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U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively

Not Approved by C5F UNCLASSIFIED

Gulf of AdenCounter Piracy

Operations

USNI Brief

Rear Admiral Terry McKnight

Overall Classification

UNCLASSIFIED

2UNCLASSIFIEDNot Approved by C5F

U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively

Background

• Fishing + No Coast Guard = Pirates

• United Nations Security Resolution 1851 (Dec 2008)

– Condemns and deplores all acts of piracy

• United Nations Security Resolution 1846

– States may enter Somalia’s territorial waters & use “all necessary

means to fight piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somali coast.

• European Union NAVFOR ATALANTA – Established December 2008

– Ensure protection of vessels of the World Food Program (WFP)

• Combined Task Force 151 – Established January 2009

– Counter Piracy Operations

• Transit Corridor Established - Internationally Recommended Transit

Corridor (IRTC)

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• More than 30,000 vessels transit the Gulf of Aden each year

• Piracy impacts less one percent of shipping

• Gulf of Aden encompasses 1.1 million square miles . . . Three times the size of the Gulf of Mexico

• Piracy involves more than just the ship . . . It puts the crew at risk --- the merchant mariners

• Piracy threatens U.S. National security interests and the freedom and safety of maritime navigation throughout the world.

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden . . . the Issues

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U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively

Financial Issues

• 2008 – Over 80 attacks . . . Cost over $30 million

• 2009 – 97 attacks – 27 successful

• Over 3000 oil tankers pass through the Suez Canal each year

• 25% of the Canal’s total revenue is from oil tankers

• Bypass the Suez Canal . . . 6000 mile voyage

• 12% of the total oil transported goes via the Gulf of Aden

• 8% of the world trade annually passes via the Gulf of Aden

• The price of insuring and securing voyages has more than quadrupled

• Funding terrorism???

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U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively

International Maritime BureauReported Attacks for 2008

Actual Attack

Attempted Attack

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International Presence

• Royal Australian Navy

• Canadian Forces Maritime Command (NATO)

• People’s Liberation Army Navy

• Royal Danish Navy (NATO)

• French Navy (NATO)

• German Navy (NATO)

• Greek Navy (NATO)

• Indian Navy (SCO)

• Italian Navy (NATO)

• Japan Maritime Self Defense Force

• Republic of Korea Navy

• Royal Malaysian Navy

• Royal Netherlands Navy (NATO)

• Royal New Zealand Navy

• Royal Saudi Navy

• Russian Navy

• Republic of Singapore Navy

• Spanish Navy (NATO)

• Swedish Navy

• Turkish Navy (NATO)

• United Kingdom’s Royal Navy (NATO)

• United States Navy (NATO)

Countries that have participated in counter piracy in the GOA

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U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively

Campaign Results – 257 Days

Approx 70 merchant vessels in

MSPA at any one time

International Response

• 381 pirates encountered:

– 181 released

– 169 turned over for prosecution

– 8 killed

– 23 pending

• Pirate vessels destroyed: 24

• Pirate vessels confiscated: 12

• Weapons confiscated: 163 small arms, 34 RPG, 64 RPG projectiles

• Other paraphernalia confiscated : 33 ladders, 9GPS, 23 phones

UNCLASSIFIED

Campaign start – 22 AUG 08, 16 vessels held as pirated

10 12 12 12 18 12 16 16Average Monthly Assets in CP Campaign

05MAY09

• >33,000 vessels transit the Gulf of Aden / yr

• International navies patrol >1.1 Million sq miles– Average 14 Coalition / non-Coalition ships on patrol– IRTC extends 464 miles

• Industry best practices – Critically important– Speed and maneuver, onboard security teams– Since CTF-151 standup, 56/64 ships that evaded pirate attacks reported having

performed evasive maneuvers

• Implement legal framework to hold pirates accountable– 04 May 09, French government inquire to Kenya if 11 suspect pirates can be

prosecuted under agreement with EU

Internationally

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Corridor (IRTC)

Average GOA Sea State Over Past Five months 3-5ft

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GOA SB GOA SB GOA SB GOA SB GOA SB GOA SB GOA SB GOA SB GOA SB GOA SB GOA SB GOA SB GOA SB

May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09

Pirated

Maritime Crime

Evaded with Miltary Presence

Evaded No Military presence

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U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively

Pirate Techniques

• 1 - 3 Skiffs with 3 - 7 pirates each

– Usually 7 - 20 meters in length with 2 motors

– Possible mothership

• Navigate with GPS

• Majority attack targets of opportunity

• Attacks usually occur in the early morning

• Utilize small arms

– AK – 47

– RPG

• Use grappling hooks and hooked ladders

• Secure bridge first, then work their way

down through the ship

• Usually no harm to ship or crew

– Have a pirate’s code

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U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively

