). 5P. D. 9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not favored. 6This

principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against

the state and liberally in favor of the accused. 7In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are repealed

only by subsequent ones and their violation or non- observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to

the contrary.

Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a

prosecuting fiscal, under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree. That being the case, the right

becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential elements of the

offense charged against him, if he is not to become an easy pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent or

misguided official actiona fear understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the nature of their judicial

functions are daily exposed to such dangers.

2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in the caption as well as in the body of the

Information with a violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense treated in the presidential

decree in question?

We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed

weapon, etc. not us

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