Severe Risk Vessels

• Low freeboard

• Slow SOA

• Transit path is outside of IRTC

• Transit high risk areas during

early morning hours

• Not transmitting AIS

• No lookouts

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U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively

Maritime Security Center(WWW.MSCHOA.EU)

• Maritime Intelligence:

– Provides a quick and easy brief describing how pirates operate

• Alerts to Mariners:

– Lists Information Bulletins

– Provides time and location of Coalition warship transits

• Counter Piracy Advice to Masters:

– Provides a useful guideline for Masters and Ship’s Security Officers

• Transit Guidance:

– Contains information on military measures in place to reduce the risk of piracy

• Vessel Movement Register:

– Allows participating international forces to track ship movements through the GOA

11UNCLASSIFIEDNot Approved by C5F

U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively

Proper Anti Piracy Techniques

• Utilize the International Recognized

Transit Corridor (IRTC)

• Transit high risk areas during hours

of darkness / convoys encouraged

• Utilize AIS when transiting the GOA

• Report to UKMTO / MSC HOA before

entering high risk areas

• Proceed at maximum speed

• Maintain lookouts

• Fire hoses should be set and running

to prevent boarding

• Use maximum available lighting

• When pirates are present, conduct

evasive maneuvering

• Use lights / alarms to alert crew and

notify pirates they have been spotted

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Employing Counter Piracy Techniques

Fencing employed to prevent access to bridgeFire hoses and counter measures used to stop boarding

High pressure fire hoses used to prevent boardingsLookouts posted scanning for pirates

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U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively

M/V LONGCHAMP (Pirated)

• Not registered with UKMTO

• No fire hoses set

• No lookouts

• Complacent crew

• No attempt to speed up or conduct evasive maneuvers

• Not on Vulnerable Shipping List (VSL)

M/V POLARIS (Evaded Pirating)

• Coordinated transit with UKMTO

• Broadcasting AIS

• Lookouts posted

• Active crew

• Conducted evasive maneuvers

• Made contact and coordinated with Coalition Units

M/V LONGCHAMP vs. M/V POLARIS

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U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively

Counter Piracy Tactics

Escort Operations (Man to Man)

• Concentrated defense

• Greater protection to limited number of ships

• Take on more legal responsibilities

• Slows traffic flow

Presence Operations (Zone Coverage)

• Area denial

• Concentrated forces in high risk areas

• Economy of force

• Allows for free traffic flow

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U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively

Counter Piracy Concerns

• Too many uncoordinated players (CTF 151, EU, NATO, and individual players)

– In an ideal world, all state-run Counter-Piracy Operations off the Horn of Africa would be led by

a single U.N. force; There is no operational benefit from having decentralized coordination

– Having a U.S. led NATO force in addition to a U.S. led Coalition Force (CTF 151) is redundant

and may even result in conflicting efforts

• Current naval patrols are only effective in their limited operating areas, however

they have done little to deter piracy attempts

– Naval activity has dissuaded some , but not a major deterrent factor

– Pirates have adjusted their tactics to avoid areas under military patrol

– Attackers flee if the responding force arrives before pirates have seized control of the ship

– If the ship is already under pirate control, military response has no effect

• Regional legal systems present challenges in prosecuting Somali pirates

– Inability to effectively prosecute suspects diminishes the consequences

– Even with successful prosecution, the risk vs. gain in Somalia still favors piracy

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U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively

• SH-60B Seahawk

• Lynx’s

• AB-212’s

Helicopters Utilized for Counter Piracy Operations

• AH-1W Cobra

• UH-1Y

• HH-60 / MH-60’s

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U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively

Tools for Success

• Coalition Support

• Maritime Community Support

• US Platforms

– CG with SH-60’s

– DDG with UAV

– LPD 17 with HH-60s and Fleet Surgical Team

– USGC Cutter with VBSS teams

• NCIS agents embarked

• Scan Eagle

• Somali Linguist

• MPRA

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U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively

Keys to Success

The Coalition

The Maritime Community

Governance in

Somalia

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U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively

Discussion

• Task Group 169 – PLA (N) – RADM Du

• Armed Merchants???

• Who owns Counter – Piracy Operations – AFRICOM or CENTCOM?

• USNS Lewis & Clark (T-AKE 1)

• LCS – HDMS ABSALON (L 16)

• Coalition – Command - Control – Communication (C3)

• USS San Antonio (LPD 17)

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U.S. Naval Forces Central Prevent First …When Directed, Win Decisively

Questions